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

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
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PREFACE

I HOPE to complete the history of *England under Queen Anne*. But the present volume can be published and read by itself, for it has its own unity of movement and its own climax : all roads in it, foreign and domestic, lead to Blenheim. I do not, therefore, feel that any apology is due to readers for presenting them with this fragment of history, provided I can account to them for the omission of everything Scottish, everything Irish and most things Colonial. I have thought that each of these three subjects can be better treated *en bloc* at a later stage. There are, indeed, disadvantages in failing to record Scottish affairs for 1702–4 in their chronological order in this volume. The absence of the ' Scottish Plot ' and the Act of Security from the history even of the English Parliament in those years, is decidedly a blemish. But it is a choice of evils, and the disadvantage of breaking up the presentation of the Scottish scene and story seems to me the greater. The next volume will, among other things, deal at large with the whole matter of the passing of the Union and its causes, from start to finish. Ireland plays a very much smaller part than Scotland in Anne's reign, but I think the Irish scene also will be better described in a later volume.

In order that the general reader should not have his attention distracted by a heap of references, that mean little to him, at the foot of nearly every page, I have put the references together at the end of the volume.

For my part, I cannot abandon the older ideal of History that was once popular in England, that the same book should make its appeal both to the general reader and to the historical student. In these latter days there tends

to be division. It is right there should be division in some cases, but it is right that in other cases the older unity should be attempted.

The materials, printed and unprinted, for the reign of Queen Anne are of high interest and of great abundance. The Historical MSS. Commission has done well for us all in printing so many volumes of documents from private collections not ordinarily available, wisely leaving the treasures of the British Museum and Record Office for the student to examine in the original MSS., as he so easily may. The Venerable Archdeacon Coxe, who did much more for historical study a hundred years ago than is realised in the patronising notices of him in the *Dictionary of National Biography* and elsewhere, among his other good deeds left in the British Museum so many volumes of transcripts from the Marlborough and Godolphin papers, that admission to the Manuscript Room there is perhaps nearly as good as admission to the original papers at Blenheim would have been. If, after the harvesting by Coxe and the gleaning by the Historical MSS. Commission, the papers in Blenheim have still any important secrets to reveal, we shall shortly know, when the work of family piety, for which the world is so eagerly waiting, sees the light. Meanwhile, I thank the Duke of Marlborough for his personal courtesy to me. There are in the British Museum, besides these Coxe MSS., the transcripts of Sir J. Macintosh, the Hatton Finch, the Ellis and the Stepney papers, the L'Hermitage transcripts and numerous other collections to which reference will be found in the lists below. These, together with the diplomatic and consular papers in the Record Office, furnish material enough to occupy a whole regiment of historical students.

When the historian, inland-bred, deals with naval matters, he is apt to be very much at sea. I have had the good fortune to be assisted in my navigation of the period by the work of that great naval historian, Julian Corbett, in the later chapters of his admirable *England in the Mediterranean*. I have also been helped by the kind criticisms of my friend Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, though I do not wish to suggest that he is responsible for what I have written.

As to the land war, Sir John Fortescue's first volume, and Frank Taylor's *Wars of Marlborough* constitute an unusually good starting point for the study of the voluminous contemporary records.

On the political side, some may think there is even more open to dispute. Certainly there are a hundred possible points of view. And yet I am struck by the amount of general agreement among competent modern historians as to the main outlines and issues of a reign in which party spirit was so hot. Those particular heats have burnt themselves out long ago. My debt to my friend, Mr. Keith Feiling and his *History of the Tory Party* will be clear to all scholars. If I have not produced a new and startling theory about the policies and personalities of the Whigs, the High Tories and the Moderate Tories, about the characters of Anne and Marlborough, I can only plead, to those to whom the plea may seem relevant, that any new and startling theory would have been wrong. Only those who have not followed recent historical writing will be surprised to find that I think Anne had a policy of her own, independent of her favourites.

If, indeed, the story of the great events and the great men of our Augustan age could be told in its truth and simplicity, as only the man of Athens could have told it, it would move like a five-act tragedy from start to finish, presenting in turn the overweening pride and the fall of Louis, then of Marlborough and of the Whigs, then of the Tories in their turn, while, through the crash of each successive crisis of war and politics, the fortune of England moves forward on the tide of destiny. And what men that little rustic England could breed! A nation of five and a half millions that had Wren for its architect, Newton for its scientist, Locke for its philosopher, Bentley for its scholar, Pope for its satirist, Addison for its essayist, Bolingbroke for its orator, Swift for its pamphleteer and Marlborough to win its battles, had the recipe for genius.

I should like to express my gratitude to Lord Dartmouth for kindly inviting me to see the complete MSS. of

his distinguished ancestor, of which only a part was published by the Historical MSS. Commission. I am also indebted to the kindness of the authorities of Christ Church, of the Bodleian, of the Lambeth Library, and of the Rijks-archief at the Hague. I must thank for their kind help Colonel Goldney and several other officers of the garrison of Gibraltar, the Librarian and, above all, my friend the then Colonial Secretary, Major Hubert Young ; much that I discovered with their assistance will be of even more use in the next volume, when I come to the first defence of the Rock by the English.

Note on Methods of Dating

Readers will note the difference between the New Style (N.S.) and Old Style (O.S.) of reckoning dates. Until 1752 the English at home always used the Old Style, after 1700 eleven days behind the New Style of Gregory XIII's Calendar, current in all continental countries except Russia. Our sailors, on service at sea and on coast operations like the taking of Gibraltar, generally used the Old Style familiar at home. Our soldiers in the Netherlands and Germany generally but not always used the New. Diplomats abroad most of them used the New, but some the Old. *I employ the O.S. for home affairs ; and for affairs outside England I put either Aug.* 13, *N.S., or Aug.* $\frac{2}{13}$.

Anne came to the throne on March 8, 1702—at least, so we say now. But our ancestors called it March 8, 1701. For, with them, the New Year began not on January 1, but on March 25. March 24, 1701, was followed after midnight by March 25, 1702. This is confusing to modern students of old documents, who are liable to get a year out in affairs occurring in January, February or early March, particularly in Parliamentary affairs, as the normal session was held in winter, astride of the two years. The Lords' and Commons' Journals of Anne's reign change from 1701 to 1702 only on March 25. All modern histories, including this book, begin the new year at January 1.

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ENGLAND UNDER QUEEN ANNE

CHAPTER I

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THE story of the reign of Queen Anne is no parochial theme. It involves great issues, moves among brilliant societies, and reveals distant landscapes. Whoever writes of the England of that day must show Marlborough's many-coloured columns winding along the banks of Rhine, Danube and Maas ; English fleets heaving on Mediterranean and Biscayan waters, or coasting the West Indian islands and the misty Newfoundland shore ; Gibraltar's rock rising into azure above unwonted smoke and uproar ; envoys posting over land and ocean with Godolphin's gold and Marlborough's persuasive counsel to half the Courts of Europe from Lisbon to Moscow : nearer home, the fashionable arena of sedan chairs and glass coaches between St. James's Palace and the Parliament House, the battle ground of political and literary intrigue in the days of Swift, Addison and Pope—with Wren's dome in the distance still rising to its completion above the masts of the river, and beyond it the Tower, the workshop of Newton as Master of the Mint.

But all these fine doings had their roots amid homely scenes. Marlborough's war, like other wars,

> Moved by her two main nerves, iron and gold.

And those sinews of Britain's strength were forged in humbler surroundings than the world of patched cheeks and full-bottomed wigs. So too the game of politics played

by Sarah Churchill and Mrs. Masham, Bolingbroke and the Lords of the Junto, was set and decided by the needs and prejudices of common folk in manor house and village, in port and market town. The island must first be surveyed if we would understand Westminster or St. James's, Blenheim or Utrecht.

When a survey is demanded of Queen Anne's island, of its everyday life far distant from the Mall and yet farther from the sound of war, our thoughts turn to Daniel Defoe, riding solitary on that very quest. It was one of his tasks to traverse Britain on tours of observation ; in the evenings, at his journey's end, he wrote his report on local opinion to his employer, Robert Harley, a mystery-man like himself, and a lover of exact information secretly given. On Sundays he would attend the Dissenters' Chapel, not unobservant of his fellow-worshippers and their business affairs. For besides being a trader, he was a Nonconformist, not indeed of the type laden with the proverbial conscience, for Defoe could be all things to all men, but a Puritan in his preference for solid work and homespun to fashionable display. Like Cobbett who rode and wrote about England a hundred years after him, he was a realist and a man of the people, but he was not, like his successor, half blinded by rage against the powers that be. For the age of Anne was the prelude to a long era of content, and Defoe, more than Swift, was the typical man of his day. Defoe, the trader, hailed the advent of the era of business prosperity, as heartily as Cobbett, the disinherited yeoman, bewailed the rural past. He first perfected the art of the reporter ; even his novels are imaginary ' reports ' of daily life, whether on a desert island or in a thieves' den. So then, the account that this man gives of the England of Anne's reign is for the historian a treasure indeed. For Defoe was one of the first who saw the old world through a pair of sharp modern eyes. His report can be controlled and enlarged by great masses of other evidence, but it occupies the central point of our thought and vision.*

* He published it in the reign of George I, but the tours on which he based his observations were largely taken in the early and middle years of Anne. The first edition of the *Tour through Great Britain* (1724–27) has been edited and republished by Mr. Cole in 1927.

Now this picture of England, drawn by Defoe in much wealth of prosaic detail, leaves the impression of a healthy national life, in which town and country, agriculture, industry and commerce were harmonious parts of a single economic system. Much indeed of the administrative machinery of government, particularly of the ' poor decayed borough towns ' which Defoe despised, was antiquarian lumber too religiously preserved. As yet no cry was raised for Reform, because the principle of freedom then peculiar to England enabled individual enterprise to flourish, and new shoots to push up through the old jungle. The Bumbledom of that day could not suppress the economic initiative native to the island soil.

The England so ordered was prosperous and in the main contented even in time of war, partly indeed owing to good harvests and cheap food in the first half of Anne's reign. Industry, agriculture and commerce were all expanding their operations, and society was moving forward unconsciously towards the Industrial Revolution, which grew in the next hundred years out of the conditions described by Defoe. Overseas trade ; water-carriage up the rivers, particularly of coal ; sheep-farming and the cloth trade ; the national marketing of corn and agricultural products by wholesale dealers—on these things he lays stress, and it was these things that enabled the squires to pay the land-tax, the mainstay of the Marlborough wars. They grumbled but they paid, till the war was won, when they sent the Whigs about their business and made peace.

It is true that these rural squires over their October ale cursed the monied men and traders as economic parasites, war-profiteers, Dissenters, and would-be intruders into political life which was the proper sphere of the landed interest alone. But economically the activities of these undesirables doubled the rent of many a squire, as indeed he was partly aware.[1] And the Act of Toleration, though scarcely to be mentioned without a groan over degenerate times, gave riches as well as quiet to the countryside.

In the reign of Anne the old way of life for peasant and craftsman was still carried on, but under conditions peculiarly favourable. The enterprise of trader and middle-

man was finding new markets for the products of the peasant's and the craftsman's toil, and had already done much to relieve their mediæval poverty without as yet destroying their rustic simplicity of manners. Money made in trade was constantly put into land by improving landlords, who had won or enlarged their fortunes as mercantile investors. This interplay of the activity of town and country, not yet subversive of the old social order, gave to Queen Anne's England a fundamental harmony and strength, below the surface of the fierce distracting antagonisms of sect and faction.

While religion divided, trade united the nation, and trade was gaining in relative importance. The Bible had now a rival in the Ledger. The Puritan, sixty years back, had been Cromwell, sword in hand ; thirty years back, Bunyan, singing hymns in gaol ; but in Anne's reign the Puritan was to be found in the tradesman-journalist Defoe. The Quaker, too, had ceased to prophesy in public against steeple houses, and had become a thrifty dealer, studying to be quiet. For old sake's sake, Puritans and Quakers were still called ' fanatics ' in common parlance. But if there were ' fanatics ' at large, one of them surely was that ' Justice Bradgate ' who ' rode a horseback into the Meeting House ' at Lutterworth and told the preacher he lied.[2] Yet that zeal of the High Churchmen was perpetually being tempered by patriotic and economic considerations that worked strongly in the minds of the Moderate Tories, led by Harley, whose secret servant was this same Defoe. Here then was an island which, with luck and good leading, might in wartime display enough unity, wealth and vigour to bring to his knees the mighty Louis, the undisputed lord of nobles and poor peasants, who had got rid of his Non-conformists once for all by revoking the Edict of Nantes.

A bird's-eye view of England in Anglo-Saxon times would have revealed a shaggy wilderness of forest trees, brushwood, marsh and down, spreading from shore to shore, but slowly shrinking at ten thousand points where agricultural and pastoral clearings were gaining on the wild. Each clearing had its hamlet of wooden huts, and each

hamlet was linked to the next by tracks meandering through the forest. The whole land was traversed by straight Roman roads gradually falling into disuse, and by rivers winding through undrained swamp and forest, their solitude sometimes broken by the transit of a war-galley or a laden barge, or by the rise of a town beside some notable ford.

Very different is the prospect viewed by the airman to-day. He looks down upon a chessboard of rectangular fields divided by hedges or stone-walls, and dotted with well-built farms, villages and fenced plantations of trees. But the green area is diminished by the creeping smoke-pall and the red and grey house-tops of industrial districts, already covering a substantial acreage of the island. The whole scene is overlaid by a network of busy railways and busier roads; but on river or canal little traffic appears save near the harbours of the sea.

Half way in character, though not half way in time, between these two very different scenes, lay the panorama of the England of Queen Anne. The bulk of the primæval forest had already disappeared. But the general aspect of the country, particularly south of Thames, was rich in woodland and coppice. The greater part of the acreage of the land south of the Pennines and east of the Welsh moor-lands had already been reclaimed as arable or as pasture. It had not, however, as yet acquired the rectangular chess-board pattern, for the best agricultural lands of central England were still cultivated in open fields without hedges, while the enclosed lands that lay thickest to west and to south-east, were divided up into irregularly shaped orchards and intakes. Straight lines were not prominent in the land-scape. The Roman roads had for the most part gone to grass long ago, or had been broken up by the plough. But the winding Saxon bridle tracks had become muddy roads and lanes, threaded all the year round by strings of pack-horses and by solitary riders, and in summer time by waggons and coaches moving at a foot's pace. The rivers flowed through rich corn-fields and meadows from one prosperous market town to another, bearing on their waterways the heaviest traffic of the land. The industrial areas, except great London, were hardly as yet of a size to

be distinguishable in the landscape, amid the gardens, trees and pleasure grounds that crowded close round every town of importance. The industrial life of that day was scattered widely over the island ; it was absorbed as an integral part of the life of village and country town. To a bird's-eye view England might have looked like a purely agricultural land, had not the bristling masts in every river-mouth and harbour told a tale of other activities than those of the peasant.

The disappearance of the primæval self-sowing forests of England exercised the minds of the subjects of Queen Anne. Though there were many more trees then than now, men were more troubled by their decrease because they were less accustomed to trust to foreign supply for the first needs of life. And timber was then required for several essential purposes where it has since been replaced by iron and by coal. The Royal Navy and the mercantile marine were then built of wood ; iron was smelted by wood-charcoal * ; and the domestic hearth had to be kept alight by faggots, in those many regions in which neither peat nor coal could be delivered on account of the badness of the roads.

There had once been forests even in Cornwall, but when in the era of William and Anne the adventurous Miss Celia Fiennes extended her riding tour into that remote peninsula, she experienced in her own person the shortage of wood. ' I was surprised,' she wrote, ' to find my supper boiling on a fire always supplied by a bush of furze, and that to be the only fuel to dress a joint of meat and broth.' This was at Penzance, where the sea-borne supply of coal from the South Welsh mines had been cut off by French privateers hovering off the Land's End ; the more fortunate north coast of Cornwall, she tells us, still obtained coal from across the Bristol Channel even in time of war.†

* It is possible that the Darbys invented methods of smelting by coal and coke instead of wood and charcoal in the reign of Anne ; but it was long before it affected industry on the large scale.

† *Through England on a Side Saddle, The Diary of Celia Fiennes*, 1888, pp. 221–223. This delightful and important record was composed on tours made partly in the reign of William III, partly in that of Anne. Miss Fiennes was a lady of means and a Dissenter. She was sister of the Third Viscount of Saye and Sele. She travelled for pleasure and curiosity.

About the same date, Edmund Gibson, the antiquarian and future Bishop, in his edition of Camden's *Britannia*, commented on the words which the Elizabethan had written a hundred years before as to the Oxfordshire hills, ' clad with woods ' ; ' this is so much altered,' writes Gibson, ' by the late civil wars that few places except the Chiltern country can answer that character at present. For fuel is in those parts so scarce that 'tis commonly sold by weight, not only at Oxford, but other towns in the northern parts of the shire.'

The magnificent national inheritance of the royal forests had in Stuart times been alienated by royal favouritism and improvidence, or cut down by rebel greed. They were still incompetently administered, and ill-guarded from cattle and depredators. There remained indeed some sixty royal forests, but they were no longer able to supply a tenth part of the tale of oaks demanded in the Admiralty dockyards. The Forest of Dean in Gloucestershire, the New Forest and Alice Holt in Hampshire were the only royal forests of any great importance in this respect.

Most of the valuable timber of the island, for which the Admiralty had to compete in the open market with so many other demands, was now to be found in the chases, parks and woodlands of the nobility and gentry. These too had suffered from the soldiery in the Civil War, and still more from the Parliamentary fines on the estates of Cavaliers which had laid many a tall oak prematurely on the ground. But there was still a vast quantity of timber all over the island in private possession, fenced in as deer parks, or otherwise preserved alike for beauty and for profit. Forestry still had its proper place in the economy of an estate, and an attempt was usually made by landowners to cut trees at the right time and then to replant. An oak, it is true, would not ripen for a century or so, but men still believed that their great-grandchildren would inherit them. When Charles II came home, and the belief in the solidity of the upper class was restored with him, Evelyn's *Sylva* had taken its place on the bookshelves of the better-to-do gentry ; it was a work of propaganda, and preached to the governing class the national duty of planting and

caring for trees, especially after the depredations of the late unhappy times.* At the beginning of Anne's reign both Evelyn and his book were still alive, and the old man was giving his last advice to his grandson to 'restore the name of Wotton' [Wood Town] by planting oaks, timber-trees and copses, 'the only best and proper husbandry the estate is capable of.'[3]

The eastern corner of the island south of Thames—Kent, Surrey, Sussex and Hampshire—was the homeland of oaks, growing on the stiff clay soil of the old Andredsweald. It was therefore the chief source of supply for the Admiralty dockyards. But already the iron forges were moving from that region to Shropshire and the Forest of Dean, in search of cheaper wood-fuel; the first railings set up round the statue of Queen Anne in front of St. Paul's were said to be one of the last products of the old Sussex ironworks.

But the timber of England and Wales, though scanty as compared to the wealth of remoter ages and the needs of the actual time, was still very extensive as compared to the present day. When Anne came to the throne, it was reckoned that, only ten miles north of Cheapside, there were growing more than half a million fine oak and beech, sheltering the deer of Enfield Chase.[4] Throughout the island, even the best cultivated districts were thickly sprinkled with heaths, copses, dingles, hawthorn brakes and natural groves, the haunt of the highwayman, the gypsy and the whole tribe of Autolycus, bird-haunted sanctuaries of old romance, destined to be closed and ploughed up in the coming century and a half of agricultural progress.

The straits to which the Admiralty was put to obtain oaks of requisite size for the dockyards of Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham and Woolwich were not due to the entire exhaustion of English timber in the aggregate, but to the difficulty of tapping reserves in out-of-the-way districts, particularly in the North, Midlands and West. Even in Sussex, Defoe declared that it was impossible to

* 'Whether or not the *Sylva* actually caused the plantation of "millions of timber trees," it is certain that the Restoration plantings matured in time to carry the Navy through the wars of the later eighteenth century.'—*Albion*, p. 131.

find a market for much fine timber except in the neighbourhood of water-carriage. On a road close to Chatham dockyard he saw a team of two-and-twenty oxen tugging at a single oak.[5] The expense and difficulty were very great of moving heavy trees of the battleship type over any considerable distance of the unmetalled roadways. The ironworks could move from Sussex to Shropshire in chase of the vanishing forest, but the dockyards must remain on the coasts opposite to Europe. For these reasons the Admiralty was fain, partially and most unwillingly, to turn to Baltic and American supply, which could be brought straight from the felling-grounds by water.

The mercantile and fishing marine was already accustomed to purchase most of its timber abroad. Moreover its lighter vessels could be built of English trees of the smaller kind, which were of no use for the great battleships. The timber of Berkshire was floated down the Thames from Reading to London, where it was bought up to build the merchant fleet.[6] Only the great East Indiamen, themselves veritable warships, seriously competed with the Royal Navy for the best English oaks.

The demand for hemp, tar and timber, above all for the tall, straight fir-tree masts that could not be grown in England, had no inconsiderable place in our foreign and colonial policy under Queen Anne. The southern shores of the Baltic supplied us with oak and fir from the ports of Danzig, Memel and Riga at the mouth of great navigable rivers draining the forest-lands of Teuton and Slav. The Swedish ports supplied masts and tar. It was therefore an object of the first importance to our statesmen to keep open the entrance to the Baltic for English trade, and to prevent that inland sea from falling into the hands of any one power, whether Denmark, Sweden or Russia. We sought the balance of power in the Baltic hardly less assiduously than we sought the balance of power in Western Europe. Nor was it easy to keep the balance trimmed. In 1700 the English fleet had protected Charles XII of Sweden from a coalition of neighbour powers, who had sought to take advantage of his youth. But throughout the reign of Anne his fierce and incalculable temper caused anxiety, not only

by his repeated threats to attack Denmark and Austria, our allies against France, in his own private quarrel, but by his resentful attitude towards the English Navigation Acts, and his policy of economic reprisal whereby he refused to supply our Admiralty with tar except in Swedish ships and at the Swede's own price.

The diplomatic and economic tangle in the Baltic was indeed complicated by our stiff Navigation Act policy of restricting British commerce as far as possible to British ships, and by the slowness with which we relaxed it even to supply the needs of the naval war with France. The Admiralty sought relief by a colonial policy of encouraging the importation of timber and naval stores from the North American Colonies. Already in Anne's reign we were fetching masts and tar from the forests of New England. In 1704, under the stimulus of strained relations with the Swedish king, an Act was passed offering large bounties on the importation of naval stores from America, with a right of pre-emption for the Royal Navy. The policy was not unsuccessful, though the Baltic remained the main source of our foreign supply. The usual difficulties between British officials and American colonists arose when the broad-arrow was placed on trees of the primæval forest near coast or river-bank, to be reserved for purchase by the Admiralty ; the backwoodsmen of New England, as lawless and enterprising on land as her buccaneers and smugglers at sea, had little reverence for royal monopoly, and the marked trees disappeared by thousands from the unpatrollable wilderness. Nevertheless, it can be safely asserted that in Anne's reign one of the chief reasons why the colonies were valued by the statesmen and coffee-house politicians of England was as a sure source of supply for the needs of the navy.[7]

Less than a hundred years after the accession of Queen Anne the people of England had acquired an invincible prejudice against eating any bread save wheat ; even for purposes of poor relief, under the ' Speenhamland system ' begun in 1795, wheat prices alone were used as the basis of calculation. Yet in every century before the eighteenth,

the bread of the great majority of our ancestors had been rye, barley, oats, or else one of these mixed with wheat ; in England, as in all the lands of northern Europe, pure wheat bread had been regarded as a luxury proper to the rich. It was only under the Georges that wheat became the staple diet. That defiance of the natural economy of our climate was achieved by means of large farming and the application of capital and capitalistic methods to the cultivation of the soil. If England had remained a land of small peasants, she would not, any more than Germany or Scandinavia, have grown any large proportion of wheat.

In the reign of Anne English agriculture had improved so far that already more wheat was grown than in mediæval times. Wheat was reckoned at thirty-eight per cent. of the bread of the whole population ; rye came next, barley and oats a good third and fourth. Prices were therefore quoted in terms of wheat and rye.

But wheat formed a much smaller proportion of the actual corn grown than of the bread baked, because enormous crops of barley were produced all over the island to make malt for ale. Cambridgeshire, for example, outside the grassy level of the drained fens, was ' almost wholly a corn country ' and, as Defoe observed, ' of that corn five parts in six is barley, which is generally sold at Ware and Royston and other great malting towns of Hertfordshire.' [8] Except in the cider counties of the West, ale had been unchallenged in former ages as the native drink of English men, women and children at every meal, and it was only beginning to feel the rivalry of strong spirits on the one hand and of tea and coffee on the other. It was still the drink of ladies. In 1705 Lady Carnarvon imputed the fact that Miss Coke was ' extremely fallen away and her voice weak and inward ' to ' her having had stale beer all this summer.' [9]

Not only did barley everywhere provide the staple drink, but in some districts it provided the staple food. The small farmers of the Welsh hills supplied themselves with an excellent barley bread. The peasantry of the northern counties consumed oats and rye in various forms ; and in Scotland, oats ' supported the people,' as Dr. Johnson was

still able to assert many years later. In the central districts of England, rye and barley divided honours with wheat, and only in the drier climate of the south-east could wheat be said to preponderate.

But already in the reign of Anne a great interchange of agricultural products was going on between one district and another, especially where river traffic was available. Largely for this reason the deepening of rivers and the making of locks was a movement specially characteristic of the period, two generations before the era of Bridgewater's artificial canals.* The Thames all the way down from Oxford, and its affluents the Wey, the Lea and the Medway, were the scenes of an animated and crowded traffic—food, drink and timber going down to London, and Tyneside coal and overseas products going up-country in return. Abingdon and Reading were each the emporium of a great agricultural district, of which they dispatched the produce by water to the capital. The coasts of Sussex and Hampshire sent their corn, Cheshire and other western counties sent their cheese, by sea to London, running the gauntlet of the French privateers from Dunkirk. The roads were often too soft for waggons, but in most weathers the sheep and cattle, the geese and turkeys of the northern and midland shires could be driven to the capital, grazing as they went. Even before the Union, Scotland sent 30,000 head of cattle a year into England ; the strange speech of the Welsh drovers was familiar on the roads near London ; only the Irish cattle-trade had been killed by an Act of the reign of Charles II, a sacrifice to the jealousy of English breeders.

England and Wales already formed the most considerable area in Europe for internal free-trade, to which Scotland was added in 1707. ' 'Tis our great felicity in

* The *Statutes*, and the *Commons Journals* for Anne's reign, as well as local histories, afford abundant evidence of this. One case may be quoted for all: in 1699 the inhabitants of Wisbech and neighbourhood (North Cambs.) petition the House of Commons to have the River Lark made navigable, as the roads are impracticable, and their district which itself produces only butter, cheese and oats, is supplied with wheat, rye and malt from Suffolk (Watson's *History of Wisbech*, 1827, p. 385). Among the rivers at this period deepened and supplied with proper locks were the Bristol Avon, the Yorkshire Derwent, the Stour and the Cam ' from Clayhithe Ferry to the Queen's Mill ' in Cambridge (*Statutes of the Realm*, VIII pp. 56–59, 172–178 ; Barrett's *Bristol*, p. 697).

England,' wrote Defoe, ' that we are not yet come to a *gabelle* or tax upon corn, as in Italy, and many other countries.' The shrewd Venetian envoy, Mocenigo, at the end of his residence in our island, reported to his masters in 1706 that freedom from internal *douanes* was one reason why ' industry was further advanced in England than in any other part of the world.' London and every provincial city was an open market for provisions, with no toll taken at the gate. Favoured by this freedom, the corn-factors and middlemen of agriculture pervaded the whole island, buying up on speculation the farmers' crops as they grew in the field, or as they lay unthreshed in the barn ; penetrating to the most unlikely places, even to dangerous Highland straths, amid claymores and Jacobites, in search of cattle to be fattened in English parks ; everywhere forwarding the movement towards agricultural progress by opening new markets for the produce of remote estates and hamlets.[10]

Under this regime of enterprise and improvement England was sending corn overseas on a large scale. Since the Revolution the government had paid bounties on its export. In the middle of Anne's reign the employees of the Gloucestershire coal trade rose in revolt against the high price of corn, due to the scale on which the Bristol merchants shipped the local supply abroad. And even north of Trent, homely squires were calculating on sales abroad as an important item in their own and their tenants' fortunes.*

Nevertheless, this cheerful picture of agricultural and distributive activity must not delude us into imagining that England under Queen Anne was already the land of improved agriculture and reformed traffic that it became by the end of the century. The busy life of the rivers

* In July 1709 Robert Molesworth writes to his wife from Edlington, near Doncaster : ' If God sends good harvest weather, there will be a very great store of corn in the kingdom, and yet such are the wants abroad that it is likely to bear a very good price for several years to come. This must enrich our farmers.' And next year he writes : ' Corn must certainly rise in the price and that very suddenly, for the plague, which is got into the Baltic, will make soon both us and the Dutch to prohibit all trade there and then the Dutch must be furnished with corn from us.' [11]

was a measure of the badness of the roads. The best cornlands in England—the midlands, Lincoln and Norfolk—were still for the most part unenclosed. In those regions the vast and hedgeless 'village field' was still being cultivated on the mediæval method of three-course agriculture, that would have won the approval of a Doomsday commissioner, but were destined to shock the modern intelligence of an Arthur Young.

The initiative of an improving landlord or farmer was closely circumscribed on these 'village fields,' wherein the scattered strips of individual owners had perforce to be cultivated on the plan laid down for the whole community. The Manorial Court might be in decay, but less formal village meetings still regulated the commonfield agriculture, the use of the town's plough, the rules of gleaning, the common herd, and the pasturage on common and waste. A country town like Godmanchester still employed its bailiffs to summon all the farmers to appear, according to old custom, at the Court Hall, where they 'did agree that none should sow barley in the commonfield before Friday, 21st March (1700), and that day only headlands.'[12]

More initiative and therefore more progress was possible, though by no means inevitable, on the enclosed portion of a squire's demesne farm, and in the enclosed lands of southern, western and northern England. But the districts where enclosure was commonest were on the average the less productive parts of the island, with the worst climate. It is true that Kentish hop-fields and west country orchards and fruit-gardens must be reckoned among the lands of early enclosure, but so must the intakes amid the weatherbeaten moorlands of west and north. Most of the best cornlands of the midlands and East Anglia were still unenclosed.[13]

Since many of the sheep and cattle were fed on heaths and commons, and without the aid of roots or artificial grasses, they were pitifully small and thin. Their weight at Smithfield market in 1710 was less than half that of ordinary sheep and cattle in 1795.[14] At the beginning of the century the difficulty of keeping beasts alive in winter was still so great that, when they came off the summer grass, a very

large proportion had to be slaughtered and salted. When the price of salt rose in 1703 the House of Commons was petitioned, on the ground that it was 'a grievance to the poorer sort of people who mostly feed on salted provisions.'[15]

The days of Lord Townshend's turnip-fields and Coke of Norfolk's fat sheep and cattle were still in the future. But already the Wiltshire and Cotswold uplands, that bred sheep for the western wool-clothiers, were a wonder to behold. 'On the pleasant downs' within a six-mile radius of Dorchester, Defoe was informed that more than half a million sheep were feeding; and he noted that on Salisbury Plain and the Dorset Downs the land was becoming so much enriched by the folding of sheep with pens in a new place every night, that the chalk lands thus manured, though hitherto fit for nothing but pasture, were rapidly coming under the plough.[16]

Ever since Tudor times, and more particularly since the Restoration, there had flowed from the press an ever broadening stream of books on improved methods of agriculture. The spirit of scientific enquiry emanating from the regions of the Royal Society into the walks of common life, was a constant stimulant but often a sore puzzle to the practical farmer. For the experts and modernizers were so seldom agreed. Jethro Tull, the great improver who introduced the drill and the horse-hoe into his own farming operations in the course of Anne's reign, was quite wrong on many other points, as subsequent controversies showed. But men were on the look out to adapt new methods as soon as they had proved themselves—especially where enclosed ground gave liberty for change.[17]

With the idea of agricultural improvement thus in the air, the movement for the enclosure of commons and heaths was not only practised, as it had been for centuries, but was preached by modern theorists as a duty to the commonwealth. When Anne came to the throne agricultural writers were denouncing the commons as 'seminaries of a lazy, thieving sort of people,' whose sheep were 'poor, tattered and poisoned with rot,' and whose heath-fed cattle were 'starved, todbellied runts, neither fit for the dairy nor

the yoke.' Here already we have in full blast the famous controversy as to the social value of rights on the common, in which Cobbett a hundred years later was protagonist of the defeated commoners. On the merits of that dispute the historians of our own day are still divided. In Anne's reign there was not yet much enclosure done by Act of Parliament, but enclosure was going forward under the common law by agreement or otherwise.*

This old rural England, on the eve of the wholesale enclosures and the industrial revolution, is often presented to the mind's eye of posterity in one or other of two rival pictures. On the one hand we are asked to contemplate a land of independent and self-respecting peasants, most of them attached to the soil by small personal rights therein, contented with the country quiet and felicity which have been since destroyed, and celebrating their rural happiness in alehouse songs about 'Harvesthome,' which we have promoted to the drawing-room ; and the same land, we are reminded, was also the land of craftsmen in village and market town, not divorced from rural pleasures because they pursued industry, using tools instead of watching machines, and therefore enjoying in their daily work the delight of the individual artist, for which a poor substitute is found in the feverish excitement of our modern amusements, organized *en masse* as a counterpoise to the dullness of mechanical and clerical toil. On the other hand we are shown the opposing picture : we are asked to remember the harsh backbreaking labour of the pre-mechanical ages, continued for thirteen or more hours in the day ; child-labour instead of primary schools ; disease and early death uncontrolled by medical science or hospital provision ; and absence of cleanliness and comforts which we now regard

* In the summer when Marlborough was marching to Blenheim, a Yorkshire squire was writing to his wife :

'The law in England is (as I know now by experience) that every freeholder can enclose so much of his common as lies upon him (much more a lord of a considerable land), provided he leaves out as much common as is sufficient for those that have right, and disclaims any further title to put beasts on the rest of the common which he leaves out. This is the instance of Mr. Frettwell, of Hellaby, our neighbour, who carried it even against the Lord Castleton, who is lord of the manor, upon trial. And this is our case between us and Cunsborough.' [18]

as necessities ; neglectful and unimaginative harshness not only to criminals and debtors but too often to women, children and the poor at large ; and finally a population of little more than five and a half millions in England and Wales, less well fed than the present population of more than seven times that number.*

Confirmation of both these pictures emerges from a study of the period. But which picture contains the greater and more important body of truth it is hazardous to pronounce, partly because the dispute is about intangible values—we cannot put ourselves back into the minds of our ancestors, and if we could we should still be puzzled ; partly also because even where statistics would help, statistics are not to be had. It is true that, a dozen years before Queen Anne's accession, the able publicist Gregory King made a calculation from the hearth tax and other data of the probable numbers in various classes of the community. The figures he gave represent a shrewd guess, no more. They will indeed serve negatively as a check on the enthusiasm of the *laudator temporis acti*, by recalling the fact that, even before the great enclosures and the industrial revolution, the number of farmers and yeomen was relatively small, and the numbers of the agricultural proletariat large. By far the two largest classes in King's analysis of the nation are the 'cottagers and paupers' and the 'labouring people and outservants.' [19] The former represent, we may suppose, those who attempted to be independent of wages and according to King made a very poor business of the attempt. Yet those who picked up a living off the common whereon they had squatted, or off the small field they owned behind their hovel, may have been happier than King knew, even if they were poorer than is realized by modern idealizers of the past. King's second large class, the 'labouring people and outservants,' are the wage-earners. But many of them had also some rights on the common, some garden or tiny holding which added to the interest and dignity of life, without entitling the owner to the proud rank of English yeoman. Even the servants of industry had many of them small gardens or

* See note p. 75, below, on statistics of population.

plots of land to till in their off hours, especially the woollen weavers in all parts of the island. On the stony heights around Halifax each clothworker had 'a cow or two' in a field walled off on the steep hillside whereon his cottage stood.[20]

On the other hand there were very large numbers of employees both in agriculture and industry who had no rights in land and no means of subsistence but their wages.

The wages in agriculture and in industry were supposed to be regulated by schedules issued for each county by the Justices of the Peace, who also occasionally set a limit to the price at which certain goods might be sold. These schedules did not pretend to fix either wages or prices exactly, but only to set a maximum which was not to be surpassed. Variations were therefore permissible inside every county, as well as differences between one shire and the next. Moreover the maximum announced was very often transgressed in practice.*

Judging by negative evidence, we may conclude that concerted strikes and combinations to raise wages were not common. They could be punished under then existing laws, long before the celebrated Combination Acts of the younger Pitt. In 1706 the Leeds Quarter Sessions heavily fined six cloth drawers who had combined not to work except for three-halfpence an hour in place of the current penny an hour. The Elizabethan Statute of Artificers, that was still partially in force, penalized the leaving of work unfinished, as well as the giving or taking of wages above the maximum fixed by the Justices of the Peace. But the maximum was often exceeded when excess payment was to the interest of both employer and employed. If there was

* Wages differed from one estate to another; in 1701 a Yorkshire squire wrote:

'The wages of a good husbandman in the parts about Barnsley and Wortley I find to be no more than £3 a year, and Sir Godfrey gives his keeper but £3 14s., and his bailiff £4, so that we are worse served for high wages. About Wortley all the husbandmen are up every morning with their beasts at three o'clock, and in our house they lie abed till near seven. But above all Warne's £20 vexes me.'

That year, we should remember, wheat stood as low as 34s. a quarter and other grain in proportion, and chickens could be bought in the West Riding at twopence apiece. [21]

little or no trade-unionism, there was much individual bargaining about wages.[22]

Even when the low prices are taken into account, some of the wages paid seem low by modern standards.* But they were high by comparison with the Europe of that day. The national characteristic of Englishmen, then as now, was not thrift but insistence on a high standard of life. Defoe, writing as an employer, declared that:

> Good husbandry is no English virtue. English labouring people eat and drink, especially the latter, three times as much in value as any sort of foreigners of the same dimensions in the world.

A Dutchman, he declared, lived well and provided for his family on a wage which meant misery to the improvident Englishman. It is to be noted that in this pamphlet Defoe speaks of the English labourer as earning nine shillings a week, a rate greatly in advance of that of the Quarterly Session schedules. He declares that he himself 'offered nine shillings per week to strowling fellows at my door, and they have frequently told me to my face they could get more a begging, and I once met a lusty fellow in the stocks for making the experiment.' Nor is this the only evidence that, in spite of the attempted control by Quarter Sessions, wages varied greatly from place to place.

Defoe's extortionate beggar is a type known in every age, and that period was not, upon the whole, propitious to him. Indeed many wanderers for work were more sinned against than sinning. The monstrous Act of Settlement of the Poor, passed in 1662 in one of the lightest moods of Charles II's Cavalier Parliament, was still in operation unamended. By this Act every parish in which a man settled could send him back to the parish of which he was native, for fear that if he stayed in his new abode he might at some future date become chargeable on the rates. Nine-tenths of the people of England, all in fact who did not

* Truck payments were a common abuse. The establishment of a sound currency in William III's reign had indeed set some limits to it. But still farmers and bailiffs often 'compelled the poor labourers to take corn and other provisions instead of their hire, and that in such quantities that they cannot spend the same in their own families.' [23]

belong to a small class of landowners, were liable to be expelled from any parish save their own, with every circumstance of arrest and ignominy, however good their character and even if they had secured remunerative work. The panic fear of some parish authorities lest newcomers should some day fall on the rates, caused them to exercise this unjust power in quite unnecessary cases. The Act placed a check upon the fluidity of labour and was as much an outrage as the Press-gang itself on the boasted freedom of Englishmen. Yet it was seldom denounced until Adam Smith dealt with it in scathing terms. It is hard to ascertain the exact degree to which it operated, and Adam Smith appears to have exaggerated the harm done and the number of cases in which cruel wrong was inflicted. But at best it was a great evil ; it is the reverse side of that creditable effort of Tudor and Stuart England to provide for the maintenance of the poor through the local public authorities. That effort, on the whole, was not unsuccessful, and largely accounts for the peaceable character of English society.

In Anne's reign the parish provision for the poor chargeable on the rate was being very generally supplemented and softened by the establishment of Almshouses through private benefaction. The keelmen of the Tyneside coal trade contributed among themselves to build a hospital for their aged and sick members at a cost of £2000. But more usually almshouses and schemes for the employment of the workless were endowed by well-to-do men and women anxious to provide for their less fortunate neighbours. The age of Anne was very generous in foundations of this type, as well as in the establishment of Charity Schools.

But besides private beneficence, public policy, financed out of the local rates, was constantly establishing new workhouses and enlarging the ' parish stock ' of materials to give employment. When Anne came to the throne almost a quarter of the population was occasionally in receipt of parochial relief, and the poor rate stood at about £800,000 a year. It increased to a million a year before she died, but fell below £700,000 in the reign of George II, owing to better times and to the application of the workhouse test.

There was much to criticize in the English Poor Law, especially the Law of Settlement, but at least there was an effective system of public relief and therefore England was not shamed, at the end of the great struggle with France, by scenes such as Lady Mary Wortley Montagu noticed on her travels in 1718 :

> I think nothing so terrible as objects of misery, and all the country villages of France show nothing else. While the post-horses are changed, the whole town comes out to beg, with such miserable starved faces, and thin tattered clothes, they need no other eloquence. This is all the French magnificence till you come to Fontainebleau.

Not only our parliamentary liberties but also, with all its faults, the English Poor Law stood between us and the social revolution towards which Louis XIV's famed system of despotism in Church and State was leading the French nation.[24]

The Yeoman was not a figure characteristic of mediæval society, which rested on the two bases of the serf and his lord. But with the gradual emancipation of the villeins in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, the yeomen had come to the front in the English scene. He flourished under Tudor and Stuart, when the number of small landowners and of large farmers was multiplied, in spite of some local destruction of peasant households by enclosure in early Tudor times. The praise of the English yeoman in prose and verse is a favourite *motif* of our literature from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries.

The reign of Anne was the culminating point of the fortunes of the English freehold yeomen, before their decline began, and it was no ill time for the still rising fortunes of the tenant farmers.* The freehold yeomen were reckoned at about one-eighth of the population of the country, and the substantial tenant farmers at a little less ; it was believed that the freehold yeoman was on the average a richer man

* Until the later eighteenth century the word ' yeoman ' was used to include the substantial tenant farmer as well as the freehold cultivator. In the most famous of all descriptions of the yeoman class, Hugh Latimer, preaching before Edward VI, states that his ' yeoman ' father farmed another man's land.

than the tenant farmer.* A hundred years later the opposite was probably the case, in so far as the freehold yeoman any longer existed. For in the Georgian era of agricultural improvements, the tenant farmer had the benefit of his landlord's capital poured into his land, while the small freeholder had no financial resources save his own with which to keep abreast of the times. But Anne's reign was perhaps a moment of no very marked economic difference between the two types of yeoman.

The difference was political and social. The freeholder had a vote for Parliament and was often in a position to use it as he liked. The tenant farmer had no vote, and if he had, he would have been obliged to cast it for his landlord. Even the ideal landlord, Sir Roger de Coverley, was represented by Addison to an approving world as exercising over his tenants an absolute, patriarchal sway.

But the independence of the freehold yeoman was deeply cherished and stoutly maintained. In the election correspondence of country gentlemen we meet such expressions as ' The freeholders do not stick to say they will show their liberty in voting.'[25] The squire, who had everyone else under his thumb, was for that reason often disposed to buy out the freehold yeoman, and, as the century went on, many freeholders were ready, on fair terms, to quit the countryside, in which their old independence was threatened by the increasing wealth of the large landlord and his tenant farmers.

But in Anne's reign the 180,000 cultivating freeholders enumerated by King, were still the class upon whose unforced and unpurchased support the structure of Church

* In 1688 Gregory King had calculated that there were over one million three hundred thousand households in England and Wales, of which 160,000 (or 180,000) were families of freehold cultivators with incomes ranging from £55 to £91 a year; while 150,000 families of tenant farmers enjoyed incomes averaging just over £42 a year; and that 15,000 gentry and squires had incomes ranging from £280 to £450, without reckoning the titled folk and the larger landed proprietors. In the reign of Anne it is probable that the average income of the various classes was appreciably larger. For King's tables, see note 19 below.

It is exceedingly difficult to put these incomes into terms of present-day money. How much has the value of money declined? On the one hand the price of wheat stands not very far from the average of Anne's reign (see note 19 below). On the other hand, many articles to-day cost five, ten, twenty or thirty times what they cost then.

and State mainly rested, like the Ark on Ararat, in the staggering times that followed the great upheaval and backwash of the Revolution. The nicely adjusted balance of Whig and Tory interests was maintained or redressed at each successive election in the Queen's reign by the divided opinions of the ' forty-shilling freeholders,' most of them yeoman agriculturists. The ' forty-shilling freehold ' was the basis of the uniform Parliamentary franchise in every shire of England and Wales. On the other hand, in the towns privileged to return members, the varying and eccentric methods of election—sometimes by the Corporation, sometimes by a section of the inhabitants—rendered many ' rotten boroughs ' the political property of single grandees, or laid them open to a competition of influence and bribery. The freehold yeomen of the counties were therefore the class of voter with whom at election time genuine political considerations went farthest, and cajolery and intimidation least far ; just as, in a former generation, Cavalier and Roundhead had recruited their best cavalry from the same class by other means than drink-money.

But even more than politics, partridges caused squire and yeoman to look at one another askance. The squirarchical legislation of later Stuart Parliaments had excluded all freeholders of under a hundred pounds a year—that is to say the very great majority of the class—from killing game, even on their own land. Thus many poor families had been robbed of many good meals that were theirs by right ; and even those few yeomen whose wealth raised them above the reach of this remarkable law, were for that reason regarded with suspicion. The best that even the good-hearted Sir Roger can bring himself to say of the ' yeoman of about a hundred pounds a year,' ' who is just within the Game Act,' is that ' he would be a good neighbour if he did not destroy so many partridges '—that is to say upon his own land.[26]

For many generations to come, grave social consequences were to flow from the excessive eagerness of the country gentlemen about the preservation of game. Their anxieties on that score had grown with the adoption of the

shot-gun. During the Stuart epoch shooting had gradually superseded hawking, with the result that birds were more rapidly destroyed, and the supply no longer seemed inexhaustible. In Anne's reign it was already not unusual to 'shoot flying.' But it was regarded as a difficult art, the more so as it was sometimes practised from horseback. But the 'perching' of pheasants by stalking and shooting them as they sat on the boughs, was still customary among gentlemen. Netting birds on the ground was a fashionable sport, often carried on over dogs who pointed the game in the long grass. It is written that Sir Roger 'in his youthful days had *taken* forty coveys of partridges in a season,' probably by this means. 'Liming' by twigs, snaring and trapping birds of all kinds, not only pheasants and wild duck but thrushes and field-fares, had still a prominent place in manuals of *The Gentleman's Recreation*. To lure wild duck into a decoy upon the water was a trade in the fens and a sport on the 'decoy-pond' of the manor house. But the shot-gun was clearly in the ascendant, and with it the tendency to confine sport more and more to the pursuit of certain 'game' birds. In that sacred category a place had recently been granted by Statute to grouse and blackcock: already the heather and bracken where they lurked were protected from being burnt except at certain times of the year, and the shepherd transgressing the law was liable to be whipped. Addison's Tory squire declared the Game Law to be the only good law passed since the Revolution.[27]

The squalor of the mediæval village had long been in retreat before the homely dignity and comfort of the rural middle class. In Anne's reign men were everywhere building or enlarging farmhouses, in stone, brick or half-timber according to the tradition or material of the district. The architectural results of rustic prosperity were most evident in those favoured regions where the cloth manufacture made a great demand for the local wool, as in the magnificent stone farms of the Cotswolds dating from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries, or in the dwellings of the Cumbrian and Westmorland mountaineers whose

fortunes had more recently risen with the Kendal cloth trade.[28]

Besides the fine old farmhouses familiar to the traveller in the Lake District to-day, there were then many cottages, since disappeared or derelict, wherein the poorer dalesmen brought up large and sturdy families. The children were kept at their mother's knee, spinning for the Kendal clothiers, until they were old enough to go up on to the fells to drive the sheep and to pile those great stone walls up the sides of the precipices which are the wonder of our less industrious age. It was only in the course of the Eighteenth Century that the beauty of Wordsworth's homeland attained the moment of rightful balance between nature and man. In previous centuries the valleys were 'choked, tangled, swampy and featureless'; in our day man is all too successfully regulating the face of nature with the machine. But in the reign of Anne the dales were just beginning to take on their brief perfection of rural loveliness, ordered but not disciplined, in contrast with the mountain magnificence above and around.

Nevertheless visitors were extremely rare in the Lake District, 'the wildest, most barren and frightful' in England, as it appeared to Defoe and his contemporaries. The few strangers whom business or curiosity caused to ride up the steep stony tracks beyond Windermere and over Hardknot, complained of the bread of the Lake Valleys as 'exceedingly black, coarse and harsh,' and the houses as 'sad little huts' of unmortared stone, more fit for cattle than for men. But already 'here and there there was a house plastered' and sometimes the 'oat clap bread' was cunningly baked and delicious. We may conclude from these travellers' impressions that the great improvement in the prosperity, the farm-building and the furniture of this happy region was by no means complete in the reign of Anne. But already the famous Windermere delicacy, 'the fish called charrs, came potted to London.'[29]

In the neighbouring county of Northumberland, recently so warlike and barbarous, the travellers along the coast and in the valley of the South Tyne, found 'plenty of good bread and beer' as well as hens and geese, and famous

stocks of claret, no doubt on account of the neighbourhood of Scotland where the gentry imported claret from France in spite of the war. When Anne came to the throne, there was still a 'County Keeper' for Northumberland, who drew a salary of £500 in return for making good all cattle stolen and not restored. Although the wild moorlands between Redesdale and the Roman Wall still had a bad name, the County Keeper had the best of his bargain, and 'was able to inform travellers that the moss-trooping trade is very much laid aside, and that a small sum will recompense all the robberies that are yearly committed in the County.' Peace with Scotland, the wealth of the Tyneside mines, and the trade of Newcastle were factors already raising the standard of life all along the border.[30] But the more outlying rural districts of Northumberland were still very poor, though more thickly inhabited than they afterwards became. In many a 'township' now consisting of a single prosperous sheep farm, a cluster of half a dozen cottages of the crofter type then maintained a hardy population of borderers, unused to comfort, and tilling the moorland for a meagre harvest of oats.

In the more southerly districts of England where civilization was of older date, long peace was multiplying the comforts of life. Everywhere that perfectly beautiful equilibrium between man and nature which marked the Eighteenth-Century landscape, was in process of being established. While hedgerow and orchard were gaining on the wild, the multiplication or improvement of cottages, farm-buildings and Halls was going on, either in old traditional styles, or in that dignified but simple manner which we know as 'Queen Anne.' That style, which seems to us now native English, in its origin owed something to Dutch influence. Nor was the internal decoration unworthy of the architecture : in 1710 a foreign traveller noted that 'now in England tapestry is no longer in fashion, but all is panelled at great cost.' China-ware, brought to Europe by the Dutch and English East India Companies, was a passion with ladies, and we may conceive the scheme of decoration in many Queen Anne mansions in town and country, as blue and white jars in wainscoted

recesses, and tall grandfather clocks decorated with lacquered work from the East. Grinling Gibbons was still executing his marvels of woodwork. Mahogany was beginning to come in from the American Indies, and with it the lighter and finer furniture that we associate with Eighteenth Century taste. Already foreign art dealers were amazed by their opportunities over here, and 'fleeced the English rarely, selling for great sums what they imported for a trifle from France and Italy.' Foreign artists declared that the nobility and gentry over whom Anne reigned had secluded in their country Halls as many pictures by renowned Italian masters as were to be found in all the Palaces and museums of Rome itself.[31]

Vanbrugh's Blenheim House, with its magnificent conception and doubtful detail, is by no means characteristic of the architecture of Anne's reign. Usually a purer taste prevailed in the realm of ecclesiastical, academic and public buildings, while in ordinary domestic structures the note of the day was 'simple in elegance.' Wren was still alive and active over his London churches and his Hampton Court, and Gibbs was learning that skill which was soon to produce the Radcliffe at Oxford. Together they taught the succeeding generations to 'effect the fusion of classic grace with vernacular energy.' The rules of proportion which these great men laid down, filtering into the text-books commonly used by local architects and builders, prepared for the Eighteenth Century a long and happy period of common English building in hamlet and country town. It was only when, after this school had decayed, and men attempted to restore the architecture of ancient Athens or of the Middle Ages in the Nineteenth Century, that the English tradition was lost, and was succeeded by a hideous anarchy of amateur fancies and exotic modes.[32]

CHAPTER II

The country gentlemen—variety of types. A squire's occupations and budget. Education and younger sons. The landed and the trading interests. Ladies. The marriage market. Gambling. Drinking. Smoking. Duelling. Hunting. Racing. Boxing. Out-of-doors life.

THE country gentlemen included many grades of wealth and of culture. At the top of the social hierarchy stood the Duke, who would in any other land have been styled a Prince, and whose manner of life outdid in magnificence the courts of allied monarchs drawing England's pay. At the lower end of the scale was the squire of £300 a year, speaking in the broadest provincial dialect, but distinguished from the yeomen, among whom he mingled almost on equal terms, by a small sporting establishment, by a coat of arms, and by the respect which all paid to him as a 'gentleman.' If once in his life he went to London on business, he was noticeable for his horse-hair periwig, his jockey belt and his old-fashioned coat without sleeves.[33] His library, traditionally at least, consisted of the Bible, Baker's Chronicle, Hudibras and Foxe's *Martyrs*, and, whether he read these works or not, his view on Puritans and Papists usually coincided with those expressed in the last two.

But in picturing to ourselves the culture of the country house of that time, we must not forget the grandees filling rural palaces with pictures from Italy, furniture from France, and editions of Italian, French or Latin authors which they not only collected but read—the men whom in the next reign Voltaire contrasted favourably with the French nobles as patrons of letters and science. There were philosopher Lords like young Shaftesbury; scholar

statesmen like Somers and Montagu; and the greatest of all antiquarian collectors, Robert Harley, who, when too much engaged as 'the nation's great support' to hunt books and manuscripts himself, still had his private agents everywhere on the look out.* The Lords of the Junto and their followers and foes at Westminster and St. James's prided themselves on being country gentlemen, whether self-made or to the manner born, each with his country seat to which the careworn statesman was ever anxious, at least in theory, to return. When a politician, a lawyer or a war-profiteer had made his fortune at the public expense, he put his money into land and founded a county family. The older families, who were mostly Tory, complained of the parvenu families, who were mostly Whig, but the process went on, and rural and urban society were to that extent amalgamated.

The London season was over by the first week in June, when people of fashion dispersed to their country homes or adjourned to Bath.[34] A longer residence in town would have ruined many families who had strained a point to bring their daughters to the London marriage market, while their neighbours were fain to be contented with a county capital, or with the round of such rural visits as ladies could accomplish in the coach in summer, and on the pillion behind their brothers in the muddy lanes at Christmas. The rival claims of town and country are thus celebrated in a popular song of the period:

Good bye to the Mall,
The Park and Canal; †
St James's Square
And flaunters there:
The gaming house too
Where high dice and low
Are managed by all degrees.
Adieu to the knight
Was bubbled last night,

* Something of the organized method by which the great Harleian collection was being built up during the busiest time of Harley's political engagements can be seen in the *Harleian MSS.* (*B.M.*) 7526.

† St. James's Park and the long artificial water in it. The song is from D'Urfey, *Pills to Purge Melancholy*, 1719, I, p. 5.

That keeps a Blouze,
And beats his spouse ;
And now in great haste
To pay what he's lost,
Sends home to cut down his trees.
And well fare the lad
Improves every clod,
That ne'er set his hand
To Bill or to Bond
Nor barters his flocks
For wine or pox,
To chouse him of half his days.
But fishing and fowling
And hunting and bowling
His pastime is ever and ever.

The natural reply of 'the town' was to harp on the reputation of the rustic gentry for too exclusive a devotion to drinking, hunting and shooting ; and this charge, so generally made, may well be credited, provided we remember that no description will cover the whole ground. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, a brilliant blue-stocking, in a letter of which the dullest part is a quotation from Tasso, condemns the squires of a certain district of Sussex as 'insensible to other pleasures' than the bottle and the chase. 'The poor female part of the family being seldom permitted a coach, their lords and masters having no occasion for such a machine, as their mornings are spent among the hounds, and their nights with as beastly companions—with what liquor they can get.'[35] Yet in the same letter she regrets and praises the society of the squires of Northamptonshire. No less real, if more rare, than boorish Squire Western was the learned country gentleman, celebrated in Somerville's sententious lines :

A rural squire, to crowds and courts unknown
In his own cell retired, but not alone ;
For round him view each Greek and Roman sage,
Polite companions of his riper age. [36]

Nevertheless the impression left by turning over many hundreds of letters of the better-to-do gentry of the reign of Anne, is neither that of country scholar nor of country

bumpkin. We read the actual thoughts of squires, anxious about their account books, their daughters' marriages and their sons' debts and professions : attending to their own estates, and to the county business on the bench of magistrates, as well as to their hounds and horses ; devoted to their gardens and their ponds a little more than to their books ; living, as we should expect, a wholesome and useful life, half public, half private, wholly leisured, natural and dignified. Many of the better-to-do gentry, as their letters and diaries show, were getting several thousands a year from their estates.[37]

The expenditure required of a country gentleman, rich or poor, was in one respect very small. It was not then considered obligatory that his sons should be sent at great cost to exclusively patrician schools. At the nearest local grammar school, the squire's children sat beside those sons of yeomen and shopkeepers who had been selected for a clerical career ; otherwise the young gentlemen were taught at home by a neighbouring parson, or in wealthier families by the private chaplain. Where a tutor was specially employed, he was often a Huguenot refugee, for the land was full of educated men of this type, welcomed by careful parents for their French, and doubly welcome in Whig families for their sufferings and their principles. Eton, Winchester and Westminster were indeed patronized by many but not by most of the aristocracy. And even at Westminster there could be found at the end of Anne's reign 'houses at which boys pay but £20 a year for boarding, and the schooling but five or six guineas.' It was only in the reign of George I that Harrow began to rise into the rank of the fashionable schools.[38]

It followed that, whereas a gentleman of moderate means in our day often thinks himself obliged to spend a sixth part of his income on the schooling of one boy, he could in those days be satisfied to spend a hundredth. Thus squire Molesworth, at a time when he was drawing a rental of just under £2000, paid £20 a year for each of his sons—including board, instruction, clothes and all charges. His heavy parental liabilities only began when

the two lads left school, and the younger went into the army. Then indeed 'Dick must be furnished with a hundred pounds or he cannot stir a step. He has both horses, clothes and equipage to buy.' As 'he was not in the list of officers slain in the late glorious battle of Blenheim,' which would have been a sad economy, nor yet 'in any of the desperate attacks on Lille,' Dick continued for many years to be an increasing source of expenditure and pride to his Yorkshire home. The elder, Jack, had chosen diplomacy, a no less costly method of serving the State. In 1710 the father writes: 'I verily believe these two sons of ours have spent between them £10,000 within the last seven or eight years'; they and the daughters 'are all money-bound. It is well they have a good father's house to tarry in.' Five years later Dick's zeal for his regiment caused him to 'lay out £600 above what was allowed him, so well he loves the service.'[39]

Smaller squires paid equally little for their sons' schooling, and then prenticed them to cheaper trades than the army or diplomatic service. In the plays of Congreve and Farquhar the younger son of the manor may still expect to be 'bound prentice,' perhaps 'to a felt-maker in Shrewsbury'; and Steele declares that 'younger brothers are generally condemned to shops, colleges and inns of court.'* On these terms the gentry could afford to have large families, and although a great proportion of their children died young, they kept England supplied with a constant stream of high-spirited young men, who led her along the forward path at home and overseas. For the 'younger sons' were willing, as the cadets of the continental nobility were not, to mingle in the common avocations of mankind and not to 'stand upon their gentry.' The fact that the younger son went out to make his fortune in the army or at the bar, in industry or in commerce, was one of the general causes favouring the Whigs and their

* In the *Gentleman's Magazine* for 1732, we read 'I remember (and am now near seventy-three) the younger sons of our best families were usually bound apprentices to eminent merchants. But now young master must be sent into the army as soon as he can strut tolerably well.' (*Gentleman's Magazine*, No. XXII, Vol. II, p. 1015.) See *Way of the World*, III, 15; *Trip to the Jubilee*, I, 1; *Tender Husband*, I, 1.

alliance with those interests, as against the desire of the High Tories to keep the landed gentry an exclusive as well as a dominant class. Dominant it remained for another century, but only on condition of opening its doors wide to newcomers, and fostering in a hundred different ways close alliance with interests other than agriculture, in scenes far remote from the manor house and the village church. The country gentlemen ruled Eighteenth-Century England, but they ruled it largely in the interest of commerce and empire.

It is indeed one of the curiosities of English life from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries that, although the landed gentry looked down on the mercantile class as a lower order of society, many of the landed families had not only acquired their estates by money made in trade, but continued from generation to generation to invest in mercantile and financial adventures of every kind. The House of Russell, one of the main pillars of the Whig landed aristocracy, had risen and thriven not more by acquisition of monastic acres than by judicious investment in trading concerns throughout the Plantagenet, Tudor and Stuart periods. In the reigns of William and Anne, Sir William Blackett, the leading merchant and mineowner on Tyneside, sometimes member for Newcastle in the Whig interest, became also a landed proprietor in the heart of rural Northumberland, where he had bought the estate of the needy Jacobite, Sir John Fenwick. The Blacketts of the next generation became Tories under the influence of 'Osbaldistone' rural society, but they remained mercantile as well as landed magnates, and put into agricultural improvement much of the wealth they acquired on Tyneside. These cases are typical of countless other instances. The close personal connection between the landed and trading interests gave stability and unity to the social fabric in England, which was lacking to the *ancien régime* in France, with its sharp distinction of interest between *noblesse* and *bourgeoisie*.

The common schooling of the upper and middle class was criticized, even in those days, for its too rigidly classical

curriculum. It was even declared by some that 'a girl which is educated at home with her mother is wiser at twelve than a boy at sixteen' who knows only Latin. Yet the second classical language was so ill taught at school and college that the excellent Latinists of Christ Church had not enough Greek to be aware that Bentley had proved them dunces over the *Letters of Phalaris*. It was only in the Nineteenth Century that the typical English scholar was equally at home with Aristophanes and with Horace.[40]

It would be a mistake to suppose that nothing was anywhere taught but classics; there was considerable variety in the type of school patronized by gentlemen. Thus Robert Pitt, father of a mighty son, writes in 1704 to his own scarcely less formidable father, Governor Pitt of Madras:

> My two brothers are at Mr. Meure's Academy, near Soho Square, esteemed the best in England. They learn Latin, French and accounts, fencing, dancing and drawing. I think of settling them in Holland for their better education next summer: and should my wife's father-in-law, Lt. Gen. Stewart, accompany the Duke of Marlborough, of placing them under his care to see a campaign.[41]

Among the critics of our educational methods were the wise Locke and the good-natured Steele, who both urged that perpetual flogging was not the best method of imparting knowledge and maintaining discipline. Upper-class education was admitted on all hands to need reform, yet nothing was done to reform it. Swift, for all his hatred of the Scots, agreed for once with Burnet that the lairds gave their sons more sound book-learning than the wealthier and idler English.

Nevertheless, the Eighteenth Century, in spite of its educational defects, produced a larger proportion of remarkable and original men from among those who passed through its schools than our highly educated and over-regulated age is able to do. And in spite of cruel flogging by 'those licensed tyrants the schoolmasters,' and cruel bullying by the unlicensed tyranny of ill-disciplined schoolfellows, there was also much happiness in boyhood, that

still had leisure and still spent it in the free range of the countryside. Nor was severity universal: a young lord, newly arrived at Eton, writes home: 'I think Eaton very easy scholl. I am shure one cannot offend without they be meare rakes indeed.'[42]

Women's education was sadly to seek. Among the lower classes it was perhaps not much worse than men's, but the daughters of the well-to-do had admittedly less education than their brothers. It was before the days of 'ladies' academies,' and though there were 'boarding schools' for girls, they were few and indifferent. Most ladies learnt from their mothers to read, write, sew and manage the household. We hear of no fair Grecians, like Lady Jane Grey and Queen Elizabeth in days of old. But a few ladies could read the Italian poets and were therefore held in some awe by their swains. And at least two women could meet Swift on terms of something like intellectual equality. Yet it was he who lamented 'that not one gentleman's daughter in a thousand should be brought to read her own natural tongue, or be judge of the easiest books that are written in it.' The want of education in the sex was discussed as an admitted fact, one side defending it as necessary in order to keep wives in due subjection, while the other side, led by the chief literary men of the day, ascribed the frivolity and the gambling habits of ladies of fashion to an upbringing which debarred them from more serious interests.

Nevertheless, country-house letters of the period show us wives and daughters writing as intelligent advisers of their menfolk. Such correspondents were something better than brainless playthings or household drudges. A whole class of the literature of the day, from the *Spectator* downwards, was written as much for ladies as for their fathers and brothers. And it was observed that the ladies took a part, often too eager, in the Whig and Tory feuds that divided town and country. As to rural pastimes, the prototype of Diana Vernon is to be found in Farquhar's Belinda, who tells her friend 'I can gallop all the morning after the hunting horn and all the evening after a fiddle.

In short I can do everything with my father but drink and shoot flying.' [43]

In the upper and middle classes, husbands were found for girls on the principle of frank barter. 'As to Cloky,' writes her father, squire Molesworth, 'we shall not have money enough to dispose of her here,' so she must be sent to Ireland to seek there a husband at a cheaper rate. Another squire, named Guise, who is in search of a wife for himself, writes, 'Lady Diana sent a very venerable person to view my estates, and was well satisfied with the report and I think did sincerely desire I might have her daughter.' But the daughter had other views, so Guise found consolation elsewhere :

> Being on the Bench at the quarter Session, a Justice of the Peace took me aside and asked me whether I would marry a woman worth twenty-thousand pounds. The lady I had seen but never spoke to, and upon the whole readily accepted his offer.

A Cornet of Horse writes with equal frankness :

> Not expecting anything this campaign I had taken thoughts another way, to try my fortune under Venus, and accordingly about a fortnight ago was (by some friends) proposed to a lady of very good fortune : but how I shall speed (farther than a favourable interview already) I can't tell.

Since almost everyone regarded it as a grave misfortune to remain single, women did not account it a universal grievance that their hands should often be disposed of by others. They were no doubt usually consulted as to their destiny, much or little according to character and circumstance. Swift, in writing 'to a very young lady on her marriage,' speaks of 'the person your father and mother have chosen for your husband,' and almost immediately adds, 'yours was a match of prudence and common good liking, without any mixture of the ridiculous passion' of romantic love. And this description would probably have covered a vast proportion of the 'arranged' marriages of the day. But since the 'ridiculous passion' sometimes asserted itself, runaway matches were common enough, like that of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu. Divorce was almost

unknown. It was obtainable only through Church Courts, and then only if followed by a special Act of Parliament ; not more than six divorces were thus legalized during the twelve years of Queen Anne.[44]

Both sexes gambled freely, the fine ladies and gentlemen even more than the country squires. In London, Bath and Tunbridge Wells the gaming-table was the central point of interest, while in the manor house it was of less account than the stables and the kennel. The expenses of gambling and of sport, as well as a noble zeal for building and for laying out gardens and planting avenues, burdened estates with mortgages which proved a heavy clog on agricultural improvement and domestic happiness. Immense sums of money changed hands over cards and dice. As the pious Robert Nelson wrote to his young cousin, 'gaming hath brought footmen into coaches, and has made them walk on foot that before kept them.' Since politics were no less the rage than gambling, there were packs of political playing cards, Whig, Tory and patriotic—'Orange cards containing the happy Revolution in pictures,' Sacheverell cards, and 'Queen Anne cards,' recalling the military and naval glories of her reign. The Dissenters maintained a Puritan disapproval of gambling and even of card-playing as such. In 1711 the Assembly of the General Baptists passed a resolution :

> That playing at cards and earnestly contending for the same in Christian families is unbecoming and unlawful for such as profess the Gospel of Christ and unfits them for Church Communion. [45]

Drunkenness was the acknowledged national vice of Englishmen of all classes, though women were seldom accused of it. A movement for total abstinence was out of the question in days before tea or coffee could be obtained in every home. But tracts in favour of temperate drinking were freely circulated by religious bodies and anxious patriots, setting forth with attractive detail the various and dreadful fates of drunkards, some killed attempting to ride home, others seized by a fit while blaspheming, all gone straight to Hell. Among the common folk, ale still reigned

supreme ; but ale had a new rival worse than itself in the deadly attraction of bad spirits. The acme of cheap spirit-drinking was not indeed reached till the reign of George II, in the days of Hogarth's ' gin-lane,' but things were already moving in that direction.

Meanwhile the upper class got drunk sometimes on ale and sometimes on wine. It is hard to say whether the men of fashion or the rural gentry were the worst soakers. But perhaps the outdoor exercise taken by the fox-hunting, sporting and farming squire made him better able to absorb his nightly quantum of October, than the gamester and politician of St. James's Square to escape the ill effects of endless Whig toasts in port and Tory toasts in French claret and champagne. Magistrates often appeared on the bench heated with wine. The leading physician in the capital, Dr. Radcliffe, whose highly rewarded skill and generous disposition stand commemorated in one of the noblest buildings of his old University, was once sent for at an unseasonable moment to attend the Princess Anne. He blurted out over the bottle that ' Her Highness's distemper was nothing but the vapours.' This piece of truthfulness in wine, being reported at Court, had, his biographer tells us, the effect of permanently consigning the future queen and her family to other and less skilful hands—possibly with important consequences to the history of England.

Tobacco was still taken in long churchwarden pipes. A ' smoking parlour ' was set aside in some country houses. But Beau Nash forbade smoking in the public rooms at Bath, as disrespectful and unpleasant to ladies. Among the common people of the south-western counties, men, women and even children smoked pipes of an evening. When in 1707 the Bill for the Security of the Church of England was passing through Parliament, Dr. Bull, the High Church Bishop of St. David's, being suspicious of the Whig proclivities of some of the Bench, kept watch ' sitting in the lobby of the House of Lords, all the while smoking his pipe.' Swift describes how his brother parsons pull his character to pieces at their favourite resort at Truby's coffee-house,

> And pausing o'er a pipe, with doubtful nod
> Give hints that poets ne'er believe in God

The taking of snuff became general in England during the first year of Anne's reign, as a result of the immense quantities thrown on to the London market after the capture of Spanish ships loaded with snuff in the action of Vigo Bay.[46]

The drinking and gambling habits of society, and the fierceness of political faction, led to frequent duels of which many ended ill. The survivor, if he could show there had been fair play, was usually convicted of manslaughter and imprisoned for a short term ; or haply ' pleaded his clergy,' was ' touched with cold iron ' and so set free. It was the privilege of all gentlemen, from a Duke downwards, to wear swords and to murder one another by rule. As soon as men were well drunk of an evening they were apt to quarrel, and as soon as they quarrelled they were apt to draw their swords in the room, and, if manslaughter was not committed on the spot, to adjourn to the garden behind the house, and fight it out that night with hot blood and unsteady hand. If the company were not wearing swords, the quarrel might be slept upon and forgotten in the sober morning. Fortunately the wearing of swords, though usual in London, was not common in the depth of the country, among the uncourtly but good-natured rural squires, whose bark was often worse than their bite. And even at Bath, Beau Nash employed his despotic power to compel the fashionable world to lay aside their swords when they entered his domain : in this he did as good service to the community as in teaching the country bumpkins to discard their top boots and coarse language at the evening assemblies and dances. During his long supremacy as Master of the Ceremonies, nearly covering the reigns of Anne and the first two Georges, Nash did perhaps as much as any other person even in the Eighteenth Century to civilize the neglected manners of mankind.[47]

London and the county capitals were the commonest scenes of such duels as Thackeray has immortalized in *Esmond*. Even more often than Leicester Fields, the open

country behind Montagu House, the site of the present British Museum, was selected by duellists as being at that time on the edge of the new London. It was no unusual thing for the town to be disturbed by such a double event as the following :

> Ned Goodyear has killed Beau Feilding as is reported, and made his escape. The quarrel began at the Play House in Drury Lane. The same night a captain here did the like friendly office for young Fullwood, so that there will be two Warwickshire beaus the fewer. The captain is in Newgate. [48]

Fox-hunting, like so many other English institutions under Queen Anne, was beginning to assume features recognizably modern. In Tudor times the fox had been dug out of its earth, bagged, and baited like a badger, or had been massacred as vermin by the peasantry. For in those days the stag was still the beast of the chase *par excellence*. But the disorders of the Civil War had broken open deer-parks and destroyed deer to such an extent that at the Restoration the fox was perforce substituted in many districts. In the first decades of the Eighteenth Century there were no county or regional packs supported by public subscription, but private gentlemen kept their own packs and allowed their nearer neighbours to follow. The idea that gentlemen should hunt ' the stag and the fox with their own hounds and among their own woods,' was only gradually yielding to the chase across the country at large, irrespective of ownership. Already there were fox-hunting songs, with the chorus :

> Will sometimes follow, will sometimes follow,
> Will sometimes follow the Fox's train.

The year after Queen Anne died, Addison poked fun at the High Tory Squires under the title of ' foxhunters,' taking that sport as the badge of all their tribe. But scarcely less characteristic, though more old-fashioned, was the chase of the hare, with a ' tunable chiding ' of hounds, the gentlemen on horseback, and the common folk running, headed by the huntsman with his pole.

Country pleasures were thus epitomized in a popular song of the time :

> The Country Squire loves running
> A pack of well-mouth'd hounds ;
> Another fancies gunning
> For wild ducks in his grounds :
> This hunts, that fowls,
> This hawks, that bowls,
> No greater pleasure wishing,
> But Tom that tells what sport excels
> Gives all the praise to fishing.[49]

Ever since the Restoration, foreigners had admired the English bowling greens ' which are so even, that they bowl upon them as easily as on a great billiard table. And as this is the usual diversion of gentlemen in the country, they have thick rowling-stones to keep the green smooth.' In Anne's reign cricket was just beginning to take its place among village sports alongside of the far more ancient football. Kent was the county most renowned at the new game, and, ' among the Kentish men, the men of Dartford lay claim to the greatest excellence.' [50]

At cockfighting all classes yelled their bets round the little amphitheatre. If a foreigner should by chance come into these cockpits, we are told, ' he would certainly conclude the assembly to be all mad, by their continued outcries of Six to Four, Five to One, repeated with great earnestness, every Spectator taking part with his favourite cock, as if it were a party cause.' Horse-racing presented much the same spectacle in a more open arena. Race meetings were attended by spectators who were most of them on horseback. They were still regional or county gatherings. The only national meeting was at Newmarket. There indeed ' the vast company of horsemen on the plain at a match contains all mankind on equal footing from the Duke to the country peasant. Nobody wears swords, but are clothed suitable to the humour and design of the place for horse sports. Everybody strives to out-jockey (as the phrase is) one another.' The Queen, out of the secret service money, gave plates to be run for at Newmarket, and at Datchet near Windsor. Arab and Barb blood was being introduced by

Godolphin and other noble patrons of the sport—a change fraught with great future consequence to the character and appearance of horse-flesh in England.[51]

Sword-fighting was a coarse popular spectacle, not far removed from the gladiatorial shows of old Rome, save that the wounds inflicted on the platform at an English fair, though disabling, were not intended to be fatal. Hardly more alluring to our modern sensibilities is the notice issued in April 1702 'to all gentlemen, gamesters and others' of a fight between a 'bald-faced dog of Middlesex against a fallow dog of Cow Cross, being a general day of sport by all the old gamesters, and a great mad bull to be turned loose in the game-place with fireworks all over him and two or three cats tied to his tail and dogs after them.' Fighting of parties of men with sticks or fists, and 'women fighting in their shifts' were also popular spectacles. Foreigners waiting for the boat at Harwich saw with amazement two sailors, who had been promised a crown by 'two lords,' strip to their waists and fight with fists till their faces ran with blood, and 'whenever they wanted to give over the spectators tossed them a shilling to keep them to it. This is a common pastime of passengers.' The famous diplomat, Richard Hill, accustomed to less exuberant street scenes abroad, described his countrymen as 'a drunken Gothic nation that loves noise and bloody noses.'[52]

There was a good side to pugilism. The English common folk, below the rank of gentlemen-duellists who must return a stab for a blow, thought shame to revenge their injuries by murder. The quarrels of the common people were settled in England by the fist, not the knife. A story was current of an English sailor in a Chinese port, who, when rudely shoved out of the way at a Mandarin's train in the street, challenged the Mandarin and his officials to box; the story ends with 'Jack' winning the amused favour of the Mandarin himself by knocking down his champion, a giant Tartar, in fair fight. Such already was the Englishman's idea of himself, and in particular of Jack ashore in foreign parts.[53]

When we try to imagine how the generality of our

ancestors disported themselves out-of-doors, we must remember that most of them lived widely scattered and in the country. For most men the village was the largest unit of their intercourse. A village cricket match, or hurly-burly at football, or races on the green were very different from the 'organized athletics' of the modern arena. But most people took their 'exercise' as a matter of course in doing their work, in tilling the soil, or in walking or riding to and from their daily task. Among the upper and middle class riding was the commonest act of the day.

The most usual 'sports' that lay at many men's doors, were taking fish, and shooting and snaring birds of all kinds, particularly but not exclusively 'game.'* England was alive with game and with many birds now rare or extinct, from the Great Bustard of the Downs and the eagle of Westmorland and Wales down to many smaller friends that survived to be recorded by Bewick. Much of the land was strictly preserved and religiously shot by the owners, but great tracts were open to any man who could procure a net or gun or who was clever at setting a springe. In Anne's reign, and indeed for the rest of the century, as Gunning records, the fens and uncultivated lands round Cambridge were the common playground of the undergraduates, whence they returned with pheasants, partridges, duck, snipe, bitterns and ruffs, with none to say them nay. And in every part of the lovely island the uncared-for heaths, coppices and marshes, destined ere long to be drained, ploughed up or built over, were still the cover for abundance of wild life of every kind. The Englishman had only to move a few yards from his door and he was in contact with nature at its best; and his love of field-sports led him to wander wide.

* See p. 24, above.

CHAPTER III

The parish clergy. Their status and influence. Queen Anne's Bounty. High and Low Church. Toleration. Roman Catholics. Dissenters. Belief in witches declining. Sceptics and anti-clericals. Nonjurors. The religious and moral revival. Religious Societies and their work: Charity schools; Reformation of manners; Propagation of the Gospel.

In the Middle Ages, the economic and social position of the village clergy had been identified with that of the peasants. Parish priests took an active part in Wat Tyler's rising against the proprietary classes, the wealthy monasteries and the great princes of the Church. The Reformation not only permitted the clergy to marry, and removed from them a great weight of unpopularity by abolishing invidious clerical privileges and powers, but also gradually raised the social status of the parson. Before the end of the reign of George III, Jane Austen depicted a society in which the rural clergy are scarcely to be distinguished from squires in education, in standing and in desirability as husbands for young ladies—although even at that time there was a class of poor parson of whom we hear nothing in those novels of sheltered life.

In Anne's reign the village clergy stood midway between the low social position they had occupied in the Middle Ages and the high social position to which they attained under the House of Hanover. Just because their status was on the up-grade, it was equivocal and a subject of frequent dispute.

As to his Priesthood [says one writer of the period], I see nothing in that which can intitle him to more than the quality of an ordinary Gentleman, for that, as I take it, the common courtesy of England allows him, as well as an Attorny or Licenciat in Physick.

And being only a Gentleman by Profession, he is inferior to him who is a Gentleman by Birth.*

There were indeed many sons of squires in the priesthood. But most of the village clergy were themselves children of the parsonage, or else of the farmhouse. Yeomen with large families often sent one son to the local school to pick up Latin, and thence passed him through the University on the basis of semi-starvation. At Oxford the 'Servitours' of this class sometimes slept four in a garret, pinched by poverty, and earning their keep by waiting on 'Gentlemen Commoners.' A Servitour's fortune was described in 1704 as consisting of 'the reversion of old shoes which Gentlemen Commoners leave off, two rags called shirts, a dog's-eared grammar and a piece of an *Ovid de Tristibus*.' Such was the rough educational ladder of old times, up which many remarkable men have climbed. The principle of equality among students, which became axiomatic in the Universities of the Nineteenth Century, was then impossible, for it must have excluded either the rich or the poor from Oxford and Cambridge.†

In an age when class distinctions were so universally accepted that not even philosophers called them in question,

* From a curious tract of 1700 entitled *Mrs. Abigail, or an account of a female skirmish between the wife of a country squire and the wife of a Doctor in Divinity*. It throws light on the question of the social position of the parsons and their wives.

† A brutal Hudibrastic poem of 1709, 'The Servitour,' describes the 'husbandman's' son passing through the University on the way to a parsonage:

'For he conceived a mighty notion
Of th'honour t'which he should attain
By living among gentlemen;
Who ne'er before did any know
Except his landlord 'twas or so.
He struts, pulls off his cap to no man,
And to conceal, betrays the ploughman.
But checked for's insolent behaviour
And fearing to be out of favour,
His duty h'as so much regard of,
He'll cap a master twenty yards off.'

See also C. E. Mallet, *History of Oxford*, III, pp. 66–67. Swift, in the *Education of Ladies*, writes, 'The sons of clergymen bred to learning with any success must, by reason of their parents' poverty be very inconsiderable, many of them being only admitted servitors in colleges, and consequently proving good for nothing.'

the position of such poverty-stricken aspirants to social advancement was equivocal, and left them an easy mark for the ill-natured satire which played so large a part in the politics and literature of the day. To make matters worse, the clerical profession was at that time over-stocked by rival candidates. Sycophancy towards patrons who had livings or private chaplaincies in their gift, was only too common in the hungry host, jostling for their shares of an inadequate supply of loaves and fishes. Even the proud-souled Swift, though assuredly no sycophant, was notoriously preoccupied about his own promotion.

These characteristics of the clerical life of the day were commented upon alike by the friends and the critics of the Church. Addison, who was both at once, held up to censure the conduct of patrons who dismissed their chaplains from table before dessert, and forbade them to touch the jelly. But he represents Sir Roger de Coverley as bound by ties of equal friendship to the parson whom he has appointed to his parish, who 'understood a little backgammon,' and 'was a good scholar tho' he does not show it.' [54]

The private chaplain had, indeed, to suffer whatever indignities were put upon him, if he happened to fall in with inconsiderate employers. But the parson of a parish, once inducted, was a freeholder, and could with impunity defy both bishop and squire, unless he set out on the arduous pursuit of pluralities or of a better living in exchange. Such designs were pardonable when penury was at the door. Gregory King had estimated the average income of 10,000 clergy at £48 in the year of the Revolution ; and a return of the resources of the beneficed clergy of Lincolnshire in the reign of Anne does not lead one to suppose that much improvement had then taken place. Many even of the Rectories were valued at something between £30 and £60 a year. Some livings were not worth £10 a year, and many were so inconsiderable that no one could reside. Plurality, if sometimes an abuse, was more often a necessity, limited by the canonical rule that no one should hold two livings with cure of souls if they were more than thirty miles apart.[55]

Many parishes were tended only by curates. In the

diocese of Worcester a curate's salary was £24 a year, while the Bishop had fifty times as much. Some livings, indeed, were worth £200, like Epworth, the benefice of Samuel Wesley, the remarkable father of yet more famous sons ; and even Samuel Wesley was constantly in debt. In 1703 the Chancellor of Norwich Diocese writes :

> We have but one clergyman laid violent hands upon himself since I came here [two years before], but abundance have broke. Two who made a great show went off together out of this neighbourhood last week. [56]

Although the incomes enjoyed by the clergy represented a much greater purchasing power than the same money to-day, they were very small, especially when we remember that the parsonage so often contained a crowded nursery and school-room. Bishops' postbags were full of such letters as this—'I have six children all at my own charges, my wife is downlying, I owe £16 and know not how to pay 'em.' [57] The *Dictionary of National Biography* bears witness to many prominent men who were sons of the parsonage, answering to the 'children of the manse' in Scotland. The duty of begetting and attempting to rear children left little over on which the parson himself could achieve a high and liberal culture in a remote village.

It was to remedy this state of things that Queen Anne instituted her famous Bounty. The 'first-fruits and tenths' of benefices, originally exacted by the Pope, had, after the Reformation, been annexed by the Crown. Nominally, the incoming clergyman had to pay his whole first year's income and the tenth of every year's income ; but, in fact, the 'first-fruits and tenths,' like so many old English taxes, had become a fixed charge of a much less onerous character, estimated at about £16,000 a year for the whole country. The fund thus derived from the taxation of benefices had been used as a source of privy income by the Crown, not always in the most respectable manner. When Anne came to the throne, a thousand a year was being paid to a nobleman who had bought the interest in the fund enjoyed by Charles II's French mistress, the Duchess of Portsmouth. And a thousand a year was being paid to

Nell Gwynne's royal offspring, the Duke of St. Albans, who had become a Whig and a soldier of William. Burnet, the historian of the Reformation, whose researches had familiarized him with the history of the fund, first raised the question of its proper use. As Whig Bishop of Salisbury, the burly protagonist of Low Church offered a broad target for the abuse and ridicule of his clerical brethren. He repaid them in a manner worthy of a Christian, not only by constantly befriending the poorer clergy of his diocese with zeal exemplary in a bishop, but by urging upon his patron King William that the first-fruits and tenths ought to go to the relief of poor benefices. William's financial straits prevented him from acceding to Burnet's request, though he considered it favourably and though it was supported by Somers. But a few years later Queen Anne was persuaded to act a part worthy of her special love of the Church, at the instance partly of Burnet, partly of her ecclesiastical adviser, Sharp, the wise Archbishop of York, whose motto was 'no politics.'

Accordingly, in February 1704 the announcement of Queen Anne's Bounty was made, and an Act of Parliament was passed that year to give it effect. She not only remitted all arrears of first-fruits and tenths to poor clergymen in debt to government on that head, but she made over the fund itself for the increase of inadequate stipends. Owing to bad debts and the existing charges on the fund, little could be paid to the clergy before she died. But by the early part of George II's reign the Governors of Queen Anne's Bounty were in a position to make frequent grants, which were invested to increase the value of poor benefices.[58]

It was also in the reign of Anne that a design was set on foot to circulate books among those provincial clergy who could not otherwise afford to study. The intention was excellent, and High and Low Churchmen worked side by side in this as in other similar movements of that factious but philanthropic age. Unfortunately the effort was made on too small a scale. In 1711 about forty-five towns in England were each receiving from this source a 'library' of some forty religious books, representing the two prevailing schools of thought in the Church. But the library

movement hardly touched the fringe of the rural parishes. In those days the bulky tomes in which learning was buried could not be had cheap, and it is not therefore surprising that the impoverished clergy were less accustomed to read Plato and the Fathers with their feet on the fender than their successors in the golden age of Queen Victoria.[59]

Swift's picture of the 'Country Parson,' wherein the author's natural acidity is tempered by his love of the Church of England, may stand for the portrait of the parish clergyman, if a single picture must serve :

> Parson, these things in thy possessing
> Are better than the bishop's blessing.
> A wife that makes conserves ; a steed
> That carries double when there's need ;
> October store and best Virginia,
> Tythe-pig and mortuary guinea ;
> *Gazettes* sent *gratis* down and franked,
> For which the patron's weekly thanked ;
> A large concordance bound long since ;
> Sermons to Charles the First, when Prince ;
> A chronicle of ancient standing ;
> A *Chrysostom* to smooth thy band in.
> * * * * * *
> He that has these, may pass his life,
> Drink with the squire, and kiss his wife ;
> On Sundays preach, and eat his fill ;
> And fast on Fridays—if he will ;
> Toast Church and Queen, explain the news,
> Talk with churchwardens about pews ;
> Pray heartily for some new gift,
> And shake his head at doctor Swift.

Most of Swift's clerical brethren 'shook their heads' at him over the bold imagery of his *Tale of a Tub*, and not at all in reproof of the ferocity of his onslaughts against Papists, Whigs and Dissenters, in which he hardly surpassed the warmth of the majority of the Lower House of Convocation.

Zeal for the cause of the Church of England was then inflamed by two negative passions, anti-Popery and anti-Puritanism. Each was based on bitter experience of the past and consequent fear for the future. The fires of

Smithfield were the most living part of English historical tradition, popularized in Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, the only book besides the Bible which was equally welcome in the home of the High Churchman and the Dissenter. And these feelings had been revived and strengthened by the recent action of James II in overthrowing the laws of the land in order to re-establish a Roman Catholic despotism in England, and by the renewal of an unprovoked, cruel and wholesale persecution of the Huguenots in France after they had for long years been good and loyal subjects. England was full of the French victims of contemporary Roman Catholic intolerance, and their case was not therefore likely to be forgotten. The supremacy of Louis XIV in Europe, which seemed almost established when Anne ascended the throne, would probably lead to the restoration in England of the Roman Catholic Pretender, whose cause the Grand Monarch had just espoused, standing by the death-bed of James II. In these circumstances, the Church of England, even the distinctively High Church section of it, showed no relenting towards Rome.

But if the events of that generation had renewed the fear of Rome, the events of fifty years back were responsible for an answering fear of Puritanism. The overthrow of the Church and the aristocracy, the beheading of the King, and the rigid rule of the Saints had left a negative impression almost as formidable and permanent as the memory of 'bloody Mary' and James II. The Cavalier and Anglican view of the Great Civil War held the field, even after the Revolution; the Whigs scoffed at it in private but only occasionally dared to contradict it in public. Animosity against the quiet business men who attended Nonconformist chapels was fostered on the ground that they were one and all 'fanatics,' about to draw the sword and again destroy the Church; such fears scarcely derived from close observation of contemporary facts, but were the result of historical memories, constantly kept alive in the parish pulpit, in Tory pamphlets, and in the talk of men. The Dissenters might seem humble and harmless burghers, but they were in alliance with the powerful and dangerous Whig lords, and unless they were kept low *'forty-one would come again*. Such was the belief. And the memory of Cromwell was scarcely more productive of bitter fears for the future than was the actual presence beyond the Cheviots of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, established and intolerant.

The Low Churchmen, on the other hand, regarded the danger to the Church of England from Rome and France as real, and the danger from Dissent and Scotland as imaginary. The Bishops appointed by William since the Revolution, and the majority of the highly educated clergy of the capital, were Low Churchmen. When, therefore, Anne ascended the throne, the Upper House of Convocation was Low Church and the Lower House was High Church, and there was little love lost between them. Addison's Tory Fox-hunter remarks, 'There is scarce a Presbyterian in the whole county except the Bishop.' And the Whigs replied by taunting the High Church clergy with being themselves Presbyterians, since they were always defying the episcopal authority. The bitterness of invective in these controversies, as in most controversy in old times, is astonishing to modern students of long-forgotten pamphlets. Sacheverell, the leading High Church champion of the day, accuses the Low Churchmen as a body, including half the most highly respectable Bishops, of immoral lives and unmentionable vices, on no ground at all save his own party animus.* Such methods of debate caused less astonishment then than now. Yet even then such wrath among souls celestial helped to diminish the influence of the clergy, and to enhance that of 'scoffers and deists.'

The Low Church party desired friendship with the Dissenters in England and with the Protestant Churches abroad, in the common struggle against France and Rome. But the High Churchmen, though ready to maintain the contest for national independence, wished to do so without seeking the friendship of Dissenters and Scots at home or of Dutch and other allies abroad. And therefore Marlborough, though still a Tory in 1702, was to find by experience that the vast combinations of his European war policy could only be carried through by a breach with

* *Character of the Low Churchman*, 1702, pp. 17–18. This amazing piece of Billingsgate is repeated in the second edition, 1706, p. 11.

the High Church statesmen and an ever-increasing dependence first on the moderate Tories and finally on the Whigs.

Sacheverell himself thus defines the characteristics of the High Churchman :

> He is High for the divine right of Episcopacy, High for the uninterrupted Succession, High for the Liturgies against extemporary Prayers, High for the primitive Doctrine and Discipline of the Ancient Church. He much laments the destruction of the Episcopal Church in Scotland, and should be for addressing Her Majesty to restore it. He believes separation from the Church of England to be a damning Schism, and the Dissenters to be in a very dangerous state, notwithstanding the toleration. . . . He is so High as to observe the traditional customs as well as the written laws of the Church, and he always bowed very low before the Altar and at the name of Jesus.[60]

But there was no approach towards Rome, and no tendency to ritualistic innovation ; High Church Eucharistic doctrine and practice went little further than the attempt to make attendance at Communion weekly, an attempt in which many Low Churchmen joined with them in the work of the Religious Societies. The more usual custom in cities was for the clergy to celebrate monthly, and in rural parishes between three and seven times a year.[61]

In the dread of a return to Papal or to Puritan rule, the Church had the passions of common Englishmen on her side. All through the reign of Anne, and long afterwards, it was easy to raise a mob to burn either Catholic or Dissenting chapels. But these passions were, in the common Englishman, not the outcome of High Church doctrine but of anti-clerical instinct. The Church of England was liked because she did not attempt to interfere with life as Papist and Puritan in their different ways interfered. But when the High Churchman made clerical claims of his own over the laity, he at once aroused the same impatient temper as had destroyed successively the power of Rome, the power of Laud and the power of the Puritans. The history of England can never be understood unless we realize the

presence of another force at work besides the rival religions, the unorganized but very real passion of anti-clericalism. This passion, at the service of the Church against Papist and Puritan, was at the service of the Whigs against the pretensions of the ' high-flying ' clergy, when they clamoured for the suppression of unorthodox opinions and the reinforcement of Church discipline over the laity.

Antagonism to the Church no longer took the form of a militant Puritanism demanding ' a godly thorough Reformation,' as in the days of Pym and Cromwell ; the Dissenters would have been only too thankful to be sure of the undisturbed enjoyment of the Toleration Act and of the schools they had founded to educate their own children, without again provoking persecution by another attempt to capture the Establishment. The anti-Church feeling that gave most vigour to the Whig party in the days of Somers and Wharton was of a different order from Cromwell's. It was the nascent latitudinarianism of the new century, a feeling against ' priestcraft ' in all its forms which already appeared in not a few pamphlets and in common talk. Two centuries of rival religious persecutions, Catholic and Protestant, Puritan and Anglican, ending in the anti-Roman revolution of 1688, had aroused in England a movement of resistance to clerical claims of all sorts, destined to pass in a more virulent form to the Continent, when the bankruptcy of Louis XIV's persecuting policy had become fully apparent over there. The day of Voltaire was yet to come, but in England under William and Anne the attitude of open disrespect for the clergy already alarmed the High Church party, especially in connection with the ' Socinian ' and ' Deistic ' philosophy of the ' Freethinkers.' * The cry was raised for fresh laws to keep Dissenters in due subordination, and for State action against impiety and abuse of the clergy. Clerical writers complained that the word ' parson ' was used in many companies as a word of contempt, and that young lawyers called them ' black locusts.' Bishop Trelawny wrote in 1703 that ' in Westminster Hall, Atheism, Socinianism and perfect detestation

* The word ' freethinker ' came in at this time. ' Atheist is an old-fashioned word, I'm a Freethinker, child.' Addison, *The Drummer*, Act 1.

of the principles and government of the Universities is allowed and justified.'

Yet it may be questioned whether the Universities were not themselves at the bottom of the trouble. Collins, Toland and the professed deists made the noise, but did not carry the weight ; more profoundly and ultimately influential was the system of exact reasoning conducted by such giants as Barrow, Newton, Locke and Bentley, and the work of the Royal Society, in place of the mere learning and oratory of the academic world before the Restoration. These greater men sometimes descended into the field against the ' Deists,' but they were themselves laying the foundations of the larger reasonableness and latitudinarianism of the Eighteenth Century.

The avowedly anti-clerical writers, while showering abuse on ' priestcraft,' were careful to confine their philosophic arguments within bounds. They eschewed the ' atheism ' of which they were accused, but claimed that reason must be the arbiter of all doctrines ; and while they tended by implication to efface the supernatural, they retained the divine element in religion. There was nothing of Bradlaugh in Toland, Collins and young Lord Shaftesbury under Anne, or in Bolingbroke and Pope in the following reigns. They suffered therefore nothing worse than a certain measure of social obloquy and a shower of enraged pamphlets, and even these penalties were only dealt out to those of them who were both Whigs and commoners.[62]

For, in spite of the outcries of the Lower House of Convocation, times were not propitious in England for persecution. The Church was rent by her own political divisions, and her official representatives belonged to the party that favoured toleration. And most Englishmen, though they derived their political opinions chiefly from their dislike of other people's religions, were heartily tired of persecution in practice. The harsh enforcement of the Clarendon Code in the reign of Charles II had made life uncomfortable for everyone, and had admittedly been very bad for business. Moreover in 1702 a united front for the war against France was desired on patriotic grounds by many strong High Churchmen, like the famous Tory pamphleteer Davenant, and Queen Anne herself. The Whig aristocracy protected the free expression of opinion, whether Puritan or Deistic. The Puritans were only too glad to make common cause with the Rationalists, to render Toleration secure. Some of the Tory leaders, like St. John, the future Bolingbroke, were as pronounced freethinkers as Collins himself, and were moreover libertines desirous of anything rather than the revival of the authority of the Church Courts over morals. The poems of Ned Ward, the popular Tory poet, though full of hearty abuse of Papists and Dissenters, are also full of ribaldry, libertinage and something very like scoffing at religion. The High Church clergy, who for a short while believed that the accession of Anne meant a return to the age of Laud, raised a cry for the revival of a compulsory penance and the ' primitive discipline of the Church,' but such pretensions, though actively enforced by the clerical democracy of Scotland, were in England a long-lost cause.*

The Press, too, had entirely escaped from ecclesiastical control. The censorship had never been renewed since its lapse in 1695 ; anyone therefore could print what he liked,

* E.g. *The Church of England's Wish for the Restoring of Primitive Discipline*, 1703.

It is remarkable that in 1705 the Chancellor of Worcester Diocese pronounced sentence in the Bishop's Court on a Baronet for incontinency, condemning him to appear in a white sheet in the cathedral during service on a stated day. Whether the sentence was carried out does not appear. Diary *Francis Evans*, p. xvii. Such discipline, common in Scotland, was very rare in England in Anne's reign. In answer to the Bishop's question, ' Have any public penances been performed since my last visitation ? ' almost every parson in Bucks replied, ' None,' except in a case which was to defend a woman's character from slander, not to punish immorality. In Lincolnshire there were some half dozen penances done for the whole county. But in some rural districts the authority of the Church Courts over sin died rather more slowly. In country parishes of Oxfordshire the Churchwardens still occasionally fulfilled their increasingly unpopular duty of ' presenting ' neighbours for incontinence or the ' fame ' of it, before the Church Courts. Public penance was in such case generally ordered, but seldom enforced ; it was occasionally commuted for money, more often neglected. Occasionally persons were excommunicated for this, or for refusing to pay Church rates or other dues. But excommunication in Anne's reign meant nothing more than exclusion from the rites of the Church which the sinner probably and the Dissenter certainly had no wish in the world to attend. In the Isle of Man penance was done in Church in a white sheet as late as the reign of William IV (see A. G. Bradley, *Our Centenarian Grandfather*, pp. 162–163). *Wake MSS., Misc.* 5 and 11, *Epist.* 5 ; *Lambeth MSS.* 1115 ; S. A. Peyton's *Oxfordshire Peculiars* (1928, Oxf. Record Soc.), pp. lxx–lxxv and *passim*.

subject to such proceedings as might afterwards be taken against him in Parliament or in a court of law for sedition, libel or blasphemy. The Toleration Act, though strictly limited in scope by its text, had in practice been extended to persons outside its actual provisions, like Unitarians and Papists, and had created an atmosphere antipathetic to the persecution even of highly unpopular opinion. England had moved far since the days of Elizabeth, when Unitarians had been burnt at the stake.

The Roman Catholic body benefited by this change of atmosphere. During a war with France on behalf of the Protestant Succession, English Roman Catholics, who could scarcely fail to be Jacobites at heart, might have been expected to suffer something analogous to the cruelties inflicted on the French Huguenots. But nothing of the sort occurred. Roman services, so long as they were conducted with some degree of privacy, were not interfered with at all. At St. Winifred's shrine there was a continual come and go of pilgrims, catered for by a whole regiment of priests in thin disguise, which the Protestants of the neighbourhood understood and respected. In every county in England, Roman Catholic nobles or gentlemen kept priests whose presence was neither obtruded on public notice nor enquired into by the authorities. They ministered to small congregations centring round the manor house. The Whig Duke of Devonshire, who had suffered under James II and was ' a steady opposer of Popery and the French power,' lived on excellent terms with the Roman Catholic gentlemen in the neighbourhood of Chatsworth, ' and remembered his Master King William saying that he came over to defend the Protestants and not to persecute the Papists.'

In the Eighteenth Century, Roman Catholicism was an aristocratic but unfashionable faith. It declined because it dared make no public propaganda in face of the laws and in face of a hostile public opinion. It was weakest in the towns, except in so far as the immigration of Irish poor into certain slum districts was beginning. The Roman Catholics were strong only in Lancashire, and there alone were they accused of making open propaganda. They

made a certain show also among the landowners in Northumberland, Durham, Yorkshire and the English counties of the Welsh border. In Wales itself they were negligible. And in the typical midland and southern shires they were few and far between. Enquiries frequently made throughout the reign were answered in parish after parish by the parson's assurance that there was ' No Papist,' and occasionally by the addendum ' Nor, God be thanked, no Dissenter.' [63]

To judge of the treatment of Roman Catholics merely by reading the Statute Book would lead to error. For in England the only part of the harsh laws against them which were actually enforced were the laws excluding them, as the Protestant Dissenters also were excluded, from civil office, and a further law which subjected Roman Catholics to pay double land tax. ' Only these two laws are put in practice,' wrote Cardinal Paolucci's secret agent in the year 1710. ' As regards the exercise of their religion they enjoy it entirely free.' Such was the Roman Catholic official account of the position in England under Anne. But the same agent made a very different report as to the treatment of his co-religionists in Ireland.*

The Protestant Dissenters, other than the Unitarians, had obtained, under the provisions of the Toleration Act of 1689, the privilege of public worship in their own Meeting Houses. Except for occasional attacks by incendiary mobs in time of political excitement, this open public worship was everywhere enjoyed throughout the reign of Anne by the congregations of licensed Dissenting ministers. But unlicensed preachers were still liable, like Daniel

* *P.R.O. Transcripts, 9, Rome,* 101. The report (which is in Italian) adds: ' There is no person of distinction who cannot if he so desires keep a chaplain, whether in town or in his country seat, without the government making any enquiry.' Like many foreign reports of the day, it calls the Tories ' Anglicani ' and the Whigs ' Presbiteriani.' *H.M.C. Portland,* iv. pp. 86–87, gives typical instances of the non-enforcement of the laws purporting to prevent Papists from owning arms and good horses and travelling freely about England. Even at the crisis of the war (1704) they rode what they liked, where they liked, armed as they liked. But after the rising of the Catholic squires of Northumberland in 1715, priests and their congregations were persecuted for awhile in the Northern Counties, see *E.H.R.,* July 1929.

Skingle at Hitchin, to be haled into the Spiritual Court and forced to desist and to ask pardon. Few country villages had a Meeting House, but few market towns were without one or more.

The three principal Nonconformist bodies were Baptist, Presbyterian and Quaker. It is uncertain which was the most numerous in the country as a whole. The Quakers had begun to decline in numbers and propagandist zeal, after the revivalist ardours of George Fox and his immediate disciples, which had swept over the common people of England in the days of Cromwell and of the second Charles. Toleration had not caused them to increase. But there were still, even in remote hamlets, many more Quakers than in later times. Denunciations of Quaker blasphemy and misbelief were still an important part of Church literature. In some towns the wealthy and educated Dissenters were beginning that drift towards Unitarianism which became a marked feature of English as distinct from Scottish Presbyterianism.

According to Davenant, Nonconformity in Anne's reign was strong among seafaring men, among "lower tradesmen and artificers, manufacturers and day labourers." In some rural districts, like Bucks and Devon, the Dissenters were much stronger than in others. All over the country they were stronger in the market towns than in the villages, in the cities stronger still, and in London they were strongest of all.[64] In 1711 a House of Commons Committee reported that English Dissenters and French Huguenots together made up a fifth of the half-million inhabitants of the London suburbs, exclusive of the City, and that they had built themselves 88 chapels;[65] the remaining 400,000 potential Churchmen of the suburbs had only 28 parish churches among them. At the end of William's reign a Lord Mayor of London had been so indiscreet as to attend his nonconformist Meeting House with the official insignia of the City. This had aroused a storm of indignation and a cry of 'Church in Danger,' to which the accession of a Tory Queen gave fresh encouragement. The violence of the language commonly used in attacks on Dissenters is the violence common in the mouth of dominant

parties; the replies of the Puritans were of a milder strain, very different from the intolerant tone of the days of their prosperity fifty years back.[66]

In some districts, however, the relations of Churchmen and Dissenters was more kindly than the controversial literature of the time might lead one to suppose. In the Yorkshire dales, where Nonconformity was strong, there was much good feeling; and in some parishes, even in the south, there were religious folk who attended both Church and Chapel.[67]

In one respect the progress of science and scepticism had already won an important battle for humanity. The persecution of supposed witches had reached its height under the Puritan Commonwealth. It had since been declining, most rapidly among the educated class. The reign of Anne saw the real end of witch trials. Judges and country magistrates refused to convict old women of compacts with the Devil, on the evidence of their neighbours' prejudiced imaginings, or even of their own frantic confessions. This marked a great advance of common kindliness and good sense over primæval cruelty and superstition. It was a victory of reason imposed by an educated aristocracy on a rural population that still retained its old belief in witches, but was in no position to assert it against the will of its 'betters.'

The decline in convictions for witchcraft was also one sign among many others that the scientific laws of evidence were better understood by bench and bar. Courts of Justice were beginning to weigh the value of testimony, and to trust less to the oath of informers and prejudiced or ignorant persons than in the days of Titus Oates and all previous ages, when every oath was an oath and weighed so much in the judicial balance.

In 1702 a rascal named Richard Hathaway was convicted at the Surrey Assizes for falsely accusing an old woman as a witch on the evidence of pins which he spat out of his mouth and declared that she had placed in his belly. In 1712 took place the last case of a conviction for witchcraft in England. In that famous case, the jury,

indeed, found Jane Wenham guilty of witchcraft, but the judge, Sir John Powell, who had lightly remarked when she was accused of flying that there was no law against flying, respited her and she obtained a pardon. Her case attracted general attention and became the subject of a warfare of pamphlets. Some Church clergy took the field against the accused and attacked the judge, but the majority of the upper class could not feel sure that, because some sheep had died in fits, the farmers were necessarily right in saying that Jane had bewitched them. Others pointed out that, even if several cats had been seen going about the village each with Jane Wenham's face, the Devil might have been malicious enough to manage the affair without her connivance. Some bold spirits avowed their disbelief in the possibility of any such phenomena, Scripture texts notwithstanding. These were the minority. But witch-trials in England were drawing to an end. In 1736 the law punishing witchcraft by death was repealed.[68]

Similarly the upper class in this more sceptical generation were beginning to be annoyed when they were compelled, by the fears of their servants, to shut up half the rooms in an old manor house as ' haunted.' Stage comedies about sham ghosts indicated, not indeed entire materialism, but a new readiness to look supernatural stories in the mouth. The atmosphere of the capital was peculiarly inimical to old rustic romance.

> I have known many a country lady come to London [says a character in Addison's *Drummer*], with frightful stories of the hall-house being haunted, of fairies, spirits and witches ; that by the time she had seen a comedy, played at an Assembly, and ambled in a Ball or two, has been so little afraid of bugbears, that she has ventured home in a chair at all hours of the night.[69]

But only a small proportion of the villagers of either sex ever visited town. Most people remained all their lives under the influence of Pan and his magic. The mental food of English children was just such cottage fire-side tales of ' the hall-house being haunted, of fairies, spirits and witches,' perhaps only half believed but pleasantly shuddered at. Now that the witch could be pointed out but no longer

hanged or ducked, such earth-born legendary lore was no unwholesome fare. The fairies still danced in the woods, though when the wayfarer came round the bush they had always vanished. Books in the village were few. The ordinary farmer and cottager saw no printed matter of any kind except Bible, Prayer Book and

> The ballads pasted on the wall,
> Of Joan of France and English Moll,
> Fair Rosamund, and Robin Hood,
> And the Little Children in the Wood.

And therefore, even at the end of the ' Century of reason ' and of artificial poetry among the governing class, the faculty of wonder was not dead in the English people. Wordsworth attributed the growth of imagination in his own mind partly to the fairy tales and ballads of the rustic North that he heard in childhood, in contrast to the rationalism of the Nineteenth Century schoolroom.[70]

No city-made newspapers or magazines stamped a uniform mentality on the nation. At the beginning of Anne's reign villagers seldom saw a printed newspaper, but depended for their news on gossip or on the ' newsletters ' written to the squire by his correspondents in town. Partly for this reason it was easy for gentry and clergy to mould the political opinions of the village.

In this isolation from the world at large, each shire, each hamlet had its own traditions, interests and character. Except for some unusual event like the Battle of Blenheim or the trial of Dr. Sacheverell, country folk had little to think or talk about except their own affairs. Their shrewd rustic comment on things they knew and understood was expressed in the pithy dialect of their own countryside. For gossip and sensation they were satisfied with the daily human drama of their own village, with its poaching affrays and smuggling adventures, its feuds and loves and suicides, its quarrels of miller and innkeeper, of parson and squire.

In his dislike of Papists, Dissenters and Deists, of Whig Bishops and Dutch allies, Swift was at one with his high-flying brethren, and has become their mouth-piece for

all time. But, as an Irish Protestant, he was not wholly typical of the English High Churchmen. He was more of a Williamite, and continued to the end more whole-heartedly hostile to the Pretender than many of his English Tory allies ; it is not in the writings of Swift that we must seek the uneasy and hesitating attitude of the average High Churchman towards the questions of non-resistance, divine hereditary right, the Revolution and the Hanoverian Succession.

In defence of the Church of England against the direct assault of James II, the High Church laity had taken as leading a part in the Revolution of 1688 as any other section of the community.* In the following year, the Toleration Act had been granted with their full and free consent, in payment for the Dissenters' support of the Church against James. In 1701 the Tories in Parliament had taken the lead in passing the Act of Settlement, fixing the reversion of the Crown after Anne's death on the House of Hanover, to the exclusion of James II's Catholic son. Nevertheless, many High Churchmen still found it hard to accept the consequences of their own successful act of rebellion. They feared the growth of Dissent under the Toleration Act. They could not stomach being called rebels and resisters of the Divine Right of Kings, for they had themselves made non-resistance and Divine Hereditary Right the shibboleth of good Churchmanship under Charles II. The inhuman doctrine that non-resistance was the subject's duty under every royal provocation had indeed broken down in practice, but it had not yet expired in theory. Because they were men, the Tories had resisted James ; because they were men, they afterwards tried to deny their own inconsistency, to explain away their own action and to avoid its logical results. In Anne's reign some Tory writers refused to admit that their beloved Queen reigned ' on a Revolution foot.' But they hardly

* According to Swift, the Revolution was ' wholly brought about by Church of England hands,' against the Dissenters (*Examiner*, No. 37). This is a partisan travesty of the facts, but it is no more untrue than the opposite assertion, that the Revolution was the work of the ' Whig aristocracy ' against the Tories ! It is impossible to say whether Whigs or Tories, Churchmen or Dissenters were foremost in the rebellion that brought William of Orange from Torbay to London.

knew what to say about her exiled brother, who would certainly be King if the Revolution had not happened. Many Tories continued to salve their consciences by regarding the Pretender's birth as doubtful, while the Whigs had no longer any use for the warming-pan and rejoiced to think that an Act of Parliament could exclude a Prince otherwise legitimate.[71] So anxious were the Tories to avoid the plain fact that they had been rebels in 1688, that they often argued that there had been no ' resistance ' in the Revolution itself ! *

The divided and uneasy attitude of many Churchmen towards the Revolution and towards the Dynastic question which the Revolution had created, was the source of fundamental weakness in the Tory party, otherwise the strongest in the State. These difficulties were greatly increased by the action of the Nonjurors, or consistently Jacobite clergy. Five out of the Seven Bishops whom James had prosecuted in the famous trial, refused to take the oaths to William, on the ground that Parliament could not change the divine right of hereditary succession. One of them, Lake of Chichester, declared on his death-bed that the ' religion of the Church of England taught me the doctrine of Non-resistance and Passive Obedience, which I took to be the distinguishing character of the Church of England.'[72] The nonjuring Bishops were followed in their refusal to take the oaths by about four hundred other clergy. They were all, in due course of law, extruded from their sees and benefices. The deprivation of Bishops by Act of Parliament they regarded as of no effect, and therefore formed themselves into a small rival Church of England, strong beyond its numbers in piety and learning, though hardly in common sense. They treated the great body of their clerical brethren as schismatics, and even had a form of absolution for admitting a ' penitent ' from the false Church of England to their own more select communion.[73]

The sees of the Nonjuror Bishops, including Canterbury vacated by Sancroft, were filled up in William's reign by

* *The Best Answer*, by a student at The temple, 1708, p. 8. In regard to the High Church and Tory attitude I refer the reader particularly to Mr. Keith Feiling's *History of the Tory Party, 1640–1714*.

Low Churchmen, or as we should now call them Broad Churchmen—the only unhesitating clerical supporters of the new regime. The appointment of men of this school of thought was a necessity to the State struggling for life against domestic and foreign foes, but it was naturally resented by the High Church party, which included the majority of the parish priests. The continuance of the Nonjuror Schism throughout the reign of Anne deprived the High Church clergy of the leadership of many of the ablest, most sincere and learned members of their party. As party-leader Sacheverell was a poor substitute for Sancroft and Ken, especially as Sacheverell by his own showing ought to have been a Nonjuror. Meanwhile the Bench was crowded with able and learned Low Church Bishops like Tenison and Burnet, as the official fathers of the Church. A High Church party is more formidable when led by its Bishops, as in the days of the two Kings Charles, than when led against its Bishops, like Convocation in the reigns of William and Anne.

The immortal part of the Nonjurors' protest, which had far-reaching effects on Anglican thought at the time of the Oxford movement, was their insistence on the spiritual independence of the Church of England as a self-contained body, not a mere appanage of the State. The removal of the Nonjuring Bishops by the State for political reasons they regarded as a proof that the Church was in chains. But their claim for ecclesiastical independence was couched in a form which would have meant clerical domination in England. The Nonjurors did not claim the separation of the Church from the State, but the submission of the State to the Church : because the Church had once believed in the Divine Hereditary Right of Kings, England, they claimed, was for all time to be an absolute monarchy, subject to a Roman Catholic Prince : even in politics the will of the people of England was to be overruled by the clergy. The Nonjurors claimed self-government for the Church, meaning the clergy alone ; for the laity had at that date no voice in the government of the Church of England, except in so far as they were represented by the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament : therefore an established

Church uncontrolled by the State would have meant an uncontrolled clergy, dictating to the laity alike on matters spiritual and political.

The deprived Jacobite clergy stood on the flank of the body which they had left, stirring the uneasy consciences of the beneficed High Churchmen. The latter had no wish to be mere time-servers like the Vicar of Bray. But they heard themselves called so by indignant Nonjurors on one side and by the irreverent multitude on the other.[74] The death of James II, followed shortly by the accession of his Anglican daughter Anne in place of William, eased the situation a little for the High Church conscience, and even brought back a few Nonjurors to the national fold. But, partly owing to the stricter terms of a new oath abjuring the Pretender,* the relief was but partial. The end of the Queen's reign was to see the Church of England and therewith the Tory party split from top to bottom on the dynastic question, when the time for nuances and reserves drew to an end, and the actual choice became imminent between Restoration of the House of Stuart or Accession of the House of Hanover.

When the highest questions of Church and State were thus inseparable, the boundary between religion and politics could neither be defined nor observed. It was a common saying, doubtless greatly exaggerated, that more was heard in the parish pulpit of Charles the Martyr than of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless the reigns of William and Anne were a period of purely religious activity and revival, which left a permanent mark on the life of the country, and sowed the seed of great developments in the future. An age to which we owe the Charity Schools and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge was not wholly absorbed in the rancorous political feuds of High and Low Church. In some of these better activities, members of the two Church parties co-operated with each other and with the Dissenters, and were greatly helped by Robert Nelson, the lay Nonjuror, a man in whom the instinct to lend a hand to

* See p. 159, below.

every good cause worked more powerfully than the exclusive and scholastic spirit of his sect.

The religious revival had its origin in the brief and stormy reign of James II. That King, having watched the conduct of English public men throughout the reign of his brother Charles, had drawn the conclusion that there was no religious conviction or moral feeling in England sufficient to resist the force of royal displeasure and royal favour, if steadily exercised, to make men change their religion. The challenge was an insult to the nation, perhaps not wholly undeserved. But it aroused a memorable response. It was not the treachery or intrigue of individuals that drove James from the throne, but the moral rally of a whole people. The Tory pamphleteer Davenant, in the early years of Anne, thus recalled how those times had stirred men's souls :

> The measures King James the Second took to change the religion of the country, roused up fresh zeal in the minds of all sorts of men ; they embraced more straitly what they were in fear to lose. Courtiers did thrust themselves into the presence to quit their offices, rather than be brought to do what might prejudice the Church of England. Nor had the licentious ways of living in fleets and armies shaken our seamen and soldiers in their principles. They all stood firm. The clergy showed themselves prepared to die with their flocks and managed the controversial parts of Divinity with primitive courage and admirable learning. The Churches were everywhere crowded, and the prospect of persecution, though peradventure at some distance, begot devotion.[75]

The symptoms of this moral and religious revival did not wholly subside with the crisis that gave it birth. In the first instance it gave an immense impetus to the work of the already existing Religious Societies inside the Church of England. These Societies were groups of ' serious young men,' who came together, usually under the influence of some active clergyman, to strengthen each other in religious life and practice. The original idea of John Wesley, many years later, was merely to form such ' societies ' within the Church as those which that zealous Churchman his father had helped and defended in the reigns of William and Anne. The first object of these groups was to promote a religious life in individuals and families, to encourage church

attendance, family prayers and Bible study. But more public activities soon grew out of the impulse thus given. Of these activities some were carried on in rivalry to the Dissenters, others with their co-operation.[76]

The Dissenters, who were excluded from both the Universities by law, and from many schools either by law or by custom, had started all over the country a number of excellent schools and academies of their own, covering the whole field of primary, secondary and higher education. These caused much jealousy, and at the end of Anne's reign the High Churchmen at last succeeded in passing the Schism Act to suppress them—an act of persecution quickly repealed under George I. But the Church also reacted to the challenge of the nonconformist schools in a more generous fashion. In the reign of Anne, Charity Schools were founded by hundreds all over England, to educate the children of the poor in reading, writing, moral discipline, and the principles of the Church of England. They were much needed, for the State did nothing for the education of the poor, and the ordinary parish had no sort of endowed school, though in many villages ' dames ' and other unofficial persons taught rustics their letters in return for fees; here and there an endowed Grammar School gave secondary education to the middle class.[77]

The able men at the head of the Charity School movement introduced the principle of democratic co-operation into the field of educational endowment. They did not depend merely on the support of a few wealthy founders. The policy at headquarters was to excite the local interest of a parish in the setting up of a school. Small shopkeepers and artisans were induced to subscribe and to collect subscriptions, and were taught to take a personal interest in the success, and a personal part in the control of the school for which they helped yearly to pay. The principle of ' joint stock enterprise ' was being applied to many sides of life in that era, among others to the cause of philanthropy and education. By the end of Anne's reign there were 5000 or more boys and girls attending the new Charity Schools in the London area, and some 20,000

in the rest of England. The movement was already being taken up in Scotland by the General Assembly. Essential parts of the scheme were to clothe the children decently while at school, and to apprentice them to good trades afterwards. In 1708 a 'poor boy' could be clothed at nine shillings and twopence, and a 'poor girl' at ten shillings and threepence in one of the London schools.[78]

Another characteristic organization of this period was 'The Society for the Reformation of Manners.' In its open ranks Churchmen and Dissenters co-operated against the licence of the age. Scores of thousands of tracts were issued against drunkenness, swearing, public indecency and Sunday trading. We know not what success attended the *Kind cautions against swearing* distributed among the hackney coachmen of London, and the similar *Kind cautions to watermen* distributed among the West Country bargees. More effective, perhaps, were the innumerable prosecutions instituted. Magistrates were shamed into enforcing laws which had become obsolete. These activities aroused furious opposition. Some of the High Churchmen, like Sacheverell, clamoured for the 'ancient discipline of the Church' to suppress vice, immorality, heresy and schism, instead of this new-fangled Society for the Reformation of Manners in which laymen and even Dissenters were allowed to take a part. Some prudent Bishops like Sharp, and Judges like Holt, feared that organized delation would lead to ill-feeling, corruption and blackmail. Many magistrates positively refused to receive the evidence of the philanthropic informers. The mob in some places was dangerous, and at least one active member of the Society was murdered outright.

Nevertheless there were tens of thousands of successful prosecutions. It was said that no one but a person of quality could safely swear in a public place. There was, indeed, a strong body of opinion that supported these proceedings. Many quiet citizens had found the magistrates, ever since the Restoration, scandalously lax in restraining drunkards from annoying the sober, in protecting women from insult, and in preserving any show of decency

and order. Nor was Sunday trading really desired by the bulk of the community. The Mayor of Deal, a courageous and energetic man, undertook single-handed a crusade against the behaviour of the town, carried most of his points and was re-elected Mayor in 1708. It is indeed probable that many of the prosecutions, especially for swearing and for travelling on Sunday, were vexatious, and the time came under the Georges when the Society was doing as much harm as good, and could disappear. But its activities in the reign of Anne helped to make the streets and taverns less unpleasant for decent people, to reduce drunkenness and to secure Sunday as a day of rest from business and labour.

The more gloomy side of the English Sunday struck a German visitor in 1710:

> In the afternoon to St. James's Park, to see the crowds. No other diversion is allowed on Sunday, which is nowhere more strictly kept; not only is all play forbidden, and public-houses closed, but few even of the boats and hackney coaches may ply. Our hostess would not even allow the strangers to play the *viol di Gamba* or the flute, lest she should be punished.

He added, rather sourly, that Sunday observance was the only visible sign that the English were Christians at all.[79]

But the most important and lasting impression of the religious revival was made by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and its offshoot, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. The self-same men were the supporters of both, above all the indefatigable Dr. Thomas Bray. The same spirit as afterwards characterized the societies that abolished the Slave Trade and Slavery, inspired these voluntary societies of evangelists, lay and clerical, High and Low Church, Nonjuror and Nonconformist. The last years of William's reign and the first of Anne's saw them fully at work. The diffusion of Bibles and of other religious literature was their chief object. They were therefore great advocates of the Charity Schools where the poor could be taught to read them; the two movements went side by side. The Society's publications were welcomed by Marlborough in

the army, and by Benbow and Rooke in the fleet. Cheap Bibles and Prayer Books were furnished in the country districts. And a supply of Bibles and other books to America was begun on a large scale, and to the rest of the world on a scale, modest indeed as compared to the gigantic work of the Society in later years, but ever growing with the growing power and wealth of England oversea. These activities betokened an instinctive movement of the English religious world to get away, on one side at least, from the denominational and political feuds in which it was entangled, into a field of broader vision, where zeal might produce something better than hate.

In the reign of Anne, as also long before and long after, religious differences were the motive force behind political passions. It is doubly impossible, therefore, for the English historian to ignore religion, if he would explain other phenomena. But he must not be tempted to forget that there was more in the religious sense of the nation than the feuds out of which, incidentally, our political liberties in large part arose. The religious life of many quiet parishes and humble families moved on its way, little concerned with partisanship of High and Low Church; English religion was, in the main, a free and healthy function of that old-world life, nicely guiding itself between superstition and fanaticism on the one side and material barbarism on the other.

The movement towards philanthropy instead of persecution, as an outlet for religious enthusiasm, was one of the characteristic fruits of the Revolution, as also was the improvement in public justice, both political and criminal. Because the Revolution Settlement was not a party victory, but an agreed compromise between Whig and Tory, Church and Dissent, it made humanity, moderation and co-operation the main current of affairs in the Eighteenth Century. The stabilizing and securing of these gains, in the face of violent counsels urging a return to former methods, was not yet certain when Anne came to the throne; but she herself and her chosen servant, Marlborough, stood, with certain reserves, for the new system of

moderation at home, and were prepared to defend it in arms against assault from abroad. By proclaiming the Pretender a few months before Anne's accession, Louis XIV had for the time rallied the whole nation to the Revolution Settlement. The Tories had resented his action no less fiercely than the Whigs. Above all, the great City of London was behind the new system and ready to defend it against King Louis with purse and person. In London, more easily than elsewhere, Churchmen and Dissenters co-operated in philanthropic or patriotic causes, and religious toleration was regarded as essential to the life of a great trading community. Such a trading community London was already, and the whole of England was on the way to become.

CHAPTER IV

London. Her trade and population. Her political and financial power. Her relations to the Revolution governments. The Tower. Westminster. London's self-government and privileges. The City. The river and environs. St. James's. Coffee Houses. Plays and music. Literature. Newspapers. Posts and roads. Mining. Apprenticeship and child labour. Cloth trade. Industry under rural conditions. Decay of municipal life. The Justices of the Peace. State of the prisons.

Two miles away from the Parliament at Westminster and the Queen's Court at St. James's lay the centre of the greatest City in the world, less under the jurisdiction of Court and Parliament than any other portion of English soil. London was governed by her own freely elected magistrates; policed, in so far as she was policed at all, by her own constables; guarded by her own militia; and rendered formidable to the neighbouring seat of government by the largest and least manageable mob in the island. With only a tenth part of her present population, and much less than a tenth of her present area, London had more than her present relative importance. She surpassed her nearest English rivals, Bristol and Norwich, at least fifteen times in number of inhabitants. Her merchants and her markets controlled the larger business operations of the towns and villages of England, 'sucking the vitals of trade to herself.' It was the peculiar boast of the men of Bristol that they alone kept their trade independent of London, bringing American goods to their own port and disposing of them in the west through their own carriers and agents. Everywhere else the strings of trade were pulled from the capital. 'Norwich buys Exeter serges, Exeter buys Norwich stuffs, all at London.'[80] Every county joined in the great national business of supplying London with food, coal or raw material. In return she sent to every county the finished goods of her own luxury trades, and the distant products of her foreign merchandise. To the port of London belonged practically all the East India trade of the country, most of the European, Mediterranean and African, and much of the American.

The lower strata of the population of the capital, the dockers and unskilled casual labour of a great mart and port, lived under the most filthy conditions of overcrowding, without sanitation, police or doctors, and far beyond the range of philanthropy, education and religion. Such was their state both in the City proper and in the liberties beyond, when the new century and the new reign began. The death-rate among them was appalling, and was still going up because they were learning to drink spirits instead of ale. The privileged sanctuary of outlaws in 'Alsatia,' so outrageous to the dignity of the neighbouring lawyers at the Temple, had indeed been abolished a few years before, but the fraternity of thieves, highwaymen and harlots had only been scattered thence to spread themselves more thickly over the whole metropolitan area. Their secret organizer, the great Jonathan Wild, flourished under Anne, ostensibly as a zealous magistrate, really as a receiver of stolen goods on an immense scale. Some of his methods of preserving discipline among his subordinates are ascribed to Peachum in the opening scene of the *Beggar's Opera*, which was written immediately after Wild's belated exposure, trial and execution in 1725. His life's story argues an inefficiency on the part of magistrates and constables, that only began to be remedied in the middle of the century, when the famous brothers Fielding set up their office in Bow Street.

Even honest workmen in the ranks of unskilled labour in London were totally without education: Jonathan Brown, a leading personality among the bargemen, confessed to Calamy, the dissenting preacher, that he and his companions 'had never so much as heard who or what Christ was,'[81] though they could easily be set on by their

betters to burn Meeting Houses or Popish Chapels according to the religious requirements of the hour. It was to combat this state of things that the Charity Schools were being founded by public subscription, and that in 1711 Parliament voted the taxpayers' money to build fifty new churches in the suburbs for several hundred thousand persons unprovided for by the Established Church ; the Dissenters, whom the Committee reckoned at 100,000 in that district, already had their own chapels.* Similarly, it was to remedy the material wants of this neglected mass of humanity that under the first two Georges hospitals were founded by private benevolence, and medical assistance was provided. The material and medical advance in conditions of London life under the Georges so lowered the death-rate, that the population went up with startling rapidity in the period of the early Industrial Revolution. We may imagine then what the life of the London poor was like in Hogarth's boyhood.[82]

But London was above all a city of contrasts. The port and mart where the goods of England and the world were exchanged, required not only the muscular efforts of unskilled labour, but a supervising army of foremen, clerks, shopkeepers and middlemen of every variety. Moreover, London was not only a mart ; she was also the seat of manufactures, of finishing processes and luxury trades, employing the most skilled workmen in the island. Many thousands of Huguenot silk manufacturers had recently settled in Spitalfields, and other skilled trades previously conducted in France were now practised in Longacre and Soho by refugees who were rapidly becoming Englishmen and were already voting Whig.[83] The finest native craftsmanship was also concentrated in London. In the best shops of the City the apprentices were sons of country gentlemen, likely to die richer than their elder brothers, and dressing in full-bottomed wigs when off duty.[84] Greater London was the centre of English literary and intellectual life, and of fashion, law and government. For all these reasons the capital contained, alongside of the most brutal ignorance, an immense and varied stock of skill and intellect. London wits were

* See p 58, above ; *H. of C. Journals*, April 6, 1711.

sharpened, not only by the processes of national and world commerce, but by daily contact with the lawyers and politicians of Westminster, and with the noblemen and persons of fashion of St. James's. During the season, the leaders of Society lived in private mansions or in boarding houses west of Temple Bar, and were as much Londoners as the annually returning swallow is English.

Such a city, containing more than a tenth of the population of England * and a good half of its trained thinking power, placed beside the seat of government at Westminster in juxtaposition so close as to form a single metropolis, could not fail to exercise a decisive influence on the course of English history, in the days when the difficulties of travel still isolated Court and Parliament from the other towns and shires of the land. At no time, indeed, did London seek to govern England as Rome had governed Italy or as Athens sought to govern Greece. She accepted the government of England by the Monarchy or by Parliament, so long as the rulers of the land remained at Westminster outside her gates, leaving her ancient municipal liberties undisturbed, and so long as they conducted the religious and foreign affairs of the country in the main in accordance with principles that were popular in London. The Kings and Queens whom she favoured—Henry VIII, Elizabeth, William III and Anne—left behind them political structures that survived. Those who quarrelled with her built for the day—Mary Tudor, the two Charleses and Jameses, and the Protector—though Oliver and the Second Charles each owed his rise to power largely to her support.

In Tudor times, the action of London enabled a strong national Monarchy to be erected on the ruins of ecclesiastical and feudal privilege. In the following century the quarrel of London with that Monarchy resulted in the transfer of political power to Parliament. The seat of English

* It has been estimated from the registers of baptisms that in 1700, when England and Wales contained rather more than five and a half million inhabitants, the Metropolitan Area contained 674,350. Of these the 'City' proper contained about 200,000 (Mrs. George, *London Life, etc.*, pp. 24–25, 329–330). On the figures of population for England and Wales, see Talbot-Griffith, *Royal Statistical Society Journal*, 1929, Vol. XCII, Pt. II, pp. 256–263.

government lay just outside the gates of the City, as London's hostage : when Charles I at Westminster attempted to arrest the Five Members, over whom London threw her shield, he was forced to fly from his palace, and he never returned save as a captive. In the Civil War the wealth, brains and sea-power of the City proved more than a match for the Crown.

The Restoration of the Monarchy upon terms in 1660 was the joyous, voluntary act of London, tired of the rule of saints and soldiers. But Charles II and his brother quarrelled with her again, and leagued with France against her liberties. Taking advantage of Whig and Tory divisions in the City, the royal brothers seized her Charters, and made her for awhile the slave of arbitrary power. James lived to pay the price. On the rumour that William of Orange was about to sail, the Lord Chancellor Jeffreys humbly brought back the old Charters to Guild Hall, too late to save himself and his master. When the crown was offered to William and Mary on terms stricter than the terms of Charles II's restoration, London endorsed the deed, without any of those hesitations and regrets that moved some of the other elements in the body politic.

Thenceforth the City was the surest bulwark of the new regime. And in return the Revolution Settlement offered complete security to the restored privileges of London, and to the high place claimed by London in the counsels of the State. The City might have only four members in Parliament, but after the Revolution she exercised an influence like that of a separate estate of the Realm. That influence, unknown to the law of the constitution, was resented by the Tory squires, who held that political power should be monopolized by the landholders. But the governments of the Revolution, whether Whig or Tory, had to fight for their life with France, and only the City could supply the sinews of war. The establishment of the Bank and the National Debt in William's reign forged new links between the Ministers and the Merchants, and emphasized the political and financial meaning of the new constitution.

To these things also Anne was heir. Whether she called herself Whig or Tory, High Church or Low, she

must accept the alliance with London because she was heir to the Revolution, and needed defence against Louis XIV and his client, her brother on whose throne she sat. And the men of London, on their part, required in 1702 that their trade with the Mediterranean and America should be saved from the open attack of the new Franco-Spanish power. The capital would never again suffer the government to assume towards France the dependent attitude of Charles and James II. And so, by a series of linked inexorable facts of public life, no less than by her private attachment to Sarah Churchill, Anne was bound to choose Marlborough and Godolphin as her confidential advisers rather than her kinsman Rochester and the more high-flying Tories, who did not see things at home and abroad as the City saw them. In the November after Anne had ascended the throne, a foreigner noted :

> In the evening there was an illumination in the City, in memory of King William's coming. [And next day] a Pope of straw with the Devil behind him, are set on a cart : they go from house to house begging contributions for a great bonfire, into which they cast Pope and Devil.[85]

With London in this mood, there might be a Tory Queen and a Tory Parliament, but none the less let Louis and the Pretender beware. Seven years later, when Louis had been brought low and London mobs began to cheer for Sacheverell and to burn Meeting Houses instead of Popes, the deferred High Church holiday could safely take place.*

The Tower of London, which was to have overawed the citizens, had been built by William the Conqueror on the side of the City away from Westminster. Partly for that reason, it had not overawed them long. In Stuart times it could not, in its isolated position, serve to protect Westminster and Whitehall from the insults of the London mob. In Anne's reign the Tower still served as the great Arsenal whence cannon and gunpowder were shipped to the wars

* Ned Ward, in his Tory poem *Vulgus Britannicus*, celebrating the burning of Meeting Houses by the Sacheverell mob in 1709, distinctly and repeatedly states that this London mob had previously been Whiggish (*e.g.*, at pp. 43–47 of the ed. of 1710).

oversea, and as the Mint presided over by Newton himself as Master. Its outer walls enclosed a network of streets inhabited by the officers of these two establishments. On occasion it was still a State prison. But already it had its lighter side, as the Zoo and Museum of the Capital. Visitors were taken to see the Crown Jewels, and the newly finished Armoury where a line of English Kings sat mounted in battle array. The stock of lions and other wild beasts had been maintained ever since the days when the Tower had been a favourite residence of mediæval kings ; it was finely replenished by presents to Queen Anne from the monarchs of North African 'Barbary,' with whom the English merchants traded, and with whom the captors of Gibraltar made treaties of alliance against France and Spain.[86]

Between the Tower and Temple Bar stretched the length of the City proper ; its meagre breadth extended northwards from the river only as far as the 'bars' of Smithfield, Holborn and Whitechapel.* But the march of bricks and mortar had burst the municipal bounds, chiefly in a westerly direction, attracted towards the seat of national government at Westminster. At the Strand began the jurisdiction of that City. But the municipal privileges of Westminster were no rival to those of London. Neither London nor the Court nor Parliament had ever wished to have to deal with a Lord Mayor of Westminster. So Westminster was never permitted to enjoy self-government, or to acquire a corporate sense. It was ruled by twelve burgesses appointed for life by the High Steward, and even their powers were being rapidly superseded by those of the Justices of the Peace and of the Vestries of the different parishes. It is true that the parliamentary franchise in Westminster was democratic, and in the days when most boroughs had a narrow franchise, the election of a member of Parliament for Westminster caused unusual political excitement long before the time of Charles Fox, as when General Stanhope stood in 1710 in the Whig interest and was defeated after a fierce contest and a hot canvass. But Westminster's local government was a mere bureaucracy,

* These 'bar' boundaries were, of course, more extensive than the original City bounded by the wall and gates, *e.g.* Temple Bar was farther west than Ludgate.

so far as it was anything better than an anarchy of rival jurisdictions.

On the other hand the City of London enjoyed complete self-government in an unusually democratic form. At that time very few boroughs in England were so free of the element of oligarchy, unless it were Ipswich and Norwich. In London as many as 12,000 ratepaying householders voted in their respective Wards to elect the 26 Aldermen and 200 Common Councillors. These ratepayers at the Wards were almost identical with the Liverymen of the 89 Gilds and Companies : in their double capacity they controlled by their votes the complicated mediæval machinery of London self-government.

The electorate of shopkeepers chose men of their own class to represent them on the Common Council, rather than the great merchant princes known in the world of high finance and politics. The City magnates were more often chosen as Aldermen. Common pride in the privileges and power of London, and jealous care for her independence, prevented a serious breach between the great men of the Exchange and the shopkeeping democracy. But there was sometimes friction, and in the course of Anne's reign a tendency became apparent for the democratic Common Council to be Tory, and for the Mayor, Aldermen and wealthy City magnates to be Whig.

The jurisdiction of London's elected magistrates was not confined to the area of their own City. Their power stopped short of Westminster, but they clipped it in on every side. They possessed the Shrievalty of Middlesex and the Bailiwick of Southwark. They administered and taxed the port of London. The Lord Mayor was Conservator of the river from Gravesend and Tilbury up to a point just above Staines Bridge—a course of over sixty miles. London levied coal duties in a radius of twelve miles, and enforced her monopoly of markets in a radius of seven.[87]

The City proper was the most densely populated acreage in England. It was not, as now, abandoned to 'cats and caretakers' at nightfall ; the merchant prince and the

shopkeeper slept, each with his family, over his place of business—servants and prentices above in the garrets, and porters and messengers packed away anywhere in cellarage and warehouse. Old Jewry and Basinghall Street, in particular, were reputed to contain the homes of some of the richest men in England. But the nobility of the realm had already deserted their ancestral palaces in the crowded City, whence gardens were vanishing apace : ' the great ' resided, during the season, round Covent Garden, Piccadilly, Bloomsbury, or St. James's Square, or in some other section of Westminster. And the rich merchants, who still inhabited their beloved City for reasons alike of business and of sentiment, had also their country houses and villas among the woods, fields and pleasant villages within a twenty-mile radius of London. In their suburban and riverside retreats—in Hampstead, West Ham, Walthamstow, and below Epsom Downs, already a great pleasure resort, and especially along the green shores of the Thames from Chelsea upwards—there was perhaps as much good eating and drinking done by Londoners as in the City itself. The poorer sort walked out for a holiday in the country to less distant places like Dulwich.[88]

In London the river was the most crowded of the highways. Passengers in boats were perpetually threading the heavy commercial traffic, to the accompaniment of volleys of traditional abuse exchanged between boatmen and bargees. On the north bank, between London Bridge and the Parliament Stairs were at least thirty landing places, where boats waited by the steps to carry people along or across the river. Statesmen and parsons going over to Lambeth, or prentices and budding barristers on lighter errands to Cupid's Garden hard by, one and all crossed by boat. There were ferries with platforms to take a coach and horses. For until Westminster Bridge was built in 1738, London Bridge was the only road over the river. The street that stood upon it had been rebuilt in a more modern style since the ravages of the Great Fire, but the projection of its ancient piers still hindered and endangered traffic. To ' shoot the bridge ' was still an adventure ; it was said that London Bridge was made for wise men to go over and fools to go under.

The big shipping, therefore, came no higher than the Bridge. Below it, a forest of masts covered the Pool of London, with which no scene in the world save Amsterdam could compare. The fairway was the more crowded because scarcely any of the great docks had then been dug out, except those at Deptford, and the single dock at Blackwall used for the vessels of the East India Company.[89]

To pass from the City to Westminster by land, Fleet Ditch had first to be crossed. It was spanned by the bridges of Fleet Street and Holborn ; below them, glided barges laden with coal, where to-day the solid traffic of Farringdon Street moves at a scarcely more rapid pace. But the headwaters of the Fleet River, rising amid the hills of Hampstead and Highgate, flowed through the green fields of St. Pancras and Clerkenwell.

A few years before the Queen's accession, the learned Edmund Gibson had appended to his edition of Camden's *Britannia* a list of more than a hundred ' rare plants growing wild in Middlesex,' which botanists may read with envy to-day. The *Osmunda regalis* fern still grew on Hampstead Heath, for popular ignorance of bird and plant life still gave the less common species a chance to flourish, and the collector had not yet plundered England.

Amid the hayfields on Thames bank stood Chelsea Hospital in solitary grandeur, inhabited by four hundred red-coated pensioners of Sedgemoor, Landen and the Boyne, discussing the weekly news of Marlborough's doings with the professional earnestness of Corporal Trim. A little way off lay the village of Chelsea, where a few persons of fashion had taken the fancy to build themselves retreats, as far removed from the turmoil of London and Westminster as Kensington Palace itself.[90]

Since coal was burnt on almost every London hearth, the air was so infected that a foreign scholar complained ' whenever I examine London books I make my ruffles as black as coal.' On days when the north-east wind carried the smoke-cloud, even Chelsea became dangerous to the asthmatic, as the philosopher Earl of Shaftesbury had reason

to complain.[91] There is no wonder that King William had lived at Hampton Court when he could, and at Kensington when he must. Westminster would have been death to him. Anne, on her accession, could safely move the royal residence from country to town, from Kensington to St. James's Palace. But that was all the satisfaction she would give to her loving subjects ; not only was she often at Bath and yet more often at Windsor, but, even when she came to town, the doors of St. James's were open only to her Ministers and her female favourites, and to those whom Ministers or favourites introduced by the front stairs or the back. Throughout her reign she was an invalid. What asthma was to William, gout or dropsy was to Anne. To be jolted in a coach to Westminster to open Parliament, or to St. Paul's to give public thanks for some famous victory, was a penance that she could only occasionally consent to endure.

Queen Anne therefore kept Court as little as her predecessor. Metaphorically as well as literally, the Whitehall of the Merry Monarch lay in ruins, never to rise again. Except the Banqueting House of tragic memory, the whole Palace had been burnt in 1698, and its roofless walls still cumbered the river bank. Buckingham House was still the residence of a subject. The fashionable world parading in chairs and six-horse coaches in the Mall, or sauntering in the more private garden immediately below the windows of St. James's Palace, had to be content with remembering that they were near the invisible Queen. It was more to the point that in the other direction the Houses of Parliament were but a few minutes' walk away from the centre of fashion.

As in the reign of Charles II, the Coffee House was still the centre of social life. It afforded a much needed relaxation of the severe drinking habits of the time, for alcohol was not to be had on the premises. A list of some of the Coffee Houses in Queen Anne's reign runs to nearly five hundred names. Every respectable Londoner had his favourite house, where his friends or clients could seek him at known hours.

'Remember, John,
'If any ask, to th' Coffee House I'm gone,'

says the citizen to his apprentice as he leaves the shop.

Then at Lloyd's Coffee House he never fails
To read the letters and attend the sales.*

The *beau monde* assembled at White's Chocolate House in St. James's Street, where, as Harley bitterly complained to Swift, young noblemen were fleeced and corrupted by fashionable gamblers and profligates. Tories went to the Cocoa Tree Chocolate House, Whigs to St. James's Coffee House. Will's, near Covent Garden, was the resort of poets, critics and their patrons ; Truby's served the clergy, and the Grecian the world of scholarship ; nor were there lacking houses for Dissenters, for Quakers, for Papists and for Jacobites. The 'universal liberty of speech of the English nation' uttered amid clouds of tobacco smoke, with equal vehemence whether against the Government and the Church, or against their enemies, had long been the wonder of foreigners ; it was the quintessence of Coffee House life.

The Coffee House filled the place now occupied by the Club, but in a more cheap and informal manner, and with a greater admission of strangers. In days when men stood much on their rank, it had a levelling influence : at the Coffee House 'you will see blue ribbons and stars sitting familiarly with private gentlemen as if they had left their quality and degrees of distance at home.' But that was not all. In days before telegrams and effective journalism, news could be most easily obtained at the Coffee House. The Windsor, at Charing Cross, advertised itself as supplying the 'best chocolate at twelve pence the quart and the translation of the *Harlem Courant* soon after the post is come

* In Ned Ward's *Wealthy Shopkeeper* (1706) his day is thus apportioned : rise at 5 ; counting-house till 8 ; then breakfast on toast and Cheshire cheese ; in his shop for two hours ; then a neighbouring coffee house for news ; shop again, till dinner at home (over the shop) at 12 on a 'thundering joint' ; 1 o'clock on Change ; 3 Lloyd's Coffee House for business ; shop again for an hour ; then another coffee house (not Lloyd's) for recreation, followed by 'sack shop' to drink with acquaintances, till home for 'a light supper' and so to bed 'before Bow Bell rings nine.'

in.' Not only was news sought for its political, military and general interest, but for the strictly business purposes of commerce as at Lloyd's. Edward Lloyd, whose surname instantly rises to men's lips when they speak of shipping to-day, was, when he walked the earth, nothing more nor less than a Coffee House keeper in Lombard Street in Queen Anne's reign. To his house merchants came for the latest information, and for the personal intercourse and advice necessary for all transactions. Newspapers had then no commercial column and no details of shipping. The spoken word did many things that print does to-day, and for merchants the word was spoken at Lloyd's. Before Anne's reign ended Lloyd had set up a pulpit for auctions and for reading out the news.[92]

At six o'clock the theatres began to fill. A patriotic Briton has thus described the scene :

> The pit contains the gentlemen on benches ; and on the first story of boxes sit all the ladies of quality ; in the second, the citizens' wives and daughters ; and in the third, the common people and footmen ; so that between the acts you are as much diverted by viewing the beauties of the audience, as while they act with the subject of the play ; and the whole is illuminated to the greatest advantage. Whereas abroad, the stage only being illuminated, and the lodge or boxes close, you lose the pleasure of seeing the company. And indeed the English have reason in this, for no nation in the world can show such an assembly of shining beauties as here.[93]

The footmen aloft in ' Olympus,' had been originally admitted there free to form a *claque*, and had conspired to treat this concession as their inalienable privilege ; they had become the tyrants of the house, a plague to managers and to the politer part of the audience, interrupting the most affecting passages in the play with savage clamour.[94]

But on the whole the London theatres catered for people who were cultured or desired to be thought so. The drama had not yet been divorced from literature to marry commerce, and was still conducted on a repertory basis. Shakespeare was gaining rather than losing ground, though in versions disastrously mangled. The genius of Betterton and Mrs. Bracegirdle in the early years of Anne, and the

critiques of the *Spectator* in the latter part of the reign were preparing the way for the apotheosis of the national poet in the era of Garrick and Johnson. Actors' reputations were made in *Hamlet* and *Othello*, as they seldom are to-day.

Sometimes, indeed, the ladies of the audience were insensible even to the charms of Betterton acting Shakespeare. In 1709 a susceptible Irish baronet complains ' that they can talk of indifferent things while the tenderest passions of their whole frame are called for. Whereas I own freely had not Desdemona been very ugly I had certainly pulled out my handkerchief. There will be another trial of them this night at *Hamlet*.'

Betterton's power was matched by his restraint. Instead of ranting as Hamlet, at the entry of the ghost, ' he opened with a pause of mute amazement ; rising slowly to a solemn, trembling voice, he made the ghost equally terrible to the Spectator as to himself.' In Brutus quarrelling with Cassius, ' his spirit flew only to his eye ; his steady look alone supplied that terror which he disdained an intemperance in his voice should rise to.' But his greatest part was Othello.[95]

But most of the plays acted belonged to the contemporary comedy of manners ; its best writers, Congreve, Vanbrugh and Farquhar are still, after more than two centuries, familiar to ' the town,' or at least to the suburbs. In their own day, the attack launched on the immorality of the stage by Jeremy Collier, the Nonjuror, was a theme of discussion constantly renewed throughout the reign of Anne. Collier's first blast had been blown in 1698, but the argument was carried on for years by other clergymen —' venomed priests ' as they were called in Vanbrugh's Prologues. The clerical critics were able to draw on a formidable armoury of undesirable passages quoted from the dramas of the day.[96] The assault, though exaggerated and in part misdirected, was neither unprovoked nor ineffectual. Colley Cibber, actor-manager and dramatist, confessed that :

> the calling our dramatic writers to a strict account had a very wholesome effect. They were now a great deal more upon their guard ; indecencies were no longer wit ; and by degrees the fair sex

came again to fill the boxes on the first day of a new comedy without fear or censure.[97]

Colley Cibber's own play, *The Careless Husband*, which appeared in 1704, turns on the reclamation of an erring husband by the virtues of his wife. Cibber, who was very far from being the dullard that Pope afterwards made him out, had perceived shortly after the accession of Anne that the moment had come for a play with a moral ending, but still enlivened by dialogue and situation not too refined : with the help of the rising star of Nance Oldfield, *The Careless Husband* became the theatrical success of the winter that followed Blenheim. The dramas of Anne's reign were, on the average, less heartless than those of the preceding decades. The comedies of Addison, Steele and Mrs. Centlivre gave a kindlier and less cynical view of men and women than the abler work of Congreve, who never wrote a play after 1700. Indeed, by the end of the Queen's reign sentimentalism was a fault of the modern playwrights, both comic and tragic. The tragedies of Rowe, like the essays and plays of Addison, were addressed to ' the fair sex ' that now mingled with the male part of the audience without fear of being put to the blush. And increasingly the tone of the theatre was set by the middle classes rather than by the Court. The stage therefore became more respectable and more sentimental than in the period of the Restoration Comedy.

One peculiarity of the stage at this time was that nearly all the dramatists were Whigs, and that consequently the army, during the Marlborough wars, was represented in a sympathetic light, instead of being pursued with the rancour which Tory writers like Swift so often showed in speaking of a redcoat.[98] Congreve, Addison, Rowe, Mrs. Centlivre and Colley Cibber were Whigs, and Farquhar, Vanbrugh and Steele were not only Whigs but soldiers. But the politics of the audience was by no means entirely Whig. Indeed, during the period of Marlborough's greatest unpopularity with the Tories, at the close of the war which he had won for England, the management thought fit to interpolate in the middle of the deceased Farquhar's

Recruiting Officer a chorus of soldiers in uniform, to sing a scurrilous song against Marlborough's avarice, ending every verse with the chorus :

But Marlborough not a penny.

One of the Duke's daughters who was present ' blushed scarlet,' but the play was interrupted for a quarter of an hour by the frenzied cheering of the Tory ladies and gentlemen.[99]

In music, the age of Anne saw the invasion and conquest of England by the Italian Opera, under the able leadership of Nicolini and his band of eunuchs. There was a short struggle, in which native musical tradition attempted to hold its own. Steele, in the Epilogue to his *Tender Husband*, exhorted the audience,

No more th' Italian squalling tribe admit,
In tongues unknown ; 'tis Popery in wit,

while Addison's other friend Tickell denounced it as,

Nonsense well tuned and sweet stupidity.

But the ladies loved to see ' Nicolini strangle a lion with great gallantry,' and the Italian opera took hold. It became the vogue to depreciate Purcell and old English songs and music, once held to be the best in Europe. Nothing is more striking than the inability of the English to stand by their native traditions in art ; the following of French fashions in so many things had prepared the way for this musical surrender to the Italians. By the end of the reign Addison had sadly to admit : ' The foreign tone and manner which are expected in everything now performed among us, has put music itself to a stand.' It was not till the following reign that the ingenious Mr. Gay created in the comic or ballad Opera a refuge for English humour and English musical genius, where they survived in a state of semi-obscurity, with the help of Dibdin, till the advent of Gilbert and Sullivan.[100]

The reading public was still so small that authors could not live by their sales alone. It is true that Defoe, Addison and Swift were creating forms of literature and journalism that greatly enlarged the area influenced by the pen. But

patronage was still necessary for authors to subsist, and it could be courted in a variety of ways : the aspirant might present copies, or dedicate editions of his works to ' a person of quality,' who might reward him with a bag of guineas, or haply with a living or with a post in public or private service ; or else he might write political poems, pamphlets and Reviews for the Whig or Tory parties, to earn similar rewards from the party leaders.

Of the personal relationship of author and patron, the following example will serve, though here too an element of the political can perhaps be detected : a certain Joseph Harris writes to Thomas Coke, M.P. :[101]

> Some time since I presented to your honour a book which I writ on my Lord Duke of Marlborough ; and last summer I presented another book to you, called Luzzara, being an encomium on Prince Eugene of Savoy. As yet I have never had any return for either of those presents to your honour, wherefore now, by reason I am very ill and lame of rheumatism, I humbly make bold to address myself to your honour either for small charity, or for return of the books that I may present them to some other persons of quality. I have nothing but what I get by translating out of Latin, Greek and Spanish to maintain my wife and four children.

There speaks the authentic, unhappy voice of Grub Street. There were many more servants of the Muse living like poor Harris than like Secretary Addison, Dean Swift or Sir Richard Steele.

In his life of Matthew Prior, Dr. Johnson remarks : Throughout the reigns of William and Anne no prosperous event passed undignified by poetry.' The flood of such patriotic verses, dedicated to all the statesmen and generals in the country, has sunk, as floods sink, into the ground in deserved oblivion, all save Addison's *Campaign* that still adds lustre to Blenheim. But the prose of Whig and Tory polemics contained a larger proportion of stuff destined to endure : Swift and Addison, as journalists, spoke to their day but they have been overheard by the ages. The importance of the pamphlet and of the political Review, and the price that political leaders were ready to pay the writers thereof, naturally resulted from government by Parliament and by public opinion. It was for this reason that Voltaire

in his youth found that literary men were much more highly esteemed in England than in his own despotically governed country. Political power could not be exercised in England unless a wide public had first been persuaded. As there was then no reporting of speeches or publication of parliamentary debates, and very few political meetings of any kind, literary men had to be employed to say to the people what the political leaders wished to have said. Men with this gift occupied, therefore, a very high place in the society of Queen Anne's reign, while their brother poets were starving in garrets.

The rich rewards of political literature was one of the causes why men of letters, though they still wrote verse as well as prose, were turning away even in their verse from poetry and imagination to the prosaic and journalistic spirit of the clear, rational Eighteenth Century. Milton, indeed, had written political pamphlets, but their best passages had retained the quality of great poetry rather than of skilled pamphleteering. This cannot be said of any writer in the age of Anne.

The Censorship had been removed in 1695 and a vested interest in free literature had consequently sprung up. When it was proposed to restore the censorship in 1703 ' to restrain the licentiousness of the press,' the workmen printers of London petitioned the House of Commons that they would be thrown out of work in great numbers if the Bill became law.[102] This national industry born of freedom was settled almost entirely in the Capital. London sent to the farthest ends of the land the outpourings of her seventy printing and publishing houses.

In the days of the Popish Plot and the Revolution, it had been customary to satisfy the thirst for news by ' newsletters ' in manuscript sent down from the capital to correspondents in the provinces. But when Anne ascended the throne, written communications were beginning to be replaced by the printing of a dozen London newspapers. The newspaper usually consisted of a single sheet of two printed sides, sometimes folded into four pages ; it appeared two or three times in the week, and contained the main

items of home and foreign intelligence, set down without comment. The last half page was devoted to advertisements of such items as patent medicines, sales of houses, meetings for 'the noble and heroic sport of cockfighting,' or the vent of Portugal wine by Messrs. Brook and Hellier. Some papers gave a Tory twist to their news, like the *Postboy*, or a Whig twist like the *Postman*. But the news was much the same in all, and there was no leading article.

There was, however, another type of periodical, like the Whig *Observator* and Defoe's *Review* in the early years of the Queen's reign, giving little news but commenting at length upon news reported elsewhere. A few years later this new method of journalism reached its perfection in the *Spectators* and *Examiners* of Steele, Addison and Swift.

By the end of the reign, a few of the largest provincial capitals had started newspapers of their own, upon the London model. Such was the *Newcastle Courant* begun in 1711. The first serious check to the rapid and healthy growth of journalism that signalized the reign of Anne was the effective measure taken to muzzle the press by Bolingbroke, when in 1712 he put a heavy duty on newspapers and their advertisements.[103]

Some counties had no printing presses at all, and the greatest provincial capitals seldom had more than one or two apiece. All England looked to London as the original source of news, opinions and arguments of every colour in politics, religion, literature and fashion—and to London, Oxford and Cambridge for works of learning. The printer was generally a publisher, and the publisher was generally a bookseller, who sold the books he printed. The London booksellers were most of them attached either to the Whig or Tory cause, and some of them to the Jacobite.*

London was the focus not only of literature, journalism

* Nichols's *Lit. Anecdotes* (1812), I, pp. 289–312. The printer and publisher in Newcastle-upon-Tyne put the following advertisement into his paper, the *Newcastle Courant*, in 1711: 'This is to give notice to all Gentlemen and lovers of learning who are willing to publish any book in the Northern parts, that John White, printer, living in the Close in Newcastle-upon-Tine, is furnished with great variety of letters and presses and will be ready to print the same upon reasonable terms.'

and public news, but even of private correspondence. The General Post Office with a staff of forty sorters, was established in Lombard Street, and nearly all letters in England sent by the public post had to pass through it: the first 'cross posts,' going straight between two important towns without touching London, were only set up a few years before Anne came to the throne. But in the rural parts letters were sent by private messengers to a much greater extent then than now. The London area already enjoyed a penny post, under the management of the Lombard Street Office, with delivery every few hours.[104]

The time which it took for the Post Office to deliver letters in the country, like the pace of all traffic by land, varied greatly according to the wet or dry condition of the roads. The postboys reckoned to accomplish the journey from London to Edinburgh in six days on the average. But in the storms of winter, postboy, horse and mailbag were apt to disappear in crossing a flooded valley: the horse may well have been a greater loss than the letters, of which there was sometimes only one for all Scotland in the mail from London. On a fine summer day, a good coach-and-four could accomplish the fifty-three miles from London to Cambridge between five in the morning and eight at night, a record easily broken in modern times by undergraduates on foot. Only the very best coaches had springs, and the cumbrous machines were seldom moved at a trot, except on the not infrequent appearance of a horseman of suspicious aspect. Highwaymen lurked in security in the unfelled thickets and unenclosed heaths, and were in league with many keepers of inns, like Boniface in the *Beaux' Stratagem*. In Scotland, indeed, the highwayman was unknown; he would have wearied of waiting for the rare passengers, and would have been little richer after their plunder than before. But in England no one began a journey wholly free from the fear of such encounters.

A more common sight upon the roads than the coach was the yet slower 'hooded waggon,' with passengers and luggage inside, and the carrier walking at the head of his eight horses. And more usual than any form of wheeled vehicle was the string of laden pack-horses, sometimes as

many as fifty in a single file, following a leader with a bell round its neck.[105]

During the war with France, the most usual route to the Continent lay through Harwich and Rotterdam. Travellers in an ordinary coach took two days between London and Harwich, and they were often held up a week at the port, waiting for weather in which to cross, with ' nothing to do, poor fare and a terribly long bill ' at the inn. The crossing itself might take another week, or might be accomplished in twenty-four hours if the breeze held and the French privateers from Dunkirk were avoided.

Even on the Great North Road, delays and perils were much increased in winter or foul weather. When in January 1709 the antiquarian Thoresby was leaving Huntingdon for London, the guide refused to proceed southward after a night of snow and flood. The party, however, rode on without him, causing the good folks of Royston to run out of their houses to gaze at such venturous travellers. They made thirty miles that day and slept at Puckeridge. Next day they reached London, but not before Thoresby's horse had plunged belly deep into the water by the roadside at Enfield, ' by the breaking of the ice.'

Such in winter was the Great North Road itself, in its best section. North of Grantham it consisted only of a narrow stone causeway with soft ground on both sides. On such a highway wheeled traffic could scarcely pass in wet weather ; and even horsemen, when shoved off the causeway by the pack-horse trains, sometimes had difficulty in getting back out of the morass into the middle of the road. Many highways were of this ' causeway ' type. Village roads were mere mud tracks or broad green lanes. It was well, perhaps, that so many roads were unenclosed for the greater part of their length, for passengers were therefore able to ride or walk off the morass of the road itself through the neighbouring heaths or corn-fields. Farmers complained, but the law upheld the rights of the distressed traveller in this matter. In enclosed counties like Kent, two horsemen could scarcely squeeze past one another at many points on the main road between London and Canterbury, and a coach entirely blocked the way between the hedges. The

Weald of Sussex, described as ' a sink fourteen miles broad,' was so ill drained that the roads between the North and South Downs were deep in mud till the middle of a dry summer. One picture by Defoe stays in the mind :

> Going to a Church in a country village not far from Lewis I saw an ancient lady, and a lady of very good quality I assure you, drawn to Church in her coach with six oxen ; nor was it done in frolic or humour, but mere necessity, the way being so stiff and deep, that no horses could go in it.[106]

The badness of the roads was due to the want of any adequate administrative machinery for their reconstruction or repair. Every parish through which a road passed was legally bound to maintain it by six days a year of unpaid labour given by the farmers, under no supervision save one of themselves chosen as surveyor. The unfairness of laying the burden of repair not on the users of the great roads, but on the parishes through which they happened to pass, was equalled by the folly of expecting farmers, who had no interest in the matter, to act gratuitously as skilled makers of highways. The result was that few hard roads had been made since the Romans left the island. In the Middle Ages, when there was little commerce, this had mattered but little. Under the later Stuarts, when commerce was large and rapidly increasing, it mattered much ; it was beginning to be felt as a national disgrace. The new system of turnpikes to make the users of the road pay for its upkeep was therefore enforced in a few of the worst sections by Acts of Parliament. When Anne came to the throne the usual machinery of local Justices of the Peace was employed to manage the turnpikes, but towards the end of the reign special bodies of Turnpike Trustees were sometimes established by Statute. It was not, however, till the House of Hanover had been some time on the throne that anything approaching a general reform was effected by this means.[107]

Under such conditions, sea and river traffic, however slow, held a great advantage over road traffic, especially for heavy goods. Fish could be sent up from Lyme Regis to

London by relays of fast trotting horses ; but coal came there by sea. Even so, while it cost but five shillings per chaldron at the Tyneside pit's mouth, it cost thirty shillings in London, and anything up to fifty shillings in the towns of the Upper Thames. This was partly because sea-borne coal was taxed, both to pay for the rebuilding of St. Paul's and to pay for the French war. Coal was cheaper in those towns of Yorkshire, Lancashire and the west Midlands to which it could be floated from the pit's mouth on rivers like the Calder or Severn. For coal carried on inland rivers was not taxed, like the coal carried by sea, neither was it exposed to the attacks of the Dunkirk privateers, nor harassed by the consequent restrictions of an inadequate convoy system supplied by the Royal Navy between Tyne and Thames.[108]

Whitehaven was springing into importance by exporting Cumbrian coal to Ireland. Bristol shipping exported coal from South Wales. In three-quarters of the counties of England where it is raised to-day, coal was being raised in Anne's reign. The ownership of mines and an interest in their working was not deemed beneath the dignity of the greatest noblemen of the land, for in England, unlike most countries of Europe, all minerals except gold and silver have been treated as the property of the owner of the soil. Among the aristocratic coal owners of that time was Lord Dartmouth, to whom belonged many of the Staffordshire mines near his country house at Sandwell. He had a rival in a country gentleman named Wilkins, who was said to have 'engrossed the coalworks of Leicestershire to himself.'

It was then usual to leave pillars of coal to support the roof of the mine, rather than to use timber props. Shafts were sunk to a depth of 400 feet and more, and in Lancashire the science of the engineers had devised in the year 1712 a machine for pumping water out of the mine which has been described as 'the first genuine steam-engine.' On Tyneside, wooden rails were used to run the trucks down to the river for loading the keels ; twenty thousand horses were employed in the transport of coal in the environs of Newcastle alone. Since the larger mines were deeper below the surface than in the Middle Ages, explosions due to

fire-damp were already frequent, as at Gateshead in 1705 and at Chester-le-Street in 1708, when a hundred miners perished 'besides great damage to many houses and persons for several miles round. One man was blown quite out of the mouth of the shaft, which is fifty fathom, and found at a prodigious distance from the place.' Two years later another explosion at Bensham, in the same North Durham district, killed eighty more. But the amount of surface mining was still considerable ; in the west there were many scores of small workings, each conducted by two or three colliers, and sometimes by a single man.[109]

The miners of all kinds and the quarrymen of every county form an important exception to the statement that in old England the method of industry was domestic. Other exceptions there were, but they are harder to specify and define. Many workshops had premises so large, and contained so many apprentices and paid journeymen, that they may be reckoned as standing half-way between the domestic and the factory system. The normal basis of industry still was apprenticeship, the only legal doorway to a trade whether for boys or girls. The apprentice system was often abused by cruel masters and mistresses, and pauper apprentices were at least as badly treated as children in the worst days of the subsequent factory system. There were no inspectors and no checks on ill usage. On the other hand the apprentice was part of his master's 'family,' and the average man does not like to see unhappy faces at his own board and in his own household. Moreover, apprenticeship was invaluable for the discipline and skilled training that it provided during that important 'after-school age' so much neglected in our own day. It largely compensated for the deficiency of school education. Apprenticeship was the old English school of craftsmanship and of character.*

* Already in Anne's reign there were complaints that apprenticeship was not made as universally obligatory as the laws dictated. In 1702 the Corporation of Kendal petitioned for a new and stricter law, because 'although there are laws against persons setting up any trade without having received seven years' apprenticeship, when such persons come to be prosecuted they meet with such favour that very few have been punished of late.' *H.M.C. Bagot*, R. 10, pt. iv., p. 336.

Before they were old enough to be apprenticed, small children were sometimes set to work in their parents' cottages at an age full as early as the factory children of later times. Especially was spinning for the cloth industry conducted in this fashion : Defoe noticed with approval at Colchester and in the Taunton clothing region, that ' there was not a child in the town or in the villages round it of above five years old, but, if it was not neglected by its parents and untaught, could earn its bread.' Again in the clothing dales of the West Riding he found ' hardly anything above four years old but its hands were sufficient for its support.' Poor little things ! But at least, whenever their parents let them go to play, they had fields near at hand, instead of the boundless wilderness of slums.[110]

Spinning was done chiefly in country cottages by women and children, and weaving chiefly in towns and urban districts by men. Both processes, though conducted under domestic conditions, required capitalist organization and supervision, either by employers, or by middlemen who bought the goods manufactured by the cottager. The methods by which the cloth trade was organized differed in the many different regions of England where it flourished.[111]

While the coal trade of Anne's reign interests us especially because of its future, the cloth trade was the typical industry of the time. Two-fifths of English exports consisted of cloth woven in England. Many of our domestic laws and many measures of our economic and foreign policy were aimed at the great national object of promoting the manufacture of cloth and pushing its sale at home and abroad. It was felt that here lay our real advantage over Dutch rivals in the carrying trade of the world, for we had this great staple manufacture with which to load our outgoing ships, whereas they had little to export except herrings, and acted mainly as carriers between other nations.

The cloth industry was encouraged by various legislative devices. Even the dead were compelled to be buried in good English cloth :

> ' Odious ! in woollen ! 'twould a saint provoke '—
> Were the last words that poor Narcissa spoke.*

* Pope, *Moral Essays*, I.

Severe laws were passed and partially enforced against exporting raw wool abroad to help foreign manufacturers. But ' owling,' or running of English raw wool to France, went on all through the war, from Romney Marsh in Kent, the favourite haunt of smugglers and Jacobites, or from Sussex and the Lincolnshire marshes, with many a skirmish between smugglers and dragoons. Much English wool was exported to the Continent from Scotland, with the connivance of the Scottish Government prior to the Union. Irish wool was smuggled to France on an even greater scale, and with more moral justification, because the English Parliament had in 1699 prohibited the export of Irish cloth, by one of the most iniquitous and short-sighted laws ever passed by Parliament in obedience to English trade jealousy, in utter disregard even of the ' Protestant interest ' in the neighbouring island.[112]

The desire to keep open the great markets of the world for English cloth was a chief incentive to taking up arms in 1702 against the Franco-Spanish Power, which was at that moment, at the command of Louis XIV, proceeding to close Spain, the Netherlands, South America and the Mediterranean to our goods. The taking and keeping of Gibraltar in 1704 was symptomatic of more than military and naval ambition : a free entrance to the Mediterranean and Turkish trades was vital to the cloth industry. Not only were great quantities of our cloth sold in those parts, but our merchants brought back from Spain and Southern Italy oil used here in the manufacture of cloth. Spanish merino wool was worked up in England and sold back as cloth to Spain herself, whose native industry was in the last stages of decline. Of late years the fine quality and great quantity of English-grown wool had been yet further increased by means of ' clover and other grass seeds ' to feed the sheep. Our American Colonies were valued largely as markets for our cloth. In Russia, too, a great demand for it was growing up in the new century.[113]

Only in the Far East it was impossible to sell the heavy English cloth, and this was the most damaging argument which the East India Company had to meet in pleading its cause before Parliament. But the tea and silk it brought

to England sufficed to condone the high economic crimes of failing to sell English cloth and daring to export bullion to buy cloth substitutes. In vain the merchants of the rival Turkey Company pleaded that 'if silk be brought from India where it is bought cheap with bullion, it will ruin our trade with Turkey, whither we send cloth for their silk.' The demands of fashion and luxury outweighed the arguments of clothiers, Turkey merchants and orthodox economists. 'Our stately fops admire themselves better in an Indian dressing gown than in one made at Spitalfields.' The ladies, besides, were all drinking 'tay.' So the Indian Trade was permitted to flourish, and in spite of that the Cloth Trade flourished as well.[114]

Though the cloth trade was organized in the cities, the cloth was spun and woven for the most part in market towns and hamlets, in farms and cottages. Nor was the cloth manufacture exceptional in being thus seated amid rural surroundings. Industry was less urban than in Plantagenet times. Only a small part of the manufacturing activity of the country was any longer conducted within city walls or subjected to municipal control. It is true that many towns, especially London and certain other seaports, were much larger than of old, because commerce had increased, and commerce must needs be concentrated in cities. But many other towns had decayed or stood still, because manufacture had ceased to be municipal and had become national. The master workman, in choosing where to set up his workshop, was at more pains to plant himself outside the area of pettifogging borough regulations, than to seek safety within the walls of a city as in the rough society of the Middle Ages. The villages and open market towns were now sufficiently civilized and secure to become the homes of highly elaborated craftsmanship.

The return of industry to urban areas came later, with the advent of modern machinery and the modern factory system. But from Elizabeth to George III, the bulk of the industrial population lived under rural conditions of life. The typical Englishman was a villager, but a villager accustomed to meet men of various crafts, occupations and

classes—by no means a mere rustic boor, ignorant of all save the plough handle. Ploughing and agricultural operations constitute indeed a highly skilled trade; but it was not only ploughmen, but all sorts and conditions of men who made up the society of the villages and small market towns during the Stuart and early Hanoverian reigns. Partly for this reason, the English of those times made famous colonists, handy men able to adapt themselves to new conditions, and to meet sudden and various demands on their ingenuity and skill, more easily than the ignorant serf of the feudal age, or the over-specialized miner, city workman and clerk of to-day.

Partly because industry had thus broken the bounds of municipal control, the municipal life of the boroughs was already in Anne's reign suffering from senile decay. The corporate spirit of the burghers was so enfeebled that they could project no new forms to give it a fresh lease of life. They were content to watch the mediæval institutions of their City or Borough degenerate into antiquarian lumber, until at length the Municipal Reform Bill of 1835 swept it away and began a new era in town government on the basis of modern democracy.

Except in London and a few other towns, municipal government was oligarchical in one form or another. In some towns the oligarchy was of immemorial date; in others the burgher rights of the Freemen were still in process of disappearing. If English trade had still, as in the Middle Ages, depended on efficient control by City Gilds and magistrates, the needs of commerce and industry would assuredly have caused a demand for Municipal Reform long before the era of Bentham. But in Anne's reign, so long as industry was unfettered, and so long as the individual enjoyed political, religious and economic liberty as those terms were then understood, inefficient and corrupt municipal government was not very deeply resented.

There was infinite variety among the governments of the numerous English Boroughs. Hardly two of them were quite the same. One very common form of local government was that exercised by Justices of the Peace for the Borough, who were either identical with the Municipal

Officers or were appointed by them. On these urban Justices of the Peace were conferred, within the area of the Borough, much the same powers as those enjoyed throughout the county as a whole by the Justices of the Peace nominated by the Crown.[115] In this way, though there was no uniformity, there was a general similarity between the type of government in town and in country. This contributed to the peaceful character of English life in the Eighteenth Century. If there had been a self-assertive or democratic spirit in municipal life, it must have come into collision with the land-owning aristocracy that ruled the island. But as things were, the towns, with the notable exception of London, were nearly always ready to fall into line administratively and politically, obedient to the *mot d'ordre* for the country at large. As often as not, the citizens were willing to see the members of Parliament who were supposed to represent them at Westminster, nominated by the landed grandees of the neighbourhood, who more and more asserted their ownership of 'rotten boroughs.' The other side to this system of mutual accommodation was the respect paid by the ruling squirarchy to the real or supposed interests of trade. The squires usurped the Borough membership at Westminster, but they used their power there to wage wars and make laws and treaties in the interest of English industry and commerce.

In the rural districts there was even less local self-government than in the towns. It is true that the rural elections for Parliament were less farcical than the elections for rotten boroughs. But for purposes of local government there were no rural elections at all. Until the County Council Act of 1888 the English countryside was judged, administered, and rated by Justices of the Peace appointed by the Crown from among the local gentry. In Anne's reign the power of these magistrates was becoming yearly more independent and more extensive. Since the Revolution, the Crown was more than ever afraid to interfere with the proceedings of local magistrates whom it appointed. Early in Anne's reign, Defoe reported to Harley how in a dozen counties the High Tory justices were openly inciting

the people against the Moderate Tory War Ministry. They did not seem to fear dismissal by the Crown merely because they were opposing its policy. On the other hand there were many politicians who held the view that the rural magistracy should go in and out with the Ministry, that when there was a Tory Ministry all Whig Justices should be dismissed, or *vice versa*. In this matter there was no settled theory or practice. The Queen and some of her Ministers were for the moderate course in this as in other matters, while high-flying Tories and zealous Whigs clamoured for a system of 'spoils for the victors,' and the extrusion of all magistrates of the wrong party. Few disputes in the reign caused more bitterness and few indeed were of greater importance than this unsettled question.*

The power of the Justices of the Peace was constantly on the increase, as it had been for centuries past. In the absence of a paid bureaucracy like that which served the French Monarch, most new functions of government had to be placed on the shoulders of the Justices of the Peace. The limit of the ability and goodwill of these amateurs in government was the limit of royal power in England, as James II had learnt to his cost. Except the magistrate's own clerk, there was no trained service on which the central government could rely to carry out its orders in the countryside. But the members of the Parliament at Westminster trusted the Justices of the Peace just because they were squires like themselves. Parliament, indeed, might be called the grand national Quarter Sessions. And so Statute after Statute thrust new duties upon the amateur magistrates. For example, in 1702 an Act gave to the Justices assembled in Quarter Sessions the power of assessing every town or parish for the upkeep of bridges, at a rate not exceeding threepence in the pound.[116] Police work, petty justice, the poor law, and every function of local government depended upon the same magistrates. Without a staff of specialists through whom to work, the Justices of the Peace were not, judged by our later standards, equal to the proper performance of all their tasks. English freedom and the old

* See pp. 206–208, below.

English dislike of taxes and officialdom were not conducive to perfectly efficient administration.

Nothing better illustrates the inadequacy of the governmental machine than the state of the prisons. Because Quarter Sessions would have found difficulty, financial and other, in maintaining the gaols as public institutions with a staff of public officers paid out of the rates, therefore the prisons were farmed out to gaolers of the type of Lucy Locket's father. This system prevailed both in London and the provinces. The prisoners were absolutely at the mercy of these sharks, who had paid the authorities high prices for the post of gaoler and recouped themselves by practising extortion on the victims committed to their charge. The prisoner, on arrival, was struck in irons, which were only removed on payment. If he could not or would not pay 'the garnish money,' at Newgate, he was removed to the cell known as 'Tangier,' and there he was 'stript, beaten and abused in a very violent manner.' The poorer prisoners, and above all the debtors, suffered the worst; and innocent men or discharged debtors often remained in prison for years after they might otherwise have been free, solely because they had no means of paying the prison fees which they had incurred. Men and women were often kept without bedding, and almost without food, till they died of ill-usage or found friends to pay their 'garnish.' In 1711 Mary Pitt, in the Gatehouse prison, was 'thrown down a pair of stairs because she had not money to pay for a bed,' and was 'put where she was almost poisoned' by the stink of a corpse fifteen days old.*

Such enormities were, it is to be feared, as old as public justice itself, but they were beginning at long last to attract the indignation of philanthropists. In the reign of Anne reports were made and enquiries held into the conduct of gaolers, at least in London. But, as is well known, it was only at the other end of the century that Howard obtained the first effective measures of reform.[117]

* On the other hand those prisoners who could pay well were, on the same principle, permitted to purchase extraordinary privileges, including that of absenting themselves under surety from the Fleet or King's Bench Prisons 'in a hackney coach privately,' or 'publicly with what they call a day-rule.' Macky, *Travels*, II, pp. 1–3, 234.

Such was the England of Queen Anne—a land of many faults and abuses, sadly wanting in the efficiency of its public organization, but not markedly inferior in that respect to other countries of the time, and superior to them in freedom and in the vigour and initiative of her individual citizens. The war that occupied the reign was destined to render England for the first time the acknowledged head of European civilization on its political side, in place of the France of the Grand Monarch; it was owing to this change in the distribution of power that free institutions and the spirit that must accompany their exercise began to take a leading place in the thought and aspiration of mankind.

CHAPTER V

William, the Whigs and the Tories, from the Revolution to the Act of Settlement. 1689–1701.

In the reign of Anne the struggle for power at home and abroad revolves round the person of Marlborough. But in the preceding reign there had been no dominant figure among the subjects of the land : except for the King himself, it had been a contest rather of parties than of persons. King William, the Whig Party and the Tory Party are the three forces whose mutual attraction and repulsion governed the uneasy movements of the English body politic. We may picture William as a coachman, without whip and with rotten reins, trying to impel two high-mettled steeds, shy of one another and of their driver, along a difficult road, without a spill.

It was at once the weakness and the security of the Dutch King in dealing with his English subjects, that he cared as little for the domestic feuds that were their meat and drink, as Gallio for the points of the Jewish law. The one aim and passion of his public life of thirty years was to curb the power of the French monarchy in Europe.

When he had first stepped to the front of the world's stage at the age of twenty-two, a young Prince far more severe and taciturn than his kindly ancestor whom men had accidentally called ' the Silent,' events were taking place which marked out for him his task in life. In 1672 the French armies, aided by England as their ally at sea, occupied as insolent conquerors four of the Seven United Provinces. Louis XIV declared the territories which he had over-run to be annexed to his Crown. The Province

of Holland itself was only saved by the dilatory movements of the French Generals, that just gave time for the Dutch to cut the dykes and drown the approaches to Amsterdam and the Hague.

The terror and humiliation of that year permanently altered the outlook of Holland. Not only the policy of William during the rest of his life, but the policy of the Dutch statesmen who succeeded him in the period of the Marlborough Wars, have their origin in the events of 1672. William owed to those bitter memories half his power as Stadtholder at home, and half his influence in Europe : he stood before the world as the most formidable foe of Louis, whose ambition had become an object of dread to all.

After two years the French were extruded from the soil of the Republic, but Holland did not recover her old sense of security. In the time of the De Witts she had relied too exclusively on her navy : but now, reverting to the earlier tradition of Prince Maurice, she again sought the added protection of a large and well-disciplined army, recruited from every Protestant country in Europe. It crippled her finances and her prosperity, but she had no choice. The Dutch army, destined to play a great part in the wars of Marlborough, was very different in numbers and in quality from the regiments which had so signally failed to protect the territory of the Republic against the first onrush of Louis in 1672.

Henceforth, too, the United Provinces were protected by a system of alliance with foreign powers, in the formation of which young William showed his peculiar skill. France had become a manifest danger to the petty Princedoms of Germany and Italy, to the vast inanimate bulk of the Spanish monarchy, sprawling over two hemispheres like a dead leviathan, and even to the Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperors at Vienna. Every State of Europe, Catholic or Protestant, that still aspired to independence, saw in William the leader who could save them from the hegemony of France.

Louis threatened Austria, Spain and the Pope with vassalage, and thus forced those Catholic Powers into alliance with William ; but he threatened Protestantism with extirpation. He was extirpating it in France with the

dragonnades and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

1685 The conquest of Holland or of any other State by the French armies would, ere long, be followed by like measures against Protestants in the conquered territory. To Protestants, therefore, war against Louis was a war for their religion, though fought with the help of Catholic allies. The common literature of the reigns of William and Anne shows that the struggle was so regarded in England.

While the object of William's life was to curb the power of France, he saw that success could only be achieved if England could be brought to play an active part in the struggle. For that reason, and not for the *beaux yeux* of the English, or for the glittering bauble of a crown, he had decided to run the enormous risk of invading our island in November 1688. Louis' fleets and armies lay on his flank, and he had nothing on which to depend except the momentary union of all sections of English opinion against James. The venture had, by a series of chances so wonderful that men regarded them as providential, resulted in a bloodless revolution. England did not plunge into a fresh civil war in consequence of William's invasion, as Louis had contemptuously reckoned when he permitted him to sail undisturbed by the French armaments. Contrary to the precedents of former Stuart reigns, the two rival factions agreed on a policy, chose William and Mary as King and Queen, and entered as a united nation into the war against France. William had achieved the object for which he had come over. He had brought England into line against Louis.

The glory of the ' glorious Revolution ' did not consist in the triumph of a party but in the reconciliation of parties. There was, indeed, little glory in the mere expulsion of one foolish mortal from an island where he had made himself universally detested, but there was glory in the lasting treaty of mutual toleration that followed the regifuge, in the Revolution Settlement that staunched the blood-feud of Anglican and Puritan, Roundhead and Cavalier, and launched Britain afresh on her career of domestic unity and freedom, European influence and trans-oceanic expansion. Throughout the reign of William England still staggered

from the shock of the political earthquake of the Revolution, but she kept her feet. Only in the following reign was revealed all that the Revolution Settlement had done to give her strength.

As King of England, no less than as Stadtholder, William was guided in his conduct by his antagonism to the French power. Since this was England's interest, he cannot be said to have deflected her course to suit his private ends. He set her head straight once again, because her true course happened also to be his and Europe's.

Fear of Louis was no peculiar doctrine of the Whigs. The Tory Danby and the Trimmer Halifax had seen years before that it was the true policy of our country to oppose French predominance. But the faction fight of Whigs and Tories over the Exclusion Bill, and the Roman Catholicism of Charles and James II had postponed the entry of England into the European arena. During the years when English kings and statesmen were the pensionaries of Louis, his power on the Continent had grown so great that in 1689 all Englishmen could see the danger from France as clearly as Danby had seen it in 1674. Neither Whigs nor Tories

1689–1697 opposed King William when he employed the resources of the island in the maritime and continental struggle. From the Revolution to the Peace of Ryswick, Parliament willingly voted the war supplies.

The reasons why England, in the reigns of William and Anne, felt constrained to take part in the wars against Louis are the same reasons that have periodically guided her action in great European crises from the reign of Elizabeth to the reign of George V : commercial and colonial rivalry, exacerbated in earlier times by the exclusive character of the commercial and colonial policy of each nation ; the need to secure the safety of our small island by preventing the predominance of any one State on the Continent—the policy known as the Balance of Power ; and the imperative demand on behalf of our maritime security that the Low Countries should not fall into the hands of a great military and naval Empire. These were the reasons why England fought Philip II, Napoleon and

Kaiser Wilhelm. They were also the reasons why she fought Louis XIV. But there was an additional motive compelling England to fight France in the reigns of William and Anne. Louis in 1689 and again in 1701 adopted the exiled Roman Catholic branch of the House of Stuart and attempted to restore it by force of arms to the English throne. Therefore both Whigs and Tories had to fight to defend the Revolution Settlement, the Protestant or Anglican establishment, and the political independence of the nation. The fortunes of the Roman Catholic Stuarts were identified with the fortune of the French arms. Whether the chance of a Jacobite restoration was increased or diminished by being thus put to the hazard of battle, it is not easy to say. At least it made it certain that so long as the wars of William or Anne continued, nothing except French victory would restore the exiled line. The English would never in time of war send to the enemy's Court for their King.

William treated the Whig and Tory Parties merely as two indifferent instruments necessary to his task of bridling France. He regarded them with impartiality tinged with contempt. He disliked their factiousness, their furious quarrels over trifles and old memories that meant nothing to him and impeded their union in the common cause.

He began his reign with some suspicion of the Whigs for their anti-monarchical views. He thought they were more republican than they were, and he could not at once forget that they had, under the leadership of Shaftesbury, set aside the claims of his wife and himself to the throne, in order to place thereon the bastard Monmouth as the instrument of their faction. The Tory Danby had, in Charles II's reign, been the most active friend of the reversionary claim of the House of Orange to the English throne. It was not the Whigs but Danby who had, under great difficulties, negotiated the marriage of William with James's daughter Mary, precisely in order to strengthen that claim, and to bind England and Holland together against France.

William therefore began with no prejudice against

the Tories, nor was he opposed to their principles in domestic politics. They were Royalists and he had no objection to Royalism, for he was a Prince with a will and a policy of his own, brought up as the head of the anti-Republican Party in Holland. What he disliked in the Tories was their High Church principles. He was both a Calvinist and a Latitudinarian, and though his Latitudinarianism softened the rigour of his Calvinism, the two combined to put him out of sympathy with the High Church standpoint. He was not deeply concerned with the religious aspect of High Church zeal, but he dreaded its political and European consequences. High Church doctrine despised a parliamentary title to the Crown. High Church hostility to English Nonconformists divided the nation while at war, and High Church hostility to foreign Protestants stood in the way of a hearty alliance with Calvinist Holland. These tendencies, which troubled William, were destined to give no less trouble to his successor, who, though a High Churchwoman herself, was head of the fighting alliance against France.

Whigs and Tories had both taken their full share in the armed risings of November and December 1688, which drove James from England. But in the Convention Parliament of January 1689 it was the Whig majority that placed William on the throne on equal terms with Mary. The Tory minority in the Convention had striven to give him a place inferior to his wife's, as Regent or King Consort only, though charged with the administration. The Tories in 1689 had not resisted his claim to the throne from any personal objection to him, but to save their own faces as apostles of the doctrine of divine hereditary right. When the Whigs had outvoted them, they finally acquiesced in the Whig proposal to place William and Mary on the throne side by side, with equal titles, derived not from strict hereditary right, but from the vote of Parliament.

The Whigs looked for a rich reward for their support on this momentous occasion. They expected William to act as King of the Whigs, as Charles II in his later years had acted as King of the Tories. William preferred the rôle of King of England. He began by choosing a mixed

Whig and Tory Ministry, even while there was a clear Whig majority in the Lower House ; and when, in 1690, that Whig majority tried to take retrospective vengeance on their Tory enemies, and held up the Act of Indemnity instead of getting on with the war, William dissolved Parliament and aided the Tories to obtain a majority at the General Election. This strictly constitutional *coup d'état* gave internal peace to the land, and won for William several years of Tory loyalty and gratitude. The Tory majority in the new Parliament supported him through the most dangerous crisis of the reign—the Boyne campaign and the reconquest of Ireland.

1690–1692

But as time went on, and the centre of interest was shifted to the war on the Continent, the relations between William and the Tories began to cool. Queen Mary's death in 1694 snapped a personal link between the party and the Crown. The Tories loved the House of Stuart —provided its members were Anglican. Mary and Anne, the Anglican daughters of the Romanist James, enjoyed the full measure of Tory loyalty which their father had once possessed but had sacrificed on the altar of religious fanaticism. Mary, indeed, had no use for loyalty to herself if it were not extended to her husband. But Anne was always on bad terms with William, whom she and her friend, Sarah Churchill, familiarly spoke of as 'Mr. Caliban.' After Mary died in 1694, Tory loyalty and Tory hopes for the future were concentrated on Anne.

And so, for the last eight years of William's now solitary reign, the Tories looked forward with growing impatience to the day when Anne should ascend the throne. She was everything they could wish. She was the daughter of King James and yet a devout Anglican. Mary indeed had been both these, but Anne was something more which Mary had never been—a High Churchwoman, and therefore a Tory. Under her, it was confidently believed, there would be no more Whigs appointed as Bishops, or as Ministers of State, or as Justices of the Peace ; and with the help of the Crown at election time there would, it was hoped, never again be a Whig majority in the House of Commons. These party hopes for the golden age under Queen Anne

would have been realized to a greater extent than they actually were, had it not been for cross-currents arising out of the renewal of the war with France.

The increasing alienation of the Tories from William was only one cause of the trouble between the King and his Parliaments in the years that followed the peace of Ryswick. The attitude of many even of the Whigs was lukewarm or hostile. It is true indeed that the Whig Ministers were becoming increasingly devoted to William. The two ablest of the Whig Junto, the Chancellor Somers and the great financier Charles Montagu, as the King's confidential servants in time of war and national peril, had been admitted to see the inner side of that nature, so repellent in the chill mask presented to the world, but so wise and constant in the crises of great affairs. And after peace had come in 1697, the Whig Ministers were flattered and to some extent misled by a tendency on William's part to prefer them to their Tory rivals and to keep them in office after they had lost their popularity.

1698–1700

But there were many independent Whig members who, after the return of peace, no longer felt bound to support Ministers or to gratify the King. The old tradition of their Party before the Revolution, that they should act as a 'Country Party,' opposed to the Court, was still strong on the Whig benches. And it was still thought to be the business of the House of Commons, without distinction of party, to oppose the Executive. The private member still regarded himself as sent by his constituents to keep a watch on the King's Ministers—'placemen' as they were opprobriously called—to curb their schemes of private avarice and to thwart their plots against the liberties of the land. The honest private member, whether he called himself Tory or Whig, was often zealous in this duty—until he got a place or a pension himself.

For these reasons many Whigs united with the great body of the Tories on the floor of the House to vex the Whig Ministers and to over-ride the King on the questions of a standing army in time of peace, Irish grants and Dutch Guards.

1698–1700

It is clear that Whig party discipline was less strict in William's reign than in Anne's, when the Lords of the Junto established an absolute sway over the parliamentary movements of their followers. In 1698 many Whig members thought of Somers and Montagu, not as Whig Ministers, but only as the King's Ministers, and therefore as fair game. The implications of party government were not yet fully understood even by party men.

But while, for the first three years after the peace, William and his Ministers were badly supported by the Whigs as a whole, they bore the full weight of Tory displeasure. The increasing animosity of the Tories against William was due to many causes. His appointment of Low Church Bishops aroused as much political as religious indignation. The death of Mary had emphasized both the non-hereditary and the Dutch character of the occupation of the throne, both repugnant to Tory feelings. The end of the war with France made it possible for patriotic politicians to oppose the King's government. The Tories were incensed at the lavish grants of English Crown lands and the still more lavish grants of forfeited Irish lands, to William's Dutch friends, such as Bentinck, first Earl of Portland. Bentinck, a faithful but an ill-tempered and disagreeable man, did great injury to his master by his bad manners to the English and by his greed in accepting scandalously munificent gifts. The Parliament of 1698–1700, of which the majority was composed of Tories and anti-ministerial Whigs, forced William to accept an Act cancelling the Irish grants wholesale ; right in principle, it was a violent and unjust measure in detail, and the
1700 Commons forced it through the House of Lords by the device of ' tacking ' it to a money Bill—a device of doubtful constitutional propriety of which more was to be heard in the reign of Anne. The Commons also compelled the King to send home his Dutch Guards. William, accustomed to command the polyglot army in the service of the United Provinces, had failed to understand the resentment of the English against the presence of foreign troops in their island.

These measures were popular in the country and were

supported by many Whigs. But the Tories took the lead in them and reaped popularity for expressing the national feeling against the Dutch. The Whigs stood as the champions of national feeling against France, the Tories against Holland. This difference, not perceptible prior to the reign of William, remained a constant feature of politics under his successor.

But by far the most serious measure taken by this somewhat irresponsible Parliament had been the reduction of the
1698 army to a peace footing of 7000 men, besides the garrison of 12,000 needed to keep Ireland down. In this also many Whigs joined the Tories, for the dread of a standing army, though strongest in the Tory ranks, was by no means confined to them. Louis, meanwhile, kept 180,000 men on foot. The consequent disparity in the military force of France and England that existed during the negotiations that ensued over the Spanish Succession, certainly reduced the chances of a peaceful solution, for Louis had the impression that he could do what he liked in Europe so far as England was concerned ; while the Spaniards in casting about to preserve the unity of their Empire, supposed that Louis was all-powerful and William impotent.

The worst part of the King's troubles with Parliament between 1698 and 1700 had been due to the transitional character of the English constitution in that epoch. The Royal Ministers had, at the Revolution, become once for all responsible to Parliament and dependent on the support of the House of Commons for effective action either at home or abroad. After the Revolution, a Ministry at loggerheads with the Commons could no longer play the tyrant. It was merely reduced to impotence, like a sailing-ship without the wind. It followed that Ministers would have in future to be chosen from the same party as the majority of the House of Commons. But that logical necessity was not at once recognized either by the King, or by the Commons, or by any of the leading statesmen who had made the Revolution. Only slow experience led men to this conclusion, and much of the bitterest experience was undergone in the closing years of King William.

Under the system to which William succeeded, the loyalty of Ministers was due, not to each other, not to the Commons, not to a party, not to a Prime Minister, but solely to the King. The King's will alone gave to the Ministerial counsels the unity which is to-day secured by party ties and by the influence of the Prime Minister. All through his reign William had worked with Ministries partly Whig and partly Tory. The two sides had been fairly even in his first Ministry, although there was a large Whig majority in the Convention Parliament. During the Tory Parliament that followed in 1690, the Ministry had the same mixed character ; by the end of the war in 1697 it was principally Whig, and so was the Parliament elected in 1695. But after the Peace of Ryswick, the Tories and independent Whigs out-numbered the Ministerialists in the House of Commons elected in 1698. The King would have been well advised if he had at once altered the character of his Cabinet in a Tory direction. His conduct in preserving a Ministry predominantly Whig to meet a House of Commons predominantly Tory was not regarded as unconstitutional ; but it edged the acrimony of the Commons' attack on the standing army, the Dutch Guards and the Irish grants. If, after the election of 1698, William had at once done what he finally did in 1700, if he had dismissed Somers and Montagu not because he had ceased to trust them himself but because they were distrusted by the House of Commons, even so the Dutch Guards might have been sent home and the Irish grants overhauled, but with far less bitterness and rudeness to the King ; and certainly the army would not have been cut down to a figure so perilously low as 7000 men, if there had been Ministers who had the confidence of the House to plead with it against such folly.

William scrupulously adhered to the law and custom of the constitution as it had been fixed by the Bill of Rights at the Revolution. He cannot be blamed because he did not at once perceive that Parliamentary Ministries were a necessary corollary of the Revolution Settlement. His English advisers foresaw the future development of the constitution of their own country as little as their foreign King. Somers and Montagu clung to office in 1699 like limpets to a rock,

till they were pulled off by the personal attacks of the House of Commons.

At length in 1700 the King had learnt the lesson of experience. He took a number of leading Tories into the Ministry in place of the Lords of the Whig Junto. Above all he entered into an understanding with Robert Harley, the moderate Tory and skilled parliamentary manager. From that moment affairs in England began to mend and the moment was none too soon, for the French troops were on the point of occupying the territories of the Spanish Empire. By Harley's help as Speaker in 1701, the Tory House of Commons was induced to take the two great steps which govern the domestic and foreign history of Queen Anne's reign. In 1701 the Tories passed the Act of Settlement, fixing the Crown on the Protestant House of Hanover after Anne's death, and in the same year the Tories, step by step, authorized the European alliances and undertakings made by William for a renewal of the war with France. Neither of these great decisions were as agreeable to the party feelings of the Tories as to the party feelings of the Whigs, but on both issues the Tories of 1701 did what the interests of the country required.

The closing chapters of Macaulay's *History* give an illuminating account of the quarrels of William with his later Parliaments. But Macaulay died before he had completed these chapters. Feeling his own death coming on, the historian hastened to write the death of William, printed on the last page of his *History*. But he left important gaps in the narrative of the last twelve months of the reign. He did not live to write an account either of the Act of Settlement of 1701, or of the gradual acceptance of the war policy by the Tory Party in the same year. These measures were taken by the Tory Ministry and House of Commons during the very months when they were, with the utmost partisan acrimony, impeaching the fallen Whig Ministers. Macaulay's *History* describes the impeachments, but not the Act of Settlement or the votes that led to the renewal of the war. For this reason Macaulay's *History*, because it was left incomplete owing to his death, conveys an impression too unfavourable to the patriotism and good sense that

was found side by side with the bitter partisanship of the Parliament of 1701. A distinguished historian of our own day has filled up this important gap in the annals of our country. In Mr. Keith Feiling's *History of the Tory Party* justice is done to the part played by Harley in bringing the Tory Party into line with the national interest, both as regards the necessity for the War of the Spanish Succession, and the necessity for an Act to settle the reversion of the Crown on the House of Hanover.

To set out clearly the circumstances under which the Tories reconciled themselves to a renewal of the war will require a separate chapter. But the Act of Settlement needs less explanation. In July 1700 Princess Anne's only surviving child, the little Duke of Gloucester, died. With him died the hopes of England, and in particular the hopes of the Tories, for a line of native Princes bred in the Anglican faith, and directly descended from James II. The Duke of Gloucester's succession would have been welcomed by the Tories almost more than by the Whigs, and the Jacobites would therefore have had scant chance of success in opposing it. Indeed it might have eliminated Jacobitism as a force in English affairs. His death rendered the dynastic future again uncertain. For the Acts of Parliament passed at the Revolution, though they debarred any Papist from reigning in England, had not fixed the succession on any persons more distant than the children of Anne and of William. It was now regarded as almost certain that William and Anne would both die childless, and as probable that they would both die soon. At any moment, perhaps in time of war with France, the country might be faced by a dynastic crisis ; a disputed succession might lead to a civil war or even to a restoration of the Roman Catholic Stuarts. It was necessary at once to fix the succession by Act of Parliament on some race of Protestant heirs.

The House of Savoy was the most nearly related to the Stuarts, but it was Roman Catholic. At one time indeed the proposal had been made that a son of Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, might be brought to England and educated as an Anglican and as heir to the throne. The young

Savoyard was great-grandson of Charles I.* The Duke, who was no religious zealot, had welcomed this plan for his son's promotion. But towards the close of the late war he had made one of his crafty periodic changes of side, deserting the Allies to join Louis for a while. Therefore in 1700 Victor Amadeus and his family were out of favour with William and the English.

The House of Hanover was not only a Protestant House, but was stout on the side of the Allies against France. The Dowager Electress Sophia was the granddaughter of James I of England, for she was daughter of Elizabeth of Bohemia and the Palatine, the Protestant heroine and victim of the Thirty Years' War. Sophia was fixed upon in the mind of William and many of his subjects as the most suitable person to succeed Anne on the English throne. The proposal to fix the succession upon her and her children had been made in 1689, but had been left in abeyance for another decade. She was a woman of much more than ordinary character and intellect, and her friend, the philosopher statesman Leibnitz, was well able to recommend her cause without appearing to press it. She herself either felt or affected an indifference to the glittering prize. She described herself as an old woman, past ambition, and her children as strangers to England. Her son, the reigning Elector, afterwards George I, was indeed more particularly a German Prince than his vivacious and internationally-minded mother. Sophia stated to William's emissaries the obvious objections to the promotion of her House to the English throne, and expressed personal sympathy for James II's son whom she refused to regard as supposititious. Historians are not agreed how far her resistance was serious. She held out for some time, but at length, under the influence of Leibnitz, and of William, who came to visit her and press England's suit, she consented in the early weeks of 1701 to become parliamentary candidate for the throne, on behalf of herself and her children after her.[118]

It was reported, and it is not impossible, that William had an additonal motive to get the succession settled ere he

* See p. 121, below.

died, in his suspicions of Anne's ultimate intentions with regard to her half-brother at St. Germains. It is said that William at this time received a warning from the English Ambassador in Paris to the effect that Anne was in correspondence with her father James, that she had asked his permission to accept the Crown on William's death for her own lifetime, on the understanding that she should use her endeavours to pass the succession on to her brother as James III. James II has left to posterity a fragment which appears to record that his daughter approached him with some such proposal and that he spurned it. But we have neither the text of Anne's letter to her father, nor its date. No one knows what was really passing in her mind after the death of her last child. But, in any case, the very distressing position in which Fate had placed her in relation to her father's family rendered it doubly desirable to secure the Protestant succession by Act of Parliament before her death began to draw near. She was obviously not a suitable person to burden with the task of naming her own heir.[119]

The House of Commons in 1701 was so constituted that the Act of Settlement could not have passed without the goodwill of the Tories. But the Tories were never less Jacobite than in 1701, just as they were never more Jacobite than in 1714. At the end of William's reign they were looking forward eagerly to Anne's accession ; they regarded the Jacobites as bloody traitors involved in the recent assassination plot ; and they had as yet no reason to regard the Hanoverian heir as their enemy. At the end of Anne's reign all this had changed. Many Tories were then living on intimate terms with Jacobites, and the party had by that time quarrelled with the future King George. The difference between the High Tory attitude to Hanover at the two dates can be seen in the attitude of Henry St. John, the most brilliant of the younger Tories in 1701, the future Bolingbroke of 1714. A few weeks after the Act of Settlement became law, he wrote to his friend, Sir William Trumbull,

> I might venture to go to Hanover, where I should propose serving my country by being near those that are like to wear the crown of England, and laying the foundation of a future fortune to myself.[120]

If this hopeful plan had been carried out, it might have made a great difference to the history of England, or at least to the history of St. John.

In this mood the Tory Party of 1701, maugre all theories of divine right and hereditary succession, listened to the request of William, and settled the reversion of the Crown on Sophia and her children after her, being Protestants. By virtue of this Act of Settlement, George I succeeded without challenge in 1714. In that year the Tories found, to the chagrin of some, including Bolingbroke, that they had tied their own hands thirteen years before.

But the form of the Act of Settlement was not so much to William's taste as the substance. The offer of the Crown to the foreign House of Hanover was conditioned by eight provisions limiting the Sovereign's freedom of action, and some of these provisions implied a criticism of William's own methods as a foreign king. Since the Revolution the Tories had ceased to be a Court Party and were at least as eager as the Whigs to limit the powers of the Crown, when it could not be worn by a Stuart and a devotee of the Anglican Church, such as Anne. In abandoning the divine hereditary right of succession, the Tories also ceased to defend the prerogative rights of the Crown.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

The Act of Settlement, 1701.

On March 3, 1701, the House of Commons passed this resolution :

> That for the preserving the peace and happiness of this Kingdom, and the security of the Protestant Religion, by law established, it is absolutely necessary a further declaration be made of the Limitation and Succession of the Crown in the Protestant line, after his Majesty [W. III] and the Princess [Anne] and the heirs of their body respectively. And that further provision be *first* made for the security of the rights and liberties of the people.

In pursuance of this resolution, in particular of the last sentence, the following eight provisions were passed *before the motion settling the throne on the House of Hanover was moved.* These eight resolutions were embodied in the Act of Settlement, *to come into force when the House of Hanover should succeed.* In fact clauses IV and VI never came into force, *because they were altered in* 1705, and so the Parliamentary Cabinet system was not prevented by law from developing under the House of Hanover.

I. That whoever shall hereafter come to the possession of the Crown, shall join in communion with the Church of England, as by law established.

II. That, in case the Crown and Imperial dignity of this Realm shall hereafter come to any person not being a native of this Kingdom of England, this nation shall be not obliged to engage in any war for the defence of any dominions or territories, which do not belong to the Crown of England, without the consent of Parliament.

III. That no person, who shall hereafter come to the possession of the Crown, shall go out of the dominions of England, Scotland or Ireland, without consent of Parliament.

IV. That, from and after the time that the further limitation by this Act shall take effect [viz. *after the succession of a monarch of the House of Hanover*], all matters and things relating to the well government of this Kingdom, which are properly cognizable in the Privy Council, by the laws and customs of this Realm, shall be transacted there, and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the Privy Council, as shall advise and consent to the same. [*Never operative, because repealed in* 1705.]

V. That, after the limitation shall take effect, no person born out of the Kingdom of England, Scotland or Ireland, or the dominions thereunto belonging, although he be naturalized or made a denizen (except such as are born of English parents) shall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a Member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military, or to have any grant of lands, tenements, or hereditaments from the Crown to himself, or to any others in trust for him.

VI. That no person who has an office or place of profit under the King, or receives a pension from the Crown, shall be capable of serving as a Member of the House of Commons. [*Never operative, because altered in* 1705 *so as to allow of re-election of a member after he has received a 'place of profit under the Crown.' If it had come into force in its original form the Parliamentary Cabinet system, as we know it, could never have grown up. Ministers could have sat in the Lords, but not in the Commons.*]

VII. That, after the limitation shall take effect, Judges' Commissions shall be made *quamdiu se bene gesserint*, and their salaries ascertained and established. But, upon the address of both Houses of Parliament, it may be lawful to remove them.

VIII. That no pardon under the Great Seal of England be pleadable to an impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.

THE RIVAL CLAIMANTS TO THE THRONE


James I
Charles I
(4) Henrietta = Philip D. of Orleans.
Anna Maria = Victor Amadeus D. of Savoy.
Prince of Savoy, possible candidate for English throne.
(1) Charles II
Monmouth and others (illegitimate).
(3) James II = i Anne Hyde ii Mary of Modena.
ob. 1701
(2) Mary = William II of Orange ob. 1650.
William III = Mary II
ob. 1702. ob. 1694.
Elizabeth = Elector Palatine
Sophia = Ernest Elector of Hanover.
ob. 1714.
George I
ob. 1727.
George II
ob. 1760.
Mary II = William III
dau. of i
ob. 1694.
Queen Anne
dau. of i
ob. 1714.
William Duke of Gloucester and others, died young.
James, the 'Old Pretender,' or 'James III.' Son of ii, born 1688, ob. 1766.
Charles Edward, the 'Young Pretender,' ob. 1788.

CHAPTER VI

The Spanish Empire and the problem of the Spanish Succession. The Partition Treaties. The acceptance of Charles II's will. The subsequent errors of Louis. The drift to war and the party struggle. The Netherlands and the Dutch Barrier seized by France. The *Asiento* for a French Company. Effects on English opinion, Whig and Tory.

At the close of the Seventeenth Century, Spain was the sick man of Europe. The Spanish Empire, without national or economic unity, was saved from disruption rather by the atrophy of its parts than by any principle of sound administration from the centre or of self-government in the Provinces. Famous marriages and wars of old had brought together an incongruous collection of lands and peoples, with nothing in common save that all were misgoverned from Madrid.

There was indeed the link of language between Spain and her half-breed colonies in America. The 'Spanish Indies,' as they were called, included Florida, Mexico, the Isthmus of Panama, Cuba and other islands, and all South America except the Guianas and Portuguese Brazil. The Philippines in the Pacific and the Canaries off the coast of Africa belonged to Spain. In Europe the keys of the Mediterranean and of the English Channel were, potentially at least, in her keeping. For in the hands of an energetic power, Milan, Sicily, Naples, Sardinia and the Balearic Islands, in addition to the *terra firma* of Spain, could render their sovereign master of all the States of Italy and all the waters of the Mediterranean.* On the Northern seaboard, the Spanish Netherlands, roughly corresponding to modern Belgium and Luxemburg, formed the buffer State protecting Holland from France ; and if once France had Holland, it would be strange if she failed to acquire the naval control

* *See Map X at end of book for the Spanish dominions in Europe.*

of the English Channel. Therefore, in the wars of William III, when Spain adhered to the Alliance against France, the Netherlands had been defended by the armies of England and Holland, since the Spaniards themselves could no longer make any serious military effort outside the Iberian Peninsula.

'The Maritime Powers,' in other words the Dutch and English peoples who throve by traffic at sea, had indeed an interest as great as that of any people in the world in the future disposal of the King of Spain's heritage. For if his Empire as a whole fell under French domination, English commerce and manufacture and the Dutch carrying trade would be fatally injured. Of recent years the Spaniards, incapable of conducting either industry or commerce for themselves, had allowed English and Dutch merchants, thinly disguised under Spanish names, to carry on the trade between the mother country and her American colonies through the port of Cadiz ; cloth which had been woven in England, even if it had been grown on the backs of Spanish merino sheep, was imported on a vast scale into Spain herself, her American colonies, and her possessions in Italy and the Netherlands.[121] But if once French influence became supreme at Madrid all this would come to an end. Dutch and English merchants would be excluded in favour of their French rivals in every one of these great markets. The Mediterranean would be closed to their ships. And in addition to economic ruin, the national independence of England, based on her control of the narrow seas, would be seriously threatened by the French in the Netherlands ; while Holland would be exposed to the armies of Louis gathered on her very frontiers along the Scheldt and the Maas.

Such fears were not visionary. When Anne came to the throne every province of the Spanish Empire was occupied either by the armies of Louis or by Spanish garrisons acting as his allies. If these newly sketched frontiers of French influence could be made good as a permanent fact, based on accepted Treaties and guaranteed by the law of nations, the independence of every State of Europe, not excluding England, would remain at the mercy of the Grand Monarch. It is true that the fleets and armies of

Spain no longer weighed in the balance of power as at the time of the Armada, or even of the Thirty Years' War. There was little use in warships that could never put to sea, or in regiments that could never take the field. But great use could be made of the harbours, fortresses, territories and populations belonging to Spain in both hemispheres. In November 1700 all these at a stroke of the pen were placed at the disposal of France. Vast provinces and unnumbered millions of men, who had figured as allies of William III in the war that ended in 1697, were four years later arrayed on the opposite side.

Why did the Spanish Empire thus cease to be the antagonist of Louis and become in effect his property for the purposes of the new war? It is necessary to give some answer to this question before attempting to unravel the wars and policies of Queen Anne and her servant Marlborough.

The Spanish Empire from 1665 to 1700 belonged to the imbecile invalid, King Charles II. The conditions under which this most exalted and most miserable of mankind dragged out his existence have been described in the last chapters of Macaulay's *History*.* By an irony of fate, cruel alike to Charles and to Europe, his grotesque sufferings were prolonged year after year, contrary to all expectation. He lingered till November 1700, and died at the precise moment when nothing short of a World War could decide the question of his inheritance.

If Charles II had died before the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, while Spain was still at war with France, the Spanish Empire would have passed either to the Austrian or the Bavarian candidate, and France would have been powerless to interfere. That was one reason why Louis had been eager to conclude a general peace, because, so long as France

* The account of the Spanish Succession question from 1697 to 1700 in Macaulay's *History of England* is no less picturesque and more reliable than his account of it in the youthful essay on the *War of Succession in Spain*. That essay, as he himself has recorded in a letter most kindly given to me by Dr. Temperley, was written for the *Edinburgh* 'very hastily, with very little assistance from books, during the tumult of a contested election at Leeds' (1832). Given these remarkable conditions of authorship, the result, though not an historical authority, is an historical *tour de force* certainly never equalled by any other parliamentary candidate!

was in a state of war against Spain and Europe, the French claims on the Spanish inheritance would go by default.

When, therefore, peace was restored at Ryswick, the
1697 minds of European statesmen were at once directed to solve the problem of the Spanish Succession before the death of Charles II should actually take place.

The three most important candidates were three young Princes—the French Bourbon, Philip; the Austrian Hapsburg, Charles; and the Bavarian, Joseph Ferdinand. Both Louis XIV and the Emperor Leopold of Austria were sons-in-law of Philip IV of Spain and also grandsons of Philip III. Following the natural order, the eldest son of Louis XIV would succeed Charles II. But at the marriages of Louis XIII and Louis XIV respectively to the two Infantas, the French claim to the Spanish throne, resulting from those marriages, had been solemnly and officially renounced by the parties concerned. Next came the claim of the House of Bavaria; there also renunciations had been made, but privately and not in a manner affecting the law of Spain. But the Emperor Leopold, in view of these renunciations, claimed the whole inheritance for the House of Austria, though he was ready to renounce it for himself and his eldest son, the future Emperor Joseph, in favour of Charles, the cadet of the family.*

* TABLE OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION


Philip III of Spain
ob. 1621
Louis XIII = Anne of France
Philip IV
ob. 1665
Maria = Emp. Ferdinand III
Louis XIV = Maria Theresa
ob. 1715
Charles II of Spain
ob. Nov. 1700
Margaret Theresa = Emp. Leopold = Eleanor of Neuburg
ob. 1705
Louis, Grand Dauphin
Max Emanuel = Maria Antonia
Elector of Bavaria
Louis, Duke of Burgundy
ob. 1712
Philip V of Spain (B)
=1. Maria Louisa dau. of Victor Amadeus II of Savoy
=2. Elizabeth Farnese of Parma
Joseph Ferdinand (A)
Electoral Prince of Bavaria
ob. 1699
Emperor Joseph
ob. 1711
Charles (B)
(claims to be Charles III of Spain. Actually Emperor Charles VI after 1711)
Louis XV

(A) Recognised heir of Charles II and chief beneficiary of the First Treaty of Partition till his death in 1699.

(B) Rival claimants of Spain after Charles II, the elder brother of each resigning his pretensions.

As regards the character of the renunciations made, see *History*, January 1928, Sir Richard Lodge's article.

No one outside Vienna expected Louis to consent to the annexation of the whole Spanish Empire by any member of the House of Austria. Nor would Austria, or any State of Europe that aspired to independence tolerate a French Prince as Lord of Spain, the Spanish Indies, Italy and the Netherlands. In such a case, compromise was a necessity to the life of Europe. Partition alone could have averted war ; and after twelve years of war Partition was accepted by the tired combatants at Utrecht.

Of the three claimants, the young Bavarian was by far the most popular among European statesmen interested in the balance of power. For under him the Spanish Empire would remain independent of both Austria and France. The neighbours of the Spanish Empire—Holland, England and the German and Italian States—had nothing to fear from a Bavarian ruler of the whole inheritance. France could endure him better than an Austrian Prince and Austria could endure him better than a French Prince.

Nov. 1698 Therefore, Charles II by his first will made Joseph Ferdinand heir to his whole Empire, to counteract the designs of Partition that were hatching beyond the Pyrenees.

Nevertheless some Partition was inevitable. For though most of the States of Europe would have accepted the Bavarian as sole heir, neither Austria nor France would have consented to forego their respective claims without compensation. That was the reason why William and Louis had made the First Partition Treaty, between

Oct. 1698 France, England and Holland, to save the peace of Europe. By this Treaty most of the Spanish Empire went to the young Bavarian, but important consolation prizes were assigned to France and to Austria. In particular, Milan was to go to the Austrian Charles, while Naples and Sicily were to be detached from the Spanish and added to the French Crown.

William and Louis were making honest and praiseworthy efforts to avert another European War. It might have been thought that if France, England and Holland were agreed to keep the peace by supporting some plan of Partition, peace would be kept. But peace and Partition

had two constant enemies—the obstinacy of Austria and the obstinacy of Spain herself.

The Emperor Leopold of Austria continued to claim the whole Spanish inheritance for his younger son, Charles. The intransigent attitude of Vienna was a major cause of the War of the Spanish Succession.

Equally fatal was the refusal of the Court and the people of Spain to consent to any diminution whatsoever of the world-wide territories that they themselves were admittedly unable to defend. The Spaniards, noble and simple, were indifferent to the question who should succeed to the Empire—French, Bavarian or Austrian—provided the whole inheritance in Europe and America passed unimpaired. How the safety and interests of the rest of Europe were affected, whether peace was preserved or not, was of no account to Castilian pride. But no province, no fortress must be given away, even to avert Armageddon.

During the fifteen years of diplomacy and war that intervened between these first abortive Partition Treaties and the final Partition at Utrecht, it may be doubted whether any single statesman of France, Spain, Austria, England or Holland ever gave a disinterested thought to the wishes or interests of the Italians, Flemings, Walloons and American half-breeds, whose future was the subject of these high disputes. Such ideas were not then current. European diplomats, busy with the mosaic work of adjusting States and boundaries, were not then called upon to make the rules of their art conform to the embarrassing demands of nationality or self-determination. The subjects of the Spanish Empire were merely counters for bargaining, make-weights in the balance of power. Nor, with the exception of the inhabitants of Spain herself, did the populations in question show any effective resentment at being so regarded.

If Charles II had died in the last months of 1698 there might have been no War of the Spanish Succession at all, and almost certainly no general war involving the Maritime Powers. By the will of Charles II, the Bavarian Prince would have been his successor. He would have been

accepted as such in America, Spain and the Netherlands ; Austria, having no sea-power, could not have asserted her claims in any of those regions. And the Spaniards would have been equally unable to do more than protest at the compensations in Italy awarded to France and Austria by the First Partition Treaty. A war in Italy between French and Austrian armies was the worst breach of the peace likely to have occurred if Charles II had died before the Electoral Prince.

Unfortunately it was not the long-moribund King of Spain but the Bavarian boy who died in February 1699. At this brute stroke of chance the elaborate edifice of peace so carefully constructed by William and Louis crashed to the ground. Unwilling even then to despair of peace, the two veteran antagonists took up again their task of goodwill, and produced the Second Partition Treaty. Louis dreaded a renewal of war on a grand scale for his impoverished country and went a great distance along the road of concession to avoid it. In 1699 he was as moderate and prudent as two years later he was arrogant and impolitic. He actually consented in his Second Partition Treaty with William that the Austrian candidate should become King of Spain and the Indies, and ruler of the Spanish Netherlands. France was to be compensated by Naples and Sicily, as in the former treaty, and in addition by Milan ; but she was to give Milan to the Duke of Lorraine in exchange for his province, already practically in French possession.*

It seems wonderful that Louis should have consented to such terms, which may be regarded as a masterpiece of William's diplomatic skill. Yet those who stood most to benefit by the arrangement were the reverse of grateful. Leopold of Austria had the incredible folly to refuse his support to a treaty which would have given to his younger son three-quarters of the Spanish Empire with the consent

* By a curiously bad slip in a generally accurate work, the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, I, p. 42, says that Charles was to get only Spain itself, and that the Netherlands, the Spanish colonies, the two Sicilies and the Milanese were to go to France. If William had made such an agreement, he would have been traitor to England, to Europe and to his own life's work.

of France. He preferred to fight for the whole without a chance of success.

The English people were no better pleased than the Emperor. Overlooking the larger fact that William had induced Louis to forego claims which would be far more perilous to England and to the world, they fixed on the single point that Naples and Sicily were to be added to the French crown. On the danger of this arrangement Tory squires and Whig merchants and cloth manufacturers were agreed. William's subjects were persuaded that France in possession of Naples and Sicily could close the Mediterranean to the ships of rival powers. It was assumed that England's Turkey and Levant trade could not run the gauntlet of French naval bases in Sicily and southern Italy. William, on the other hand, was sure that with a friendly monarch in Spain, the English fleet could hold its own in the Mediterranean in time of war and cut the sea communications between France and Naples, while the Austrian armies in Italy could dispute the land route. Naples and Sicily, so far from adding to the strength of France, would in fact be hostages for her good behaviour. Such, at least, was William's view, and he was not in the habit of giving away points to Louis.

England's great naval historian, Julian Corbett, has signalled out William as the first statesman after Cromwell to grasp the full importance to our country of a naval position in the Mediterranean, and to lay plans of diplomatic and naval strategy in accordance with that idea. The war plans that Marlborough afterwards carried out against Gibraltar and Port Mahon and attempted against Cadiz and Toulon, he had inherited from William. In the course of the negotiations with Louis leading up to the Partition Treaties, William had claimed Port Mahon and Gibraltar or Ceuta for England, as guarantees for her naval position in the Mediterranean in the event of Spain being allotted to a French prince—a suggestion identical with the actual outcome at Utrecht after a dozen years of world war. In particular, William had fixed his prophetic eye on Port Mahon as the base most suited to England's needs. It was neither from too great love of France nor from neglect of

English maritime interests in the Mediterranean that William had been ready to concede Sicily and Naples to France as the price of peace.[122]

But whatever be thought of the substance of the Partition Treaties, the manner of their making was open to grave objection from the point of view of English constitutional practice. William had negotiated the Treaties without the knowledge of his English Ministers and had presented them with the *fait accompli*. And Parliament had been kept in the dark all the time.

These proceedings had not been illegal, but the Tories did good service when they put a mark upon them as unconstitutional. Such methods might have passed muster before the Revolution, but were out of keeping with the new relation established between Crown and Parliament. The Impeachment of Somers for his acquiescent part in the affair was useful in stopping such action by future sovereigns. It is true that the attack on the Whig Chancellor was pursued with the vindictiveness then usual in party warfare, and that much irrelevant matter was added to the charges brought against him by the Commons. The Lords protected Somers, and the Impeachment was eventually dropped, after a quarrel about procedure between the two Houses of Parliament.

William learnt his lesson. He saw that he must consult both his Ministers and his Parliament in grave decisions of English foreign policy. And, therefore, in the year 1701, when the crisis of the Spanish Succession came to a head in a new and terrible form after the death of Charles II, he was careful to carry his Tory Ministers and his Tory House of Commons with him in every important step that he took abroad, in every treaty or commitment by which he bound England. For that reason he was eminently successful in the last act of his life, the creation, with Marlborough's help, of the Grand Alliance of 1701 to fight the coming War of the Spanish Succession. He had striven in vain to render war unnecessary, and been roundly abused for his pains in England and in Europe. But when the disaster which he had tried to avert became

inevitable, his diplomatic preparations for the struggle obtained the country's consent and securely laid the foundations of the edifice of Queen Anne's glory.

The obstinacy of the Emperor Leopold of Austria in failing to sign the Second Partition Treaty and accept the lion's share it awarded to his son Charles, was partly due to mere procrastination and inability to take a decision, characteristic of the statesmanship of Vienna ; but it was partly due to the belief that Charles II's strong-minded German wife would assert herself as usual, and bully him into leaving the whole inheritance to the Austrian candidate. In building thus on the influence of the German Queen, the Emperor forgot that the able representatives of France at Madrid, especially the Ambassador Harcourt, had since the peace four years back gained much ground, against the German party, with the Court and people of Spain ; and he forgot, moreover, that Louis, if defied, could march his troops into Spain, where there were no native armies capable of resistance.

The Spanish grandees had a more lively sense of the real situation of their country than Leopold in distant Vienna. They shivered at the thought that the unprotected passes of the Pyrenees alone lay between them and Louis' redoubtable legions. They heard that William had quarrelled with his Parliament and that his army had been disbanded ; such, they reflected, was always the way in England, a country of heretical madmen, not to be relied on. They knew that Austria, having no fleet, could send no troops to protect Spain from French invasion and maintain the authority of the Austrian Charles in America or the Netherlands. Yet they were determined that there should be no partition. Only one course, then, was open now that the Bavarian prince was dead—to proclaim Louis' grandson as Philip V, and call on his grandfather to defend the whole Spanish inheritance against all comers. Since France was in a position to defend the Spanish Empire and Austria was not, the French candidate must be preferred.

For these reasons, Cardinal Porto Carrero and the Spanish grandees, supported by the mob of Madrid, drove

the German Queen and her party from the bedside of the dying King and overawed his feeble mind with solicitations that assumed the character of commands, while the whole enginery of superstitious terrorism was applied for the same purpose by practised hands. Thus overmastered, Charles II abandoned his life-long enmity to the House of Bourbon and his life-long attachment to the other branch of the Hapsburgs. He signed his last Will and Testament in favour of Louis' grandson, Philip, and promptly died in November 1700, bequeathing to the world this apple of discord.

The famous Will of Charles II represented neither the result of French intrigues through the Ambassador Harcourt, nor the personal whim of the imbecile testator. It represented the proud, blind determination of the Spaniards of Castile to keep every inch of the Empire which they called their own. For that they were prepared to set all the nations of the world fighting. The strongest fighter, France, they had bought to do battle for their cause by naming a French prince as their King. But they had no special love for France, except as the hired champion of their imperial unity. Charles II, therefore, had, at Porto Carrero's dictation, made it a condition of his dying bequest to the French prince that, if Louis would not sanction the acceptance by Philip of the whole Empire, the whole was to go to the Austrian Charles.

What would Louis do? All the world waited to hear. He was, indeed, placed by the dead man's offer in an awkward, though a proud position. He had just signed a new Partition Treaty with William allotting Spain and the Indies to Austria. And now the whole Empire was offered to his grandson if he would throw over the Partition Treaty. He was a grand gentleman; could he condescend to break his word just plighted to another King? No doubt if he could enforce the Partition Treaty, he was bound in honour to uphold it and so give Europe peace. But, in fact, he could not enforce it, and his refusal to accept Charles II's Will would not give Europe peace. For Austria had not accepted the Partition Treaty, though its terms were so favourable to her candidate. If, therefore,

Louis now refused the whole Spanish inheritance for his grandson, Philip, Leopold was free to accept it for his son, Charles.

Torcy, the wise French minister, thus stated the case in his memoirs:

> If the King refused to accept the Will, this same Deed transferred the entire succession to the Archduke Charles. The same courier that had been despatched into France would proceed to Vienna: and the Spanish nation would, without any hesitation, acknowledge the Emperor's second son for King. The House of Austria would re-unite, betwixt the father and the son, the ancient power of Charles V, a power formerly so fatal to France. . . . The King, by rejecting the Will had no other course left than entirely to resign the Spanish Succession, or to wage war in order to conquer that part which the Treaty of Partition had assigned to France.

The prospect of such a war was not inviting to Louis. The best part of the territories assigned to France by the Partition Treaty lay in Italy where Austrian armies could most easily come. And it was far from certain that England and Holland would support Louis in arms: for he would be fighting to annex Sicily and Naples and certain Tuscan ports to the French Crown in accordance with the Partition Treaties—the very arrangement which had aroused the strongest commercial and national jealousy in England. In the Christmas of 1700, the Tories were loudly declaring that it was better that the whole Spanish inheritance should go to the Bourbon Philip, on the condition that the Crowns of France and Spain should never rest on the same head, rather than that Naples and Sicily should be annexed to France. Many of the Dutch were at that moment of the same opinion.

Therefore, neither England nor Holland were likely to give warlike sanction to William's Treaty of Partition. If Louis rejected the Will, and went to war with Spain and Austria for his portion under the Treaty, he would get no help on the thorny road of honour. But if he chose the primrose path and accepted the Will, he would have Spain on his side; her territories, fortresses and harbours would everywhere be open to his troops and fleets in time of war, while it was most doubtful whether England and Holland

would dispute Philip's accession. Austria, of course, would declare war, but without the help of the Maritime Powers she could not transport her armies to America, Sicily, the Low Countries or Spain. The war would be confined to Italy under circumstances peculiarly favourable to France.

All these arguments considered, it is difficult to blame Louis for accepting Charles II's Will on behalf of his grandson. What else could he be expected to do in the face of the obstinacy of Austria and Spain, and the unreliability of England and Holland? In November 1700, Louis decided to accept the Will, and sent his grandson to Madrid to reign there as Philip V.

Up to this moment Louis had acted with great moderation in the matter of the Spanish inheritance. For several years he had seemed above all else anxious to avoid the renewal of war with the Maritime Powers in the then economic condition of France. That was a policy worthy of a great King, if only he had continued it to the end. But now that, as the Spanish Ambassador declared in the enthusiasm of the moment, there were no more Pyrenees, the brilliancy of the new prospect turned every head in the French Court. Louis was again the Sun King, *nec pluribus impar*; William was beaten in the game of their life-long rivalry. The Grand Monarch and the upstart Dutch Princeling were back in their relative positions of thirty years before.

Such was the voice of the French Court, raised in a pæan of joy and adulation. In an air so infectious as Versailles no wonder Louis was again attacked by one of his recurrent fits of arrogance. In a few months he fatally compromised the position of moral advantage which he had held when he first accepted the Will; he united and armed his enemies against him, and roused England and Holland from acquiescence in the Will, to a grim determination to fight by the side of Austria for a fair Partition of the Spanish inheritance.

The great war was made inevitable, not by the acceptance of the Will, but by the interpretation which Louis put upon it in the following months by seizing the Dutch

Barrier, by showing that he regarded the Spanish Netherlands as French territory, by excluding the English merchants from the American trade, and by treating the Spanish Empire as a prize for French commercial exploitation and a field of manœuvre for French armies. By these measures he converted the English Tories to the need of war, before ever he crowned the edifice of pride and folly by proclaiming the Pretender as King of England.

Against these errors, which were to prove so fatal to France, Louis received fair and full warning. His Ambassador in England was Marshal Tallard, whose name was ere long to be associated with the most memorable episode in the fulfilment of the premonitions he now made to his master. In December 1700 Tallard wrote to Louis that the English people hated the Partition Treaty and that it was dead; he declared that the English positively preferred the Will to the Treaty. But, he added, they do so under the belief that they are to be given security for their trade in the Spanish Empire, and that Flanders will be governed independently of all French influence. The English people, he said, want peace, but only if security be given.*

William meanwhile confessed to Heinsius that neither England nor Holland would fight, that the Will was accepted by public opinion in both countries. For the moment he was powerless, and had the sense to know it. His strength was to sit still, and say nothing to alienate any further his irritable and suspicious subjects, until Louis should have done his work for him, and persuaded English Tories and Dutch burgomasters that they must fight or be slaves.

Optimism and pacifism reigned at the festal boards of Englishmen in the Christmas of 1700. But with the New Year these sentiments received a series of rude shocks.

* St. Simon represents Tallard as a figure of fun, sulking absurdly because the Partition Treaties which he had negotiated were thrown over in favour of the Will. But there is no sign of this mood in his despatches. In December 1700 he accepts the new situation frankly and on that basis gives his master excellent advice, which if taken would have saved France from disaster. *P.R.O. Tr.* 3. *France*, 186, ff. 270–280 and *passim*.

In the first weeks of February the French armies poured into the Spanish Netherlands and occupied all the fortresses, including Nieuport and Ostend opposite the English coast. This unexpected news, Tallard reported, had greatly disturbed opinion, and unfavourably affected the results of the General Election then taking place. Though the 'Wigts' had not a majority in the new House, they were more numerous than Tallard had hoped, and even the Tories were turning hostile to France. Already in February he noticed that the popularity of Lord Rochester and the friends of France was declining. His foreigner's account of the General Election is remarkable: at the previous election, he writes, the constituencies had chosen solid country gentlemen to maintain their liberties and keep down taxation; but this time more than forty-three merchants have been chosen, by favour of the Court and by profuse expenditure of their own money—men not subject to the land-tax who will, therefore, vote for war more easily. The 'Wigts,' he says, are the Presbyterians, the Tories are the Anglicans; there is also a third party attached to Marlborough. Opinion is running hard against France. The best he can do is to tell the English that Louis will withdraw the French troops from the Spanish Empire, as soon as Spain is able to defend her own provinces—a date suspiciously like the Greek Kalends. Meanwhile the Ambassador begs his master for more and more *louis d'or* with which to bribe the Duke of Hamilton and the seamen at Chatham, and so stir up revolts and revolutions. But the time had gone by when such proceedings could turn Britain from her course; they only provoked angry denunciations in the House of Lords, where the Whigs declared that France was at her old game of corrupting the nation with gold.[123]

Feb. 1701

The occupation of the Milanese by French troops was reasonable on the ground that the Austrian armies were pouring over the Alps to dispute Philip V's Italian possessions in the name of the Archduke Charles. But in the Netherlands there was no such excuse. No Austrian troops could reach Flanders. The Maritime Powers were

not disputing Philip's claims there, or indeed anywhere else. The Elector of Bavaria, who had for some years past been acting as Governor of the Netherlands for Spain, had proclaimed Philip without encountering any opposition. If he had been merely loyal to Spain, he had no need of French troops. But in fact he was in league with France. The Spanish Netherlands were administered in his name by Bedmar as his lieutenant governor, who took his orders not from Madrid but from Versailles.

It is clear from Louis's own correspondence that the French armies were sent into the Netherlands not to protect them for Spain but to annex them for France. Before the end of the year he began to broach at Madrid a proposal for the partition of the Netherlands between himself and the Elector of Bavaria. He was met at first by the assurance of his Ambassador that he dared not even mention it to Philip, lest his subjects should get wind of the scheme. It was precisely to avoid partition that the Spaniards had handed themselves over to Philip, and already it had come to this![124]

But Louis did not confine himself to occupying the Spanish fortresses in the Netherlands. He seized the Dutch Barrier guaranteed by international treaty. Ever since the French invasion of thirty years back, Dutch policy had been directed first and foremost to prevent a repetition of that catastrophe. Not only was a large and effective army now kept up by the United Provinces, not only were European alliances formed, but the Dutch had obtained Treaty Rights to occupy with their own troops a number of fortresses in Spanish territory, stretching in a broken line from Luxemburg to the sea. The inefficiency of Spanish garrisons and armies fully justified this precaution. But the precaution was not enough, for the Dutch garrisons were widely separated from each other and were left under Spanish command.

Such was the Dutch Barrier in 1701. It was weak militarily, and it was not rendered self-subsistent by the political and commercial privileges which Holland claimed for the Barrier restored after the recovery of the Netherlands by Marlborough. In 1701 the Spaniards felt no

objection to the presence of the Dutch garrisons, and it was not the Court of Madrid that demanded their extrusion. It was the high-handed act of Louis himself in pursuance of a purely French policy.*

The betrayal of the Dutch Barrier fortresses to the French troops was arranged between Marshal Boufflers and the Elector of Bavaria, who, though Spanish Governor, had now passed over entirely into the interest of France. At his orders the French were admitted into the fortresses. They disarmed the Dutch garrisons, who hardly knew whether it was their duty to resist. They were kept as prisoners of war for some weeks, till the States General formally acknowledged Philip as King of Spain. Then they were contemptuously permitted to go home.

Holland and her six sister Provinces had hoped to find safety by a timid approval of Charles II's Will. They awoke to find their Barrier gone, the roads and fortresses of the Netherlands choked with French armies, their own frontier open every moment to attack. It was 1672 come again—almost but not quite. For this time the Republic had on foot a well-disciplined army of 45,000 men, which was at once ordered to be raised to 80,000. England was very differently prepared for the crisis ; the Parliament of 1698 had cut down her army to 7000. Had it not been for the more adequate Dutch force, Louis might have marched unimpeded to the Hague and forestalled the formation of the Grand Alliance against him, before England had time to rouse herself to action and re-equip her disbanded regiments. This immense initial service was recalled by the Dutch in later years, when Swift and the Tories complained that they left the burden of the war increasingly on England.[125]

Both Louis and William temporized in the summer of 1701. Though the outlying Dutch Barrier had been

* *P.R.O. Spain*, S.P. 94, 75. Aglionby writes from Madrid, May 4, 1701, that the Spaniards 'never had any apprehensions of the Dutch remaining in their towns in Flanders and it is not they but France who has driven them out and will never give the fortresses back to Spain.'

The first Dutch Barrier, thus destroyed in 1701, consisted of Luxemburg, Namur, Charleroi, Mons, Ath, Oudenarde and Nieuport. *See Map VIII at end of volume*.

seized, the territory of the United Provinces was not invaded. And William for his part still walked warily. He was negotiating the great European alliances that were to wage war on the new Franco-Spanish Empire. Such a combination was not to be made at a week's notice but step by step, and for each new step of diplomacy abroad he had to win the consent of his agitated English Parliament, where the whole mass of opinion was in confusion, faced by the unexpected aggression of the French King.

The news that the French had occupied Belgium came as a thunderclap to the English. It had much the same effect as the news of the German occupation of the same country two centuries later ; with equal certainty it led England into the war, though at the slower pace of all happenings in that more leisurely epoch. Another piece of news that quickly followed was scarcely less disagreeable to the islanders. Louis compelled the Spaniards to make over to a French Company the coveted '*Asiento*' or 'Contract,' for supplying Spanish America with African slaves, and the Company's monopoly was enforced by the ships of the French Royal Navy policing the American waters. The Government of Spain ostensibly forbade other nations to trade with her colonies at all, but the slave-trade permitted under the *Asiento* carried with it an amount of half recognized smuggling of other goods. 'The French ships,' it was presently reported, 'go frequently to all the Spanish ports in the West Indies under pretence of carrying niggers according to their agreement, and at the same time introduce their and other nations' commodities and return with the proceeds to France, which the Spaniards resent, but can't yet help it.' This *Asiento* contract and its opportunities for smuggling on a larger scale was one of the most coveted things that England won for herself in the war and pocketed at the Peace of Utrecht.[126]

The American trade was not the only one in peril. 'The vent of English cloth,' always a first object in the eyes of the nation and its public men, was likely to be shut out from three of its largest European markets by the entry of the French troops into the Netherlands and Italy, and by

the subjection of the Spanish peninsula to French influence. Aglionby, an able English diplomat who arrived in Madrid in February, wrote home that the French Ambassador Harcourt was 'holding councils in his own house,' where Porto Carrero and the grandees of Spain came to pay him 'the lowest submission.' 'This country,' wrote the Englishman in April 1701, 'is nothing but an instrument in the hand of France.' What prospect, then, was there for the continuance of English trade in any part of the Spanish Empire, or indeed in any part of the Mediterranean, which was becoming a French Lake? 'There is not,' Aglionby reported in June, 'a port between London and Leghorn where we can shelter ourselves in case of war and so refresh. Leghorn itself is but precarious now, so that the Turkey trade is quite out of doors.' Aglionby's reports from Madrid were borne out by his Dutch colleague Schonenberg. In June, Portugal made an alliance
1701 with France and Spain. In October, English and Dutch merchants in Spanish ports were being forced by the authorities to sell their goods at half price. Every month that passed, the hatred for England and Holland grew greater at the Spanish Court and the dependence on France more abject.[127] The meaning of Charles II's Will, as interpreted by Louis, was becoming clear to all Englishmen. Our country must either fight the French or abandon to her rivals commercial prosperity and naval power.

Such were the reasons why the House of Commons elected in February 1701 sanctioned the successive steps by which William in that year prepared England and Europe for war, or at least for a demonstration of warlike power which should bring Louis to reason. As early as February
1701 20th the Commons asked the King to enter into negotiations with the United Provinces and 'other potentates,' and promised to support the Treaty of 1677 by which England was bound to defend Holland with 10,000 men if she were attacked. Such was our immediate response to the French invasion of the Netherlands. From that first resolution of the newly elected Tory Parliament sprang the whole movement that led on to Blenheim, Ramillies and Utrecht. It came as a disagreeable surprise to the Courts

at Paris and Madrid. Harcourt confessed to the Spaniards that he had not looked for it, 'but the English are the most unsteady people, easy to be blown to violent resolutions.'[128]

After that first step things marched more slowly for a while. The Tories were in the majority in the Commons and they hoped for peace, if it could be kept with safety and honour. They trusted that Louis would yet see reason if they showed a stiff front to his aggressions. Their leading pamphleteer, Charles Davenant, was engaged in the double process of heaping abuse of the most libellous character on the Whigs as corruptionists, and preaching a *via media* abroad, based not on surrender to France, but on an honourable agreement. The French *chargé d'affaires*, Poussin, whom Tallard left behind him in England in April, was in close touch with Davenant, persuading him to alter passages in his pamphlets too unfavourable to France, promising that Louis would be reasonable, urging him to trounce the Whigs. Though Davenant attacked the Whig clamour for war, he himself wrote: 'What Englishman can bear to see Flanders in French hands? And what mischiefs to our trade may not be expected from their being in a manner masters of Spain and Italy?' But if Davenant supposed that anything short of defeat in the field would induce Louis to withdraw the French armies from the Netherlands and to give English merchants access to the Spanish markets, he had allowed Poussin and his own wishes to get the better of his often excellent judgment.[129]

The Whig opposition, on the other hand, was beating up the country for a war. As Louis's arrogant proceedings over commerce became known, the war spirit in London and the Home Counties swelled high. The Whigs strove to fill their own sails with the rising blast. They attacked the Tories as pensioners of France, as disloyal to the good King, as men who had disarmed the nation in the face of the enemy. The famous 'Kentish Petition,' drawn up by the Grand Jury and freeholders at Maidstone quarter
May sessions, was presented to the House of Commons on
1701 May 8th. It 'humbly implored the Honourable House to have regard to the voice of the people, that our religion and safety may be effectually provided

for, that your loyal addresses may be turned into bills of supply and that his most sacred Majesty may be enabled powerfully to assist his allies before it is too late.' The Kentish Petition and others modelled upon it were indeed part of an organized Whig propaganda, but they were also genuine expressions of the changing temper of the country.

The Tories were stung to fury by the accusation of want of patriotism. In revenge, they pressed the impeachment of Somers with redoubled zeal. They raised the cry that the Constitution was being destroyed by democratic attempts to overawe the independence of Parliament, and the five gentlemen who had presented the Kentish Petition were imprisoned for the remainder of the session by order of the Commons. Yet Poussin had to report to France that the petitions organized by the Whigs in London and the provinces had had a most unfortunate effect on opinion, and that when the King asked for troops to be sent to defend Holland in case of attack, the Commons had granted it.[130]

In the summer, Parliament * was chiefly engaged in passing the Act of Settlement. The fury of domestic
1701 faction and the imminence of foreign war only served to hasten its passage. In September the European crisis came to a head with the signature of the Treaty of Grand Alliance at the Hague and the proclamation of the Pretender at Versailles.

* See p. 119, above.

CHAPTER VII

Marlborough at the Mauritshuis. The Grand Alliance and the war aims of the Allies. Proclamation of the Pretender by Louis. Whigs and Tories in William's last Parliament. Louis invades the Bishoprics. The eve of war. The death of William.

THE Grand Alliance between England, Holland and Austria represented the result of months of anxious work by William and Marlborough, in adjusting the very different views of the Emperor and the Maritime Powers. In this delicate task Marlborough served his apprenticeship in great international affairs, under the master whom he was destined to succeed as the leader of the European league against France.

Early in the reign, Marlborough had headed the party of the Princess Anne and of the Tory malcontents against William ; and he had been deep in abstruse Jacobite plots, with what precise motive no one then knew and no one now knows. Since the death of Mary had made Anne the immediate heir to the throne, the relations of the Marlboroughs to the King had somewhat improved. And William, to whom personal resentments were nothing when the common cause was at stake, had fixed on Marlborough to carry on the work to which he himself was becoming unequal and which he must soon relinquish altogether. It was a policy at once magnanimous and subtle to admit his late enemy to his innermost counsels for the salvation of Europe ; to send abroad the Englishman who had a few years before posed as the leader of the anti-Dutch party, to work as the colleague of Heinsius at the Hague ; to give Marlborough a near view of Europe as the field of his future ambition, and so to engage his interests and affections in the conduct of the great struggle with France. When

once he had seen the real aspect of continental affairs from inside, his strategic genius would never permit him to adopt the comfortable belief held by so many of his fellow Tories, that naval operations against Spanish Colonies and treasure-ships were the chief part of all that England need do to bridle the ambition of Louis. William desired that, before he himself left the scene, Marlborough should be personally committed to the common cause of Europe. Anne could be trusted to follow his lead. The future Queen had long been accustomed to take the sage advice offered her by the husband of Sarah Churchill.

With these ends in view, William in the first days of July took Marlborough with him from Harwich to the Hague, as English plenipotentiary and Commander-in-Chief of the forces that Parliament had agreed to send for the defence of Holland. Already the first of English subjects, Marlborough was treated like a Prince and lodged in the Mauritshuis. A finer work of art has never been shown there. The statesmen of Europe were received at the top of the staircase by a glorious living portrait of a Milord, every inch a soldier and a courtier ; said indeed to be fifty years of age but in the prime of manly beauty, with a complexion like a girl's ; talking charmingly in bad French ; seeming to understand all and sympathize with everyone.*

July 1701

It was a most engaging picture, whatever passions or schemes were hid behind the canvas. Those the future might reveal—or haply never reveal. But though the Dutch could not pluck out the heart of his mystery, contact with him gave them fresh confidence. The terrible position in Europe and on their own frontier seemed somehow lightened by the presence in the Mauritshuis of this courteous, dignified man, giving the sense of immense reserves of power. It cheered the Allies hardly less than the news that the great Prince Eugene with his Austrians had broken out of the Alpine passes by a masterpiece of

* Even after Ramillies, when he was nearer sixty than fifty, a Dutch Deputy, who knew him well, noticed his beauty ' de blanc et de rouge qui puisse braver le plus beau sexe ' ; also his bad but charming French. See van Goslinga's *Mémoires*, ed. 1857, pp. 42–43.

strategy, and begun the war in the plain of the Po to advantage, while Holland and England still negotiated. There was something in Austrian unreasonableness after all ! Perhaps Louis was not invincible. Milord's smile said as much.

Above all Marlborough won the confidence of Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary of Holland. It was as well they should be friends, for they two would have to carry on William's diplomatic task when he was gone ; and they would have to conspire together to keep their two jealous countries on a common course, when the Stadtholder King no longer united the governments, when the Tories ruled in England and the burgher oligarchy raised its head in Holland.

In those summer months spent by Marlborough in the Hague beside the still waters of the Vyver, he acquired his consummate knowledge of the element in which his life's work must thenceforward move. He mastered the details of the political and military map of Europe. He learned to deal at close quarters with the slow, reliable selfishness of Vienna ; the greed and jealousy of some German Princes, the greed and public spirit of others ; the bourgeois tremors of Dutch deputies and generals ; the raw barbarian pride of Charles of Sweden. On each of these he learned to play as on an instrument : all could be used to make or mar the harmony of the Alliance. They must be attuned to one another and to the island prejudices of the squires in the Parliament at home.

The first difficult adjustment of these factors, the common work of William, Marlborough and Heinsius, took shape in the Treaty of Grand Alliance. It was signed by Austria, England and the United Provinces—Marlborough alone signing for England. The three principals bound themselves to exact certain terms from France and Spain, by negotiation if possible, or if that failed by war. Other Princes were to be invited to join the League as accessories.

Sept. 7 (N.S.) 1701

With great difficulty Leopold of Austria had been persuaded that his Allies could not be bound to win the whole Spanish inheritance for his son Charles. In 1701 neither

England nor Holland were ready to fight on those terms, though they changed their minds two years later. The original Treaty of Alliance accepted the rule of Philip V over Spain and the Spanish Indies, on condition that the crowns of France and Spain should never under any circumstances be united, a point on which Louis had offered no satisfaction to Europe. But in return for acknowledging Philip at Madrid, the Allies bound themselves to obtain for the House of Austria 'a just and reasonable satisfaction' in the shape of Milan, Naples, Sicily, the Spanish Mediterranean islands, and finally the Netherlands.

The Allies, in fact, engaged to fight for a 'Partition' of the Spanish Empire, such as was afterwards effected at Utrecht. Many years later Bolingbroke, when accused of treachery to the allied cause for having made peace on those terms, justly defended himself by referring to the Treaty of Grand Alliance :

> The object of this war, which King William meditated, and Queen Anne waged, was a Partition, by which a Prince of the House of Bourbon, already acknowledged by us and the Dutch as King of Spain, was to be left on the throne of that dismembered monarchy. The wisdom of those counsels saw that the peace of Europe might be restored and secured on this foot and the liberties of Europe would be in no danger.[131]

The Treaty of Grand Alliance did not, however, assign the Netherlands unconditionally to Austria. For in that quarter Holland considered that her own most vital interest lay. By Clause Five the Allies bound themselves to recover the Spanish Netherlands 'with the intention that they should serve as a dyke, rampart and barrier to separate and keep off France from the United Provinces.' What precisely these words might mean the future would reveal. The bear had better be killed first, before the hunters fell out over dividing the skin. Five years later, when the victory of Ramillies had driven the French from the Low Countries, the difference between the Austrian and the Dutch interpretation of Clause Five became only too apparent. The Austrians then claimed full, immediate sovereignty of the reconquered lands, while Holland claimed practical sovereignty till the war was over, and afterwards

a perpetual barrier of fortresses much stronger and more independent than the Barrier which Boufflers had so easily swept away in the February of 1701. The vagueness of definition on this point in the Treaty of Grand Alliance was due not to bad draftsmanship but to the diplomatic necessity of postponing an irreconcilable dispute.[132]

The special trading interests of England and Holland were secured by a clause guaranteeing to them the same commercial privileges in the territories remaining to Philip V as those which they had enjoyed under Charles II ; the same clause expressly barred the French from becoming possessed of the Spanish Indies, or even from sending any vessels there to trade 'directly or indirectly under any pretext whatever.' England's general interests were otherwise sufficiently safeguarded by the provisions under which the Spanish holdings in the Netherlands, Italy and the Mediterranean islands passed under Austrian rule : Austria could be no object of jealousy to England, for she was an inland power with no fleet and no naval ambition.

At Marlborough's instance, a clause was added authorizing England to seize and hold for herself at the peace any parts of the Spanish Indies that she coveted. Such colonial expeditions he knew to be the ideal of the coming war cherished by many of his Tory colleagues, though in his own mind European operations by land and sea held a prior place. The same privilege of territorial plunder in South America was, *pro forma*, conceded to the Dutch, who were even less likely to exercise it.

In the weeks following the signature of the initial Treaty of Alliance, Marlborough showed admirable prudence and firmness : he resisted the entreaties of Heinsius and the wishes of William that he would pledge England to provide a specific number of troops, to balance similar undertakings by Austria and Holland. 'Before God I will die rather than do so fatal a thing,' wrote Marlborough to Godolphin, in language unusually impassioned from his pen : the numbers must be left to the free vote of Parliament, or that jealous assembly would throw everything overboard. And to Secretary Hedges he wrote :

Oct. 1701

If the King should be prevailed upon to settle this by his own authority we shall never see a quiet day more in England and consequently not only ruin ourselves but also the liberties of Europe. For if the King and Parliament begin with a dispute France will give what laws they please.

The impeachment of Somers for the affair of the Partition Treaties had served as warning ; English diplomatic procedure was being duly adjusted to a parliamentary system of government.[133]

Marlborough in fact proved to be no mere apprentice, learning the diplomatic trade from William. Still less was he a mere instrument of the King's foreign policy, like Portland or Somers. In these negotiations that laid the basis of the Alliance so well, Marlborough asserted his own personality and the rights of the English Ministry and nation, yet in a manner that gave no offence to his master. He so prepared the Treaties of Alliance that they would be acceptable to Parliament. Marlborough would not have been England's greatest leader in war if he had not understood the necessary relation between her war effort and her civil constitution. In that understanding he was not surpassed by Chatham himself. Long absences abroad, great victories in the field, the flattery of all Europe never made that cool head forget that he must answer for all he did to the Commons of England.

Marlborough also took the lead in negotiating a Treaty that pacified Charles XII of Sweden. He persuaded that prickly but Protestant monarch, in return for English gold, to dissociate his interest from Louis and leave his late enemy the King of Denmark free to hire out Danish troops to fight on the Western front for the Allies. It was not the last time that Marlborough would be the means of dissuading the fiery Swede from falling on the rear of the Alliance.[134]

That winter, Treaties were rapidly made with the King of Prussia, the Bishop of Münster, the House of Hanover, and other German Princes, by which each covenanted to send prescribed numbers of cavalry and infantry, usually in return for specified payments by England and Holland. Already the Maritime Powers were the paymasters of the Alliance. These subsidiary Treaties grew in a thick cluster

round the original Treaty of Grand Alliance between the three principals. The international army that Marlborough was to lead in the spring was signed and sealed for, on the faith of the English and Dutch exchequers. For all this the English Parliament readily consented to stand sponsor, partly owing to the prudence of Marlborough, but still more owing to the crowning imprudence of Louis.

The Treaty of Grand Alliance had been signed on September the Seventh, though it was not yet ratified, and was kept a secret for some weeks.* Louis was still ignorant of its contents, though informed as to the general attitude and intentions of the Allies, when on September the Thirteenth he stood by the deathbed of James II and promised to acknowledge his son as James III. A few days later the young man was, on his father's death, proclaimed in France as the new King of England.

Sept. 13 (N.S.) 1701

By this act Louis proclaimed himself above all law save his own will; he broke the Treaty of Ryswick, by which he had acknowledged William as King and had pledged his word of honour not to countenance any attempt to disturb the English Government ; and he flouted the Act of Settlement, which Parliament had passed only three months back, for the precise purpose of cutting off from future hopes of succession the Prince whose claims he now championed before the world.

No defence of his conduct is to be found in the sophistical pleading of Torcy. That able Minister of France, anxious to minimize the anger of England, argued in his best diplomatic style that the proclamation of the Pretender was a pure formality and meant no more than the English King's retention of the antique title of King of France. No one in Europe believed that, least of all Torcy himself. In the very month when Louis publicly proclaimed James III, he was conspiring in secret with his ally, the new Pope Clement XI, to bring about a Jacobite restoration on William's death. Hard cash was sent to Paris by the Pope, to be used by the French Government to bribe the Scots Parliament through the agency of the Duke of Hamilton.

* The Treaty of Grand Alliance was disclosed to Louis on November 10 by the Swedish Minister. *Klopp*, IX, pp. 397, 410.

Torcy himself, even while he was assuring Europe that the proclamation of the Pretender was a mere form, was assuring Cardinal Gualterio, the Papal Nuncio at Paris, that if there were a war an armed attempt to restore James would be made, and that even if there were no war the young man would be helped by France to mount the English throne the moment William was dead.[135]

If Torcy opposed and deplored his master's hasty and emotional act in proclaiming James III, it was not because he disapproved attempts to overset the Protestant succession in England, for he was even then plotting such an attempt himself. He only thought it unwise to stir the warlike ardour of the English people by letting them know the truth. They would have been yet more angry if they had known the whole truth, and had realized that the Pope himself was conspiring with Louis to restore the Roman Catholic line in England.

Torcy's disclaimer of any real intention was therefore not made in good faith, and need deceive no one. The real defence of Louis' action, from his own point of view, is very different. He had determined not to make any of those large concessions which the Allies were bound to demand of him as the price of peace. Therefore, though he still hoped for peace on his own terms, he was fully prepared for a renewal of war, under conditions that seemed to ensure victory. Everything surely had been changed in his favour since the last European struggle. The Netherlands and the whole Empire of Spain were now at his disposal ; the new Pope was his ally ; the Elector of Bavaria would raise his standard on the banks of the Danube. William he knew to be dying,[136] and he had been advised that on his death the Republican and pro-French party would revive in Holland and overthrow Heinsius ;[137] as to England, he believed that, even if he failed to effect the restoration of James III, the Tories would come in with Queen Anne, and either keep peace or wage half-hearted war. When William was gone, what other Prince or general could give unity to the military operations of the Allies, if any such were undertaken ?

It never occurred to Louis that these calculations would

be overset by the English nobleman whom William had recently taken the odd fancy to push forward at the Hague. As yet the name of Marlborough had no terrors in the French ear. The secrets of his double disloyalty in the past were better known at St. Germains and in the French Chancellery than in London ; while his military successes over English peasants at Sedgemoor and Irish bogtrotters at Cork, however remarkable in fact, had made little noise among professional soldiers abroad.

Louis, therefore, though he still hoped for peace, did not fear war, and he did not fear the English. Why then should he not indulge his personal sentiments of pride and generosity, and promise the dying James to place his son on the throne at the earliest opportunity ? The gesture would win the applause of the chivalrous French people. And it would restore to him in case of war the confidence and co-operation of the Jacobites of England and Scotland, who considered that the King of France had betrayed them at Ryswick.

But all that Louis gained with the Jacobites he much more than lost with the rest of the nation. The proclamation of the Popish Pretender by France gave to the coming war a dynastic and religious character in the eyes of the English, without distinction of party. It was the High Tory Chief, Sir Edward Seymour, who moved in the House of Commons that a clause be added to the Treaty of Grand Alliance, binding the Allies not to sheathe the sword till Louis had acknowledged the Protestant Succession in England. In April 1702 this clause was accordingly added to the Treaty ; Holland and Catholic Austria thereby undertook to fight for the Protestant Succession as the price of England's continued support of their own claims. Austria had no feeling for the Stuarts who were the catspaws of France. The English dynastic question took a leading place in the war aims of the Allies ; and the somewhat shadowy Hanoverian Succession, hovering aloof in space and in time, came nearer to English hearts when English soldiers fought for it at Blenheim and Ramillies.[138]

Jan. 1702.

The proclamation of the Pretender was not indeed the

reason why England joined in the War of the Spanish Succession. Her participation had become certain a week earlier when Marlborough had set his name on her behalf to the Treaty of Grand Alliance. Though the Tory Ministry and Parliament were ignorant for some time of the precise terms of the Treaty, they had given their previous sanction to the formation of an Alliance to obtain security and compensation from Louis and Philip. They would, in any case, have gone to war in support of the Treaty.

But it is by no means certain that, without the spur of Louis's final insult, England would have made the great military and financial effort necessary to achieve victory. Many of the Tories who accepted the war as unavoidable, were still, like Rochester and Jersey, unwilling that England should fight 'as a principal' in Flanders and Germany. They still disliked their Dutch allies, the four-shilling land-tax, and the regular army of which they had hoped to see the last at the disbandment of 1698. They wanted to attack the Spanish Colonies and to do as little as possible on the Continent. But the rage produced in England by Louis's insult governed affairs in the last months of William's life, and after his death enabled Marlborough to commit Queen Anne to the policy of a great Continental war in the summer of 1702. His success in that first campaign rendered it impossible for his High Tory colleagues to withdraw England from an enterprise so happily begun.*

The French recognition of James III was not the only

* A song popular in English alehouses at the beginning of 1702 shows the feeling against Louis and the rising interest in the continental war, then confined to Eugene's campaign in Italy:

> In the Ryswick Charte remember
> He great William lawful names;
> But grown doating last September,
> Loudly sounds, loudly sounds another James;
> Routs our trade too,
> And would invade too,
> Could he turn the Oglio
> Into Seine, which our boys in Italy
> All resolve shall never be,
> Drink, drink, drink we then a flowing glass to Prince Eugene.

D'Urfey, *Pills*, II, p. 226.

provocation endured by England in September 1701. In that same month Louis prohibited the importation of all British manufactured articles into France.[139] The dynastic outrage and the economic injury combined set all England aflame. The Tories were reconciled to war; but the temper of the nation made the electoral opportunity of the Whigs. For a year past they had been denouncing the Tories as Francophils and Jacobites. Here, they were now able to say, is the outcome of the Tories' tenderness for France and their slowness in declaring war. Louis flouts us because he no longer fears us. Let us have men to conduct the war who intend to win it and will vote the necessary measures. In the winter of 1701–1702 the nation, though united for the coming struggle abroad, was torn by the rage of faction at home.[140]

What course would William take? Portland, Somers and other ex-Whig Ministers, still threatened with impeachment by the existing House of Commons, saw the road back to safety and power opening before them. They besought William to hold another General Election at once. Now was the moment to get a Whig Parliament and a Whig Ministry as the necessary prelude to a vigorous conduct of the war. Such was their advice to the King, and their reasoning was supported by the counsel of the mystery-man of English politics, Robert Spencer, second Earl of Sunderland. Once James II's pseudo-Papist tool and then his betrayer, Sunderland now acted behind the scenes as William's occasional confidant, for he was skilled in the cool prognostication of storms of State, though he had wrecked himself by sailing too near the wind in the greatest tempest of all.[141]

William yielded to their persuasions so far as to dissolve Parliament, though it was not ten months old. He cared little about the Whigs, but he saw that a House elected in the present state of public feeling, whether Whig or Tory, would be pledged to prosecute the war with vigour. But he still walked warily. He would not change the Tory Ministry before the Dissolution; and, therefore, the influence of the Crown and Government, always an important make-weight in

Nov. 1701

elections, was not thrown decisively on the side of the Whig candidates.

When the new House met in January 1702, parties were evenly balanced; the Whigs had improved their position, though less than they had hoped except in the London area.* But the Assembly as a whole was strong for war. The 'Poussineers,' as Davenant and the friends of the late French Minister were called, had been rejected by the constituencies.

William's conduct in dissolving the old Parliament was justified by its European results. For although some months after Anne's accession it was succeeded by another Tory Parliament, it sat long enough in both reigns to initiate the Continental war by sea and land according to the ideas of William and Marlborough, to the exclusion of the half-hearted policy of Rochester and the High Tories. And that first step gave the direction to the whole course of the war.

But it was inevitable that the Tories were bitterly aggrieved at the dissolution. As a party they never forgave William. It was his last act in relation to them, and it coloured their picture of him in memory. After his death they forgot how he had helped them against the Whigs in the Christmastide of 1689–1690, and remembered only the Christmas of 1701. The feelings of the average Tory towards William and the Whigs at the moment of the November dissolution are expressed in a private letter of Henry St. John :[142]

> The King is desirous to meet a Parliament of good Englishmen and Protestants, in order to which he dissolves us, and thus we are sent to the country with labels affixed to our backs. The Dutch . . . were resolved not to enter into a war but upon the foot of the last . . . and so have raised these wretches [the Whigs] once more to oppress our unhappy country. If in the next Parliament people continue thus mad and the majority of the House be modern Whigs (as from the ill temper of the nation we have some reason to fear it) why then *actum est*, at least we are on the very brink of destruction. But if the contrary should happen, then . . . the child unborn may rue the hunting of this day, to use an expression out of the noble ballad of Chivey Chase, and these fellows while they have been endeavouring the ruin of their country, may have worked out their own.'

* Vernon wrote to Shrewsbury, 'I wish the people all over England would choose with the same spirit they have done in Westminster, London and Southwark, where they have shown great aversion to Jacobitism and a French faction. . . . The lists of the new choice contain many of the old members and some of the hottest, only Hammond and Davenant happen to be dropt.' *B.M. Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9090, f. 118.

Fortunately in the newly elected Chamber the balance of the two angry parties was so even that neither could oppress the other. Parliament met in January, 1702 strong for war, prepared to send large English armies to the Continent and a great English fleet into the Mediterranean. The High Tory policy of fighting the land war through subsidies alone was abandoned in face of the demand of the constituencies for more vigorous measures. But while a large majority of both Houses was united on foreign and military policy, in domestic affairs Whig and Tory still raged against one another as though no enemy were at the gate.

The close balance of parties in Parliament was reflected in the Ministry : Godolphin, the finest of Tory administrators and financiers, resigned, greatly to the chagrin of Marlborough, his friend and kinsman by marriage. But William still adhered to the principle of keeping both parties in his service. Somers and the Whig Junto were not brought back to power. But the mixed Ministry, like the Parliament, was united on a vigorous conduct of the war.

It was, indeed, time for England to show that she meant business. Before Christmas all hope that peace could be kept in the following spring had been abandoned by both sides, and armies were taking up their positions accordingly. Louis, whose forces preponderated in the Low Countries and Lower Rhine, brought off a great blow there late in November. To forestall the Allies, he extended the area of his invasion of the Netherlands by sending the French armies to occupy the whole Bishopric of Liège and some important Rhine fortresses in the Bishopric of Nov. 1701 Cologne, including Bonn. In so doing he isolated the outlying Dutch possession of Maastricht, occupied the valley of the Maas up to the borders of Dutch

Brabant, and threatened an invasion in the Spring of the United Provinces from bases on the Rhine and the Maas, the route of 1672. The chain of his armies and fortresses ran from Bonn and Kaiserswerth to the sea.*

He had invaded the two Bishoprics in the strength of his new alliance with the Elector Bishop, Joseph Clement, whose brother was Max Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria and Governor of the Netherlands. These two brothers of the House of Wittelsbach between them gave the keys of all the Netherlands and of the Upper Danube to Louis. The Chapter of Cologne, as often before, took the opposite side to its Bishop, and called in Allied troops to garrison other towns in the Electorate.[143]

Such was the situation of Europe when William met his last Parliament. The King's Speech, ably drafted by Somers, called the nation to arms to defend its safety and honour, and asked the Gentlemen of the House of Commons to show by their votes of supply 'that they shall never be losers who trust to a Parliamentary security.' The news of the enthusiastic reception of this speech by the two Houses put fresh heart into hesitating princes abroad, and speeded their preparation for war against France. Now for the first time the Treaty of Grand Alliance, signed four months back, came into the full vigour of active life when ratified with the consent of the English Parliament. 'You will easily guess,' wrote Stepney, our Minister at Vienna, 'what a favourite I am grown since his Majesty's Speech has reached us and the noble resolutions of the Commons.' The statesmen of the Hague, long accustomed to read the fortunes of their country in the debates at Westminster, declared in February that no House of Commons had ever done better business in less time.[144]

Jan. 1702

The number of soldiers to be supplied by England, which Marlborough had so wisely refused to fix on his own responsibility in October, was freely voted by the new House of Commons at the splendid figure of 40,000†—18,000 to be British and the remainder foreigners in English pay. And 40,000 English seamen were to man the fleet. Thrown on to the streets without provision after

* *See Map VIII at end of volume.* † See pp. 147-148 above and Ap. A. below.

the Peace of Ryswick, many of the sailors had taken to piracy and the soldiers to marauding on the highway; they now returned from these and other more honest employments to knock the raw recruits into shape. In the early months of 1702 the naval press-gang was let loose on the merchant ships and the seaboard towns; and William's veteran army, destined to see better fortune as Marlborough's, was hastily called back to the colours.

For three years past, loungers in the London parks had been familiar with the sight of hungry half-pay officers in threadbare red coats and the hat and feather of their profession. The poor fellows had had much to put up with during the anti-military reaction that followed the Peace of Ryswick. Even their half-pay was in arrears. And the veterans of the Boyne, Steinkirk and Namur had been told to their faces that they were 'the plagues of the nation,' a danger to the constitution and to all honest men. The habit of showing gratitude to soldiers at the end of a war is a growth of quite recent times, at least in England. Many officers, rather than beg or go on the highway, had taken service under the Emperor or the Dutch. Those who remained in England watched eagerly the signs of a change of temper in the country and the chances of a new war with France. Now once more they found themselves the favourites of their fickle countrymen. The King, in accordance with the votes of Parliament, was signing commissions for them at the rate of two hundred a day. The playhouse resounded with their wrongs, advertised by the Whig playwrights. The army was in vogue again.[145]

But while the moderate Tories co-operated with the Whigs in all that concerned the coming war, they were at one with the High Tories on home affairs. Neither section of the party could forgive the late dissolution, or the Whig agitation that had preceded it. When the new House met in the first days of January 1702, the moderate Tory, Harley, was elected Speaker by four votes over the Whig Littleton. But in the following days the Whigs were in the majority on several election petitions, which in those days were treated by both sides not as questions of evidence but as tests of voting strength in a new House. A few

weeks later, when William was on his deathbed, the Tories began to win the election petitions, and it was only by fourteen votes that the Commons decided to drop the impeachments against the late Whig Ministers. No one could tell from day to day how the House would vote.[146]

March 1702

The Tories just succeeded in carrying a retrospective censure on the famous Kentish Petition. But their resolution reflecting on the petitions which had urged the King to dissolve the late Parliament was defeated. The Whigs warmly defended the liberty of the subject to petition, and the rights of the constituencies to express their opinions about the actions of their representatives. The Tories took their stand on the sacrosanct character of the House of Commons, and its right to choose a course uninfluenced by the pressure of opinion from outside. The debate on these nice principles of the constitution, fanned by party passion, went on after the winter daylight failed. Candles were ordered, but as only one was set upon the table, the orators harangued unseen, hurling across the floor language which they would never have ventured to use if their faces had been visible to their opponents. The darkness rang with angry cries, sword hilts were handled as on the day of the Grand Remonstrance long ago ; the scene was compared by alarmed spectators to Milton's pandemonium or the Polish Diet.[147]

Such was the fury of faction during the last days of William's life, in a Parliament happily united on foreign affairs. The last important public act of the reign was the Abjuration Bill. No one in England had regarded the recent Proclamation of the Pretender as a ' formality.' The Tories were fully as angry as the Whigs, and more embarrassed. It was necessary for them to dissociate themselves in the most unequivocal manner from Jacobites in league with the national enemy. In the new Parliament, not only did Seymour insist on the insertion of the Protestant Succession in the Treaty of Grand Alliance,* but an Act of Attainder against the Pretender was passed into law.

Finally the Abjuration Bill imposed the test of a new and

* See p. 151, above.

stricter oath on all Members of Parliament, clergy, and office holders. It had been part of the compromise on which the Revolution Settlement was based, to respect the tender consciences of Nottingham and other High Churchmen who, while perfectly ready to swear allegiance and give true loyalty to William as King ' in fact,' could not swear to him as King ' by right.' That was a distinction known to the old law of England in the days of the rival Roses, and it helped to give peace to the land under William's rule. But Louis' insult stirred the nation to such anger, that a new oath was demanded, renouncing the Pretender in less equivocal terms. By the Abjuration Bill of 1702 every person holding a post in Church or State was called on to deny the theory of divine hereditary right, for he had now to take the compulsory oath to William, and afterwards to Anne, as 'lawful and rightful' monarchs, and to abjure the Pretender and his heirs as having ' no right or title whatsoever ' to the Crown.

Nottingham and the High Churchmen had Louis to thank when they were forced to swallow this unpalatable draught. The fact that Anne had come to the throne before they were called on to take the new oath, no doubt made it easier to conform, in actuality though not in logic. Yet the satisfaction felt by the High Tories at the accession of James II's daughter was qualified, when they found themselves thus compelled to make a more explicit declaration of Revolution principles under Anne than had been required of them under William. Those who still hoped for a repeal of the Act of Settlement and a Jacobite restoration after Anne's death ' took it for granted,' like one of Nottingham's correspondents, ' that notwithstanding this oath every man is free to consent to any change that shall be made by Parliament.'[148]

But the new oath tended to prevent the return of Nonjuror clergymen to the Established Church in Anne's reign. It was refused wholesale by the Scottish Episcopalians. It was used in 1709 as a further weapon with which to persecute the Roman Catholic priesthood in Ireland.

The Tories in Parliament had assisted at the passage of the Abjuration Bill and, with the exception of the ever

scrupulous Nottingham, they had scarcely ventured to object to the stricter terms of the proposed oath of loyalty. The majority of the party had indeed voted against making the oath compulsory. But in their days of power under Queen Anne they never repealed it. The new test, thus far sanctioned by the passive consent of the Tory Parliamentarians, aroused the indignant protests of many of their supporters in the Church and in the country at large. The oath indeed was taken, but not without many murmurs against those who had passed it. Such was the embarrassment into which the dynastic question was constantly putting the great party which, but for that question, would have been decidedly the strongest in the State. In the reign of Anne, many Tories, like Swift, tried to solve these difficulties for themselves or their friends, by still affecting doubts as to the birth of the Pretender, while the Whigs rejoiced to proclaim him the genuine son of James II, but excluded from the throne by vote of Parliament on the clear and rational principles of the Revolution.[149]

On February the twentieth William went for his last ride in Hampton Court Park. The intrepid horseman, who had so often hunted the boar and the stag all day, and so often ridden unscathed through the thick of battle, met his end from the stumble of his horse, Sorrel, on a level stretch of English sward. It was only a collar-bone, but death had its bill out against him on other counts, and his frail body was unable to recover from the shock. For more than a fortnight he lay at Kensington in a fever, slowly dying, while Whigs and Tories wrangled at Westminster as fiercely as ever, not knowing for some days after the accident how near they were to the great change. On February the twenty-eighth a message came to them from the King raising larger visions : William's last message to the two Houses was a recommendation for a closer Union of the kingdoms of England and Scotland. He had had the misfortune to be King of both, severally and at once, and knew from the experience of Darien what weakness resulted to Britain from the disunion of her two Parliaments and her two systems of commerce. William, who loved England little, understood her interest well.

Feb. 20 (O.S.) 1702

The large successes of the reign of Anne, which laid the foundations of British power and prosperity in the Eighteenth Century, had all been foreseen and advised by the Dutch King—the Grand Alliance, the Continental war under Marlborough, the fleet in the Mediterranean, the acquisition of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and last but not least the Union with Scotland—these were all policies that he bequeathed.

On the sixth of March, no longer able to write his signature, he was held up in bed to put with feeble hand the stamp of his approval on a commission to pass the Abjuration Bill. The High Tories who had hoped he would die before it passed, considered this the last outrage.[150]

Two days later the end came.* As the news spread over Europe, men's hearts stood still, the Allies fearing that all was lost, the French hoping that all was won without a war. Louis had been promised by his agents great changes for the good in Holland and England as soon as the breath was out of William's body. For some days it was rumoured in French official circles that Anne was having difficulty in securing the succession, and would be in need of all her troops at home. Then the mists cleared, and Anne was seen, seated benignly on her throne amid the enthusiasm of a loyal people ; while in Europe the great machine of the Alliance prepared by William, moved forward to the brisker tune of Marlborough going to the war. If indeed it was a molehill over which Sorrel had stumbled in the Park, the 'little gentleman in black velvet,' toasted by Jacobites, had done his work too late to help either them or their friend King Louis.[151]

* Macaulay's account of the death of William, on the last page of his history, has no references at the foot of the page, as the historian himself died before completing it. I do not therefore know whether he had read the account given by L'Hermitage to the Dutch Government, nor, if he had, whether he considered it a high authority. I think some of it is worth quoting for comparison with Macaulay's narrative. In the first place L'Hermitage states that Bentinck was half an hour late in coming to the bedside of his friend and master owing to the mistake of a valet sent for him by the King. When at length he came, Bentinck found William being held up in bed by attendants. 'Il s'approcha tout prest du roi pour entendre ce que Sa Majesté vouloit lui dire, mais il ne peut entendre que quelques paroles Flamandes qui signifient en Français *pour la dernière fois*. S.M. lui tendit la main et la lui serra, et l'on dit qu'elle (S.M.) la luy porta sur son coeur.' *B.M. Add. MSS.* 17677, xx, f. 248. 'Flamande' we should translate 'Dutch.'

In times of desperate difficulty William had done services to England greater than those rendered to her by any save a very few of her native Princes. But he had been cold to Englishmen, not hiding his preference for his native land and people. So his meed over here had been admiration always, gratitude sometimes, but seldom love. He was remembered as the Deliverer, often with religious thankfulness ; but warmth of feeling for him, on this side St. George's Channel, was found chiefly in the army, among the men who had seen his soul taking fire under the stresses of battle. Uncle Toby, when he remembered the look of William galloping past him at Landen to rally the shaken squadrons for another charge, forgot the King and cried 'gallant mortal !'

In Anne's reign and for long afterwards, his memory was the plaything of parties—a toast for Whigs, a stumbling block for Tories, a flag of flaming battle in Ireland. But though opinions about him differed with parties or persons, there was a core of agreement : the central feeling in England was given voice by the West Country Tory member, Sir John Packington, when the news of his death was announced in the Commons. 'Sir, we have lost a great King ; we have got a most gracious Queen.'

CHAPTER VIII

First days of the new reign. Marlborough again at the Hague. Question of the command. Character and opinions of Queen Anne. Her Church appointments. The dynastic question in 1702. The 'Queen's evil.' Anne and Party Government. Anne and the war. The Prince Consort, George of Denmark. Character of Marlborough. Godolphin as Lord Treasurer.

THE first week of Anne's reign was hardly less momentous than the last. If the dramatic scene at her deathbed cleared the path for the peaceful advent of the House of Hanover, the early hours of her accession ensured that the conduct of the coming war should lose nothing in vigour by William's death, a decision unwelcome to some who stood near the Queen's throne, utterly unexpected in France, and hardly hoped for in Holland.

William died on the morning of March the eighth. It was Sunday, but no one thought it wrong to labour for the salvation of the State. That very day the Queen was proclaimed, and met her Privy Council. She addressed them in a soft, clear, pleasant voice, her chief asset on public occasions. She told the Council, and thereby told the world, that her two aims were the maintenance of the Protestant Succession and the reduction of the power of France. As old Sunderland wrote to the Marlboroughs—'She is now in the King's place, her interest is the same as his was.' [152]

March 8 (O.S.) 1702

The same day the Lords and Commons assembled,* and each voted an address, expressing not only their loyalty

* *H. of L.* and *H. of C. Journals.* After the Assassination Plot against William, an Act had been passed to avoid a dissolution of Parliament at the demise of the Crown. The Houses were thereby enabled to sit (for not more than six months) after the King's death, and so thwart all Jacobite plots against the succession.

to Anne and the Protestant line, but their desire to wage the war with the utmost vigour. On Monday these addresses were presented to the Queen. On Tuesday, March 10th, only forty-eight hours after William's death, Marlborough had received his instructions as Ambassador Extraordinary from Queen Anne to Holland : he was to go at once to the Hague to revive the drooping spirits of the Alliance and arrange for the opening of the spring campaign. On Wednesday the Queen, making her first speech to the two Houses of Parliament,

> charmed them both, for never any woman spoke more audibly or with better grace. And her pressing to support our alliances abroad will commute for what the Dutch may take amiss in that emphasis which Her Majesty laid on her *English heart*. But it did very well at home and raised a hum from all that heard her.[153]

The swift sequence of these steps towards vigorous warfare on the Continent, by no means desired by everyone, least of all by the Queen's relations of the Hyde family, must have been pre-arranged between Anne and the Churchills while William was still drawing painful breath.

The City of London, that fourth Estate of the Realm, whose long purse was destined to maintain the efforts of the Allies and to bankrupt Louis, was eager for the renewal of war in defence of commerce and the Protestant religion. London had never been more united. During the reign of William the City had been rent by the feud between the Old and New East India Companies, rival claimants for the privilege of trading in the East. The Old Company was mainly supported by the Tories, the New mainly by the Whigs. The political reactions of this great quarrel in the financial and commercial world had caused grave embarrassments to government, for, whatever line it took, half the City was in high dudgeon. In January 1702 the agreement for the eventual amalgamation of the two companies had been signed, in time for the East India trade of the country to face the renewal of naval hostilities with something like a united front. The agents of the Dutch Government regarded it as an augury of the first importance for the unity of England's effort in the coming struggle.[154]

Marlborough well knew how necessary was his immediate presence abroad. As soon as the wind permitted him to leave Harwich, he made for the Hague, Mar. $\frac{17}{28}$ 1702 where he found the Allies in consternation over William's death, and more than half expecting to be deserted by England. Louis' emissary, Barré, was on the spot, attempting to renew the old-time connections of French diplomacy with the anti-Orange party in the States. A few days after Marlborough's arrival, Barré was instructed to promise that France would negotiate separate terms with Holland if she would desert the Grand Alliance. What the terms were to be was not said ; they certainly did not include the retreat of the French from the Spanish Netherlands. The tone of Louis' instructions to Barré was that of a man confident of a revolution in Holland on William's death, and the resurrection of a party prepared to purchase peace by accepting vassalage to France.

But Barré's offer had been forestalled by Marlborough's presence, and by the good news from England. Assured of the support of Queen Anne's Government, the Dutch nation, without distinction of party, demanded war to recover their lost national security. Amsterdam, where anti-Orange tradition was strong, took the lead in the patriotic movement. Indeed the followers of Buys, the Burgomaster of the great City, were not, as Louis supposed, hostile to the late Stadtholderate on account of William's foreign policy; the wealthy burghers of the Republican party considered war a great evil, but they were not for peace at any price, and they were particularly anxious to retain the friendship of England. Buys was soon on confidential terms with Marlborough.[155]

The Pensionary Heinsius was thus confirmed in power, not as the leader of a party, but as the head of a united nation in the hour of crisis. Both he and Alexander Stanhope, the English Minister at the Hague, declared in their confidential letters that the situation had been saved by the prompt action of the English Queen and Parliament, and by Marlborough's timely arrival. Heinsius was on such excellent terms with Milord that he ventured to speak to him about English politics, advising him not to engage in the High Tory policy of

a hue and cry against Whigs and Dissenters, but rather, on the model of Dutch statecraft, to incline to ' moderate sentiments, so as to introduce unity among the people ' in time of war. Marlborough expressed agreement with his ally's advice.

At the same time Heinsius confessed, in confidential letters to Bentinck, Earl of Portland, that one question still ' gave great embarrassment '—the leadership of the Allied Army in the Low Countries. Queen Anne had made Marlborough Captain-General of the British Expeditionary Force ; but the Dutch and the auxiliaries were the larger part of the whole army : who was to command them now that William was gone ? Various Princes competed, but the Dutch did not want a foreign Prince, because he might resent the orders of their Field Deputies. They were prepared to place their troops under Marlborough, on whose shoulders William had dropped his mantle. But on no account would they accept as their Commander-in-Chief Queen Anne's notoriously stupid husband, Prince George of Denmark, whom she insisted on pressing upon her Allies. It was Marlborough's task to argue for this absurd proposal ; he did so with his usual suave propriety. Who shall say whether he dropped a hint of his real thoughts to Heinsius ? Probably such a hint was unnecessary. But if those serene and perfect features were ever distorted by a wink, it must surely have been while he was urging upon the Pensionary the claims of Prince George to the supreme command. At any rate the Dutch stood firm and saved Europe. Anne struggled for her husband's claims till May ; only then, when the campaign was already beginning, was it agreed that Marlborough should command both the English and Dutch forces as William had designed.[156]

This curious and little remembered episode must be borne in mind in interpreting the character of Queen Anne. The idea, long prevalent, that she was a weak woman governed by her favourites, first by the Marlboroughs, then by Mrs. Masham and Harley, is far from the full complexity of the truth. Never were Sarah and John Churchill dearer to Anne than in the year when she came to the throne. Yet she strove for two months to give to Prince George the

supreme command in the Low Countries, in order to please a husband she loved, and to flatter her own sense of what was due from the Powers of Europe to the Queen of England. The appointment would have cruelly frustrated Marlborough's dearest ambition, yet there is no evidence that ' Mr. and Mrs. Freeman ' dared to expostulate with their ' poor dear unfortunate Mrs. Morley ' on this very delicate question. It is doubtful whether Anne had any prompting or support except from her husband, who was fool enough to wish to match himself against the Marshals of France. He was not the choice of the High Tories ; their military favourite was Ormonde, Marlborough's life-long rival, who had been bitterly disappointed the year before when William overlooked his claims to the command.[157] Yet Anne held out alone in her obstinate choice, till the positive refusal of the Allies to submit their armies to her husband's orders forced her to desist. Then, indeed, she consented without demur to Marlborough's nomination. But since she had endeavoured to set Prince George's claims above his, it cannot be argued from her preference for his claims over Ormonde's that she was aware in the spring of 1702 of the immense superiority of his military talents. By the autumn, Anne and all Europe had learnt that Sarah's husband chanced to be the greatest English soldier since Cromwell.

The friendship of Anne Stuart and Sarah Churchill, though partly fostered by self-interest on Sarah's side, was rooted in genuine human affection. Like many friendships, from that of Hamlet and Horatio downwards, it flourished on a contrast of temperaments. It withered when after many years the strain imposed by that contrast became too great.

Anne's mind was slow as a lowland river, Sarah's swift as a mountain torrent. Sarah kept her sharp and witty tongue in constant use. Anne, though she could read a speech well in public, could not carry on a conversation. That disability, together with her ill-health, prevented her from keeping Court. The occasional receptions at St. James's or Kensington consisted of ' Foreign Ministers

and Ladies sitting for a quarter of an hour about the Queen in dead silence!' 'No Court attenders ever came near her,' but reserved their obsequiousness for her servants, particularly for Godolphin. If people came to the Palace at all, Anne 'never cared to have them come in to her, having little to say to them, but that it was either hot or cold.' Her delight was to sit alone with Sarah, listening in silence to her friend's brilliant talk. Sarah for her part declared that 'to be shut up for so many tedious hours as I have been with a person who had no conversation and yet must be treated with respect,' was often a weariness, but, 'on account of her loving and trusting me so entirely as she did, I had a concern for her which was more than you will easily believe and I would have served her with the hazard of my life upon any occasion.' [158]

Though one of the friends was clever and the other pious, neither had strictly intellectual interests. Sarah indeed did not lack the brains to be a blue-stocking, if time and place had been favourable. But at the Court of Charles II ladies graduated in nothing but gambling and intrigue. There, Sarah tells us, 'I never read, nor employed my time in anything but playing at cards'—and later at the larger stakes of politics. Anne had been taught in the same school. One of her early letters to Sarah runs as follows: 'I am sorry you have so ill luck at dice yesterday. I won £300 but have lost about half of it again this morning.' [159] But in the sad years following the Duke of Gloucester's death and at the time of her own accession, Anne spent a good many hours of her retired life in reading works of devotion; and she even read some English history to prepare herself for the queenhood. The only exercise of which she was physically capable consisted in driving a *chaise roulante* with two gentlemen walking beside the horses' heads, holding the reins.[160] In this way she 'hunted the hare' at Windsor, went out to watch great herds of deer driven past her in her own or her subjects' parks, or attended reviews of her troops.

The birth and death of at least fifteen children, few of whom survived infancy, was a closed chapter when she came to the throne. That experience in the past, and ever recurrent

fits of gout or dropsy, rendered pain of body and mind her portion in life. She was often swathed in bandages, presenting an object of horrified pity to her subjects when, brought bowing into the presence, they saw their glorious Queen as a much-suffering woman, 'in extreme pain and agony, everything about her in much the same disorder as about the meanest of her subjects.' [161] Shut away in the privacy of ill-health, with a husband dull and sottish though faithful and well-loved, no wonder she leaned on Sarah for company and on religion for comfort. No wonder she liked her dinner, for she had few of the other common pleasures of life. Shortly after the Revolution the royal family had been thus described:

> King William thinks all,
> Queen Mary talks all,
> Prince George drinks all,
> And Princess Anne eats all.

After she had come to the throne, her subjects were pleased to believe that she consoled herself with brandy out of a tea-cup, and jokes were made about Queen Anne's 'cold tea.' [162]

She was indeed no picturesque figure. Yet in that part of heroism which consists of endurance, poor dowdy Queen Anne was no less heroic than her ancestress the Prima Donna of Scottish romance. And certainly the last of the Stuart Queens had many more of the qualities required for the wise ruling of a State. For a dozen weary years the invalid daily faced her office work. She did not leave affairs to her favourites or even wholly to her Ministers. In order to do what she thought right in Church and State, she slaved at many details of government. And the ideas that inspired her were those of moderation, good sense and humanity, for which the Stuart line had not always been conspicuous.

One of her hardest drudgeries was not connected with politics. In those days when so many offences were punishable by death, the royal prerogative of mercy was constantly being called into action. Queen Anne took great pains in reading the disagreeable literature of such

cases, and after faithful examination often directed her Ministers to grant reprieve.[163]

In the same conscientious spirit she applied her mind to the more pleasant business of Church appointments. Here Sarah at once found that her own influence went for nothing at all. For Sarah, if not a freethinker, was a decided anti-clerical. The pretensions of the clergy to order men's lives and thoughts were one of the many things that roused her to fury. And the bitterness then commonly displayed by the High Churchmen towards English, Scottish and Continental Protestants who were not of their communion, seemed to her equally injurious to the domestic unity and the foreign interests of Britain. Sarah thought for herself about politics, a subject on which in 1702 the ablest married couple in England agreed to differ. Sarah was a Whig, Marlborough was still a Tory. And each feared and loved the other too much to quarrel over it.

Queen Anne indeed was no persecutor. She was determined to be Queen of all her people, and was free from the itch of hatred for Dissenters and Low Churchmen that embittered the minds of Atterbury, Sacheverell and Swift. But in a positive sense she was a devout Anglican, and in those days politics and religion were to some extent inseparable. Because she was High Church in religion, she was Tory in politics. But she did not allow Tory politicians to dictate all her ecclesiastical appointments, as Swift was one day to find to his cost. On Church matters she consulted Bishops as well as statesmen. She had, indeed, no confidence in Tenison, Archbishop of Canterbury, on account of his Latitudinarian views. But she constantly sought the advice of Sharp, Archbishop of York, a High Churchman of great piety but of equal moderation.

It is not then surprising that Sarah, when solicited for her good offices by a friend in 1704, replied by professing her own impotence, and bearing witness to the non-political character of the Queen's motives in clerical appointments.

> I must own to you that I have less opinion of my solicitations of that sort than any other, because whoever speaks to the Queen upon that subject, she does always consult with the Bishops before she disposes of the thing; and besides Her Majesty has so many Chaplains who are always importuning her for preferment, that I think they have the advantage of everybody else.[164]

Most of her Church appointments were therefore made on genuinely religious grounds. On first coming to the
1702 throne, she vainly pressed Ken, the saintly Non-juror, to reconsider his scruples and return to the Bench. All that she could do was to induce him to receive, as he did most gratefully, a yearly allowance paid him through the hands of his successors at Bath and Wells, to whom this exemplary Christian bore no animosity. A few years later she chose the uncompromising
1708 Whig, Fleetwood, as Bishop of St. Asaph. That remarkable man, the originator of the study of economic history in England by his *Chronicon Pretiosum*,
1712 lived to see his Whiggish sermons burned by order of the House of Commons at the end of the Queen's reign, and to enjoy high honours under the House of Hanover. His benevolence and assiduity in the Bishop's office, like Burnet's, failed to atone in the eyes of many of his clergy for the friendliness he showed to Dissenters. But Anne was not afraid to call him 'my Bishop' and to attend his sermons at the time when he was most unpopular with her fellow Tories.

Naturally most of her ecclesiastical appointments went to the High Church. But Archbishop Tenison, though much out of favour with the Queen, outlived her in a most aggravating manner, so that Lambeth was never available for a Tory and High Churchman. Certainly the Whigs had luck about the bishoprics. The Queen was not indeed in all cases obdurate to political considerations, for the links between Church and State were manifold. But in the middle of her reign, owing to the split in the Tory Party, her political advisers were hostile to High Church claimants for preferment, and she herself was alienated by the conduct of the High Flyers in Convocation and in Parliament. In 1705 she was actually induced by two Tories, Godolphin and Bishop Trelawny, contrary to the advice of her mentor Sharp, to give the bishopric of Lincoln to Wake, the learned Whig protagonist of the

Bishops' cause against the lower clergy in Convocation.[165] Seventeen episcopal appointments were made during her reign. In the net result, the rule of the Tory Queen, though it raised Atterbury to the Bench, failed to reverse the moderate Low Church character which the Hierarchy had rapidly and irrevocably assumed in the reign of William.

How did Anne's High Church religion affect her view of the royal office? Born five years after the Restoration, the offspring of the marriage of James Duke of York with Clarendon's daughter Anne Hyde, she had at Charles II's command been saved from the instructions of her father's Jesuits, to be brought up in the very heart of the Royalist and Anglican atmosphere, during two decades when the Church of England made the Divine Hereditary Right of Kings its most distinctive dogma. Then had come the Revolution, shattering that theory, and rendering those who still held it suspect of disloyalty to the new regime. And now Anne herself was reigning as a consequence of the overthrow of the belief in which she had been so religiously nursed. Her attitude as Queen was a full acceptance of the Revolution in practice, and something just short of complete acceptance of it in theory. Even in her most Tory days at the end of her reign she declared that her right was not divine, and that such an expression ought not to be used of the claims of any mortal to authority over his fellow creatures.*

So far she accepted Whig doctrine. And yet, like many of her Tory subjects, she strengthened her case against her popish brother by dallying with the idea that he might after all be supposititious. Was he her father's son, or had he entered the royal circle in a warming-pan? One day, in answer to a question of Sarah's :

She told me she was not sure the Prince of Wales was her

* In October 1710 the Duke of Shrewsbury wrote : 'Lord President having left with me the City address I read it to the Queen last night. She immediately took exception to the expression that *her right was Divine*, and this morning told me that, having thought often of it, she could by no means like it, and thought it so unfit to be given to anybody that she wished it might be left out.' *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), p. 199.

brother, and that it was not practicable for him to come here, without ruin to the religion and country.

At a later date Sarah wrote :

I never could observe that she had any scruples about wearing the Crown, nor any inclination to those that were in that interest if she believed them so, though she always loved the Torrys, because she believed they would be for her against her brother. And I believe to the last [1710–14] Mrs. Masham's Ministers never ventured further with the Queen than to persuade her that it was best for the Protestant religion for him to come after her death.[166]

It is very difficult to determine how far, at various times in her life, she contemplated the possibility of being succeeded by her brother.* But it is certain that she was always resolute to defend her rights in her lifetime against him and his adherents. The Tories were equally stiff in her defence against all comers. In the spring of 1702 they excited themselves with a rumour that some Whig Lords had plotted to exclude her from the throne, and bring over the House of Hanover in immediate succession to William.† The Tory Party regarded Anne as their Queen in a special sense. They would defend her against Whigs, Jacobites or French. But already in 1702 many of the Tories who had the year before passed the Act of Settlement for the benefit of the House of Hanover, were speculating among themselves, in the freedom of the Coffee House, whether after all James III might not succeed Anne, provided the power of France had first been well reduced. They would not take James as the nominee of Louis, but after a victorious war a restoration might perhaps be desirable on an English and an Anglican basis. Such talk was common in High Tory circles in the first year of Anne's reign, and was still more common in the last.[167]

So uncertain, therefore, did it seem who would succeed Queen Anne, and so doubtful was it how long she would live, that the old game of 'insuring' against a Restoration by secret overtures to St. Germains continued to be played

* See p. 118, above.

† The only scrap of evidence for the alleged plot is the statement made many years later by Dartmouth in his notes to Burnet, iv. p. 540 (299). When the enquiry was made in Parliament in 1702, no evidence was forthcoming from Dartmouth or any other source. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 18–22.

by the less scrupulous statesmen of all parties. In the spring of 1703, Somers himself, the model of Whig constitutional propriety and reputed honesty, thus 'insured' by making insincere offers of service to the Jacobite Court through the medium of the French Minister Torcy, a strange method of approach for a patriotic statesman in time of war with France! The Whigs dreaded a Restoration above all things. But as a result of Anne's accession, they felt that the Tories were masters in the land, and might use that mastery to bring back the ancient line after her death. If such an event were unavoidable, the Whigs did not wish to be proscribed and for ever excluded from power under the House of Stuart. After Blenheim they recovered their confidence in the future; there is no evidence that Somers thus played the knave any time later than 1703.[168]

If for these reasons even Somers was 'insuring,' no wonder Marlborough was doing the same. In 1702, while dealing the French armies shrewd and vigorous blows in the Netherlands, he protected secret Jacobite agents coming into his lines with proposals from Torcy for an agreed peace, and a restoration of the Pretender by consent of the English after the Queen's death.[169]

Anne's view of her high office was not wholly rationalistic. She disclaimed 'right divine,' but she was yet the anointed Queen. Her High Church religion still shed upon the throne a light of something not derived from the vote of Parliament. She moved in a world of royalist sentiment unknown to her predecessor and successor. William had faced unpopularity by refusing to touch for the King's Evil, because he did not believe himself endowed with miraculous powers. Anne revived the practice the moment she became Queen, to the joy of High Churchmen and old Cavaliers. The representative of King Charles the Martyr of course had magic powers denied to a Dutchman. In the course of her reign she must have 'touched' several thousands of her poorer subjects, including little Samuel Johnson, who was brought to her among two hundred others on a March day of 1712. The cures do

not seem to have been remarkable. The parents who thought that their scrofulous offspring had the Queen's Evil, hastened to bring them to the Royal healer; and many more, without a close diagnosis of their children's case, sent them up for the sake of the bit of gold which the Queen tied round the neck of each boy and girl.

Anne seems to have taken a particular pleasure in this old-world performance, dating by tradition from the time of Edward the Confessor:

> I desire [she writes on one occasion] you would order 200 pieces more of healing gold, for I intend (an it please God) when I come from Windsor to touch as many poor people as I can before hott weather coms. I do that business now in the Banqueting House, which I like very well, that being a very cool room, and the doing of it there keeps my own house [St. James's] sweet and free from crowds.[170]

With these notions of her royal office, half of the old world, half of the new; with a kindly nature, and a due stiffening of obstinacy; with a fund of moderation and good sense, shading off into stupidity; and with 'a heart entirely English,' she was not at all ill-suited to fill the throne after William, to be umpire of her subjects' quarrels, and to preside over the period of transition from Stuart to Hanoverian England.

Her reading of the prerogative acknowledged the checks imposed on it by the Revolution Settlement. But she did not accept any more modern constitutional theory or practice. She did not, for instance, hold herself bound to choose her Ministers solely from the party dominant for the time in the House of Commons. William, by hard experience, had been driven some distance in that direction when he sent for a Tory Ministry in 1700. But Anne throughout her reign asserted her right to choose her servants from either party, or none.

> All I desire [she wrote to Godolphin] is my liberty in encouraging and employing all those that concur faithfully in my service, whether they are called Whigs or Tories, not to be tied to one or the other. For if I should be so unfortunate as to fall into the hands of either, I shall not imagine myself, though I have the name of Queen, to be in reality but their slave, which as it will be my personal ruin, so it will be the destroying of all government. For

instead of putting an end to faction, it will lay a lasting foundation of it.[171]

She began her reign so decided a Tory, so strongly prejudiced against the chiefs of the Junto, that the Whigs in 1702 only benefited very slightly by this royal liberty of choice. But in a short while the High Tories had gone so far to alienate her, that her theory of holding the balance between parties became a reality of great importance.

The parties are such bugbears [she wrote Marlborough] that I dare not venture to write my mind freely of either of them without a cypher, for fear of any accident. I pray God keep me out of the hands of both of them.[172]

So long as the Marlborough-Godolphin Ministry was in a middle position independent of both Whig and High Tory, it suited Anne excellently ; but as soon as it was made captive by the Whigs, it lost her confidence.

This battle to maintain the right of the Crown to choose its servants independent of party and of Parliament, was waged by the Queen alone throughout her reign ; first against High Tories, then against Whigs ; now at the instance of her domestic favourites, now in opposition to their demands. It was Queen Anne's personal contribution to the constitutional and political history of her reign. The future was against it, for Parliamentary Cabinet Government was destined to displace the old idea of Ministers chosen by the King. But Anne's stubborn fight for the ancient rights of the monarch in this matter probably enabled England to wage the war effectively in the early years of her reign in spite of the High Tory majority in the Commons, and to get peace at last in spite of the Whig majority of 1708–1710. She could not have carried on this struggle in our faction-ridden island if she had not had the power of dissolving Parliament, and of throwing the weight of the Crown and the Ministers at election time against the party whose predominance she at the moment wished to reduce.

But apart from her High Church religion and her Tory politics, apart from her theory that the queenly office must be kept independent of control by any section of her subjects, there remained Anne's feeling as an Englishwoman

and a Protestant. She was Queen of England and heir of the Revolution, and Louis had scornfully defied her in both capacities. She held it her first duty, in the circumstances of her accession in March 1702, to defeat France in war. Whosoever was to be her successor on the throne, he must come in by the choice of England, not of France. War, then, was her first duty. And after the first campaign, she saw that Marlborough was the only person who could lay victory at her feet. Marlborough, therefore, must have a free hand abroad, and if her High Church friends, if her domineering uncle Rochester, if her faithful servant and co-religionist Nottingham, obstructed Marlborough in foreign and military policy, they must be removed out of his way. Her support of Marlborough as war lord between 1702 and 1706 decided the fate of England and of Europe.

Marlborough was a Tory and his wife a Whig, but on everything touching the war there was no shadow of difference between them, or for many years between them and their mistress. All three made themselves executants of the European policy of the late King whom they had loved so little.

The retired invalid's life led by Queen Anne put her much more in the hands of a small domestic circle than was the case with Queen Elizabeth or even Queen Victoria. And the Marlboroughs' influence over her was the greater, because she disliked her Hyde relations, Clarendon and Rochester, who had never been kind to her and who scarcely concealed their Jacobite opinions. Her uncle Clarendon, indeed, refused to take the oaths to her, and was therefore sent away from Court, though she allowed him a pension. Her loved and loving husband, Prince George the Dane, was too stupid or too shrewd to wish to govern her political action. He had become a ' good Englishman,' identifying himself with his adopted country. But his accent still betrayed the foreigner, and he prudently regarded English politics as a mystery too deep for his understanding, a maze wherein if he ventured he would certainly be lost. By those who stood near him the Prince Consort was liked, if not respected ; he was ' mighty easy towards his servants,

affected not popularity nor appearing in public.' And we have Bishop Burnet's word for it that he was ' free from all vice '—after his marriage. It was no vice in those days to drink like a fish. As years went on he grew very fat on England's good cheer. After many a succulent meal, he died in 1708—a kindly, negligible mortal.*

There was, therefore, in 1702 no rival influence to counteract that of the new Queen's oldest and truest friends, the Churchills. Of treachery to Anne, Marlborough has never been accused. And if in the end Sarah quarrelled bitterly with her mistress, the breach had its origin in the too jealous quality of the servant's devotion.

Macaulay adopted his unfavourable reading of Marlborough's motives and character straight from Swift and the Tory pamphleteers of the latter part of Anne's reign. Macaulay, indeed, was less often misled by traditional Whig views than by his own over-confident, lucid mentality, which always saw things in black and white, but never in grey. The greatness of his history lies in his account of political situations and his narrative of the course of events; a public man himself, he understood these things better than most historians, and he could make them clear in his own unrivalled manner. But he was no psychologist, and the artist in him tended to delineate character by the unsafe method of dramatic antithesis. He instinctively desired to make Marlborough's genius stand out bright against the background of his villainy. He had blacked in the background, but did not live to put in the full-length figure of the victor of Blenheim in all his magnificent panoply.

In place of Macaulay's villain of genius, what do we see in fact? Nothing quite so clear, except indeed the military genius, which shines the brighter the more closely it is analysed. But Marlborough's motives often remain obscure and his character is not as sharply definable as that of

* Compare Burnet's remarks on Prince George's supposed Toryism, with the Earl of Westmorland's belief that he would have favoured the Whigs if he had lived longer than 1708. Both agree that he was a kindly man, and not quite so ridiculous as he has been represented. *Burnet*, V, p. 380 (515), and *H.M.C. Westmorland* (1885), p. 50. See p. 261, below, on his position as Lord High Admiral. He was a patron of science and a friend of Newton. *Proceedings of Brit. Academy*, pp. 181–2 (Broad on Newton).

Chatham, Nelson or Wellington. Unlike those occasionally talkative heroes, Marlborough kept a very strict guard on both his tongue and his pen. He liked to keep his own secret, and in keeping it from contemporaries he has kept it from posterity as well. He scorned or neglected to answer his libellers or to state his case in memoirs. His correspondence deals with the matter in hand and refrains from discursive remarks. The nearest approach to self-revelation and frank comment on events as he saw them, is to be found in the long sequence of his love-letters to his wife. Otherwise his actions alone speak for him. Sarah for her part told her story in the *Conduct of the Duchess*, with frankness worthy of Pepys and ability worthy of Defoe. She unpacked her heart in words ; but her husband hid himself in the cloud of his mighty deeds.

It would be an error, in reaction against Swift and Macaulay, to picture Marlborough as a public servant of the same integrity and high-mindedness as Wellington. Born in 1650, John Churchill had been brought up in the very worst school of Restoration laxity. His father, Sir Winston Churchill, a West-country squire, had suffered heavily for the royal cause, and John, when still of schoolboy age, was sent up to Whitehall to remake the family's fortunes there as best he might. His elder sister, Arabella, was mistress of James, Duke of York. If the brother had been a man of high principle, he would have felt his sister's shame and would not have attached himself to James's clientele. But Churchill had no higher standards than the world in which he found himself, and that world regarded a Prince's mistress as a grand lady. So, too, Whitehall thought that handsome Jack Churchill had done a fine thing when he cut out King Charles in the easy affections of Barbara, Duchess of Cleveland ; nor would that Court have raised its eyebrows very high, if indeed the lady, as rumour afterwards averred, had rewarded her needy gallant with gold. But unlike the other harpies of Whitehall, Churchill was hardening his body and training his mind in the profession of arms, in the desert hills behind Tangier, and in Germany under Turenne himself.

1668–1670

1672–1673

A few years later, he married for love a Court lady of unspotted character, whose face and wit were her only fortune. This was not the act of a mercenary or coldly calculating man. And he loved Sarah Jennings, for all her disagreeable humours, every hour till he died.

1678

Between the ages of fifty and sixty he went through his great campaigns at the head of half the armies of Europe, with his thoughts as constantly turning home to Sarah as those of a young subaltern to his mistress. Of all the world's famous soldiers he seems to have had the warmest and most fixed domestic affections. In the campaign of 1702 he writes :

> I do assure you that your letters are so welcome to me that if they should come in the time I was expecting the enemy to charge me, I could not forbear reading them.[173]

And as he drew rein on the plateau of Blenheim, before the carnage of that great victory had ceased, he had two thoughts : one for his wife to whom he scribbled a pencil note from the saddle, the other for the wounded and prisoners who depended on his care. He was, like the Duke of Wellington, a humane man in war and in peace, and he was less stern than Wellington to his subordinates. Except the burning of Bavaria no act of cruelty stands against his name. He won Sedgemoor ; others turned it into a butchery. He taught generals how their poor soldiers should be fed, clothed and cared for.

The successful military conspiracy which Marlborough organized against James II at the time of William's invasion saved England from the horrors of a civil war. Macaulay, without denying the public usefulness of his action, regarded it as a piece of selfish treachery on Marlborough's part against his patron James II. But there is no reason to doubt that his devotion to the liberties of England and the Protestant religion was a motive with him at that crisis, as with the rest of his countrymen. And like them he thought that, in time of revolution, conspiracy is a legitimate weapon, and the method of conspiracy is deceit. Probably, indeed, his motives were to some extent personal in 1688 as at other times. He did not like the prospect of holding high command at the goodwill of Jesuit Fathers ; and he had good private as well as public reasons to support a revolution which would secure the reversion of the crown to his wife's devoted friend, Princess Anne.

So, too, when she at length came to the throne, he took pleasure in his position as the greatest subject in England and in Europe. He enjoyed using in the largest field his unrivalled military talents, as everyone who is worth anything enjoys doing the thing he can do best. But it is clear from his letters to his wife that he cared deeply for the cause for which he fought—the cause of England, of Protestantism and of European liberty against the domination of France.*

There are, indeed, bad incidents in his career, particularly in the troubled reign of William III. His deep intrigues with the Court of St. Germains are ugly reading. Whatever his precise motives in these mystifications, he was playing the knave—but so were many others, Whig and Tory, whom it is not the custom to set down simply as villains. Perhaps, like so many others, he was only insuring his head and his fortune against a Restoration which he did not desire but regarded as probable. In judging his actions we must consider the standards of a time when Russell, Shrewsbury and Somers thought fit to masquerade as Jacobite penitents. But when Marlborough sought to strengthen the impression of his loyalty to St. Germains by betraying to the national enemy the coming attack on Brest, he touched the lowest point in his career. It is true that the French had previously had warning from others, including his friend Godolphin, at that moment a Minister of King William. And it is probable that Marlborough knew that the French were so forewarned. All this must be remembered. But even so it was a base thing for an English soldier to do.†

1694

Apart from the charge of treachery, it is said that he was uxorious, ambitious and avaricious. He was uxorious in the sense that he lived long and happily with that woman

* *E.g.* p. 205, below, his letter to Sarah of June 10, 1703.

† I think Lord Wolseley's analysis of the Brest affair in Chap. 78 of his *Life of Marlborough* is very fair.

whom no one else could charm or control. His ambition saved his country and Europe. And for every guinea that his avarice drew from England, he gave her back the value of a thousand. Nearly all the other statesmen of the day were engaged in founding families and amassing estates at the public expense. Marlborough only differed from Portland, Rochester, Danby and countless others, in that he gave the public very much fuller value for their money.

The talk about his avarice, grossly exaggerated for purposes of faction, arose in part from little, thrifty personal habits which never go down well in England. They would have passed unnoticed in Holland or France. But the English made it a crime in the man who had given them victory, that he blew out unnecessary candles, and walked home when other rich men would call a coach. These habits of life, innocent, if not actually laudable, he had acquired in his penurious youth, when he was living at Charles II's Court on his ensign's pay, and they clung to him when he grew rich.

Perhaps the secret of Marlborough's character is that there is no secret. Abnormal only in his genius, he may have been guided by motives very much like those that sway commoner folk. He loved his wife, with her witty talk and her masterful temper, which he was man enough to hold in check without quarrelling. He loved his country ; he was attached to her religion and free institutions. He loved money, in which he was not singular. He loved, as every true man must, to use his peculiar talents to their full; and as in his case they required a vast field for their full exercise, he was therefore ambitious. Last, but not least, he loved his fellow men, if scrupulous humaneness and consideration for others are signs of loving one's fellows. He was the prince of courtesy. It is true that courtesy was one of his chief weapons in political and diplomatic negotiation ; but it would not have been so effective if it had not been genuine, and based on kindly feeling. Old John Evelyn records on one of the last pages of his journal a scene in London society in the winter after Blenheim.

I went to wait on my Lord Treasurer, where was the victorious Duke of Marlborough, who came to me and took me by the hand, with extraordinary familiarity and civility, as formerly he was used to do, without any alteration of his good nature. He had a most rich George in sardonyx set in diamonds of real value : for the rest very plain. I had not seen him for some years, and believed he might have forgotten me.

Swift might suspect Marlborough of some deep-laid scheme of avarice or ambition, when he crossed the room to give pleasure to the old man by speaking to him. But what advancement could he hope from Evelyn ? It is not so that the incident should be read.

The charm of Marlborough's manners was irresistible, and he used it to the full to hold together for ten years the Alliance of touchy Kings, Generals and Councillors. His patience was often tried to the utmost by fools of importance —English, Dutch and German, in the Cabinet and in the field. And his patience was as inexhaustible as his courage. Now patience is not only a weapon but a virtue.

Why, then, was he so hated by the Tories and so ill defended by the Whigs ? Chiefly for reasons of faction. Party spirit raged in the reign of Anne with a ferocity that devastated social life and human intercourse. Marlborough deserted the Tories, yet never fully became one of the Whigs. Yet in spite of his fall between the two stools of English public life, he would have found more friends and defenders if he had ever obtained a hold on the popular affection at all proportionate to his services. His soldiers loved him, because he cared for their wants, and led them to victory ; they bitterly resented his treatment by the politicians at the end of the war. But, outside the army, the common people had so little feeling for him that they allowed the Tories to libel him and drive him from the country without protest. Patient, courteous, persuasive, humane, he lacked the spark that kindles devotion. His unbroken reserve, though we need not suspect it as a mask for designs invariably evil, acted as a screen between him and the multitude of his day, and still acts as a screen between him and historians seeking to know him. He never gave himself away, to friends in love or to foes in anger. Except by his achievements he has never fired the imagination, like Cromwell or Nelson. The flame of his spirit served

for light, not heat. He stands on the threshold of the Eighteenth Century, one of the first-born of the Age of Reason, the armed champion of toleration and good sense.

In the reign of Elizabeth, Sir Francis Godolphin, of Godolphin Hall between Lizard and Land's End, had brought over skilled Germans who had permanently improved the traditional methods of Cornish tin-mining. He had thus enriched his county and founded the fortunes of his house. His great-grandson was now to display the same business qualities as Lord High Treasurer of England, in supplying the sinews of war for Marlborough.

Sidney, Lord Godolphin, was much more a public servant than a party politician. He brought to the aid of the wild factions of the Restoration and Revolution era, the trained and dispassionate 'civil-service mind.' That indispensable element in the well-being of a State was very little provided for in the old machinery of Government; 'Whitehall' in the reign of the Merry Monarch had a different significance from the sober associations of the word to-day. Godolphin was indeed a 'political chief' in the departments where he served, but he found no difficulty in continuing at his duties in all political weathers—under James II until the actual outbreak of the Revolution, then under the Tories, and late in Anne's reign under the Whigs. The intervals when he was out of office were seldom long. He made his changes of allegiance quietly, with the least possible amount of apology and protestation. And he was too useful an ally for anyone to bring up against him his political past.

Unlike many of his Whig and Tory colleagues, he had no literary tastes. Gambling was his passion, though conducted with his habitual prudence. The professional libeller, Mrs. Manley, was for once not unfair when she described him in her *New Atlantis* as 'the greatest genius of the age with the least of it in his aspect. The affairs of a nation in his head, with a pair of cards or a box of dice in his hand, or poring upon a chess board.' Newmarket was his spiritual home. And not the least of his services to England was done in the capacity of breeder of race-horses. The Barb and Arab sires, which he was one of the first to

bring over, altered the appearance and improved the speed and quality of the animal in Eighteenth-Century England, which became the greatest land of horses in history.

In 1698 Godolphin's son, Francis, married Henrietta Churchill, the Marlboroughs' handsome eldest daughter. In January 1701, their younger and still more beautiful daughter, Anne, toasted by half the town as 'the little Whig,' was married to Charles Spencer, son of the Earl of Sunderland. On the death of that veteran rascal in September 1702, his more straightforward son became third Earl of Sunderland and thenceforth was accounted as one of the Lords of the Whig Junto; yet he was Marlborough's son-in-law. In this manner, when Queen Anne came to the throne, Marlborough and Godolphin had already forged domestic links with one another and with one of the great Whig Houses. These marriages proved of dynastic importance to England and even to Europe. For Marlborough and Godolphin, Tories without zeal, were liable to regard marriage alliances as no less sacred than party ties.*

Nor was Anne without personal friendship for Godolphin. He had stood unobtrusively but firmly on her side in her frequent bickerings with William. In one of the last of these, in the winter before her accession, she had written to Godolphin:

It is a very great satisfaction to me to find you agree with Mrs. Morley [Anne herself] concerning the ill-natured cruel proceedings of Mr. Caliban.[174]


Sir Winston Churchill, ob. 1688.
Arabella Churchill, 1648–1730, mistress of James, Duke of York (James II). She bore him the famous Duke of Berwick and other children.
Sarah Jennings 1660–1744 Duchess of Marlborough (married 1678)
John Churchill 1650–1722, Baron Churchill, 1682 Earl of Marlborough, 1689 Duke of Marlborough, 1702.
Henrietta Churchill (married 1698) Duchess of M. in her own right 1722–1733.
Francis Godolphin, son of Sidney Lord Godolphin.
Charles Spencer 3rd Earl of Sunderland
Anne Churchill (married 1701, d. 1716).
Charles Marquis of Blandford, d. 1703.
Charles Spencer Duke of Marlborough after his aunt Henrietta's death in 1733.

It appears from Coxe's *Marl.*, Chap. 7, that Marlborough in 1700 had objected to the Whig politics of young Sunderland, but that his objections to the marriage had been overcome by Sarah and by the genuine lovers' devotion of the young couple.

He was destined to be a faithful servant to Anne as Queen. He had not been very faithful to William : in 1694, while at the head of the Treasury, he had preceded Marlborough by several weeks in sending intelligence to France of the intended attack on Brest, and he was constantly in communication with the Court of St. Germains.

In May 1702 Marlborough asked of the Queen, as a condition of his own military service abroad, that Godolphin should become Lord Treasurer. His reasons were two-fold. In the first place, he could not be sure of money for the war unless a financier in full sympathy with his extensive plans were in control of the national purse, a man not only able to raise the money, but able and willing to see that it got through to the purposes for which it was voted, a thing by no means of course in those days of corrupt and haphazard administration. Secondly, Marlborough could not be sure of the conduct of parliamentary and political affairs during his absence abroad, unless a man in his full personal confidence were Chief Minister. The head of the Ministry was then the Lord Treasurer—the ' White Staff,' as he was commonly called after the symbol of his office. If Godolphin were Lord Treasurer he could counteract any disturbing movement by Rochester, Nottingham and the High Tories in the Cabinet, who opposed as a matter of party principle the dispatch of a large English Army to the Netherlands and liked the expedition no better for being under Marlborough's command. Marlborough, therefore, was in earnest when he said that he would not go abroad unless Godolphin were Treasurer. Anne was willing enough, but Godolphin declined the post. He only yielded to his kinsman's positive refusal to serve without him. Once in office, the Treasurer showed no eagerness to quit; in 1710 he was compelled much against his will to surrender the White Staff which he had first handled with such apparent reluctance eight years before.*

* Dartmouth, in his notes to *Burnet*, said ' Lord Godolphin would have been more uneasy if the Treasurership had been put in other hands. But he constantly refused everything that he was sure would be forced upon him.' This may be so ; or, again, he may have felt some genuine shrinking from the load of so heavy a responsibility, to which, when once he had assumed it, his broad shoulders soon grew accustomed. Hugh Elliot, *Life of Godolphin*, pp. 204–207.

It was fortunate for England that financial talent was not then a monopoly of either Whigs or Tories, as it was a monopoly of Tories in the era of Huskisson and Peel. The Whig Montagu, Earl of Halifax, had an initiating genius in finance, a flight beyond the more steady qualities of Godolphin. Montagu had founded the Bank of England and the National Debt to meet the darkest crisis of William's reign. But he was sadly deficient in the arts of mollifying hostility and managing men. Godolphin's more work-a-day talents were fully adequate to carry on the system that Montagu had begun, and steadily to pursue the sound financial road for eight years of European war. England beat France with the purse as much as with the sword, and great credit is due to Godolphin's finance.

But the Lord Treasurer was not merely what the Chancellor of the Exchequer is to-day. He was also, under Queen Anne, something very near to a modern Prime Minister. He was responsible for the principal acts of the Government at home and abroad, and it lay with him to secure the acquiescence of his colleagues in one another's actions, and to instil a certain unity into the policy of the various Cabinet Ministers. King William himself had played this part, at least in foreign affairs. He had been his own Prime Minister: Anne only chose hers. The Queen's sex and her lack of political training threw much of the higher political work on the Lord Treasurer, and helped to approximate his office to that of Prime Minister—a term occasionally used in this reign almost in its modern sense.

The Government was known as ' Godolphin's Ministry ' so long as he was Lord Treasurer ; it began in 1702 almost entirely Tory, and ended in 1710 almost wholly Whig. It derived its coherence not from party loyalty, but from the family alliance of Marlborough and Godolphin and their agreement on public affairs. But without the Queen's friendship and the use of her name, the task of the two kinsmen would have been impossible. Even when supported by the royal authority, the Lord Treasurer had need of all his tact, temper and craft to steer a course for this family Government between the Tory and Whig parties, to keep on terms with one without wholly antagonizing

the other. But Godolphin was by nature one of those statesmen whose skill it is to handle perilous material tenderly, and get the work of the country done under grave difficulties, by patient and tactful plodding rather than by eloquence, genius and daring. Godolphin's slow methods eminently suited the political situation at home, while Marlborough's lightning strokes were needed for the war abroad. And the Lord Treasurer found in Speaker Harley a man of ideas and qualities not dissimilar to his own, a public servant and a moderator, who could manage for him in the Commons, as he himself managed in the Cabinet and in the Lords. The methods and the services of Godolphin and Harley were not those of the Pitts, Cannings and Gladstones ; they were those of the Walpoles, Liverpools and Asquiths.*

* The *Godolphin MSS.* and the *Hatton Finch* (Nottingham) *MSS.* in the British Museum show Godolphin in his letters performing the Prime-Ministerial functions of bringing the Secretaries of State and other Ministers into line with a common Cabinet policy, *e.g.* about the War and Scotland. The phrase 'Prime Minister' was occasionally used in Anne's reign. Clerk of Penicuik (*Memoirs, Rox.*, pp. 53, 56, 58) calls Godolphin and Marlborough the Queen's 'Prime Ministers' in the plural, and later speaks twice of Godolphin alone as 'Prime Minister.' And Defoe in his *History of the White Staff* (1714) twice speaks of Lord Treasurer Oxford as 'Prime Minister.' Equally marked uses of the word in its modern sense, and without any implied disparagement, will be found in *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 119, and V, p. 655. See correspondence in *Times Lit. Supp.* throughout March 1930. For Godolphin as guardian of the finances see *C.S.P.Tr.* pp. vii–viii and *passim*.

CHAPTER IX

The Whig and Tory Parties. The Junto. Wharton and electioneering. Shrewsbury and Somerset. The Queen's Speech and Scotland. The Tory Ministry of 1702. Tory divisions. The Coronation. War declared on France. The question of the Justices of the Peace. The General Election of July 1702. Defeat of the Whigs. Electioneering methods. The Queen's Western Tour.

Two very different types of Englishmen, the Protestant Nonconformists and the Whig aristocrats, combined to form the irreducible minimum of the Whig Party. Others supported or opposed it according as its policies won or lost the general approval of the nation. But the Dissenting Chapels and great Whig Houses never wavered in their party allegiance in good fortune or in bad. This strange political combination of forces, socially so far asunder, was no mere stratagem adopted to meet a passing crisis : it proved to be one of the two enduring elements in English public life from the middle of the reign of Charles the Second to the middle of the reign of Queen Victoria. The Whig alliance and tradition answered to something persistent in the national mind and character, just as the union of the Church clergy and the squires in the equally long-lived Tory Party expressed the other aspect of England's needs and ideals. On questions of foreign policy, of peace and war, of free trade and protection, the two parties in Anne's reign held views which it is possible to regard as the opposite of those which they respectively held in the early Nineteenth Century. But the more enduring instincts and antipathies of religion and of class preserved the core of Whig and of Tory tradition through all changes of party policy and of party fortune, from the days of Somers and St. John to the days of Grey and Peel. On other matters

the parties changed policies with the changing circumstances of new eras, but the Tories were always the champions of the Church interest, and the Whigs the critics of Church privilege.

The Protestant Nonconformists* were strongest in the middling classes of society ; they were rich merchants, small shopkeepers, freehold yeomen, artisans and craftsmen—unfashionable folk, living in a world far removed from the parks and mansions of their aristocratic leaders. They followed the Russells, Cavendishes and Whartons all the more faithfully because they themselves were not of social rank to aspire to seats in either House of Parliament, were rigidly excluded from the Universities, and were prevented by the Test Act from taking any considerable part even in local administration. Yet they could not be indifferent to politics. From the age of Elizabeth onwards, the Puritan tradition in England had always been closely associated with Parliament. And, moreover, the Dissenters had to protect themselves against the threat of renewed persecution.

The Tories in Anne's reign complained that even the Quakers voted for the Whigs, the men of peace for the warmongers ; and old poll books bear out the charge. One Quaker, indeed, was put in the stocks at Canterbury for fixing on the walls of a church some verses against ' Wars and Bloodshed among Professors of Christianity '—

> You kill and slay and take the prey,
> And thank God when murder's done.

—on the day of thanksgiving for the victory of Vigo.[175] But the Quakers as a body, for all their pacifism, had good reason to vote against the High Tories, who were continually attacking them as little better than infidels, and threatening to close their schools, as well as those of the Protestant Sects of more militant tradition. These threats began to cause alarm among all the Dissenting bodies at the beginning of Anne's reign, and at the end of it took shape in the Schism Act.

The Dissenters dreaded the rage not only of the squires

* See p. 58, above.

and parsons, but of the people. For although the High Church doctrine and discipline were little appreciated by the common herd, the cry of ' No Fanatics ' could rouse the *mobile* almost as easily as the counter-cry of ' No Popery.' The surest appeal of both the English parties was made not to the religious instincts of the ordinary man, but to his dislike of the religion of others.

In self-protection against an unfriendly world, the Protestant Dissenters sought refuge as clients of the Whig aristocracy. They did not come empty-handed, for they could offer their patrons good value at election time. They were many of them of the rank of society likely to have votes as forty-shilling freeholders in the counties, or as possessors of one or other of the numerous varieties of fancy franchise in the boroughs. Although they formed perhaps a twentieth part of the nation in numbers, they possessed much more than a twentieth part of its wealth and voting power.

The ' Whig aristocracy ' is a phrase that requires analysis. In the reign of Anne it consisted of rather less than half of the English nobles* and a small but important minority of the untitled country gentlemen. The Whig squire was often richer than his neighbours ; he was frequently connected with commerce or public affairs. Robert Walpole of Norfolk was such an one. But in Anne's reign the chief political leaders of the Whig, as also of the Tory, party sat in the Lords, which was more important in comparison with the House of Commons than it had been in the Long Parliament. To that extent the Whigs under Anne were more ' aristocratic ' than the Roundheads of 1640. But the Roundheads and their Whig grandsons, the Cavaliers and their Tory grandsons, were landed gentry leading rival sections of the middle and lower orders, on behalf of opposing ideals in Church and State. English politics were only to a limited extent a strife between classes.

In Anne's reign hardly one of the Whig noblemen or

* The modest majority that the Whigs often obtained in the Upper Chamber in Anne's Parliaments was due to the preponderance of Low Church principles on the Episcopal Bench in consequence of William's numerous appointments. Some of the Peers had, of course, no party allegiance, and Roman Catholics could not sit.

gentlemen was a Dissenter. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred they conformed to the Church of England and were, therefore, unlike their Dissenting clients, qualified by law to hold office. Some were religious Churchmen of tolerant views, like Addison and Lord Somers ; some were scoffers, like Lord Wharton, the Restoration rake ; or moral philosophers, like young Lord Shaftesbury, whose writings helped, in the more respectable reign of Anne, to render fashionable a serious-minded scepticism suited to a man of culture.

The High Churchmen pointed out the difference between leaders and led in the Whig Party :

> The Dissenters themselves [says a Tory pamphlet of 1705] are not so silly as to imagine that those persons who have of late put themselves at the head of their quarrel do it on any conscientious liking of their doctrine and manner of worship, and that they whom wantonness, unbelief and faction have rendered impatient of the discipline of the Church, can be brought to submit to the sour rules and saucy encroachments of Edinburgh and Geneva.[176]

This was perfectly true, if we add that ' wantonness, unbelief and faction ' were as marked in St. John, champion of the High Church, as in Wharton, champion of the Dissenters.

Besides aristocrats and Nonconformists, certain other classes added to the Whig strength. Army officers, war-profiteers, lawyers, merchants trading oversea, younger sons and persons of all sorts who had to make their own way in the world and found themselves more hampered than helped by the respect paid to antique custom and privilege—all these were more often Whig than Tory. It is significant that in February 1703 the Tories passed through the Lower House a Parliamentary Qualification Bill to exclude all save landowners with a certain annual value of land from sitting in the House of Commons, even to represent the boroughs. The small Whig majority in the House of Lords threw it out in 1703, but it became law in the heyday of Tory power in 1711. It remained on the Statute Book till Victoria's reign, but was rendered a dead letter by legal subterfuges of conveyancing. This Act, which was praised

by Swift as a statesmanlike measure, would, if it had achieved its purpose, have closed the doors of Parliament to all save squires ; it would have kept out merchants, professional men including lawyers, and even the younger sons of the landed gentry. The second Pitt, Fox, Sheridan and Canning would have been excluded from Parliament, if this masterpiece of October Club legislation had not been neatly evaded by the chicanery of successive generations of lawyers.[177]

The Tory Party in Parliament, when it came to be reconstituted by the younger Pitt, extended a welcome to recruits from the mercantile and professional classes—Eldon and Stowell, Rose, Canning and the Peels. But in earlier times the party marshalled by Harley and St. John firmly believed that the landed interest alone had a right to govern the country. In Anne's reign the Tories raised perpetual complaints of the intrusion of ' monied men ' into the constituencies and into Parliament, and considered their presence as one of the chief crimes of the Whigs. According to Swift every form of property, except land, was ' transient and imaginary,' and its owners were not fit to sit in Parliament.*

After more than forty years of unchallenged power, the Whig aristocracy of 1760 could be justly charged with exclusiveness. But in Anne's reign their faction was fighting for its life against great odds ; they were most of the time in opposition ; the shifting breath of popular favour was their only hope. They stood, therefore, for the career open to talents. Out of the five Lords of the Whig Junto, at least two, Somers and Halifax, were self-made men who had risen by their wits into the inner shrine of Whig aristocracy. And Addison was lifted out of Grub Street and given high office.

In these circumstances young ambition often inclined to the Whigs as being more ready than their opponents to patronize merit independent of pedigree. But though the

* Swift, in the *Examiner* of March 29, 1711, rejoicing over the passage of the Qualification Bill, says that now ' future Parliaments ' will be ' composed of landed men ; and our properties lie no more at the mercy of those who have none themselves, or at least only what is transient and imaginary.'

Whig party enlisted wealth, activity and intelligence from many quarters, it was a minority party prior to the Industrial Revolution. The landed interest and the Church together made up far the greater part of old England. The parish clergy, in spite of the bishops, were Tory. So were the smaller gentry, particularly in the rural communities farthest removed from the influence of London and the trading world. These classes and their clients, led by one half of the nobility and larger gentry, were in normal times more powerful than the Whig interest. The Whigs could hope to prevail only through the divisions of the majority and through their own closer union.

It may seem strange that the Whigs were the more united party of the two. For they were an alliance of socially heterogeneous atoms, while the Tories were a solid phalanx of squires and parsons, accustomed to co-operate in the governance of village life. Yet the Whigs were agreed on the main political questions of the day : religious toleration for all Protestants ; war with France by land as well as by sea ; the Scottish union ; and the Hanoverian Succession. On all these issues the Tories were at variance with one another. Moreover, while the chiefs of the Whig Junto acted together as one man, the Tory chiefs were divided by acute personal jealousies—Rochester, Nottingham and Ormonde against Marlborough and Godolphin, and a few years later Bolingbroke against Oxford.

Whig members of Parliament were better disciplined than their opponents. Under the orders of the Junto, the Whig body moved and wheeled like a well-drilled battalion throughout the whole of the Queen's reign. There was no repetition of the indiscipline that had injured the party in 1698–1699.* The most malcontent of the Whigs of William's reign, such as Jack Howe, had carried their humours over into the Tory camp. The remaining members had learned, in the fierce struggle against the Tory majority in 1701, the need of supporting and obeying their own chiefs. And the leaders, on their side, had learned better the arts of managing a party. The ' Junto ' of five Whig Lords—Wharton, Somers, Halifax, Orford

* See pp. 111–112, above.

and Sunderland—consulted in private, decided on party policy, and in accordance with these decisions conducted parliamentary operations with great skill. Their chief theatre of action was the House of Lords, where all five members of the Junto sat. Thence the Whigs in the Commons, led by young Walpole and Cowper, took their cue for action.*

The Tories had no such leadership. They never knew in what humour proud Seymour would come down to the Commons, or conscientious Nottingham to the Lords : whom these individualists would attack, or what resolutions they would move. St. John alone could be depended on to show the party sport, and Speaker Harley to enjoin caution. In important divisions the Tory chiefs again and again divided on opposite sides.

The most active manager in the Whig Junto was Thomas, Lord Wharton. In the Lords he led the party with equal energy and craft. But electioneering was his special province. In the *Life of Wharton*, published after his death in 1715, occurs a story that throws an intimate and amusing light on the development of canvassing and electoral methods in the reigns of William and Anne.

His Lordship having recommended two candidates in the Borough of Wicomb, some of the staunch Churchmen invited two of their own party to oppose him and money was spent on both sides. . . . They found my Lord Wharton was got there before them and was going up and down the town with his friends to secure votes on their side. The [Tory] gentleman with his two candidates and a very few followers marched on one side of the street ; my Lord Wharton's candidates and a great company on the other. The gentleman, not

* The social centre of the aristocratic Whigs was the Kit-Cat Club. In Nov. 1703 we read—' The last 4th of this month was King William's Birthday. 'Twas kept with eluminations etc in the chief streets all over the town, and Lord Orford, Lord Sunderland made bonfires. And at the Kitcat 'twas very great. Lord Hartington, Duke of Somerset, etc were there. The glass sent down was to the immortal memory of King William. They had all new cloathes etc, and now I am in the Kitcat, 'tis proper to tell your Lordship that a great number of glasses are chose and a sett number of lady's names are writ on them.' *H.M.C. Rutland, II*, p. 177. The most popular ' toast ' at the Kit-Cat at this time was Marlborough's younger daughter Anne, married to young Lord Sunderland and known in society as ' the little Whig.'

being known to my Lord or the townsmen, joined in with his Lordship's men to make discoveries, and was by when my Lord, entering a shoemaker's shop, asked *where Dick was?* The good woman said *her husband was gone two or three miles off with some shoes, but his Lordship need not fear him, she would keep him right. 'I know that,' says my Lord, 'but I want to see Dick and drink a glass with him.'* The wife was very sorry Dick was out of the way. *'Well,'* says his Lordship, *'how does all thy children? Molly is a brave girl I warrant by this time.' 'Yes, I thank you,'* says the woman. And his Lordship continued: *'Is not Jemmy breeched yet?'* The gentleman crossed over to his friends and cried: *'E'en take your horse and be gone; whoever has my Lord Wharton on his side has enough for his election.'*

This scene is laid in Buckinghamshire, Hampden's old Roundhead county, which had become the chief centre of Wharton's influence. He had also estates and political interests in Yorkshire, where the Whigs held a surprising number of seats. And he organized the party in many widely scattered shires. At election time he scoured the island, on horseback and in his coach-and-six, giving himself and his unfortunate retinue no rest by night or day. His biographer boasted that 'sometimes thirty members of Parliament were chosen by his procurement.'

In these and similar stories we see the national machinery of party life gradually gaining ground on the purely local choice of Members of Parliament. The party system, by dividing the whole nation into two camps, worked towards national unity, because it obliterated local interests and divisions, such as had often decided elections in earlier times. Neither Whigs nor Tories, it is true, had Central Offices or Central Funds as parties have to-day, but energetic Whig or Tory magnates like Wharton, who had time, money and horses to spare, helped to supply a certain degree of national organization and control, in the aristocratic form suited to the tastes and habits of the age.

Sir Edward Seymour was the Tory magnate who had his finger in most of the electoral contests in Devon and Cornwall. At election time men spoke of Seymour's 'Western Empire.' In Devon, where Dissent was strong, the Whigs, under the flag of the House of Russell, carried

most of the seats against him. But almost all the Cornish rotten boroughs were Tory.* Indeed, the party had in the same district another electoral chief of great influence, Sir Jonathan Trelawny, Baronet, Bishop of Exeter. Of the Seven Bishops whom James II had put on their trial, five had become Nonjurors after the Revolution. Trelawny and Lloyd alone took the oaths to the new regime. At the beginning of Anne's reign Lloyd of Worcester electioneered for the Whigs, but very much less effectively than his brother of Exeter for the Tories.

Seymour and Trelawny were rival hereditary chieftains of the West, each playing very much for his own hand, on doubtful terms one with another and with the party leaders in London. Trelawny, though a Tory, had his eye on the main political chances and on the ladder of ecclesiastical promotion. Before Anne had been a year on the throne, he was complaining to Nottingham that, though he had returned eleven Tory members by his electoral influence, nothing was being done to relieve his 'numerous family from the burdens of a poor Bishopric.'[178] And even Seymour's more uncompromising High Toryism was a point of personal pride rather than of party loyalty. Wharton's influence, on the other hand, was placed without reserve at the disposal of the Whig party. He was a member of the Junto, in frequent and friendly consultation with Somers, Halifax and Sunderland; and he put all his electoral influence and experience into the common pot.

Wharton came of a Roundhead Puritan family, to which he owed his politics and his religious antipathies. But he owed his scepticism, his engaging manners and his loose morals to the Restoration society in which he had been brought up. When Anne began to reign, he was a vigorous and attractive debauchee of fifty. He was also the most cheerful and unblushing of liars. Swift, like all Tories, 'hated Wharton like a toad,' and declared him 'the most universal villain I ever knew.' Yet Swift bore testimony to

* L'Hermitage, speaking of the last Parliament of William III, said that all the members for Cornwall were Tories, but this proves on examination to be exaggerated; of the forty-four, I reckon some half dozen as Whigs or Whiggish.

his good humour, which had analogies to that of Charles II, the good humour of a man who has long ago ceased to trouble about his own reputation. After reading one of Swift's fiercest lampoons on him, Wharton would come up to the Doctor and say he was ' damnably mauled,' and then, with the easiest transition in the world, ask about the weather or the time of day.

Without principle in private, he was an example of public loyalty in a slippery age, when half his Whig colleagues and Tory rivals were in secret relations with the Court of St. Germains. Wharton's zeal for the principles of parliamentary government, and of toleration for all Protestants, was a genuine and disinterested passion, and this man, renowned for his falsehood in private life, would have sacrificed everything rather than be false to his party. His colleagues could trust him with their political, though not with their marital honour. Young Lord Shaftesbury, the moralist, who knew Wharton well, wrote :

> If I ever expected any public good where virtue was wholly sunk, 'twas in *his* character. I have seen many proofs of this monstrous compound in him of the very worst and best.[179]

Tory swordsmen were set on to challenge him, but he disarmed them one after another, always sparing their lives. The charm of his company was such that he made a practice of luring young noblemen and men of fortune into the Whig party as his boon companions, as did Charles Fox two generations later. But while Fox was a good man with faults, Wharton was a bad man with virtues. He had a great deal to do with the development of our party system, and has left his mark on our history. He was perhaps the most influential Whig of Anne's reign, and he was long remembered. Dr. Johnson in his Dictionary illustrated one of the meanings of the word ' leader ' by his example : ' One at the head of any party or faction, as the detestable Wharton was the *leader* of the Whigs.' *

* I think it only fair to Wharton to observe that the most renowned of the outrages of which he was accused, the indecent profanation of a church, is not proved. Swift affected, in *Examiner* No. 23 (22 in the reprint), to name the place where the offence had been committed, but he was forced to admit in No. 25 that the place he had named was wrong, and neither he nor any other of Wharton's eager enemies could ever, so far as I am aware, name the right place. The Tory Churchmen got into the habit of accusing their Whig enemies at election time of this particular offence. When the excellent General Stanhope stood for Westminster in 1710, he was accused of having defiled the Abbey (Mayor's *Cambridge*, p. 396). Such a charge in Wharton's case had at least some verisimilitude, in Stanhope's less than none. It is a good rule to be careful of any tale that Swift tells against a Whig or Burnet against a Tory.

The disreputable character of Wharton was balanced by the gravity of his chief colleague in the Junto, the ex-Lord Chancellor Somers. A fine constitutional lawyer, he was the most generally esteemed of the Whig chiefs in Anne's reign. But the Queen had taken a strong prejudice against him, and the Partition Treaties stood against his record in the popular regard ; he was never again destined to have charge of the Great Seal. Such are the curiosities of human character that the respectable Somers, in sending insincere messages to the Court of St. Germains, committed a meanness which the reprobate Wharton would have scorned.

A third member of the Junto was Charles Montagu, Earl of Halifax. Somers had won his place among the hereditary aristocracy by his legal talents, Halifax by his financial genius.* But Halifax was vain and arrogant ; his head was turned by success ; in spite of the great services which he had rendered to England in William's reign, he was neither popular like Wharton nor respected like Somers.

The fourth member of the Junto was Lord Orford. He had great claims on the Whig party and even on the nation at large. He was a Russell, and he was the victor of La Hogue. But he was a cantankerous, selfish, false-hearted man. By the time Anne came to the throne he had deservedly forfeited his influence. In 1702, despite his name and fame, he was already the least important member of the Junto.

The fifth member of this strange, informal Opposition Cabinet was young Charles Spencer, who became Earl of Sunderland on his father's death in September 1702, when he inherited the mansion house of Althorp in Northamptonshire. The new Lord Sunderland, like several other party

* See p. 187, above.

leaders in that Augustan age, was a true Mæcenas. He began to collect the famous library at Althorp, just as Harley made the Harleian collection of Manuscripts. In contrast to his unprincipled father, Sunderland was a sincere and straightforward Whig. But he was intemperate and unwise, and not personally popular. Queen Anne disliked him, yet because he was Marlborough's son-in-law he was destined to be the first member of the Junto whom the Whigs succeeded in forcing into her Cabinet.

But in 1702 any such event seemed highly improbable. The Queen filled up her Cabinet and nearly all the lesser ministerial posts with Tories. Only some Court places of no administrative importance she gave to moderate Whig noblemen who were not of the Junto : the Duke of Devonshire became her Lord Steward and the Duke of Somerset her Master of the Horse. But the Junto she regarded, not without justice, as an organization directed to the control of the Queen's government by a party ; such control she would not endure from any Tory combination, still less from a combination of Whigs. Not only, therefore, was every member of the Junto excluded from office in the spring of 1702, but Somers, Halifax and Orford suffered the indignity of having their names omitted from the list of the new Privy Council. Wharton was yet more odious to Queen Anne. She not only dismissed him from the Lord Lieutenancy of his own Buckinghamshire, but took from him the staff of the Comptroller of the Household and handed it in his presence to his personal enemy Sir Edward Seymour.

The only statesmen outside the Tory fold to whom Anne willingly turned for advice were the Dukes of Shrewsbury and Somerset. She trusted them because they were detached from party. In the last years of her reign they were destined to play a decisive rôle, first in helping to deliver her from bondage to the Whig Junto, then at her deathbed in thwarting Bolingbroke and bringing in the House of Hanover. But in 1702 Shrewsbury would make no effort to help the Queen.

The career and character of Charles Talbot, Duke of

Shrewsbury, bear some resemblance to those of Lord Rosebery two centuries later. A cultured, super-sensitive nobleman, self-indulgent but no libertine, a wit in whose brilliant but weighty conversation everyone delighted, he was known to all ranks and to both sexes as ' the King of Hearts,' ' the only man the Whigs and Tories both spoke well of.' Called upon to lead a party, he saw too clearly the faults of both parties. He had roused himself once to take a resolute and active part in bringing about the Revolution. William, who owed his throne in no small measure to Shrewsbury, employed him in high office. But with all the ability he had only half the health, will-power and industry required for an administrator and parliamentarian. It was said of him that ' he went out of the great Offices with as much ease as he shifted his clothes.'

When Anne came to the throne he was resident in Italy, and declined, on his usual plea of ill-health, to return and serve her. For half a dozen years he lived at Rome the life of a dilettante *milord*, when he might have been helping to govern his country in the crisis of the great war. He preferred to spend his time procuring pictures and statues to be sent home to his friends. Many of the older works of art in the great mansions of England are pieces which Shrewsbury picked up in central Italy, while Eugene was desperately holding his own against the French armies in the north of the peninsula. On one occasion he sent Godolphin a plan drawn by the best Italian architects for the reconstruction of Whitehall Palace. He was on excellent terms with the Lord Treasurer, with Marlborough, with the Whig Vernon, and the moderates of all parties ; they corresponded on home and foreign affairs with the illustrious exile. But, Whig as he was in principle, he was not on good terms with the Junto, and he incurred the censure of the party in the first years of Anne for absenting himself from Parliament, at a time when the House of Lords alone ' stood in the gap for two years together ' against Tory reaction in the Lower House.

Once, in 1704, his equanimity was disturbed by a rumour circulating in England to the effect that his long residence in Rome meant that he was reverting to the

religion of his boyhood. He wrote to clear himself to his kinsman Talbot, Bishop of Oxford :

> I never go to a church unless it is sometimes to look at a picture. I have never been with the Pope. In my discourse among our countrymen I have never omitted to expose the folly and superstition of this religion. Venice excepted, where I fear the moist air would not agree with me, the Pope's dominion is the least Popish of any place in Italy. I have often lamented that there's nowhere in Europe a Protestant country favoured with a warm sun, a blessing the circumstance of my health so much wants.

When, before the Allies had got the upper hand in the war, the Francophile Pope tried to bring about a peace that must have been to the advantage of Louis, he tried to approach Shrewsbury through 'a hermit,' but in vain. In the middle of Anne's reign Shrewsbury returned home, as good a Protestant as when he went away. The most serious outcome of his residence abroad was an Italian Duchess, an eccentric and entertaining woman, duly converted to the Anglican communion, but guarded by a fury of a brother, who was eventually hanged by impartial English justice for murdering his servant in the street.[180]

Charles Seymour, the 'proud Duke' of Somerset,* had not Shrewsbury's charm, brains or brilliancy, but he, too, was a political Duke of moderate Whig principles, detached from the party and alienated from the Junto. He had the Queen's ear in the first days of her reign, and joined with her moderate Tory advisers in persuading her to express her desire for a closer union with Scotland in her speech to the Houses on March 11th. Thus the policy which had been William's last was Anne's first advice to Parliament. Her message led to a debate in the Commons that divided the Tories. The more pronounced High Churchmen declared against any dealings with the Presbyterian kingdom, and Sir Edward Seymour railed at the Scottish nation in harsh terms. But when the Whigs spoke up for the royal policy

* His pride was illustrated by a current anecdote to the effect that when his second duchess tapped him with her fan, he said, 'Madam, my first duchess was a Percy, and she never took such a liberty.' He was sixty years Chancellor of Cambridge University.

of a closer union, they were supported by a number of Tories connected with the Government. A Bill enabling the Queen to name Commissioners to treat with Scotland for a Union was carried by 165 to 119. But Anne was surprised and hurt by the reception which her proposal had met with from the Church party. It was symptomatic of much that was to come.[181]

Mar. 27 (O.S.) 1702

Meanwhile, throughout March and April, Lords, Commons, clergy and officers of the Crown were one after another taking the necessary oaths to Queen Anne, including the Abjuration of the Pretender. Some of the High Tories had hoped that the Abjuration Bill, so vexatiously passed by William on his death-bed, would be repealed in the new reign. But the old Parliament was still sitting and nothing was changed. After some demur, Nottingham took the oath, and was followed by all other sticklers for the theory of divine right who recognized the Queen, even if, like the Bishop of Norwich, they avowed a hope that she would be succeeded by her brother.*

In the middle of April, King William's body was interred by night in the vault of Henry VII's chapel by Mary's side : Prince George acted as chief mourner. Ten days later, on St. George's day, Anne was crowned with full magnificence. Unable to walk, she came privately in a sedan to Westminster Hall, whence she was carried across Broad Sanctuary in an open chair, so as to be better seen by the shouting multitudes. Both Archbishops were present : Tenison performed the coronation ceremony, but her favourite, Sharp of York, preached the sermon. At the end of the service medals were thrown by handfuls among the grandees in the Abbey, and money to the mob outside. The new Queen was popular with the mass of her subjects, and the Coronation Day was kept as a high festival in parts of the country distant from Westminster : at Bristol there was mumming, music and dancing, closed at night with a bonfire of the Pope in his robes and triple crown : at Kendal, in front of the town

April 23 (O.S.) 1702

* See p. 159, above, on the Abjuration Oath. *B.M. Add. MSS.* 29588, ff. 16-17 22 ; *Tindal* (1744), III, p. 544 ; *H.M.C.*, R. 3 (*Lestrange*), p. 273.

cross, the Mayor and Corporation drank on their knees health to the Queen and prosperity to the established Church, whereon followed 'illuminations, bonfires and such joy as I have never seen in the town.'[182]

One other ceremony was needed to initiate the reign —the formal Proclamation of War. Already French privateers were attacking Dutch and English commerce, and the Allied army had begun operations on the lower Rhine. Yet even now Rochester protested in the Privy Council that England ought not to declare war 'as a principal.' He argued that we should aid the allies, since we had promised to do so, but only as 'auxiliaries' and not go to war with France in our own name and interest. Rochester had just been admitted by his niece to a seat in the Cabinet and had been confirmed by her in the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, of which William had been on the point of depriving him. But instead of going to Dublin, he lingered in England to thwart Marlborough and Godolphin, of whose influence with Anne he was bitterly jealous. When, however, he proposed that war should not be declared, he failed to carry with him either Nottingham or Seymour, representatives of High Churchmanship, indeed, but on patriotic and anti-Jacobite lines.

May $\frac{9}{19}$ 1702

With the hearty concurrence of both Houses of Parliament, war was proclaimed in front of St. James's Palace gate. On the same day war was declared in Holland by the United Provinces. English and Dutch sailors began at once to retaliate vigorously on French privateers and merchant ships.[183]

May $\frac{4}{15}$ 1702

In the same month of May, Rochester issued from the Oxford University Press the first folio volume of his father Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion*, doing thereby a greater service to High Tory principles than any he was ever likely to do by direct intervention in politics. That epic record of great events, written by one of the chief actors, in the grave and stately speech of an elder world, has a perennial value for all Englishmen, not to be touched by the changing tides of time and faction. But when it first appeared in the early months of the reign of the Tory Queen, it was bound

to have a political effect, stimulating the cult of King Charles the Martyr, stirring up anger against the Dissenters as the heirs of the Puritan fanatics, and against the Whigs as the heirs of the Roundhead rebels. Rochester's preface, though written in dignified language, did not fail to point the moral of the story for the passing hour, and went on, rather unnecessarily, to denounce 'the raising of a great number of land forces' and warlike operations in the Low Countries, where the enemy 'by the strength of his numerous garrisons must be, for many years at least, invulnerable.'

Marlborough, indeed, regarded Rochester as the most dangerous enemy of his plans for the deliverance of Europe. A year later he thus opened his heart to Sarah on the subject :

> The conversation that was between Rochester and the Speaker is no doubt the language that Rochester entertains the whole Party with, and if they can once be strong enough to declare which way the War shall be managed they may ruin England and Holland at their pleasure. . . . Our poor country would then be the miserablest in all Christendom for we should not only lose our liberty, but our religion also must be forced, and those gentlemen that would be helping to this would then be as miserable as others, for the French when they are masters make no distinctions.[184]

The debates on the proclamation of war were enlivened in the House of Commons by a vigorous party tournament on the subject of foreigners in the army. The English were only in process of becoming a military nation, and in William's reign they had owed much to the professional knowledge and zeal of the Huguenot exiles, a number of whom were men of birth and breeding, formerly officers of the French army. Besides Marshal Schomberg, who had died at the ford of the Boyne, and Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, who had turned the Irish flank at Aghrim and was still destined to command English armies, there were many regimental officers of like origin. A Tory member now proposed to place a restriction on the grant of commissions to foreigners born, even if they had been naturalized and had served England in the last war. The Whigs, led by Lord Hartington, protested against the

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motion as cruel and ungrateful. Colonel Mordaunt bore testimony to the efficiency of the French-born Captains, who, he declared, kept their companies fuller and better disciplined than those of their fellow officers. The motion was lost by ninety-four to ninety-one.[185]

Besides the question of the war and the Scottish Union, another issue from the first moment divided Anne, Marlborough and Godolphin from the more intransigent members of their party. This was the demand for a clean sweep of all Whigs from the Government service in all its branches.

No such clear distinction existed in men's minds as exists to-day between ministerial posts of a 'political' character which must be vacated at a change of Government, and those parts of the public service which are permanent and non-political—Civil Service, Army, Navy and Magistracy. When a Government changes to-day, everyone knows precisely which places will change hands and which will not; but it was otherwise in Anne's reign, and to this want of definition was due much of the confusion and anger of political strife among her subjects, and much of her own distress of mind in dealing with infuriated rivals for every kind of office.

In accordance with the principle enunciated in general terms at the time of the Revolution, the judges kept their places through all party storms and changes until, with the accession of the House of Hanover, the Act of Settlement came into operation and gave to every judge an even clearer legal right to keep his place, unless both Houses of Parliament petitioned for his removal for ill conduct.* But except for the judges and the clergy, no other public servant had security of tenure, either by law or by custom. Marlborough, indeed, who had no wish for politics in the army, was able to save military officers from proscription until his own fall in the last years of the reign. Godolphin, for similar reasons of efficiency, threw his shield over Whig financial experts in the Treasury. But the High Tories, led by Rochester and Seymour, called loudly for the dismissal of everyone who was not a Tory from the Civil

* See p. 120, above, clause vii.

Service, the Lord Lieutenancies and the Bench of Justices of the Peace.

The Queen, who had of her own free will done much in this direction, soon began to find such extreme demands unreasonable. In an evil hour for her own peace of mind she had delivered the Great Seal into the charge of Sir Nathan Wright as Lord Keeper. He was a poor lawyer, but a keen partisan. He used his position to dismiss Whig Justices and to substitute Tories wholesale. But the Queen, urged by Godolphin, was perpetually moderating his zeal, greatly to the annoyance of the extremists.

The Treasurer and the Marlboroughs had it clearly in mind from the first that only a united nation could win the war, and that the Whigs must not be driven to desperation. They knew that many of the ablest and most experienced servants of Government in the provinces were magistrates who had sat on the bench in the last reign, men whom Wright and Rochester regarded as Whigs and wished, in many cases, to replace by fox hunters of semi-Jacobite proclivities. For the first four years of the reign this quarrel raged high, leaving Anne hardly a day's peace. Every post in the gift of the Crown was claimed by the High Tories as their party perquisite, a claim rejected by the Tory Queen. She declared that she 'would be the Queen of all her subjects.' As time went on, Godolphin and Harley discovered from the reports of Defoe and others that many of the High Tory Justices appointed by Wright were using their public position to attack the home and foreign policy of the Moderate Tory Government. It was largely this that brought the schism in the party to a head.* The case was

* Here is a report to Harley of 1704 from Richard Duke, in Devon: 'Sir Edward Seymour prevailed with the Lord Keeper (Wright) to throw out several of our most valuable justices, five round me worth £100,000, and put in one of £100 per annum; he threw out Sir Jo. Elwill, worth £50,000, the most necessary justice in the county, and I desire you may have the honour to rout Sir Edward by inducing the Queen to restore the Justices of this Kingdom county, as has been done in lesser counties.' Next year Defoe writes to Harley:

'Brentford: lodged at Justice Merriwether's—he was a Justice, turned out of commission in the general displacing moderate men. Note, Justice Lamb of Acton is now the high-flying and ruling Justice of that side of Middlesex.'

'Tewkesbury, a quiet trading drunken town, a Whig baily and all well.' (*H.M.C. Portland*, IV, 122, 269–271.) On Justices of the Peace, see pp. 100–101, above.

the more serious because of the scale of Wright's operations : an enquiry by the House of Lords showed that between 1700 and 1704 several hundred magistrates had been removed from the Commission of the Peace.[186]

In the summer of 1702, the High Tories took advantage of Marlborough's absence with the army abroad to push their policy of exclusion hard. The General Election was coming on, which was expected to put the House of Commons and therewith the control of Government policy into the hands of the High Churchmen. But elections were in many places influenced by the local representatives of the Crown—Lords Lieutenant, Justices of the Peace, Governors of Castles, Bishops and Cathedral clergy—and by expectations of favour to come. Hope of promotion in Church and State was a great reason with many persons of all ranks, from nobleman to tide-waiter, for supporting the Whig or the Tory candidates. Therefore, as the General Election drew near, the High Tories assailed the Queen and her Ministers with urgent demands that a more complete distribution of loaves and fishes among the well-disposed should be made in good time to affect the results of the poll. Nottingham, as the Secretary of State most trusted by the High Tories, was the recipient of such confidences as this on the eve of the election :

My Lord,—

The six old Commissioners are continued when I particularly excepted against Mr. Pollexfen to my Lord Treasurer, and the two scandalously ignorant Commissioners of Customs are kept in only for being Whigs. . . . Certainly Cornwall did ill in choosing so good members last time, and must now be made sensible of it. . . . It will be difficult enough to make good elections without such discouragements.[187]

In Northamptonshire one of the Tory candidates, Sir Justinian Isham, and the local Tory manager, Griffin, had made early application at Court for the substitution of a Tory for at least one Whig magistrate, ' which will keep the rest in proper awe ' for the election ; a few weeks later both the town and county of Northampton were duly carried by the Tories, and Isham and Griffin rejoiced together that

' Lord Spencer went home very melancholy ' to Althorp.[188] Innumerable instances could be given of the close connection which was held by both parties to exist between the patronage of the Crown, the local magistracy and the election results.*

Another equally important influence at election-time was the activity of local noblemen and magnates on either side. In Northamptonshire, only the slackness of Lord Exeter, so it was said, could have lost the County for the Tories ; but he appears to have been brought up to the mark in July 1702. In the same month, in the neighbouring county of Leicester, the Tory candidate, John Verney, writes to his friend Thomas Coke, knight of the shire for Derby :

We have a great many persons towards Melton side that will vote for us ; but the power of the two Lords has carried off from us all the gentry of that part of the country. So that if you will please to permit the freeholders from that part of the country to attend you to Leicester your presence would give great reputation to us ; and I am sure we have a sufficient number in those parts to make a very considerable figure if they could have the honour to be conducted by a person of your quality.[189]

If considerations of this kind went for so much in the free atmosphere of county elections, they went for still more in the close boroughs.[190] In the choosing of Members of Parliament, family influence and personal interest weighed at least as much as Whig and Tory principles. Partly for this reason, there were a very large number of uncontested returns ; perhaps in half the constituencies no poll was taken.

Nevertheless, the Tory enthusiasm of the first summer of Anne's reign, and the expectation of favours to come from that quarter, sufficed to reduce the Whigs in the new Parliament to a shadow of their former strength. The

* The connection between electioneering and office-cadging is illustrated in the following letters of September 1710 : Duke of Beaufort to Lord Dartmouth : ' I find the not having the list of Deputy Lieutenants with the Queen's approbation will be of ill consequence to our elections.' And Lord Guernsey writes to Lord Dartmouth asking for the office of Register of the Chancery of the Duchy of Lancaster for ' my cousin Mr. Harvey ' ; it is only £100 a year, but ' will help him with his election at Clitheroe,' because a sign of royal favour helps candidates. *Dartmouth MSS.* at Patshull, see also *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 107.

Queen, in her farewell speech to the old Parliament on May 25th, had said :

> I shall be very careful to preserve and maintain the Act of Toleration, and to set the minds of all my people at quiet. My own principles must always keep me entirely firm to the interests and religion of the Church of England and will incline me to countenance those who have the truest zeal to support it.

The country was not slow to take the hint, and in the July elections the Queen's name was everywhere used against the Whigs.

As the importance of the House of Commons had grown in the constitutional balance of power, there had grown with it the excitement, corruption and violence of electioneering methods, sometimes brutal, sometimes sporting and good-natured. If we take a long view of our national history, we may perhaps believe that the rowdy noise and fun of the ' Eatanswill ' type of election have done more good than harm : for they interested the mass of the people, even in times when the fewest of them had votes, in the joyous business of choosing and chairing a Member ; and it is largely for want of popular interest in polling day that parliamentary institutions in sunnier lands have wilted and died.

Certainly the electioneering politicians of Queen Anne's time could not be accused of want of enthusiasm. An Act of William III punished bribery and intimidation by the loss of the seat ; but it was a dead letter, except when the majority of the House of Commons wanted to get rid of a political opponent. The most corrupt constituencies were the boroughs with a small electorate of a hundred or fewer votes. At Thetford ' all is sold : the election there is among the magistracy, and fifty guineas for a vote is their price.'[191] At the end of the reign, Atterbury, with some exaggeration, said of the country as a whole, ' the price of a vote is as well known as an acre of land,' and complained that the Tory squires were so exhausted by war taxation that they could no longer as candidates make head against the Whig moneyed men.[192] They did their best ; and at any rate in 1702 their pockets were still full.

But even more prominent than direct bribery was the

power at election time of landlord over tenant, of patron over client, in all ranks and callings. The open poll left small room for independence except to the freehold yeoman, and even he was often a tenant for some other piece of land beside his freehold. Bishops canvassed the clergy of their diocese, and the parson sometimes took refuge from episcopal pressure in the plea that he was unfortunately necessitated to vote according to the wishes of his lay patron.[193]

The recording and counting of votes were often mismanaged by incompetent clerks or falsified in the interest of a party. Sometimes, indeed, both sides ' signed articles to prevent any disputes or disorder, and provided that a gentleman should watch the clerks on behalf of each candidate.'[194] But the returning officer himself could by no means always be trusted. At the Gloucester election of 1702 the Whig candidate, Sir John Guise, complained :

> This was a bad time, for there was the Earl of Marlborough, Godolphin and the whole court entirely in the Tory interest and whatever power could contrive to defeat my election was done. But the High Sheriff put the finishing stroke to their design, for, by pretending to make a scrutiny of the bad votes, he shuffled up a return, which return when I petitioned the House against, . . . without hearing my case, Simon Harcourt put the question that Mr. John How was duly elected and it was carried. . . . And here I must take notice that I after sat in the House and saw Simon Harcourt turned out of the House, if possible, with more injustice than he excluded me.[195]

Sham arrests for debt and kidnapping of voters were common. In the 1705 election, the Whig candidates of Great Bedwin kept sixteen doubtful voters drunk at their expense all night before election day, but

> would not suffer them to whisper to one another nor to stir out of doors to do their necessary occasions but under the guard of two or three of Sir George Byng's or Mr. Pollexfen's servants. William Darrell sat in the doorway with his legs across the door to stop them from going forth.[196]

Another aspect of election time is given in Defoe's *Review*, where the grazier says to the farmer:

> Ay, ay, zooks we mun all vote for Sir Thomas. They say his Baily was with all the tenants t'other day, and kissed all our wives round, and said my Landlord sent him. But they say he shall come

and kiss 'em himself before they'll speak for him ; they won't take it at second-hand.[197]

No one in Anne's reign, or for fifty years after her death, seriously proposed a redistribution of seats so as to get rid of the rotten boroughs. Their existence was indeed sometimes spoken of as a ' scandal ' and ' a mighty blemish to the constitution of England.'[198] But neither Whigs nor Tories wished to part with their own rotten boroughs. The spirit of the age was against institutional change. The last person who had adopted parliamentary redistribution was Cromwell, and the last person who had tampered with existing franchises and the charter rights of corporations was James II. In the age of Anne both were considered to be *pessimi exempli*. Parliamentary Reform and Municipal Reform were not public questions of the day.

It would be hard to say which party would have gained most if a Reform Bill such as that of 1832 had been carried one hundred and thirty years earlier. The increase of county seats would have favoured the Tories, who returned the majority of the knights of shire even at elections like 1705, when the Whigs did well. But the increase of the representation of trading towns and of the London area, in place of rotten boroughs, would on the balance have favoured the Whigs.*

As it was, both parties were content to fight in the electoral field as they found it. The Tories, all told, were the stronger party, but their divisions often gave the Whigs a chance in the reign of Queen Anne. In the first year of her successor's reign, Lord Chancellor Cowper thus instructed his Hanoverian master :

* The electoral condition of Old Sarum in this early era is not without interest. Governor Pitt's son Robert, the father of the great Chatham, reports in 1705 to the old man in India :

' My election for Old Sarum was unanimous : and had not Mr. Mompesson opposed your right of bailiwick I should have joined with him. Finding, however, that he intended to take that course I set up Lord Grandison against him. There was a double return, five, including himself, voting for Mr. Mompesson, and five, including one, Carter, for Lord Grandison ; the former, through superior party influence, was duly elected. Carter voted for a garden which I bought for you from Mr. Philips, for £500, of which £100 was paid for the vote, which was pretty dear ; but the other side were ready to give the money I refused for it.' *H.M.C. Dropmore* (1892), I, pp. 16–17.

> Give me leave to assure your Majesty, on repeated experience, that the parties are so near an equality, and the generality of the world so much in love with the advantages a King of Great Britain has to bestow without the least exceeding the bounds of law, that it is wholly in your Majesty's power, by showing your favour in due time (before the elections) to one or other of them, to give which of them you please a clear majority in all succeeding Parliaments.[199]

Such, indeed, was the ' repeated experience ' under Anne, beginning with the election of July 1702 when she had ' showed her favour in due time ' to the Tories. The good Queen held the balance throughout her reign ; she inclined first to one side and then to the other, for much the same reasons as those which swayed the mass of her people, whom in many respects she represented better than many cleverer politicians. But, whether we regard her as leading or as following public opinion, certain it is that the one party who never lost a General Election in her reign was Queen Anne herself.

In every Parliament of Anne there sat a number of members not pledged to Whig or Tory, but inclining to support the Queen's Government as such. Godolphin once calculated that the House of Commons contained 190 Tories, 160 Whigs and 100 ' Queen's Servants.'[200] Most of the ' Queen's Servants ' would probably have called themselves moderate Tories, prepared to support Marlborough and Godolphin. The division of the House between Whig and Tory was not exhaustive and was not always employed. A contemporary made a list of one of Anne's early Parliaments, in which he divided the members into the following categories—' Churchmen, High-Churchmen, Low Church, Nonconformists, Courtiers and Sneakers.'[201] But the net result of the polling in July 1702 was to put the House of Commons into the hands of the Tories—unless they fell out among themselves.

When the result of the General Election was known, the Queen prorogued the new Parliament till October and went on a tour in the West, which naturally took on the character of a Tory triumph. Prince George's asthma troubled him, and Bath, their favourite resort in less happy days, had

attractions for both husband and wife. After enjoying a great demonstration of loyalty and Anglican enthusiasm in the Sheldonian and in the Colleges of Oxford, the royal party travelled slowly westward at the end of August. On the top of Lansdowne Hill they were met by two hundred virgins clothed in white, as Amazons, with bows and arrows by their sides, and attendant shepherds ' with their crooks and tarboxes, singing and playing on pipes of reeds,' who accompanied the royal coach into the city of Bath. The spirit of the Elizabethan pageant was not yet dead in the land. The Queen was entertained in Bristol by the citizens, and yet more splendidly by the Duke of Beaufort at Badminton ; but she remained at Bath as her head-quarters until October 8, surrounded by her principal counsellors and statesmen. From this autumn began the recognition of Bath as indisputably the greatest provincial centre of fashion, a reputation of which young Beau Nash and other founders of the City's greatness were not slow to take advantage. Its fine public and private buildings, and the ordering of its social customs dated from this visit of Queen Anne.[202]

The Western Tour had been a success. It had shown something at least of the invalid Queen to her subjects. It had been rendered cheerful by the hopefulness of a new reign, by the Tory victory at the recent elections, and not least by the good news that kept arriving from the Netherlands of the retreat of French armies, and the surrender of fortress towns on the Maas to the arms of Marlborough.

CHAPTER X

Marlborough's army. Recruiting conditions. The Militia. Army organization, weapons, formation and discipline. The Treasury and the war. Methods of warfare.

THE sententious moral philosopher, Lord Shaftesbury, grandson of a greater and less innocent man, held it a proof of the corruption of the age that his own Whig leaders had not opposed King William's wishes for a standing army in time of peace. No man, according to Shaftesbury and his friends, loved English liberties better than William of Orange who came over to save them, but no true patriot could trust even the ' Archangel Michael ' with a military establishment, ' lest his heart should be lifted up and he should turn aside from the commandment, *anglice* the law.'[203]

Such language coming from such a quarter is evidence that anti-military feeling was not mere party prejudice of the High Tories, but was a rooted national instinct, reinforced by recent experience with the Kings and Protectors of the Stuart era. It was no easy matter to reconcile the institution of a standing army with the genius of parliamentary and popular government, and the work was not done in a day. It was due to the device of the annually expiring Mutiny Act, and to the good sense of Ministers under the first two Georges, that the small but efficient military establishment required by Britain's growing Empire became one of the facts accepted by Eighteenth-Century custom. Marlborough's victories helped to make England proud of her soldiers. Yet the treatment of Marlborough himself in the last years of Anne shows how little, even then, the country cared for a red coat, or was dazzled by the glory of war.

The armies of Europe had ceased to be feudal but had not yet become national. They were not raised by conscription. Soldiering was a trade or profession at which a man spent his life, by no means necessarily in the service of the State to which he owed political allegiance. An army was a polyglot epitome of Europe. Long service was the rule, although in England, army-shy, the return of peace meant disbandment and the throwing on to the street of men who had no resources for civil life. Every great army, especially that of the Dutch, and even to some extent those of France and England, consisted largely of foreigners. They were some of them enlisted as individuals, but more by the purchase of their services from German and other Princes who enlisted them in their territories and let them out as a source of State revenue. The cause of the employer was not by any means always the cause of the employed in the trade of war—certainly not in the great Dutch army, except in so far as common Protestantism was felt as a motive in the ranks, in the struggle against the revoker of the Edict of Nantes. But in the native regiments of the French and the English armies there was a strong national feeling.

Of the 40,000 men that Parliament had voted in the winter of 1701–1702 as England's contribution in kind to the first year of the land war, only 18,000 were to be British ; more than half of these were destined for the Low Countries under Marlborough. By 1706 the native British soldiers engaged in Spain, Portugal and the Low Countries together numbered 33,000. In 1708–1709 England's war effort reached its high-water mark, when the Peninsular War engaged 25,000 English-speaking troops, and the war in the Netherlands as many more, while the whole regular army, including home and colonial garrisons, touched 70,000—not counting foreign regiments in British pay, and altogether apart from the armies of other States subsidised by the British tax-payer.[204]

By what methods were Marlborough's men recruited ? Europe was not then subject to conscription. Even the armies of the Grand Monarch were maintained by voluntary

enlistment, except that near the end of his reign the militia ballot had to be employed sometimes to keep up the waning military strength of France. On the other hand, compulsion was always used to man the English Navy in wartime, by armed raids of the press-gang on the folk of the port towns and neighbouring villages. But the Army was less popular and was regarded as less essential to our island safety. In 1702 no compulsion was authorized in its recruiting, nor was that task undertaken directly by the State. Each Colonel had to enlist his own men.

The Colonel was in a sense the proprietor of his regiment. It was known by his name. He paid and clothed its rank and file out of the public money allowed to him for the purpose. Abuses were rife under corrupt officers, who made ' false musters,' drawing pay for ' faggot men ' who were not in the ranks at all. The poor privates were often choused of their pay, food and clothing, either by the civilian contractors or by their own officers, under a system peculiarly favourable to such frauds. These bad practices were commonest among the absentee officers of regiments allotted to the dreaded service in the unhealthy climate of the West Indies. They were least common in the Low Countries under Marlborough's vigilant eye.

A normal regiment consisted of a single battalion of 700 to 900 men.[205] The business of replenishing its ranks in wartime was one of the severest tests of a good officer. Six months were spent in the field, but the six winter months, when the operations of war were suspended, were none too long for the drill necessitated by the elaborate line tactics of the day, and for the arduous task of making good the yearly wastage of the ranks through battle, disease and desertion. Directly the regiment went into winter quarters in Holland or Portugal, the Colonel sent over his most trusted officers to England to find the food for powder in the next campaign. A Yorkshire Colonel whose regiment had lost 200 men in 1710, sent home that winter, ' two Yorkshire gentlemen with a good number of sergeants and corporals ' to raise men in the West Riding. The proceedings of Captain Plume and his faithful sergeant Kite, recruiting the yokels of Shropshire in the year after

Blenheim, can be studied in Farquhar's comedy, *The Recruiting Officer* :

> If any gentlemen soldiers, or others, have a mind to serve Her Majesty and pull down the French King : if any prentices have severe masters, any children have undutiful parents, if any servants have too little wages, or any husband too much wife, let them repair to the noble sergeant Kite, at the sign of the Raven in this good town of Shrewsbury and they shall receive present relief and entertainment. . . . I love a fellow of spirit, but I scorn to coax, 'tis base : though I must say that never in my life have I seen a better built man. . . . give me your hand then : here's a purse of gold and there's a tub of humming ale at my quarters. 'Tis the Queen's money and the Queen's drink.

Criminals were drafted in wholesale* and the debtors' prisons were emptied into the Army ; bounties sometimes amounting to four pounds for each recruit tempted the needy to enlist. Sometimes the lure of a short service of three years was offered. Yet with all their shifts the most diligent officers found it ever more difficult to keep the old regiments up to strength while Parliament was perpetually voting new ones to be raised. The soldier's life was popularly regarded as an escape only for the desperate, and in the early years of the reign the country was prosperous and work abundant. No wonder then that in 1702 the naval press was abused for the purposes of the land service ; that year over a thousand English recruits deserted to the French lines, and ' alleged one and all that they were pressed for the sea service, and then carried to the Tower, were embarked blindfolded and transported to Flanders.' [206]

To remedy this state of things a series of Recruiting Acts was passed, beginning in the session of 1703–1704,

* The following ungrammatical note from Narcissus Luttrell's Diary (March 12, 1705–6, vol. vi. p. 25) may be read with the explanation that ' half-hanged Smith ' was a famous character at this period owing to the unusual experience he had undergone at the hands of public justice :—' Smith, who some time since was half hanged and cut down, having accused about 350 pickpockets, housebreakers etc., who gott to be soldiers in the guards, the better to hide their roguery, were last week upon mustering the regiments drawn out and immediately shipped for Catalonia ; and about 60 women, who lay under condemnation for such crimes, were likewise sent away to follow the camp.'

whereby compulsory enlistment in the Army was rendered legal within certain strict limits. Magistrates were instructed to hand over to recruiting officers persons who could show no means of supporting themselves. Parish constables were to be given ten shillings for every person suitable for the press whom they produced before the authorities. The small privileged class of electors for the House of Commons were specifically excepted from the operation of the Acts, probably to prevent their forcible enlistment by politically-minded magistrates, anxious to remove voters of the wrong colour before the next election.

But the business of enlistment, though thus facilitated by law, was still left to local haphazard and caprice. High-flying Justices, who disliked the war or had taken offence with the officer recruiting for his regiment in the district, would do nothing to help. But magistrates of Moderate Tory opinions, who supported Godolphin and Marlborough, and the remnant of the old Whig bench that had escaped Wright's purge, were zealous to enlist those whom they chose to regard as having no other means of livelihood. The Recruiting Acts were seized on as a chance to rid the countryside of poachers and suspected persons, and to pay off personal or political scores. In the Isle of Ely three Tory Justices of the Peace drafted a well-to-do Nonconformist minister into the ranks, clearly contrary to the law as he had a vote for Parliament. The Court of Queen's Bench had to intervene to obtain his release. Sometimes the mob rose against the recruiting officers, and forcibly set free those whom the magistrates had consigned to their clutches as unemployed. The new ' pressing act ' was unpopular, as a weapon of tyranny in unscrupulous hands. Employees complained that if they asked for better wages or food from their masters, they were threatened with being carried before the magistrates and forced into the Army.

Meanwhile, a whole class of bounty-jumpers lived by taking the Queen's guineas in regiment after regiment and deserting each in turn before they could be marched down to the transport ship. The recruiting officers of the rival regiments were careful not to enquire whence volunteers came. Desertion was easy, for there were no barracks

or proper depots.* Even when these lively fellows had at length been carried safe to Flanders, many of them slipped over to the enemy's lines, hoping to get back to England as exchanged prisoners, and there play the game of bounty-jumping once more.

The raising of Marlborough's armies was indeed a harum-scarum, knock-about affair, replete with old English comedy and tragedy, of which glimpses are revealed to our later age, accustomed to the machine-like horror of modern war and its unavoidable roll-call of the whole youth of the nation. In those days 'the fife of war' could still sound like 'a blackbird's whistle':

Here's forty shillings on the drum
For those that volunteers do come,
With shirts and clothes and present pay
When over the hills and far away.

We then shall lead more happy lives,
By getting rid of brats and wives,
That scold on both night and day,
When over the hills and far away.

Come on then, boys, and you shall see
We every one shall Captains be,
To whore and rant as well as they,
When over the hills and far away.

The constables they search about
To find such brisk young fellows out;
Then let's be volunteers I say
Over the hills and far away.

Over the hills and over the main
To Flanders, Portugal and Spain,
Queen Anne commands and we'll obey,
Over the hills and far away.[207]

* The want of barrack accommodation in England caused many difficulties. The Mutiny Act of 1702, besides complaining that officers and soldiers destroyed a great deal of game, orders the Justices of the Peace to find them quarters in the inns, and to fix the prices the soldiers were to pay. They were not to be quartered in private houses except by consent of the owner. Officers were to be cashiered if they took money for excusing the quartering on any inn; presumably therefore these compulsory guests were disliked by inn-keepers as keeping away more paying customers. *Stats. of Realm*, VIII, pp. 211–214.

Such were the sorrowful chances of recruiting for the regular army bound on foreign service. There was no such difficulty in filling the ranks of the stay-at-home Militia of the shires and towns, trained a few weeks in the year and officered by civilian Justices of the Peace. That force was popular with everyone, and in particular with the Tory squires. Therefore it was raised by a well regulated system of compulsion, which would not have been tolerated for the army proper. The burden fell on the willing shoulders of the country gentlemen: the Militia was their own force and they were ready to pay for it without any of those murmurs with which they paid the heavy land-tax to support the war. Every rich landowner was called on to supply, in person or by deputy, a horseman fully armed; every landowner of moderate means, a foot soldier; while the small landowners were bound in groups, each of which had to send one militiaman to the muster.

The squires armed and paid men to serve for them in the ranks, but themselves competed eagerly for the officers' commissions. The manor-house walls were hung with Militia weapons, which the Muster-Master of the Deputy Lieutenant had the right to inspect. The Militia, therefore, cost the State but little. It was a capital force, the country's pride, the guardian of our free constitution. There was nothing to be said against it, except that, as realistic Whigs pointed out, one regiment of Louis's veterans would easily drive before it the Militia of three English counties.[208]

At the opening of the Thirty Years' War, battles had been fought by troops fighting in close column. Even the cavalry charged in column six or more deep; they trotted up, handling their musketoons, or huge 'dag' pistols, and slowed down to let them off, before offering to draw their swords. In the pictorial art of the Seventeenth Century, the battle-pieces, from those of Wouverman downwards, frequently depict horsemen firing their pistols as they swerve their horses round for retreat; and such was the commonest manœuvre of the cavalry of the period.

A worse way of employing mounted men could hardly have been devised. To permit men to fight from horseback

with firearms instead of hand-to-hand weapons, is to throw away the power and speed of the animal, by checking its charge just before the moment of impact. And if any shooting is to be done, the column is the worst formation, either to give or receive fire. Gustavus Adolphus, indeed, reduced the cavalry formation from column of six to line of three deep, and taught his cavalry to charge home, though even he permitted his men to fire their pistols at close quarters provided they did not break the pace of their charge. Rupert and Cromwell each made his troopers fight in this 'Swedish' fashion; three deep they charged in with pistol and sword upon columns of hostile cavalry, who halted to fire their dags at a distance and then broke before the onset of fast-trotting horses and cold steel.

In the wars of Queen Anne, battles were still lost by cavalry halting to fire, as did many squadrons of French horse at Blenheim. The English, without breaking their pace, rode in on them sword in hand. Marlborough would not let his troopers fire their pistols at all, as even Cromwell's men had often done. The Duke 'would allow the horse but three charges of powder and ball to each man for a campaign, and that only for guarding their horses when at grass, and not to be made use of in action.'[209]

We may then think of Marlborough's cavalry as fighting in line three deep, charging, not indeed at a gallop, but at a brisk trot,* and using no weapon but the sword. In his early campaigns his cavalry had no body armour; in 1707 he gave them a cuirass in front, but none at the back. Dragoons had a double function: they could charge sword-in-hand like the cavalry; or else as mounted infantry they could ride to the scene of action, leap down and picket their horses, and use their muskets to contest broken ground. At Barcelona, Peterborough used dragoons in siege warfare.

The Infantry too, when the Thirty Years' War began,

* Marlborough's orders to the English cavalry for the decisive charge at Blenheim were 'to advance gently until they came near them and then ride *on a full trot* up to them.' *Parker's Memoirs* (1746), p. 92. See also Taylor, *Wars of Marlborough*, II, pp. 386–387.

fought in dense columns. The principal weapon had been the mass of long pikes in the centre. The musketeers, also in column, fought on both sides of the pikemen, dangerously exposed to the charge of cavalry, against which the club end of the musket was a poor defence. Gustavus set the fashion of reducing the depth of the infantry, and at Naseby 'the poor foot' fought in battalions not more than six deep. But so long as the pike was the chief weapon, the column was the natural formation rather than the line. The real revolution in infantry tactics only occurred at the end of the century, when the invention of the ring-bayonet enabled the musketeer to be as it were his own pikeman, to fire his shot through the ring that fastened the bayonet to the gun, and next moment to stab the enemy with the same weapon.

With the introduction of the ring-bayonet in William's wars, the proportion of each regiment to be armed with the pike had rapidly diminished. But in the first campaign of Marlborough there were still some pikemen in the army of each nation engaged. In the English regiments of 1702 they numbered one to every five musketeers. The tallest men were selected for the service, and given half-a-crown every time they could break a pike on the parade ground 'to induce a brisk and smart motion in charging.' Two years later pikes had disappeared.*

Marlborough's Infantry, therefore, from the Blenheim campaign onwards, were armed with the firelock and ring-bayonet, and arrayed in long lines, usually three deep, sometimes two or four. When surrounded by the enemy's horse, a well-drilled regiment of foot could form hollow square and move safely away in that formation.[210] And even without forming square, infantry were brought up, as in the allied centre at Blenheim, to play a deciding part in the main action between the cavalry of the two armies,

* February 9, 1704, Lord Portmore writes to the Duke of Somerset, about troops destined for Portugal:

'I have the honour of receiving an order from your Grace directing the store-keeper to deliver 450 firelocks, in lieu of the like number of pikes which some of the regiments which come from Holland have, as they say, left behind, by his Grace, the Duke of Marlborough's allowance.' *H.M.C. Somerset* (1898), p. 118; *Peter Drake's Memoirs*, pp. 50–51; *Fortescue*, I, p. 584.

a thing unheard of in the time of Rupert and Cromwell, and rendered possible only by the bayonet.

The line tactics of the early Eighteenth Century were superior to the practice of most armies in the time of Napoleon, when the French and every Continental Power in imitation of them had gone back to the more primitive method of the infantry column. The line formation demands excellent drill and strict discipline. The great conscript armies of France under the First Republic were not sufficiently trained to be able to manœuvre properly in line. Even in Napoleon's time they kept the field all the year round and had little time for drill. But the forces of Marlborough and of his antagonists were small, professional armies, who kept the field only half the year and spent six months on the parade ground, learning the difficult manœuvres of the period.

The English did not therefore enjoy under Marlborough the advantage which they enjoyed under Wellington, of fighting in line against enemies clubbed in the clumsy column. Both sides were in line. But the English had a fire-drill superior to the French. They were taught to fire by platoons, while the French fired by ranks. And the English aim was much the more deadly. Marlborough laid great store on fire-drill and marksmanship, which he caused to be practised strenuously in winter quarters. The effect of the simultaneous volley of an English platoon, two or three deep, was shattering to the enemy's ranks and nerves.[211]

The ' grenadiers ' had not then given their name to the First Regiment of Foot Guards. Every regiment in the army had a company of grenadiers, armed with hand-grenades and axes, as the song recalls ; it was their business to lead the attack on fortified places or other obstacles. They were in some sort ' storm troops,' and specially selected for their athletic qualities and their dash.

Marlborough's use of his field artillery, commanded by the famous Colonel Blood, played an important part in his battle tactics. The waggoners who dragged the guns into position were not soldiers, but rustic carters in peasants' dress, for the artillery service was as yet only half militarized.

But Colonel Blood, his officers and gunners were as good artillery men as ever served, and the difficulties of ground which they overcame in the passage of the Black Forest and on the day among the marshes of Blenheim, proved them also to be expert and energetic engineers. Their field-pieces fired cannon-balls at long range, and at close quarters ' cartridge ' or ' partridge ' shot, as grape was then called. The heavy siege trains were a separate service, sent up from the base, as far as possible by water, when required against a particular town.

Marlborough was in direct command of all the batteries in his army, placing them with the greatest care on spots selected by himself. In the moderate-sized armies of that day there was no large unit, like the modern Division or Army Corps, comprising smaller units of all three arms under a subordinate command. Without any intermediary, Marlborough sent his orders to each Brigadier or Colonel, or rode up with them himself to point the way.

Any more elaborate system would have hampered Marlborough's genius, that shone most brightly in the smoke and uproar of actual conflict. The modern Divisional system of orders interpreted by subordinate Generals, would have made sad work for him in those days of big-wigged Princes and Lords jealously stickling for their rank and rights, even on the battle-field. The complete freedom enjoyed by Marlborough to move any of his troops in detail himself, if he saw fit to do so, was one of the secrets of his invariable success whenever action was joined, when, in Addison's words, he

> Inspired repulsed battalions to engage,
> And taught the doubtful battle where to rage.

The limitation of his freedom to attack the enemy when and where he wished was diplomatic rather than military. The right of the civilian Field Deputies, and yet more often the right of the Dutch Generals themselves, to veto any order that would have brought the troops of the States General into action, ruined his plans half a dozen times, by preventing him from fighting under conditions which would have rendered victory certain. Marlborough, though

Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch and other allied forces in the Netherlands, had not, therefore, on all occasions complete control over his foreign troops in that region, though he enjoyed it on the Danube.

Bolingbroke, who having been Secretary at War in the year of Blenheim knew something of the army, long afterwards wrote in his essay on the *Study and use of History* :

> What I remember to have heard the Duke of Marlborough say, before he went to take on him the command of the army in the Low Countries in 1702, proved true. The French misreckoned very much, if they made the same comparison between their troops and those of their enemies, as they had made in precedent wars. Those that had been opposed to them in the last [William's war] were raw for the most part when it began, the British particularly ; but they had been disciplined, if I may say so, by their defeats. They were grown to be veteran at the peace of Ryswic, and though many had been disbanded, yet they had been disbanded lately : so that they were easily formed anew, and the spirit that had been raised continued in all.

But in the operations of 1702 the army was only in process of being ' formed anew,' and its discipline was proportionately bad. The misconduct of Ormonde's landing party at Cadiz that year was a European scandal. And before Marlborough arrived in Holland, English regiments were plundering Dutch villages as if in an enemy country. On June 9th our agent in Rotterdam wrote to Nottingham, ' My Lord Marlbury goes next week from the Hage to the Army, where he is extreamly wanted to keep our men in order.' In the following year the Allies still made occasional complaints of the plundering habits of the English as contagious to other nationals.[212] But these murmurs died away as Marlborough established his hold. In the march to the Danube of 1704, the well-behaved English regiments maintained week after week their popularity with the allied populations through which they passed. Nor did discipline degenerate in the later years of the long protracted war. No such scenes as those that dimmed the glory of the capture of Badajos and San Sebastian in

Wellington's day stained the reputation of Marlborough's men.*

The good conduct of the army was secured by the double method of rigorous punishment and of careful supply of food, clothing and comfort. Military executions were not rare. Still more common were military floggings —things of terror, as we know from Corporal Trim's account of the unfortunate ' grenadier in Mackay's regiment ' who was ' whipped to death's door,' and ' begged to be shot outright.' Recorded history supports the novelist. In 1712 a guardsman had killed his Colonel's horse to steal the hide ; he was ordered 12,600 lashes, and received the first 1800, of which he nearly died. A sentence of such extreme ferocity was indeed exceptional, and occurred only after Marlborough had been dismissed from the command of the forces. In civil life flogging was still the common punishment of the poorer classes, including women, and for that reason flogging in the army and navy was not yet, as in a later age, denounced as an outrage on humanity and a degradation to the service.[213]

Marlborough would not have reduced his men to proper discipline merely by ceremonial lacerating of their flesh. He took great trouble about everything connected with the supply and comfort of the troops, and he had his reward. Well fed, well clothed, well shod, well drilled, the English army came to be recognized as the best on either side in the war. This was due very largely to the care which the Duke deigned to bestow on small prosaic things behind the scenes, in days when troops were too often neglected, starved, ragged and unpaid. Part of his ' genius ' consisted in ' an infinite capacity for taking pains.' †

The connection between army and navy has often been a weak link in England's armour. Although Marlborough had unusually sound and penetrating ideas as to the

* ' Marlborough's army seems to have been better conducted than Wellington's,' *Fortescue*, I, p. 572. The ' burning of Bavaria ' in 1704 was deliberate policy ordered by Marlborough, who employed chiefly foreign troops in that bad business.

† The wounded, including the enemy prisoners, received more care from Marlborough than from other generals of the day. But medical practice, even in time of peace, was rudimentary, and nursing was a science unknown.

co-operation of the two services, which governed his successful strategy in the Mediterranean, and triumphed at Vigo, Gibraltar and Minorca, he does not seem to have secured proper conditions for soldiers at sea. In January 1704 Admiral Rooke vainly protested against the absence of proper transports, and the consequent crowding of whole regiments upon the men-of-war, 'especially without beds,' for the long voyage to Spain. In the winter of 1706–1707 nearly half of a large body of troops sent thus to Valencia perished of hardship and disease before they landed. And in 1708 private John Deane, a God-fearing and well-educated man, who trusted and loved Marlborough and was no grumbler, described the lot of the soldier at sea as 'Pox above board, plague between the decks.' He tells us, in words impressive in their simplicity, how, even off the coast of England, they lay 'under many inconveniences having only the bare deck to lie upon, which hardships caused abundance of our men to bid adieu to the world.'

In the Spanish Peninsula, far from the Duke's protecting hand, our troops suffered terribly from exposure, climate and bad food, which slew far more than the sword in that unfriendly land, where even our allies, the Portuguese, hated us. In Gibraltar, after it had passed into English hands, the authorities spent money on fortifying the rock with batteries, but for many years erected no barracks for the soldiers. The garrison continued to die there of disease and exposure for many seasons after the Spaniards and French had raised the siege of 1705. In the West Indies, the men died like flies from tropical diseases and gross neglect, forgotten by the War Office and often by their own absentee officers. In short, during the wars of Queen Anne, those were luckiest whose service kept them nearest to Marlborough himself.[214]

If the Duke had not had political as well as military authority, if Godolphin had not been in charge of the national purse on his behalf, he could not as a mere General have coped with cheating civilian agents and contractors and procrastinating Treasury officials. Even as it was, the fight was uphill. In the infancy of paper credit and

financial science, the difficulties of the Treasury were great, even under the best management. It was customary to leave soldiers and diplomats unpaid for years together, with disastrous results to the prestige of the country abroad. In 1702 many officers had not touched money due to them for services in the last war. Lord Cutts, when left in command in Holland during Marlborough's absence in the winter of 1702–1703, failed to receive his pay and was ignominiously harassed by the dunning of Dutch tradesmen. Michelborne, the military governor of Londonderry during the siege of 1689, where he had lost his wife, his seven children and his fortune, was still in 1704 petitioning the State for arrears acknowledged as due to him for that memorable service. He was the national hero of Protestant England, yet in Anne's reign he was a prisoner in the Fleet for debt, because he was a creditor of the State. And the widow of Micaiah Browning, who had broken the boom on the Foyle in his own ship, the *Mountjoy*, and lost his life in the action, petitioned in vain for nine years' arrears of her pension—and was in 1703 'paid as much as is due in the queen's time.' Such was the Treasury as paymaster.[215]

That this shameful state of things was somewhat improved in the course of the long wars of Anne, instead of getting very much worse as might have been expected, was due to the earnest efforts and close co-operation of Marlborough and Godolphin. Yet in 1712 the embarrassed father of the diplomat John Molesworth, after vainly visiting Godolphin's successor at the Treasury, writes: 'I am told I shall not be paid a day sooner than the other envoys when they come in course. There is two and a half years due to them all. In the meantime we must maintain Jack out of our estate.'[216]

The warfare of that age was far less destructive than the warfare of the Twentieth Century, partly from the inferiority of the weapons used, but chiefly because of the small proportion of the world's manhood which it was then possible to withdraw from production and maintain in the field. Europe was too ill-organized and too poor to pay a heavy blood-tax, and her credit system was too primitive to draw

large drafts on the wealth and happiness of future generations. Man was still so much more valuable than the machinery he used, that his human rights were seldom forgotten by the War-lords. Prisoners, for instance, were rapidly exchanged, by an excellent system, honestly worked throughout the war. The French and English authorities saw their advantage in exchange, because it was difficult to get recruits and impossible to keep prisoners alive without great expense. The same difficulty of raising men, before the age of conscription, made governments and generals unwilling to risk lives in battle, or to expose them to the inevitable wastage of winter campaigns. Only Marlborough saw that battles won as he could win them would save lives in the end.

Plundering by the soldiers was naturally commoner in enemy than in allied country, but systematic destruction was seldom resorted to. When Louis ravaged and burnt the Palatinate in 1688, when the Allies ravaged and burnt Bavaria in 1704, there was in each case an outcry that had its effect. The War of the Spanish Succession went on for a dozen years—that was indeed the worst of it, and was one of the chief causes of the decline of Holland. But the war did not ruin the districts where it was fought—the Netherlands, the Rhine Valley, the plain of the Po, or Spain—as the Thirty Years' War had ruined Germany, and as the Four Years' War of our own day made a desert of the seat of operations and ruined the whole of Europe. A battle, or manœuvres to avoid a battle, trampled the crops of two or three villages—no more. A heavy bombardment or a siege might unroof a few score houses. But trade by land went on very much as in peace time, even between countries at war with one another, in spite of England's protest against Dutch trade with France. The war on commerce at sea was a more serious matter for merchants.

It was not the custom to make armies support themselves by pillage. The universal brigandage of the ill-disciplined bands of the Thirty Years' War was never repeated ; civilization had taken a step forward out of that quagmire. Nor had military science yet adopted Napoleon's system of supporting armies by the systematized

plunder of invaded territory, so as to make penetration more rapid. On the contrary, a chain of supply bases was formed by an advancing army, and each of these bases had to be filled up with supplies and stores from the rear, before the invading forces could move further into the land.[217] Partly for this reason the movement of the armies of Louis XIV and his adversaries was slow compared with Napoleon's lightning darts across Europe. Consequently, Marlborough's march on the Danube, carefully, though secretly, prepared beforehand, surprised the French, and aroused the admiration of the world.

The general character of this slowly-moving warfare, especially in the highly fortified Netherlands, was a war of sieges. To the military mind of that age, a campaign meant a summer of sieges, with field armies manœuvring to cover or break up investment, followed by a winter of recruiting and drill.

But Marlborough had other views. Like Gustavus and Cromwell before him, he knew that the enemy's towns and fortresses would fall fast enough if the enemy's armies were first destroyed in the open field. But this unorthodox system of war by battle caused doubt, hesitation and panic among all the allied Generals and Princes, except Eugene. And it met with most opposition of all from the Deputies and Generals sent with the Dutch troops to see that Marlborough, to whose charge they had been somewhat rashly committed, did not spend their valuable lives too fast.

The attitude of the Dutch to their large army of well-disciplined and well-paid mercenaries from all the Protestant countries of Europe, was the attitude of a careful trader to the stock in which he has invested his money. Those expensive regiments must not be hazarded in battle. Dutch military history had been full of lost battles, from the time of William the Silent's first defeats by the Spaniards, down to William III's Landen and Steinkirk. Such adventures were therefore suspect to the mind of the careful Hollanders. Their one great soldier, Maurice of Nassau, had taught them, a hundred years before, the bloodless strategy of covering sieges as the principal use of armies in the field. If Louis XIV had the splendid military engineer, Vauban,

the Dutch had his rival Cohorn, both still active in 1702.

Only the Pensionary Heinsius partly saw the force of Marlborough's reasoning, when he argued that to recover the Spanish Netherlands at the rate of a couple of successful sieges a year, would mean another Thirty Years' War. Louis was the man in possession—he held Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and parts of Germany. It was for the Allies to extrude him from these positions before the inevitable exhaustion of the combatants put an end to hostilities. Therefore, Marlborough's risky method of warfare by battle was the only possible hope of salvation to Europe, since her liberties had no longer, as in the last war, to be guarded from French aggression, but had now to be wrested back from the already triumphant enemy.

(*See Appendix C, below, 'War then and now.'*)

CHAPTER XI

Opening of the war in 1702. German Princes and the Empire. Affairs on the Rhine. Marlborough's campaign of 1702. Reconquest of the Lower Rhine and Maas valleys. Venloo and Liège. Character of Cutts. Bavaria joins France, September 1702.

[*For this Chapter see the maps at the end of the volume.*]

THE principal cause of trouble in Europe was the political unity of France, over against the political non-existence of Germany and Italy. Germany was a geographical expression for several hundred sovereign Principalities, many of them the size of an English nobleman's estate. Except Bavaria, which was on the point of joining France, the only two German-speaking States with large and formidable armies were Austria and Brandenburg-Prussia, and they lay so far away to the East that their troops had great distances to march before they could operate on the French border at all.

Austria, moreover, was distracted by constant trouble, or fear of trouble, with Turks, Poles and Swedes, and by the running sore of the Hungarian rebellion. Yet the whole weight of the war against France in Italy rested on Austria's empty treasure-chest and ill-organized army, until the defection of Savoy from the French cause at the end of 1703. England and Holland, who ere long undertook the war in Spain, never sent their own troops into Italy; and in the spring of 1702 they were fully occupied in protecting Dutch territory from invasion.

In these circumstances, the war of the Rhine depended chiefly on the armies of the smaller German Princes, since Austria was engaged in Hungary and Italy, and England

and Holland nearer home. The attitude of the German Princes was therefore of vital importance.

The only political union known to the Germans of that day was the famous Holy Roman Empire, a loose confederacy of sovereign powers, with the Emperor as unpopular chairman. Leopold's real power lay in the fact that he was also hereditary ruler of the Austrian territories in the East—a great recruiting ground for armies where men were to be had cheap. But that hereditary position of the House of Hapsburg in the lands of the Lower Danube caused the Emperor to be regarded with all the more jealousy by the republic of German Princes over whom he presided. The Empire was divided constitutionally into 'Circles'—Westphalia, Swabia, Franconia, the Upper and Lower Rhine, and half a dozen more. Each Circle debated in its Diet whether it should remain neutral or take a side in the war that had begun between Austria and France. The adherents of Louis argued that the question of the Spanish Succession was a private quarrel between the Houses of Hapsburg and Bourbon, and that if the Empire fought in Austria's quarrel it would become Austria's slave. Leopold replied that it was the duty of the Circles to stand by the rights of the Empire, whose feoffs in Italy, particularly Milan, had been wrongfully seized, and whose Netherland territory had been invaded by France ; and that the power of Louis was a danger to the independence of every German Prince.[218]

In 1701 the Circles hesitated to respond to the Emperor's call to arms. Each Prince waited to see how he was personally affected by the new situation. But in the winter and spring of 1701–1702 the decided action of England and Holland, the subsidies they offered to fighting Princes, and the ever-increasing dislike and fear felt by Germans for the insolence of French diplomats and soldiers, brought a strong nucleus of Princes into the Alliance.

Foremost among these was Frederick Elector of Brandenburg, faithful by family tradition to the Protestant and anti-French cause in Europe, and personally gratified by the recognition of his brand-new title of King of Prussia, wrung from the unwilling Emperor as the price of alliance

in the war ; the Maritime Powers readily acknowledged his Kingship and paid his excellent troops.

George, Elector of Hanover, was influenced by his expectations of the English succession. His neighbour and kinsman, Anthony Ulric, Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, had formed an alliance with Louis, and was raising troops to fight for him. But in March 1702 Anthony's Principality was invaded by his watchful cousins of Hanover, and Wolfenbüttel was compelled by military duress to join the Alliance.[219]

This prompt action against French intrigue in the heart of Northern Germany counterbalanced the defection of the Elector Bishop of Cologne and Liège, who had successfully invited French troops into his territories.*

The Bishop's brother, Max Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, though acting wholly in the interest of France in his capacity as Spanish Governor of the Netherlands, still maintained a show of neutrality as German Prince. He had not yet declared on which side he would employ the forces of Bavaria, reckoned at 45,000 troops, more numerous and no less stalwart than the contingent contributed by Prussia to the allied cause. Max Emanuel had permitted the Imperial armies to cross Bavarian territory, and as late as August 1702 he was still negotiating with Godolphin and with the Emperor, though probably only to amuse them, as to the terms on which he would consent to terminate Bavarian neutrality and serve the Imperial cause either in Hungary or the Italian plain.[220]

The delay of Max Emanuel in declaring for Louis, whatever its motive may have been, rendered it possible for many of the smaller Princes, whose territories lay between Bavaria and France, to join the Grand Alliance in the spring of 1702. The Electors of Mainz and Trier, the Landgraves of Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, Lewis, Margrave of Baden and the Elector Palatine all took the field ; a German army of the Rhine came into being.

The active alliance of so many Rhenish Princes with Holland and England brought into painful prominence

* See p. 156, above.

the fact that the French were astride the Rhine at Kaiserswerth and Bonn, barring communication along the great waterway between Holland and her allies in South-West Germany. An army of Prussians, Palatines and Dutch therefore laid siege to Kaiserswerth, the first operation of the war north of the Alps.*

The main French army, 60,000 strong, under Marshal Boufflers, endeavoured to raise the siege; Boufflers lay near Xanten in the King of Prussia's territory of Cleves. But Kaiserswerth was on the east bank of the Rhine and the French dared not cross the river in the presence of the main Dutch and English forces. The Allies lay at Kranenburg, watching Boufflers, partly to cover the siege of Kaiserswerth, and partly to protect the approaches to Dutch territory. At this early stage of the campaign their numbers were not half those of Boufflers' army, and Marlborough was still in England, smoothing out the political arrangements of the new reign. In his absence the Allies were commanded by the Earl of Athlone, one of William's Dutch generals, best known in English history as Ginkel, who had completed the conquest of Ireland after the Boyne.

May 1702

Boufflers decided that the best way to raise the siege of Kaiserswerth was to invade the Dutch territory by the route of the Rhine and Waal, along which the armies of Louis had entered in 1672. Athlone, ill informed by his scouts, was taken off his guard. Boufflers made a sudden dash from Xanten for Nimuegen; if he had been able to seize it behind Athlone's back, the English and Dutch armies would have been cut off from their base and Holland exposed to the invader. Athlone retreated at full speed from Kranenburg and only just reached Nimuegen before the van of Boufflers' army. In the rearguard action outside the town, the English troops were engaged for the first time in the war and came well through the ordeal.†

June 10 (N.S.) 1702

* *See Map VIII at end of volume.*

† According to Captain Parker, who was present: 'If Boufflers had won the race not a man of our small army would have escaped; all must either have been killed or taken. At the same time Nimuegen must also have fallen into their hands which would have opened them a way into the heart of the very province of Holland.' *Parker*, p. 64.

By so small a margin had the blow failed which might have proved fatal to the allied cause. But a miss is as good as a mile. Holland was safe, though frightened through and through. A few days later Kaiserswerth fell. The allied army received large reinforcements. Last but not least, Marlborough at length arrived to take the command.

The first of Marlborough's many letters to Sarah from the war which was destined to be known by his name, was written on a morning of mid-May, on board ship, as the Margate coastline was vanishing from sight:

> It is impossible to express with what a heavy heart I parted with you when I was by the water's side. I could have given my life to have come back, though I knew my own weakness so much that I durst not, for I knew I should have exposed myself to the company. I did for a great while, with the perspective glass, look upon the cliffs in hopes I might have had one sight of you. If you will be sensible of what I now feel, you will endeavour ever to be easy to me, and then I shall be most happy.

Was she not always 'easy' to him? On that point she has kept her secret from posterity. At her request, he burnt her letters as fast as he received them. In the *Account of her Conduct* which she gave to the curiosity of mankind, she readily exposed herself and her friend the Queen and their most intimate mutual relations. Only for her husband and for the nature of their life together she showed, by her silence, a reverence that she displayed for no one and for nothing else.

At the Hague Marlborough was detained some weeks, before it was finally agreed, chiefly owing to the efforts of Heinsius, that he should have the command of the Dutch and other allied armies, as well as of the English.* Many of the Dutch Generals had no wish to serve under him. Athlone, with the support of many of his fellow countrymen, aspired to the post, and was chagrined at the promotion of the Englishman over his head. It must be remembered that Marlborough's European reputation as a soldier was yet to make. He made it first in the short remainder of the campaign of 1702. At the end of the year Athlone said

* See p. 166, above.

with admirable generosity: 'The success of this campaign is solely due to this incomparable chief, since I confess that I, serving as second in command, opposed in all circumstances his opinions and proposals.' One of Marlborough's most notable victories was the conquest of Athlone.[221]

At the beginning of July, nearly half-way through the normal fighting season, he arrived at the front, to take over at Nimuegen the command of an army now as large as that of Boufflers, some 60,000 men, of whom 12,000 were English. His first object was to manœuvre the French field-army out of the strongly entrenched position that Boufflers had taken up between the Rhine and the lower Maas. There, in the territories of Cleves and Cologne, his presence was a threat to Holland, whose inhabitants ever since 1672 had lived in terror of invasion down the great waterways from the East. Till the French could be shifted from that region, the Dutch would never consent to any serious operations against the Spanish Netherlands.[222] So long as Boufflers remained in Cleves, the Allies were held to the defensive, and so long as Louis could hold them to the defensive he would be victor in the war, for he was the man in possession, and need only retain what he already had, to rise the winner. Unless the Allies could take the offensive, there was no purpose in their having gone to war at all.

July 2 (N.S.) 1702

All this was realized by Marlborough, who saw the remedy. If he crossed the Maas at Grave and boldly marched south, on the west side of the river, the French army would be forced to evacuate the territory between Maas and Rhine, and come racing home to save the Spanish Netherlands. For the weakness of Boufflers' fine advanced position in Cleves lay in his communications. His supplies came from Brabant and the Liègeois; they were already threatened and hampered by the Dutch garrison in Maastricht, and if Marlborough moved south from Grave he would cut the line on which the French army depended for its food.

This reasoning was certain and simple. Yet Marlborough had the greatest difficulty in persuading Athlone and their High Mightinesses the States General to give him

leave to advance. They feared that, if he moved off south, Boufflers would make another pounce on Nimuegen. Marlborough had to spend three precious weeks in messages to and from the Hague, persuading the Allies that the way to save Holland from all fear of attack during the rest of the war was precisely to take the offensive in a southern direction, and so force Boufflers to retreat once for all into Spanish Brabant. 'I shall soon deliver you,' he said, 'of these troublesome neighbours.'

At length leave was obtained. Crossing the Maas near Grave, Marlborough moved southwards across the marshes and heaths of Dutch Brabant into the Bishopric of Liège.* The result he had prophesied instantly followed. Boufflers retreated in haste from the territories of Cleves and Cologne, which were never again during the war infested by a French field-army. Already, without a shot fired, an immense success had been achieved. 'Our marches have already had the desired effect,' wrote Marlborough to Godolphin, 'which was their repassing the Maas, which had we done sooner, would have been much better.'

July 26 (N.S.) 1702

Boufflers had good reason to be in a hurry: to reach his lines in Spanish Brabant he had to march right across the front of Marlborough's advancing army. As the French hastened by forced marches from Bree to Sonhoven, they were caught in the flank on the open heathlands at Peer, and could have been attacked under circumstances which must have resulted in their complete defeat. But the Dutch Field Deputies stopped Marlborough at the very moment he was moving into battle. It may be doubted if a man ever underwent a more bitter disappointment. But without any sign of annoyance, he invited the Deputies to ride forward with him 'to see the enemy pass over the heath, which they and most of the General Officers did, and saw them hurrying over it in the greatest confusion and disorder imaginable. Upon this they all acknowledged that they had lost a fair opportunity of giving the

Aug. 2 (N.S.) 1702

* If the Dutch had consented he would have turned further west and invaded Spanish Brabant, threatening Brussels. But that had proved too bold a proposition to win their consent.

enemy a fatal blow.' Nevertheless, on the very next day they refused to allow Marlborough to attack the French at Sonhoven, in a position so badly chosen that Berwick, the ablest of the French Generals present, declared they must have been totally destroyed if they had been attacked by the Allies.[223] Thus twice fortunate, Boufflers escaped into Spanish Brabant where he was joined by reinforcements.

A fortnight later, Marlborough had once more, by skilful manœuvring, drawn the French army into striking distance in the same region of open heaths near Helchteren. This time the Dutch General Opdam refused to advance to the attack when ordered, on the excuse of the ground being marshy. The next day it was the turn of the Dutch Deputies to save the French, by prohibiting the attack which the Dutch General had thwarted by his disobedience the day before.

Aug. 23 (N.S.) 1702

By this time even Marlborough's temper was disturbed. His secretary, Cardonnel, described him as 'much out of humour.'[224] Yet even now he was capable of writing from Helchteren to Godolphin :

Aug. 27 (N.S.) 1702

> I believe we should have had an easy victory, for their whole left was in disorder. However, I have thought it much for her Majesty's service to take no notice of it, as you see by my letter to the States. But my Lord Rivers and almost all the general Officers were with me when I sent the orders [to Opdam], so that notwithstanding the care I take to hinder it they do talk.

The feeling between Dutch and English rose high, and a disastrous breach was only prevented by Marlborough's instinct for the tactful management of Allies, which he practised as an essential part of the art military.

On four several occasions in the month of August, Marlborough had been prevented by Dutch Generals or Deputies from giving battle, under circumstances which would very probably have led to the reconquest of the Spanish Netherlands in 1702 instead of four years later after Ramillies. At Ramillies the French army was drawn out on ground of its own choosing, in circumstances much less favourable to the Allies than those offered on the heathlands of the northern Liègois. Time has its revenges. Between the battle of Ramillies and the Treaty of Utrecht, the Dutch had much to complain of in their treatment by English Whigs and Tories, in the protraction of the war and the circumstances of the peace. But if they had allowed Marlborough to win the war at an earlier stage, they might, with the help of the moderate Tories, have obtained a 'good peace' before the exhaustion of Holland's resources had rendered her the plaything of English factions.

So Marlborough was not permitted by his Allies to begin the conquest of Spanish Brabant and Flanders in his first campaign. But he found time that autumn to reduce the fortress towns of the Maas valley. The sieges of Venloo, Ruremond, Stevensweert and Liège were carried through in the face of Boufflers, who was unable to hinder the operations.

The English army won golden opinions at the taking of Venloo in September. Venloo lies on the east bank of the Maas, but the key to it was the fort of St. Michael on the west bank. Fort St. Michael was an elaborate earthwork fortress of the smaller size ; traces of it can still be seen on the meadow by the riverside to-day. It was quite capable of holding up the besiegers for a few days. But 1500 English, in obedience to the orders of Lord Cutts, nicknamed the 'Salamander' because his element was fire, were set on to capture the outer works. They shortened proceedings, contrary to all the rules of siegecraft, by pursuing the defenders from post to post till they had captured the whole fort. Captain Parker, who took part in this memorable escalade, has left his comments:

Sept. 18 (N.S.) 1702

> Thus were the unaccountable orders of Lord Cutts as unaccountably executed, to the great surprise of the whole army and even of ourselves, when we came to reflect on what we had done. However, had not several unforeseen accidents occurred, not a man of us could have escaped. In particular, when we had penetrated as far as the wooden bridge, had the officer drawn the loose plank after him, as he ought, we must all have fallen into the moat which was ten feet deep in water. And again, when we had passed the bridge which was 120 feet in length, and had got on the faussebraye, had there been six or eight feet of stone or brick under the sod work (which is always practised in our modern fortifications) or had the Governor

kept the grass, by the help of which we climbed, close mowed, as he ought to have done, what must have been our fate? But everything fell out fortunately and Lord Cutts' orders were crowned with success.[225]

It is possible that Cutts, who knew more about storming parties than any man in the army, had judged the chances coolly and the legitimate risks aright. Early in life he had been the first to plant the Imperialist standard on the walls of Buda. He had served William at the head of attacking parties at the Boyne, Limerick, Steinkirk, Brest, Namur and been wounded again and again. 'Tall, lusty and well-shaped, an agreeable companion, with abundance of wit, affable and familiar, but too much seized with vanity and self-conceit,' the 'Salamander' was always in the public eye and always in debt. A poet and a wit, one of Dicky Steele's many friends and one of Swift's many enemies, the squire of Childerley, a Cambridge man and five times Member for the County, he seems almost as Elizabethan as Peterborough himself; but he was more of a soldier by profession.

Ruremonde fell next and Stevensweert, placing the whole waterway of the Maas up to the outlying Dutch city of Maastricht in the hands of the Allies. Still not content, Marlborough prolonged the season of warfare to attack Liège. He was welcomed by the inhabitants of the city, who had no more love for their Bishop than in the days of Quentin Durward. But on the hill overhanging the city stood the Citadel, whose extensive and formidable earth-works, duly faced with brick, still remain very much as when Marlborough besieged them. Approaching from the north, where alone the ground was level, Marlborough effected a breach in five days and stormed the fortress on October 23.*

* These sieges were regarded as great exploits in England. Several years later the actor speaking the Prologue to Farquhar's *Twin Rivals*, flattered the patriotism of the audience with these lines:

> 'So Don and Monsieur, bluff before the siege,
> Were quickly tamed at Venloo and at Liege.
> 'Twas "*Viva Spagnia*," "*Vive la France*" before,
> Now "*Quartier, Monsieur*," "*Quartier, ah Señor!*"'

There were a few Spanish troops in the Netherlands.

Here ended the first campaign. Marlborough returned to the Hague by the waterway of the Maas which he had opened. It nearly cost him dear. A raiding party of irregulars from Guelder, a town in alliance with the French, surprised his boat as it was gliding down the river at night. It was the chivalrous custom of the age for generals to give passes to their opponents. Marlborough had none, but his servant, Stephen Gell, slipped into his hand in the darkness a French passport really made out for his brother, General Charles Churchill. With impassive mien he handed it to his captors. They failed to recognize him in the darkness, and let him go on, after plundering the boat and securing the escort. The rumour that Marlborough was captured got abroad, spreading joy in France and consternation in Holland. When he arrived safe at the Hague the whole population turned out to meet him with shouts and tears of joy. He had won the heart of the Dutch people, who, whatever some of their rulers might think, recognized in Milord the man who had saved them from France. He gave Stephen Gell a pension of fifty pounds a year.[226]

The results of Marlborough's campaign of 1702 may be summed up as the expulsion of the French from the valleys of the Maas and lower Rhine. The navigation of the Maas from Liège downwards was in allied hands. On the lower Rhine, only Bonn held out for the French, an isolated post, reduced in the following year. In those days of bad roads, waterways were to generals what railways are to-day. The march on the Danube two years later was only rendered possible by the work of 1702—the freeing of the Rhine and Maas valleys for the movements of the Allied army, and the release of the Dutch mind from all fear of invasion from that quarter. Moreover, the Elector Bishop of Liège and Cologne had been signally punished for his desertion of the cause of the Empire: he had lost both his provinces, where the constitutional party, represented by the Chapters, welcomed the Allied troops. The diplomatic prestige of the Alliance had thereby been enhanced at a moment when such encouragement was sorely needed. The year's campaigning in Italy and the upper Rhine

brought the Allies small success, beyond the capture of Landau and Eugene's bare victory of Luzzara—if victory it was. And in September a blow fell which threatened the fundamental structure of the Alliance ; Bavaria took the field for France in the rear of the Allied German Princes of the Rhine.

It appears probable that the Elector of Bavaria's negotiations with England and Austria in the summer of 1702 had been carried on either to distract their attention from his real designs, or to raise his price with France.* Ever since the spring he had been drawing subsidies from Louis, who grew impatient at his long delay in throwing off the mask. But Max Emanuel frankly avowed to his patron that he would not take the risks of defying the German cause in the heart of Germany, unless he was promised something very tangible as a reward in case victory crowned the French arms. His terms were a vast increase in the territories of Bavaria, and for himself nothing less than the Imperial dignity. The House of Hapsburg was to be dethroned and the Holy Roman Empire reconstituted under the House of Wittelsbach, with Bavaria in place of Austria as the leading State. But in effect the Empire would become a Protectorate of France. Max Emanuel's letters show that he designed to subject Germany to France in order to gratify his personal ambition. The scheme was indeed Napoleonic, but fortunately for Europe the Napoleonic genius was not on the side of the conspirators.[227]

By the Bavarian Alliance Louis was enabled to pass from the defensive to the offensive. He need no longer confine his ambition to keeping the whole Spanish Empire as his perquisite ; he could advance across Central Europe and end the rivalry of centuries by destroying the House of Hapsburg. He could dethrone Austria from the leadership of Germany in favour of a vassal of France. Militarily Vienna would be taken between two fires ; the Hungarians were already knocking at its gates from the east. French and Bavarians would now march upon it from the west.

That would be for next year's campaign. All that was

* See p. 235, above.

necessary in the autumn of 1702 was to establish communication between Bavaria and the French armies, sufficient to prevent the conquest of the rebel German State by the troops of the Empire. This was effected in September ; while Marlborough was reducing the fortresses on the Maas,

Sept. 8 1702

the Bavarian army unexpectedly attacked the territory of its German neighbours. The Free Imperial City of Ulm was seized by an old-fashioned ruse, cleverly executed by Bavarian officers, who entered disguised as peasants, overpowered the burgher guard, and opened the gates to their comrades without. Ulm was, in the tradition and feeling of its citizens, an outpost of Protestantism on the Upper Danube, strongly opposed to French ambition and Bavarian intrigue. But now, under military duresse, it became a place of arms where the well-appointed Bavarian army could await the arrival of the French forces from Alsace. Between them lay the pine-clad mountains of the Black Forest, but the routes across it were inadequately guarded by the Allies. Communications of a sort between France and Bavaria were established that autumn. In face of this fact, the capture of Landau by the Allies was of small account. For a train had been laid which should result next year in the fall of Vienna.[228]

CHAPTER XII

'The Sea Affair,' 1702–12. The Press-gang. The Naval Campaign of 1702. The West Indies and Benbow's action. Men and Officers of the Navy. Privateers. The War on Commerce. Marlborough's Mediterranean policy. The failure at Cadiz and the success at Vigo.

WHEN the War of the Spanish Succession began, it seemed to many that the command of the sea had passed with the Empire of Charles II into the hands of France. The Mediterranean, recently open to the commerce of England and of all nations, had become a French lake : the ports and islands of the Spanish and Neapolitan kingdoms were occupied by the soldiers of Louis and his grandson. French troops were already in Naples, quarrelling with the inhabitants. The French fleet from Toulon patrolled the coasts of the inland sea, unchallenged. Tuscany, Savoy and the Papal States were submissive to Louis, and though Venice was neutral she was so impotent that the enterprising French captain, Forbin, ran into the very port of Malamocco and burnt an English vessel in the middle of the Venetian shipping. In these circumstances, many Englishmen spoke of their Turkey and Levant trade as a thing already lost.[229] Spanish America was officially closed to all commerce save that of a French Company, and a great French fleet under Châteaurenault was cruising in the West Indies to enforce the embargo.

But if we look forward ten years to the end of the war, matters wear a very different face. Queen Anne's Admirals are policing the Mediterranean like Nelson after the Nile, reliant on their own impregnable bases of Gibraltar and Port Mahon. The harbours of Portugal, Italy, Turkey and North Africa are in the hands of allied or friendly

powers. The action off Malaga in 1704 was the last occasion on which the French Grand Fleet ventured to encounter the English, and three years later it was destroyed in Toulon harbour. After Malaga, the campaign against commerce was the only form of enemy activity at sea. The Spanish-American trade was lost to France, and at Utrecht was officially assigned to an English Company. In the words of Admiral Mahan : ' the demands made by England as conditions of peace in 1711 showed her to have become a sea-power in the purest sense of the word, not only in fact, but also in her own consciousness.'

In the course of the Queen's reign, not the French enemy alone but the Dutch ally were finally left behind in the race for sea-power. The Republic, which in the time of the De Witts had been well-nigh defenceless on land, but had fought the united French and English navies on equal terms, began the Marlborough wars with a military force rising to 80,000 men. A great Dutch army was kept up till the end of the war, but the Dutch fleet was allowed to shrink from fifty-five ships of the line in 1702 to forty in 1711. The financial strain of protecting their land frontier told as heavily on the Dutch as on the French, and sealed the doom of both their navies. Holland became England's client, trusting her maritime security to British power and good faith. Towards the close of the war, the Tories made the decline of the Dutch naval contingent a subject of diplomatic complaint abroad and political agitation at home ; but it was greatly to the advantage of England to be left without a rival at sea. The statesmen of the United Provinces, in excusing their default, pointed out that England had incomparably greater commercial interests to defend, particularly in the Mediterranean—an argument no Dutchman would have used thirty years before.[230]

The erection of British naval and commercial supremacy on a footing that proved permanent for more than two hundred years, might not unreasonably be regarded as the most important outcome of the reign of Anne. But it passes little noticed in English popular tradition, being associated with no stirring name like the Armada, La Hogue or Trafalgar ; no supreme seamen like Drake, Blake or Nelson.

Even the heroism that won and kept Gibraltar for Queen Anne lies in the shadow cast by Eliott's later defence of the Rock.

This great but noiseless revolution in sea-power was accomplished by the victories of Marlborough's arms and diplomacy on land ; by the maintenance of England's fighting navy at full strength during the time when French and Dutch were perforce disarming at sea ; and by the wise application of an amphibious strategy in the Mediterranean, dreamed of by Cromwell, conceived by William, and executed by Marlborough,* through the agency of such capable seamen as Rooke, Leake, Shovell and Byng. It was because Marlborough regarded the naval war as an integral part of the whole allied effort against Louis, that English sea power was fixed between 1702 and 1712 on a basis whence no enemy has since been able to dislodge it.

If the idea of a standing army was unpopular, there was no corresponding prejudice against the navy. Both political parties were in favour of a powerful war fleet. The liberties of England were thought to be threatened by the red-coat and protected by the blue-jacket. A song, popular in the Seventeenth Century, reflects this feeling :

> I care not for your martial men who do the State disdain,
> But I care for your sailor lads who do the State maintain.

The sons of the Cavaliers nursed resentment against the New Model Army and against all soldiers for their sake, but not against Blake's fleet which had defended the Regicide Republic and chased Rupert's privateers, the Dutch and the Spaniards in turn. And so it happened that when in 1698 Parliament cut down the army in England to 7000 men, the fleet had been maintained on a peace footing of 15,000 men with a proportionate number of good ships in commission. When war broke out again the navy had not, like the army, to start again from the bottom. A few weeks before William died, the House of Commons voted that the number of seamen should be increased to 40,000 for the first year of renewed hostilities.

* See p. 129, above, and *Corbett*, II, *passim*, *e.g.*, pp. 471–474.

The navy, as the more essential service of the two, also enjoyed the right, denied to the army, of forcibly seizing any of the subjects of the land, to man the Royal ships in time of war. The sight of honest citizens waylaid, knocked down and marched off manacled to serve the Queen at sea, was strangely out of keeping with the free and lawful spirit of the English polity. The interruption of trade was even more loudly complained of, for merchant fleets ready to leave port often lost so many of their crews to the press-gang that they could not set sail. The demand for a just and scientific naval conscription was raised by Admiralty officials like Burchett, the successor of Pepys' traditions in the post-Revolution world. But in the age of Anne it was not easy to carry out big administrative reforms. The body of efficient Civil Servants was not large enough to tackle the initial task of compiling a register of seamen for the whole country. And since all agreed that the navy must be manned in war time, the abuses of the press-gang, with its arbitrary and haphazard methods, went on through the days of Rooke, Shovell and Leake to the days of Nelson.[231]

The naval campaign of 1702 was played out in the two widely distant theatres of America and Spain. Each became the scene of a dramatic episode long remembered in popular tradition—Benbow's last cruise and the conflagration in Vigo Bay. They were linked together by the trail of the Spanish treasure ships across the Atlantic, which gave a certain unity to the maritime operations of the year.

Throughout 1701 the expectation of coming war, which kept European statesmen from their sleep, made American planters and backwoodsmen no less uneasy. The prospect of war with France and Spain, for the first time united as allies, alarmed every English-speaking household from Barbados to Hudson Bay ; and the most anxious of all were the English of the rich West Indian islands scattered about in an archipelago that was still very largely Spanish and French. The buccaneers from the English colonies had, for more than a generation past, dealt alternately as traders and as robbers with the Spanish Americans of the isles and the

mainland. If French fleets and armies from Europe now took a hand on the side of Spain, the smuggling trade was like to be stopped, and the plundering exploits of Morgan and Sharp bitterly avenged on their countrymen.

Admiral Benbow, a rough and loyal sailor of the 'tarpaulin' breed, better loved in the foc'sle than on the quarter-deck, was familiar with the West Indian station. He was sent out again by King William in the summer of 1701 to cruise with a small squadron round the Leeward Islands and Jamaica, in expectation of events. His arrival at first greatly cheered the English colonists. But when Châteaurenault arrived at Martinique in January 1702 with forty warships, mostly of the line, Benbow's squadron was heavily outclassed. Châteaurenault was only waiting for the declaration of war to fall on Barbados and the English Leeward Islands. Benbow fixed his base at Port Royal in Jamaica, where his men took ill and died apace ; he reported to the Secretary of State that 'scarce one in three of our Europeans live here twelve months.' And, indeed, the French fleet was losing men from disease as fast as the English.

At length, in July 1702, the news of the declaration of war arrived, having taken two months to cross the Atlantic. Fortunately for the English planters of the Leeward Islands, the French Admiral had, ere that, moved west to Cuba and Vera Cruz, leaving our defenceless colonies intact. Another more urgent task had called him away. The Spaniards had very few warships in either hemisphere capable of putting to sea, but they had a fleet of armed treasure galleons ready to sail from Vera Cruz, which could safely start for Spain if the French war fleet acted as convoy. Châteaurenault, with great difficulty, persuaded the suspicious Spaniards to put themselves under his charge, and in the middle of July set sail for Europe with thirty battleships, guarding the precious galleons, a moving magnet to the imagination of seafaring men all the world over. Benbow, in no force to attack such a fleet, sent word home of their departure, fluttering the dovecots at Whitehall and Portsmouth with visions of Spanish gold that at once began to cast a spell on our naval strategy in Europe.



Benbow, left behind with his little squadron in the West Indies, addressed himself to a more prosaic task. Châteaurenault, whose name the honest English Admiral rendered as *Shatternoe*, had detailed a small squadron under Ducasse to sail to Carthagena and Porto Bello, there to establish the French Company now enjoying the rights of the *Asiento* trade,* and to 'destroy the trade of the English and Dutch on that coast.' Benbow determined that the enemy should never reach Carthagena on such an errand. Leaving his base at Port Royal, he came up with them off Santa Marta, and at once engaged them in a running fight, as they sailed westward along the Spanish Main.

Aug. 19 (O.S.) 1702

The English squadron, all told, had a superiority of more than a hundred and twenty guns. If battle had ever been fairly joined, Ducasse was doomed, for the common seamen on the English ships were eager for battle. Unfortunately, four out of the seven captains were of a different mind. The flagship *Bredah*, the gallant little *Ruby* and the *Falmouth* did their duty. The other four refused to obey Benbow's signals to join in the action. For six days they followed, for the most part at a distance of several miles, watching their Admiral and his consorts keeping up the battle against odds—the enemy still making every effort to escape.

Once, indeed, Captain Kirby of the *Defiance* found himself close up against the enemy; even then he refused to fire because, as he afterwards boasted to the Court Martial, the French held him in too much respect to fire at him. His crew reported that he was in bodily fear, 'dodging behind the mizzenmast and falling down on the deck on the noise of a shot.' Some at least of the other Captains were men of proved courage, and it is, therefore, generally presumed that they were in a conspiracy of personal rancour against Benbow. It is said, though on no certain evidence, that he had given them the rough side of his tongue in Jamaica. But he behaved with only too much gentleness to them during the action, and no explanation of their conduct or account of their alleged wrongs appears in the

* See p. 139, above.

report of the Court Martial. There is still a certain element of mystery about the affair. Burchett of the Admiralty, a competent judge and a friend of Benbow, blamed him for not summoning the recalcitrant Captains on board his ship and placing them under arrest. Rightly or wrongly, he did not venture to take this course, presumably for fear of further treachery or desertion.

At length, at early dawn of the sixth day of this strange battle, Benbow had his 'right leg broke to pieces by a chain shot.' Thereupon, he ordered the ship's carpenter to rig him up a cradle on the quarter-deck, and sat there directing the fight as though nothing had happened. Later in the day, Kirby came on board and, without so much as asking after the wounded Admiral's health, demanded that the battle, in which he had taken no part, should at once be broken off; Benbow, instead of arresting him, summoned the other Captains to the *Bredah* to consult, and all followed Kirby's lead, signing a paper advising that the action should be brought to an end.

Aug. 24 (O.S.) 1702

So the dishonoured squadron returned to Port Royal in Jamaica where Benbow at once had his Captains tried by Court Martial. Kirby and Wade were condemned to death, carried to England and shot on board ship in Plymouth Sound, the Queen refusing to pardon them. Several months before his betrayers suffered the last penalty Benbow died in Jamaica. According to Admiral Whetstone's report, 'his leg never being set to perfection, which malady being aggravated by the discontent of his mind, threw him into a sort of melancholy which ended his life.'[232]

April 1703

Novr. 1702

There are some gestures which redeem mistakes. Like Cranmer's hand held in the fire, old Benbow's cradle on the quarter-deck prevents posterity from enquiring too closely what else he had done or left undone. No incident of the war took such a hold on the popular imagination, or was longer celebrated in alehouse song:

> Says Kirby unto Wade: 'We will run; we will run,'
> Says Kirby unto Wade: 'We will run.
> For I value no disgrace, nor the losing of my place,
> But the enemy I won't face, nor his gun, nor his gun'

Brave Benbow lost his legs by chain shot, by chain shot,
Brave Benbow lost his legs by chain shot.
Brave Benbow lost his legs, but on his stumps he begs,
'Fight on my English lads, 'tis our lot, 'tis our lot.'

The surgeon dressed his wounds; cries Benbow, cries Benbow,
The surgeon dressed his wounds; cries Benbow
'Let a cradle now in haste on the quarterdeck be placed
That the enemy I may face, till I die, till I die.'

Although the shame of the action is the most notorious in our naval annals, it was not in that period unique. Six
1708 years later, again in the West Indies, two captains failed Admiral Wager in a celebrated action. They were court-martialled and broke, which was thought 'a very favourable sentence,' for talk about their conduct had been 'enough to concern any true Englishman.'[233]

In view of these facts, we must be content to read patiently, though without full agreement, the opinion of a witness most friendly to England, Mocenigo, the Ambassador of Venice. Four years after Benbow's battle, and two years before Wager's, he reported to his Republic that the maritime power of England must be considered as permanently greater than that of France, owing to the number of men and ships. But the French navy, he adds, is better organized, has 'better discipline and more numerous officers,' so that 'a French ship will always defeat an English ship of the same class.' The last statement was even then demonstrably untrue, but the fact that it was made by a well-informed Venetian diplomat in London shows that the quality as distinct from the quantity of the English marine was not yet fully established in the eyes of the world. The opinion expressed by Sir Cloudesley Shovell to the Secretary of State in 1702 is probably nearer the real truth:

> The misfortune and vice of our country [writes the Admiral] is to believe ourselves better than other men, which I take to be the reason that generally we send too small a force to execute our designs. . . . To fight, beat and chase an enemy of the same strength I have sometimes seen, but have rarely seen at sea any victory worth the boasting when the strength has been near equal.

It was not yet the age of Nelson.[234]

The weakness of the English navy, such as it was, lay not in the men but in some of the officers. It was a weakness which the fine Admirals who served Queen Anne—Rooke, Shovell, Byng and Leake—were busy eradicating. They succeeded so well that posterity has difficulty in believing that the English naval officer under the later Stuarts was not on all occasions what he has been for two hundred years past. The politics of a country with an unsettled dynasty had something to do with the evil. In William's reign the Jacobites had correspondents in the navy and counted on disaffection among a section of the officers, though not, as they admitted, among the crews.[235] Actually, Jacobite hopes had been disappointed, but fear of possible treachery of this kind was constantly present as a demoralizing factor. More important, probably, was the friction between the 'tarpaulin' captains who had spent their lives at sea, and the gentlemen who owed their rank to solicitation at Court or in the lobbies of Parliament. But that cause of friction, as old as the voyages of Drake, was now diminishing, and the day was not far distant when every officer in the King's navy would be both a gentleman and a sailor, a man of education bred to the sea since he was a lad.

Against the crews no one had a word to say. Though many of them were pressed men torn from their trades and families, though they were poisoned with bad food * and drink, exposed undefended to storm and pestilence, their country could count on their constant and devoted service, their skilled seamanship, their light-hearted courage. Fortunately, the proportion of officers worthy to command such men was on the increase. Though the common sailor was, by modern standards, grossly neglected and ill-treated, he had no feeling against his officers as a class, and moreover

* In January 1703–1704 one of the agents for the victualling service gave evidence how 'from January before King William died till November last was twelvemonth, he cut several hogs full of matter and stinking corruption for the sea service, which flew in his face when he chopped them, so as to make him spew and his nose to bleed. He saw those hogs salted and packed up.' On the other hand, Sir Cloudesley Shovell (a trustworthy witness) gave evidence that his fleet in 1703 has been well provisioned 'and I have never known fewer complaints.' *H. of L. MSS.*, 1702–1704, pp. 270, 286. No doubt there were variations.

it was much less difficult for a common seaman to rise to be captain or even admiral, than it became in the days of a more regulated naval system.

In Anne's wars we may think of the common sailors working and fighting, not in any uniform, but in sea-slops of the most variegated description, and the Captains in blue coats, full-bottomed wigs, three-cornered hats and sometimes in cuirasses in time of action. The warships were much the same in build, size and weight of gun-metal as those of Nelson a hundred years later.[236]

Only less important in war time than the Royal Navy were the privateers. A great deal of the fighting, and particularly of the commerce destroying, which would have been done in later times by the King's ships, was done by vessels authorized by government to make war on the enemy, but fitted out and armed by private capital as a venture at once remunerative and patriotic. Parliament passed new laws to encourage privateers, by permitting them, for the duration of the war, to employ a larger proportion of foreign seamen and of foreign-built ships than were allowed under the Navigation Laws ; to take the whole value of the prizes they made ; and to import their captured goods for sale under specially easy terms at the custom-house. Thus encouraged, they swept the seas of enemy commerce.[237]

There were, indeed, some disadvantages to the public in this system. The easier discipline on board a privateer, and its reputation as the road to wealth through jolly adventure, attracted men to desert to it from the Royal Navy and the mercantile marine. 'The privateers which are commissioned by the government,' complains Admiral Whetstone from the West Indies, 'have slockstered away several of our men, notwithstanding we use all the care we can to prevent it.' Some privateers did not distinguish very closely between the merchant ships of the enemy and those of neutrals, allies or English ; and turned regular pirates as soon as the war was over.[238]

In this war, as in more modern times, there was no lack of a fighting spirit in the merchant service, altogether apart

from the privateers. Trading ships carried guns, and often gave a good account of themselves when attacked by the French. A London skipper came into port at Jamaica 'with more prisoners than he had crew,' having fought two actions on the way out. And an enemy attack in the same seas was foiled by the crew of a small Liverpool ship, who beat off the assault of superior numbers by strewing broken bottles for the bare feet of the boarding party and sweeping the deck with musketry fire.[239]

While privateering was the secondary part of the English naval warfare, it was the principal maritime effort of the French, when their Battle Fleets had become port-ridden in Brest and Toulon. In King William's war, after the English victory at La Hogue, Jean Bart and other French privateers had been the sea-heroes of their nation rather than the unlucky Admirals of the Fleet. And so it was again in the wars against Queen Anne. The French State supplied much of the material for private enterprise against allied commerce, even letting out the King's ships for the purpose. And successful corsairs like Forbin and Duguay-Trouin were made much of at Versailles. Forbin became a favourite with Louis himself—and, being a person of 'Provençal vivacity,' took liberties with the Ministers on which the Marshals defeated by Marlborough would certainly not have ventured.

Dunkirk, commanding the English Channel, was a name of terror to the allied merchants ; it sent out its commerce-destroyers singly and by squadrons. Sometimes as many as a hundred privateers were at sea from that one port. The Dutch navy undertook to patrol the North Sea against the Dunkirkers, while the English navy guarded the Channel and the coasting trade between London and the Tyne. In the very first year of the war the Newcastle colliers had to wait for convoys which were not ready at the agreed time, with the result that trade was dislocated and coal rose to a prohibitive price in London.[240]

1702–1703

Ostend, on the same coastline as Dunkirk, was an enemy base till Marlborough took it after Ramillies. In 1702, six French war-galleys, whose oars were a strange sight in

those waters, took advantage of calm weather to row out from Ostend and capture a Dutch warship of fifty guns ! St. Malo also was constantly full of privateers, building or fitting out, and of English merchant ships brought in as prizes.[241]

Between 1702 and 1708 the English lost 1100 merchant ships to the enemy. But in the same period 175 French privateers were accounted for—answering to the list of German submarines destroyed in our own day. In the later years of the war the danger to commerce was in the main overcome ; the merchants' complaints ceased after 1708. In 1712 the tonnage of British ships clearing outwards was greater by one-fifth than in the year the war began, a striking improvement over William's war in the matter of defence of our seaborne trade.[242]

The East India Company maintained its own naval and military establishment and did not reckon on the presence of the Royal Navy in the Eastern seas. But the trade of the American colonies had to be protected for the most part by the Queen's ships. The task was no sinecure, for Martinique was a transatlantic Dunkirk. And again and again, from 1702 onwards, squadrons from England were sent through the Newfoundland fogs to protect the fishing settlements on that coast, and the cod fleets at work there from the small seaports of Dorset, Devon and Cornwall. The French settlements of Newfoundland, especially Placentia, were better populated, fortified and garrisoned than those of our colonists, who suffered from the jealousy of the fishing fleets from home ports. In spite of the frequent cruises of English squadrons in those waters, the French in the first years of the war reduced the English and Colonial fishing fleets off Newfoundland to a mere fraction of their number in time of peace.[243]

The American colonists, though active as privateers, paid nothing towards the elaborate convoy system or the upkeep of the Royal Navy, on which their trade largely depended in wartime. That was one aspect of the old colonial system. Another was the right of the Mother Country in return to put what restriction she would on the trade and manufacture of the Colonies. A third aspect of these curious arrangements was the leave so frequently taken by colonists to break the restrictive laws.

Nevertheless, England's main effort at sea was not directed across the Atlantic. It was not off the Spanish Main but off the Spanish coasts in Europe that the Grand Fleet manœuvred and fought.

After the victory of La Hogue in the late war, the British islands were safe from invasion, and the Channel no longer required defence against the Brest Fleet, but only against privateers. The strength of the English and Dutch navies could be sent farther afield. Whither, then, should it be directed ? Marlborough decided to renew the policy formulated by William in the last year of his life ; the late King had held that the proper opening for the war would be to send the allied fleets to Spain, in order to encourage Portugal to join the Allies, to open the Straits, and to secure English naval power in the Mediterranean by the seizure of Cadiz or Gibraltar.

This Mediterranean strategy, which our great naval historian, Julian Corbett, has pronounced to have been rightly chosen in the interest of English sea power, was not universally approved. There was a ' blue-water school ' which considered that we ought to have little or nothing to do with the Continental war, but wage an oceanic war on our own account against the enemies' colonies and their supply of American gold. The motive behind this policy, at least in its more extreme forms, was quite as much dislike of our Allies as love of our navy. Those who hated the Dutch could not bear that we should fight by their side in Europe, or continue any part of the policy of William of Orange. This view of Rochester and the High Tories already in 1702 came into collision with the war plans of the Moderate Tories and Marlborough. It was the view which Swift preached ten years later in the *Conduct of the Allies* in retrospective criticism of the way in which Marlborough had by that time won the war.

According to the general tenor of these doctrines put forward in different forms by different writers, we ought to have sent few troops or none to the Continent, and no ships

to the Mediterranean or the Spanish coast. We ought to have made our chief effort in the West Indies, stopping the enemy's trade and seizing his colonies and, above all, waylaying the Spanish treasure ships from Panama. If that were done, it was argued, Louis and Philip would, for want of money, soon be obliged to abandon the war in Europe. If the war had been against the King of Spain alone this reasoning would no doubt have been true. But how far France depended on the arrival of the Spanish treasure ships it is exceedingly difficult to say. She had not depended on them in the war against King William, when Spain had been her enemy, not her ally. Marlborough believed that Louis could have amply recouped himself for captured Spanish treasure ships and lost French sugar islands by occupying Vienna and the Hague, as he would almost certainly have done but for the intervention on the Continent of the English army and General. Quite certainly the Allies could not, without the help of Marlborough's generalship and his English troops, have expelled the French from Bavaria and the Netherlands ; nor from Italy, without the help of English subsidies and the English fleet in the Mediterranean. And if the Franco-Spanish power had been permitted to dominate Europe like Napoleon's in later days, English sea power could not long have survived in selfish isolation, however many colonies we had meanwhile seized beyond the Atlantic. Therefore, even from a purely maritime point of view, our active support of the Allies on the Continent and in the Mediterranean was justified for the years 1702–1706. Even for our colonial Empire, this system proved the best. Marlborough won Acadia and Newfoundland in Germany, and the *Asiento* on the plains of Ramillies. After the victories of 1704–1706 much of Swift's criticism begins to be true ; but applied to the early stages of the war much of it is erroneous.[244]

Admiral Sir George Rooke had, through all changes of the political scene, retained the confidence and favour of William III, who realized that he had no abler or more loyal seaman, no public servant who dipped his hands less in the

public purse. But, though highly competent to manage a fleet and to conduct any given operation, Rooke was cautious to a fault, sulky and unimaginative. It was never more than an even chance that he would seize an opportunity when it offered. It was he, even more than Kirke, who had been responsible in 1689 for the long inactivity of the fleet off Lough Foyle, which caused the unnecessary martyrdom of the defenders of Londonderry. His unenterprising temper had wedded him to the doctrine that the Grand Fleet should cruise within easy reach of the Channel and that any squadron detached as far as Spain must be certain to be back home before the autumn storms began. He had no sympathy with the policy of William and Marlborough that part of the fleet ought to be able to re-fit and even to winter in southern Europe, and that therefore England ought to seize and fortify naval bases in the Mediterranean. But, in spite of his limited views, William chose him to execute the designs against Cadiz and the Straits with which the naval war was to begin ; and after the King's death, Marlborough, though no less intent on these large designs, continued to employ the unwilling and recalcitrant Admiral.[245]

The alterations that took place at the Admiralty, on the substitution of a Tory for a Whiggish Ministry at Anne's accession, compromised the hopes of the year by delaying till late in July the departure of Rooke for Spain. But the political and personal changes made no difference to the outline of our naval policy as William had planned it. It would, indeed, have been otherwise if Rochester and the High Tories had controlled Anne's naval strategy. Fortunately the Prince Consort became nominal Lord High Admiral, with George Churchill as the most influential member of his Council. Marlborough, therefore, controlled the big decisions. He had to yield to his brother George, a more eager Tory partisan than himself, on a few changes of the lesser commands, particularly as to the shelving of the able Captain George Byng for political reasons, contrary to the promises made him by the elder of the Churchills. But the great strategical designs against Spain and the Mediterranean were persevered in,

1702

despite the protests of Rooke, who was still employed to execute them.[246]

During the last months of William's reign, while men were wondering how soon the inevitable war would be proclaimed, a stream of secret information had been pouring into Whitehall about the undefended condition of Cadiz and Gibraltar. It was known, indeed, that two French engineers had been drawing up plans for the repair and extension of Charles V's fortifications of Gibraltar, but those best acquainted with the ways of Spanish officialdom were confident that nothing would be done—and, in fact, nothing was done till, three years later, the Rock passed into hands better able to defend it.[247]

Meanwhile our allies were clamouring for the presence of the English fleet in Mediterranean waters. Wratislaw, the Emperor's able envoy in England, urged that the sight of Rooke's topsails would effect a revolution in Naples, win south Italy from the precarious grasp of Philip V, overawe the Francophile Pope and encourage Savoy and the other Princes of Italy to change sides. Prince Eugene, in command of the Austrian army in the valley of the Po, more modestly pleaded for a squadron to protect the passage of his supplies from Trieste across the Adriatic.[248]

April 1702

But Marlborough knew that without a base in the Iberian Peninsula nothing big could be done inside the Straits. A bold stroke on the coast of Spain might not only put Gibraltar or Cadiz in the hands of the Allies, but would encourage Portugal to join the war and to place the great harbour of Lisbon at the disposal of our fleet. The Methuens, father and son, England's energetic representatives at that Court, were clamouring for a naval demonstration against Spain to support their arguments with the hesitating King of Portugal.

Rooke, therefore, was instructed to take Cadiz. He was sent with the English and Dutch Grand Fleets, carrying 10,000 English infantry * and 4000 Dutch. The English soldiery were under the command of James Butler, Duke of Ormonde, one of Britain's grandees, inheriting great cavalier

* Of these, 2400 were the newly raised force of Marines.

traditions and the leadership of the Protestant Church interest in Ireland. This good-natured and honourable man was well fitted to play the part of popular Duke and political figurehead, but the attempt made to pass him off as the High Tory military hero, the rival of Marlborough, was foredoomed to fail. He was weak enough to accept the rôle and to follow the lure of a vain ambition till it led him to ruin and the tragedy of a long exile. But when the gallant armament sailed in July 1702, the sun shone brightly on the fortune of the most popular nobleman in the British Islands.

On August 12th, according to the home reckoning used by the Navy at sea, the armament appeared before Cadiz, and at once the weakness of its leadership became evident. Rooke was sick and sulky, opposed at heart to the whole enterprise: he insisted on nothing himself, but allowed the Council of War to quarrel to its heart's content. In those days Admirals in command of fleets were more bound by their Councils than in Nelson's time. 'Was I to engage the confederate fleet without a resolution of the Council of War?' he asked indignantly of the Committee that afterwards enquired into these miscarriages.[249] A score of generals and admirals, English, Dutch and German, met in Rooke's cabin off Cadiz on August 13th and quarrelled till they had rejected every reasonable proposal, and agreed in sheer weariness to the one course which was certainly wrong.

Aug. 12 (O.S.) 1702

If the Allies had had the spirit of Drake and his fellows, off that place, with such a force, they would have adopted one of two plans. Either they would have sent ahead a squadron to force its way past the forts of the Puntales into the inner harbour and destroy the French and Spanish fleets therein, before the enemy had time and warning to throw a boom across the mouth. That course was suggested by a captain who offered to carry it out himself.[250] Or else they might, under cover of a bombardment by the fleet, have landed the army on the narrow neck dividing Cadiz from the mainland, and taken their chance of capturing the city at a rush while it was still surprised and ill-garrisoned. The third defensible course consonant with their instruc-

tions was to sail away at once and attack some other place, if Cadiz was too strongly defended.

Ormonde, who was by no means lacking in personal courage, argued in favour of a military landing on the isthmus and a direct attack on the city. But Rooke's entourage had been alarmed by false accounts given them by captured Spanish fishermen to the effect that a powerful garrison of regular troops was already inside the walls. The

MAP III



fatal decision was reached to land the troops between the Bay of Bulls and Fort St. Catharine, far away from Cadiz and far away even from the Puntales forts and the harbour; to seize the open villages of Rota and Porta Santa Maria, and to sit down there to see what would happen next. The landing was effected in face of slight resistance from Spanish troops and batteries : the loss chiefly consisted of twenty men drowned in the swell of the surf. But when they had landed and captured Fort St. Catharine, no real strategical object had been gained. Marlborough's comment on this proceeding is the verdict of posterity :

> What can be said for staying 26 days at Port St. Mary ? For if Cadiz was to be attacked, they should not have staid there. And if the taking of Cadiz was not thought feasible, then they should not have lost time, but have reimbarked to have attempted what was in their instructions.[251]

But the month spent at Santa Maria was much worse than wasted. It was grossly misused, with disastrous and lasting effects upon the attitude of Spanish opinion towards the Allied cause. Although England and Holland had not yet bound themselves by treaty, as they did in the following year, to make the Austrian Archduke Charles King of Spain, they hoped to do so if the Spaniards proved agreeable. Prince George of Hesse, who knew something of Spanish conditions from his experience as Governor of Catalonia in former years, accompanied the fleet to see that the interests of Austria were not overlooked. The English issued promises and invitations on behalf of Charles as King of Spain in the villages that they occupied : but this system of policy met with little or no response except among the beggars of the region, and the cause of Charles III became associated in the Spaniards' minds with the scandalous conduct of Ormonde's troops, who plundered Santa Maria to the bare walls, sacked the churches with heretical glee, raped women, and even nuns.

Ormonde's limitations as a commander became only too apparent. In face of the misconduct of his troops, he was equally distressed and helpless. Sir Henry Belasys, his second-in-command, and Sir Charles Hara took a lead in the plunder. The officers even went so far, in their deplorable meanness of soul, as to place guards in the street to take the spoil from the privates and store it all away for their superiors. To add to the irony of the situation, though all Spain was horrified and alienated by the story of the conduct of the allied army, the chief losses fell upon rich English and Dutch merchants doing business under Spanish names, through whom the trade of Cadiz with America had long been conducted. They complained pitifully that they had been robbed of property of great value, besides having their future residence and work in Spain rendered impossible by

their compatriots' conduct. When the fleet and army finally departed, they 'carried away,' as the sufferers wrote, 'for the major part their countrymen and allies' goods,' and 'left behind them such a filthy stench among the Spaniards that a whole age will hardly blot it out.'[252]

The latter part of the month spent by the army on shore was devoted to a feeble attempt to take the fort of Matagorda, on the north side of the Puntales, with a view to facilitating the entry of the fleet into the harbour to destroy the enemy's ships. But by this time the Spaniards and French were reinforced and in good heart. The land on which the batteries were set up against the Matagorda was spongy and malarious. Rooke declared that, even if the fort were taken, the fleet could not penetrate into the harbour because of the corresponding fort on the other side of the Puntales entrance. At last it was decided to break off operations against Cadiz. The troops were re-embarked, all save a few companies of Irish Catholics who seized the occasion to desert and seek service in the French army, after having taken a leading and profitable part in the sack of Santa Maria.

Sept. 15–16 (O.S.) 1702

Ormonde and Prince George of Hesse wished to land again at Vigo or some other point of importance in Spain, and winter there with part of the fleet and army. But Rooke was all agog for home, and for once asserted his authority at the Council of War. The autumnal gales, he declared, would be upon them unless they hurried back to England. Belasys and Hara, anxious to lodge their ill-gotten gains in safety, voted with the sailors against Ormonde's demand for another landing in Spain.[253] Loaded with plunder and infamy the great armament set sail for England. The Admiral and the General, though both on the same side in politics, were now scarcely on speaking terms; Ormonde thought that but for Rooke's veto he could have taken Cadiz; and Rooke, himself as honest as the day in all that concerned money, had written to Ormonde in bitter terms of the plundering by the soldiers on shore.

It is remarkable that the two most disgraceful actions on the part of our countrymen in the whole long War of the Spanish Succession, Benbow's battle and the affair at Cadiz,

took place during the same days on the two sides of the Atlantic. It was fortunate for the allied cause that an accident on the way home gave Rooke's fleet and Ormonde's army an opportunity, of which gallant use was made, to retrieve the prestige of England at sea. Methuen's pessimistic letters from Lisbon to Admiral Rooke in September clearly show that if the failure before Cadiz had not been redeemed at Vigo, Portugal would not have entered the war on the allied side in the following year.[254]

It was August weather on the ocean, while day by day the Spanish treasure galleons, under the convoy of the French warships, had been drawing nearer to Europe—unseen on the watery waste, but never out of the thoughts of men in London, Paris and Madrid.* Arrived at length off the coast, Châteaurenault would have had the galleons run for safety into a harbour of France. But the Spaniards refused to take a step which would have put Philip's gold into the hands of Louis. The flotilla, therefore, put into Vigo Bay in Northern Spain in the middle days of September. There it lay for several weeks, unknown to Rooke and Ormonde farther down the same coast. The bulk of the treasure—that part which belonged to the Spanish crown—was unshipped and taken up the stony paths of the hills on the backs of mules; a residuum belonging to private persons and a great quantity of merchandize remained in the galleons, and most of the French war fleet remained to guard them.

Rooke, in his ignorance, was sailing past the mouth of the harbour in his hurry to be back home before the autumn storms which he dreaded so much. But already messengers from London and from Lisbon were scouring the seas to find him. Actually the word was brought to him by one of his own ships. The *Pembroke* had stayed behind the fleet to water at Lagos. There her Captain, Thomas Hardy, had stumbled on the great news. The Chaplain of the *Pembroke*, a Jersey man like his Captain, spoke French well; he scraped acquaintance with the French Consul in Lagos, who could not forbear a boastful hint that the

* See p. 250, above.

treasure ships were snug in a harbour of the coast. Thus put on the alert, the Chaplain fell in with another stranger who proved to be a messenger from the Imperial Embassy in Lisbon with official confirmation of the fact. At once Captain Hardy gave chase to his Admiral, and caught him up on October 6 (O.S.), in time to prevent him from crossing the Bay of Biscay.

Rooke sent ships to explore the mouth of Vigo Bay and report. They returned with the correct information, gleaned from a friar whom a landing party had seized, that the fleet was at the head of the bay protected by a strong boom and batteries, that the King's part of the treasure had already been landed, but that much wealth was still on board the galleons. Another of the inevitable Councils of War was held, fortunately this time without the participation of Belasys and Hara ; ' the two knights ' had at length been put under arrest, by orders from the home government which Ormonde ought to have forestalled on his own responsibility weeks before. Even so, the decision to attack was only carried by a majority which included the Dutch Admiral. Vigo Bay was by this time a harder nut to crack than Cadiz would have been if Cadiz had been assaulted on the first arrival of the fleet.[255]

Oct. 10 (O.S.) 1702

On the evening of October 11th the English and Dutch warships ran up the fiord for ten miles between the hills, past ' Bayona's hold ' at the mouth, past the two castles of Vigo city that fired at them as they sailed by unheeding, intent only on what they should find in the inmost lair at the end of the long bay.

The tragedy of the French and Spanish fleet was to take place in a theatre worthy of the event. Vigo Bay, after running to a narrow passage not much more than half a mile broad at the promontory of Randa, suddenly opens out into the spacious harbour of Redondela, circled by ranges of wild, bare Galician mountains. There the estuary comes superbly to an end, and there lay the treasure ships and the French fleet. Châteaurenault had blocked up the entrance from shore to shore with a boom of masts strongly lashed together. At the north end of the boom was a battery, of which traces can still be seen.

At the south end of the boom the defences were still more formidable. Randa Fort can be found by the curious to-day much as it was left after the battle, but surrounded now by a peaceful grove of trees, a forgotten monument of English valour in a strange land. A strong stone tower, with inner platforms and embrasures constructed for cannon, stands some little way up from the sea. The space between the tower and the water's edge is occupied by an outer ward

MAP IV



or fortified enclosure ; at the bottom of it, along the rocky shore, runs a long platform on which stood a battery to command the straits. Châteaurenault had landed ships' guns at either end of the boom. The Randa fortifications had been armed with more than thirty cannon, the northern shore with rather less.

The leading ships of the Allies, in attacking the boom on the morning of October 12th, were therefore liable to receive a flanking fire at close quarters from both shores, besides the broadsides of seven French ships of the line ranged inside the boom to fire across it at the assailants.

But the spirit of the Allies at Vigo was very different from their spirit at Cadiz. Shame at their recent disgrace, and the sight of the top-sails of the treasure ships roused the hero or the devil in every man. Rooke, indeed, lay in his berth, ill of gout, far down the bay. The active command fell to Vice-Admiral Hopsonn, who in the *Torbay* led the attack on the boom, in a spirit not unworthy of the *Mountjoy* at Londonderry. Behind him pressed a strong squadron of his English ships, and of Dutch under Vice-Admiral Van der Goes. They were met by a terrible fire from the ships behind the boom and the batteries on either shore. The *Association*, of ninety guns, laid her broadside along the battery on the north shore and soon silenced it. The more formidable batteries of Fort Randa were being assailed by the English infantry.

Oct. 12 (O.S.) 1702

Early that morning Ormonde and some 2000 men had landed on the sandy shore near Teis, a couple of miles lower down. They marched straight to Fort Randa, over hill-sides broken by ravines, pine-woods, vineyards and old stone hamlets. Many thousands of Spanish militia were roaming about and firing, but it was not an occasion when guerilla tactics could avail. The fort was reached, with its formidable array of guns and several hundred French, described as ' seamen ' or ' marines.' Ormonde marched on foot with the main body, sending Lord Shannon with the vanguard of grenadiers to begin the assault. The wall enclosing the outer ward was stormed, and the seaward battery silenced in time to assist the breaking of the boom by the ships. The tower, which could only be entered up sixteen steps, held out a little longer, defended by 300 French, ' the grenadiers plying them briskly with their hand-grenadoes as soon as they appeared on the wall ' and finally charging up the steps and capturing the fort and its garrison.

Meanwhile, the *Torbay*, favoured by a breath of wind, crowded on all sail and crashed at the boom. It cracked, and Hopsonn's flag-ship floated through the wreckage in among the enemy beyond. The breeze fell, and for an anxious period of time no other vessel could follow. The *Torbay* was assaulted by superior numbers, and a blazing fireship was laid along her side. She caught fire ; most of her crew leapt overboard, and she would have been burnt to the waterline had not the fireship, loaded with a valuable cargo of snuff from the Spanish Indies, suddenly blown up. A great cloud of snuff enveloped the flag-ship and partly extinguished the fire. A few sneezing and gallant men who had stuck to the ship were thus enabled to get the better of the flames.

Meanwhile, the breeze had risen once more, and other English and Dutch ships followed the *Torbay* through the gap, or hacked fresh passages in the boom with blows of the axe. Then was put to the test the opinion of the Venetian Ambassador that ship for ship the French navy was the better. Châteaurenault's sailors did not think so. Setting fire to their vessels, they sought safety on shore—after a very ' mean ' resistance in the judgment of the English Admiral. For a loss of some two hundred men, the Allies destroyed or captured the whole of the enemy's fleet. Night fell, and all through the night the waters of the bay reflected the burning ships. The air was filled with the roar of cannon and musketry, varied by louder explosions as the flames reached some magazine, and masts, men and merchandize went hurtling through the night sky. The English and Dutch worked with fury to quench the flames and save their prizes. When day dawned, they were still at the work; but there was no longer a French or Spanish vessel but had been either captured or destroyed.

The loss of the galleons was not likely to be made good in the idle shipyards of Spain. But far more serious was the loss of ten French line-of-battle ships taken and five burnt, besides frigates and smaller craft. For this was the opening year of a war in which Louis thought himself bound to keep up his armies in preference to his fleet. Even more important was the recovery of the Allied prestige, lost at Cadiz and now dramatically regained; for that secured the entrance of Portugal into the war, and the opening of Lisbon as a naval base for the Maritime Powers.

As to the treasure, which had drawn on the battle, there is no clear evidence how much was taken, either in gold or in merchandize. Much certainly, but nothing like what had been hoped. Rooke was informed by one of the

captured Captains that the King's treasure, which had gone up-country beforehand, was worth three millions sterling, and it is not improbable ; if it had been captured by the allied fleets, the feeble war-effort of Spain in the next few years would have been feebler still. In that respect the affair of Vigo had been a failure. The belief that other great sums went to the bottom in the burning ships, whether true or false, has inspired prospectuses and dredging operations by hopeful company promoters in the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. The wealth captured and destroyed was much of it the property of the Dutch merchants who carried on the trade between Spain and her colonies ; the news that the treasure fleet had got safely to Vigo had caused joy in many quarters in Holland, and the subsequent story of the battle was received in Amsterdam with mingled feelings.[256]

A few days were spent in salvaging and in making the captured ships ready to sail. The Galician peasants stood round the shores of the bay, sometimes aiming their muskets at the victors as they worked, and continually shouting abuse at them as 'English dogs, rogues, heretics and cuckolds.' 'Captain Martin, where he lay in the harbour, had a good deal of it from a neighbouring hill, the seamen making sport of it to call names with them,' till 'a volley of small arms spoilt the joke.'

Ormonde wished part of the fleet and army to winter at Vigo, but Rooke would not hear of it. So they all sailed home, to be hailed as heroes for Vigo, and questioned as culprits for Cadiz, to quarrel with one another, and to divide the blame, the fame and the spoil. Ormonde was at the height of popular favour. Wherever he appeared in an English street, he was followed by cheering mobs. Rooke would have met with a like reception, but the gout which had kept him from the battle still kept him indoors when he got home.[257] He was well pleased with his luck. For he had won his contest against Marlborough and the Admiralty by evading their desire that he should seize a port and gain permanent control of the Straits, and yet he had come home covered with glory. Two years later they beat him, when he took Gibraltar.[258]

CHAPTER XIII

The Session of the winter 1702–3. The Fall of Rochester. Lords and Commons. Peer-making, limited. The Occasional Conformity Bill. Defoe in the Pillory. Relation of politics to religion. The Convocation controversy. The Cabinet and its machinery. Nottingham as Secretary of State.

THE year's success in the Netherlands and on the coast of Spain was celebrated by the first, as it proved, of many thanksgivings for victory to be held by Anne and her subjects at St. Paul's. The Mayor and Aldermen in procession conducted the Queen from Temple Bar, followed by both Houses of Parliament. The long line of coaches defiled for hours through the streets. The guns of the Tower fired salvoes. There had been no ceremony of the like pomp, men said, since the times of Elizabeth. The glories of the Age of Anne had begun.[259]

Nov. 12 (O.S.) 1702

Ormonde was the hero of the day, for Rooke was ill in bed, and Marlborough only returned to England a fortnight later. But already Marlborough overtopped his rivals in fame. Vigo might atone for Cadiz, but it could not blot it from men's memory, or even prevent a damaging official inquest ; whereas the career of victory on the Maas, as every Englishman knew, had been limited only by the timid interference of Dutch Deputies and Generals. That winter Marlborough was still a Tory hero, and already a national hero. The Queen raised him from Earl to Duke. The newly elected Tory House of Commons * voted that he had 'retrieved the ancient honour and glory of the English nation.' The Whigs divided in vain against the word

* See pp. 208–213, above, for the General Election of July 1702.

retrieved, which had been chosen to cast a retrospective slur on William's campaigns in the Netherlands.

The Queen settled £5000 a year on the new Duke from the Post Office revenue, but she could only do so for her own lifetime. She asked the House of Commons to legislate so as to prolong the grant to him and his heirs for ever. This they refused to do, although they assigned the immense portion of £100,000 a year for life to the Prince Consort. There may indeed have been good reasons of public policy against a perpetual grant to any man's heirs. But one motive for the refusal was that the High Tories, who looked on Rochester as their chief, could not bear to see the Churchills monopolize the Queen's favour, which they thought should go in more liberal measure to her relatives of the House of Hyde. Rochester made no concealment either of his personal jealousy of Marlborough, or of his political opposition to the war on the Continent. When the Queen directed him to return to his post as Lord Lieutenant in Ireland, he still delayed his departure. He preferred to linger in England and lead the malcontents against his Cabinet colleagues. By this time Anne had had enough of her uncle's humours. In February 1703 he was forced to quit her service, the first of a long line of Tories who followed one another into retirement for half a dozen years to come. The fall of Rochester eased the situation for the Godolphin Ministry for awhile—but not for long.

The attack on William's memory and the prosecution of his Whig Ministers were pursued together by the newly elected House of Commons. But since Halifax and Orford were Peers, the Upper House saw to it that they had fair play. The charges against William's great financial adviser, Halifax, broke down on examination. Indeed, the outcry against the late Whig Ministers as corruptionists, though it had served its turn at the General Election, received a set-back from the public investigation now made into the nation's accounts, from which the Tory pot emerged as black as the Whig kettle. But the Commons found one victim. An Irish Peer, Lord Ranelagh, almost the only Whig who sat in this Parliament for a Cornish borough, was expelled from the House on a charge of peculation as

Paymaster-General of the Army—it is not clear with what degree of justice. The truth as to the charges against him and against Russell, Lord Orford, were obscured by the rancorous quarrel between the two parties, which soon developed into a clash between the two Houses.[260]

The Commons had the privilege that posterity may envy them of listening with delight to young St. John's lost philippics against Whigs and moderates. But the leaders of the House showed more vigour than skill. Sir Edward Seymour, relentless in his pursuit of the feuds of the last reign, had not the temper for tactics. The day before the House adjourned for Christmas, the country gentlemen were some of them, we may suppose, excited by seasonable good cheer and by the prospect of a week's holiday on their estates. At any rate they passed that day a series of remarkable votes. The first was a motion of Seymour's to resume all grants made by William. His Irish grants had been resumed by the Act of the Tory Parliament of 1698. The new proposal would have carried the war against the estates of certain Whig and Dutch noblemen into England as well—where the security of property was normally greater and where such a measure would have been more of a shock to society than in Ireland. Young Robert Walpole replied by moving to resume all grants made in the reign of James II, and though the proposal was voted down, it considerably damped the Tory ardour for resumptions. Seymour's proposal went no further.

Dec. 23 1702

The next division on that noisy evening showed 135 votes to 80 in favour of the principle that no one holding office under the Crown ought to sit in the House of Commons. But a few minutes' reflection, and perhaps a little lobbying by anxious Ministers, reminded the honest squires that almost all 'placemen' at that moment were Tories: Seymour himself was Comptroller of the Household. When therefore it was proposed to proceed with the measure on the lines just decided, the House went back on its opinion by 138 votes to 77.*

* *H. of C. Journals*, XIV, p. 95; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 143–144. Office-holders were to be excluded from the House of Commons under the Act of Settlement, Clause VI, see p. 120, above, as soon as the House of Hanover came to the throne. But this clause was fortunately modified in 1705 before it took effect.

And so, on second thoughts, the Constitution was permitted to grow unchecked in the direction of Ministerial representation in the Lower House. But such rash voting shows how little the Commons yet understood their future place in the English polity. The House still regarded itself as the critic of government which it had been in the past, not as the seat of government which it was to be in the future.

In the reigns of William and Anne all the leading Cabinet Ministers were found in the Upper House. There sat the five Lords of the Whig Junto ; there sat Marlborough and Godolphin, Rochester and Nottingham. When, after the political landslide of 1710, Harley and St. John came in their turn to rule the nation, they both hastened to take Peerages. Sir Robert Walpole was the first of our rulers who preferred to govern the country from his seat on the front bench of the House of Commons, and to go up to the Lords only when he left office. It is not then surprising that in Anne's reign, when all the chief Ministers were away in another place, the Commons acted according to their own sweet will, often with little regard to the wishes of Government. The idea of Government was personally associated no longer with the Court, but with the House of Lords ; and against the House of Lords the Commons nourished a tradition of jealousy almost as strong as that which it nourished against the Court.

Throughout the Stuart era the Upper Chamber represented continuity and moderation, while the House of Commons, though more vital and creative, was the seat of the alternate violence of Roundhead and Cavalier, Whig and Tory. The balance of parties in the Lords was always so close that it could be decided by the unattached Peers of moderate views. But whereas in the days of the Exclusion Bill and the Convention Parliament, there had been a small Tory majority, by the end of William's reign there was a small Whig majority, or at any rate a majority that could be relied on to pour cold water on the Tory heats of the Lower House. This change was ascribed to the numbers of Low Church Bishops whom William had been able to appoint to the numerous sees vacated by death and by the Nonjuror

Schism. The High Tories looked to the new Queen for a remedy. Though she could not make vacancies in the Episcopal Bench, she could create a large batch of Tory Peers. But her own good sense and that of her Moderate Tory advisers made her content with a creation of four Tories and, at Sarah's special request, one Whig, Lord Hervey, who came in as a client of the Marlboroughs by no means in opposition to Government. Even against this discreet exercise of the Prerogative the Whigs raised an outcry. The question of the right of the Crown to ' swamp ' the House of Peers so as to alter its political complexion, was to come up again nine years later over the Treaty of Utrecht.[261]

Feb.–March 1703

Of many conflicts between the two Houses in the winter session of 1702–1703, by far the most serious took place over the Occasional Conformity Bill. The accession of Anne and the General Election in the summer had given the signal for a High Church revival. The Doctrines of divine hereditary right and non-resistance were preached again in many pulpits, as being compatible with loyalty to Anne, though not to William. In June Dr. Sacheverell had delivered at Oxford a sermon that struck the note for the High Tories in the new reign. He took for his thesis the dependence of government on religion ; the throne was based on the altar ; heresy and schism must lead to rebellion ; finally the orator declared that ' rather than strike sail to a party that is so open and avowed an enemy of our communion,' he would ' hang out the bloody flag of defiance '—an expression that ran round the country and became a catch-word of the day. Above all, Sacheverell thundered against ' occasional conformists '—' insidious persons who can creep to our altars,' only to qualify themselves for office in order the better to destroy the Church.

1702

The indignation of the Tories against Dissenters in general and occasional conformists in particular, had been brought to a head by an incident that occurred near the end of William's reign. A Lord Mayor of London, Sir Humphry Edwyne, who had presumably qualified for the office he held by taking the communion according to

the rites of the Church of England, had the imprudence, or impudence, to ride in state to his Presbyterian Chapel on Sunday, in his Mayor's robes, with the sword and insignia of London borne before him. The political literature of the age of Anne is full of the incident. The Tories were never tired of harping upon it. Swift's *Tale of a Tub* tells ' how Jack's tatters came into fashion in court and city : how he got upon a great horse and ate custard '—custard being a traditional dish at the Lord Mayor's feast. Sir Humphry must have been sorry he had been so foolish. He certainly brought down the vials of wrath on the heads of his co-religionists for years to come.

The Occasional Conformity Bill proposed to punish with heavy fines, that might mount up to be ruinous, holders of municipal or national office who, after qualifying by taking the Anglican Sacrament, afterwards attended a Nonconformist service. Informers were to have the whole fine.

The Test Act of 1673, though passed primarily to keep Roman Catholics out of office, incidentally hit Dissenters. By the Test Act no one could hold State or municipal office unless he had first taken the Communion according to the rites of the Church of England. The Test effectively barred out Roman Catholics, in whose eyes such communion was a deadly sin. But the Dissenters were divided on the question. Many of them indeed thought it wrong for religious reasons to communicate according to the rites of a prelatic Church. Others, while not regarding it as sinful, thought it mean to communicate for no other purpose than to qualify for office. On the other hand, as Bishop Burnet reminded the House of Lords, many worthy persons made a religious habit of attending sometimes the Church, sometimes the Chapel, wherever the gospel was well preached ; Baxter and other moderate Presbyterian Divines had defended Occasional Conformity as permissible on religious grounds. Burnet had been coached in these arguments during a visit he received from the famous Dissenting minister, Calamy.

Then, as now, there were many Church of England people who liked occasionally to attend Nonconformist services. Under the Bill, such persons, if they held office,

would be at the mercy of servants, spies and ill-wishers threatening to inform against them. Queen Victoria, by Anglican standards, was an ' occasional conformist,' for she went to Presbyterian services in Scotland. Anne's own husband, Prince George of Denmark, was an occasional conformist, for he had Lutheran services in his own chapel. In 1702 his wife sent him to the Lords to vote for the Bill, but as he passed into the Tory lobby he whispered to Wharton the Whig : ' My heart is vid you.'

On the other hand, it was not unnatural that even moderate Tories should have felt indignant at the practice of Occasional Conformity for political reasons. By the Revolution Settlement of 1689, the agreed compromise that gave peace to England, Dissenters were granted legal toleration for their worship, but were to remain excluded from State and municipal office. Moderate Tories held that even if, as Burnet said, some humble folk innocently loved to hear the word in both Church and Chapel, it was nevertheless an evasion of the intentions of Parliament when a Dissenter, who never otherwise darkened the doors of the Parish Church, approached the altar in order to qualify as Mayor or Alderman. It might, indeed, be called a legal evasion of the law. But it is more doubtful whether the practice should have been so hotly denounced as a blasphemous hypocrisy by legislators who themselves insisted on keeping a religious rite as a political test. The High Tories did not consider it blasphemy when Freethinkers and rakes of their own party, like St. John, knelt to receive the necessary passport into the Queen's service.

Whatever might be thought of the arguments for and against the Bill on its merits, there were other important motives for pressing or opposing it. The Tories pressed it in order to monopolize the borough corporations more completely, and diminish the Whig vote in Parliament and the Whig influence in towns. The Whigs opposed the Bill for analogous reasons. But many Moderate Tories, above all Godolphin and Marlborough, thought the measure untimely, not for any domestic or party reasons, but because it divided the nation at the most dangerous crisis of a war on which England's independence was staked.

In the winter of 1702–1703, the Bill, fathered by St. John and by Bromley, one of the members for the University of Oxford, passed by large majorities in the Commons, and came up to the Lords. The opposition to it was led by Wharton and Burnet, a strange couple but both sincere in their advocacy of the cause of Toleration and Protestant union. Archbishop Tenison voted with them. It would not be possible to throw the Bill out on second reading, supported as it was by the Commons and the Queen heartily, and by her chief Ministers nominally. But amendments were passed which the Commons would never accept. One amendment cut out the municipal officers from the Bill, confining its scope to State officers alone. This change was so drastic that it would have been hard to maintain it in face of the Commons, if the issue had been narrowed down to that. But by reducing the excessive money fines proposed in the Bill, Wharton hoped to set the two Houses at issue on a disputed point where each was most sensitive. He succeeded admirably, for the Commons could not endure that the Lords should amend their finance, nor the Lords that the Commons should deny them the right to do so. A conference of the two Houses was held, but agreement could not be reached.

The Bill was therefore lost, to the indignation of the High Churchmen, who asserted, not without reason, that Marlborough and Godolphin had done little to help the measure except vote for it. The line of cleavage in the Tory Party on foreign affairs and the conduct of the war was thus widened by a difference of attitude on the chief domestic question of the day.

Feb. 1703

The small majority of the Lords who had carried the final vote to disagree with the Commons, were so well pleased with themselves that they took the unusual step of printing and publishing the proceedings. Such an appeal to the opinion of the country was the more remarkable, because both Houses were at that time absurdly jealous of the publication of their debates, though the reason for such secrecy had passed away with the passing of the King's power to punish members for their speeches in Parliament.[262]

The once famous controversy over the 'Occasional Bill,' that so fiercely shook the political and religious world of its day, is so far removed from the mentality of our own that it is now chiefly remembered for its effect upon the fortunes of an obscure inhabitant of Grub Street. To the careless Gallios of our later age all this noise and fury is chiefly significant because it set Daniel Defoe in the pillory.

In politics Defoe was a man of principle but not of party; in consequence he was often surprised to find himself alone upon a desert island. His principles were religious toleration, trade and British interests in the world. His hero was William of Orange, whom he loved in a more intelligent and a more disinterested manner than many who shouted his name. For violences of sect and faction Defoe had an instinctive dislike, partly because the extremes of denominational and party zeal seemed to him to be perpetually clashing with the true interests of the country. Add to these peculiar opinions the shifts natural to a hunted and friendless man, and we get the true explanation of Defoe's tergiversations in politics, and, above all, the secret of the devotion that he came to feel for Robert Harley. The one was a Dissenter and the other a Tory, but they were both suspect to their nominal friends, alike for their moderation and for their sly, underhand ways.

The relations of Harley and Defoe began, unpropitiously enough, over the Occasional Conformity Bill. On that burning controversy Defoe characteristically wrote two pamphlets, the first of which ruined him with the Dissenters, and the second with the High Churchmen. In the first, entitled *An Enquiry into Occasional Conformity*, he denounced the practice with an obvious sincerity that irritated his co-religionists, although he also expressed deep indignation at the brutality of the High Church outcry against all Dissenters. In the second and more famous pamphlet, entitled *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters*, he parodied the violence of the High Church writers. 'It is cruelty to kill a snake or a toad in cold blood, but the poison of their nature makes it a charity to our neighbours to destroy these creatures.' Unfortunately for Defoe, his irony was taken in earnest, and for some days the town

believed that Sacheverell had been outstripped in zeal by an unknown champion of the Church. For Defoe's political pamphlets, like all others at that period, appeared anonymously.

When it became known that it was a hoax, the anger of the High Churchmen was intense—and not unjustified. Defoe had been playing with edged tools and his genius for literary make-believe had for once been sadly misemployed. Speaker Harley as interpreter between the Tory House of Commons and the Ministry, reported to Godolphin that it was 'absolutely necessary for the service of the Government' to discover and punish the author. When Defoe's identity was revealed, he was prosecuted and received sentence to stand three times in the pillory and be imprisoned during the Queen's pleasure.

Defoe had offended all sections of the powerful. The Moderate Tory Ministers were angry with him for causing them embarrassment; the High Churchmen regarded him as their worst enemy; even the Dissenters resented the criticisms in his first pamphlet and the disastrous maladroitness of his second.

And yet his punishment in the pillory was turned by the Londoners into an ovation. His non-party attitude was perhaps not so unpopular with the multitude as party men affected to suppose. The 'integrity and good nature' of the English people prompted them to throw flowers instead of rotten eggs at the man whom Church and State had united to crush. But the imprisonment 'during the Queen's pleasure' that followed meant ruin to him—unless he could shorten it by making his peace with some important member of government by an offer of notable services. He was destined ere long to find the needed protector in Harley.

July 1703

In Newgate, then, let us leave him for the present, bringing out ever fresh editions of his *Hymn to the Pillory*:

> Hail! Hiroglyphick State Machin
> Contriv'd to punish Fancy in.

The immediate popularity of the poem gave him revenge on his enemies, without thereby increasing the chance of his own deliverance. From Newgate, too, he wrote to his friend William Paterson, his complaints of misprision by the political world:

> Even the Dissenters, like Casha (*sic*) to Caesar, lift up the first dagger at me; I confess it makes me reflect on the whole body of the Dissenters with something of contempt, and gives me the more regret that I suffer for such people. Shall I own to you that the greatest concern I have upon me is that the government whom I profess I did not foresee would be displeased, should resent this matter? I had it not in my thoughts that the Ministers of State would construe that as pointing at them which I levelled only at Dr. Sacheverell, Dr. Stubbs and such people. Thus like old Tyrell who shot at a stag and killed the King, I engaged a Party and embroiled myself with the Government.[263]

The motive behind the party passions and political manœuvres of the age of Anne was religious, or if not religious in the higher sense, at least denominational. The world of Marlborough and St. John, of Defoe, Swift and Sacheverell does not appear religious in the same sense as the world of Laud and Baxter, of Cromwell and George Fox. The chief actors in Anne's reign, even when they are beating the drum ecclesiastic, do not seem to have essentially religious minds. Doctrine and ritual are no longer undergoing transmutation in the crucible of war and parliamentary debate. The House no longer divides on Arminianism or the use of the surplice. The doctrine and ritual of the Church of England has become a fixed quantity that no one proposes to alter. The Dissenting Sects hold with easy minds the doctrines that their grandfathers sought after sorrowing, and reached with doubts and divisions, groans and tears. And the Puritans no longer aspire to capture the Church of England. Controversy, therefore, has limits set within which it must move. Yet within these limits the rivalry of Church, Dissent and that vague *tertium quid*—Free Thought—is the very pulse of the machine of politics. As in the Ireland of to-day, so in the England of Anne, although men no longer debated doctrine and ritual as the subject-matter of politics, the framework of the rival political parties was formed on a confessional basis, and dislike of the smell

of one's neighbour's religion seemed the prevailing passion in man as a political animal.

The last year of William's reign and the first four years of Anne were filled with the noise of the Convocation controversy. Not only were the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament divided against one another, Whig against Tory, but precisely the same division set the High Churchmen of the Lower House of Convocation against the Low Church Bishops of the Upper House.

At this period a definite attempt was being made to revive Convocation as an integral part of the Church and State system of the country. If the attempt had been conducted with moderation it might have been successful and beneficent. But in the hands of the extreme political High Churchmen, the Lower House, by violently attacking the Bishops and the Whigs, became a sounding-board for High Tory politics. Their political acrimony gave an incentive and an excuse to the Whig Government of George I's reign to relegate Convocation once more to the limbo of an assembly that never meets.

Convocation had not played a prominent part in the religious struggles under the earlier Stuart Kings. The Anglicans had depended on the Crown ; the Puritans on Parliament. In the days of Laud, neither party in the Church had used Convocation in the way the Presbyterian party in Scotland had used the Scottish Church Assembly. For Convocation was a purely clerical body, representing the clergy alone, whereas the Scottish Church Assembly had a large lay representation, like the English Church Assembly of our own day.

Convocation, therefore, had played little part in the controversies of James and Charles I's reigns. At the Restoration, the Lower House of Convocation had deprived itself of future political importance by voluntarily surrendering its right of taxing the Church for State purposes. From 1664 onwards the House of Commons taxed the clergy, and the clergy were in return allowed to vote for Parliament. Thenceforth, throughout the reigns of Charles and James II Convocation was not suffered to meet for

the discussion of business. But after the Revolution, William III summoned it and appealed to its members on behalf of a scheme of Comprehension. He wished to obtain its blessing on a proposed parliamentary alteration of the Prayer Book, designed to ' comprehend ' Moderate Dissenters, that is to induce them to return to the fold of the Church. But the clergy of the Lower House were hostile to the scheme, which had indeed enemies in many other quarters, Whig as well as Tory. William was vexed at the failure and did not summon Convocation in the middle period of his reign.

But in the closing years of the century the Convocation question was forced to the front of politics by the writings of a new High Church champion, Francis Atterbury, a controversialist of much higher stamp than Sacheverell, but unfortunately no less extreme.

In his *Letter to a Convocation Man*,* Atterbury claimed that the clerical assembly was an essential part of the Constitution of Church and State, on a par with Parliament both in its importance and its independence, and that even the King had no more right to prevent the meeting of Convocation than to prevent the meeting of Parliament. According to Atterbury, it was because it had not sat for some years past that infidelity and Socinianism had made such alarming strides. Let it only meet, and it would soon set the laity to rights as to what they were to believe and to read.

This claim for the rights of Convocation was one of the chief war-cries of the Tories in the reign of Anne. It was a new policy on the part of High Church. Under the early Stuarts the High Anglicans had looked to the Crown, and after the Restoration to Parliament also, to maintain them against their enemies. But now times had changed. Neither Crown nor Parliament were any longer allies on whom the Church party could count on all occasions. Therefore Convocation was to be set up again, with vague but ambitious schemes for the control of thought and morals.

Indeed, since the Revolution, the High Church could

* That Atterbury was the principal author of this famous *Letter* appears from his own statement to Hearne (*Collections*, III, pp. 279–280). See also Beeching's *Atterbury*, pp. 53–56.

not even trust the Bishops. Atterbury, therefore, claimed that the Lower House of Convocation, where the parish clergy were represented, depended not on the Archbishop but on the Crown alone. The clergy in Convocation, he pleaded, were not subordinate to the Bishops any more than the Commons were to the Lords. Such was his analogy, a dangerous one for an episcopal Church. It laid the High Church party open to the charge of practical Presbyterianism, which the Whigs scoffingly flung in their teeth. It was a topsy-turvy situation. The Episcopate, once the *bête noire* of the Puritans, now shielded Dissenters and Low Churchmen from persecution.

In 1700 William III, in coming to terms with Harley and the Tories, had consented to summon Convocation again. In 1701, and again in each year of Anne's reign, as often as Parliament met, Convocation met also.* Led by Atterbury, the majority of the Lower House plunged into violent courses chiefly against the Upper House. Burnet of Salisbury, outspoken, tactless and formidable, was the broad butt at which the High Churchmen loved to shoot.

1701 His very innocent book on the Thirty-nine Articles was attacked as heretical by the Lower House. And other latitudinarian writers were placed under the same ban. It was openly said that if the Bishops would not act against false doctrines, their clergy would act for them. The Bishops, alarmed at what they regarded as a mutiny against their authority, prorogued the sittings of the Lower House through the action of Archbishop Tenison. Thereupon Atterbury claimed that the Archbishop had no power to prorogue the Lower House, and it continued sitting in spite of the prorogation.

An important minority, however, broke away and obeyed the Bishops. It would be a mistake to suppose that the whole of the Parish Clergy were extreme High Churchmen. But a majority of their representatives took the high line in this quarrel.

* There was, of course, a Convocation of Canterbury and a Convocation of York, meeting separately. It was in the southern Province that the great struggles took place, and historians of this epoch usually speak of the Convocation of Canterbury as 'Convocation' for short.

The dispute over the right of prorogation, begun in the last Convocation of William, swallowed every other issue in the early Convocations of Anne. The learned aspect of the controversy was illuminated by writings of Wake and Gibson against Atterbury. Precedent did not appear to be on his side.

Thus the energy of a revival that might have been most useful to the Church, was wasted in bickerings between the Bishops and their clergy, which ungodly Whigs watched with delight. The affair added greatly to the bitterness of politico-religious controversy, and to the discontent of the High Church and the High Tories with the Ministry in the first years of the Queen's reign. The Queen, Marlborough and Godolphin did their best to keep out of the conflict, but their impartiality was itself an offence to Atterbury's followers, who had called on the Crown to resume powers said to have been usurped by the Archbishop. When in the session of 1702–1703 the Lower House of Convocation appealed to the Queen to interfere, Her Majesty, for all her High Churchmanship, gave them no answer. This, as well as the loss of the Occasional Conformity Bill, counted in the minds of zealots against the Ministers and even against the Queen herself. In January 1703 Nottingham vainly attempted to mediate behind the scenes in a correspondence with Tenison. The failure of the Ministry to do anything in the matter was one of the causes of the break up of the Tory Party in the year of Blenheim.[264]

The reign of Anne was marked by an important constitutional development—the growth in unity and power of the Cabinet Council. King William had directed Foreign Affairs himself, and he had been his own Prime Minister, holding together Cabinets of mutually antagonistic Whig and Tory statesmen by the imposition of his own will. Anne, being a woman and an invalid, had to leave many more decisions to be made by the agreement of her Ministers. The Cabinet, therefore, grew in importance, and at the same time the need for political unity and joint responsibility among its members was increasingly felt.

It was found in the very first years of the reign that the same Cabinet Council could no longer contain High Tories and Moderate Tories, who hated each other personally and differed as to the conduct of the war. The 'confidential servants of the Crown' had no longer a royal master to keep them in order and override their differences. Some other principle of unity was required. Party loyalty like that of the Whig Junto might give it. Failing that, Godolphin as Lord Treasurer began to impose his personal authority, and so to approach the position of Prime Minister —a name by which he was occasionally called.*

Nevertheless, the Queen was almost always present at the Cabinet Councils, though her power of controlling them was limited by her disabilities of health, sex and understanding. Meetings were held wherever Anne happened to be. In August 1703 we find Godolphin writing to Nottingham to collect the views on Scottish policy of those 'Lords of the Cabinet Council' who were then in London, and send them down to him at Bath in writing, 'upon receipt of which Her Majesty intends to call together those Lords who are here' and come to a decision by the help of the Cabinet's advice. At meetings in London, Cabinet Ministers were 'summoned to attend the Queen.' It was George I's ignorance of the English language and indifference to English affairs that first occasioned the absence of the sovereign from his own Cabinet Council.[265]

The 'Lords of the Cabinet Council,' as they were called, were not necessarily Peers. They consisted, then as now, of the chief officers of State. The year before Anne's accession the experienced Sunderland named ten posts, the occupants of which ought to compose the Cabinet.† But

* See p. 188, note, above.

† Archbishop, Lord Keeper (or Lord Chancellor), Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Steward, Lord Chamberlain, First Commissioner of the Treasury (or Lord Treasurer); two Secretaries of State; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland when he is in England; and, 'if the King would have more,' the head of the Admiralty, and the Master of the Ordnance. In Anne's reign Marlborough attended the Cabinet in the latter capacity. *Hardwicke*, II, p. 461. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 669, and *Salomon*, pp. 352–356, show there was little change from this list by the end of Anne's reign.

The Cabinet appears to have originated from two independent bodies, the All-purposes Committee of the Privy Council, and the Cabinet or private meeting

there was no absolute rule, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, who was reckoned in the list, was certainly not always present—towards the end of the reign very seldom. These great officers, 'the Lords of the Cabinet,' usually met once a week in the Queen's presence, and at other times to prepare business without her.

Besides these meetings of the Cabinet, the two or three greatest managers met privately to decide on policy, as so often happens in the case of over-large committees. In November 1703 Godolphin wrote to Harley, 'It is necessary above all the rest that the Duke of Marlborough and you and I should meet regularly, at least twice a week if not oftener, to advise upon everything that shall occur.'[266] Since Harley was at that time Speaker and not in the Cabinet at all, it would be a misnomer to call such a meeting 'an Inner Cabinet.' But no doubt the knowledge that Godolphin, Marlborough and Harley were arranging the affairs of the nation in private conference was one of the things that drove first Rochester and then Nottingham into revolt, and made the position of the High Tories in the Cabinet impossible.

The older, larger and less homogeneous body, the Privy Council, also met frequently and transacted much executive business which is now left to various departments of State. But it no longer initiated policies of any importance that had not been previously sanctioned by the Cabinet. Only in case of some grave emergency like a dynastic crisis, it was always possible that the Privy Council might assert its ancient authority once more.*

Next under the Lord Treasurer, who controlled finance and was beginning to assume the rôle of a Prime Minister, the most important administrative office in the Cabinet was

of the King's Confidential Servants—not a legally recognized body at all. In Anne's reign these two bodies are practically identical in personnel. See articles in *E.H.R.*, October 1912, January 1914, April 1914, April 1916, April 1917, and *Am. Hist. Rev.*, July and October 1913.

* By Clause IV of the Act of Settlement (see p. 120, above) the Privy Council was to be restored to its ancient position as the real organ of government, in place of the more modern Cabinet. But that clause, only to come into force when the House of Hanover came to the throne, was repealed in 1705 and was therefore never operative.

that of Secretary of State, who dealt with almost everything except finance. There were two Secretaries of State, one usually of the Civil Servant type, for if both Secretaries had been politicians claiming to guide high policy, they would have collided, since their spheres overlapped. In 1703 Sir Charles Hedges, Secretary for the Northern Department, was the modest administrator ; Nottingham, Secretary for the Southern Department, was a statesman who considered himself on a par with Godolphin and Marlborough—an issue that was yet to be tried. It would be impossible for the two kinsmen to carry on the war without the co-operation of Nottingham, for as Southern Secretary he dealt with the South European countries and with the Colonies ; the Northern countries of Europe and Scotland were the province of Hedges as Northern Secretary. There was no general Foreign Secretary. The two Secretaries of State also shared the duties of the Home Department, and each could issue orders to the Admiralty and the War Office, although there was a Lord High Admiral and a Secretary at War, not to mention the Commander-in-Chief.

It seems strange that government could have been carried on under such a shapeless system of overlapping departments. The Secretaries were in a sense subordinate to the Treasurer, but his power over them was that of influence, not of authority. In the last resort the Queen must be called in to judge the disputes of her servants. Godolphin, however, exercised his influence on the heads of the other departments with watchful industry and tact. Rochester, indeed, had soon proved impossible and the Queen had dismissed him. But the final breach with Nottingham was postponed until 1704.

CHAPTER XIV

War Taxation and the National Debt. The Squires and the Land Tax. Dutch and English trade with the enemy. Neutral Rights. The Methuen Treaties. Port *versus* Claret. The Portuguese Alliance and revised war aims. The Peninsular War, Lisbon and the Mediterranean. Nottingham's Foreign Policy. Victor Amadeus. Savoy joins the Alliance. The Great Storm of 1703.

THE close co-operation of England and the United Provinces, by which alone the power of Louis could be kept in check, had been secure throughout the last war because the greatest statesman in Europe was both Stadtholder of Holland and King of England. After William's death a like result was attained, only in a less degree, by the friendship between Marlborough and Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary. This good understanding with the Calvinist Republic was disagreeable to the High Tories, the more so as they saw it leading England month after month into larger military commitments on the Continent, and ever more extensive subsidies to German Princes.

1689–1697 William's war had lasted nine years and had cost England an average of three and a half millions a year. The War of the Spanish Succession 1702–1713 was destined to last a dozen years and to cost her an average of four millions a year or more. William's finance Minister, Charles Montagu, had, with the help of the City magnates, devised the machinery of the National Debt and the Bank of England, by which the last war had been financed. The same machinery was employed by Godolphin for the War of the Spanish Succession. William's war had run up a National Debt of fourteen and a half millions. To this was added another twenty-one and a half millions debt for Anne's war ; and since the total cost

to England by this second struggle was over fifty millions, more than half must have been defrayed out of annual taxation, which also bore the interest on the debt.[267]

The Tory squires had special reasons for objecting both to the National Debt and to the method of taxation in time of war. They complained that the deeper the Treasury became indebted to the great moneyed men of the City, many of whom were Dissenters and few of whom were Tories, the more the Queen's Government was inclined to listen to the advice of the ' moneyed ' as distinct from the ' landed ' interest. Year by year Godolphin, in his capacity of Lord Treasurer, was drawn into closer communion with the City, and the Queen herself was ever more deeply pledged to that section of her subjects. Conversely, those who lent money to the State tended to become Whiggish, because if the Pretender returned he would repudiate loans to the governments of the Revolution.

Moreover, as the landowners complained, it was they who were charged with the cost of a policy which they disliked and in which the moneyed men found their profit. The interest on the National Debt, the subsidies to the Continental Allies, the maintenance of the English army—all objects of malediction to the up-country squire of that day—were paid for to a very large extent out of the Land Tax. Even if the High Tories were short-sighted in grumbling about expenses necessary for a modern State aspiring to independence and expansion, they were more justified in complaining of the peculiar incidence of taxation in that era. The direct taxes, a large proportion of the whole, were not evenly assessed on all wealth, but fell with disproportionate weight upon the land.

Attempts had indeed been made in the reign of William, and were made again in the first year of Anne, to levy an Income Tax on the salaries of officials and the profits of professional and business men, side by side with the Land Tax on the squires. But there did not then exist the machinery of the Inland Revenue requisite to make the necessary calculations for the assessment of profits and incomes ; and the tax-payer was unwilling to help any such inquisition into his private affairs. So the Income

Tax of four shillings in the pound on personal property, voted in 1702, was a failure and was not renewed.* The whole burden remained on the landlords, whose acres could not be hidden away from assessment.

The method of raising the Land Tax appears very singular to our modern notions. Each year of the war a new Act declared that two millions were to be raised by what was called a ' four-shilling Land Tax.' This annual Act contained a schedule of the counties and principal towns of England, with the amount that each was to pay, making up in all the two millions required. The local authorities had to produce these sums, and did so by charging four shillings in the pound, nominally on the annual value of land, really on certain old assessments which were often not half the true value. The so-called ' four-shilling Land Tax ' was in its actual effect nearer a two-shilling tax on the real annual value of most estates in Queen Anne's day. Many properties escaped far more easily than others, owing to the antiquity of the assessment. When peace returned in 1713, the Land Tax fell to a nominal two shillings in the pound, half the war-time rate.

Since it was beyond the ability of the State in that age to make an up-to-date assessment even of the land, it is no wonder that the more difficult assessment for a general Income Tax proved impossible. If it had been within the power of the administration to levy such a tax on all kinds of property, Godolphin would have been only too glad to propitiate the Tory squires by laying a share of the burden on the moneyed and professional men. It was his political interest to do so. But how to do it puzzled the Treasury officials, and even the Tory economist Davenant regarded the difficulty as insuperable. It was the younger Pitt who first successfully levied an Income Tax in addition to the old Land Tax, to fight the war against Revolutionary France. The statesmen of William and Anne tried to raise such a tax, and failed for want of official machinery.[268]

The Whig merchants, therefore, escaped too lightly from the burden of the wars against Louis. But the Whig

* It had been reckoned to produce £800,000 and actually produced £300,000, after which it was abandoned.

landed aristocracy paid its share. John Hervey, in 1703, the year when he was made a lord, drew £5250 in rents alone, of which he tells us nearly half went in ' taxes, repairs and charges of the house and garden.' Nine years later he wrote, ' I am sure the war has cost me above £40,000.'

Such grandees were often more Whiggish, or at least more ministerial, than the generality of squires, and owing to their frequent visits to London were better informed about foreign countries. Therefore they complained of war taxation less than their more rural neighbours, who regarded Europe much as a Western American farmer regards her to-day. It was the murmurs against the four-shilling Land Tax in the smaller manor houses that constituted the chief danger to the ministerial policy during both the wars against Louis.

In the early years of Anne's reign harvests were good and corn prices low, so that the common people did not suffer as they had suffered during the wars and bad harvests of William's reign. That helped to prevent the renewed war from becoming generally unpopular, until prices doubled about the time of Malplaquet. But although the lowness of corn prices postponed discontent among the masses, it did not enhance the profits of those who grew corn for the market, and the squires considered themselves less able to pay the Land Tax on account of low prices. ' We have meat and drink sufficient, but we receive little money,' wrote one country baronet. Northern squires complained that all their ready money had gone to the tax-gatherer, and that unless the Vigo Treasure was as great as rumour said, there would be very little specie for the ordinary business of the countryside. Others ' were alarmed at taxes, and thought with King William all should cease.' A supporter of the war said the country gentlemen were unwilling ' to groan under the weight of four shillings in the pound,' unless the new war showed a better list than the last of victories won and towns taken.

Could Marlborough in the field deliver the goods in time to stop the mouths of his Tory critics at home ? In the first two anxious years of Anne both the success and the popularity of the new war were doubtful. Especially when

1703 failed to repeat the military successes of 1702, Ministers walked on a razor edge at home and abroad. Then came the turning point of Blenheim, bringing two-fold relief, foreign and domestic. For the capture of an army and a Marshal of France seemed to the country squires, as a correspondent wrote to Harley, ' more for their four shillings in the pound than ever yet they saw.' [269]

The somewhat divided feelings with which the Tory majority in the Commons regarded the war and the Dutch Alliance, found a natural vent in protests about allied trade with the enemy. The State policy of England differed from that of Holland in this matter. Under the influence of Whig politics and mercantilist economics, England had endeavoured to put a stop to her own trade with France even in time of peace. But Holland lived by trade, and not least by trade across her southern border. Amsterdam, the financial centre of the world, continued to remit money to France by bills of exchange, undeterred by the outbreak of war. It was commonly said in England that France could not have fought either the war against William or the war against Anne, without the money that came from Holland and the horses that came from Holland and Germany in return for French wines. The Dutch replied that neither could they fight a long war unless their trade was maintained, and that the English themselves were constantly smuggling goods into France.

In January 1703 this controversy grew to a head. The House of Commons voted an increase of 10,000 men for the next year's campaign in Flanders, as requested by Holland, but only on condition that the States General compelled their subjects to break off trade and correspondence with the enemy. Marlborough was determined to keep friends with the Dutch in order to win the war, but he was, for the same reason, most anxious to stop the trade with France. He took, as mediator, a strong middle course. The States General, guided by Heinsius, was ready to meet the English demand half-way. But the federal constitution of the United Provinces left the Government with but feeble control over the smuggler-privateers of Zeeland or

the capitalist houses of Amsterdam. 'Whatever the States General may resolve, they will never be able to hinder their people from trading where there is hope of gain,' wrote Alexander Stanhope, Queen Anne's Envoy at the Hague.

However, in accordance with the English demands, a Treaty was signed in April between England, the United Provinces and the Emperor; the three Powers bound themselves to prevent their subjects from trading with the enemy except in certain specified goods. The prohibition was to run from June 1703 for twelve months, since the Dutch refused to sign for more than one trial year.

During the agreed period of prohibition there were many infractions of the pact by the subjects of all three signatories. June 1703–June 1704 Ships from Irish ports drove a regular trade with Brest, under colour of being taken by privateers, really by collusion with the French Government, to whom they paid ten per cent. on their cargo. Evidence was given before the House of Lords proving that 'the French fleet was victualled from England and Ireland.' 'Owling' of English wool to France went on as briskly and as illegally as ever from Sussex and East Anglia. But these English lapses from the path of allied righteousness did not prevent our privateers from seizing Dutch ships which they caught running cargoes into Spanish American ports.

If English and Irish practice was irregular, so was that of Zeeland and Amsterdam. Nevertheless Dutch trade with the enemy was so far curtailed that the States General declared themselves desperately impoverished, and unable to continue the war any longer on a basis of prohibition. They absolutely refused to renew the pact for another year. England had to submit. In the winter session of 1704–1705, the public was rejoicing over Blenheim and the influence of the Whigs and Moderate Tories had increased. They were therefore able to prevent the House of Commons from quarrelling further with the Dutch on the subject. For the Whigs, though more anxious than the Tories to stop English trade with France in peace as well as in war, were as anxious as Marlborough himself not to ruin the prospects of the Alliance in order to punish the Dutch for holding a different view of their own interest.

After this unsuccessful experiment in agreeing to stop trade with the enemy, England and Holland agreed better in another policy—that of trading with Spain and Spanish America. After our proclamation of Charles III as King of Spain in 1703, the territories of which he pretended to be King were treated by England and Holland technically as Allied countries. In the middle and later period of the war, the French and Spaniards of Europe were prevented by our control of the sea from visiting Spanish America, where commerce was carried on by the English and Dutch in constant rivalry with one another. But the trade was less lucrative than it would otherwise have been, because the English privateers could not be induced not to attack the property and alienate the sympathies of Spanish-American colonists.

The international position as regards neutral rights in the War of the Spanish Succession was complicated by the fact that another war was going on among the Scandinavian and Slav States of the Baltic seaboard. In that eastern war England and Holland were neutrals, whereas Sweden, Denmark, and Poland were neutrals in the war against France. It is true that Denmark had hired out a most excellent army for the service of the Western Allies; the charge of the Danish Horse enabled Marlborough to win Ramillies. Yet Denmark, no less than Sweden, claimed the maritime rights of a neutral in the French war. England and Holland could not afford to break with the Danes, whose armies they required on loan, nor with Charles XII of Sweden lest he should fall on the rear of their German allies. Moreover Scandinavian naval stores were essential to the very being of the Maritime Powers.* We could not, while claiming our own rights as neutral traders in the Baltic, press too closely the right of search against Baltic neutrals in the war nearer home. For these reasons, the Danes were permitted to trade with France, except in contraband of war, including horses. And the formidable King of Sweden was treated with similar respect. Neutrals whose favour we had less reason to court, like Genoa and other Italian States, after our fleets had occupied the Mediterranean basin, were more effectively prevented from trading

* See p. 9, above.

with France. But in one way and another French trade, though blocked in many avenues, was never devoid of outlets, some recognized and some unrecognized by the governments of the Grand Alliance.[270]

The year 1703 was marked by no warlike successes by sea or land.* This unproductive campaign would have been fatal to the Alliance in its race against time, had not the year, so barren in martial achievement, been singularly fruitful in diplomacy. In May Portugal ceased to be neutral and joined the enemies of France, and in October Savoy abandoned the French for the Allied party. Neither event would have occurred but for the skilled application of English naval, diplomatic and financial pressure.

John Methuen and his son Paul, successive envoys to Portugal in the last years of William and the first years of Anne, were the chief architects of those famous Treaties which are still known by their name in economic and political history. The Methuens thoroughly understood not only England's interests in the country to which they were accredited, but the inner workings of its Court and the mind of its people. Their first duty was to prevent the King of Portugal from joining the French side. After the disbanding of the English army in 1698 had been followed by the acceptance of Charles II's will by Louis on behalf of his grandson, the impression in the Iberian Peninsula of the weakness of England and the strength of France was for a time overwhelming. King Peter II of Portugal was on the point of acknowledging the Pretender as King of England, in accordance with the solicitations of France and Spain, with whom he had formed an alliance. The Methuens were just able to persuade him to watch events a little longer before taking the plunge into war against the Allies.

It would be necessary for Portugal to take one side or the other. Like Italy in 1915, she was between the Devil and the Deep Sea, and neutrality was as dangerous for her as intervention. If Portugal stood neutral and let the French and Spanish power establish its hegemony in

* See the next chapter for Marlborough's Campaign of 1703.

Europe, the little Kingdom would be the merest vassal of Louis and his grandson, lucky if she were not annexed once more to Spain as in the days of Philip II. And whether she remained neutral or joined the side of France, in either case she would be in danger of losing her trade and her colonies, for the English fleet could sweep her shipping off the sea, and cut her communications with her American, African and Indian possessions.*

Could she then with safety join the Allies? Her own army was useless against the French. Would English and Dutch troops come in sufficient numbers to protect her eastern frontier against Bourbon invasion? In 1701 England seemed helpless, and the answer in the negative. With difficulty the Methuens kept up their end at Court against the formidable Franco-Spanish party. The King was less favourable to France than were his Ministers. Then the news of Vigo turned the tide of opinion in Portugal. The power of English ships and landing parties had been demonstrated in dramatic fashion. Perhaps after all the Portuguese could trust the Alliance to defend their eastern border, provided the Maritime Powers would commit themselves to the policy of a Peninsular War on the grand scale by undertaking the expulsion of Philip V from the throne of Madrid.

Oct. 1702

Six months of intrigue and negotiation followed, ending in the signature at Lisbon of the Methuen Treaties, commercial and political. They form the most important group of diplomatic documents signed between the Grand Alliance of 1701 and the Peace of Utrecht. They changed the war aims and the war

May 1703

* 'The late King [of Portugal] made the [Methuen] Treaty and broke his alliance with France because he was told he could not stand neuter, the French could not protect his port and trade; therefore he joined with us. The same reasons subsist still with much greater force: the French have no fleets at sea and we are in possession of these seas, and these people can have no trade but under our protection. Though their trade is certainly beneficial to us, yet 'tis so more to Portugal. All their gold, sugars and tobaccos are the returns of our own manufactures, which our people give them on credit, to be paid for upon the return of the Brazil trade. Three parts in four of the corn expended here and all the dried fish is imported by the English, so it is plain these people live by us.' Thos. Leffever to Lord Dartmouth, October 13–24, 1710, Lisbon. *Dartmouth MSS.* at Patshull.

strategy of the Allies. They remained the basis of England's power in southern Europe till the days of Nelson and Wellington, and affected her commercial policy down to the era of the Great Reform Bill.

The origin of the Methuen Treaties can be sought far back in the commercial history of the two countries, and in the conditions of the marriage of Charles II of England to Catharine of Braganza. But the bargain struck in 1703 began a new era in Anglo-Portuguese relations, because it was successfully followed up by the taking of Gibraltar and Port Mahon and by the permanent establishment of English power in the Mediterranean, based on the free use of the harbour of Lisbon.[271]

The commercial part of the Methuen Treaties bound Portugal to remove her existing prohibition on English cloth, and admit it at an easy rate. In return, England undertook to admit Portuguese wine at rates that should always be less by one-third than those charged on French wine. English merchants and manufacturers were delighted at a bargain that found a new vent for their cloth, and sheep-breeding squires and yeomen were well pleased. The cloth manufacture of Portugal was destroyed by English imports, but the country found salvation in reorganizing itself as a huge vineyard to supply the English table with port.

A vested interest in the Methuen Treaty grew up during the war, so strong that, at the height of the reaction against the war policy ten years later, the powerful Ministry that made the Treaty of Utrecht failed to carry the Commercial Treaty with France through a House of Commons that took a Tory view of every other subject. To admit French claret at an easier rate than port would have meant breaking the Methuen Treaty and losing the Portuguese market for our cloth. A pamphlet of that year asserts that :

1713

> 'Tis the Portugal trade that has supported us in the war, and without it we should soon find the peace more burdensome than the war. But I need not to talk to a West Countryman, who for several years has seen so much Portugal gold in the Fairs, markets, shops, and amongst the gentlemen's Stewards, how advantageous the Portugal trade is to England.

Very possibly a French trade might have proved even more 'advantageous,' but the country refused to sacrifice the Portuguese bird in the hand in hopes of greater advantages that would at best have to be shared with France. The French trade was pronounced dangerous by the school of political economy then prevalent. And so, throughout the Eighteenth Century, port came into the country more lightly taxed than claret.* Port was patriotic and Whig and woollen ; claret was Francophile and Jacobite—patriotic only in Scotland. The gout that consequently afflicted the English upper class so sorely in the days of Fox and Pitt was one of the by-products of the Methuen Treaty, of Whig policy, of mercantilist economics, and of the exigencies of the great war in the early days of Queen Anne.[272]

But in the spring of 1703 Marlborough and the Methuens were not thinking of their descendants' gout or taste in wine, but of the way to obtain the Portuguese alliance, and the Lisbon harbour for the war fleet. King Peter's terms were irreducible. Not only must great English and Dutch armies be sent to the Peninsula, but as a pledge of allied sincerity not to desert him, they must proclaim the Austrian candidate as Charles III of Spain, and he must come in person to the Peninsula to fight for his inheritance. These demands raised for some months considerable difficulty, because the Emperor Leopold was most unwilling to send his dearly loved younger son to the other end of Europe, to a barbarous land under a bodyguard of heretics. 'The Imperial Ambassador in Portugal,' wrote Secretary Hedges, 'shows himself very indifferent in the matter and says that the Emperor will not need Portuguese help.' Certainly Leopold was an aggravating mortal. He had plunged all Europe into war rather than forego any portion of his family's claim on the Spanish Empire, and now he was 'indifferent' to his one chance of placing Charles on the throne of Madrid.

* The Portuguese possession of Madeira also began to supply us with its wine, the companion of port. In 1705 Queen Anne established a Consul General in 'the islands of Maderas' 'to aid and protect our merchants' there, as an outcome of the Methuen Treaty two years before. *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 104, 130 ff. 260–262.

But Viennese lethargy was coerced by the more energetic purpose of London ; after all, the English and Dutch were the paymasters of the Alliance, and could call the tune. At length the Emperor consented to sign the military part of the Methuen Treaty, whereby he promised that the Archduke Charles should go to Portugal. As soon as he arrived, but not before, King Peter undertook to acknowledge him as Charles III of Spain and begin the Peninsular War on his behalf. England, Holland and the Emperor pledged themselves to send 12,000 ' veteran troops ' ; and the 28,000 Portuguese, promised by King Peter, were to be mainly paid for and armed by the Maritime Powers. Austria, in truth, contributed nothing more than the person of Charles. For, although by the Treaty she undertook to supply one-third of the 12,000 allied troops in Spain, England at once took over her share. A readjustment of the Brazilian frontier with French Guiana favourable to Portuguese claims was also to be arranged at the peace.

1703

Such was the political and military section of the Methuen Treaties. It placed the harbour of Lisbon at the full disposition of England's fleet and so enabled her to take and keep Gibraltar and Minorca, to dominate the Mediterranean and to assist effectively in the liberation of Italy from the French power.

In so far as the Portuguese alliance gave the Allies entry to the Mediterranean it was pure gain, indispensable to victory over France. But in so far as it drew them into a war inside the Iberian Peninsula it was a more doubtful boon. They gained indeed Portugal, Catalonia and the Eastern Provinces of Spain as active friends, but they roused up Castile and Central Spain from habitual sloth to active resistance, against which the English and Dutch spent the strength of armies that might have fought elsewhere. It is true they thus compelled Louis to send troops to Spain. But as the French were on the inner line they could keep troops in Spain more cheaply than the Dutch or English. It was a question similar to the vexed question of the ' sideshows ' in the World War of our own day.

More certainly disastrous was the deflection of the moderate war aims defined by William in the Treaty of

Grand Alliance,* to the misleading policy of placing on the throne of Madrid a candidate who, though popular in Catalonia, was odious to the great body of the Spanish people. This increase in the allied programme was dictated by the desperate need to purchase the support of Portugal at the worst moment of the war. It served its purpose, but in the end it protracted the world struggle long after it had been won. The vain endeavour to turn Philip off his throne added, perhaps, four years to the war.

The fatal formula ' no peace without Spain ' became the Whig shibboleth after Ramillies, and it took the whole strength of the reunited Tory party to overcome it and give peace to Europe at Utrecht. But in the early years of the war, Nottingham, the High Tory Secretary of State, was the staunchest supporter of the policy afterwards regarded as peculiarly Whig. In 1703, as Southern Secretary, he was active in pushing through the negotiations of the Methuen Treaty. In this matter, as in so many others, this most conscientious of English statesmen took a line of his own : Nottingham wanted a great military effort to be made by England in the Peninsula, whereas other High Tories wanted the war to be confined to the sea and to coast raids. But he did not agree with Marlborough's policy of fighting on a large scale with English troops in the Netherlands and Germany ; he wished them to be sent instead to Spain. In 1703, therefore, while the Methuen Treaty was amaking and the preparations for the coming Peninsular War were on foot, Nottingham was able to co-operate heartily on those matters with Marlborough and Godolphin. But in the following spring, when the question arose of sending English troops into the heart of Germany, the difference between the Secretary's view of the war and that of the two kinsmen would alone have sufficed to bring on a Cabinet crisis.[273]

The activity of Nottingham in foreign affairs was not confined to Portugal. It was his policy to stir up the mid-European powers to save themselves by their own exertions, so that the English army could be concentrated on Spain. His Secretaryship was marked by great efforts to induce

* See pp. 146-147, above.

Savoy and Bavaria to change sides. And at his instigation, as also at that of Marlborough, our Minister, Stepney, at Vienna was constantly urging the Emperor Leopold to grant concessions to the armed Hungarian Protestants and Constitutionalists, so as to face westward against France with his eastern door safely closed behind him, and his hereditary dominions united. But the Emperor, under Jesuit advice, was obdurate, and when pressed used only to reply by raising the analogous case of Ireland, and protesting against the infamous penal laws still being added to the Statute Book in England's Hungary.

If Nottingham could have won the Elector of Bavaria to change sides, and Leopold to be humane and reasonable in his dealings with his subjects, the English army need never have gone to the Danube. But though he succeeded with Portugal and Savoy, he failed with the Emperor and the Elector. And that failure doomed his own scheme of war strategy and made him impossible in 1704 as a colleague of Marlborough, who held that if the Emperor would not save himself, it was England's interest to go to his rescue.[274]

Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, would have won the approval of Macchiavelli, both for his ends and for the means by which he attained them. It was his life-long endeavour to keep the foreigner out of his principality—since to keep him wholly out of Italy was no longer possible ; to preserve the real independence of Savoy-Piedmont by balancing Austria against France ; to observe no faithfulness except to this patriotic end ; to use subjects, allies and daughters as mere pawns in the game ; to dodge perpetually like a fox and now and again to strike like a lion. Just as England sought the balance of power in Europe, so the Duke sought the balance of power on the Alpine watershed. He was a ' trimmer ' in the sense of Savile, Marquess of Halifax : he ' trimmed ' not towards the victor of the hour but against him to hold the balance even. No party could trust him in the hour of triumph.

In 1703 the position of the Allies was so desperate that Victor Amadeus saw that it was time for one of his periodic desertions from the stronger to the weaker side. Louis

could not believe that the Duke, twice his kinsman, meditated a treachery so dangerous and apparently so contrary to his interest. One of his daughters was married to the Duke of Burgundy, ultimate heir to the throne of France ; another to Philip, King of Spain. The French armies were in and around the Savoyard territory, which constituted their land route to Milan, Naples and Sicily. Surely, if ever a man was attached by interest and by fear to the French cause it was Victor Amadeus in 1703. Moreover, he had recently been angry with the English for rejecting the claims of his House in favour of the Hanoverian succession.*

But the Duke was in no good humour with the French. Their Generals were insolent to him ; their soldiers treated Italians as inferior beings. His daughter at Madrid was quarrelling with the Court of France over the personality and power of her female favourite the Princess des Ursins. Above all, the real object of the Duke's statecraft was not to find the path of immediate safety, but the road of ultimate independence. If French power were permanently established in Italy, Savoy would be surrounded by lands ruled from Versailles, and its Duke would be a vassal of the Grand Monarch. Victor had other dreams for the future of his House. Austria must be re-established in the Milanese : for only then would Savoy be independent, holding the mountain passage between the two rival powers, like Afghanistan between England and Russia.

Richard Hill, our envoy at Turin in 1704, thus explained the policy of the Court to which he was accredited : Victor Amadeus ' hopes the Germans may have a greater force in the country than the Spaniards used to have and may be always at hand to support him on that side, as the French may do upon occasions on the other side.' Hill added that the Italians of the Milanese ' do perfectly hate the French and abhor their government. They are used to the Spaniards ; born and bred under that gentle or feeble government.' It was French government to which the nominal Spanish Province of Milan had in reality been subjected ever since the death of Charles II of Spain.

But Victor would not change sides unless he had a

* See pp. 116–117, above.

reasonable chance of preserving himself from the vengeance of the French. The foothold of Prince Eugene's Austrian army in the plain of the Po, feeble in 1701–1702, was feebler still in 1703. The secret negotiations begun at Vienna for a change of sides by Savoy, produced from Leopold many promises of military aid and offers of additional Italian territory as good as those made by France. But what was the chance of performance by an out-at-elbows Emperor, with Hungarian, Bavarian and French armies at that moment in different parts of his Austrian territories? Stepney, the well-informed English Minister at Vienna, disbelieved in the whole negotiation, which he regarded as another fox-trick of Victor's, signifying nothing. 'It does not seem probable,' he wrote, 'that the Duke of Savoy should resolve to deprive his daughter of the kingdom of Spain. I can hardly think for my part that he is in earnest.' Stepney 'never had any opinion of the Duke's honesty'; he was a 'Proteus' whom it was impossible to catch; as late as September 1703 the English Minister regarded the whole negotiation as 'banter.'

Yet for once the wise Stepney proved mistaken. In the atmosphere of Vienna, every allied effort might well seem hopeless which depended on the Emperor's aid. But the Duke of Savoy did not depend on Vienna alone. The English fleet, under Sir Cloudesley Shovell, with Leake as his energetic lieutenant, was sent into the Mediterranean in 1703, 'above all to induce the Duke of Savoy to declare for the House of Austria,' wrote Nottingham to Heinsius, as well as to encourage the Imperial party in all the States of Italy and to get into touch with the revolted Protestants of the Cevennes. Shovell sailed too late to do much, but he showed the flag off the coasts of Italy, unchallenged by the Toulon fleet. Through the Savoyard ports of Nice and Villafranca, the Duke was in direct communication with the power of England. Godolphin's promise of financial aid to the tune of 800,000 crowns a month was certain to be carried out; and the English Ministry's undertakings, to put the Emperor in a way to resume military operations powerfully in Italy, were honestly meant and were ultimately fulfilled.

Yet for all the promises of Nottingham, Marlborough and Godolphin, the danger in which the Duke would stand if he defied France was so great that he hesitated from month to month. Finally, in the autumn, Louis got wind of the negotiations and ordered the 5000 Savoyards in the French army to be disarmed and arrested. This stroke, instead of frightening the Duke, rendered him desperate and bold. He took the plunge and publicly joined the Allies. It is possible that he thereby saved Vienna from capture. But he almost lost Turin. In July 1704, when Marlborough was already on the Danube, the plight of Savoy was such that Hill in Turin thought Victor would still be obliged to sell himself back to France. 'The Duke,' he wrote, 'will lose his country, or we shall lose the Duke.' In Italy, as elsewhere, Blenheim came just in time to save the allied cause from utter ruin.[275]

Oct. 1703

The return of Savoy to the English alliance at once revived a policy, dear to English statesmen of all parties, of arming the Protestants of Southern Europe against their French persecutors. Victor Amadeus appealed to the most hardy and war-like section of his subjects, the mountaineers of the Vaudois Valleys, to supply him with recruits against Louis, whose influence at Turin was always so fatal to their welfare. Huguenot refugees from Switzerland and France swarmed to his standard. At the same time the Duke and his English allies put themselves into communication with the 4000 Huguenot rebels of the Cevennes hills, who, rendered desperate by their wrongs, were waging a terrible war of mutual atrocity against the power of Louis in the very heart of France. The Cevennois had their agents in Switzerland, in London, and now at Turin. Their number, though not their courage, was exaggerated in the minds of the Allies. The idea of a combination of these French rebels with the Savoyard army and the English fleet against Toulon was already floating through Marlborough's mind. But the time for such an attempt was not yet. Turin had first to be placed out of danger, and the French expelled from Milan.[276]

At the close of November, English naval supremacy

was nearly broken and the war lost by the sudden, brief and unprovoked intervention of a neutral power. The Great Storm, without rival in the recorded history of our island, fell for two days on the Channel and the South of England. The wind blew from west-south-west, 'resembling thunder at a distance and being attended with terrible flashes of lightning.' The battle-ships of Shovell and Leake, just returned from the Mediterranean, were lying in the Downs and off the Gunfleet. Another squadron was off the coast of Holland, waiting there to take up 'King Charles III' bound for his kingdom of Spain. To avoid being dashed on shore, most of the English fighting fleets ran out to sea. So did thousands of merchantmen of all sizes. For a week to come the North Sea was covered with English shipping, in every variety of peril. Only after many days was it possible to tell what proportion of them would ever come back. It was said that 'if the storm had not been at its height at full flood and in a spring tide, the loss might have proved fatal to the nation,' as the ships would have been driven on the sand-banks that were mercifully covered when the hurricane first fell.

Nov. 26–27 (O.S.) 1703

Never was English seamanship put to a harder test and never were ships better handled. On that awful night, and the no less awful day that followed, England was saved by the skill and courage of the crews of innumerable vessels, fighting the greatest naval battle of the war against no mortal foe. At Versailles the courtiers believed that the English had lost their fleet. At home men and women waited in an agony of suspense for the return of the ships. One by one the survivors came in, battered, with broken masts and rigging in shreds. Happily the winter was still in front, so that the dockyards had many months in which to repair the ships before next year's campaign. The Royal Navy had lost Admiral Beaumont, 1500 seamen and 15 warships varying from second to sixth rate, besides smaller craft. The total losses of the merchant service were never estimated, but amounted to several hundred craft of all sorts.

The pride and resolution of the country rose to the call.

The Navy was well loved and it was well supported in its hour of need. On the first of December, the Commons, to the dismay of the enemies of England, voted supplies to make good all losses, and insisted that the quota of ships in commission next spring was not to be diminished. Next year, indeed, Gibraltar fell to the English sailors and marines, and was preserved by the only full-dress naval action of the war, the battle with the French Grand Fleet off Malaga. Within a fortnight of the storm, Alexander Stanhope wrote from the Hague, 'I have read with no small pleasure the votes of the House of Commons and addresses to Her Majesty on the occasion of our losses, which will certainly make both Her Majesty and the nation more considered and respected all over Europe.' *

Between sea and land stood the Eddystone lighthouse on its rock. The upper part consisted of wood, but it was then regarded as a great engineering feat and was a blessing to mariners. By the strangest of chances 'the ingenious Mr. Winstanley,' who had been responsible for its erection, had crossed over to see after some repairs and was there on the unlucky evening when the storm began. Signals were made for help, but no boats could put out from shore. Night and hurricane closed round the Eddystone. In the morning the rock was bare ; the lighthouse and its occupants were gone.[277]

The storm on land was less dangerous to the State than the storm at sea, but the destruction that it wrought was no less dramatic. The south-west, where the hurricane first struck the island, bore the full brunt. Kidder, Bishop of Bath and Wells, was killed with his wife as they lay in bed in Wells Palace, by the fall of a chimney-stack. The saintly Ken, the Nonjuror whom Kidder had succeeded, records that he narrowly escaped a like fate. Of great cities, Bristol suffered the worst. Its port was filled with wrecked shipping. Its famous underground warehouses were swamped by the inrush of the tide before the wind, and so much property was destroyed that the loss was computed at

* It is pleasant to note, in the Journals of the House, that the Commons at the same time voted that the families of the drowned seamen should be relieved—a matter by no means of course in those days.

over £100,000. For days afterwards, boats from Bristol were rowing through the countryside, rescuing families off roofs and tree-tops.

Starting from Cornwall, the Great Storm traversed England in an eastern direction with a touch of north. Trees went down in battalions ; the lead roofs on cathedral and parish churches were rolled up like carpets ; in many places scarce a chimney remained standing, not a roof uninjured. Boats were flung out of river beds, carriages thrown over hedges into the fields.

> I bless God we are all well [wrote Lady Rachel Russell] but the chimney where my son and his wife lay fell, and the bricks and soot coming down the chimney made them rise at six o'clock and come to my drawing-room. The wall of the garden fell next the field, and all the trees beat one side to the very ground. But at Stratton my loss is worse in all respects, corn and hay dispersed hanging on the trees, and the fir-grove entirely tore up by the roots. Hampshire is all desolation. I hear of many killed in country as well as town. Lady Penelope Nicholas killed in her bed in her country house, and he in the same bed saved ; a piece of timber falling between his legs kept off the bricks.

In London the damage was reckoned at a million pounds. On the morning of November the 27th, Londoners peering through the storm saw their streets like those of a city bombarded, piled high with the rubbish of fallen chimneys and roofs. It was fortunate that, after the rain on the first night, three dry weeks followed, most unusual at that time of year ; otherwise the roofs of South England could not have been patched up before the contents of the houses had suffered fatal damage.

At midnight on the 26th Queen Anne had stood watching through the windows the downfall of trees of historic tradition in St. James's Park. At the same hour, one of the most venerable of her subjects, old John Evelyn, father of arboriculture in England, was listening to the uproar of the uneven battle between the great wind and his beloved oaks at Wotton—' Wood Town no longer ' as he mournfully said. At morning there they lay, ' like whole regiments fallen in battle by the sword of the conqueror, and crushing all that grew beneath them.' Evelyn lost

2000 great trees that night ; a neighbour lost 1300, New Forest 4000 ' brave oaks,' Forest of Dean 3000 more. The elms of South England fell, as it were, without a struggle. But in those days there was hope of the future, for though elm and oak might fall, men planted others—as they seldom will to-day.

The fury of the storm lessened as it passed northwards. It died out somewhere in East Anglia. Ely's long roof was torn to shreds. But at King's Lynn on the Wash the damage in the town was only reckoned at £1000, and the loss in the harbour at no more than £3000, though it included seven or eight ships. The North was but little affected.

So England survived by land and sea. It was a sad but thankful Christmas. Normal life had surely returned when on December 16 ' the pious Robert Nelson ' was discussing with other members of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge ' whether acting the *Tempest* upon the next Wednesday after the late dreadful storm, at the new play-house in Little Lincoln's Inn Fields, was proper or seasonable ? ' England was herself again.[278]

CHAPTER XV

Death of Marlborough's son. His Netherland campaign of 1703. The Dutch generals again obstruct. Character of Villars. The French in Bavaria. Danger to Vienna. The Tirol diversion. Desperate prospects for 1704. Prince Eugene. Origin of idea of the Danube campaign. Marlborough and Wratislaw.

THE year 1703 was Marlborough's year of sorrow : domestic calamity stood prelude to a fruitless campaign.

The Duke's family affairs, like all else that he touched, bore the mark of his sure mastery over life : forty-four years of happiness with the cleverest woman in England, who quarrelled sooner or later with everyone else, was in itself no mean achievement. His political power was increased by the splendid yet happy marriages of his handsome daughters. His elder son John had died early, but Charles, Lord Churchill, Marquess of Blandford, had reached the age of seventeen, beloved and admired, with his mother's wit and his father's sweetness of temper. 'He is not only the best-natured and most agreeable but the most free-thinking and reasonable creature that one can imagine at his age,' wrote Godolphin. What a place this young Marcellus seemed born to fill in Eighteenth Century England !

Given to sober companions and proficient in the classics, Blandford had passed from Eton to King's,* where, though admitted as a 'nobleman,' he pursued his studies with zeal. His tutor was that adventurous clergyman, Francis Hare, afterwards the Duke's Field Chaplain on the Danube and

* In Blandford's day the Kingsmen lived in buildings on the site of the present (1930) Cambridge University Library, on the north side of King's Chapel. The present King's buildings, other than the Chapel, did not exist.

in Flanders. Blandford was burning to serve a campaign under his father ; but Sarah interposed : her son must stay yet awhile at college.

She had better have let him go. The smallpox, with its wonted humanity, chose for its prey the youth with the brightest prospects of any man at Cambridge. Blandford's parents hurried down, but could only watch him die. In a side chapel of King's, his tomb of white marble, prodigal of inscription, bears witness to the frailty of human hopes.

Feb. 20 1703

Jactat genus et nomen inutile.

A few weeks later Marlborough wrote home to Godolphin, after a review of the allied forces on the Rhine :

I have this day seen a very great procession, and the thoughts how pleased poor Lord Churchill would have been with such a sight have added very much to my uneasiness. Since it has pleased God to take him, I do wish from my soul I could think less of him.

Common sorrow had drawn him closer than ever to his wife. In April he wrote to her from the siege of Bonn :

If you had not positively desired that I would always burn your letters, I should have been very glad to have kept your dear letter of the ninth, it was so very kind, and particularly so upon the subject of our living quietly together, till which happy time comes I cannot be contented.

They still hoped for a male heir :

Pray let me have in every one of your letters an account of how you do. If it should prove such a sickness as that I might pity you but not be sorry for it, it might yet make me have ambition.

Heavens ! What then is ambition, if Marlborough lacked it ? But we need not strain at the chance outcry of a man in grief. There is more need of interpretation for the following letter that he wrote to the Duchess in August.

You and I have great reason to bless God for all we have, so that we must not repine at his taking our poor child from us, but bless and praise him for what his goodness leaves us. The use I think we should make of this his correction is, that our chiefest time should be

spent in reconciling ourselves to him, and having in our minds always that we may not have long to live in this world. I do not mean by this that we should live retired from the world : for I am persuaded that by living in the world one may do much more good than by being out of it, but at the same time to live so that one could cheerfully die when it shall be His pleasure to call us.

This might pass as Oliver Cromwell's to his Elizabeth, but it is Marlborough's to Sarah. It cannot be conscious hypocrisy, for the woman to whom alone it was addressed insisted on no such sentiments ; nor can it be mere custom, for such was not the conventional language of the Whitehall where he and his wife were brought up. It must represent one of the genuine moods of this most secret man.[279]

Sick at heart, Marlborough had crossed to Holland in March, and by great efforts got the Dutch early into the field. But their Generals were less willing than ever to undertake the downright attack on the French lines in the Netherlands, without which Holland could not hope to obtain her chief object in the war. Athlone, who had been converted by the events of last year's campaign to recognize the genius of the English commander,* had unfortunately died, and his successors with one consent began to make excuse why there should be only a defensive campaign. All that Marlborough could get leave to do was to besiege Bonn in good time before the enemy were moving. It fell, the last of the Rhine fortresses that the Archbishop of Cologne had betrayed to the French, and its fall opened the great waterway to the Allies and so rendered possible the operations of the following year, which no man then foresaw.

Marlborough in person pressed forward the siege at Bonn.† The operations were covered by an army under Overkirk, the best of the Dutch Generals, holding an entrenched camp under the walls of Maastricht against the relieving army coming from the direction of Brussels under Marshals Villeroi and Boufflers. Overkirk would have been surprised and overwhelmed at Maastricht but for the delay of the French before the little walled town of Tongres, where two battalions, one of Dutch and the other of Scots

* See p. 238, above.

† *See Map VIII at end of volume for this campaign.*

of the Queen's Regiment, endured bombardment by an army for a night and a day, before they surrendered. May 15 (N.S.) 1703 During the breathing space thus obtained, Overkirk ably prepared his defences, which Villeroi cannonaded but dared not assault. Marlborough, having that very day taken Bonn, hastened back and all was well.

The Duke valued so highly the services of the Scottish and Dutch defenders of Tongres, that he insisted upon their being exchanged for the next batch of French prisoners whom he captured three months later on the fall of Huy. Aug. 1703 That fortress, high up the Maas, near Namur, was the last town held by Joseph Clement, the Elector Bishop of Cologne and Liège ; all his territories had now passed into the hands of the Allies he had betrayed, who indignantly remembered that he owed these very provinces to their diplomatic support of his candidature in the days of William of Orange. Retribution had been swift in the case of Joseph Clement ; it hung on a slower foot in pursuit of his brother, Max Emanuel of Bavaria.*

Bonn, Huy and the fortress of Limburg were all Marlborough's trophies for the year 1703—a miserably inadequate counterpoise to the great Franco-Bavarian thrust along the Danube that threatened the very heart of the Alliance at Vienna. But all the efforts of the Duke to make headway in the Netherlands had been shipwrecked on the folly or ill-will of the Dutch Generals, who proved no less obstructive than the year before. In July Marlborough had devised a plan for a surprise attack on Antwerp. The Dutch Generals Cohorn and Opdam were to attack it from the west and Marlborough from the east. But Cohorn, better at a siege than a campaign, gave the enemy warning by avaricious plundering raids into Western Flanders. Opdam allowed himself to be surpised at Ekeren, and ran away from his army, leaving it to be extricated and brought off by Slangenburg, a man of courage and resource but of vile temper and bitterly jealous of Marlborough. July 29 (N.S.) 1703 The scheme against Antwerp had failed.

From Antwerp to Namur the French were constructing ' lines,' like those of Torres Vedras, but ninety miles long,

* For these Wittelsbach brothers see p. 156, above.

to protect their occupation of the Spanish Netherlands. The line consisted in some sections of impassable rivers, elsewhere of continuous earthworks. Marlborough, back on the Maas in the neighbourhood of Huy, proposed to force these lines near the Mehaine, at a point where the earthwork barrier was still incomplete, not far from the future battlefield of Ramillies. A formal remonstrance was signed by Marlborough and a dozen English, German and Danish Generals, demanding that the attack should be made, and pointing out the reasons to expect success. But the Dutch Generals refused to concur, in spite of the willingness on this occasion of their civilian Field Deputies. William Cadogan, the burly Irish giant in whose staff-work Marlborough confided, wrote of the Dutch that 'the resolution and vigour the Deputies show were enough to put their Generals out of countenance, if they were not equally incapable of shame and reason.'[280]

Aug. 24 (N.S.) 1703

Taking two years of experience together, the dominant fact of campaigning in the Netherlands was this, that the Dutch Generals would not let Marlborough fight. He wrote to his friend Heinsius that he would 'much sooner die' than fight another campaign under the same conditions, and that he 'had the spleen to a very great degree.' The anger of the English army spread to the home front. The High Tories found fresh fuel for their campaign against the Dutch alliance and fresh proof that the war on land was a waste of men and money. Among the Ministers, Nottingham, Seymour and Jersey were agreed that the English troops should leave the Netherlands. Marlborough was coming to the same opinion, but in a different sense. Might not his army instead of taking ship either for England or Spain, march southward along the Rhine on some enterprise of pith and moment?

As early as August 11, 1703, he wrote to Stepney at Vienna that the Dutch Generals were impossible, but that a campaign on the Moselle next year might yield better results. It would open a road into France not, like the Netherlands, studded thick with fortresses. Marlborough asked Stepney to see whether the Emperor would support his plan by representations at the Hague and elsewhere, so

as to obtain for him 'a good body of troops to winter on the Moselle,' and take Trarbach and Trier, as a preliminary to a speedy opening there next spring. The desperate straits of Vienna would not permit this particular plan to materialize, but the idea of turning south, from co-operation with the Dutch to co-operation with the Austrians, held the seeds of the Blenheim campaign.[281]

The summer of 1703 nearly witnessed the fall of Vienna, and with it, as an inevitable consequence, the collapse of European resistance to the 'universal monarchy' of Louis XIV. The instigator of the attempt was Villars, the greatest French soldier of the war. His gasconades, his hearty good-fellowship, his obvious enjoyment of life, his sudden tempers, his blunt utterances of the thought that was within him, endeared him to the French soldiery, but rendered him odious to prickly princes, formal courtiers and bigoted priests. He would have been more at home in the armies of the First Republic: Murat would have found him a man after his own heart, and Napoleon would have used him to the full. But in 1702, though fifty years old, Villars was still a General of lower rank. His victory that October over the German Princes at Friedlingen, near Basle, led to his elevation as Marshal of France. But since this honour was shared with a group of nonentities, he wrote to the Minister in no courtier's vein: 'I hear that his Majesty has just made ten Marshals. It would be more to the point if he had made ten generals fit to command.'[282]

However, after Friedlingen it was impossible to overlook the value of this rough diamond. That victory, won near the borders of Switzerland, rendered possible for the following year the junction of the French armies of Alsace with the Bavarians on the Danube. In 1703 Louis XIV entrusted to Villars the task of crossing the Rhine and the passes of the Black Forest, and joining the Elector of Bavaria for a stroke at the heart of the Empire. Not waiting for the usual season for operations to begin, Villars in the depth of winter seized Kehl, the bridge-head across the Rhine opposite to Strasburg. But even his ardent spirit felt the necessity of waiting till

Feb. 1703

near the end of April before attempting the difficult passage of the Black Forest.*

The safe arrival of Villars and his army on the Upper Danube early in May seemed to presage the speedy termination of the war in a blaze of glory for the Sun King. On June 1st, one of his servants wrote to a Scottish nobleman bidding the Jacobites press the Government hard in the Edinburgh Parliament, because the junction of Villars with the Bavarians would enable France to bring the Dutch to a separate peace and send help to Scotland.[283] There was consternation among the Princes of Germany at Villars' arrival on the Danube. The Diet of the Empire was sitting hard by at Ratisbon for the express purpose of declaring war on France. The usual strife was going on between the Catholic and Protestant parties in the three Colleges of Electors, Princes and Towns ; the Protestants of the Diet appealed to Queen Anne, and she replied 'Her Majesty regards herself as the Chief of the Protestant interest.' A few weeks later Ratisbon was occupied by Bavarian troops, and the Diet continued to sit under the armed duresse of its enemies.[284]

The family, the Ministers and the subjects of the Elector of Bavaria disliked the part that he was forcing them to play. They had no love for the French, who plundered them and all other Germans without mercy. The Bavarian peasants thought it hard to be exposed to the miseries of war 'for the sake of the French whom they look on as their natural enemies.' De la Colonie, who was serving in the Bavarian army, describes himself as 'a solitary Frenchman in a regiment where it was customary for the officers to hate all our nation,' against whom they had been fighting all their lives.[285] Yet so much stronger was the instinct of obedience to the Prince than the still nascent instincts of race and nationality, that from beginning to end of the War of the Spanish Succession the fine Bavarian army remained loyal to their Elector and his French friends, throughout long years of disaster and exile.

The reason why Max Emanuel clung to the French cause

* For these Franco-Bavarian operations of 1703 *see Maps IX and X at end of volume*. See also Marlborough's letter to Heinsius, May 24, 1703, in Appendix A, below.

against the wishes of his servants and his subjects, was personal ambition to fill the Imperial throne in case of victory, and the assurance that, even if rebellion had bad luck upon the Danube, he could still look forward to a great career as Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. It never occurred to him as possible that Marlborough would conquer both Bavaria and Flanders.

In May 1703 all the omens were favourable to the Elector's ambition. He made Villars welcome as the saviour of his throne and family. But this warmth was little reciprocated. In the previous November, before ever he crossed the Rhine, the Frenchman had conceived a deep distrust of Max Emanuel's loyalty. Since the Elector never ceased to negotiate with the Allies even after he had drawn the sword for France, these suspicions were not unnatural ; but they were in fact unjust, as his subsequent conduct showed. The habit of negotiating secretly with one side while remaining essentially loyal to the other, was at that period common among the Princes of Europe, as well as among the statesmen of England.[286]

For a few weeks after Villars' arrival on the Danube, the appearance of harmony prevailed, for the Elector agreed at first to the French Marshal's daring plan of an immediate march on Vienna. Villars had been there in former years in a diplomatic capacity, and had noted the weakness of the defences. 'We can easily lodge ourselves on the counterscarp the first day,' he wrote home to the King ; in his opinion it would be 'an affair of eight days' to take the capital of Austria. The siege cannon could come down the Danube, of which the fortresses were one after the other falling without resistance into Bavarian hands. The Hungarian rebels were already almost at the eastern gate of Vienna. Austria's Treasury was empty, and her armies on the Rhine and in Italy could not return in time. They could be held in play respectively by Tallard and Vendôme. Such was Villars' opinion of the situation at the beginning of June 1703. But Max Emanuel was not the man to put it to the touch ; and, according to Villars, he was surrounded by advisers who were at heart in the interest of the Emperor. After a short period of agreement with the bolder plan, he

changed his mind and carried off his army into Tirol, to the intense disgust of the French Marshal, who was left to guard the communications on the Danube against the gathering hosts of Germany.

Even in his anger Villars confessed that the invasion of Tirol was the next best plan to the immediate march on Vienna. For what should stop the Bavarians from reaching the Brenner Pass, and joining hands there with Vendôme coming up from the plain of the Po? They could return together to join Villars on the Danube and resume the march on Vienna, late indeed but in greater strength for the reinforcements from Italy.[287]

Max Emanuel had, however, a political as well as a military reason for thus turning aside into the Alps. He would add Tirol to his Bavarian territories and so become possessor of the road between Germany and Italy, as befitted a Prince aspiring to the Imperial Crown. He reached Innsbruck, where the townspeople swore allegiance to him as their lord. The prospects seemed so bright that Villars wrote him a merry letter asking for a Duchy in Bohemia from the future Emperor.

June-July 1703

Suddenly a blow fell from a quarter of which the conspirators had never dreamt. The loyalty of the mountain peasantry of Tirol to the House of Hapsburg blazed up in a flame, like that which Andreas Hofer kindled against a similar invasion of the French and Bavarians in the time of Napoleon. Max Emanuel's line of communications and retreat lay along a single road that meandered through perilous defiles. Their rocky sides were now occupied by chamois hunters, the best cragsmen and shots in Europe. In the last days of July the Bavarian army had to fly for its life and was glad to win its way back to Munich without worse catastrophe than the loss of a few detachments, who got little quarter.

The Elector had returned to Villars, but had not brought the expected aid from Italy. In July Vendôme on the Po had received orders from Louis to effect a junction with the Bavarians by way of the Brenner Pass, 'and finish the war by carrying it into the heart of the Empire.' The resistance of Austria in Italy was almost negligible that year, for

Eugene had been recalled to Vienna to make head against the Hungarian rebels as best he could, short of money and short of men. But Vendôme wasted precious weeks round the Lake of Garda, partly because of rumours that the Duke of Savoy was about to join the Allies, as in fact he did two months later.* Vendôme's delay was fatal. In August the Bavarians lost all the remaining fortresses that they had garrisoned in Tirol, and it was no longer possible for a French army to pass from Italy to Germany athwart the resistance of the mountaineers.[288]

Though cut off from Italy, Villars and the Elector made good their position on the Danube. On September 20th they inflicted a severe defeat on the army of the German Princes near Hochstädt and Blenheim.† Thanks to the Tirolese diversion, the Empire had been reprieved for one campaign, but its prospects for the next year seemed desperate. In December 1703 the talk at the Austrian capital was that the Court would have to be carried to Gratz in Styria, while the French and Bavarians shook hands with the Hungarian rebels in the streets of Vienna.[289]

These expectations would have been realized if in 1704 Villars had been in Bavaria and Marlborough not. But in the winter the hot-tempered Villars finally quarrelled with the Elector and threw up his command of the French army of the Danube. He was succeeded by Marsin, a commander of talent greatly inferior in every respect except his ability to get on well with Max Emanuel. They were soon hand in glove, and their armies manœuvred as a single unit.

Meanwhile Louis sent Villars for the fighting season of 1704 to command the army of the Cevennes, engaged in the task of quelling the resistance of the 4000 Huguenot peasants—the Camisards as they were called—who were holding out against their persecutors in their native hills. Villars, a rational man, who would have been happier in the age of the Encyclopædists, saw the folly of this unnecessary civil war in the heart of France at the crisis of

* See pp. 305–307, above.

† The German army was drawn up behind the rivulet of Gremheim, about two miles to the east of the French position behind the Nebel in the battle of Blenheim next year: the pursuit passed over part of the ground of the later battle.

a foreign struggle. He had the boldness to offer the Camisard leaders terms and toleration. He thought he had stopped the war, but the bigots at Versailles repudiated the sensible arrangements he had made, and things went on much as before, until gradually the resistance of the Camisards was worn down. English promises of help often got through to them, but never the help itself.*

And so, during the campaign that turned the fortune of the war, Louis's one great soldier was removed from the decisive scene of affairs. Afterwards, on the Moselle in 1705, and at Malplaquet in 1709, Villars prevented Marlborough from breaking into France. If he had been opposed to him in 1704 on the banks of the Danube, it is not likely that any such complete victory as Blenheim would have been scored for the saving of the allied cause.

Prince Eugene of Savoy, thirteen years younger than Marlborough, was a French-speaking Savoyard Prince of Alpine blood, brought up at the Court of Louis XIV.

1663–1736

As a lad not yet of age, he had dared to quarrel with the Grand Monarch for two reasons : first because Louis had harassed his father and mother with a long and vindictive persecution—so at least Eugene had been taught to think ; in the second place, because he had ordered Eugene himself to be a priest when he wished to be a soldier, and angrily refused to listen to the young man's expostulation. In his mania for arranging other people's lives, Louis refused to allow Eugene to be a soldier of France. He never did a worse day's work for the French army. It was not so easy to put the Alpine eaglet in a cage : Eugene escaped from Versailles to Vienna in order to pursue the profession of arms and to be avenged on Louis. Though more personal in its motives than the steady purpose of William III to thwart the same man, Eugene's determination to humble the Grand Monarch was neither less persistent nor less successful. Cold and ascetic in a profligate age, Eugene had a soul of fire for his profession ; without a country and

1682

* See p. 307, above, and note 276, below, on the Camisards, also Villars' *Mémoires* for 1704.

without wife or family, he pursued honour and fame with the zest of a young knight-errant, during a military career of fifty years.

The desperate danger of Vienna, due to the incompetence of Leopold and his lay and clerical advisers, at length forced them to entrust the fate of the Empire to Eugene. The obscurantists of the Imperial Court could no longer dispense with his hand on the helm. In the winter of 1703–1704 he was brought back from Italy and placed at the head of the War Office at Vienna as President of the Council of War, to reorganize the forces of Austria so far as her straitened means permitted. These means were eked out by English subsidies.

Marlborough and Eugene were not yet personally known to one another, except by reputation. But the world-wide fame of the Savoyard Prince, as the conqueror of the Turks, was one reason why the Englishman entertained the notion of staking his own and his country's fate on a plan which involved close co-operation with the Austrian army. As a colleague, Eugene would be as good as the Dutch Generals were bad. It would be useless for Marlborough merely to exchange Slangenberg for Lewis of Baden. But Eugene was now at the head of the military counsels of Vienna, and might next year himself take the field in Germany.

It is commonly said, and has been often repeated by English historians on insufficient evidence, that the plan for Marlborough's march to the Danube had been prearranged in correspondence between himself and Prince Eugene in the winter of 1703–1704, and that the project was for some time a secret between these two men. But their great friendship was the result, not the cause, of the Blenheim campaign. And if they corresponded during the preceding winter, their correspondence has not seen the light.

The method by which the great campaign was planned was somewhat different, more gradual and less dramatic. In so far as any one person persuaded Marlborough to bring the English army to Bavaria, it was not Eugene, but Wratislaw, the Emperor's able envoy in England. As

early as October 1703, Eugene, Wratislaw and the Emperor were agreed in the desire that the Allies' chief effort in 1704 should be made in Bavaria. They knew the Dutch would be hostile to any such plan, and that the Imperial General on the Rhine, Lewis of Baden, would be lacking in the necessary initiative. Marlborough was their only hope, and Wratislaw laid personal siege to him all through the winter both in England and at the Hague.

Marlborough was from the first not unfavourable to such a plan, if indeed his own favourite scheme of invading France by the Moselle valley, which he had formed as early as August 1703,* had to be postponed owing to the more urgent danger to Vienna. Moreover, Marlborough was uncertain until the actual moment of action came in April 1704, whether or not it would be possible to elude the hostility of the Dutch Government to his departure with the army on such an enterprise. It is clear from Wratislaw's correspondence with the Emperor that the complicated argument on these issues went on all winter with varying fortunes, and that only at the last moment, at the beginning of April, had Marlborough finally made up his mind that the attempt must be made to carry his army at all hazards to the Danube.

The merit and the genius of Marlborough lay, not in conceiving the idea of the march to the Danube, an expedient so obvious that it was urged that winter, not only by Eugene and Wratislaw, but by the independent judgment of the Elector Palatine, ever zealous in the cause of the Empire. Marlborough's genius lay not in conceiving the plan, but in executing it. And his moral superiority appeared in assuming single-handed the responsibility of carrying his army into Central Europe without the leave of the States General or of more than two or three of his English colleagues. It was easy for the German soldiers and statesmen to ask him to come. It was another matter for him to consent to go, and to effect his most difficult departure.

* See pp. 316–317, above.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV

The Origin of the Idea of the March to the Danube

English historians, including such excellent modern biographers of Marlborough as Frank Taylor and Mr. Atkinson, have neglected the most important available evidence on the growth of Marlborough's plan, which is to be found in *Klopp*, XI, pp. 41–42, 91–112, and *Feldzüge*, pp. 50–58, based upon the Austrian archives, particularly on Wratislaw's letters to the Emperor.

But while accepting Wratislaw's account of his frequent conversations with Marlborough and of what Marlborough said on those occasions, we may still ask whether or not Eugene was all the while in correspondence with the Duke on the same subject. I think not. There is a remarkable absence of any indication of this in Eugene's, Marlborough's and Wratislaw's known correspondence. And it seems impossible to square with Wratislaw's accounts of what Marlborough said to him in January, February and March, the theory that the Duke had already made a separate agreement with Eugene to lead the English troops to the Danube. If he had, he or Eugene would surely have told Wratislaw ; for Wratislaw was perfectly in Eugene's confidence in the matter, and both were working together for that object.

The historian has, however, to take note of the following passage in Coxe's *Marlborough*, chap. 21 (ed. 1818, i, p. 234) :

> Through the agency of Prince Eugene, with whom he had secretly arranged the whole campaign, he induced the Emperor to write a letter to the Queen, claiming assistance, etc. (*Letters from Eugene to Marlborough, in the Blenheim Papers*; also *Vie du Prince Eugene*, t. 2, p. 156.)

This method of dealing with a subject so important is not worthy of the learned Archdeacon's usual documentary fullness and care. The *Vie du Prince Eugene* to which he refers is, I think, *Histoire du Prince Eugene*, 1741 (and 1777), Vienna, 5 volumes. In volume II of that work, pp. 145–146 (not 156), there is a letter purporting to be from Eugene to Marlborough asking him to come to recover Bavaria. It is in inverted commas but in *oratio obliqua*, and the authority for it is given as *Vita e campeggiamenti del Principe Eugenio* (Venice 1738). The letter is there, in the *Vita*, sure enough, but in Italian, in *oratio obliqua* and *not* in inverted commas ! It may possibly be based on some genuine original, but as the letter bears no date it throws no light on the question when and how Marlborough came to his decision. The letter is not to be found in the official Austrian collection of his

correspondence and is apparently quite unknown to modern Austrian historians.

As to Coxe's vague reference to letters on the subject from Eugene to Marlborough in the Blenheim Papers, it is strange that the Archdeacon, who published so much, did not publish these. No such letters are to be found in his voluminous transcripts of the Blenheim Papers in the British Museum. They are not mentioned in the *Hist. MSS. Com.* Report on the Blenheim Papers. And I have reason to think they are not in Blenheim at all. But certainty on this point will be obtained when Mr. Winston Churchill produces his anxiously expected life of Marlborough. If he has found them at Blenheim, we shall know more. Meanwhile, I am sceptical as to the existence of these letters and as to Eugene's alleged part in persuading Marlborough to come to Bavaria, except indirectly through Wratislaw. Austrian historians know nothing about it, and so far the English historians have produced no evidence of it that bears scrutiny.

The letter of Marlborough to Heinsius of March $\frac{7}{18}$, 1704, which I have printed below, in Appendix A, so far as it goes, supports the idea that the Moselle was in the minds of Eugene and Marlborough as much as the Danube, even as late as the middle of March, and that there was still no fixed plan in Marlborough's mind until the end of that month.

The position of Vienna was certainly alarming enough in 1704 to call for direct assistance. On February 13, Whitworth wrote 'I must own we live at the discretion of the Hungarians as to the suburbs, where they may arrive with little opposition in twelve hours' time.' (*Add. MSS. St.* 7064, f. 130.) The only hope was the Treaty with the Hungarians which the English were perpetually pressing the Emperor to make. If such was the situation in February, before the French and Bavarian armies took the field on the Danube, what was likely to happen in the summer, unless help came from England and Holland!

CHAPTER XVI

The Session of 1703–1704. The Tory split. Queen Anne and party heats. The Occasional Conformity Bill again. Marlborough at the Hague in February. His despondency. Return to England. Wratislaw's memorial and Marlborough's decision for a Danube campaign. His departure in April 1704. Resignation of Nottingham, Jersey and Seymour. A Moderate Tory Ministry formed. Harley and his man Defoe. St. John and Marlborough.

In 1702 it might well have been supposed that the new reign and the new century in England were both to be dominated by the Tory Party and the ideals for which it stood in Church and State. Queen Anne was of that inclining, and so were the majority of her subjects. Marlborough was prepared to win the world war and lay its laurels at the feet of his royal mistress and his Tory colleagues. The more distant future, too, was secure, if the siren lures of Jacobitism could be avoided and the voices from the past forgotten; for the House of Hanover was as yet no more inclined to the Whigs than to the Tories, who had passed the Act of Settlement in 1701. The long period of quiet national growth and Hanoverian stability which we associate with Walpole and the Whigs might have been associated with the Tories, if, in Anne's reign, they had held together as a united party in support of their Queen and their General. All that was asked of them was to acquiesce, for the duration of the war, in a system of toleration and moderate measures at home. That system was implied by the Revolution in which they had taken part and the Act of Settlement which they had so recently voted. But the High Tories could not accept these conditions. They wished to restore the atmosphere of 'good King Charles's golden days,' to give Whigs and Dissenters the

bad time that was their due, and to ignore the Revolution while enjoying its benefits. If Marlborough would not help them to realize these ideals, so much the worse for Marlborough and his war. If the House of Hanover would not help them, so much the worse for the House of Hanover and its chances of succession.

On these issues, as well as on the personal rivalry of great noblemen, the party split in two, once in 1704, and again, yet more fatally, in 1714. In both these years of decision the schism between High and Moderate Tories was as broad as the difference between Tory and Whig. The political history of the Queen's reign cannot be understood merely in the terms of controversy between the two historic parties.

It was the custom under the good Queen Anne, as soon as the armies of Europe went into winter quarters, for the politicians to meet at Westminster for their annual wrangle. The session was usually over by the end of March, and, if the Government survived so long, Marlborough could then go back to the war with the confidence that Parliament would not meet again till October, and that Godolphin's Ministry was safe for another summer and would support him through another campaign. If Parliament had sat while the armies were in the field, the burden of carrying on the war under such conditions of insecurity at home might have been too much even for Marlborough's iron nerves. In particular, if it had been sitting in May 1704 he could hardly have ventured to steal the British army and run away with it to the Danube.

The session of November 1703 to March 1704 was one of the stormiest of the reign, because the Tory Party was in process of splitting in two, with the fierce mutual reproaches usual on such occasions. Swift, who was in London on one of his visits from Ireland, watched the heats of that winter with detachment, though still calling himself a Whig and even writing in secret against the Occasional Conformity Bill a pamphlet which he did not publish :

> I observed the very dogs in the streets much more contumelious and quarrelsome than usual ; and the very night before the bill went up, a committee of Whig and Tory cats had a very loud and warm debate upon the roof of our house. But why should we wonder at that, when the very ladies are split asunder into High Church and Low, and out of zeal for religion have hardly time to say their prayers ? To cool your insolence a little [he wrote to a Tory friend] know that the Queen and Court, and House of Lords and half the Commons almost, are Whigs ; and the number daily increases.[290]

The ' Queen and Court ' were not Whigs, but Swift calls them so because they were in process of quarrelling with the High Tories.

Already, before Parliament met in November, the position of Nottingham, Jersey and Seymour in the same war ministry with Marlborough had become almost impossible. In August, when it was rumoured that Prince Eugene was about to visit England, Jersey had written to Nottingham : 1703

> I cannot look upon this Prince's journey hither any otherwise than as a contrivance of Comte Wratislaw with his friends the Whigs to extort subsidies which I fear this nation cannot bear.

Jersey was a Jacobite at heart, but even Nottingham was declaring for a ' defensive ' system of warfare. In October he took 2000 English troops from the Netherlands and sent them to his favourite seat of war in the Peninsula, without the knowledge of Marlborough and to his subsequent great indignation. When Parliament met in November, Marlborough's secretary and personal friend, Cardonnel, wrote that the voting of supplies for war was ' like to go on very well,' and that ' Sir Edward Seymour and his gang are the only people to make bustle. The Duke of Marlborough and he are quite out.' So much indeed were they ' out ' that in June the Duke had written to Sarah : ' We are bound not to wish for anybody's death, but should Sir Edward Seymour die it would be no great loss to the Queen nor the nation.'

Sarah, as a good Whig, urged him to turn to her political friends. But Marlborough still thought, like the Queen, that ' either of the parties would be tyrants if they were let alone,' and preferred to be ' governed by neither

party, but do what I think best for England, by which I shall disoblige both parties.'

> I do own a great deal of what you say is right, but I can by no means allow that all the Tory party are for King James, and consequently against the Queen : but the contrary, I think it is in her power to make use of almost all, but some of the heads, and to the true interest of England.

Unfortunately, 'some of the heads' were his ministerial colleagues.[291]

The touchstone of party was still the Occasional Conformity Bill,* which loomed larger in the minds of many politicians than the approaching crisis of England's twenty years' struggle with France. In the middle of December the Commons passed it again by a large majority. John Verney, knight of the shire for Leicester, wrote :

> We carried up our Bill to-day in great state to the Lords. I believe we were 200 that attended it. But all the bustle we have made about it had no effect. The Bishops, I hear, divided, against it 14, for it 9. The Prince [George] was not there.

The debate in the Lords went more openly against the principle of the Occasional Conformity Bill than last winter. Bishop Burnet took the lead in opposition, again expounding the Dissenters' point of view as he had learnt it from Calamy's coaching. Lord Mohun, who was endeavouring in these years to live down his reputation as a murderous brawler and rake and to blossom out as a Whig statesman, 'did not stick to say that if they passed this Bill they had as good tack the pretended Prince of Wales to it.' This year the Lords felt strong enough to reject the Bill on second reading by 71 to 59. Anne had withdrawn from it her active support. Her husband was allowed to absent himself. The Queen's Speech had contained a significant sentence against 'heats or divisions' and in favour of 'perfect peace and union' in face of the national enemy—phrases that were a signal to placemen in the Lords. This new wartime

Dec. 14 (O.S.) 1703

* See pp. 277–283, above.

doctrine of the Queen's was preached by the Tory pamphleteer Davenant : his latest pamphlet, *Peace at Home and War Abroad* condemned the Bill as inexpedient, and preached the comfortable doctrine that the Dissenters were less powerful, less zealous and less united as a result of toleration. The tide had turned against the zeal of High Church, and continued to ebb for several years to come.

Marlborough and Godolphin, indeed, voted for the Bill and even carried hypocrisy so far as to enter their 'protests' in the Journals of the House against the rejection. For Marlborough had written to Sarah :

> I must be careful not to do the thing in the world which my Lord Rochester would most desire to have me do, which is to give my vote against this bill. But I do most solemnly promise that I will speak to nobody living to be for it.

But these shifts did not save Marlborough and Godolphin any more than Davenant from the fury of the baffled High Churchmen. Nor did they spare the Queen herself, who had bitterly disappointed them. A popular satire of the year treats of their grievances against her :

> And yet the Whigs vote for the Queen
> More heartily than we do ;
> And is not this as sad a thing
> As any man can see to ?
> We thought when their Dutch king was dead
> We should have leave to smite 'em,
> But now our hands are so tied up
> We cannot gibeonite 'em.
> Thus sorrowfully must we sing
> Or mournfully may say—
> Our Queen is so much like their King,
> Alack and well-a-day.[292]

During the remainder of the session, both before and after Christmas, the anger of the High Tories expressed itself in a number of Parliamentary moves, some of which were voted down by a combination of Whigs and governmental Tories in the Commons, and others vetoed by the Lords, bolder than last year in their Whiggery in spite of the recent creations of Tory Peers.* The Recruiting Act,

* See p. 277, above.

which enabled Justices of the Peace forcibly to enlist the unemployed,* was opposed by the Seymour group in the Commons as contrary to the liberties of Englishmen, but was carried through both Houses to Marlborough's great relief. The increased estimates for the year were also accepted and honoured. And a dangerous project, favoured by Nottingham and Seymour, for 'tacking' the Occasional Conformity Bill to Supply was postponed till the following autumn. The increase in the numbers of the army was voted, amid murmurs that would have become an uproar if Seymour and his friends had dreamt that it was to be taken to the Danube. The usual attack and defence of Ministers past and present added the spice of personality to party heats. The Whigs attacked Nottingham for the alleged sheltering of Jacobite spies. The High Tories continued the attack on Orford for alleged malversation in the late reign, and the Lords finally exonerated him. Above all, the famous case of Ashby *v.* White arose out of an electioneering squabble in Aylesbury, a borough of Wharton's, and led to one of the most noisy constitutional controversies that ever brought the two Houses of Parliament into collision.† On these troubled waters Queen Anne poured the oil of her Bounty‡ to the poor clergy, in hopes that it would avert from herself and her Ministers some at least of the indignation of the Church that she loved so well and yet so wisely.[293]

Feb. 1704

While such matters were occupying the minds of English public men almost to the exclusion of the crisis in Europe, Marlborough was secretly and slowly coming to his great decision. The determination to carry the English army to Bavaria did not spring from his head like Pallas fully armed, nor was it posted to him in a letter from Eugene. It was not made, but grew. Gradually and with many hesitations, as a result of many discussions of other plans with Dutch, Germans and English, under the pressure

* See p. 219, above.

† I shall tell the story of *Ashby* v. *White* in the next volume, as it came to its crisis in the session of 1704–1705.

‡ See pp. 47–48, above, for Queen Anne's Bounty.

of Wratislaw's ceaseless iteration that Vienna, if unaided, would fall in the spring, he came to admit the necessity of substituting the Danube as his field of action for his own favourite idea of an invasion of France through the Moselle valley. But the Moselle scheme continued to serve in public as a blind to the Dutch, to the French and to the world at large. For the concentration of troops and stores along the Rhine as far south as Coblentz pointed to the Moselle, yet would serve equally well for a march on the Danube. It is therefore difficult to determine the precise week when the Moselle ceased to be Marlborough's real objective, while continuing to be paraded as his professed goal. From the evidence we have, it would seem that as early as January he contemplated the likelihood of going to the Danube, but that until April he felt no certainty of being able to overcome the opposition of the Dutch.

In the middle of January, amid the peril and discomfort of winter storms that delayed other passengers, he crossed to the Hague, and there in the course of the next month divulged the Moselle plan, as a secret, to the Dutch Government. The States-General took objection even to that not very distant removal of Marlborough's army from their frontier. But Heinsius again came to the rescue and eventually secured their acquiescence. At the same time Holland and England made arrangements to assist the German Princes with men and money to save the Empire. But nothing as yet was said to any Dutch statesman about the English going to the Danube.

Jan.-Feb. 1704

During this February visit to the Hague, Marlborough wrote to the Duchess in a mood of despondency, not at all like a man with a great design ready formed, which he is certain of being allowed to attempt.

> For this campaign I see so very ill a prospect that I am extremely out of heart. But God's will be done. In all the other campaigns I had an opinion of being able to do something for the common cause; but in this I have no other hopes than that some lucky accident may enable me to do good.[294]

After the Duke's return to England towards the close of February, Wratislaw renewed his representations of the certainty of the fall of Vienna unless something more

drastic was done in the Danube valley. It seems to have been in the course of the month of March that Marlborough finally decided that it was necessary that he himself should carry relief to the tottering Empire, at every military and diplomatic risk. To the last he feared that the Dutch, if thus deserted, would make a separate peace with France. But Wratislaw argued that the States-General, however frightened or angry they might be, could not withdraw from the war till the following winter, and that if, meanwhile, the Empire were saved in the summer and Bavaria conquered, the Dutch would again take heart of grace. Marlborough pointed out that the Dutch would not in any case let him take their siege-train to the Danube, and Wratislaw promised that the Princes of the Empire would supply him with siege cannon if he would bring powder enough, and, of course, his own field artillery. This arrangement was actually carried out. By the first days of April the march to the Danube had been arranged between Marlborough and Wratislaw. As part of the plan, the Emperor was to be pressed to release Prince Eugene from his duties at the War Office, and to send him to take the field in Germany as the colleague of Marlborough and of the Imperial Lieutenant-General, Lewis of Baden. On account of his hereditary position and territories on the Rhine, it was impossible to deprive that jealous and incapable Prince of the right to play the part of Lepidus in the triumvirate that was to save the Empire.[295]

For the present, the secret was kept between Marlborough, Wratislaw, the Emperor and Prince Eugene. Presumably the Queen and Godolphin knew that he was going to take the English troops wherever it was necessary to save the Empire, but there is no proof that they yet knew he was going as far as the Danube. And it is certain that Sarah did not yet know. The Moselle would serve excellently to cover the early operations of the campaign. For many reasons secrecy must be observed to the last possible moment. If the French Generals on the Rhine suspected that Marlborough was going to Bavaria by a flank march across their front, they could move forward across his path, or get to Bavaria before

him. If the Dutch knew whither he was bound, they would veto the project as regards all the allied troops in their pay. If Marlborough's own colleagues, Nottingham and Seymour, knew, they would raise wild alarm at home. But the Queen and Godolphin were staunch. Anne graciously received and graciously answered Wratislaw's Memorandum on the desperate straits of the Empire; in her reply she commissioned Marlborough, in concert with the States-General, 'to send a speedy succour to His Imperial Majesty and the Empire.' What the nature of this succour was to be was not stated in her letter; she left that to the servant in whom she trusted.[296]

Apr. 2 (O.S.) 1704

Next week Marlborough sailed from Harwich on his great adventure. He was far from easy as to the position that he left behind him at home, and on his last evening ashore he wrote to Godolphin complaining that Nottingham was bitterly hostile to them both, that he was in favour of tacking the Occasional Conformity Bill to Supply, and that he was 'doing Her Majesty all the hurt that he is capable of.' In the weeks that followed, the quarrel in the Cabinet came to a head, and the Queen had to make her choice between the High and the Moderate sections of the Tory Party. The crisis was not precipitated by Godolphin, who was far from certain of his position, especially with the Duke oversea. Nottingham made the first move by demanding the dismissal of the two moderate Whig peers, Devonshire and Somerset, from the Privy Council. Anne refused. Nottingham thereupon proffered his own resignation. The Queen, though very angry with her old friend and fellow-churchman, was loath to part with him. But at the instigation of Harley, Godolphin and Sarah she dismissed Jersey and Seymour, whom she had come to dislike. In the end she had to let Nottingham go as well.*

Apr. 8 (O.S.) 1704

For some years to come the dark, tall, melancholy figure of this honest but opinionated man remained in the back-

* The crisis went on confusedly for some weeks, and it is difficult to put an exact date to it. As early as April 22 Hedges writes officially to Ellis: 'A Cabinet must be summoned to attend the Queen to-morrow, and all are to be summoned as usual, except the Lords Jersey, Nottingham and Sir Edward Seymour.' (*Add.*

ground of English politics. Nottingham had been known as 'Dismal' in the world of cheerful reprobates among whom his political life was passed. He had served England faithfully in times very difficult for a man of nice conscience, first under Queen Mary and then under Queen Anne. The elder sister, in deep distress of mind amid servants of doubtful loyalty, wrote to her William, absent at the Boyne :

> Lord Nottingham appears to be sincere, though he does not take much pains to persuade me of it on all occasions, as others do, for he never spoke but once of himself. Yet I confess I incline to have a good opinion of him. It may be his formal, grave look deceives me. He brought me your letter yesterday, and I could not hold, so he saw me cry, which I have hindered myself from before anybody till then.

After 1704 Nottingham never again held a dominant position in any government, though he once again held high office. His room was taken by younger men of suppler mould, like Harley and St. John, to whom 'Church principles' in politics were not a matter of religious conviction, but a force to be evoked or withdrawn as suited best the needs of national welfare or personal ambition.

It did not occur to Queen Anne that because she had quarrelled with some of her High Tory servants she must, therefore, call in their Whig rivals. The places of the fallen ministers were taken by Moderates of their own party. And a few High Tories still remained in office, like Wright and the Duke of Buckingham.* The Godolphin Ministry was reconstituted to support Marlborough in carrying succour to the Empire, but, unlike many war ministries in our history, it did not rest on a 'broad bottom.' It stood on the narrow middle way of Moderate Toryism. Its strength was that it represented the national feeling of the moment; its weakness that most of the politicians were against it. The Whig and High Tory leaders were

MSS. (E.) 28895, f. 316). Yet Nottingham's final resignation is said not to have taken place till May 18. (*Coxe*, Chap. XX, I, pp. 229–230 ; *Feiling*, pp. 373–374.)

As regards Nottingham's character as a man and a gentleman, the terrible accusation made against him by Defoe to Harley in 1704 (*H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 88) ought not, I think, to be believed, in view of his general reputation, without other evidence.

* See Appendix B, below, the Godolphin Ministry.

angry at being out in the cold, and only the happy circumstance that the Houses would not meet again till autumn concealed the narrow basis of Parliamentary support on which the Queen's Government now stood.

Feeble attempts to placate the High Tories by dismissing Whig magistrates continued throughout the critical summer of 1704. In June Harley wrote to the party managers in Westmorland that orders had been given to Lord Keeper Wright 'to remove Fleming,' the Whig Squire of Rydal Hall, from the bench. After announcing this sop, Harley adds, apologetically, that the Duke's march into Germany is the only thing to save the Empire. But these tactics failed to appease the High Tories and infuriated the Whigs, who could not see why they should still be excluded from all share of power, since the Cabinet would next session depend upon their votes. The High Churchmen, led by Rochester and Seymour, declaimed against the waste of English blood and treasure in the cruel wars in High Germany, and threatened the impeachment of Marlborough.[297] Like much else then at hazard in England and in Europe, the Godolphin Ministry could only be saved by a great victory on the shores of the Danube.*

In the extrusion of the High Tory chiefs and the reconstruction of the Government, the Speaker, Robert Harley, had been scarcely less instrumental than in the still greater change in the opposite direction which he conducted six years later. Both in 1704 and in 1710 Harley was guided by a correct sense of the needs and wishes of the country and of the Queen, and on both occasions he worked by his usual method of secret whisperings in the lobby and the back-stairs.

In the reconstructed Ministry the gaps were filled up by Harley and the Tories he brought with him, sworn first

* A popular ballad-monger next winter expressed the situation in simple terms :

> The Duke the Victory did obtain,
> Or else h'had got a Tartar.
> If he had been beaten back again
> Perhaps he had been shorter.

that is, by his head. (*Poems on Affairs of State* (ed. 1707), IV, p. 120.)

and foremost to win the war, prepared therefore to be profuse in protestations of devotion to Sarah and her lord, and not to resent some measure of political understanding with the Whigs. Harley himself became one of the two Secretaries of State : since the other was still the serviceable and unpretentious Hedges, Harley took Nottingham's place as the leading Minister for home and foreign affairs, under Godolphin's general control. He retained the Speakership as well until the dissolution of 1705.

The new Secretary of State was more active than most who held that office in seeking information as to the political opinion in the provinces, and in devising means to influence that opinion through journalism. Perhaps because he himself was so little of an orator in Parliament, Harley realized sooner than any of his colleagues or rivals the relation of public opinion to political power in post-Revolution England. It was not only the Queen, but her subjects whom he approached by the back-stairs. He found the observer, agent and journalist he wanted in Daniel Defoe, a man of shifty and secret ways like himself, of moderate views and kindly nature like himself, like himself of Puritan upbringing, but with a style of writing as lucid and telling as Harley's was slovenly and confused.

Defoe had not stayed long in the prison where his *Shortest way with the Dissenters* had sent him.* Before the end of 1703 Harley and Godolphin had effected his release. And Harley now employed him to travel round England and report. Moving about under an assumed name, he communicated with the Secretary of State by stealth. Defoe was still so unpopular with all parties in Church and State that Harley dared not own him in public. Moreover, both men loved mystery for its own sake. Defoe became Harley's Man Friday, and remained so for long years to come, through many changes of men and measures. As early as 1704 he was writing to his master to urge him to make the Secretaryship of State a ' Prime Ministry without a grievance,' by reforming the lax methods of the office, by courting popularity with all men, by cultivating the middle

* See pp. 281–283, above. On the date of Defoe's release, see *Times Lit. Supp.*, January 26, 1928.

classes, and by protecting the Dissenters. More precise were the reports sent in by Defoe of the political conduct of local magistrates. He showed that in case after case the High Tory Justices of the Peace, whom Wright had appointed in such numbers, were actively working against the Queen's Government, and undermining its position with a view to the next General Election. On the other hand, magistrates more Whiggishly inclined supported the war and the Ministers who waged it. These reports must have helped to draw Harley still further away from his old political connections.

But although Defoe's real name and employer were concealed, it was obvious, wherever he went, that he had some political business in hand and that he openly consorted with Dissenters. He was suspect to the high-flying magistrates in ' Seymour's Western Empire ' of Devon and Cornwall, who threatened to enlist him under the new Recruiting Act as an unemployed rogue ; he was forced sometimes to protect himself with Harley's ' pass.'

Nor was Defoe less diligent to serve his patron in the capacity of journalist. He preached the cause of national unity to win the war, in his able *Review*, appearing three times a week, which he wrote single-handed including the ' correspondence.' While the ordinary newspapers gave news with little comment, the *Review* was profuse in comment with little news. For some years its only rivals in this field were its ally the Whig *Observator* and its enemy the *Rehearsal*, conducted on High Tory lines by the Jacobite Charles Leslie. Of the three, the *Review* was the most moderate in tone and became the most influential. It was only towards the end of the Queen's reign that Swift, Steele and Addison, with their *Examiners*, *Tatlers* and *Spectators*, imitated and surpassed the example of Defoe.[298]

Meanwhile, the vacant places in the reconstructed Ministry were filled up by men of the new Secretary's choosing. Seymour was replaced by Thomas Mansell, a dependent of Harley's, a wealthy and popular Welsh squire. And Harley's friend, St. John, became Secretary at War.*

* See Appendix B, below, the Godolphin Ministry.

Henry St. John had run up his price in the political market by serving as the brilliant spokesman of inarticulate High Tory squires, accustomed heretofore to the old-fashioned ponderosities of Seymour. It is easy to understand why Disraeli felt a special interest in his career. The young deist was in truth no fanatic, and was well able to curb his High Church zeal at the call of patriotism or ambition. In May 1704 both motives appealed to him to change his part, to leave his rustic friends grumbling on the back benches while he pushed his own and his country's fortunes. He became Marlborough's faithful and efficient servant at the War Office. He was twenty-five years of age with the world before him ; his wit, his personal beauty and charm and his rare ability endeared him to the Duke. Two such brilliant men never before or since controlled the military forces of England. If Bolingbroke was to prove the Peterborough of politics rather than the Marlborough, that was still hid in the future. For the present he was content to feed politically out of the hand of his friend Harley, whom he afterwards learnt to hate and despise ; while towards Marlborough the young man felt a hero-worship which future events never wholly extinguished in his mind. More than thirty years later, Bolingbroke wrote of the chieftain he had once broken and exiled :

> I take with pleasure this opportunity of doing justice to that great man, whose faults I knew, whose virtues I admired ; and whose memory, as the greatest general and as the greatest minister that our country or perhaps any other has produced, I honor.[299]

CHAPTER XVII

Gloomy prospects of the alliance in the Spring of 1704. Marlborough's march to the Danube. Storming of the Schellenberg. Occupation and devastation of Bavaria. Arrival of Tallard and Eugene : the lists set.

THE success of England and her allies in the War of the Spanish Succession, which curbed ' the exorbitant power of France ' for eighty years to come, influenced the whole tone of Eighteenth Century civilization in a thousand ways. The defeat of Louis is one of the most prominent facts in history. We are, therefore, apt to forget how very near he came to attaining world-power, by the retention of the whole Spanish Empire as a field of French influence, and by the virtual annexation of the Netherlands and of Italy as jewels in the French Crown. He was never nearer to success than in the spring of 1704. Nothing but the accident of Marlborough's genius, and some lucky turns of fortune in the field that year, diverted the paths of destiny.

If Marlborough had not gone to the Danube, it is likely that the French and Bavarian armies, aided by the Hungarian insurgents, would have taken Vienna, as they had so nearly done the year before. Possibly, owing to the absence of Villars and the presence of Eugene, Vienna would again, in 1704, have escaped capture. But even so, after another inconclusive campaign, the liberation of Europe from French predominance would still have been as far from realization as on the day when the sword had first been drawn. Not to win meant, for the Allies, to be beaten. The Treaty of Grand Alliance had rightly defined the issues of the war : it would be lost if the French remained in Italy or in the Netherlands.* Yet, after two

* See p. 146, above.

years' fighting, they were not only still in the Netherlands, and still in Italy, but in Bavaria as well.

In Italy, it is true, the Allies had gained one advantage ; Savoy had passed over to their side. But Eugene had been recalled from the valley of the Po to save Vienna, and the English Minister at Turin expected that Victor Amadeus would shortly be deposed or forced to change sides once more.* In the neighbourhood of the Netherlands, Marlborough had, in his first campaign, won back the Bishoprics of Cologne and Liège, which the French had occupied two months after the Treaty of Grand Alliance had been signed. But he had made no headway at all towards the recovery of the Spanish Netherlands themselves. Worst of all, he had no prospect of doing so, for on half a dozen several occasions the Dutch had prohibited him from fighting a battle. The march to the Danube was not merely an expedition to rescue Vienna and conquer Bavaria ; it was also the way chosen by Marlborough to escape from the tutelage of his enemies among the Dutch Generals, and so recover freedom to stake the issue of the war on the wager of battle. He knew that, unless something great were done, discouragement and war-weariness would presently dissolve the Alliance. He knew that his time was short, unless he could change the whole atmosphere of the war and set the expectations of friend and foe running in new channels.

Time was on the side of France if the Allies failed to strike an effective blow. A defensive war would serve the purposes of Louis, who had the prize already in his possession. Spain could not desert France. And Louis, though severely feeling the financial strain, was sole master of all the resources of his own kingdom. But Marlborough was dependent on the temper of Parliament and of the English people, Heinsius on the States-General and Dutch opinion, the Empire on the humours of a dozen Princes, any one of whom might refuse again to hire out his troops for another year. Already in May 1703 Marlborough had written, with more truth than grammar, 'you see how little the Empire dose for themselves.' England and Holland paid for almost all that was done. And already the Dutch were

* See p. 307, above.

crying out under the burden : in November 1703 Heinsius wrote to Bentinck that the gallant little Republic had to borrow money at high interest, and even to pay interest on interest, for every new war expenditure or subsidy to the Allies, whereas the more fortunate English were still able to establish funds based on taxation to meet and partially extinguish any new borrowings.[300] Only success could keep the Alliance much longer in being, and in the year 1703 there had been no military success at all. While the Diet at Ratisbon sat under the guard of Franco-Bavarian bayonets, the thought was spreading in the circles of the Empire that the war was already lost.

The domestic crisis in England at the moment of Marlborough's departure had, indeed, brought into office an able and united war ministry of Moderate Tories. But they had no majority of their own in the House of Commons, and would fall as soon as the Houses met in the autumn, unless, before the time for Parliamentary reckoning arrived, Marlborough had achieved a success sufficient to dazzle the Whigs and the multitude, and to stop the mouths of the High Tory opposition. Meanwhile, Scotland was threatening England with invasion and civil war. A few days before the news of Blenheim reached our distracted island, the Scots Parliament extorted England's surrender ; Queen Anne unwillingly consented to sign the Act of Security, a measure abhorred of all men south of the Border except those few who were more Jacobites than Englishmen.* The hold of the reconstructed Godolphin Ministry on Britain was feeble indeed, more like that of the drowning sailor on the spar he has clutched, than of the pilot's hand on the rudder. And so things drifted on all summer, until that happy day in August, when the tidings burst on London that Marshal Tallard was a prisoner in the Duke's coach.†

April–May 1704

* This and other Scottish matters will be treated together fully in the next volume.

† Chatham's redoubtable grandfather, Governor Pitt, wrote from Madras in September 1704 : 'I like not the face of our public affairs abroad or at home. God send a miracle to save old England at last.' A month before he wrote this at the other side of the world, his prayer had been answered on the shores of the Danube. *H.M.C. Dropmore* (1892), I, p. 12.

On the April evening when Marlborough reached the Hague, the trees were putting on their spring green around the Vyver and in the Bosch, and the diplomats and generals of half Europe were patrolling those pleasant alleys in eager dispute as to the plans of the coming campaign. The Duke came from England accompanied by Austrian Wratislaw, with whom he was now in secret conspiracy to bring about an English campaign on the Danube. It would be necessary for Marlborough to take with him to Bavaria not only Her Majesty's forces, native and foreign, but a number of regiments in the pay of the States-General.

April $\frac{10}{21}$ 1704

But how was this to be done? Merely to mention the word 'Danube' to the States-General would have provoked an angry refusal, besides letting the whole world, including the French Marshals, into the secret. When the Duke first arrived at the Hague, the Dutch were so far from contemplating the reconquest of Bavaria that they were calling back from South Germany some foreign regiments in their pay, in spite of loud remonstrances from the Princes of the Empire. The first struggle was to induce the States-General to leave those troops in their southern stations.

After an initial victory on that point, came the real tug-of-war; Marlborough asked leave of the Dutch to go himself on the Moselle campaign. He had adumbrated the plan during his visit to the Hague in February.* But now, in April, the Moselle had become, in his own mind, merely a ruse to deceive friend and foe, a half-way house to the Danube. Writing from the Hague on April 29 (N.S.) he explained his real intentions to Godolphin, who was now, perhaps for the first time, let into the full secret:

> By the next post I shall be able to let you know what resolutions I shall bring these people to; for I have told them I will leave this place on Saturday. My intentions are to march all the English to Coblentz, and to declare here that I intend to command on the Moselle. But when I come there to write to the States that I think it absolutely necessary, for the saving of the Empire, to march with the troops under my command and to join those in Germany that are in Her Majesty's and the Dutch pay, in order to take measures

* See p. 333, above.

> with Prince Lewis for the speedy reducing of the Elector of Bavaria. . . . What I now write I beg may be known to nobody but Her Majesty and the Prince.*

Even Sarah was still left in the dark. The day before, he had written to her:

> I am hagged out of my life, so that I long extremely for Monday, when I intend to leave this place. . . . I shall go myself to Coblentz, to take care that the cannon and other things that are there may be forthwith sent to Treves

But it was not for Treves on the Moselle that the 'cannon and other things' were destined. Possibly the Duke took the view of Shakespeare's *Brutus* as to the chances of a great secret remaining hid with even the most devoted of wives. Some difference—political perhaps—had clouded his domestic bliss at the moment he left England, but Sarah was now kind again, and even wrote proposing to follow him to the field.

> You will see [he replied on May 5], that what you desire is impossible, for I am going up into Germany, where it would be impossible for you to follow me. But love me as you now do and no hurt can come to me. You have, by this kindness, preserved my quiet, and I believe my life; for till I had this letter, I have been very indifferent of what should become of myself. I have pressed this business of going up into Germany in order to leave a good name behind me, wishing for nothing but success. I shall now add, that of having a long life, that I may be happy with you. . . . I do this minute love you better than ever I did before.

Against the proposal of Marlborough to go himself with the main force as far as the Moselle, the States-General put up a strong resistance. Their plan of campaign was that only 15,000 men should be sent to the Moselle, while the rest of the English and Dutch armies stayed under Marlborough to guard Holland. The representatives of Zeeland loudly opposed his departure for Coblentz, lest their province should be exposed to invasion.

At length the patient Duke saw that the moment had

* Viz. the Prince Consort. *For this chapter see Map IX at end of the volume.*

come to force the issue. He announced to the Dutch
May 1–2 (N.S.) 1704 Government his positive intentions of marching to Coblentz with all the troops in Her Majesty's pay, with or without the consent and aid of his allies.

> I am very sensible [he wrote to Godolphin], that I take a great deal upon me. But should I act otherwise the Empire would be undone and consequently the confederacy. . . . If the French shall have joined any more troops to the Elector of Bavaria, I shall make no difficulty of marching to the Danube.

The announcement that he was going to Coblentz, with or without their aid, had an excellent effect on the Dutch. Heinsius had been working on his behalf all this while, and now carried the day. The States-General not only submitted to Marlborough's decision, but allowed him to carry off many of their troops, under Generals such as Goor who were his personal friends, and would help and not hinder his plans. And when, a few weeks later, the States found he had deceived them and was bound not for the Moselle but for the Danube, they made little remonstrance, and never dreamt of recalling the army he had obtained under false pretences. It is true that by that time their fears had been calmed by the fulfilment of a prophecy he had made : he had told them that, as soon as he marched south, large French armies would leave the Netherlands to follow him —and it was so. But English historians should acknowledge that, in the decisive year of the war, the conduct of the Dutch towards Marlborough and the common cause was, from the first week of May onwards, both wise and magnanimous.

Meanwhile, Wratislaw was bombarding the authorities at Vienna with impassioned appeals to initiate at the other end of Europe the movements that were to meet the deliverer of the Empire half way. Marlborough would not go, unless Prince Lewis of Baden, the Imperial General on the Rhine, agreed to the plan of operations on the Danube. With some difficulty his consent was won by pressure from Vienna. But those who knew Prince Lewis best, trusted him least as a colleague in a great crisis. Wratislaw insisted that Eugene must be liberated from the Vienna War Office, and sent to take the field at the head of the other

army of the Empire, with a commission superior, in case of need, to that held by Prince Lewis. This also the Emperor Leopold granted in the middle of May, speaking of it as a heavy sacrifice, made in grateful recognition of Marlborough's efforts to save the House of Hapsburg. One of Wratislaw's letters to the Emperor that month throws light on the thoughts and temper of the Duke, as well as on those of the writer :

> I once more beseech Your Majesty, in God's name, not to lose a moment of time, for the execution of these plans depends on time, and on their execution depends the survival of your house. Marlborough, who has come in while I write these lines, assures Your Majesty that he and his whole army will march into the Empire, resolved to sacrifice their lives or overpower the Elector, for if this does not happen he will be lost both in England and Holland for ever. But if he sees Your Majesty is not in earnest to beat the Elector, he will be obliged to retire at once with his troops.[301]

Owing to his successes in the campaigns of 1702–3, Marlborough now enjoyed the free use of the Maas valley below Namur, and of the Rhine valley as far up as its junction with the Neckar. Otherwise he could hardly have ventured on the dangerous operation of carrying his army from the borders of Holland to the neighbourhood of Mannheim and Heidelberg. In so doing he had to cross the front of the French Marshals and their armies, without any effective covering force between. Speed was the essence of the business, and speed was much increased by the fact that the heavier part of the baggage and artillery, and the hospital stores, which the Duke had carefully collected, were able to come up by water the whole way from the borders of Holland, through Coblentz and Mainz, as far up as Mannheim. The troops, indeed, had to plod through the muddy roads of the Rhineland, and to take with them some at least of the field artillery. It was a rainy May, and the difficulties overcome by Colonel Blood in dragging his guns up the hill roads above Coblentz without delaying the advance of the infantry, show how greatly the speed of the army was increased by the dispatch of the heavier weights by the waterway.[302]

Coming from Holland, the army crossed the Maas by a bridge of boats constructed at Ruremonde, and made *rendez-vous* at Bedburg, whence the great march officially began.* The Duke's friend and secretary, Adam Cardonnel, writing from Maastricht, reckoned the army at 40 battalions and 80 squadrons, 'upwards of 40,000 men, very good troops,' which the enemy would 'not be able to match for goodness.' Of these 16,000 was computed, perhaps with some exaggeration, to be the number of native British troops.† The army would be enlarged, as it passed south and east across Europe, by German, Danish, Prussian, and other nationals, for whose co-operation in the great design elaborate arrangements had been made beforehand in the correspondence of Marlborough and Wratislaw, Prince Eugene and Prince Lewis of Baden. With the Germans, the southward march of the English army was highly popular. One by one the Princes of the Empire, whose troops were involved, were, at Marlborough's instance, let into the secret of their destination for the Danube ; in the middle of May the truth was told to the Elector Palatine, and a few days later to the King of Prussia. The States-General were informed only in the first week in June, when concealment was no longer possible, though Heinsius had known for at least a fortnight, perhaps for more.[303]

May 12 (N.S.) 1704

There were two stages in the deception of Europe. Until Coblentz was reached and passed, all the world expected the English would turn thence up the Moselle valley. At Coblentz great stores had been collected as though for this purpose, but they were sent on up the Rhine after the southward course of the army. But even when the Rhine and Lahn had been crossed, when Coblentz and the rock-fortress of Ehrenbreitstein had sunk from the sight of the marching columns, it was not even then guessed by friend or foe that the Danube was the goal. Alsace, it was now

* *See Maps VIII and IX at end of volume.*

† *Add. MSS.* (*St.*), 7063, ff. 48–49; *Coxe*, Chap. xxi, I, p. 240. The native British troops present at Blenheim were not more than about 9,000 (14 battalions and 14 squadrons), see *Coxe*, Chap. xxvi, I, p. 289. At the beginning of a campaign a battalion of infantry might be 700 and a squadron of cavalry 150. By the middle of a campaign 500 and 120 effectives would be a safer reckoning.

conjectured, was the field of operations chosen by the Duke. A bridge of boats, which he caused the Princes of Germany to throw over the Upper Rhine near Philipsburg, confirmed the Alsatian hypothesis. In that belief, the Dutch sent after him from the Maas seven more battalions and twenty-one squadrons—a friendly act for which he sent warm thanks.* Villeroi had relieved the fears of the Dutch for their frontier by hastening with his army from the Netherlands to the Moselle ; thence he passed southward to join Tallard in Alsace. Marlborough was drawing the whole war in his wake, away from the North Sea into the heart of Europe.

Tallard, meanwhile, had not been inactive on the Upper Rhine. He had, by a bold and clever piece of strategy, outwitted Lewis of Baden, slipped round the German guard on the passes of the Black Forest, and delivered in the Upper Danube valley the year's recruits for Marsin's French army of Bavaria. They were mostly conscript militia, undrilled and ill-armed, ill-fed and over-driven on the march through the mountains, but they numbered 12,000 men. Tallard returned to his own army in Alsace, where he was joined by Villeroi and the army from the Netherlands. The two Marshals spent precious weeks watching, in bewilderment, the southward progress of Marlborough, speculating as to his still uncertain destination, and corresponding with King Louis at Versailles as to the course to be adopted. Their inaction gave the Duke his chance to make the unexpected wheel to the left at the Neckar, and carry his army across to the Danube.

Marlborough's mind had been finally made up on May 23, in the neighbourhood of Bonn and Sinzig, when the ill news arrived that Tallard had safely delivered Marsin's recruits ; the report that reached Marlborough doubled their real number. In grave alarm for Central Germany and Vienna, he then and there dismissed the possibility of any alternative scheme that would keep him

* As late as June 19 he wrote from the passes of the Black Forest to Heinsius : 'I beg you will take care that I receive no orders from the States that may put me out of a condition of reducing the Elector, for that would be of all mischiefs the greatest.' And Heinsius took care. See *Heinsius MSS.*, Appendix A, below.

longer on the Rhine. From Sinzig onwards, he rode ahead with the Allied cavalry on the route that led most quickly to Bavaria, leaving the infantry and guns to follow, a few days behind, under his brother, General Charles Churchill.[304]

In this mood, and in this order of march, he passed from Coblentz over the hill roads to Mainz, and finally crossed the Neckar in the neighbourhood of Heidelberg. Till they reached the Neckar, his troops and officers, even his own brother, did not know whither they were bound. But all were in the highest spirits. Every man felt that he was marching under a great chief towards a great destiny. This time no Dutch Generals would spoil the sport ; somewhere, therefore, at the end of the long road lay battle and victory. The German Princes and peoples of the famous and lovely lands through which they passed turned out to welcome their deliverers. The English, as they wound round the wooded hills crowned with the castles of old romance, as they passed through shouting towns and wondering villages, signalled their goodwill to all and sundry, and had smiles and winks ready for the fraüleins, ' some of them much handsomer,' Lieutenant Pope wrote home, ' than we expected to find in this country.' The Rhine wine, too, was plentiful, and even the so-called beer had qualities of its own. Altogether, the march was a soldier's paradise, tempered by rain. But happy as they all were, the red columns kept up, as they moved along, a running fire of ' oaths and profane language,' harrowing the soul of Cameronian Colonel Blackader, who found ' an army a sad place to be in on Sabbath.'

' Notwithstanding the continual marching, the men are extremely pleased with this expedition,' wrote Marlborough from Mainz, to Lord Treasurer Godolphin : ' so that I am sure you will take all the care possible they may not want.' And never did army, in that era, ' want ' so little. The elaborate preparations of their General's forethought waylaid his men at every turn. When they reached a great river, a bridge of boats was waiting for them, prepared, at the Duke's special request, by the Prince of the land. Every day the troops marched in the grey of the summer's dawn, and several hours before noon reached their camping

ground for next night, having covered their day's march of twelve to fifteen miles. But the Commissaries were at the *rendez-vous* before them, with food for man and beast, so that, in the words of Captain Parker, who saw it all day by day, ' the soldiers had nothing to do but to pitch their tents, boil their kettles and lie down to rest.' ' The remaining part of the day's rest,' wrote Sergeant Millner, ' was nigh as good as a day's halt.'

When the Elector of Mainz reviewed the infantry, he came at the end of the long line to the Battalion of Guards ; ' observing not only their order, but their cleanliness, and their arms, accoutrements, clothes, shoes and linen,' he said to General Churchill, ' Certainly all these gentlemen are dressed for the Ball.'

Contrary to the custom of the wars in High Germany, Marlborough caused everything to be paid for on the nail, ' and to prevent any failure herein he ordered the Treasurer of the Army to be always in cash to answer Bills, and duly to have a month's subsistence beforehand.' With this object, he had established large credits with the bankers of Frankfurt and Nüremberg, whence specie was conveyed to the army as it drew near the Danube, and in the subsequent campaign upon its shores. Shoes reached them by the same route, so that the infantry had been completely reshod before they set foot in Bavaria, ' because shoes and other necessities would not be so easily found in an enemy's country.'

As he passed further and further away from English politics and Dutch leading-strings, the Duke's spirits rose. He was no longer, as at the Hague, ' hagged out of his life.' At Coblentz he had written to Sarah :

> If flattery could make me happy, Count Wratislaw, who came to me yesterday, has said so much from the Emperor that I am ashamed to repeat it to you ; but I hope the Queen will find the good effects of it. For it is certain if these troops I bring had not come to his assistance, he would have run great risk of losing his Crown, which he seems sensible of. I have also the satisfaction of receiving marks of the friendship of the Dutch Generals in Flanders.[305]

It was at Wiesloch, in the plain just south of Heidelberg, that he took his strategic turn to the east, left the Rhine

valley and its French armies behind him, and made off boldly for the Danube. The route lay through pleasant farmlands, between wooded hills. In a few days he struck one of the upper reaches of the Neckar, and skirted Stuttgart to the north. At Mundelsheim, half-way between Rhine and Danube, Prince Eugene rode into Marlborough's camp, and the two rivals in fame, destined ever afterwards to be friends without one thought of jealousy, first met face to face. Marlborough confided his impressions to Sarah : ' Prince Eugene has in his conversation a great deal of my Lord Shrewsbury, with the advantage of seeming franker.' A long secret conference ensued that evening, in the course of which Eugene revealed his distrust of the jealous temper and timid strategy of Prince Lewis of Baden. He imparted a secret of state, which Marlborough sent on to Godolphin in cipher :

June 10 (N.S.) 1704

> Prince Eugene has in great confidence told me the Emperor had given him full power in case he and I should have reason to suspect Prince Lewis acting with zeal for the common cause, to take such measures as not to leave him with the army.

But so desperate an expedient was only to be used in the last emergency. As yet the two friends shrank from offending their colleague, a reigning Prince with troops of his own.[306]

Next day Eugene and Marlborough rode on to Gross Heppach where a review of the cavalry was held.

> His Highness was very surprised to find them in so good a condition after so long a march, and told his Grace that he had heard much of the English Cavalry and found it to be the best appointed and the finest he had ever seen. But, says he, money, which you don't want in England, will buy clothes and fine horses, but it cannot buy that lively air I see in every one of these troopers' faces. To which his Grace replied that that must be attributed to their heartiness for the public cause, and the particular pleasure and satisfaction they had in seeing his Highness.

And so they bowed their big wigs to mingle with their horses' manes, in stately compliment to one another. It was in these honeymoon days that Wratislaw brought an offer from his master Leopold, to make the English Duke a Prince of that Empire for which he had already done so much. Marlborough, with characteristic prudence, declined the glittering prize till he had fully earned it.[307]

While they were still at Gross Heppach, Prince Lewis joined their councils, and the parts were allotted. Eugene should go to the Rhine and do his best to keep the superior forces of Tallard and Villeroi amused in that region, while Marlborough and Prince Lewis reduced Bavaria and compelled its erring ruler to change sides. A few days later the English General received full powers from Secretary Harley to make any treaty he chose with the Elector.[308]

Marlborough would greatly have preferred to take Eugene to the Danube, but it was known that Prince Lewis thought it was due to him that he should go there. To prevent jealousy, the Duke and he agreed, after the fashion of the Roman Consuls of old, that each should command their united forces on alternate days. It might be wagered that the first battle would be fought on one of the days ascribed to Marlborough. Eugene had put him on his guard, and he was at great pains to propitiate his colleague ; Secretary Cardonnel reported :

> We joined the Prince of Baden two days ago, and there seems to be a pretty good harmony between him and my Lord Duke.

So they parted awhile from Eugene, and pushed forward, ever east and south. Since they had left the Rhine, the heavy baggage and artillery could no longer come by water. The cavalry still marched several days ahead of the foot. The greater part of their way still passed through pleasant and gently undulating farm-country, less difficult than the passes of the Black Forest further south by which alone Tallard would reach the Danube from Alsace. Only when they approached the watershed was the road mountainous ; there the long, narrow, wooded, defile beyond Geislingen was threaded, slowly and with labour, while the rain poured down on cursing men and sliding horses, struggling to move guns and waggons stuck deep in the mud. If the enemy at Ulm had sent out even a small force to dispute the pass, the result might have been disastrous.

At length the table lands at the pass top were reached,

and the army began to descend into the valley of the Danube. Though it was the last week in June, the rain still fell in sheets, and Marlborough wrote to Sarah :

> As I am writing, I am forced to have fire in the stove in my chamber. But the poor men, that have not such conveniences, I am afraid will suffer from these continual rains. As they do us hurt here, they do good to Prince Eugene on the Rhine [by immobilizing the superior forces of the French in that region], so that we must take the bad with the good.

The weather caused sickness, but the invalids, well-cared for in hospitals that were set up at Heidenheim, soon recovered and rejoined the ranks. When the united army under Marlborough approached the Danube at Elchingen close to Ulm, the condition in which the soldiers reached the term of their long march greatly added to their fighting strength.[309]

All Europe and all England had eyes turned on the Danube in astonishment and expectation. At home, opinion was divided. The fury of the High Tory leaders knew no bounds at the rape of the English army, vanished into the depths of German forests on the Emperor's quarrel. In the middle of June it was reported :

> There is a greater party forming against my Lord Treasurer and My Lord Marlborough than ever there was against King William's Ministers.

Sir Edward Seymour swore that when the Duke came back they would run him down as hounds do a hare. But outside the ranks of professed politicians, high hopes filled many an English heart that summer. Thomas Coke, the Member for Derbyshire, himself a Moderate Tory, wrote to the Duke in June that the country gentlemen were ' more cheerful about the war ' and more reconciled to the land tax by the news of his great march. Even William Penn, the venerable Quaker, felt a concern for the Duke of Marlborough, bound on ' this mighty march to the Danube with so prodigious an artillery requiring 2000 horse to draw it,' to ' give a turn to the French affairs ; and *may England, poor England, ever prevail.*'[310]

In the last week of June, the joint forces of the Elector of Bavaria and of the French Marshal Marsin were awaiting Marlborough on the Upper Danube. The French had amused themselves that winter and spring by pitilessly robbing the Germans of the towns and villages of Swabia. According to de la Colonie, one of their own countrymen who was there, ' the post of Provost-Marshal was non-existent in this campaign ' ; and on arrival at any fresh camping ground they sent out organized parties to pillage the country. Marlborough, therefore, with his well supplied and well disciplined troops, was welcomed as a deliverer by the German populations, everywhere except in Bavaria.[311]

The Franco-Bavarians at Ulm were inferior to the united forces with which the English and their allies had arrived to overwhelm them. A large part of the Elector's army was scattered about in garrisons in his Bavarian territories, as far away as Munich and the Tirolese frontier, whence they were never withdrawn till Blenheim was lost and won. But Max Emanuel, though overmatched for the moment, was yet in a position far from desperate. If he could hold out a month, Tallard would come from the Rhine with another great French army. Marlborough had got a start, but he had no time to waste. Meanwhile, every fortress on the Danube, from Ulm down to Ingolstadt, was garrisoned by French and Bavarians. And the fortified camp on the north shore of the river, between Dillingen and Lauingen, could shelter their field army until Tallard's arrival. Thither Max Emanuel and Marsin repaired, to avoid giving battle ; Marlborough and Prince Lewis, not daring to attack a position rendered impregnable by redoubts and inundations, passed round Dillingen to the north, by wooded and hilly ways, through Balmershofen and Amerdingen, in the direction of Donauwörth. The infantry had overtaken the cavalry at Gingen, and the Duke, on reviewing them, was delighted at their condition and spirit after footing it all the way from Holland.

Three weeks before, Marlborough had, with remarkable foresight of the position he would find on the Danube, already determined to seize Donauwörth and ' there settle

a magazine for the army.' * His task was to induce Max Emanuel to change sides before Tallard came to the rescue. An agent of the King of Prussia was still in the Bavarian camp, negotiating with the Elector for this purpose, but the Duke believed that the only chance of bringing him to close with the Allies' offers was to invade his territories. That, he hoped, would induce him to abandon the French alliance, already highly unpopular with his subjects and Ministers. But in order to enter and occupy Bavarian territory, Marlborough must rush past the enemy's main army at Dillingen, leaving it between him and his old line of communications. He must, therefore, form new communications, to obtain supplies from the friendly States of Central Germany, by way of Nördlingen and Nüremberg. And he must have a fortified bridge-head and magazine on the Danube, by which these supplies could cross so as to reach him when he was in Bavaria, south of the great river. He had selected Donauwörth to serve this purpose, and he must capture it at every cost.[312]

The enemy also were well aware of the importance of Donauwörth. From their camp at Dillingen, the Elector and Marsin detached 12,000 troops, including 7,000 of the best Bavarian infantry, three regiments of French infantry, twelve squadrons of cavalry and fifteen cannon. This force, under the command of the principal Bavarian General, the Piedmontese Count D'Arco, was charged with the defence of Donauwörth. It could only be conducted on the heights of the Schellenberg, a high domed hill that overshadowed the eastern walls of the town. The steep slopes and the broad open plateau on the summit were covered at that season by growing crops. The Schellenberg had been a place of importance in war since time immemorial. After the battle, the inhabitants of Donauwörth flattered the victors by telling them that the hill had been attacked a dozen times in history and only once before captured—by the great Gustavus himself. The statement was as questionable as most local legends, but in any case the veritable earthwork fort of the Swedish king still crowned the edge of

* *Coxe*, Chap. xxii, I, p. 249, to Godolphin, June 8 (N.S.).

the Schellenberg plateau, on guard over the town and its northern approaches.

D'Arco had several days in which to fortify the hill. With the help of French engineer officers, he started to repair and strengthen the two miles of old entrenchments that connected the fort of Gustavus with the Danube on one side and with the city walls on the other. But as he had no belief that Marlborough would venture to attack him, he was tardy in beginning the work and negligent in pushing it on. So little, indeed, did he scent danger, that when a French officer impudently applied for leave to pursue his amours at Munich, he let the truant go, almost on the eve of battle.

When the unexpected assault took place, the bastions, the curtain, and the ditch were fairly complete on the long east face from the shore of the Danube up to the wood on the hilltop. In the shorter section extending from the wood to the fort, the angle where Marlborough's fierce attack was delivered, the earthwork had been more hastily made up with fascines of brushwood thinly covered over with soil. Here the English visitor can still trace the faint outline of bastions and curtain, once deeply dyed with the blood of his fellow-countrymen ; further on the star-shaped fort of Gustavus, still nearly complete, encloses to-day a peaceful grove. The third or western section of the lines ran steeply downhill from this fort to the city walls, by way of the Calvary since erected in memory of the battle. In this last section there was very little to show by way of defences,* but to compensate for its structural deficiency, the west end of the line could be protected by a flanking fire from the fortifications of the town.

Such was the strength of the Schellenberg. But its very size might on this occasion be a source of weakness. Could D'Arco's 12,000 men hold so long a line against the greatly superior forces of the Allies until the arrival of the rest of the Franco-Bavarian army ? The Elector, indeed,

* In the local museum at Donauwörth is a large painting of the town and neighbourhood, dated 1725, in which the lines round the Schellenberg are represented as extant to the north and east of the fort, but non-existent between the fort and the town.



was hastening from Dillingen to Donauwörth, having got wind of the allied movements. It was a race against time, a game which Marlborough was peculiarly fitted to win. July 2 was one of the alternate days when it was his turn to command. When authority for the next twenty-four hours passed into his hands at midnight, fifteen miles of execrable road divided his sleeping army from the Schellenberg. But he knew that, unless he stood upon its conquered summit before night fell, it would never be taken at all, and he would never set foot on the southern shore of the Danube. For on the morrow Prince Lewis was most unlikely to take the responsibility of attacking. And in the course of that morrow not only would the earthworks be completed, but the main Franco-Bavarian army would arrive to defend them.

And so, at three o'clock, scarcely waiting for the summer dawn, the Duke took the road with an advanced guard of 5,800 picked troops who were to begin the assault. The rest of the army started at five.

July 2 (N.S.) 1704

The roads, very different from those of our own day, were deep in mud, and the forced march demanded a continuous effort of will and muscle. It would have been an ill preparation for battle at the close of day if they had not been seasoned troops, kept in condition by the constant care of their great captain. The engineers went ahead to improve the worst passages for the cannon, and to throw a bridge of boats across the Wörnitz, side by side with the stone bridge at Ebermergen.

Marlborough himself, riding far ahead, examined the enemy's position at nine in the morning. He observed through his telescope that a camp was being prepared on the other side of the Danube from the Schellenberg, evidently for the reception of the main Franco-Bavarian army next day. About the same hour a messenger reached him from Eugene that Tallard was gathering his forces at Strasbourg to cross the Black Forest and join the Elector. There was indeed no time to be lost. It wanted twelve hours before dark, and those hours were his, though his men were still cursing and struggling in the mud, miles away behind the Wörnitz.

Prince Lewis joined him in his morning reconnaissance, and together they closely examined the enemy's lines under fire from his cannon, and laid the plan to be executed that evening as soon as their troops should arrive. Marlborough had been courteously careful to consult the Prince the night before as to the proposed attempt, and both commanders did their duty well that day. Baden was indeed a competent, though an unenterprising officer, fit to be second in command but, unfortunately, aspiring always to the chief rôle. On a day of his own responsibility, he would never have ordered the attack on the Schellenberg. Indeed, Marlborough's decision to attack that evening was, we are told, taken against the opinion of most of the generals.

It was between five and six o'clock that the advance guard and Colonel Blood's artillery reached the scene of operations. There would just be time before nightfall to storm the position on its north side, where the attacking army found itself, but there would not be time to pass round the wood on to the east of the Schellenberg and develop simultaneous attacks on the far-flung lines from more sides than one. For this reason the Allied army lost much of the advantage of superior numbers ; the front of attack must be relatively narrow, for want of time to deploy to the full extent. Even the wood on the hill-top had to be avoided, as the brushwood was too dense for orderly operations ; therefore the attack could not be developed on the flat summit of the Schellenberg, but had to be delivered mainly up the steepest part of the slope immediately to the north of Gustavus' fort, where the entrenchments followed the very edge of the plateau. The English, on the extreme left wing of the Allied attack, skirted the wood as closely as possible without passing through it.*

The plan agreed upon was that Marlborough, with his own polyglot army of troops in English and Dutch pay, should assault the angle between the fort and the wood so fiercely as either to carry it at a rush or, at least, to draw thither the whole of the enemy's force. An hour later Lewis of Baden's Imperialists would be arriving on the

* I think the end of the wood was a trifle further back than its present extent (1930), though not much.

scene. They would then be able to march straight in, near the town walls, over the uncompleted lines, which would, it was hoped, be stripped by that time of all save a handful of defenders. This scheme of operations, dependent on the ardour of Marlborough's containing attack, would be costly of life, but it was the only way to take the Schellenberg before dark, and therefore the only way to take it at all.

Under cover of the smoke of the village of Berg, which the enemy had set ablaze, Colonel Blood erected his batteries on that opposing hill, and began to fire across the valley at the death-angle between the fort and the wood. The English cannon balls plunged at long bowls into the ranks of the enemy's reserve, and, according to de la Colonie, killed eighty grenadiers of his regiment before the infantry fighting began. An Imperialist battery soon afterwards took up its station beside the English.

At six o'clock, Marlborough's advanced guard of picked men—English, Scots, Dutch, Hanoverians, Hessians, and other German nationals—moved to the attack, up and along the steep slopes of the Schellenberg. A forlorn hope of fifty grenadiers of the English Guards was led on in front of the rest by Lord Mordaunt, Peterborough's eldest son, who alone with ten others of that gallant company survived unwounded. The battalions coming on behind were mowed in swathes ; scores and hundreds fell together. A battery of guns in the death-angle tore their closed ranks to pieces with grapeshot. Musketry volleys from the earthworks did frightful execution. The Dutch General Goor, deservedly a favourite with Marlborough, fell dead at the head of the Hollanders. Those English who reached the trenches raised a hoarse hurrah ; even in that moment of universal uproar it struck a chill into the enemy commanders, one of whom ordered his drums to beat lest the islanders' cheer should discourage his men. Next moment assailants and defenders were at handgrips on the parapet, ' tearing at the muzzles of guns and the bayonets which pierced their entrails,' as the same officer described it. The Bavarians charged and drove the assailants down the hill and along the woodside. But the English Guards,

though already cruelly mauled, drove them back in turn within their lines.

Under cover of the Guards' charge the broken assault was rallied in hollow ground out of sight of the enemy. For awhile the defenders could only see the tops of the standards round which the Allies were gathering for another attack. Then it came, as bloody and as unsuccessful as the first. Again the red-coats of the English and the blue-coats of the Dutch service advanced side by side in perfect order, their general officers leading them on foot, sword in hand. Again they were mowed down in hundreds round the death-angle. The German General, Styrum, fell, mortally wounded. Again the attack reeled back, followed by the Bavarian sortie. Lumley brought up the English horse and again drove back the pursuers.

Twice the assault had failed to carry the lines, but it had done its work. The Bavarians and French had been concentrated in thousands to defend the death-angle, and the line between the fort and the town was no longer held by more than a skeleton force. The Prince of Baden's Imperialist infantry were arriving on the scene. He led them straight at the lines, passing within musket shot of the town. The cannon of the city fortifications played on their flank, but the French infantry, whom D'Arco had ordered to be put into the covered way beneath the walls, had, by some misunderstanding, never been placed there, and the cannon fire alone could not stop the advance of Baden's men. Almost unresisted in front, they crossed the lines of the Schellenberg at their weakest point. Wheeling to the left, with their backs to the enemy cannon on the wall, they marched up the steep slopes into the flank and rear of the Bavarians in the death-angle. A charge of cavalry down the hillside failed to break their ranks. Up they came, bringing on their bayonets the well-planned victory.

The moment of the day had come. The allied infantry on the hilltop moved forward to their third attack on the death-angle, this time with better fortune. The approach of fresh troops on their rear at last aroused the instinct of self-preservation even in the firm breasts of the Bavarian infantry. The kaleidoscope of battle was shaken, and in

a moment the broad plateau was covered by thousands fleeing for their lives, while the British, Dutch and German foot rushed after them, the islanders crying out ' Kill, kill and destroy.' Lord John Hay's Scots Dragoons or ' Scots Greys ' had dismounted, to follow their noble Colonel over the enemy trenches as part of the final infantry attack ; then remounting their white horses, they headed the pursuit over the top of the Schellenberg.

Marlborough entered the captured lines with the foremost squadrons of the English cavalry. These he let loose upon the flying foe, while he called off his exhausted foot to rally round their standards, secure the position, and lend aid to the surgeons amid the piles of wounded. Galloping forward once more, he reached the southern edge of the plateau, and in a moment the full panorama of victory was revealed. It was near sunset, but there was light enough to see, beyond the Danube, the vast open plains, deep in standing corn and circled with dark forests, those southern plains which the capture of Donauwörth would open to his advance. To the south-east lay the straight, wooded line of the Lech, marking the boundary of Bavaria, now at his mercy. At his feet stretched the broad, silver ribbon of the Danube, which he had come so far to find, henceforth for ever associated with his name. The bridge of boats, which D'Arco had laid across it below the town, was breaking up beneath the weight of madly-struggling fugitives ; many had crossed ; many were drowning in the river or trying to steer the drifting boats ; many who had been cut off on the northern shore could be seen running for their lives among the reed-beds or the corn, vainly endeavouring to avoid the rise and fall of the sabres of the red-coated horsemen. Looking to the east, Marlborough could see another dark mass of fugitives near the village of Zirgesheim, straining to escape from the pursuing squadrons into the wooded hills beyond. Only to the west he could detect a few battalions, who had found their way into the streets of Donauwörth, crossing the Danube by the town bridge in tolerable order. Then darkness fell and the scene was blotted out. And, with the darkness, sheets of rain descended in pitiless brutality on the maimed and dying

men, gathered from all the four quarters of Europe to perish together on that tragic hill.

With the return of daylight all the wounded who could be moved were sent off to the hospitals that the Duke had had prepared beforehand at Nördlingen in readiness for the battle. The Allies confessed a loss of 1,400 killed and 4,000 wounded : these figures included 1,500 of the pick of the English and Scottish armies. Of the British engaged every third man had fallen. Of the general officers of the Allies no less than seven had been killed as they marched at the head of their troops to the attack, and nine wounded, including Prince Lewis of Baden ; most of them were German princes and noblemen, a class that had well borne its part that day.

D'Arco tried to minimize his disaster by dwelling with truth on the greater number of the Allied losses in the actual conflict at the death-angle. But in the pursuit and dispersion that followed, his own losses had risen to an unknown quantity of great dimension. There were at least 2,000 prisoners, and the drowned and the deserters were very numerous. According to the French marshals, those few who rejoined the standards arrived without arms and in a state of complete demoralization. ' I have ruined the best of the Elector's foot,' wrote the Duke to the Duchess. When he allowed his chaplain and historiographer, Dr. Hare, to claim that only three out of the twelve thousand defenders of the Schellenberg were left in service, this estimate, though too precise to be certain, was not inconsistent with the general tone of the reports that reached Marshal Tallard. D'Arco's fifteen field pieces, his baggage, and his stores were prizes to the victor, besides Donauwörth, its fortifications and cannon ; for, contrary to the Duke's expectation, the town was at once abandoned after the battle by the enemy, who left after an ineffectual attempt to set it on fire. Marlborough had won his bridge-head over the Danube and secured a line of communications by which his supplies from central Germany could reach his army as it advanced into Bavaria. He had put himself between the French and Vienna. He stood, moreover, between the Elector and his unfortunate country.[313]

It was a notable victory, and it rang through Europe. Shrewsbury wrote to Marlborough from Rome, ' In this holy, ignorant city they have an idea of you as of a Tamerlane ; and had I a picture of old Colonel Birch with his whiskers, I could put it off for yours, and change it for one done by Raphael.' And he added, to another friend, ' A year ago I was so ill in the opinion of the Pope that it was a crime to go near me ; now that they fear the Duke of Marlborough and his red-coats should come to Italy, His Holiness does nothing but commend me.' At Vienna, wrote Stepney, ' the whole Court is quite changed,' and the British minister was loaded with exultant congratulations. Ratisbon was hastily evacuated by the Bavarian troops, and the Diet of the Empire sat there liberated from the armed force of the anti-German party. Neuberg also was evacuated, and except for Ingolstadt the whole line of the Danube from Donauwörth down to Vienna was once more in Allied hands. ' It is very plain,' wrote Marlborough two days after the battle, ' that if Her Majesty's troops had not been here, the Elector of Bavaria had now been at Vienna.' To the generality of Englishmen at home, as to Lord Hervey, ' the news of the late noble action on the Danube was too full of wonder to let one speak at all upon't at first hearing.' Martial victories of this kind over a foreign foe were new to the islanders, recalling dim traditions of Crecy and Agincourt.

Such were the moral and material effects of the Schellenberg, even before Blenheim decided the still uncertain issue of the struggle on the Danube. Till then, the French kept up their spirits by speaking of the immense losses of the Allies at the death-angle. The High Tories took up the same tale to disparage the Duke ; nothing alienated him more from his old political associates than to learn that Rochester and his friends ' took the action at Donauwörth not to be a victory.' Up till this time he had been accustomed to complain to Sarah that ' your friend the *Observator*,' the ultra-Whig paper, was ' malicious ' towards Moderate Tory government, while devoting most of its space to exposing the iniquities of ' Jacks,' Non-jurors and ' Highflyers,' and paying little attention to the Duke's

operations of war. But on the news of the Schellenberg, the *Observator* discovered the necessity of supporting Marlborough, and did full justice to that victory and afterwards to Blenheim, while it treated with scorn the news of the capture of Gibraltar by the Tory Rooke, as 'an amphibious relation of taking a Spanish town.'[314]

The victory of the Schellenberg put a sharp end to friendly relations with Prince Lewis, who was jealous of the fame his English colleague acquired that day. The Duke clearly perceived that he would never again get the Prince's consent to fight a battle.

But if Prince Lewis was turning hostile, the rest of the army was devoted to Marlborough. A week after the victory he wrote to Sarah :

> I have the pleasure to find all the officers willing to obey, without knowing any other reason than that it is my desire, which is very different from what it was in Flanders, where I was obliged to have the consent of a Council of War for everything I undertook.[315]

Throughout the month of July the Prince and the Duke, in spite of growing alienation, had a single object in common —to occupy Bavaria and so compel Max Emanuel to change sides, as the price at which he might have back his hereditary dominions. Negotiations for this purpose were going on all the time. The Elector had been deeply depressed by the disaster of the Schellenberg. As a soldier of old experience in the Turkish wars, he knew a defeat when he saw one, and for the first time felt real alarm for the ultimate outcome of the campaign. For a fortnight after the battle he was inclined to listen seriously to the diplomatic offers of the Allies, backed by their military occupation of a large part of his territories.

The invasion of Bavaria was the more easily effected because, since Neuberg and Ratisbon had fallen into Marlborough's hands, he could fetch supplies and ammunition from central Germany across the Danube by a number of different routes. He was always anxious about the feeding of his Englishmen.

> Our greatest difficulty [he wrote to Godolphin on July 6], is that of making our bread follow us ; for the troops that I have the honour to command cannot subsist without it, and the Germans that are used to starve cannot advance without us. The Duke of Würtemberg has sent orders to his country for two hundred waggons, to help bring our stores, and I have promised to pay them for a month, which time I hope will finish our business in this country [by a Treaty with the Elector.]

To the Duchess he wrote : 'I have it now in my power that the poor soldiers shall not want bread.' But the British soldier does not live by bread alone.

> His Grace [so his Chaplain records] was at the same time providing Beer for the Army at Aicha. The furnaces and other conveniences for brewing being out of order, His Grace commanded the inhabitants to repair them and to set all their brewers to work.[316]

He had solved the problem of food supply, but the question of siege guns and ammunition proved more difficult. By great efforts he had brought his own field batteries all the way from Holland, but for heavy cannon it had been agreed that he should depend on German supply. At the siege of the walled market town of Rain, commanding the entrance to Bavaria, the big guns arrived late, the ammunition for them was short and the German gunners unskilful, protracting the siege of the little place for several unnecessary days. For lack of a proper siege train the Duke had most reluctantly to abandon his original design of besieging Munich, by which he had hoped to bring the Elector speedily to terms.[317]

July 10–16 (N.S.) 1704

Max Emanuel, meanwhile, had taken up an impregnable position at Augsburg, outside Bavarian territory, on the west shore of the Lech, where the Allies from the east bank could not come at him. Marsin's French army was with the Bavarian, and from Augsburg they could easily move to join Tallard as soon as he debouched from the Black Forest. Marlborough and Prince Lewis marched by way of Aicha to Friedberg opposite Augsburg, where they lay from July 22 to August 3 watching the enemy across the river and at least preventing him from entering Bavaria or drawing from it any supplies.

While Marlborough was lying thus on the banks of the

Lech, reduced to relative impotence by the want of an adequate siege train, the politico-military situation had become decidedly less hopeful than it had been a fortnight before. The first effects of the Schellenberg had been exhausted. Tallard was on his way, bringing to the Elector the relief promised him by Louis XIV of 35,000 more French troops. As soon as Max Emanuel was persuaded that help was really coming, he broke off the treaty with the Allies on the very day that an agreement was expected. For three years past he had so many times come off and on in bargaining with both sides, that Marlborough and Prince Lewis did not yet despair ; but for the moment they had failed.

July 15 (N.S.) 1704

Partly, perhaps, from natural indignation with this slippery negotiator, the Allied commanders intensified the policy of devastating his territory, which they had already begun on July 12, before the breakdown of the parleys. On the 16th, in announcing to Heinsius the temporary failure of the treaty, Marlborough added : 'We are advancing into the heart of Bavaria to destroy the country and oblige the Elector one way or the other to a compliance.'

It is clear from this that he hoped to appeal to Max Emanuel through the sufferings of his people—a political proceeding of doubtful morality. It was also a military measure intended to prevent the French and Bavarian armies from being able to support themselves from the produce of the Elector's territory—'to deprive the enemy as well of present subsistence as future support on this side,' as he wrote to Stepney.

A man of proved humanity in the conduct of war, Marlborough was secretly ashamed of a method which recalled the more thorough-going proceedings of Louis XIV's generals in the Palatinate in the dozen years before, which had raised a universal outcry. He confessed his feelings to his wife :

> We sent this morning (July 30) 3,000 horse to his chief City of Munich, with orders to burn and destroy all the country about it. This is so uneasy to my nature that nothing but an absolute necessity would have obliged me to consent to it. For these poor people suffer only for their master's ambition. There having been no war in this country above sixty years, their towns and villages are so clean and neat you would be pleased with them.*

He had not, indeed, the heart to carry out such a policy to its logical conclusion.

> It was with great reluctance [writes his Chaplain], that his Grace saw all the country on fire about him, and therefore he ordered a stop to be put to it, in hopes that the peasants would return to the villages that were yet standing, and reap the corn which was beginning to be shed as it stood, and whole fields were thereby spoiled and lost. His Grace also spared the woods, which are stately and numerous in this country, consisting entirely of tall fir trees and pinasters.

But since the Elector could hardly have supported his troops on fir-cones there seems no particular merit in that piece of forbearance.

Accounts differed as to the actual amount of damage done. De la Colonie, a French officer in the Bavarian service writes :

> I followed a route through several villages said to have been reduced to cinders, and although I certainly found a few burnt houses, still the damage was as nothing compared with the reports current through the country.[318]

The Elector cared for none of these things. He had recovered his hopefulness after the first shock of the Schellenberg. He had decided to pin his faith on the arrival of Tallard. With a little constancy he might not only recover Bavaria but dethrone the Hapsburgs and make Munich instead of Vienna the seat of the Empire. He felt no enthusiasm for the French cause as such, for he had fought against Louis XIV in previous wars. But if he rejoined the Allies now, though he would make sure of his Bavarian inheritance, he could never be Kaiser, and he would lose the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands, a lucrative

* Captain Parker, who was there, tells us in his *Memoirs* (p. 85) that 'the Duke of Marlborough would not suffer any of the troops that were immediately under him to go out on that burning command.' This may well be so, but I think the English took part in the daily destruction as they passed along the route. On July 19 an English officer, Noyes, writes : 'Hitherto we burnt and plundered almost all the villages right and left, which indeed are very frequent and very fine in this country. In this last march particularly we entirely burnt a mighty pretty village with a noble church and cloister' (*Cam. Univ. Lib. MSS., Add.* 40. *doc. no.* 17).

and delightful office, to which he had grown accustomed through long years, and which he now held by the goodwill of France. He had learnt to love the Netherlands almost as much as his hereditary German territory on the Danube. It never occurred to him in July 1704 that Marlborough would ever drive him out of Brussels as well as out of Munich.

But while he was ready for the present to abandon much of Bavaria to the enemy, in the hope of a speedy and triumphant return, he was not thorough-going in his acceptance of the situation from a military point of view. His wife and family were at Munich, and he left large forces in his capital and other favourite spots in the delightful regions of southern Bavaria, to protect them, not only against Marlborough, but against Austrian detachments that were returning from Italy through Tirol. In July he sent 8,000 more troops from Augsburg to join these defenders of his property, reserving only a fraction of his army to join to the French under Marsin and Tallard. These half-and-half methods were false strategy. Since he had chosen to fight his way back to his territories, he ought to have drawn out every man to swell the ranks of the Grand Army in the day of battle.[319]

Meanwhile Tallard was arriving. His passage of the Black Forest had been unopposed, but had been conducted in a manner that augured ill for the quality both of the commander and of his troops. When the empire of the world depended on his movements, and perhaps on his speed, Tallard wasted a week before the utterly unimportant town of Villingen, and failed to take it after all. And his troops, like Marsin's before them, did as the French seem always to have done in Germany during this war—plundered to their hearts' desire ; according to one of Tallard's officers, the peasantry of the Black Forest were rendered so desperate that they killed as many as a thousand marauders before the French army reached the plains of the Danube.[320]

In the first twelve days of August affairs moved rapidly towards the grand climax, which was utterly unexpected by everybody except Marlborough and Eugene.

The English army, although the Duke described it at the end of July as ' full of courage and desiring nothing more ' than a battle, hardly hoped for such luck, and was beginning to suffer from a sense of inconclusiveness and failure. Even Adam Cardonnel, the Duke's familiar secretary, fell a prey to the general dejection, and on August 7 wrote home to Matt. Prior :

> We have made no great progress since our success at Schellenberg, except that it be burning and destroying the Elector's country, wherein we have not been sparing ; our last march was all in fire and smoke. We are now going to besiege Ingolstadt, and I wish to God it were well over that I might get safe out of this country.[321]

On the day that Cardonnel was writing in this mood, Tallard was effecting his junction with Marsin and the Elector at Biberbach, ten miles north of Augsburg. If Eugene had behaved as any ordinary general would have done in the circumstances and remained on the Rhine with his army to watch that of Villeroi, Marlborough and Prince Lewis would have been overmatched upon the Danube and the war in all probability lost. But Eugene played Blucher to Marlborough's Wellington. Taking with him a force of 18,000 men including the magnificent infantry of Prussia, he came by rapid marches along the north shore of the Danube, parallel with the route of Tallard. To save the Allied cause in the principal theatre of war, he deliberately ran the risk of leaving an inferior force on the Rhine.

The time, therefore, was short. In a week or two Villeroi would cross the Rhine, make himself master of Würtemberg, ' ruin the circle of Swabia,' and send on fresh forces to join the great French armies already gathered on the Danube. Moreover, the Elector had at last sent orders to the large Bavarian detachments on the Tirolese border to rejoin the main army. Marlborough and Eugene must defeat Tallard and Marsin at once, or all south Germany would be lost, and the boasted march on the Danube would prove as dismal a failure as Seymour and Rochester had foretold. The Allies, indeed, could not maintain themselves in the Bavarian territories they had ravaged, while the largest army in Europe threatened their communications

with central Germany. For already on August 10, Tallard, Marsin and the Elector had recrossed to the north shore of the Danube at Dillingen, threatening to march thence upon Eugene's isolated force that lay between Höchstädt and Donauwörth.

The crisis was now at hand. Prince Eugene visited the Duke's camp near Schrobenhausen and the two friends secretly laid their plan. They knew that they must at once fight and win a battle, or Europe would be permanently subjected to the power of the Grand Monarch. The Hungarian rebels were ravaging Austria within thirty miles of its capital. In Italy, the Duke of Savoy was in desperate straits, appealing to Vienna for the protection of which that city itself was in such sore need.* To save Germany and Italy a battle must be fought, if necessary at considerable odds. But Lewis of Baden, in his present temper, would never agree to attack a powerful army in a strong position. The two friends, therefore, thought it cheap to secure his absence from their counsels at the price of 15,000 men. With no less a force he was induced to undertake the honourable task of besieging Ingolstadt, the only enemy stronghold on the Danube between Vienna and Dillingen. Marlborough and Eugene consented to 'cover' the siege for their princely colleague—a very modest function to all appearance!

So Prince Lewis went off contentedly to sit down before Ingolstadt. Relieved of the incubus of his share in the command, Marlborough, from the neighbourhood of Rain, hastened to recross the Danube and, on August 11, joined Eugene's forces at Münster on the northern shore, where his friend's smaller army was threatened by the united forces of the enemy, coming from Dillingen by way of Höchstädt.

* *P.R.O., S.P.*, 105, 73, ff. 86, 106. On August 16, three days after Blenheim had been fought, but one day before the news reached Vienna, Stepney, the English Minister there, wrote to Hill, the English Minister at Turin: 'To-morrow, we are to consider what representation may move the Duke of Marlborough to concert with Prince Eugene some means of sending you a present succour from the Empire. But I am afraid they will say our own child is first to be christened. And if their campaign ends with the taking of Ingolstadt, we shall have almost as uneasy a neighbourhood as you are likely to have this winter.'

The day before he recrossed the Danube, the Duke wrote to Heinsius and to Godolphin in exactly similar terms:

> When Prince Eugene and I are joined our army will consist of 160 squadrons and 65 battalions. Prince Lewis has with him for the siege 31 squadrons and 24 battalions.* The French make their boast of having a great superiority, but I am very confident they will not venture a battle. But if we find a fair occasion we shall be glad to venture it, being persuaded that the ill condition of our affairs in most parts requires it.[322]

Whether the forces that the two French Marshals and the Elector had with them on the day of battle were a few thousands more or less than those of Eugene and Marlborough can never be ascertained with certainty. Approximately, the opposing forces at Blenheim were equal in number, over fifty and under sixty thousand a side, but the French had a very decided advantage in artillery.

The reasons that made it imperative for the Allied Generals to fight ought to have made the French no less determined to refuse battle. Tallard knew this as well as Marlborough or Eugene. A diplomat of high intelligence, whose advice, if it had been taken by Louis XIV, would have prevented the formation of the Grand Alliance,† he well understood the situation of Europe in August, 1704. He believed that if a battle could be avoided till the troops went into winter quarters, the war was practically won. Not only the Netherlands and Italy, but Baden and Würtemburg were now in French hands, and Bavaria would certainly be recovered if only they would sit still for a few weeks.

But Tallard, though he lacked nothing in intelligence, was wanting in firmness. His training as a diplomat made him dread an open quarrel and seek always for a compromise. But in war, compromise is less often possible

* Compare the very similar figures in *Feldzüge*, p. 496. At this stage of the campaign, it is likely a squadron on the average contained about 120 effective cavalry and a battalion not more than 500 infantry. In that case, Prince Lewis had about 12,000 infantry and 3,700 cavalry and Eugene and Marlborough fought Blenheim with about 32,500 infantry and about 18,000 cavalry.

† See pp. 135–136, above.

than in diplomacy. One must fight or one must avoid a battle ; half measures are impossible. Unfortunately for Tallard, he was associated with Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria, who both fancied themselves as soldiers of old experience, and were both eager to win immortal laurels by delivering the decisive blow of the war on a stricken field.*

Unfortunately, too, no one was in supreme command. The army moved under the orders of a Triumvirate. Tallard afterwards wrote that the lesson of Blenheim was ' to have only one man in command of an army.' He himself could give any orders he liked to his own force of nearly 35,000 men, but Marsin and the Elector were equally supreme over their joint army, which was probably less than 25,000, as the Bavarians present were a mere handful. Tallard, therefore, if he had had the requisite strength of character, could have refused to move the majority of the troops, without whom his colleagues could not have offered battle. But he was fatally influenced by a number of considerations : he was only one to their two ; one of them was a Prince for whose favour all the diplomatists of Europe were contending ; the feeling of the great body of French and Bavarian officers was all for a battle, and the forward party threatened him with ' a hundred letters ' denouncing him at Versailles if he refused to fight. Under these pressures only a really strong man would have held out. Tallard consented to a series of compromises between the policy of refusing and the policy of seeking battle, which finally landed them all in the disaster. He was dragged into the battle of Blenheim by others, very much as Aberdeen was dragged into the Crimean War.

Tallard's intention, when the joint force first crossed from Biberbach to the north of the Danube, was to remain

* I have adopted Tallard's own account of these disputes between himself and his two colleagues. (*Pelet* IV, pp. 562–566, printed in *Select Docs.*, pp. 118–121). It is first-hand evidence and very detailed. Some partisans of Marsin and the Elector afterwards declared that those two had wished not to fight and had been overruled by Tallard (*Select Docs.*, p. 133 ; *Colonie*, p. 224). But these assertions were not made by anyone present at the conferences, and Marsin makes no such claim in his narrative, which slurs over the subject of these councils before the battle, see his letter in *Lediard, Marl.* I, p. 409 ; see also pp. 424–425 for a witness in support of Tallard's story. Neither is Tallard's account of the matter at all flattering to his own strength of character : it does not read like a made-up tale.



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in the impregnable fortified camp at Dillingen until winter. But his colleagues would not hear of it, and soon persuaded him to move to Höchstädt, in the hope of falling on Eugene's 18,000 men before Marlborough had had time to join him. At Höchstädt was another position, almost as impregnable as that of Dillingen ; the broad marshes round the Pulverbach could not have been forced by the Allies as the smaller marshes of the Nebel were forced two days later. At Höchstädt, therefore, Tallard very wisely proposed to remain. Another fierce quarrel ensued. The Elector wished to march straight ahead and attack Eugene even if Marlborough had already joined him. It was agreed as a compromise that they should move forward by the great road across the Pulverbach marshes, and occupy the plains between Lutzingen and Blenheim. There they could lie protected by the Nebel marshes till they had discovered what was the real force of the enemy before them—whether Marlborough was with Eugene and whether Baden was there also. And so, in the greatest confusion of counsel, divided between offensive and defensive ideas of strategy, ignorant of the force of the enemy and still more ignorant of the amazing intention of the enemy commanders, the great host took up as a camping ground a position which was destined to prove a battlefield and the grave of the military reputation of the old French Monarchy.

Aug. 12 (N.S.) 1704

Tallard, clinging to caution till the last, the more so as he wrongly believed Baden's army to have joined those of Marlborough and Eugene, proposed that entrenchments should be thrown up on the road where it crossed the Nebel, and that the little stream should be dammed up to deepen the water of its marshlands. Both proposals were laughed out of court by the more prominent of the French and Bavarian officers, who had come to regard Tallard as an old woman. But he so far had his way as to set his own men to fortify the approaches of Blenheim village.

So the army set up its tents on the great open stubble-field, four miles in breadth, that stretched, unbroken by a hedge, from the Danube at Blenheim to the pine-clad hills above Lutzingen. While the quartermasters were

marking out the site of the camp, and while the columns of white-coated French infantry were moving at leisure over the plain to take up their appointed stations, two telescopes were directed upon the scene from the steeple of Tapfheim church, five miles away. Marlborough and Eugene had ridden out from Münster to see whether or not the enemy's main army had come out from behind the marshes of Höchstädt, and whether it was in a position where it could, with reasonable hazard, be attacked. What they saw filled them with a sober exaltation, and then and there they formed their great resolve. It stands on record that very few of the more responsible officers in the Allied army would have ventured to attack such a force so posted, except the two men of military genius who happened to be in sole command.*

* Cardonnel, the Duke's Secretary, wrote: 'The Duke of Marlborough no doubt knew the necessity of a battle better than any of us, for I believe, had the opinion of a majority of us prevailed, we should not have been for it under our circumstances' (*Select Docs.*, p. 111, from *Add. MSS.*, 28918, ff. 287–288).

And Lord Orkney, one of the very best of Marlborough's subordinates, wrote: 'I confess it is entirely owing to my Lord Duke, for I declare, had I been to give my opinion, I had been against it, considering the ground where they were camped and the strength of the army. But his Grace knew the necessity there was of a battle.' *E.H.R.*, Ap. 1904, p. 311. For the Tapfheim tower episode, see *Dispatches*, I p. 396.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII

The 'Geography' of the March to the Danube

A piece of literature about the campaign of Blenheim which will probably survive even the stirring couplets of Addison's *Campaign*, is the conversation in *Tristram Shandy* between Corporal Trim and Uncle Toby on the uses of geography in war.

What business, added the Corporal triumphantly, has a soldier, an' please your Honour, to know anything at all of *geography*? . . . Thou wouldst have said *chronology*, Trim, said my uncle Toby; for as for geography, 'tis of absolute use to him. . . . Is it else to be conceived, Corporal, continued my uncle Toby, rising up in his sentry-box as he began to warm in this part of his discourse—how Marlborough could have marched his army from the banks of the Maes to Belburg; from Belburg to Kerpenord—(here the Corporal could sit no longer)—from Kerpenord, Trim, to Kalsaken; from Kalsaken to Newdorf; from Newdorf to Loudenbourg; from Loudenbourg to Mildenheim; from Mildenheim to Elchingen; from Elchingen to Gingen; from Gingen to Balmerchoffen; from Balmerchoffen to Skellenbourg, where he broke in upon the enemy's works, forced his passage over the Danube, crossed the Lech—pushed on his troops into the heart of the Empire, marching at the head of them through Friburg, Hockenwert and Schonevelt, to the plains of Blenheim and Hochstet. Great as he was, Corporal, he could not have advanced a step, or made a single day's march without the aids of geography.

All these places that Uncle Toby mentions will be found in Map IX at the end of this volume, except Schonevelt, which is close to Rain in Bavaria. The forms of the names used by Sterne are some of them variants on those given in my map:

Belburg	=	Bedburg
Kerpenord	=	Kerpen
Kalsaken	=	Kühlseggen
Mildenheim	=	Mundelsheim
Friburg	=	Friedberg

CHAPTER XVIII

BLENHEIM

AN hour after midnight, on August the 13th, the armies of Marlborough and Eugene were aroused by beat of drum to break up their camp at Münster.* Crossing the Kessel Bach by pontoon bridges which had been laid the day before, they moved westward in eight columns, threading a passage between wooded hills and the marshlands of the Danube. The mists of dawn streamed up, a white shroud through which sounded the tramp of the invisible army of silent, half-awakened men.

Aug. $\frac{2}{13}$ 1704

Near Schwenningen they were joined by several battalions of English, posted there overnight to guard the mouth of the pass. Now in nine columns, they debouched into the great plain where the battle was to be fought.

As the sun, rising over the tree-tops, began to disperse the fog, the many-coloured ranks of horse and foot and the teams slowly dragging the fifty-two cannon, spread like the ribs of a fan, across the open country in full view of the French. The Danish and Prussian infantry and the Austrian cavalry passed on, under Eugene's command, toward their distant positions on the right wing, some of them as far as the fir-clad hills north of Lutzingen. Marlborough's larger army—English, Dutch, Hessians, Hanoverians, of all arms, together with the Danish cavalry, took the shorter routes that led them to the banks of the Nebel, opposite Oberglau and Blenheim. The two Allied armies together numbered about 52,000, of whom about 9,000 were British ; but there were very few regiments, even in Eugene's command, that were not paid for, wholly or in part, by Holland or by England. The hostile army was equal, or a little larger, in numbers.

* *For this chapter see Map VI, p. 375, above.*

The appearance of the heads of the first columns had spread no great alarm among the enemy. Such as were already astir at six o'clock thought that the red-coats moving in the mist must be a reconnaisance, sent out to cover the retreat of the main army up the Kessel to Nördlingen. For the French had made up their minds overnight that the Allied army would seek to retire northwards to its bases in Central Germany, abandoning Bavaria and the Danube. They were still divided on the question whether or not they ought to prevent such a retreat by advancing to attack a foe, who already, as they imagined, knew himself worsted in the campaign. False information, derived from prisoners, that the army of Prince Lewis had joined those of Eugene and Marlborough, still made them uncertain as to the wisdom of taking the offensive.* But the idea that the Allies would attack them was not in their thoughts that morning. Tallard himself wrote that he could see the enemy moving and that they were probably retiring to Nördlingen. Even after the mists had dispersed, revealing not a reconnaisance but the whole army of the Allies, there were French officers who believed that Marlborough was taking this road to Nördlingen, across their very front. That would indeed have been a manoeuvre of ludicrous rashness, but anything seemed to them more likely than that anyone would dare to attack the Grand Army, posted behind marshes, in a line strengthened by fortified villages, and protected on one flank by the forest and on the other by the Danube.

By seven o'clock, however, the real intentions of the Allies could no longer be in doubt. The Flemish Count, Mérode-Westerloo, then serving in a high position in the French army, had gone to sleep, light of heart, in a barn on the eastern outskirts of Blenheim. Awakened by his terrified servant, he saw through the open doorway the whole plain on the opposite side of the Nebel flooded with

* Tallard had been opposed to taking the offensive (*see* pp. 373–375, above), yet Hare relates (*Add. MSS.*, 9114, f. 104) that the day after his capture Tallard told Marlborough 'if his Grace had deferred his visit' (meaning his attack) 'a day longer, the Elector and he would have waited upon his Grace first'—and that they would have done so on August 12th but for the false information about Lewis of Baden's presence given by the prisoners.

sunlight and covered by the squadrons and battalions of the enemy. It was the surprise of his life. All around him the French were springing to arms. A cannon was fired to recall outposts and foragers, who hastened to rejoin the army, after having set the villages of Unterglau, Weilheim and Schwennenbach ablaze. Along a battlefield four miles in length, the Allies saw the white-coated infantry whom they had challenged, forming into battalions, while squadrons wheeled into long lines, and in front of the gathering army of France aides-de-camp and general officers chased and crossed each other at the gallop, along the edge of the marshland that alone divided the rival armies.

The fact remained that the French had been surprised, in a strong position certainly—so strong that Marlborough's best officers wondered at his boldness—but not impregnable if only mistakes were made in the dispositions for its defence. And mistakes were made, of which the worst, the inadequate number of French infantry in the centre, resulted, in part at least, from the fact that they had been thus surprised. For they were drawn up in the order of their encampment, not in an order of battle adapted at leisure to the proper defence of the actual ground.

The order of encampment that proved so fatal to France was that of two armies lying side by side. The larger army of Tallard stretched for a distance of two miles. The rest of the position, including the villages of Oberglau and Lutzingen, was occupied by the other French army under Marsin—which included as an integral part the few Bavarians whom the Elector had with him, numbering some 2,500 infantry and as many horse. Tallard to the south and Marsin to the north, had each camped according to custom with his cavalry on the wings, except that the cavalry of Tallard, for whom there was no room between Blenheim village and the Danube, were all encamped together on his left wing which composed the centre of the two united armies. Therefore all the cavalry of Tallard and half the cavalry of Marsin were spread in long lines over the great central plain, stretching for two miles between Oberglau and Blenheim. It was indeed a

magnificent ground for the operations of horse, a cornfield already reaped and harvested, unbroken by hedge or house or ditch or tree ; and here the greatest cavalry action of the century was about to take place. But whereas Marlborough was sending thither great forces both of horse and foot, Tallard never sufficiently corrected the original fault of the order of encampment. He had only nine battalions of infantry posted among the many squadrons of the centre. There were indeed three more brigades of infantry a little to the west of Blenheim, but they were shortly afterwards moved into the village itself, without his knowledge and with disastrous results.*

Indeed Tallard's worst shortcoming was his failure to control the course of the battle once it had begun. If he had remained in close contact with his own army near Blenheim he could have rectified the mistakes in his original dispositions, instead of permitting others to make them worse in his absence. But when the action began, he rode over to the left wing of the united armies to see how Marsin's men were doing against Eugene. It was neither his place nor his business, and the real crisis of the day did not lie there. He left his own more urgent duties to subordinates, who mismanaged them worse than heart could conceive. The shortness of his sight, unredeemed by spectacles, was thought to have added to his helplessness that day.

In strong contrast to Tallard's want of control, was the hold that Marlborough established and kept over the battle. He always appeared where he was most needed ; and where he was not present he was admirably served by subordinates, such as his brother, Charles Churchill, Cutts, Lord Orkney, and the Prince of Hesse who commanded the cavalry in the pay of Holland.

If the small number of infantry supporting the horse in the centre was one blot in the plans of the defence, another was the refusal to take full advantage of the Nebel marshes that covered the front. If infantry had lined the edge of the marsh from Oberglau to the mills above

* The 'three brigades' probably contained nine battalions, but they must not be confused with the 'nine battalions' further to the left.

Blenheim, the Allies could not have crossed there at all. And even without infantry, if the French cavalry *en masse* had charged those who first got across, before they had formed their battle ranks on the western shore, the Allies would have been hurled back into the marsh. But they were allowed to cross and form up unhindered, and even then were attacked in sections only, by isolated charges of French horse, who, through defect in the supreme command, were not fighting on any harmonized system.

Two explanations were afterwards advanced by the French. One was that their chiefs believed the marsh to be wetter and more impracticable than it proved. The other was that Tallard deliberately wished the Allies to cross, in order to thrust them back into the marsh : the more of them who came over, the more he would destroy. It was said that he had a clearly conceived plan for drawing them across the Nebel in the centre between the villages of Oberglau and Blenheim, where the infantry were massed and whence they could debouch on to the two flanks of those who had been so rash as to invade the French side of the stream. This plan was partially realized, at the crisis of the battle, by the sortie from Oberglau, repulsed only by the personal activity of Marlborough. The corresponding sortie from Blenheim was prevented altogether, because the Duke's original plan was based on a full-dress attack to be made upon that village by the English and Dutch infantry, as the initial operation of the day.

From seven o'clock till noon the two armies watched one another. Until Eugene's men should have reached their distant stations, Marlborough's army did nothing more than lay bridges of pontoon planks and faggots across the marshes of the Nebel. Religious service was held at the head of each regiment in the diverse tongues and according to the diverse rites of the races drawn together in the common cause of resistance to the hegemony of the Grand Monarch.* The recent victory at the Schellenberg and the complete confidence felt by all in Marlborough and

* The very great majority of the victors of Blenheim were Protestants of one kind or another. Even Eugene's infantry were Prussians and Danes.

Eugene, gave to that motley host a unity and a spirit which was to prove superior on that day to the tradition of the hitherto unconquered army of Louis, already conscious of weakness and division among its leaders.

During the period of waiting, the band music of the rival armies was clearly heard on both sides of the Nebel, but it was silenced at frequent intervals by the voice of the cannon. The French had over ninety, the Allies over fifty guns ; but Colonel Blood's gunners were marksmen, and Marlborough placed each of his batteries in person, waiting to watch the range and effect of the first shots. When all was done—

> His Grace rode along the lines to observe the posture and countenances of his men, and found them and the officers of all nations of the Allies very cheerful and impatient of coming to a closer engagement with the enemy. And as he was passing in front of the first line a large cannon ball from one of the enemy's batteries grazed upon a ploughed land, close by his horse's side, and almost covered him with dust. He never halted his pace for this, but moved on, and finding everything in order, sat down at length to refresh himself till Prince Eugene was ready.

The morning hours slipped by, and still with impassive countenance he watched the men he treasured fall under the cannon shots. Messenger after messenger galloped off to hasten Eugene, struggling through marsh and woodland far away. But till his colleague was ready to attack, the Duke would not give the word. What were his thoughts as he lunched among his staff in the open field, perhaps for the last time ? He well knew it was the day that either made him or undid him quite : his fortunes could not survive defeat. And with his own ambitions, the liberties of England and of Europe had come to the last hazard, to be decided, not in any famous city or crowded meeting-place of men, but here in a naked plain of reaped stubble, between villages and farms of names unknown—that tallest spire was called Blindheim, the guides said—places where unlettered peasants had for ages tilled the soil and for ages more would till it, caring nothing what the great world in its madness had come there to do that day—save only that their poor houses and barns would assuredly be burned.

Yet in this uncouth, rustic spot, the texture of Eighteenth Century civilization and thought was to take its colour for good or ill. Hasten, Eugene ! Flesh and blood can no longer stand still under this carnage of a cannonade, and the very gods are impatient to see the invisible event. Here at last comes his messenger galloping from the north. He is ready : and we are more than ready. It is past noon, but August days are long. Cutts, the Salamander, is to lead the British and Dutch against Blindheim. And everywhere, along four miles of the Nebel's course, the regiments and squadrons shake themselves and move down towards the marshy edges of the brook.

The Nebel immediately in front of Blindheim—or Blenheim, as the English won the right to call it—ran between banks comparatively firm to the feet. Cutts's brigades could wade or jump the brook without breaking their order, and march straight up in line against the approaches of the village. Blenheim was defended that day not only by its garden hedges, but by military stockades and by barriers hastily constructed of farm carts, tables and doors. Behind these were disposed the massed battalions and batteries of the French.

It was the story of the Schellenberg over again. The English and Dutch fell in swathes before the grape and musketry of the defence. But they came on, line after line. Brigadier Rowe forbade firing till they reached the defences. He struck his sword into the woodwork as the signal to fire, and French and English shot and stabbed each other through the open palisade. Rowe himself fell mortally wounded. His Lieutenant-Colonel and Major, endeavouring to carry him off, fell dead over his body. The French infantry sallied out into the open. The *gens d'armerie*, with their scarlet uniforms and magnificent horses, swept round the north-east corner of the village and the English were driven back in rout over the Nebel. The *gens d'armes* captured one of the colours of Rowe's regiment. But the Hessian infantry saved them from destruction, repulsed the pursuing horsemen and recovered the flag.

The charges and countercharges of horse and foot close

around Blenheim continued confusedly for some time. It ended with the English and Dutch infantry established, not in the village itself, but on its northern and eastern outskirts. Cannon were brought across the Nebel, some hedges and outbuildings commanding the debouchment of the village streets were secured, and under orders from Marlborough the direct assault was turned into a strong containing action, to prevent the emergence from the village of the massed infantry that it now contained.

As at the Schellenberg, the sustained valour of the English and Dutch attack had succeeded, not in carrying the position assailed, but in drawing thither defenders whom the enemy ought to have kept elsewhere. Lieutenant-General the Marquis de Clérambault, who commanded the defence, had been frightened into the fatal error of moving into the village itself the three infantry brigades whom Tallard had placed outside it to the west. There were now as many as twenty-seven battalions of foot and twelve squadrons of dragoons crowded into its streets and farms. If Tallard had been attending to his own army, this fatal mistake could have been prevented. In his absence his subordinates quarrelled over the course they ought to pursue ; Clérambault, nervous and excitable, had an angry altercation with Mérode-Westerloo, who wished to draw twelve battalions out of Blenheim to line the banks of the Nebel above the village. But the counsel of Clérambault prevailed.

During the remainder of the day Blenheim contained, dead and alive, about twelve thousand of the best infantry of France. It was, and still is, a large, straggling village of high-gabled farms, standing side by side in irregular streets, each in its own grounds and cattle-yards.* The Maulweyer brook flows down the middle of the principal street, on its way to the Danube, which almost abuts on the village. At the opposite end, the English held the outskirts and continued to fire with musket and cannon into

* The peasants tilling their holdings in the great plains between Blenheim, Oberglau and Lutzingen appear to have lived together in these large villages. There is a striking absence of isolated farms, like Hougoumont or La Haye Sainte at Waterloo.

the streets and farmyards, doing all the more execution because of the crowds with which Clérambault's nervousness had so unnecessarily packed the place. But the issue of the battle and the fate of the garrison of Blenheim were being decided elsewhere.

The forcing of the French centre in spite of the obstacle of the Nebel marshes, was an operation so critical that Marlborough gave it his personal attention from first to last, confiding in his trusted subordinates to conduct the assault on Blenheim without his presence. The affair in the centre required the close co-operation of cavalry and infantry, a branch of the military art which had entered a new era with the adoption of the ring bayonet.* In many different parts of the field that afternoon bodies of foot, under favourable conditions, got the better of bodies of horse, even on open ground, as they had seldom done in the days of Rupert and Cromwell. Marlborough gave the world a lesson in the new tactics that day, ' interlining ' his horse and foot. He drew up the centre of his army, preparatory to the crossing of the Nebel, in four lines ; † the front and back lines were infantry, the second and third lines were cavalry sandwiched in between.

Infantry, therefore, including Churchill's English, were the first to cross the marsh in the centre, partly wading, partly using the bridges of planks and brushwood. The French batteries played on them but could not stop their passage. Having reached firm ground on the far side, they covered the crossing of the cavalry. The French would have done well to advance before the Allied infantry were all across. But they stood watching from a distance, even when the first squadrons, in the wake of the infantry, came leading their horses by the bridle, picking their way across the improvised bridges.

At length, when perhaps half the Allies had crossed, but had not yet completed their battle ranks on the far side, the French cavalry came on, late but with fiery onset. In some

* See p. 223 above.

† Each ' line ' may have been two, or three, or even four deep, differing in the case of different regiments and squadrons.

places they drove the Allies back to the edge of the morass. Eye-witnesses have left accounts of many different charges and counter-charges of horse and foot in the hours of confused combat that followed. To distinguish them all is impossible. But it is to be noted that the slow but sure progress of the Allies in the centre that afternoon was due to the superior numbers and handling of their infantry. They were no longer placed in front of the cavalry as at the crossing. While the cavalry charged in front, they were drawn up in reserve, with gaps in their line so as to allow the cavalry to retreat through them for shelter, while they poured platoon volleys into the pursuing horsemen. Only well-drilled infantry could engage in such a game as that.

Besides many German regiments, British infantry under General Charles Churchill were employed in this service in the centre. After the first operation of covering the passage of the cavalry over the marsh, Churchill left Lord Orkney with a few of the island battalions to continue the support of the cavalry in the centre, while he himself, with other English foot, went to attach himself to the flank of Cutts, in the dangerous conflict swaying to and fro on the north side of Blenheim village.

The nine battalions of infantry who alone supported the French horse were young recruits, brave as young French recruits have often proved, worthy ancestors of the ' Marie Louises ' of 1813. They were hopelessly outnumbered. The Allied infantry, including Lord Orkney's British, and the batteries which the indefatigable Colonel Blood had brought over by a pontoon bridge, plied them with musketry and grape. The poor lads never moved, but were mowed down in their ranks and lay in straight lines of white-coated corpses.*

Meanwhile, the Prussian and Danish infantry under Eugene, splendid troops under a splendid leader, though poorly supported by the Imperialist cavalry, were pressing Marsin's French and Bavarians in the plain between

* Apparently they fought not in line but in square, presumably for fear of cavalry ; Orkney speaks of them as ' in battalion quarre (*carré*) in the best order I ever saw, till they were cut to pieces almost in rank and file.' *E.H.R.*, Ap., 1904.

Oberglau and Lutzingen, and through the skirts of the pine forests to the extreme north. Eugene's was, in fact, a containing action, gallantly performed at great cost of life ; it was essential to Marlborough's victory elsewhere, but had little likelihood of local success.

Late in the afternoon the crisis of the still uncertain day drew near. The French and Irish infantry massed in Oberglau made a sortie in force on to the flank and rear of the Allied centre. During the dozen years since Sarsfield and the first exiles had left Limerick, the regiments of Irish in the European armies of Louis had won themselves a reputation for disciplined valour that had atoned for the rout of the undrilled hordes at the Boyne. They now made from Oberglau a charge into Marlborough's flank, which almost severed the connection between his army and that of Eugene. Several German battalions were routed. The scales of the battle trembled and seemed to turn. But Marlborough himself was there. He brought up more German infantry and Danish horse, thrust the assailants back into Oberglau and planted cannon and musketry to command the exits from the village. No further sortie was made.

At last the hour of decision had come. The confused fighting in the centre all that afternoon had brought the Allied line forward some little distance from the Nebel.* The French infantry there had been reduced to a handful of boys who knew nothing of battles except how to die at their post. The French squadrons were fighting as separate units rather than as a single force ; after many a gallant charge they were becoming tired, and the flame of their first confidence had burnt out. Tallard had joined them at last, but he was not the man to put spirit or order into their ranks.

Such was the condition of the centre when, about five o'clock, Marlborough marshalled the English and Allied cavalry in one magnificent line for the decisive charge. His orders were that they should advance at a smart trot

* To talk of a 'hill' in the French centre, as several of the narratives do, is liable to mislead readers who have not seen the ground for themselves. The slope up from the Nebel is very gradual indeed. The general aspect is a vast level plain.

that would enable them to keep their ranks thigh to thigh, but a trot that was to get faster as they approached the enemy with drawn swords and no firearms in hand. The French, instead of charging in the same style, halted to 'present their fusils.' Their disunited and disheartened squadrons were engulfed and borne along in the trot, that soon broke into a gallop for dear life on one side, for hot revenge on the other. In the heave of that resistless wave, the thinned ranks of the infantry recruits vanished, like a child's castle on the sands melting in the wash of waters.

Far to north, on the hills above Lutzingen, along the battle-stained edge of the fir forest, Prussian, Dane and Austrian, French and Bavarian, in the intervals of their charges and counter-charges, stood straining their eyes southward over the battlefield, which they alone of the combatants could see in its entirety. Four miles away their vision was bounded by the pillar of battle-smoke which concealed the spire of Blenheim. At the supreme moment of the day, those eager spectators on the hillside had seen the two waves of opposing cavalry approach, meet and mingle into one long, locked line of combat ; then, in an ecstasy of suspense, they had watched it heave, bend, break, and scatter to the west. The remoter distances of the plain soon appeared to be sprinkled with innumerable moving spots, all making, like insects in desperate haste, towards the brushwood line of the Danube or the tall, sentinel Schloss of Höchstädt. In those few minutes the watchers on the hills had seen the turn of the tide in Europe, the ebb of the highwater mark of King Louis's effort for universal monarchy.

All effective resistance in the centre was at an end. Some squadrons attempted to rally behind the tents of the abandoned camp, only to be swept away once more as the chase rolled on towards the marshes of the Danube and the Pulverbach. Across the latter there were roads of escape at Diesenhofen and at Höchstädt ; but only strong swimmers could hope to win across the Danube. Towards its banks, on either side of Sonderheim, was shepherded the largest throng of fugitives. One of these unhappy folk, Count Mérode-Westerloo, survived to tell the tale : the horse he

rode seemed to him to be borne along in the press with its feet off the ground, till the quivering mass of terror-stricken creatures was pitched over the edge, 'two pikes high,' into the marsh below. The drop, down which horses and men were hurled to destruction, is still clearly visible, dividing the level of the great plain from the level of the Danube marshes.*

But one poor gentleman remained on the bank above. Marshal Tallard had tried in vain to get orders sent through to the infantry in Blenheim to retreat. Of the messengers who attempted to steer their way back athwart the rout :

> no more was told
> Than of leaf on Danube rolled.

At length the Marshal saw it as his own duty to extricate his infantry or share their fate. He had just started on his way back to Blenheim on this manful errand when, close to Sonderheim, he was surrounded by Hessian cavalry, who recognized him by the Order of the Saint-Esprit on his coat and carried him to the presence of the victor.

Marlborough we may imagine at this time sitting his horse somewhere in the middle of the great plain, a good two miles west of Blenheim, sending orders to check the pursuit on the edge of Pulverbach marshes, and endeavouring to draw his centre together in time to impede the retreat of Marsin and the Elector. But that retreat was carried out in excellent order from Oberglau and Lutzingen to Mörslingen. The armies of Eugene and Marlborough were too much exhausted to make another serious effort against unbroken troops. The Prince and the Duke both declared that they had scarcely a battalion or a squadron that had not

* But the Danube marshes, like those of the Nebel, have since been drained and cultivated, and the Danube canalised. This crowning disaster was celebrated in poems, one of which, as Macaulay wrote, 'has been rescued from oblivion by the exquisite absurdity of three lines' :

> Think of two thousand gentlemen at least,
> And each man mounted on his capering beast ;
> Into the Danube they were pushed by shoals.

charged four or five times. So Marsin and the Elector took their men off westward in safety into the gathering dusk. They were much less than half the enemy's total force, and of the larger army of Tallard little indeed would be left, if the infantry in Blenheim failed to escape.

In victory, as on all other occasions of life, Marlborough was the Prince of courtesy, for which he won a name from the polite and sensitive nation whom he defeated. His coach and six had followed up along the high road across the Nebel and there, with many compliments, the unfortunate Marshal was accommodated, till, a few days later, his own coach was fetched back from the retreating army under a flag of truce. In haste, with a stump of pencil on the back of 'a bill of tavern expences' spread out upon his saddle, the Duke wrote the most celebrated of his letters to Sarah, of which the precise text ran as follows : *

Aug. 13, 1704.

I have not time to say more, but to beg you will give my duty to the Queen, and let her know Her Army has had a Glorious Victory Monsr. Tallard and two other Generals are in my coach and I am following the rest : the bearer my Aide de Camp Coll. Parke will give Her and account of what has pass'd. I shall doe it in a day or two by another more att large.

MARLBOROUGH.

When he wrote these words, it is probable that Marlborough did not know that the infantry in Blenheim had surrendered, but felt certain that they could not escape. Late in the evening, 'about nine at night,' he sent a message to the English officers investing the village that they should keep close guard during the hours of darkness and he would bring the rest of the army in the morning to force the position. But in fact the catastrophe had already been hastened without his intervention, and the doings of the great day made complete.†

The moment the French line had given way in the centre, Lord Orkney, with admirable promptitude, had wheeled his English and Scots off to the left to join their

* It is reproduced in facsimile in *Coxe*, i, p. 306.

† *E.H.R.* AD., 1904, p. 310 note, Abercromby's statement.

comrades under Churchill and Cutts. He and Ingoldsby extended Churchill's line of investment beyond the Maulweyer brook, down to the marshes of the great river. The circle of troops round Blenheim was thus made complete except for the short distance where the Danube acted as a no less effectual barrier.* General Clérambault realized too late the consequences of his folly in bringing all the infantry into the village. He had not the courage to face the position he had created, but galloped out like a madman and leaped his horse into the river, whether to escape by swimming or by suicide is not clear. He perished in the Danube.

The Brigadiers, whom he had left without a word of orders or explanation, proved to be men as incompetent as himself. Deserted by some and cut off from all their commanding officers, they should have taken counsel together to unite their brigades and force their way out by a concerted movement. They might have succeeded, at least in part, and could certainly have sold their lives dear. The moral effect of Blenheim on the French army and on European opinion would in that case have been very different from what it was. The British officers who had surrounded them regarded such an attempt as by no means certain to fail, especially if made after nightfall ; and they were the more anxious to obtain a surrender while the evening was still grey.

On such occasions a little bluff may be useful, especially in dealing with junior officers overwhelmed with the weight of unexpected responsibilities. The game was excellently played by two canny Scots, George Hamilton, first Earl of Orkney, and his aide-de-camp, Sir James Abercromby. The contrast between Marlborough and Tallard that day is hardly greater than the contrast between the subordinate officers by whom they were respectively served.

But the final negotiation was preceded by a renewal of desperate attacks on the village. On the east side, Cutts's men came on for a fifth time, and for a fifth time were repulsed ; but they clung to the outskirts, still keeping up

* *See inset of Map VI.*, p. 375, *above*. Rowe's and Ferguson's brigades were under Cutts.

their fire. Orkney's men from the west twice reached the churchyard, but were twice driven back from the wall, ten feet high, that surrounds it like a fortress. They established themselves within a few yards of the church, and set fire to that side of the village, ' which incommodat ' the enemy ' very much.' The fire of the Scots Greys, who as dragoons dismounted to aid the infantry, prevented the debouchment of the French from the streets.

But at this stage Orkney was alarmed to see two whole brigades mustering to attack his troops, whom he knew to be ' very much fatigued.' The French came on, till the head of the column was ' within 35 yards of him,' when they halted in apparent irresolution.* Acting on a sudden impulse, the Scottish lord bade his drums beat a parley, and then and there offered them fair quarter. The French Brigadier to whom he spoke was Dénonville, a young man of fashion little acquainted with war. He consented to capitulate on condition that no prisoners were plundered, a condition that was religiously observed. Ingoldsby received the surrender of the other brigade on the same terms. This remarkable feat of taking the surrender, without a shot fired, of a large body of troops who had marched out to force a passage, was in part due to the personal superiority established by the British officers over the French officers and men on the spot. While Orkney was in treaty with Dénonville, his aide-de-camp, Sir James Abercromby, ' rode up to the Royal Regiment and pulled the colours out of the ensign's hands, and was slightly wounded over the arm by him. I asked them,' Abercromby relates, ' if they did not hear what the General offered ; but his Lordship was come up by this time, without giving any fire, and ordered them to lay down their arms, which they did, asking quarter.' These two tough Scottish aristocrats were not men to be easily gainsaid ; and they probably spoke French better than most of their English brother-officers. Orkney was the husband of Elizabeth Villiers, perhaps the cleverest woman in

* A comparison of Abercromby's narrative, *E.H.R.*, Ap., 1904, p. 309 note, with *Description of the Seats of War* (1707), p. 188, makes clear what happened at this critical moment.

England after Duchess Sarah, and his conduct this day showed him well worthy to be her latest lord.

The two French Brigadiers were then asked by their captors what troops were left in the village. The reply, that there were still twenty battalions of foot and twelve squadrons of dragoons, ' I own struck me,' says Orkney ; ' however I made the best countenance I could, and desired the same brigadier to return along with my aide-de-camp ' to the Marquis of Blansac—now in command of the village since Clérambault's tragic elopement.

Inside the village the psychological drama was played out amid the various and conflicting passions of ten thousand men, trapped in a situation that was startlingly novel to the proudest regiments in Europe. The French army, deprived of its proper chiefs and finding itself in the hands of men it did not trust, showed something of the emotional and equalitarian temper which in later ages so often raised it above or debased it below armies more invariably submissive to discipline. Young Dénonville, anxious to have the policy of capitulation that he had initiated for his own troops endorsed and justified by the rest, most improperly harangued the rank and file on the necessity of surrender, not without visible effect on many, though the regiment of Navarre was furious. Blansac protested, but in the end allowed himself to be conducted out of the village by Abercromby to the spot where Orkney waited in well-concealed anxiety. The French General, emerging for the first time from the battle-smoke that had wrapped the village all day, saw the great plain under sunset swept clear of all his friends, and heard the calm assurances of the imposing Milord that Marlborough himself was speedily coming with the whole Allied army—' though to tell the truth it was a little gasconade in me,' writes Orkney, for it must have been some time before the Duke could come in full force. But the impression was made, and Blansac decided to fall in with the humour of the majority of his men, and to surrender at discretion. When Abercromby was sent through the middle of the village and out at its eastern barricades to request the Salamander to cease fire because the enemy had yielded, Cutts could hardly believe

his ears, for Rowe's and Ferguson's brigades were quite incapable of making another attack.

The losses in the crowded village had been very great, but at least 9,000 unwounded soldiers, including the most famous regiments in France, laid down their arms and standards. Only the Regiment of Navarre, which was taken a thousand strong, burnt their battle-flags with tears of rage. About nine o'clock the captured army filed out of the village to an open space where they bivouacked for the night. The British soldiers were posted around with bayonets fixed till dawn, trying to keep awake in turns, for they had been afoot since one in the morning and had seen some service. ' Without vanity, I think we did our pairts,' wrote Orkney, who had been twenty hours in the saddle. ' It is,' he added, ' perhaps the greatest and completest victory that has been gained this many ages ! ' [323]

It was eight days before England had the news. It could travel no faster than Colonel Parkes could ride and sail. Day after day, and night after night, he covered the leagues between, and in every town where he changed horses he told the tidings that made Germany free of Frenchmen for another epoch. At Frankfurt the well-informed British Resident, Henry Davenant, wrote to Stepney :

> Yesterday Colonel Parkes came here with the agreeable news of the victory we have gained over the enemies. This battle will in all appearance put an end to the war in the Empire, and give the means of assisting the Duke of Savoy who is very near his ruin. The Duke of Marlborough has beyond all dispute saved the Empire. Affairs were in no very good condition before this engagement.

And to Harley, Davenant wrote : ' The people here confess that they owe to the Duke of Marlborough and to our troops the safety of Vienna.'

Leaving the Germans rejoicing behind him, Parkes reached Rotterdam, and the Dutch learnt how the regiments they had hazarded on the Danube with so many fears, had reaped there a hundred-fold of safety for Holland. Alexander Stanhope, our Representative at the Hague, had

been in the lowest depression on the eve of the battle, writing that if Marlborough evacuated Bavaria, 'they would lose the benefit of all they have done hitherto,' and fearing that the Duke's rumoured intention to accept the title of Prince of the Empire from Leopold would not be 'at all for his service in England.' But after the passage of Parkes, followed next day by the arrival of Colonel Panton with the Duke's letters to the States-General, Stanhope changed his tune :

> We cannot speak of anything else but these glorious advantages. There has not been in our age or scarce to be found in story so complete a victory as Prince Eugene and our Duke have gained. . . . I fancy the great Monarch now in Augustus' condition after the defeat of Varus, tearing his flesh, stark mad, and roaring out, '*O, Tallard, Tallard, rendez mes bataillons.*' [324]

But it was not with the effect of the news in Germany, or in Holland, or in France that Parkes was most concerned. 'What will they say in England?' must have been his thought, every hour of his four days' gallop, and while he paced the deck of the weary ship for three days more. At length he landed. On August 10th, by the home reckoning, he traversed London on his way to Windsor, leaving the news as he passed. 'In a few minutes,' the cannon of the Tower were set firing, the bells rang in Wren's steeples, and the whole population poured out into the streets.

Parkes called at the Duchess's town house, and gave her the famous note. She gave it back to him to take on to the Queen. But copies of it were struck off Aug. $\frac{10}{21}$ 1704 in the presses of London and circulated in thousands, in time for folk to read as they 'were sitting down to dinner.' That night men could talk of little else but the wonderful note, 'writ on horseback with a black leaden pencil,' and the pregnant fact of Tallard in the coach.

Only the Jacobite coffee houses were thronged at the very juncture when the news arrived ; the poor fellows moved like mere engines and vanished in a hurry. But as these disappeared the loyal, honest Englishmen repaired in crowds to the loyal coffee houses and you might read satisfaction in every face. Bohee tea, coffee, chocolate, ratafia and Nants Brandy were insipid liquors. Away they adjourned to

the tavern, every bumper was crowned with the Queen's or the Duke of Marlborough's health and the loyal citizens emptied the cellars so fast I think two-thirds were foxed next morning. Never were such illuminations, ringing of bells, such demonstrations of joy since the laying of London stone.'

Leaving the turbulent town behind, the Colonel galloped on for the last lap of his great ride. That evening he was ushered into the closet that overlooks the Terrace at Windsor Castle, delivered the note with Sarah's homage to the Queen, and told what he had seen of the battle. It was usual to give £500 to the bearer of victorious dispatches. But Parkes' only dispatch was the Duke's note to his wife,* and this was no common victory. At his own request, Anne gave him, instead of the customary bag of guineas, her own portrait in miniature. When he came to die, he left his family the picture of himself by Sir Godfrey Kneller : the Colonel stands wearing round his neck this royal token, commemorating the ride that brought the good news from Danube to Thames.[325]

On the night after the battle, Marlborough, having given special orders for the care of the wounded, slept in a water-mill near Höchstädt, full of barrels of the enemy's powder. He did not enter the town, which was protected by walls and commanded by the tall Schloss, still occupied by 600 of the enemy. But he set guards round it for the night and it surrendered early next day.†

In the morning, after inspecting the stores in Höchstädt, and arranging for an immediate advance on the Aug. $\frac{3}{14}$ 1704 traces of the flying foe, Marlborough and Prince Eugene went to visit Marshal Tallard. Before this visit the dejection among the captured French

* Colonel Lord Tunbridge was following Parkes at an interval of twenty-four hours with the real 'dispatches.' *Add. MSS.*, 9114, f. 107 ; *P.R.O., S.P.*, 84, 227, f. 27.

† See Hare in *Add. MSS.*, 9114, f. 104. There is a local tradition at Höchstädt to the effect that the English refrained from attempting to occupy the town on the evening of the battle because they saw the sun reflected on the leaden tops of the wooden crosses in the churchyard, which they mistook for the cuirasses of the French. Since the Kaspars of the neighbourhood persuaded themselves that this occurred, it is worth recording, at least as a curiosity. In the Museum in the Schloss at Höchstädt one of these crosses is exhibited (1930).

officers had been great. The Duke's chaplain was in the room with about seventy of them :

> some were blaming the conduct of their own generals, others walking with their arms folded, others laid down lamenting their hard fortune and complaining for want of refreshment, till at last, abandoning all reflections of this nature, their chief concern was for their King, abundance of these muttering and plainly saying, '*Oh, que dira le Roy!*'

But on the arrival of Marlborough and Eugene the chivalry of honourable foes charmed away for a few minutes the bitterness of defeat.

> There were a great many of the French generals with the Marshal, all of which came crowding about His Grace and admired his person, as well as his tender and gracious behaviour towards them. They had all something to say for themselves, which His Grace and Prince Eugene received with the greatest modesty and compassion. Prince Eugene . . . frankly told how often and how bravely he was repulsed by them. . . . After staying with the Marshal above an hour, the Duke and all his company returned to our army which he now ordered to march beyond Höchstädt as far as Stenheim, whilst he rode over the field of battle from the right to the left, the dead of both armies lying stripped upon the ground.

The prisoners, all save a hundred, had been captured by Marlborough's army, but he divided them equally with Eugene, partly out of compliment to the Prince and his master, and partly for convenience, since the guarding, feeding and disposal of 11,000 men was a serious matter. The number rose in a few days to nearly 15,000, as the cavalry sent in front of the Allied advance picked up more and more, and as deserters, stragglers and rearguards gave themselves up to escape the vengeance that the German peasantry were wreaking on the invaders. Three thousand Germans in the French service came over to enlist with the victors.[326]

Tallard was sent to England, where he lived for several years in a house placed at his disposal in Nottingham. Accustomed as Ambassador to get on well with the English, he attained a considerable local popularity, introducing the

cultivation of celery, and exchanging visits with the gentry for twenty miles round.[327]

The losses of the Allies were over 12,000 killed and wounded, nearly a quarter of their total force. Of these casualties the British and Dutch bore about 2,200 each. The only other nationals to suffer as much were the Danes, who had lost 2,400. Nominally neutrals in the war with France,* the troops of the King of Denmark had fought as a 'mercenary army' in the strictest sense of the word, and had given good value for their money, both on foot under Eugene and in the centre among Marlborough's horse.[328]

The French loss cannot be so exactly estimated. A large part of it took place in the wastage of the ten days' retreat, with the angry peasants around them, the Allied hussars close on their rear, and discomfiture and panic in their own ranks. Marsin's army had come off the field unbeaten and in admirable order, but anyone who has been involved in a military disaster may have chanced to witness how the atmosphere of retreat and the contagion of a rabble of fugitives can sometimes dissolve the discipline of regiments who have not themselves been worsted in the battle. And so it proved now with Marsin's army in contact with the wreckage of Tallard's force. According to some of their own reports, the French never camped at night, nor pitched tents, but lay beside their arms in constant alarm.

> In short we are in terrible consternation. We have lost our drums and standards. We have only 250 officers in all our armies who are not wounded or killed. Only 200 men left in four regiments of dragoons. The city of Ulm is so full of wounded officers they don't know how to put them apart from the common soldiers. The peasants are wild against us.

The relations of the French army with the German civilians continued to be those of mutual atrocity ; Mérode-Westerloo confesses that his comrades marked the line of their flight with pillage and arson. Some of their letters intercepted by the Allies placed their total loss at 40,000, and by August 28 Marlborough mentioned the figure as

* See p. 297, above.

not improbable. In any case, much less than half the Grand Army that fought at Blenheim remained with the standards ; moreover, the bulk of the Elector's own army, which he had left scattered in Bavaria, was disbanded in the late autumn under a treaty made by the Allies with the Electress in Munich. She remained in her palaces, but Bavaria was subjected to the occupation and extortion of the Imperialist armies. The Elector had followed the waning fortune of France, taking with him the 4,000 Bavarians who had escaped from the battle. He returned to resume his position of Vicar-General of the Netherlands.

Sept. 10 (N.S.) 1704

When Ulm had capitulated, the last enemy fortress on the Danube had fallen, and the last of the cannon of the Grand Army, save half a dozen field-pieces, fell into the hands of the Allies ; most of the artillery had been taken on the field of Blenheim.[329]

The wreck of the French army never halted till it reached Alsace, and Marlborough followed hot on its traces, leaving Ulm blockaded behind him. At the end of the first week of September he crossed the Rhine near Philippsburg and went up against Landau. The war in Germany was finished.

Marlborough was loaded with compliments by the Emperor Leopold, and at last consented to accept from him a Princedom of the Empire, with the little Principality of Mindelheim, south of the Danube, a territory which would in England have been called a nobleman's estate. It was no longer possible for his enemies in England to make capital out of his acceptance of an honour, which seemed now to redound to the credit of the whole English nation.*

But the Duke would have been even better pleased if the Emperor had taken his constantly reiterated advice to make terms with the Hungarian Constitutionalists and Protestants, and so attain power to finish the Italian war next year. For the Duke of Savoy was still only reprieved, not saved. In September, Hill, the British Minister at Turin, wrote, ' We shall go on to suffer some time longer,

* Mindelheim was taken from him and restored to Bavaria at the Treaty of 1714. But the princely title and rank remains in the Marlborough family.

and live upon the merits of the battle of Hockstead.' * Victor Amadeus, all agreed, was still ' in extremity.' But the Emperor would rather risk the loss of Italy than come to any terms with the Hungarian demands. Blenheim only hardened his heart and he began to resent personally the repeated attempts, made by Stepney at Vienna, to mediate between himself and his subjects. The Jesuits at his ear were against compromise, and, as our Whiggish diplomats complained, ' rode tantivy as Churchmen always do where they have power, to destroy all they have made their enemies.' [330]

Marlborough indeed gained little at Vienna in reward for Blenheim, except the title of Prince. Once the Empire was safe, the influence of Eugene waned, and the efforts of the War Office relaxed. The Imperialist General, Lewis of Baden, unable to forgive Marlborough for sending him to Ingolstadt like a fool while the battle was afighting, in future did his best to delay military operations and successfully spoilt Marlborough's autumn campaign on the Moselle.†

But nothing could undo the effects of Blenheim. Italy and the Netherlands, indeed, had still to be reconquered before the war was won according to the terms so well laid down by William in the Treaty of Grand Alliance. Austrian lethargy and Dutch fears of battle might yet postpone that consummation for a couple of years. But the chances of success had now visibly turned to the side of the Allies, with their two great generals, and with the certain confidence that inspired their troops whenever either of those generals was allowed to lead them into action. And, above all, the hopefulness and spirit of the armies of King Louis were fatally shaken by the circumstances of the battle of Blenheim. ' Malbrook ' had become to them a name of terror. Not for another four years and more, not until the new and extravagant demands of the Allies after victory had put the whole French nation with its back to the wall, was the morale of the French army restored.

* For several years the English used the names Blenheim and Höchstädt indifferently for the battle ; gradually the name Blenheim ousted its rival in England, though not on the Continent.

† I shall leave the Moselle affair of Sept.–Oct. 1704 till the next volume. It is less a continuation of the Blenheim campaign than a preparation for that of 1705.

CHAPTER XIX

Opening of the Peninsular War. Capture of Gibraltar. Battle of Malaga. Political reactions of the year's campaign.

ALMOST a month after the battle of Blenheim, when Marlborough had already crossed the Rhine, he heard by way of England that Gibraltar had been captured. Yet in fact the achievement of the fleet had preceded by ten days the victory on the Danube.

In 1704 Queen Anne launched her Pretender for the throne of Spain, a fair reply to Louis's claimant for the throne of Britain. The Austrian Courtiers had been unwilling to send abroad their Arch-Duke Charles; they wished, as English diplomats complained, to 'Keep him like a fine thing not to be exposed to wind and weather, which is not the way to make him King.'[331] But as Austria could not aid the Spanish enterprise either with ships, with troops, or with money, England insisted that at least the young man must come in person, for on no other condition would Portugal enter the war. He was brought over to Windsor in January, feasted there royally as King Charles III of Spain, and packed off to Portugal in midwinter under Rooke's escort, accompanied by an English army. At the end of February they reached Lisbon, where 'Charles III' was landed 'with about three hundred Germans of all sorts.'[332] The Allied force that commenced the campaign on his behalf along the Portuguese border in May consisted of some four thousand English, two thousand Dutch, and twenty thousand Portuguese armed and paid for chiefly by the Maritime Powers.*

Jan.-Feb. 1704

* See pp. 300-302, above, for the Portuguese Treaty. *For this chapter see Map of Europe at end of volume.*

Against them came the French and Spaniards, under Marlborough's nephew, the Duke of Berwick, illegitimate son of James II and Arabella Churchill. Old Sir Winston Churchill decidedly had the trick of transmitting military talent. For, next to Villars, Berwick was the best general still in the active service of France. Fortunately for the Allies, he was hampered in 1704, not only by the lethargy of all things Spanish, but by the furious quarrel raging at Madrid between the Queen's *Camera Mayor*, the Princess des Ursins, a French-born cosmopolitan, and the French Ambassador the Cardinal d'Estrées, neither of whom could brook a rival. This feud, which absorbed the whole energies of the Court, involved not merely the personal issue, but the attempt of the Spaniards to save their country from complete political subjection to France. For the Princess des Ursins, though sent to Spain by Louis to manipulate the royal couple on his behalf, had taken up the cause of 'Spain for the Spaniards.' The Savoyard girl-Queen and her elderly *Camera Mayor*, the bravest hearts in Spain, had manhood enough, though King Philip had none. They defied the French Ambassador and no one at Madrid could think of anything but this quarrel. Nothing was done that spring or summer to carry out the works agreed on to fortify Gibraltar, and no adequate garrison was placed there, in spite of the Governor's earnest prayers. Nor was Berwick furnished with ammunition and stores for his Portuguese campaign. Two-thirds of his cavalry horses died, because, as he himself records, the French were too proud to take the advice of the Spaniards and feed the beasts on barley since ordinary forage was wanting in that barren land.[333]

These circumstances saved the Allies from losing Lisbon in the first weeks of the Peninsular War. The campaign on the Portuguese border, begun in May, was brought to an end in July by the summer heats that made further effort intolerable to man and beast. But before nature imposed her annual truce, a number of fortresses on the Tagus had been surrendered to Berwick at the first summons, although he had no powder to bombard them. The Portuguese took particular delight in compelling the

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English who were in garrison with them to surrender, on one occasion wetting their powder to prevent any attempt at resistance. Two whole regiments, the Ninth and Eleventh Foot, were thus lost. Further to the north, the Portuguese veteran, Las Minas, aided by the Dutch, won some minor successes against the Spaniards.

From the first moment of their landing, the mortality had been great among the English, utterly unprovided for in that land of neglect, where the magazines were empty, the transport non-existent, the native army a mob. 'The only comfortable thing I have seen since I landed,' wrote Colonel Hamilton from Lisbon, 'was one rainy day. Several, both English and Portuguese, are every morning found dead in our streets, for murder is as frequent here and passes as unregarded as picking of pockets at Common [Covent] Garden Playhouse.' It is difficult to say whether the Spaniards or the Portuguese were the more hostile to their respective allies. The Portuguese, under the influence of the priesthood, hated the heretics perhaps rather more than the Spaniards hated the French. On one occasion a detachment of Portuguese, challenged by a Dutch sentry, and not understanding this common military usage, took him for an enemy and massacred him and his fellow-countrymen ; when they discovered their mistake, they merely stripped the dead and wounded and went callously on their way.

It would have needed a man of Marlborough's patience and power to deal with the brutal ignorance of such allies. The general in command of the English was Meinhard Schomberg, son of the noble old soldier who had been William's right-hand man in his English and Irish campaigns. But Meinhard was lazy and indifferent to the welfare of his troops. He roused himself only to quarrel violently and to no purpose with Dutch and Portuguese alike. Before the end of the summer Marlborough had him recalled and replaced by another English general of Huguenot origin, Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, who had won his laurels in the Irish wars of the last reign.

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The news of the 'better success' of the Allies at the Schellenberg confirmed the wavering loyalty of the Court

of Lisbon ; 'otherways we had been an undone people,' wrote Colonel John Richards from the frontier-fort of Almeida,' 'but now there is life in a muscle.' Meanwhile young Paul Methuen gave spirited lectures on unpreparedness to King Peter, the best man at the Court of Portugal, who listened patiently, and endeavoured to apply what remedy he could to the incompetence of his subjects.[334]

So began that strange Peninsular War of eight years, famous for its romantic vicissitudes and tragic in its waste of English life and treasure, in return for which the only palpable gain to England, the rock of Gibraltar, was won by a by-blow of naval enterprise in the very first campaign.

Since Lisbon was this year at the disposal of the English fleet as a base, Rooke entered the Mediterranean earlier and in better humour than might have been expected from his conduct in 1702. After seeing the English Levant trading-fleet safe through the Straits, he put himself into touch with the Duke of Savoy through the port of Nice. Marlborough had planned a joint attack upon Toulon by Rooke's fleet, the Savoyard army, and the rebels of the Cevennes. But it was already evident that Victor Amadeus would have enough to do that year in maintaining himself in Turin against the French armies. The Toulon scheme was abandoned and Rooke sailed to Barcelona.

The inhabitants of the Province of Catalonia hated the Spaniards of Castile who had trodden upon their ancient liberties. The Catalans stood in the same relation to the foreign government at Madrid as the Hungarian patriots to the Emperor at Vienna. It was known that they were not unwilling to welcome 'Charles III' as their King. Rooke therefore put ashore near Barcelona some twelve hundred English and four hundred Dutch marines, under the command of Prince George of Hesse, the able young German Prince, who had earned popularity as Governor of Catalonia in the former war against France. The conditions were curiously similar to those which led to the capture of Barcelona and the rising of Eastern Spain in 1705, but they had no such consequence in 1704. For

May 1704

there was no Englishman present capable of the dare-devil enterprise shown by Peterborough on the later occasion. The Governor of Barcelona, Don Francisco de Velasco, was a Spaniard of unusual vigour and tact, who kept the disaffected element quiet and Philip's partisans on the alert. After a fortnight of waiting in vain for a Catalan outbreak or treachery within the walls of Barcelona, Prince George and the marines came aboard again and Rooke set sail for other shores.

Meanwhile the French Admiral Toulouse, one of Louis XIV's illegitimate sons, was sailing for the Straits with the Brest fleet. Since the English had chosen the Mediterranean as the seat of the naval war, Louis decided to send his principal fleet and Admiral to that station. Rooke tried hard to prevent the formidable junction of the forces of Toulon and Brest, but the French ships, fresh from their own harbours, were in better condition than the English ships from Lisbon, fitted up according to Portuguese rather than English ideas of what a naval base should be like. Owing, therefore, to the foul bottoms of Rooke's ships, Toulouse sailed round him, escaped his eager pursuit, and arrived in Toulon. Thenceforth, he was the commander of the enlarged Toulon fleet, which had become the Grand Fleet of France. The arrival at the Straits of another squadron from England, under Sir Cloudesley Shovell, put the Allied forces in these waters on a numerical equality with that of Toulouse. But since the French Admiral was safe in Toulon, where he spent some time establishing himself in his new base, Rooke, who had turned back to join Shovell in the neighbourhood of Cadiz and Gibraltar, looked round for some new enterprise consistent with his instructions.[335]

King Peter of Portugal and 'King Charles' of Spain sent word from Lisbon that they wished another attempt to be made against Cadiz. Methuen also believed it to be still ungarrisoned and easy to take. But whether easy to take or not, it would be hard to keep, against large French and Spanish armies that would certainly be sent to recover it. The fateful Council of War, held on Rooke's flagship in the Straits, decided against another

attack on Cadiz. The wisdom of the refusal cannot be doubted. The Allied ships were not on this occasion carrying any such force as Ormonde's army that had failed there two years before; the fleet had on board only a couple of thousand marines.

July 17 (O.S.) 1704

But something else might be tried. Cadiz was not the only place on the coast. As those old Admirals sat at Council in their full-bottomed wigs on that summer day, off Tetuan 'under the Barbary coast,' it is odds but that they could see, through the portholes of Rooke's cabin, dim in the northern distance, the summit of Gibraltar Rock. There, as they well knew, was a tiny garrison, on guard along the crumbling walls and bastions of the sea-front, like to prove but a fragile screen against an English fleet in the Bay; whereas, if the place were once taken, a few companies of resolute men like the marines could make good the land front, fortified by nature herself in a style beyond the art of Vauban and Cohorn. Whole armies could not take Gibraltar from the north, so long as the friends of the garrison held the sea.

The cabin was hot and the Admirals were testy. Perhaps it was fortunate that Admiral Byng, political and personal rival of Rooke, 'thought lightly' of the proposal. Opposition from that quarter roused Rooke's enthusiasm for the project. He declared that Byng himself should lead a squadron of twenty English and Dutch ships into Gibraltar Bay, to bombard and capture the place. Between pique and jest it was settled so, and the Council broke up, every Admiral in his own humour. Rooke this year was no longer the surly and lethargic invalid that he had shown himself on the voyage of 1702.

The idea of taking Gibraltar was no sudden inspiration of the hour. Rooke and his advisers on the spot must have full credit for seeing and seizing the fleeting moment of opportunity. But the idea was old and widely spread. Cromwell had turned his powerful thoughts that way, and dreamed of turning the Spanish rock into an English island by a canal across the isthmus. William had marked it for England, to hold the French power by the throat.

Marlborough was heir to that policy. Godolphin had received reports on the value of Gibraltar to our Mediterranean trade and warfare.* Admiral Leake and the Prince of Hesse were in favour of the attempt. Methuen was all agog to take both it and Cadiz.

The great grey rock, sheer precipice on its long eastern side looking into the Mediterranean and on its narrow northern end overlooking Spain, slopes on its western side towards the Bay in screes broken by crags and interlaced with forest and brushwood ; at the foot, the little town is crowded in between the Bay, the mountain, and its own steeply climbing walls.

The Phoenicians, when they first sailed into history, used the Rock as a seamark, but their trading stations were on the mainland. For two thousand years the northern Pillar of Hercules was famous in the talk of seafaring folk, but was seldom trodden by the foot of man. The Roman saw no use in it. Even the Viking passed it by. Wild beasts roamed its steep jungle, and spirits were said to haunt there. Its human history begins in 711, when the Moors settled there in warlike guise and named it after their chief, 'the Rock of Tarik.' Later generations of Moors built the Citadel, much as it stood in 1704 and still stands to-day. Charles V, and the Kings of Spain who followed him for a hundred years, added to the Moorish works and extended the defences southward along the seafront. But under Charles II they fell into the general decay of all things Spanish. And no one, Moor or Christian, had yet placed batteries in the side of the Rock itself, but only at its lowest foot, no higher than the Citadel.

* A curious report of the relative merits of Gibraltar and Cadiz as objects of attack will be found in the Godolphin Papers (*Add. MSS.* 28058, f. 31).

'Gibraltar and Ceuta make the very mouth of the Mediterranean, the first [viz. Gibraltar] may be taken and afterwards kept easier than Cadiz, for it is but badly fortified and may quickly be made an island ; and Ceuta must soon fall for want of provisions from Spain. The Bay of Gibraltar is capable of holding as many and as big ships as that of Cadiz, and being in the very passage may much better hinder ships and galleys passing into and out of the Straits than at so great a distance as Cadiz is. . . . And the people of Spain in general will be more affected by the loss of Gibraltar than Cadiz, this [Cadiz] being envied for so many strangers [English and Dutch merchants] residing in it, and the other [Gibraltar] esteemed the key of the Kingdom.'



Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

The heights of the precipice do not come into the story of its capture : the action took place along the sea-front below.

The whole fleet stood over to Gibraltar Bay. Byng's squadron of sixteen English and six Dutch ships ranged themselves against the line of the defences from the Old to the New Mole : the Dutch were under their Vice-Admiral Van der Dussen. Eighteen hundred English marines,* under Prince George of Hesse, were landed on the low-lying isthmus that divided the Rock from the mainland, cutting off from the town all hope of reinforcement or supply. The Prince summoned the Governor in the name of King Charles III, by a trumpeter at the north gate. Don Diego de Salinas, though determined to save his honour, knew in his heart that he had no real means of resistance. Again and again he had importuned the Court for a garrison, military stores, and all the things necessary to stand a siege, and always in vain. Now the hour he had so long dreaded had struck. By his own account he had ' no more than fifty-six men of whom there were not thirty in service.' In addition to these regulars he hastily collected a few hundred civilian militia ' armed as God willed,' and ' of such bad quality that before they arrived they began to run away.' He had a hundred cannon of various ages and kinds, but few of them were in a state to be fired, and fewer still had gunners to fire them.

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The second day passed in preliminaries. Don Diego sent back a defiant reply to the summons in the grand old Spanish style. The countryman of Don Quixote was prepared to die like a gentleman. The ships of Byng's squadron warped themselves in along the sea front as close as the depth permitted : Captain Jumper brought the *Lennox* within actual musket range of the New Mole. These operations, carried out in a dead calm, were not impeded by a few shots from the Spanish batteries. At midnight the English sailors burnt

July 22 / Aug. 2

* The Royal Marines, in the modern acceptation of the word, viz. a military force specially maintained for use with the fleet, primarily as soldiers, had been established in the first year of Anne. The double object was to have such a force ever ready for the service of the fleet and to evade disbandment, the usual fate of the army proper owing to the jealousy of Parliament. *Corbett*, II, 475–477.

a French privateer lying off the Old Mole which had been firing at the camp of the marines.

Sunday, July 23rd, English Style, was Gibraltar's doomsday. About five o'clock on a glorious summer's morning, Byng's squadron opened fire, and continued hour after hour to pour an iron cascade on to the crumbling walls and forts. Don Diego reckoned the number of bombs and cannon balls that he received at 30,000, and although the English reckoned it at less, there is no doubt that the bombardment left the fleet short of ammunition at Malaga next month. The actual damage done was small in proportion to the expenditure of shot.

July 23 / Aug. 3

Two miles from the southern gate, rose the famous shrine at Europa Point, decorated by the votive offerings of lordly Spanish Admirals who had once ruled the Mediterranean with the galley and the oar. There the women of Gibraltar knelt and clung together, safe but in terror, listening to the ceaseless thud and echo of the guns. Their menfolk could be seen by the English flying out of the town up the mountain side.

There was no wind, and the smoke of the great bombardment soon hung like a cloud, hiding from the gunners any glimpse of their work. Byng, therefore, sent orders, first that only the lower tier of guns should be fired, and then that the bombardment should cease. These messages were taken from ship to ship by Captain Edward Whitaker who was acting as Byng's aide-de-camp. When, about eleven o'clock, his boat reached the *Lennox* at the southern end of the line, he found its captain, Jumper, gazing hard through the lifting smoke at the New Mole and the fort that commanded its abutment on the land. The enemy appeared to have fled. The two captains agreed that a landing could be effected there unopposed. Whitaker hastened back to Byng, who ordered the boats of the squadron to be made ready, and sent Whitaker to ask Rooke's leave to launch the attack. It was at once granted, and a flotilla of English row-boats raced for the New Mole.

Meanwhile the panic-stricken women at Europa shrine, seeing the heretics about to land between them and their

homes, began to run back towards Gibraltar. The English, able again to see what was going on ashore since the bombardment had stopped, sent a cannon-ball for warning in front of the column of women, who fled back to the shrine out of harm's way. This shot was mistaken by the eager fleet for a signal to resume fire ; the bombardment began again, and under its cover the landing party did its work.

Not a gun was fired in defence at the New Mole and its environs. The foremost sailors leapt from their boats and clambered into the breached and undefended fort.* They tumbled in, happy-go-lucky, some of them with lighted gun-matches in their hands. They had forgotten the possibility of a powder-magazine. The fort went up in the air, nearly two hundred English sailors were hurled in every direction, and several of the landing-boats sank at their moorings.

A momentary panic ensued, for the first instinct of the survivors was to suppose that the enemy had laid a trap and caused the disaster, which was really due to the carelessness of their own comrades. There was a rush for the remaining boats, but at this critical moment Captain Whitaker landed with reinforcements, rallied the fugitives, and in a few minutes two or three hundred of the ships' crews were marching behind him along the deserted ramparts of the seafront, towards Gibraltar. Arrived within half a musket shot of Charles V's southern wall of the town, Whitaker halted the sailors in a bastion on the shore, hoisted the Union Jack, and awaited what should happen next.†

Byng at once came ashore and joined Whitaker with several hundred more seamen. The town was thus invested

* *Marked C. in the map*, p. 409.

† The direct statement of Whitaker, confirmed by the narrative from Byng's notes, establishes the fact that the 'Union Jack,' 'our colours,' were hoisted on this first occasion. *Camden Misc.*, VIII (1883), *Haddock Corr.* p. 48 ; *Torrington*, p. 143. The English flag probably continued to be flown in parts of the fortifications during the occupation that followed, but the flag of Charles III also was flown, as the English held the town in his name till the Treaty of Utrecht. The statement of the Spanish historian Ayala that the English pulled down Charles's flag and proclaimed Queen Anne as sovereign of Gibraltar is, like some other statements of Ayala, quite untrue.

The Union Jack had been in frequent use since the Union of the Crowns of England and Scotland under James VI and I.

on the south, as well as on its stronger northern side where the marines had all this while been keeping up a demonstration. The fleet was bombarding from the west, and the Old Mole had been deserted by the defenders. Many of the scanty civilian militia had run away up the mountain, and there was no force left in the town capable of resisting an assault. To allow the place to be stormed would merely expose the remaining inhabitants to the horrors of a sack. Their wives at Europa Point were already prisoners in the hands of the English, who had placed officers there to protect them from rough usage ; the desire to recover these women was a further inducement to come to terms. Don Diego saw that all was lost—except his honour, ever the dearest point to a true Spaniard. He agreed to terms that saved the lives and property of those committed to his care.[336]

Under the capitulation, all the inhabitants who would take the oath of allegiance to Charles III as King of Spain could remain in the town, with religion and property guaranteed. But, except half a dozen families, they elected to depart to the mainland, where shortly afterwards the exiles founded the pleasant country town of San Rocque, among the hills in sight of their ancient home. Gibraltar has ever since been anything but a Spanish town in its racial character.

The voluntary departure of the inhabitants was inspired by loyalty to Philip V as standard-bearer of Spanish nationality against foreign and heretical invasion. The priests told their flocks that the French would retake Gibraltar in a few weeks and restore the old regime. Moreover, the Spaniards observed that, although the heretics kept their hands off women, they did not spare churches. The English sailors were hearty Protestants, and they were out for loot. At Europa shrine they first seized all the treasures, and then knocked the head off the image, 'The Oracle of Spain,' and threw it and the Child Jesus out of doors among the stones. Such conduct aroused the same anger in Spain as had been aroused among the men of Devon a dozen years before, when the French landing-

party tore up the Bible in Teignmouth parish church. In Gibraltar itself all the churches save one were sacked, besides private houses. One marine was hanged for plundering, and a good many of the sailors were sent back to the ships. But several of their officers had secured valuable loot. There is the less wonder that, amid scenes of such disorder, the Spanish inhabitants elected to go into exile, in hopes of a speedy and triumphant return. Rooke wrote home from Gibraltar that the Spaniards were so exasperated against the Allies that 'they use the prisoners they take as barbarously as the Moors.'*

The site of Our Lady of Europa is still to be distinguished by the remains of its Moorish flooring, and a fragment of Moorish building, with an inscription to the effect that the shrine was turned into a guard-house in 1704 and destroyed in the Siege of 1782.

Thus was Gibraltar taken, at the cost of about 200 seamen wounded and 60 killed, almost all of them in the explosion of the fort.

Methuen at once urged the necessity for a permanent English garrison. This was in fact supplied ; the marines who had helped to take it remained to hold it, and were joined in the course of a few months by several companies of regular troops. But the English Ministry throughout the war tried to get their Allies, the Portuguese and Dutch, to contribute to the defence. It was perhaps fortunate that these efforts failed, and that Gibraltar, from first to last, was, in fact, held by English troops at England's cost. But it was held in King Charles's name, and in 1705 we find him writing to Queen Anne about '*Ma ville de Gibraltar*.' If we had succeeded in placing him on the throne at Madrid, the difficulty of keeping the Rock for England would have been politically very great.[337]

Gibraltar had not been taken 'in a fit of absence of mind.' Its importance was widely understood. It was chiefly valued by the English public for the protection it

* *Torrington*, p. 194. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, f. 360. Details of the sack can be found in the notes of Don Juan Romero, the good priest who stayed in Gibraltar and saved his church, St. Mary the Crowned, from pillage. These notes are in the Parochial Register of the City of Gibraltar at San Rocque, where I have seen them. An extract from them made in 1908 is in the Garrison Library at Gibraltar.

was expected to afford to our trading interests in the further Mediterranean. A month after its capture, Secretary Hedges described it as—

> A footing for the King of Spain in the strongest fort belonging to that country, and of great use to us for securing our trade and interrupting of the enemy's.

A few years later Addison wrote, 'The Streight's mouth is the key to the Levant.' The piratical Moors of the African shore would, it was hoped, be prevented from attacking our merchants when they saw the English power established on the Straits ; this hope was largely realised, and the Princes of Barbary became the Allies of Queen Anne.

Yet it was well known that Gibraltar had its limitations as a harbour. When the news of its capture reached London, one Member of Parliament wrote to another :

> It will not protect a fleet against a superior one, but 'twill be of use and safety for single ships, or four or five men-of-war, and in that respect of great advantage to our trade.

Though sheltered from the worst of the winter winds, the Levanter, it could never afford such shelter as Lisbon, and in 1704 was in no way fitted out as a base. Before that 1708 had been done, Port Mahon had been captured, a better harbour and better situated for watching the Toulon fleet and the Mediterranean coasts. But the immense advantage expected from Gibraltar's command of the Straits proved no delusion.[338]

A little enterprise was the only quality required for the taking of Gibraltar, but to keep it heroism was needed, both by sea and by land. Within a few weeks of its capture, Toulouse came to retake it, and on that issue the one full-dress naval engagement of the war was fought off Malaga between the Allied and French Grand Fleets. And afterwards, throughout the following winter and spring, the armies of Spain and France battered in vain at the land approaches of Gibraltar, defended by a mere handful of English soldiers, sailors, and marines.*

* The story of the defence of Gibraltar, October 1704 to April 1705, must come into the next volume of this work. I end this volume with the Battle of Malaga, so nearly contemporaneous with Blenheim.

The news of the loss of Gibraltar was received with deep humiliation at Madrid, and with anger and alarm by the Toulon fleet, who learnt of it at Barcelona. Admiral Toulouse immediately set out to recover the Rock, with the chief naval armament of France—fifty French battleships, accompanied by two dozen of oared war-galleys. In the action that followed, the galleys proved of some service in calm weather, in towing battleships in and out of action when the wind was not serviceable, and in attacking or rescuing injured vessels. The fleet of Toulouse was approximately equal, in number of men and guns, to Rooke's force of forty-one English and twelve Dutch battleships.* It was in better condition, coming straight from home ports, and it was better supplied with powder and shot, since the wasteful bombardment of Gibraltar had reduced Rooke's store. He had left England with forty rounds per gun, and had now only twenty-five on the average, though half the fleet had not been engaged at Gibraltar.

If Toulouse could drive Rooke out of the Straits, he could, in the then condition of Gibraltar, retake it from the sea without any difficulty at all. The battle off Malaga, which decided this issue, took place after some curious manoeuvring by the two fleets between the African and Spanish coasts. Rooke, though taken by surprise, did not wish to fight till he had re-embarked and distributed throughout the ships half the marines garrisoning Gibraltar, and completed the watering of his fleet then in process on the African shore. While he was thus engaged the two fleets unintentionally changed places, and at daybreak on Aug. $\frac{13}{24}$ 1704 August 13th, the French were seen lying between Rooke and Gibraltar. The Allies had the advantage of the wind which was blowing from the east.

Rooke, who had no lack of moral courage or technical ability in his plain duty as a sailor, did not hesitate for a moment to accept battle under circumstances of disadvantage, in order to save Gibraltar. He knew that he was somewhat short of ammunition, and wished to close with the enemy so as to win a rapid victory. He sailed down

* Compare *Leake*, I, pp. 174–175, to note in *Corbett*, II, pp. 527–528.

with the wind, and the battle of the giants began and raged all day. The seamen of France, Holland, and England all did their duty, to mutual admiration.* The French retreated to keep their distance, and Rooke's attempt to finish the battle at once at close quarters failed. But the quarters were often uncomfortably close. By the end of the day both sides had their bellyful. In the opinion of the allied seamen, the French had shot too high, and their ships were in the worse case by nightfall. No vessels were sunk or captured in the action on either side, but few were uninjured, and many were practically out of service from shot holes and broken masts. A number of English ships had not a shot left in their lockers. The Dutch had rather less than 400 killed and wounded, the English list was 2,368. The French admitted in general terms a loss of 1,500, which the Allies considered a gross under-estimate. Besides Rooke himself, Leake, Byng, Shovell, the Dutch Callenburgh and Van Wassenaer, and the French Marquis de Villette, had all been deeply engaged, and their flagships had borne their full share of the very brunt of the conflict. Toulouse himself had been wounded and many Frenchmen of rank killed.

So the rival fleets lay all night, licking their wounds, the French galleys busy towing in their disabled ships. Next morning Toulouse still lay between the English and Gibraltar, and had now the advantage of the wind, Aug. $\frac{14}{25}$ 1704 which had shifted to the north-west. He could, therefore, renew the battle if he chose. The Allies lay there all day to leeward of him, challenging him to come on if he dared. But he had had enough ; and he did not know the secret that might yet have lost Gibraltar to England, that Rooke was anxiously distributing cannon-balls and powder through his fleet, ' so that by the best computation, when all was supplied, they made up some to eight, some to ten, and most to twelve round of shot ' per gun.

* ' Sir George Rooke says he never observed the true English spirit so apparent and prevalent in our seamen as on this occasion. Sir Clowdisley [Shovell] observes the engagement was very sharp, and he thought the like between the two fleets never had been in his time. The French, to give them their due, though forced in the van to give way, behaved remarkably well.' *Leake*, I, pp. 169–170.

Having lain a whole day challenging a renewal of the battle, Rooke and his Council decided that all required by honour had been done, that not even the French Court could say the English had been beaten (though here they under-estimated the powers of Versailles), and that it was high time to get back to Gibraltar and refit. Orders were issued that the fleet should cut its way thither if necessary through the intervening French fleet. Captains whose ammunition was exhausted were to sail on and *rendez-vous* at Gibraltar. The wind had shifted back and was now blowing from the east to carry the English to the Straits. It was an ugly situation for Rooke's half-armed fleet if Toulouse lay across their path. But in the course of the following night he disappeared. Next morning Rooke supposed he had gone forward to the Straits ; the Allied fleet reached Gibraltar thinking that another battle might still lie before them. But in fact the French fleet had slipped back eastward and was returning to Toulon. From that port it never again emerged in full force. The English Grand Fleet was never again challenged to battle. Malaga was the Jutland of the war. Louis, under the financial strain of the land-war after Blenheim, could not afford to maintain his fleet in fighting trim. Not only was Gibraltar saved, but the Mediterranean was abandoned to the English fleet. Louis and his courtiers might chant *Te Deum* for the victory of Malaga, but it was the dirge of French naval power.[339]

Aug. $\frac{15}{26}$ 1704

The campaign of 1704 on the Danube and in the Straits had gone far to redress the balance of power in Europe. It was characteristic of Englishmen, or at least of English politicians, that instead of being merely thankful, they managed, before Christmas had come, to divide themselves on party lines even in the counting of their blessings.

In the first reaction to the news of Blenheim, the Ministerial Tories had taken the lead in the national rejoicings.

> I question [one of them wrote in August] whether there has been so decisive a battle since that of Pharsalia. That at Pavia was not so extensive, Christendom not being so much concerned in the consequence of it. On Sunday I was at Windsor, where I found my Lord Treasurer sensibly overjoyed, for this has given the balance of Europe into the Queen's hands. . . . Since the news I have not seen any creature so like a Jacobite as a Whig : their looks, their blood and their goodwill to the Government are the same.

The Tory squires ceased that autumn to complain of the Land Tax. ' Our public good news of late has caused a general rejoicing and raised our English general above all detracting tongues ; the country people say there is something for their money.' * Ned Ward, the popular Tory poet, exploited the occasion for party purposes by contrasting the success of Marlborough as the Tory hero with William's long and fruitless campaigns :

> Long did Nassaw his Belgick valour try,
> By English arms to curb French tyranny,
> Vast sums were given, and great armies raised,
> And wonders done, that glorious Prince be praised !
> Whose matchless conduct all men must allow,
> Performed strange things, the Lord knows where or how.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> But thou, Great Marlborough, hast in two campaigns,
> Made happy Ann's surpass all other reigns,
> And by thy conduct, at a moderate cost
> Retrieved that honour fourteen years had lost.[340]

If the Tories had united on this line and adhered to it, they could have secured for their party the credit of the victorious war, kept Marlborough for their hero, and made peace, greatly to the advantage of England and Europe, as soon as the objects set forth in the Treaty of Grand Alliance were achieved. But there was another element in the party, the High Tories under Rochester, Seymour, and Nottingham, deeply embittered against the Godolphin Ministry by the events that had recently driven them from office.† The Duchess wrote that, on the news of Blenheim, they spoke as if her husband ' instead of beating the French had beat the Church.' And as the autumn went on, these voices in disparagement of Marlborough began to be more loudly heard. Never fond of red-coats,

* See pp. 293-295 above.

† See pp. 274, 335-336 above.

the High Tories were tempted by Gibraltar and Malaga to set up the deeds of Rooke and the Navy in rivalry to those of Marlborough and the Army. At the end of September De Foe wrote to Harley from Bury St. Edmunds :

> The High Church Party look on Sir George Rooke as their own. The victory at sea they look upon as their victory over the Moderate Party, and his health is now drunk by those here who won't drink the Queen's nor your's. I am obliged with patience to hear you damned, and he praised, and Her Majesty slighted and the sea victory set up against the land victory ; Sir George exalted above the Duke of Marlborough, and what can the reason of this be but that they conceive some hopes from this that their High Church Party will revive under his patronage ? [341]

So far did this movement extend, that when Parliament met in November the Commons carried a congratulatory resolution to the Queen that mentioned, as equally important, Blenheim and Malaga ; Marlborough's friends thought ' that and Blenheim ought not to be mentioned on a day,' and were better pleased with the Lords' resolution which treated the Duke's victory as the singular event of the year.

' In the House of Commons,' wrote one observer early in November, ' the Tories run out in commendation of Sir George and talk of my Lord Marlborough's victory as a small matter.' The same division appeared even among the clergy. ' The Houses of Convocation have divided about their address : the higher would not name Sir George Rooke ; the lower would.'

Thus, while the High Churchmen belittled the Duke and declared that Rooke had done as much as he, the Ministerialists and Whigs declared, with equal injustice, that Rooke had no merit at all. This bitter and absurd quarrel sprang from and further enhanced the existing divisions on the Occasional Conformity Bill and on the general policy of the war. It drove the Queen, the Godolphin Ministry and the Whigs more than ever into one camp, and prepared the way for the General Election of 1705 which overthrew the High Tory power in the House of Commons, and left Ministers definitely dependent on Whig support.[342]

The majority of the Whigs had, indeed, hailed Marlborough's victories that summer with genuine delight in their party papers, such as the *Observator* ; and the moment they saw the line taken by the High Tories they flung themselves into the fray. They had never had any love for Rooke. Marlborough now became the hero of the Whigs, though he was never a Whig hero. As the Venetian Ambassador reported to his government, the prestige and popularity won by the Duke and the Godolphin Ministry as a result of Blenheim enabled them to defy their High Tory critics, and emboldened them to seek more openly the alliance of the Nonconformists. ' The Whigs triumph, and assume the merit of a policy which the events of the war have approved,' wrote Mocenigo, while the Ministerialist Tories, who are not '*passionati* ' about home affairs, agree to take full advantage of the situation for the benefit of the nation and the '*equilibrio* ' of Europe.[343]

In this quarrel the Queen, little as she liked the Whigs, was on the side of Marlborough. She showered upon him honours and rewards. The famous Royal Manor of Woodstock became his, and Vanbrugh was commissioned to erect there Blenheim Palace at the Queen's expense. In September, while the Duke was still abroad pushing his success across the Rhine, Anne went in state to St. Paul's, to give thanks for Blenheim. The Strand, Fleet Street, and Ludgate Hill were ' railed and hung with blue cloth ' on both sides of the roadway, and behind the barriers the City Militia were drawn up. The fronts of the houses on the route were gay with Eastern carpets and rich tapestries. The sidewalks, windows and roofs were thronged with spectators, eager to see the long procession of State coaches, Beefeaters and Horse Guards. Inside Wren's Cathedral, now almost finished, two battalions of Foot Guards made a lane from the West Door to the Choir. The invalid Queen bore her pain bravely to go through with the ceremony. At her hand walked the Duchess, modestly dressed in the part of a faithful ' Abigail,' but the proudest subject in England that day.

Nor was this the last of the Blenheim pageants. Next January, after the Duke's return, a grand military march, with all London again looking on, carried ' 34 standards

and 128 colours' captured in the great battle, from the Tower to Westminster Hall. Old men remembered seeing the flags taken at Worcester fight hung with pomp in the same Hall, to vanish at the Restoration. They blessed God that this time the trophies had been torn from a foreign foe.

The flags thus deposited in Westminster Hall, the crowded thoroughfare of the Courts of Justice, remained throughout the reign of Anne one of the celebrated sights of London. Political poems were written about them, in one of which 'a jolly red-coat' points out to 'an honest tar' that, whatever his Tory friends may tell him, the flags were all taken by the Army.[344] The Army became, for awhile, more popular than it had ever been before. The music of 'The Grenadiers' March' was heard everywhere: Farquhar introduced it at the beginning and end of his 'Recruiting Officer':

> Beat the Grenadier March—Row, row, tow! Gentlemen, this piece of music, called an overture to a battle, was performed with wonderful success at the great operas of Vigo, Schellenberg and Blenheim. It came off with the applause of all Europe excepting France. The French found it a little too rough for their *delicatesse*.

The events of 1704 drew Godolphin closer than ever to Marlborough, and a little nearer to the Whigs. In September, in discussing a matter on which he differed from the Duke, he wrote to Harley, 'I can believe in him against my own senses.' Anxious to make the most of Blenheim —and also to curry favour with the rising power of the Whig Junto—Godolphin, who was himself a patron of jockeys rather than poets, consulted Lord Halifax, the Maecenas of the age, and at his advice sent Henry Boyle, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to find Joseph Addison in his modest lodging and engage him to write a poem worthy of the occasion. 'The Campaign' duly appeared with its comparison of the Duke directing the battle to the angel guiding the storm,

> 'Such as of late o'er pale Britannia passed.'

The town, accustomed to a poorer style of fustian, was pleased by its dignity and sense. Early in 1706

Addison, hitherto only a scholar and poet, became an Under-Secretary of State in the office of Sir Charles Hedges. Such, in those days, was the close connection of poetry and politics, when poetry could serve the purposes of pamphleteering.

Marlborough, for all his patience, was human, and he did not like it when so many of his old political associates disparaged his victories. He wrote that autumn to Sarah from Germany:

> I will endeavour to leave a good name behind me in countries that have hardly any blessing but that of not knowing the detested names of Whig and Tory.[345]

But for all their nonsense and faction, the English were acquiring a new conception of the place of their country in the world, as the mistress of the Mediterranean, 'the scourge of France, the arbitress of Europe,' to whom foreign Princes and peoples looked for help and justice not in vain. England was more than all she had been under Elizabeth, more than all she had been under Cromwell, for she was now a united nation with a fixed and free Constitution. Whig and Tory might bark and bicker, but they carried on the nation's work between them, because the blood-feud of sects and parties had been staunched by the compromise of the Revolution Settlement, which, by giving to England domestic peace, based more securely than on force, had opened to her the paths of greatness oversea.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Marlborough's Letters to Heinsius

I do not think that any English historian or biographer has made use of Marlborough's letters to Heinsius for the years 1701–5, of which the original MSS. are in the Rijks-archief at the Hague, though Noorden had seen them. Only the later letters of this correspondence, from 1706 onwards, have been known to English historians since their publication by Vreede in 1850. The good relations of Marlborough and Heinsius were the keystone of the whole Alliance in the early and decisive years of the war, and I think it will be of interest if I print for the first time these extracts from the Duke's share in their correspondence. The first four extracts are from letters written in William's life-time. I have preserved the Duke's original spelling in this Appendix, though not in the text of the book.

Dec. $\frac{5}{16}$, 1701. Wee have here no talk but of the Elections, I hope in God thay will be such, as will doe their utmost against ffrance.

Jan. $\frac{6}{17}$, 170$\frac{1}{2}$. The Treatys [of Grand Alliance] have been this day layd before the House of Commons and I hope it will take them into considerations, soe that wee may know what to depend upon; and I have good reason to think that every thing will goe well.

Jan. $\frac{9}{20}$, 170$\frac{1}{2}$. It is with a very hearty joy I send you the good news of the House of Commons have this day agreed to the 40000 men for the quota that England is to furnish abroad. This was unanimously agreed to, by which you may have the satisfaction of seeing that the Gentlemen of England are intirely in the interest of Holland, and as I heartily wish it may continue long, I beg if possible that care may be taken that your prints may make noe Party distinctions. [Viz. that the Dutch newspapers should not extol the Whigs over the Tories and so alienate the most important section of 'the Gentlemen of England,' some of whom would have been surprised to learn that they were 'intirely in the interest of Holland.']

Jan. $\frac{13}{24}$, 170$\frac{1}{2}$. The Parl. having agreed what the quota of England shall be, his Majy [W. III] is desirous you shou'd send mee a draught that

is proper for the convention that is to settle the denombrement [number of troops agreed to be supplied by each of the Allies]. I shou'd be alsoe oblig'd if you would let mee have your thoughts as to an article the Parl. has addressed to have added to the Treaty with the Emperor and the States; . . . we desire you shou'd ingage not to have peace till his Majy has satisfaction as to the pretended Prince of Whalles. [See p. 151 above].

March $\frac{8}{19}$, 170$\frac{1}{2}$ [the very day on which King William died]. I have had the favour of three of yours by yesterdays post, but the great lose wee have had makes me incapable of giving any answer to them by this opertunity. Her Majy has commanded mee to give you asurances of her unalterable resolutions of remaining ferm to the interest of Holland, and the Common Cause. She is very desirous you shou'd give this asurance to the States [General]; I am such a hurry that you will pardon my saying noe more, but be asur'd that my heart is, and alwise shall be with you. The resolutions of both Houses and the Queens speach to the Councell, mr Stanhope will give you.

The next letter shows Marlborough's endeavours to calm the anxiety of the Dutch at the substitution of so many Tory for Whig Ministers and magistrates in England in the new reign, the Tories being regarded abroad as more anti-Dutch and less zealous for 'the Common Cause.' The statement that 'there will be at least six Wiggs for one of the other Party' is monstrously untrue, unless we suppose that Marlborough, in writing to his foreign friend, computes all who were enthusiastic for the war as 'Wiggs,' and counts only the High Tories as 'the other Party.' But even so it is a gross exaggeration.

April 21, 1702. I am soe uneasy in my own mind that I wou'd give a great deall that I had the happyness of being with you, to let you know the true thoughts of her Majy concerning the alterations she has and will make. In the mean time you will give mee leave to asure you that her Majy is fermly resolv'd not to enter into any party, but to make use of all her subjects, that is what will appear very quickly in England, her Majy being resolved very quickly to shut the dore upon any other alterations, and I may asure you that when she has done all that she intends, there will be at least six Wiggs for one of the other Party. For the good of the Common Cause I beg of you to use your endeavours that there may be noe jealousies.

The next letter is very interesting. It is on the subject of Queen Anne's attempt to have the Allied troops in the Netherlands put under her husband (Prince George of Denmark) instead of Marlborough, see p. 166, above. It will be seen from this letter how very delicate and even dangerous a position was that in which Marlborough was placed in the matter, and how carefully he had to walk among so many enemies at home and abroad. Christian

Plessen was a Danish statesman, specially attached to Prince George in England.

Aug. 21, 1702. I am told that you have had the same information I have received, that Mons. Plessen is persuaded that it is my fault that the Prince of Denmark has not the command of your troops; he is going for England and I suppose will passe by the Hague. I take him to be an honest man, but he is impossed upon by Lord Rochester's means, who wou'd be glade to have him come into England with this opinion; if you see Plessen you must not lett him know that I, or you, know anything of this, but as occation offers I am sure you will doe mee the friendly part of letting him see the great desire I had to have it done; and if there be any hopes that it will be done this winter, I think you shou'd lett him see it, for he has power with the Prince, and that will keep them [Anne and her husband] in good humour.

May 29, 1703. I have received a second letter from Ld Nottingham, not doubting but we may spare the 12000 men [from the Netherlands for Spain]. If wee should doe it, we shall be necessitated to put ourselves upon the defensive. But you will be sensible that this must not be my opinion to his Lordship, but I must form my answer agreable to what you shall say. [This follows on a similar letter of May 26 on the same subject.]

It will be seen from these last two letters that, in the interest of the Common Cause, Marlborough had secret understandings with Heinsius against the moves and policy of his High Tory colleagues in the Cabinet.

In the following letters we read Marlborough's bitter complaints to Heinsius of the restrictions put on his action by the Dutch Generals (not Deputies) in the field in 1703. In 1702 he had been much more reticent on this subject. In 1703 he was in a position to speak out to Heinsius and even to threaten resignation.

June 22, 1703. I think the Common Interest dose requier that noe more time shou'd be lost, but that wee either attack Antwerp or Ostend; or else put ourselves upon the defensive, and send the rest to Germany, for two months, which may save the whole in Germany, and be here again time enough to take Huy, Limbourg and make themselves masters of the Mosel to Treves. This letter is whatt will let you see my thoughts as to the operations of this Campagne, which I think will be the last I shall be able to serve you in, and I beg you to believe that if I had been born at Amsterdam I could not be more desirous for the prosperity of Holland then I am, being truly convinc'd that when you are unfortunate, England must be undone.

July 31, 1703. It is impossible the warr can goe on with success att this rate, if measurs must be taken between two armys, and the quarrels and animositys of private pepel shall make a delay, which hinders the whole, it is my opinion impossible to avoyde in length of time some great misfortune, which gives mee soe much trouble, that I know not if I shall be able to outlive

this campagne, but I am shure I have not coridge to make another. . . . I own to you that I have the spleen to a very great degree.

Aug. 26, 1703. Vall Notre Dame. My opinion is for attacking the Lyns, as well as those Generals which have signed the paper [see p. 316, above]. . . . All that they [the Dutch Generals] say is to incline us to act defensively, which I take to be destruction. I can't forbear telling you that all the disafected pepel in England will take occasion to make use of the arguments given by your generals to convince our Parliament men that the warr ought to be made in other places and not in this country.

Sep. 3, 1703. Val nostre Dame. If I might have millions given mee to serve another yeare and be oblig'd to doe nothing but by the unanimous consent of the Generals, I would much sooner dye. . . . I hope they will approve of the one expedient I can think of, which is my being att the head of the troupes payde by England, and they joyne any such of theirs to mee as they shall Judge for the good of the service. Att the sam time I shall be very desirous to have as many Deputys in the Army with mee as they please, for I shall never have a thought but what I shou'd be glad thay shou'd judge off.

Sep. 10, 1703. St. Tron. I doe call God to witness that after I had seen the Lyns upon Wensday and Thursday, I was conferm'd in my opinion that wee shou'd have forced them with the lose of very few men.

The remaining letters here printed are concerned with the projects for saving the Empire and their result in the Danube campaign.

May 24. 1703. [Copy in Marlborough's handwriting of 'my letter to Mr. Secretary Hedges,' which he encloses to Heinsius.]

The Emperor is oblig'd by the Great Alliance to have 90000 men and the contingent troops of the Empir shou'd be 120.000, of which I am very very sure that since the first 15 battalions marched from hence to the upper Rhyn, which was in Feb. last, there had not marched of the contingent troops of the Empir 10000 men, but they all hope by staying att home to draw mony from England and Holland. If there can't be a method found to oblige the Emperor and Empir to defend themselves, I am afraid the consequence at last must prove fatall to England and Holland. I can't but observe one thing that the Marishall Villiers has not 26000 men with him besides the troops at Baviar, and the Marishall de Tallard does not pretend to more than 18; by which you may see how little the Empire dose for themselves.

March $\frac{7}{17}$, 170$\frac{3}{4}$. The intelligence from all parts of the Empire agree that if England and Holland doe not assist the Empire by sending an army early to the Moselle, the whole Empire must be undone. I should be glad you would lett mee know what measures you have taken concerning this, and what Coehorn says as to the siege of Thionville, for I find by P. Eugen's paper that he thinks that siege necessary [viz. for success on the Moselle. Nothing is said about the Danube].

Then comes the news of the death of Cohorn, the great military engineer, Vauban's rival, and on March $\frac{14}{25}$ Marlborough writes of it, referring to his failure in the field in the campaign of 1703:

Had he dyed one yeare sooner, any Nation might have been proud of such a subject.

March 24, 170$\frac{3}{4}$. You will see by the enclos'd Memoriall of Count Wratislagh to her Majesty what aprehensions thay have in Germany; our Councell here are very much inclin'd to the helping of Germany, in order to the reducing of the Elector of Bavaria, which we think here is soe necessary, that all things must goe wrong, if that Elector be not brought to reason. All that I have been able to prevaile on Her Majty and Her Councell is to come to no resolution on this matter, but that I shou'd att my arrivall att the Hague setle this business with the States General. . . . The Count Wratislagh comes along with mee, his zeal for his Master's service, as well as his own natural heat will make him presse this matter very much.

May 21, 1704. Camp of Kulsecken. [Since Villeroi is marching away from the Netherlands after Marlborough] it wou'd be very much for the good of your service to draw into the army a good part of your troupes in your garrisons, by which means you might send us soe many troupes as might make mee succeed against the Elector of Bavaria; and Mons. Auverkerk be able to undertake what ever you shou'd think best in Flanders.

May 25. Coblence. I am come here with the horse and shall passe the Mosel and the Rhyne tomorrow, and the Meine the 28th or 29th att furthest, for I shall make all the diligence I can to joyne the troupes about Philipsbourg. I am sure when you reflect on the great number, as well as the goodness of the troupes the Marshall de Villeroy has taken with him, you will be in no doubt of the King of ffrance doing all that is in his power to reduce the Emperor, and that I hope you will lett us have all the assistance you can. I doe not say this because I am her, but I protest before God if I were in flanders I shou'd be of the same opinion, for shou'd the Emperor be oblig'd to make an ill peace, England and Holland must pay for itt. On the other hand if wee can be putt in a condition of being able to reduce the Elector of Bavaria, ffrance must submit to such termes as wou'd be for the good of the Common Cause.

May 30. Mayence. I believe I shall not see Prince Lewis till I gett to the Danube.

June 15. Ebersbach. I send you enclos'd what I have received from the Gentleman imploy'd by the King of Prussia [to treat with the Elector of Bavaria]. If the Elector shou'd in earnest have a mind to treat, itt will be when we shall gett nearer to him.

June 19. Gros. Seissen. I very much fear he [Villeroy] may make the P. Eugene very uneasy on the Rhine, but it is his opinion as well as mine that whatever happens on the Rhine, that must not devert us from doing all wee can to ruin the Elector, for on that depends the good or bad success of the Common Cause. . . . I beg you will take care that I receive noe orders

from the States that may put mee out of a condition of reducing the Elector, for that wou'd be of all mischiefs the greatest.

Jully 16. [Gives news of temporary break down of the negotiations with the Elector of Bavaria owing to the rumour of Tallard's advance.]

Thus you see that matter is at an end for the present. . . . This Treaty has not made us loose any time, for we have been attacking the town of Rain, which has this day capitulated. And as we are advancing into the heart of Bavaria to destroy the country and oblige the Elector on way or other to a complyance.

Jully 20. Aicha. We shal march tomorrow and post ourselves [at Friedburg] soe that the Elector will be able to draw very little subsistence for his army from his own country, which we flater ourselves will make them very uneasy.

Jully 31. Friberg. Mons. de Tallard is advancing and may be with the Elector in three or four days. If we have a fair opertunity you may be sure we shall not decline ingaging them, our troupes being full of corage and desiring nothing more.

Aug. 10. When P. Eugene and I are joyned our army will consist of 160 squadrons and 65 battalions. P. Lewis has with him for the siege [of Ingoldstadt] 31 squadrons and 24 battalions. The ffrench make their boast of having a great superiority, but I am very confident they will not venture a battaile, but if wee find a fair occasion wee shal be glad to venture itt, being persuaded that the ill condition of affaires in most partes requiers itt.

[Aug. 13. Battle of Blenheim.]

Aug. 17. I had nether time nor health to write to you when I sent my aid de camp to the Estates with the account of our late victory, which appeares every day greater, for I believe att this time the number of Prisoners are above 11000. And for the honour of the troupes sent by England and Holland it is they that have done the whole business, for I can assure you that the Imperial troups have not 100 prisoners.

Aug. 25. Sefelingen [near Ulm]. It is impossible to say enough of the bravery of all the officers and soldiers, for as the enemy was stronger than wee, the greatest part of ours were obliged to charge four or five times a peece. But that which I bless God for every day is the unity and friendship in which we live, for to this minute I have not seen any discontent in any one officer, nor any one officer asked me what I intend to doe, but have all obey'd with cheerfulness.

Aug. 28. Sefelingen. By the letters we have intercepted of the enemy's, going to Paris from their camp, they all own to have lost above 40,000 men, which probably will oblige them to make detachments both from Italie and fflanders.

APPENDIX B

Principal Officers of State in the first years of the Godolphin Ministry

	1702	1703	1704
Lord Treasurer	Sidney, Lord Godolphin		
Lord President of the Council	Thos. Herbert, Earl of Pembroke		
Lord Privy Seal	John Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham		
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Hon. Henry Boyle		
Lord Keeper of the Great Seal (No Lord Chancellor these years)	Sir Nathan Wright		
Secretary of State (Northern Department)	Sir Charles Hedges		Succeeded May 1704, by (Speaker) Robert Harley
Secretary of State (Southern Department)	Daniel Finch, Earl of Nottingham		Succeeded May 1704, by Sir Charles Hedges
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland	Lawrence Hyde, Earl of Rochester	Succeeded by James Butler, Duke of Ormonde, in Feb. 1703	

APPENDIX B—*continued.*

Principal Officers of State in the first years of the Godolphin Ministry

	1702	1703	1704
Lord High Admiral . . .	Prince George of Denmark, Prince Consort		
Secretary of War . . .	William Blathwayt		Succeeded by Henry St. John, May 1704
Master-General of the Ordnance .	Duke of Marlborough		
Comptroller of the Household .	Sir Edward Seymour		Succeeded by Thomas Mansell, May 1704
Lord Chamberlain . . .	Edward Villiers, Earl of Jersey		Succeeded by Earl of Kent, May 1704

In this whole list there is not a single Whig, with the possible exception of the Earl of Kent, a person of slight ability and importance.

APPENDIX C

War Then and Now

War was a very different thing in Queen Anne's reign from what it is to-day. In the year 1704 the British Army and Navy decided the fate of Europe. The British killed outright in the four great actions of the year were computed as follows :

Gibraltar	60
Malaga	695
Schellenberg	452
Blenheim	672
	1879 (say 2000 as some estimates are a little higher).

We have no figures of those who died later of wounds, of disease, of hardship, or were killed in smaller actions. But I think 5000 would amply cover the total of loss of life to Britain due to her participation in that decisive year of the war. Between 1914 and 1918 the average loss of life in war to Great Britain per year was about 200,000. The population of the island had risen about seven times, and the cost of war in youthful life about forty times.

It is true that in the later years of Queen Anne's war the number of deaths was sometimes larger, because the number of British soldiers had then been doubled and the proportion of them employed under unhealthy conditions in Spain increased. But even at Malplaquet, where the slaughter shocked opinion at home and hastened the advent of peace, the total number of British killed was about 600, though the Dutch lost perhaps four times as many.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

Abbey = Chas. Abbey. *The English Church and its Bishops* 1700–1800 (1887).
Add. MSS. = British Museum, *Additional MSS.* Some of the principal collections are thus alluded to :

Coxe = Archdeacon Coxe's transcripts from the Marlborough (Blenheim) and Godolphin papers.
E. = Ellis Papers.
H.F. = Hatton Finch Papers (Nottingham).
L'H. = L'Hermitage (the Dutch agent).
Mc. = Sir James McKintosh's transcripts.
St. = Stepney.

Ashton = J. Ashton. *Social Life in the Reign of Queen Anne*, 1882.
Atkinson = C. T. Atkinson. *Marlborough*, 1921. (*Heroes of Nations Series.*)
Augustan = *Social and Political Ideas of some English Thinkers of the Augustan Age*, ed. by Prof. Hearnshaw, 1928.
Baudrillart = A. Baudrillart, *Phil. V et la Cour de France.*
Bod. MSS. = Manuscripts in the Bodleian, Oxford.
Burchett = Josiah Burchett. *Transactions at Sea*, 1720.
Burnet = Bishop Burnet's *History of his own Time*, ed. 1823.
Calamy = J. T. Rutt's *Life of Edmund Calamy*, 1830.
Conduct = *Account of the Conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough* (by herself), 1742.
Colonie = de la Colonie. *Chronicles of an old Campaigner* 1692–1717 (1904).
Corbett = Julian Corbett. *England in the Mediterranean*, ed. 1917.
C.S.P. = *Calendar State Papers—Dom.* = Domestic ; *Am.* = *America and W. Indies* ; Tr. = Treasury, 1702–1707.
Coxe = Archdeacon Coxe. *Memoirs of Marlborough* (page references are to the ed. of 1818).
Cunningham = W. Cunningham. *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, ed. 1903.
Davenant = Charles Davenant's Collected *Works*, 1771.
Defoe = Defoe's *Tour through Great Britain*, ed. 1 ; reprint by G. D. H. Cole, 1927.
De Jonge = J. C. De Jonge, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen*, 1841, IV, ii.
Dispatches = *Marlborough's Dispatches*, ed. Sir G. Murray, 1845.
Dowell = St. Dowell. *History of Taxation in England*, ed. 1884.
D'Urfey = D'Urfey's collection of songs. *Pills to Purge Melancholy*, 1719. (Reprinted.)
E.H.R. = *English Historical Review.*
Ec.H.R. = *Economic History Review.*
Ernle = Lord Ernle. *English Farming*, ed. 1922.
Feiling = Keith Feiling. *History of the Tory Party*, 1924.

Feldzüge = *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen*, Wien, 1879. Serie I, Band VI.
Fiennes = Diary of Celia Fiennes. *Through England on a Side Saddle*, 1888.
Fortescue = Sir John Fortescue. *History of the British Army*, 1899.
Hardwicke = *Hardwicke's State Papers*, 1778.
Heinsius MSS. = Letters of Marlborough to Heinsius in the Rijks-archief at the Hague (see Appendix A, above, for some excerpts).
Hervey, L.B. = *Letter-Books of John Hervey, first Earl of Bristol*, 1894.
Hervey, D. = *Diary of John Hervey, first Earl of Bristol*, 1894.
Hill = *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard Hill*, 1845.
H.M.C. = *Historical Manuscripts Commission.* (*R.* 8 = *Eighth Report*, and so forth.)
H.C.J. = *House of Commons Journals.*
H.L.J. = *House of Lords Journals.*
H. of L. MSS. = *MSS. of House of Lords*, printed under authority of the *H.M.C.*
Klopp = Onno Klopp. *Fall des Hauses Stuart.*
Lady Montagu = *Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's Letters*, 1893.
Lambeth MSS. = MSS. in the Library of Lambeth Palace.
Lamberty = *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du* 18 *siècle*, de Lamberty, 1735.
Leake = *Life of Sir John Leake* (Navy Records Soc., 1920).
Lediard, N.H. = Thomas Lediard. *Naval History*, 1735.
Lediard, Marl. = Thomas Lediard. *Life of Marlborough*, 1736.
Legrelle = A. Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'espagne.*
Macky = *A Journey through England*, by John Macky, fifth ed. 1732.
Martin = *Life of Capt. Stephen Martin* (Navy Records Soc., 1895).
Mayor = J. E. B. Mayor. *Cambridge under Queen Anne* (diaries of foreigners in England), 1911.
Millner = John Millner, *Journal of marches, etc.*, 1733.
Noailles = Duc de Noailles. *Mémoires politiques et militaires*, 1777.
Noorden = Carl von Noorden, *Europäische Geschichte*, 1870.
Ormonde = *Life of Ormonde*, 1747.
Parker = Capt. Robert Parker's *Memoirs*, 1746.
Parl. Hist. = Cobbett's *Parliamentary History*, vol. vi.
Pelet = General Pelet. *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d'espagne* (The French military correspondence of the period), 1835.
Priv. Corr. = *Private Correspondence of Duchess of Marlborough*, 1838.
P.R.O. = *Public Record Office Manuscripts* (S.P. = *State Papers ; Tr.* = *Transcripts*).
R.H.S. = *Royal Historical Society* publications.
Rooke = *Journal of Sir George Rooke* (Navy Records Soc., 1897).
Rox = *Roxburghe Club* publications.
Salomon = F. Salomon. *Geschichte des letsten Ministeriums Königin Annas*, 1894.
Select Docs. = *Select Documents for Queen Anne's Reign*, 1702–7, ed. G. M. Trevelyan, 1929.
Spy = Ned Ward's *London Spy*, ed. 1924.
Sykes' Gibson = *Edmund Gibson, Bishop of London*, by Rev. Norman Sykes, 1926.
Taylor = C. W. Taylor. *The Wars of Marlborough*, 1921.
Tindal = Tindal's Continuation of Rapin's *History of England*, ed. 1744.
Torrington = *Memoirs relating to Lord Torrington* (Byng). *Camden Soc.*, 1889.
Turberville = A. S. Turberville. *House of Lords in Eighteenth Century*, 1927.
Wake MSS. = Archbishop Wake's Manuscripts in the Christ Church Library, Oxford.
Westerfield = R. B. Westerfield. *Middlemen in English Business*, 1660–1760 (Yale, 1915).
Wilson = F. W. Wilson. *The Importance of the reign of Anne in English Church History*, 1911.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1 P. 3. Steele's *Guardian*, no. 9 (March 21, 1713), reminds us how often coalmines and industry were favourably regarded by the landed interest, because they increased the market and profits of neighbouring landlords and farmers.

2 P. 4. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 272 (Oct. 8, 1705).

3 P. 8. Evelyn. *Memoirs for my grandson*, 1704 (ed. 1926, p. 17).

4 P. 8. W. Robinson. *History of Enfield*, 1823, I, p. 207.

5 P. 9. *Defoe*, I, pp. 129, 140–141.

6 P. 9. *Defoe*, I, p. 292.

7 P. 10. R. G. Albion. *Forests and sea power*. (A valuable American contribution to British History.) ; *Ec. H. R.* Jan., 1930, pp. 269–270.

8 P. 11. *Defoe*, I, p. 78. See also Defoe, *English Tradesman*, Pt. II, Chap. III, on the Trade in liquors.

9 P. 11. *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 164.

10 P. 13. Sir William Ashley, *The Bread of our forefathers* (1928), *passim* specially p. 8 ; Westerfield, pp. 169–170 ; Moffit, *England on the eve of the Industrial Revolution* (1925), *passim* ; Defoe's *Tour*, *passim*, and his *English Tradesman* (ed. 1727), Pt. 2, II, pp. 30–46 ; *Ernle*, pp. 148–152 ; (*Rox.*) *Hooke's Corr.*, I., pp. xi, 426 ; *R.H.S.* 1926, *Cattle Trade* ; *P.R.O. Tr.* 14 (Venetian), 112, f. 24.

11 P. 13 n. *H.M.C. Clements* (1913) pp. 242, 249 ; *Ernle*, pp. 148, 452 ; *Westerfield*, p. 169 ; Barrett's *Bristol*, p. 696. The degree to which England, in the early Eighteenth Century, regarded herself as a corn-exporting country, is illustrated in the lines in James Thomson's *Seasons* (*Spring*), where Britain is exhorted to rely on the export of cloth and corn to purchase the world's luxuries for herself :

> ' Nature's better blessings pour
> O'er every land ; the naked nations clothe ;
> And be th' exhaustless granary of a world.'

12 P. 14. Webb, *Manor and Borough*, p. 128, 166, 183 ; Gonner, *Common Land and Enclosure*, *passim*.

13 P. 14. Clapham, *Ec. History Modern Britain*, I, p. 22 ; Gonner, *passim*.

14 P. 14. *Cunningham*, p. 706, note.

15 P. 15. *H.C.J.*, XIV, p. 352.

16 P. 15. *Defoe*, I, pp. 210, 285–286.

17 P. 15. *E.H.R.*, Jan. 1929, pp. 40–60.

18 P. 16 n. *Ernle*, p. 150 ; *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), p. 230.

19 P. 17. Gregory King's calculations can be found in Chalmers' *Estimate of the comparative strength of Britain*, ed. 1804, or in slightly variant form in *Davenant*, II, p. 184, or in *Ernle*, pp. 453–454. A brief but important comment upon them by Professor Clapham should be studied in the *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. I, no. I, pp. 94–95. King estimated thus : Freeholders, 180,000 ; Farmers, 150,000 ; artisans and handicraftsmen, 60,000 ; labouring people and out-servants, 364,000 ; cottagers and paupers, 400,000. These figures represent the number of ' families ' to be multiplied by $3\frac{1}{2}$, 5 or 7 to obtain the number of persons.

20 P. 18. *Cunningham*, pp. 564–565 ; *Defoe*, II, p. 602.

21 P. 18 n. In one year the quarter sessions for Devon proclaimed that a bailiff in husbandry should receive not more than £5 a year ; a common man-servant in husbandry not more than £4 a year ; women labouring at hay not more than threepence a day with food, or sixpence without—at reaping, sixpence with or a shilling without ; master carpenters not more than eightpence with food, or one and fourpence without ; and so forth through the whole category of labour in field and shop. A. H. A. Hamilton, *Quarter Sessions*, pp. 272–274 ; *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), pp. 223, 238–239 ; *E.H.R.*, *July* 1928, pp. 398–404.

The wages of twenty servants in a nobleman's family was reckoned at £170 ; that is £8 10*s.* on the average, but they had also perquisites, ' vails ' (tips) and commissions. *Country Gentleman's Vademecum*, 1717 ; *Ashton*, I, p. 77.

Ernle, p. 440, gives the variations of wheat prices per quarter at Eton for the first fourteen years of the century. The political historian will observe that during the dangerous crisis of the war, 1702–1706, popular content was facilitated by cheap bread, and in 1709–1711 the Tory agitation for peace was aided by scarcity. In William III's reign prices of wheat had been more than twice what they were in the first half of Anne's reign.

1701	34/5	1708	37/11
1702	26/11	1709	71/11
1703	33/–	1710	71/6
1704	42/7	1711	49/6
1705	27/6	1712	42/5
1706	23/8	1713	46/9
1707	26/1	1714	46/1

These prices answer approximately to those given in Fleetwood's *Chronicon Preciosum*, ed. 1707, p. 128.

22 P. 19. *Economic Journal*, May 1927, pp. 214–228 : Mrs. George's article.

23 P. 19 n. Defoe, *Giving Alms no Charity*, 1704 ; *Duty of a Husbandman* (anon.) 1703, p. 36.

24 P. 21. Miss Leonard justly remarks : ' Many are affected by the Poor Law who never receive relief ; it takes away some of the horror of failure from all who may if unfortunate need help of the kind, and so renders the struggle for existence less brutal to the whole labouring class. In the Seventeenth Century this assistance to the poor helped to make England a peaceful community, and it has probably had the same effect ever since ' (*English Poor Relief*, pp. 302–303) ; Webb, *English Poor Law* (1927), especially Chap. V on the Law of Settlement ; *Wealth of Nations*, Book I, end of Chap. X ; Lecky, *England*, II, pp. 203–209 ; *Lady Montagu*, I, pp. 394–395 ; *Cunningham*, pp. 567–577 ; *H. of L. MSS.*, 1704–1706, pp. xiv–xvi ; Knowles and Boyle, *Vestiges of Old Newcastle*, pp. 154–155.

25 P. 22. *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 94, Aug. 1710.

26 P. 23. *Stats. of Realm*, 22–23, C. II, XXV, 4 *W. and M.* XXIII ; *Spectator*, no. 122.

27 P. 24. *Stats. of Realm*, 4 *W. and M.* XXIII ; *Freeholder*, nos. 22, 44 ; *Spectator*, nos. 116, 122 ; Blome's *Gentleman's Recreation*, first published in 1685, was reissued by subscription in 1710 but with few alterations. References to grouse shooting are frequent in the correspondence of the time : ' in moor game time I will go to the mountains ' (*H.M.C. Clements*, p. 229, ann. 1704).

28 P. 25. Mr. Collingwood, the historian of the Lake District, has called attention to ' the old farm-houses, dating everywhere from the Restoration to Queen Anne, and their solid oak furniture, inscribed very rarely with a year before 1660. Earlier stone buildings and oak fittings were not of the statesmen (freeholders), but of the gentry, or—earlier still—ecclesiastical. But now almost everyone lived in a new world of comfort and well being.' W. G. Collingwood, *Lake District History* (1925), pp. 1, 140.

[29] P. 25. *Fiennes*, pp. 159–164 ; *Calamy*, II, p. 220–221. *Defoe*, II, p. 679. *Macky* (II, p. 167) passes ' in a day or two through the little county of Westmorland where there is nothing remarkable ' and never turns aside to Lakeland. Robinson, Rector of Ousby in Cumberland, published in 1709 a *Natural History of Westmorland and Cumberland* of a hundred pages, chiefly about the minerals. It contains this one sentence about the scenery, worth reading as perhaps the earliest extant note of appreciation of the beauties of Lakeland : ' These lofty mountains contribute to the entertainment of our visive faculty, with most curious and delightful landskips.' But casual visitors saw nothing to admire.

[30] P. 26. Gibson's *Camden* (1695), p. 874. *Newcastle Courant*, 1711–1712. According to Miss *Fiennes* (p. 176) Newcastle ' most resembles London of any place in England,' and *Macky* (II, p. 241) calls it ' next to Bristol the greatest trading town in England.' North's *Life of Guildford* gives an interesting account of Newcastle and the Tyne valley at the end of Charles II's reign ; by 1702 the region was still more civilized and wealthy.

[31] P. 27. *Mayor*, pp. 135, 360–361 ; *The Lover*, no. 10, for Addison on china ; *Art of Painting and an Essay towards an English School*, 1706.

[32] P. 27. Sir Reginald Blomfield, *History of Renaissance Architecture in England* ; James Gibbs, *Rules of Architecture* (reprinted 1924, with introduction by Barman, see pp. xxii–xxiv).

CHAPTER II

[33] P. 28. *Freeholder*, no. 44 (date 1715).

[34] P. 29. *Tatler*, no. 182.

[35] P. 30. *Lady Montagu*, I, p. 150 (1710).

[36] P. 30. *Bodleian MSS. Ballard*, 47.

[37] P. 31. The volumes of the *Historical MSS. Commission* are too numerous to cite in this connection. Those of Coke and Molesworth (Clements) will serve as typical examples, together with the *Letter Books of John Hervey* (1894). These and other family papers induce me to think that the incomes ascribed by King to the titled persons and larger gentry in 1688 were either under-estimated or had greatly increased by Queen Anne's time. Macaulay, in his third chapter of his *History*, drew a scarcely exaggerated picture of the small rustic squire's lack of culture. But he forgot to make clear what great varieties of wealth and culture existed among the class of country gentlemen. In Anne's reign there was more wealth and more culture than in 1685.

[38] P. 31. *H.M.C. Kenyon*, p. 449 ; Percy Thornton, *Harrow School*, pp. 101–104 ; *H.M.C. Rutland*, II (1889) p. 186 ; *Egerton MSS. B.M.* 1695.

[39] P. 32. *H.M.C. Clements*, pp. xix, 221, 224, 232, 235, 243, 248, 268. See p. 229, above, on Jack Molesworth's pay.

[40] P. 34. *H.M.C. Chequers* (1900), p. 96.

[41] P. 34. *H.M.C. Dropmore* (1892), I, p. 13.

[42] P. 35. Locke, *On Education* ; Swift, *Modern Education* ; *Burnet*, VI, p. 195 (648) ; *H.M.C. Wood*, p. 83 ; in *Spectator*, no. 168, Steele writes of schools : ' Many a hand have I seen whipped till it was covered with blood, perhaps for smiling or writing an O for an A. Many a brave and noble spirit has been there broken. Others have run from thence and were never heard of afterwards.' Yet such treatment cannot have been universal : Henri Misson considered children to be more kindly treated in England than France, *Voyage en Angleterre* (1698), p. 228.

[43] P. 36. *Athenian Oracle* (1710), IV, p. 327 ; *Lady Montagu*, II, pp. 3–4 ; Farquhar, *Recruiting Officer*, I, 2. Addison and Swift, *passim*.

[44] P. 37. *H.M.C. Clements*, p. 246 ; *R.H.S.* (1917) *Guise*, pp. 150–151 ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 178 ; Coxe's *Walpole*, II. pp. 7–8 ; *Turberville*, p. 7.

[45] P. 37. Secretan's *Nelson*, p. 197 ; *Postman*, Jan. 1, 1704, and Jan. 2, 1705, advertisements of political packs ; Hine's *Hitchin*, II, p. 253.

[46] P. 39. *Hearne's Collections*, I, p. 324 ; Swift, *On Himself*, 1713 ; *Fiennes*, pp. 9, 218 ; *Life of Nash* (1762), p. 25 ; H. Misson, *Voyage en Ang.*, pp. 390–392 ; *Ashton*, I, pp. 206–213.

[47] P. 39. See p. 214, above, on Queen Anne's visit to Bath in 1702, and its effects on the city. Nash began his long domination of Bath about 1704. He was ' by profession a gambler ' though a most honourable one. Nash's *Life*, pp. 21, 38–41, 51 ; Wood's *Bath*, *passim* ; *Macky*, II, pp. 137–140 ; *Fiennes*, pp. 12–15.

[48] P. 40. Dec. 17, 1702. *H.M.C. Beaufort*, p. 96. Actually ' Beau Feilding ' survived his wound. Duels at this period were sometimes fought with pistol as well as sword—*H.M.C. Clements*, p. 251 ; *Mayor*, p. 370 ; *Guardian*, nos. 143, 145 ; *Life of Wharton*, p. 35 ; *Ashton*, II, pp. 185–196 ; Centlivre, *Beau's Duel*, II, 1 ; *Perplexed Lovers*, V ; *State Trials*, William III and Anne, *passim*.

[49] P. 41. *D'Urfey*, I, p. 268 ; IV, p. 55 ; Defoe, *Compleat Gentleman* (ed. 1890), pp. 65, 248 ; *Freeholder*, no. 22 ; *Spectator*, no. 116 ; *Edinburgh Rev.*, Oct. 1927 ; *Gentleman's Recreation*, 1710.

[50] P. 41. Sorbières, *Voyage to England*, translation of, 1709, p. 9 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, VI, p. 76 ; *D'Urfey*, II, p. 172.

[51] P. 42. *Macky*, I, pp. 164, 167 ; *Mayor*, p. 355 ; *Add. MSS.* 28080, f. 74.

[52] P. 42. *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 7 ; *Mayor*, pp. 316, 322, 363–364, 409 ; *Hill*, I, p. 381.

[53] P. 42. Alexander Hamilton. *New Account of the East Indies* (1727), II, pp. 271–273.

CHAPTER III

[54] P. 46. *Tatler*, no. 255 ; *Spectator*, no. 106 ; *Ashton*, II, pp. 121–125 ; *Diary of Rev. T. Brockbank* (*Chetham Soc.* 1930).

[55] P. 46. See a very remarkable letter of Archbishop Tenison to Queen Anne, Jan. 1713, expostulating with her for issuing a warrant of dispensation for holding two such livings more than than thirty miles apart, which Tenison declares had never once been done since 1676. William and Mary, adds the Whig Primate to the Tory Queen, thought ' the distance of six miles much more expedient than that of thirty,' *Lambeth MSS.* 1133, ff. 31–39. Actually Spratt, the High Church but time-serving Bishop of Rochester and Dean of Westminster, who first sat on James II's High Commission and then took the oaths to William, did very well for his son in the way of plurality without breaking the canonical rule. The young gentleman took orders in 1704, was made by his father's interest Prebendary and Archdeacon of Rochester that same year, vicar of Boxley, Kent, in 1705, Rector of Stone, Kent, 1707, Prebendary of Winchester, 1712, Prebendary of Westminster, 1713. Prebendaries not having cure of souls did not fall under the thirty mile rule. He retained all these till his death in 1720. Pearce's *Sons of the Clergy*, 1928, p. 188. See also Richard Newton's *Pluralities Indefensible* for the practice in this matter in the early Eighteenth Century.

[56] P. 47. *Bod. MSS., Ballard*, 4, f. 65 ; *Diary of Francis Evans, Sec. o Bishop Lloyd*, 1699–1706, pp. viii, xix, 24–25, 94–96 ; *Wake MSS., Epist.* 3, for the Lincolnshire list.

[57] P. 47. *Wake MSS., Epist.* 5, Mr. Pujolas, 1709.

[58] P. 48. *Lambeth MSS.* 1120 ; *H. of L. MSS.* 1702–1704, pp. 558–559 ;

Burton, *Queen Anne*, I, pp. 52–55 ; *Address to Persons of Quality*, Robert Nelson, 1715, Appendix 7 ; Foxcroft's *Burnet*, pp. 344–345, 408 ; Overton, *English Church*, 1660–1714, pp. 69, 229–230 ; *Life of Sharp*, 1825, I, pp. 338–339 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 117–122 (369–371).

59 P. 49. *Bod. MSS., Rawlinson, D.* 834, *Parochial Libraries.* Robert Nelson was on the committee and Henry Newman Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.

60 P. 52. *Character of a Low Churchman*, 1702, p. 26.

61 P. 52. J. Wickham Legge, *English Church Life*, pp. 30–37 ; *Wake MSS., Misc.* 5 and 11 ; *Lambeth MSS.* 1115.

62 P. 54. *Vindication of the Clergy*, by a Divine of the Church of England, 1709, p. 4 ; *Burnet*, IV, p. 377 (211) ; *Abbey*, Chap. I ; Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* ; *D'Urfey*, VI, p. 214 ; Bass Mullinger, *Cambridge in the Seventeenth Century* ; Atterbury, *Letters*, II, pp. 30–31, III, pp. 314–318 ; *Bod. MSS., Ballard*, 9, f. 75 ; *Account of the Growth of Deism in England*, 1709 ; Hickeringill's *Priestcraft*, 1705, and the ensuing controversy ; *Priestianity*, 1720 ; works of Toland, Collins, Shaftesbury and pamphlets in answer ; Swift, *Argument against abolishing Christianity in England* ; William Nelson, *Rights of the Clergy*, 1712, introduction.

63 P. 57. *Wake MSS., Misc.* 5 and 11 ; *Lambeth MSS.* 1115 ; *Memoirs of the Family of Cavendish*, Archdeacon Kennett, 1708, p. 29 ; *Defoe*, II, p. 465 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1704–1706), pp. xxvii, 413–423 ; *Bod. MSS., Rawlinson*, D. 387 ; Estcourt, *English Catholic Nonjurors of* 1715 from P.R.O. documents ; *H.M.C.* (1906) *Stonyhurst*, pp. 177–182 ; *Sykes' Gibson*, pp. 292–297. In spite of the Protestant talk of the number of Roman Catholics in London, the actual returns of avowed Roman Catholics show a negligible quantity—in Middlesex and outer London a few more. They may not be complete.

64 P. 58. Hine, *History of Hitchin*, II, pp. 32–34, for case of Skingle ; *Davenant*, IV, p. 411 ; *Wake MSS., Misc.*, 5 and 11, and *Lambeth MSS.* 1115, show how much stronger Dissenters, especially Quakers, were in Bucks than in Lincs or Kent.

65 P. 58. The Chapelries were thus divided, 26 Presbyterian, 23 Baptist, 12 Independent, 14 Quaker, 13 French Protestant, *H.C.J.*, April 6, 1711.

66 P. 59. E.g. *A Letter from some aged Nonconformist Ministers*, 1702, and Nonconformist sermons, *passim* ; *cf.* to Sacheverell's sermons and pamphlets, and Leslie's *Rehearsal* for difference in tone of controversy.

67 P. 59. *Thoresby's Diary*, *passim*, and II, pp. 255–257 ; *Wake MSS., Misc.*, 5.

68 P. 60. Stephen, *Criminal Law*, I, pp. 378–383, 399–400, 415–417, 427, II, pp. 430–436 ; *State Trials*, XIV, pp. 639–654 ; *Case of the Hertfordshire Witches considered*, dedicated to Sir John Powell ; Lecky, *England*, I, p. 333. In Addison's *Drummer*, V, the coachman asks : 'Sir, I would know whether the poor beast is bewitched by Goody Crouch, or Goody Flye ?' 'Neither,' answers Sir George.

69 P. 60. Addison, *Drummer*, I ; Bass Mullinger, *History of St. John's*, pp. 210–213 ; *Spectator*, no. 110.

70 P. 61. Swift, *Baucis and Philemon* ; Wordsworth, *Prelude*, Book V.

71 P. 63. Swift, *Examiner*, no. 44 (no. 43 in the reprint).

72 P. 63. *Bod. MSS., Ballard*, 12, f. 52.

73 P. 63. There is a copy, with no printer's name, in the Library of Trinity College, Cambridge, I, 1, 27 (13). On the *Nonjurors*, see the well-known work of T. Lathbury, 1845 ; *Augustan*, Ch. V ; Secretan's *Nelson* ; Hearne's *Collections* ; *Aylesbury* (*Rox.*), II, p. 531 ; J. Wickham Legge, *English Church Life*, pp. 16–20 ; *Bod. MSS., Rawlinson*, D. 845–848, Letters 91–92, 98 ; *Bod. MSS., Ballard*, 12 ; L. M. Hawkins, *Allegiance in Church and State* (1928). Leslie's works are best studied for the Nonjurors position in Anne's reign.

74 P. 65. An early version of the *Vicar of Bray* will be found in Ned Ward's *Poems*, 1706, called *The religious Turncoat or the Trimming Parson.*

75 P. 66. *Davenant*, IV, p. 396.

76 P. 67. Overton, *English Church*, pp. 212–213 ; Josiah Woodward, *Rise and Progress of the Religious Societies* ; Secretan's *Nelson*, pp. 90–150 ; *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1927, on *Humanitarian London*, 1688 *to* 1750.

77 P. 67. *Wake MSS., Misc.*, 5 and 11, and *Lambeth MSS.* 1115, replies from parsons in Lincs, Bucks, Kent and Sussex, to the questions 'Is there any public school in your parish ?' and 'Has any Charity School lately been set up in your parish ?' In the rural parishes the replies are negative in the great majority of cases.

78 P. 68. *Bod. Rawlinson MSS.*, D. 839, papers of Henry Newman, Secretary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, contains much information on Charity Schools, *circa* 1708. *Address to Persons of Quality*, Robert Nelson, 1715, Appendix no. 12 ; *Wilson*, pp. 47–48 ; Overton, *Life in English Church*, pp. 224–228 ; Secretan's *Nelson*, pp. 118–134 ; *Strype's Stow's London*, 1720, Bk. V, pp. 47–48 ; *Present State of Great Britain*, 1708, pp. 672–684, List of Charity Schools. On Dissenters' Schools see *Calamy*, I, pp. 132–136, II, pp. 10–13, 282–294. I am indebted to Miss Jones of Girton for ideas and information about the Charity Schools. She pointed out to me the importance of the controversy on the subject in Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees*, *e.g.* 6th ed. 1732, pp. 314–318 of Volume I.

79 P. 69. *Mayor*, p. 353 ; *Persuasive to the Serious Observance of the Lord's Day*, 1712 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 18 (318), Onslow's note on Holt's views ; Overton, *English Church*, pp. 213–215 ; *Life of Sharp*, I, pp. 170–189 ; Defoe's *Reformation of Manners, a Satyr*, 1702 ; Webb, *Manor and Borough*, pp. 312–315, for the Mayor of Deal ; Secretan's *Nelson*, 96–103 ; Sacheverell's *Character of a Low Churchman*, 1702, p. 17 ; *Bod. MSS., Rawlinson, D.* 1396–1399, for records of prosecutions in Anne's reign ; the commonest seem to have been for Sunday trading.

CHAPTER IV

80 P. 72. Defoe, *Giving Alms no Charity*, and *Tour*, I, p. 43, II, p. 435.

81 P. 73. *Calamy*, II, pp. 119–141.

82 P. 74. Mrs. George, *London Life*, *passim* ; *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1927.

83 P. 74. *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), pp. 903–904.

84 P. 74. *Spy*, pp. 108–109.

85 P. 77. *Mayor*, p. 324 (F. Burman's Diary) ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 YY. (L'H.), f. 266, Nov. 6–17, 1702.

86 P. 78. *Strype's Stow's London* (1720), Book I, pp. 65–119 ; *Macky*, I, pp. 274–283 ; *P.R.O., Barbary States* (S.P.), 71.

87 P. 79. *Strype's Stow's London* (1720), Book I, p. 42 and *passim* ; Webb, *Manor and Borough*, pp. 212–227, 569–692.

88 P. 80. *Defoe*, I, pp. 6, 157, 160–165, 382–385.

89 P. 81. *Strype's Stow's London*, *passim* and maps ; Sir W. Foster, *John Company*, Chap. VIII ; *Defoe*, I, p. 350.

90 P. 81. Loftie, *London*, I, pp. 8–12 and maps ; *Strype's Stow's London* and maps ; Gibson's *Camden*, p. 335.

91 P. 82. *Mayor*, pp. 362, 414 ; *Letters of Shaftesbury to Molesworth*, p. 6, letter of Oct. 12, 1708.

[92] P. 84. Wright and Fayle's *History of Lloyd's*, 1928 ; *Spy, passim* ; *Tatler*, nos. 1 and 268 ; *Spectator*, no. 46 ; *Macky*, I, p. 195 ; Sorbières' *England* (trans. of 1709), p. 54 ; *Ashton*, I, pp. 214–236, II. pp. 262–268 ; Swift, *Modern Education* ; *Flying Post*, May 12, 1702, advertisement of the Windsor Coffee House.

[93] P. 84. *Macky*, I, p. 193.

[94] P. 84. *Colley Cibber's Life* (1740), p. 190.

[95] P. 85. *Colley Cibber's Life*, pp. 76–77, 83–87 ; *Spectator*, no. 45 ; *H.M.C. Egmont*, II, p. 240 ; *Tatler*, nos. 1, 71, 167.

[96] P. 85. E.g. *The Evil and danger of Stage plays, in almost 2000 instances taken from the plays of the last two years.* Rev. Arthur Bedford, 1706, and later editions ; Secretan's *Nelson*, pp. 107, 110 ; *D'Urfey*, II, p. 45.

[97] P. 86. *Colley Cibber's Life*, p. 225.

[98] P. 86. *E.g.* the famous passage in Swift's *Modern Education* ; Ned Ward's *Mars stript of his armour*, 1709. See also *An Apology for the Army*, 1715, on Tory attacks on the Army.

[99] P. 87. *Mayor*, p. 373 (1712).

[100] P. 87. *Macky*, I, pp. 193–194 ; *Mayor*, pp. 133, 350 ; *Lady Montagu*, I, p. 151 ; *Spectator*, no. 278 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 66 ; Tickell's Prologue to Addison's *Rosamund* ; Dr. Johnson in his life of Gay says, 'We owe to Gay the Ballad Opera' ; see also his life of Hughes, on the Italian Opera.

[101] P. 88. *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 178.

[102] P. 89. *H. of C.J.*, XIV, p. 338.

[103] P. 90. Fox Bourne, *English Newspapers*, I, pp. 81–84. There is a good collection of Queen Anne newspapers in the British Museum.

[104] P. 91. *State of Great Britain*, 1708 (a sort of 'Whitaker'), pp. 713–714 ; Moffit, *Eng. on eve of Ind. Rev.*, pp. 243–244 ; *Defoe*, I, pp. 343–344.

[105] P. 92. H. G. Graham, *Social Life of Scotland, Eighteenth Century*, I, p. 46–48 ; *Mayor*, p. 115 ; *Westerfield*, p. 282 ; Capt. Alexander Smith, *Complete History of the Highwaymen* ; *H.M.C. Clements*, p. 234–235.

[106] P. 93. *Mayor*, pp. 348, 409 ; *Thoresby's Diary*, II, p. 17 ; Webb, *King's Highway*, pp. 6, 65–67 ; Defoe, *Tour*, I, p. 129 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, VI, p. 76 ; Campbell's *Chancellors, Cowper*, IV, p. 267.

[107] P. 93. Webb, *King's Highway*, Chaps. I, III, V, VII.

[108] P. 94. Webb, *King's Highway*, p. 66 ; *Defoe*, II, p. 615, *Eng. Tradesman*, Pt. 2, II, pp. 27–30 ; *Dowell*, IV, pp. 413–414 ; *Strype's Stow's London*, II, Bk. V, p. 293 ; *Stats. of Realm* (1702), VIII, pp. 178–180 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), pp. xxxiii–iv, 225–240.

[109] P. 95. A contemporary account of the explosion, or 'dreadful earthquake,' at Chester-le-Street, by the Rev. Mr. Salter, Minister of the Gospel in those parts, will be found in the B.M., bound up with other 'Popular Histories,' 1076, l, 22 ; L. W. Moffit, *Eve of Ind. Rev.*, pp. 161–166, 239–242 ; *R.H.S.*, 1925, Miss Moller on *Seventeenth Century coalmining* ; *Defoe*, II, p. 683, and his *Tradesman* (1727), Pt. 2, II, p. 29, 70 ; *Fiennes, passim* ; *Northumberland Table, Bk. I*, p. 341 ; *Coal Industry in the Eighteenth Century*, Ashton and Sykes, pp. 1–7 and *passim* ; *Dartmouth MSS.*, at Patshull, Letter of Nottingham to Lord Dartmouth, Sept. 6, 1707.

[110] P. 96. *Defoe*, I, pp. 266–267, II, p. 602.

[111] P. 96. *Defoe*, I, pp. xiv–xvi, 600–615 ; *Westerfield*, pp. 274–276, 287–288.

[112] P. 97. Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce* (1805), II, p. 707 ; *Defoe*, I, p. 123 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), 72, 333 ; (1706–1708), xxiv–v ; *Ec.H.R.* Jan. 1928, p. 275 ; *C.S.P. Dom.* 1702, p. 520 ; Miss Murray's Commercial Relations, *Engl. and Ireland*, pp. 58–61 ; R. H. Murray, *Rev. Ireland*, pp. 401–403.

[113] P. 97. *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), p. 70 ; Defoe, *Eng. Tradesman*, 1727, Pt. 2, II, pp. 51, 65–69 ; *Ec.H.R.* Jan. 1928, p. 262.

[114] P. 98. *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), p. 73 ; *Hue and cry after East-India goods*, 1701 ; Khan, *East India Trade in Seventeenth Century*, 1923 ; *Davenant*, I, pp. 85–123.

[115] P. 100. Webb, *Manor and Borough*, pp. 266–267, 384–385.

[116] P. 101. *Stats. of Realm* (1702), pp. 52–53.

[117] P. 102. *H.M.C. Eliot Hodgkin* (1897), pp. 341–344 ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 162 ; Alexander Smith, *History of Highwaymen*, ed. 1926, introd., pp. v–xv ; *Spy*, pp. 136–138.

CHAPTER V

[118] P. 117. There is some difference as to the seriousness of her resistance between A. W. Ward (*Electress Sophia*), pp. 305–324, and *Klopp*, VIII, pp. 554–570, IX, pp. 144–153. See also *Hardwicke*, II, pp. 442–443 ; Kemble, *State Papers*, pp. 43–44, 243–249.

[119] P. 118. Clarke's *Life of James II* (1816), II, pp. 559–560 ; *Lamberty*, I, p. 121 ; *Klopp*, VIII, p. 559 ; Macpherson's *Original Papers*, II, p. 223, the Pretender's letter of May 1711 to Queen Anne refers to such a promise made by her to their father at some time not specified

[120] P. 118. *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), I, p. 805.

CHAPTER VI

[121] P. 123. Defoe, *English Tradesman*, 1727, Pt. 2, II, pp. 65–66 ; *Ec.H.R.*, Jan. 1928, pp. 262.

[122] P. 130. *Corbett*, II, pp. 298–299, 419–423, 460–474, 494–495 ; *Legrelle*, II, pp. 288, 312, 319, 322–328. For the whole affair of the succession from 1697–1701 compare the documents in Legrelle to those in Hippeau, *Avènement des Bourbons au trone d'espagne*, 1875.

[123] P. 136. *P.R.O. Tr.*, 3 (*France*), 186, ff. 270–280 ; 187, ff. 301–329 ; 188, ff. 370–385.

[124] P. 137. *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 341–351, a most enlightening correspondence. See also *Klopp*, IX, pp. 403–404 ; *Noailles*, II, pp. 148–157 ; *Baudrillart*, I, pp. 90, 119–120.

[125] P. 138. *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 87, 4, ff. 196, *Dutch Mémoire of* 1712.

[126] P. 139. *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), p. 824 (March 1704) ; Lavisse, *Hist. de France*, VIII, p. 84. That work and *Legrelle* and *Baudrillart* should be studied for Louis's conduct in 1700–1702.

[127] P. 140. *P.R.O. Spain* (S.P.), 94, 75, Aglionby's and Schonenberg's letters. On Aglionby, see G. N. Clark in *Notes and Queries*, 12th Series, IX, pp. 141–143.

[128] P. 141. *P.R.O. Spain* (S.P.), 94, 75, Aglionby to Vernon, Ap. 6, 1701.

[129] P. 141. Davenant, III, p. 345 ; *Essay upon the Balance of Power*, 1701, p. 76 ; *True Picture of a Modern Whig*, 1701. For the close relationship of Poussin and Davenant, see Poussin's letters of Aug. 11 and Sept. 8, 1701, in *P.R.O. Transcripts*, 3 (*France*), 189, ff. 500, 519. Poussin proposed to bribe Davenant, but whether Davenant actually took any money does not appear. See also *Salomon*, p. 50, note 3.

[130] P. 142. *P.R.O. Tr.*, 3 (*France*), 188, f. 424, May 23, 1701. See *Feiling*, Chap. XII, on all these events, and Defoe, *Kentish Petition*.

CHAPTER VII

131 P. 146. Bolingbroke, *On the Study and Use of History*, Letter VIII.

132 P. 147. Geikie (R.), *Barrier Treaty*, MS. in King's College, Cambridge.

133 P. 148. *Coxe*, I, Chap. IX, pp. 97-98 ; also *Add. MSS.* (Mc.) 34518, ff. 140–141, M. to Hedges and to Godolphin, Oct. 3–14, 1701.

134 P. 148. *Coxe*, I, Chap. IX, pp. 92–94 ; *Diplomatic Instructions Sweden* (*R.H.S.*, 1922), I, pp. 22–23.

135 P. 150. *B.M. Add. MSS.* 20241, ff. 18–19, 20242, f. 23, *Gualterio Papers* ; F. W. Head, *The Fallen Stuarts*, pp. 95, 128-131, 335–340.

136 P. 150. Acton, *Lectures on Modern History*, pp. 256–257.

137 P. 150. *B.M. Add. MSS.* 36621, *Mémoire de Mons. de Bonrepaux.*

138 P. 151. For the origin of the ' Seymour Clause ' of the Grand Alliance, see *H.C.J.* and *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, p. 170. For the clause itself, see *Klopp*, IX, p. 500, though the date given there is a year too late, see Pribram, *Osterreichische Staatsverträge, England*, I, p. 226. Stepney writes from Vienna on April 28, 1702, that the Austrian Court, in spite of its Catholicism, makes no difficulty about adding the clause (*P.R.O.* (S.P.) 80, 18).

139 P. 153. *Klopp*, IX, p. 334 ; *Ec.H.R.* Jan. 1928, p. 268 ; *Hardwicke*, II, p. 450.

140 P. 153. Just before his enforced departure from England, Poussin reported (Oct. 3, 1701) the state of parties. The Whigs and Tories ' partagent et agitent aujourdhui presque toute l'Angleterre.' Both are now for war ; the Whigs ' n'y entre que par passion et par les vues particulières ' ; the Tories ' par politique et en quelque sorte malgré eux mêmes.' The French agent Vaudoncourt, after Poussin's departure, writes on Dec. 27 that if the Tories have the majority they will be constrained to make war, because the people are absolutely for war ; but they will try to make it as auxiliary only to Holland, not sending any large English force to the continent, but giving subsidies to Austria and Holland, *P.R.O. Tr.* (*France*), 189, ff. 537, 545. In the same week L'Hermitage reported to Holland that the Whigs are for raising English troops and the Tories for giving subsidies to raise foreign troops (*B.M. Add. MSS.* 17677, xx, f. 147).

141 P. 153. *Hardwicke*, II, pp. 443–463.

142 P. 154. *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), I, Pt. 2, p. 811.

143 P. 156. *Pelet*, I, pp. 47–154 ; *Klopp*, IX, pp. 393–411.

144 P. 156. *Add. MSS.* (*E.*) 28910, f. 253, f. 291 ; *Coxe*, Chap. IX, p. 104 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letters of Jan., see Appendix A above.

145 P. 157. See p. 86 above, on the Whig playwrights, *e.g.* the first scene of Farquhar's *Trip to the Jubilee* and his *Recruiting Officer* ; *Luttrell's Diary*, Feb. 26 and Feb. 28, 1701–1702.

146 P. 158. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 xx, ff. 162, 165, 177, 235–237, 242 ; *Feiling*, pp. 356–357.

147 P. 158. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, ff. 224–227 ; *H.C.J.*, Feb. 26 ; *Luttrell's Diary*, Feb. 26.

148 P. 159. *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29588, ff. 16–17, 22 ; *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 2.

149 P. 160. *Feiling*, pp. 356–358 ; *Burnet*, IV, pp. 535–540 (298) ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 2 ; *Stats. of Realm*, VIII, pp. 218–220 ; *Case of the Abjuration Oath endeavoured to be cleared*, 1702 ; Lecky, *Ireland*, I, p. 158 ; Swift, *Examiner*, Nos. 40 and 44 (39 and 43 in the reprint).

150 P. 161. *Add. MSS.* (H.F.) 29588, f. 16.

151 P. 161. For some of the expectations on William's death, see *Add. MSS.* 32258 (*Deciphers*, April 4, 1702) ; *Add. MSS.* 36621.

CHAPTER VIII

152 P. 163. *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letter of March $\frac{8}{19}$, see Appendix A, above ; *Coxe*, Chap. X, i, p. 109.

153 P. 164. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, ff. 65–69, 249–254 ; *H.M.C., R.* 2, p. 242.

154 P. 164. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, f. 153.

155 P. 165. *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 259–263. On internal Dutch parties and the war, see Professor Geyl's *Nederland's Staatkunde in de Spaansche Successieoorlog*, Amsterdam, 1929, pp. 6–8 ; for Marlborough's relations to Buys see *Dispatches*, I, pp. 216, 602.

156 P. 166. Heinsius to Bentinck, March 13–24, 17–28, *Correspondentie van W. III en van Bentinck*, Japikse, 1927, Deel I, pp. 524–525 ; *P.R.O.* 84, 224 (Holland), ff. 3–9, 14, Stanhope to Vernon ; *Coxe*, Chaps. X–XI ; *Klopp*, X, pp. 32, 72 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, see Marlborough's letters in Appendix A, above.

157 P. 167. *Add. MSS.* 9090, f. 107, Vernon to Shrewsbury, June 9, 1701.

158 P. 168. *Mayor*, p. 372 ; *Priv. Corr.* II, pp. 66, 120 ; *Rox.*, *Sir J. Clerk*, p. 72.

159 P. 168. *Conduct*, p. 20 ; *H.M.C., R.* 8, p. 52.

160 P. 168. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, f. 262. Swift (*Journal*, July 31, 1711) writes : ' The queen . . . hunts in a chaise with one horse, which she drives herself, and drives furiously, like Jehu, and a mighty hunter like Nimrod. Dingley has heard of Nimrod, but not Stella, for it is in the Bible.' This bears out L'Hermitage, since ' furiously ' is clearly humorous.

161 P. 169. *Rox.*, *Sir J. Clerk*, pp. 62, 72.

162 P. 169. *Surtees Soc.* No. 54, *de la Prynne's Diary*, p. 49 ; *Mayor*, p. 368.

163 P. 170. *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29548, several notes of Anne to Nottingham of 1702 and 1703.

164 P. 171. *H.M.C. Downshire*, I, II, p. 828.

165 P. 172. *E.H.R.*, Ap. 1930, Mr. Sykes' article. For Ken's pension, see *C.S.P.Tr.*, pp. xii and 422.

166 P. 173. *Coxe*, Chap. X, note 1 ; *H.M.C., R.* 8, p. 52.

167 P. 173. *P.R.O. Transcripts*, 3 (*France*), 190, ff. 56–57, Vaudoncourt's cypher letter to Torcy, May 1702.

168 P. 174. *Hooke's Correspondence* (*Rox.*), I, pp. 13–15.

169 P. 174. *P.R.O. Transcripts*, 3 (*France*), 190, ff. 73–79.

170 P. 175. *H.M.C., R.* 8, p. 52 ; Nichols' *Lit. Anecdotes*, II, pp. 499–502. Boswell's *Johnson, sub.* 1712.

171 P. 176. *Coxe*, Chap. LI, Aug. 30–Sept. 10, 1706.

172 P. 176. *H.M.C., R.* 8, p. 42, July 3, 1708.

173 P. 180. *John and Sarah Marlborough*, Stuart Reid, p. 110. This book contains a few quotations from the Blenheim papers that are not in *Coxe* or the Coxe transcripts in the B.M. But many of the passages referred to in the volume as *Blenheim Papers* can also be found in Coxe.

174 P. 185. *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 28070, ff. 2–3b.

CHAPTER IX

175 P. 190. *Last Will of the Impostor George Fox*, Francis Bugg, Feb. $170\frac{2}{3}$; *H.M.C. Portland IV*, 188, May 17 and 190, May 31, 1705 ; *Bod. MSS. Willis*, 54, 56, poll books of Bucks and Sussex, 1713, where the Quakers can be distinguished

by their making 'affirmation' instead of taking the loyal oath required of other voters. At the end of Mrs. Centlivre's *Gotham Election*, the Whig mob carries about a Pope and wooden shoes, and the Tory mob 'a tub with a woman preacher in it.' For a specimen of the bitter attacks on Quakerism early in Anne's reign, see George Keith's pamphlets.

176 P. 192. *Memorial of the Church of England*, 1705, p. 15.

177 P. 193. *Turberville*, p. 45; *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), pp. 200–201; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1003; *H.L.J.*, Feb. 22, 1710–1711.

178 P. 197. *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29584, pp. 95, 109–110.

179 P. 198. *Shaftesbury's Letters to Molesworth* (1721), p. 44, letter of November 1, 1709; on Wharton see also *Burnet*, V, p. 116 (369), Onslow's note, and p. 328 (431), Dartmouth's note.

180 P. 202. *H.M.C. Downshire*, I, II, pp. 838–839; Elliot's *Godolphin*, p. 248; *H.M.C. Buccleugh*, II (1903), *Shrewsbury's Diary*, pp. 763–768, 791–792; *Burnet*, V, pp. 437–439 and notes (546); *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9090 *passim*, especially ff. 171–172 for Shrewsbury's correspondence with Vernon and Godolphin from Rome; *Macky's* (?) *Characters*, *Rox.* (1895), pp. 37–39.

181 P. 203. *H. of C.J.*; *H.M.C., R.* 8, p. 53, on Somerset's advice to Queen Anne; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, ff. 258–259, 266; *Burnet*, V. p. 13 (315).

182 P. 204. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, f. 287; *Tindal*, III, p. 544; Barrett's *Bristol*, p. 696; *H.M.C. Bagot*, R. 10. Pt. IV, p. 337; Strickland's *Queens*, VIII, pp. 145–157.

183 P. 204. Boyer's *Anne*, p. 14; *Tindal*, III, p. 545; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, ff. 292, 295, 299.

184 P. 205. *Coxe*, Chap. XVIII, i, pp. 204–205, June 10, 1703.

185 P. 206. *H.C.J.*; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, ff. 299–300; Boyer's *Anne*, pp. 14–15. The actual proposal was 'that no person be an officer in England or Ireland, in Her Majesty's new-raised forces, but such as were born in England, Scotland or Ireland, or the dominions thereto belonging, or of English parents, unless they were before on half pay.'

186 P. 208. *H. of L. MSS.*, VI (1704–1706), pp. xvii–xviii, note; Leadam, *Pol. Hist.* IX, p. 35; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV., pp. 122, 269; *Feiling*, pp. 362, 367; *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 15; *E.H.R.* Apr. 1900, p. 243.

187 P. 208. Lord Weymouth to Nottingham, June 5, 1702, *Add. MSS.* 29588, f. 47.

188 P. 209. *Add. MSS.* 29568, ff. 67, 114.

189 P. 209. *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 13.

190 P. 209. See *Hervey, D.*, 24, 35, 37, for the Corporation of Bury St. Edmunds and Hervey.

191 P. 210. *Camden Soc.* 1875, *Prideaux's Letters*, p. 200.

192 P. 210. *English advice to the freeholders of England*, 1714, p. 4.

193 P. 211. *B.M. Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29579, letter of Sir C. Lyttelton, July 15, 1702.

194 P. 211. *H.M.C. Chequers Court* (1900), p. 78; *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9092, ff. 2–3.

195 P. 211. *Guise Memoirs* (*R.H.S.*), p. 144; *Burnet*, V, pp. 47–48 and note (335); *H.C.J.* XIV, pp. 5–6, 37–38. Sir Simon Harcourt was unseated on petition in Jan. 1709, in the Whig Parliament.

196 P. 211. *H.M.C. Somerset* (1898), p. 194; *Guise Memoirs, R.H.S.*, pp. 145–146, for the tricks by the Gloucester Tories that year. For more electioneering methods, see *B.M. Lansdowne MSS.*, 547, 548, election petitions, Anne.

197 P. 212. *Defoe's Review*, June 8, 1708.

198 P. 212. *Defoe*, I, p. 73; *Macky*, I, p. 135, 278–280.

199 P. 213. Campbell's *Chancellors*, IV, pp. 347–348.

200 P. 213. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 291. This was in 1706; in the Parliament of 1702–5, the number of Whigs would have been less and the Tories more.

201 P. 213. *B.M. Stowe MSS.*, 354, f. 161b.

202 P. 214. See p. 39 above, for Bath; Boyer's *Anne*, p. 33; *Queen's Famous Progress* (old tract), 1702; *Add. MSS.* 28095, f. 32; R. Warner's *Bath* (1801), pp. 209, 224.

CHAPTER X

203 P. 215. *Shaftesbury's letters to Molesworth* (ed. 1721), p. xxiii.

204 P. 216. *Fortescue*, I, pp. 554–556; *H. of C.J.*, Jan. 28, 1711–12.

205 P. 217. Only the three regiments of Guards and the Royal Scots had more than one battalion each, in Anne's reign. *Fortescue*, I, p. 555.

206 P. 218. *Fortescue*, I, pp. 556, 567; *H.M.C. Wood* (1913), p. 87; *Aylesbury's Memoirs*, II, p. 523; *Mars stript of his armour*, 1709, by Ned Ward.

207 P. 220. *D'Urfey*, V, pp. 319–321; *Luttrell's Diary*, May 30 and Nov. 9, 1704, for the Ely incident; *Beaux's Stratagem*, Act III, sc. 3; Burton, *Reign of Anne*, I, pp. 197–205; *Stats. of Realm*, Vol. VIII; *Memoirs of Peter Drake* (1755); *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 70; *H.M.C., R.* 8, *Chester MSS.*, p. 394, Jan. 25, 1707; *Tindal*, III, p. 644; Hamilton, *Quarter Sessions under Anne*, pp. 275–276; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 279, 289, 295, 316, 335; *Fortescue*, I, Chap. XI *passim*, above all.

208 P. 221. *Add. MSS.* (*E.*) 28948, f. 1, for a Militia summons, *temp.* Queen Anne; Evelyn, *Memoirs for my grandson*, 1704 (Nonesuch Press, 1926), pp. 23–24.

209 P. 222. Kane, General R., *Campaigns and Discipline, etc.* (1745), p. 110; Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, Chap. V.

210 P. 223. *Parker*, p. 105.

211 P. 224. *Fortescue*, I, pp. 584–585; *Parker*, p. 139.

212 P. 226. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677, xx, f. 291; *Lamberty*, II, p. 495; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29588, f. 51; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letter, Ap. 27, 1702.

213 P. 227. *Fortescue*, I, p. 586; an account of British Court Martial proceedings abroad under Marlborough in 1708 will be found in *Journal of the Soc. for Army Historical Research*, IV (1925), pp. 161–168. Careful attention seems to have been given to the cases and to the character of the prisoners as reported.

214 P. 228. John Deane, *Journal of Campaign in Flanders*, pp. 4–6; *Fortescue*, I, pp. 559–562. *H.M.C. Somerset* (1898), p. 114.

215 P. 229. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 84 (*Holland*) 224, ff. 200, 233; (*Barbary States*), 71, 27, ff. 139, 175; 90, 2 (*Prussia*), Raby, June 9, 1703; (*Spain*) 94, 75, Aglionby *passim*; *H. of C.J.*, XIV, p. 365, and *D.N.B.* for Michelborne; *C.S.P. Tr.*, pp. 140–141 for Browning's widow, and p. x on Debts of Crown generally.

216 P. 229. *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), pp. xix, 257. For Godolphin's support of the army under Marlborough's command, see *Apology for the Army*, 1715, by An Officer, p. 36: 'The late war in Flanders was also by the admirable management of my Lord Godolphin so well supported that the forces there could scarce complain of any wants or hardships.'

217 P. 231. Hamley, *Operations of War*, ed. 1907, pp. 38–39; conversation with Sir George Aston. For the exchange of prisoners see *Lamberty*, II, pp. 412–413, and *C.S.P. Dom., passim*.

CHAPTER XI

218 P. 234. *Klopp*, IX, pp. 376–377.

219 P. 235. For the vain hopes built by Louis on the Wolfenbüttel diversion in North Germany, see *Add. MSS.* 32306, ff. 51–60.

220 P. 235. *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29588, ff. 155–158; 34518 (*Mc.*), ff. 142–144; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 80, 18, Stepney from Vienna, June 24, 1702.

221 P. 238. *Coxe*, XIII, i. p. 147; *Burnet* V, p. 31 (326).

222 P. 238. *Pelet*, I, pp. 24–25; Mons. de Puysegur's letter shows the French clearly understood this when they decided to march to Kaiserswerth and Bonn in 1701.

223 P. 240. *Parker*, p. 69; Berwick *Mémoires* (1778), I, pp. 121–122. For this campaign compare *Pelet*, Coxe's *Marlborough*, Marlborough's *Dispatches*, Taylor, *Wars of Marlborough*, and Fortescue, *Br. Army*.

224 P. 240. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7063, ff. 15–16.

225 P. 242. *Parker*, p. 73; *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 16.

226 P. 243. *Coxe*, Chap. XIII.

227 P. 244. Max Emanuel's letters on the subject will be found in *Klopp*, X, pp. 127–130.

228 P. 245. *Pelet* II, pp. 368–442; *Colonie*, pp. 95–112; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7064, f. 102.

CHAPTER XII

229 P. 246. See p. 140, above, Aglionby's letter; *Add. MSS.* (*E.*), 28910 f. 328, and *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 93, 3, Jan. 17 and Aug. 8, 1702, for French in Naples, 1702; *Mémoires de Forbin* and *Add. MSS.* 16458, f. 40, and *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 100, 29, Ap. 23, 1703, for the incident at Malamocco; *P.R.O. Tr.* 3, *France*, 189, f. 535, for English despair of their Levant trade.

230 P. 247. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 87, 4, f. 194–196, the Dutch Apology, 1712.

231 P. 249. *Add. MSS.* 28079, ff. 162–165, proposals *temp.* Anne for a register to be made of 100,000 seamen who are to be called up at stated periods for short service; never carried out. See also *Burchett*, 10th and 11th pages of the Preface,

232 P. 253. Benbow's despatches, the Report of the Court Martial and other relative documents will be found in *C.S.P. Am.*, 1702, pp. viii–xiii, 673–678, 744, *ditto* 1702–1703, pp. 82–87. See also *State Trials*, XIV, pp. 538–546; *Burchett*, pp. 590–598; *Lediard*, *N.H.*, II, pp. 741–744; Boyer's *Anne*, pp. 48–51; O. Troude, *Batailles navales de la France*, I, pp. 243–245.

The personal reminiscences about Benbow in Campbell's *Lives of the Admirals* cannot be trusted far, for they were largely derived from Calton, who palmed off on Campbell the spurious letter attributed to Du Casse. Laughton in his article on Benbow in the *D.N.B.* rightly warns us against Campbell, yet quotes Campbell as his only authority for the statement that Benbow had used the gentlemen captains 'a little briskly' at Jamaica, whence Laughton accuses Benbow of 'goading them to crime.' I do not deny the possibility of all this, but I do not think it rests on any positive evidence. Laughton in the same article says Kirby was one of the officers 'of good repute and good service.' But his own account (see Kirby, *D.N.B.*) of Kirby's previous conduct on board the *Southampton* seems to me to render this also doubtful.

233 P. 254. *C.S.P. Am.* 1708–1709, pp. xi, 38–40, 56, 95; *Burchett*, pp. 706–707; *Lediard*, *N.H.*, II, pp. 835–838.

234 P. 254. *P.R.O. Tr.* 14 *Ven.* 112, f. 21; *Corbett*, II, p. 479.

235 P. 255. *H.C.J.* XI, p. 578.

236 P. 256. *Martin*, pp. xxix–xxxii.

237 P. 256. *Ec.H.R.*, Jan. 1928, pp. 265–267.

238 P. 256. *C.S.P. Am.* 1702, p. 744; 1708–1709, pp. xi, 202, 270; 1710–1711, pp. xx–xxi, 32; G. N. Clark, *Dutch Alliance, etc.*, pp. 48–49.

239 P. 257. *C.S.P. Am.* 1710–1711, pp. 68, 126.

240 P. 257. *Ec.H.R.*, Jan. 1928, pp. 262–264; *Hill*, I, p. 252; *Mémoires* of *Forbin* and *Duguay-Trouin*, *passim*; *H. of L. MSS.* 1704–1706, pp. 14–26; 1702–1704, pp. 227–239.

241 P. 258. *Burchett*, p. 636; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *WWW*, ff. 679–688.

242 P. 258. *Ec.H.R.*, Jan. 1928, p. 264; Chalmer's *Estimate* (1782), table opposite p. 37, reprinted in *Cunningham*, II, p. 932.

243 P. 258. *H. of L. MSS.* 1702–1704, pp. 67–69, 333, and *ditto* 1706–1708, pp. 263–264; *Burchett*, pp. 631–634; *C.S.P. Am.* 1702–1703, pp. viii, 668; *Defoe*, I, pp. 212, 215, 227; Wyatt Tilby, *British North America*, pp. 265–270; *Leake*, I, pp. 90–104.

244 P. 260. *Corbett*, Chaps. XXVIII–XXXIII *passim*; Adm. Richmond, *National Policy and Naval Strength*, pp. 36–43; *Enquiry into Naval Miscarriages*, 1707 (printed in *Harleian Misc.*, Vol. XI); Swift, *Conduct of the Allies*. For Rochester's views, see his Introduction to *Clarendon's History*, ed. 1702; Bolingbroke in his *Study and Use of History* takes retrospectively a middle view, approving the land operations of Marlborough, but urging that the systematic waylaying of the Spanish treasure ships would have brought Louis to his knees. For designs on Spanish America see *Add. MSS.* 28079, ff. 39–50.

245 P. 261. *Corbett*, II, pp. 464–474.

246 P. 262. *Torrington*, pp. 81–87.

247 P. 262. *Corbett*, II, pp. 467–468; *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 28058, f. 31; *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 94, 75, Schonenberg's letter, Sept. 21, 1701.

248 P. 262. *Corbett*, II, pp. 470–471; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 104, 202, ff. 183–186, Wratislaw's proposals; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 80, 19, Stepney's letter of Sept. 9, 1702.

249 P. 263. *Rooke*, p. 243.

250 P. 263. *Burchett*, p. 622.

251 P. 265. *Coxe*, Ch. XIII i. p. 148.

252 P. 266. *C.S.P. Dom.* 1702–1703, pp. 301–303; see *Ec.H.R.*, Jan. 1928, p. 262, on English and Dutch traders at Cadiz.

253 P. 266. *Rooke*, pp. 212–213; *Ormonde*, pp. 265–266; *Add. MSS.* (*E.*) 28926, ff. 151–152*b*.

254 P. 267. For the Cadiz operations see *Corbett*, II, pp. 480–487; *Rooke*, *passim*; *Martin*, pp. 48–56; *Ormonde*, pp. 239–266; *Spain under Charles II*, 1840, pp. 162–169 (Stanhope's letters from before Cadiz); *De Jonge*, pp. 211–219; *Dangeau*, *Journal* (ed. 1857), IX, pp. 11, 358; *Add. MSS.* (*E.*) 28926, ff. 140–152; *H. of L. MSS.* 1702–1704, pp. xxviii, 101–124; *Burchett*, pp. 619–628; *Tindal*, III, p. 569; Laughton, *Howard to Nelson*, pp. 127–158. It is best to pay no attention to *Burnet* on sea affairs; he had no knowledge of the sea and was prejudiced against Rooke.

255 P. 268. *Rooke*, pp. 227–231; *Add. MSS.* (*E.*) 28926, ff. 158, 160; *Corbett*, II, pp. 487–490; *Lediard*, *N.H.*, II, p. 753 note; *Tindal*, III, p. 570; *Burchett*, pp. 625–626; *Noailles*, II, pp. 321–326; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *YY*, f. 261; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29590, ff. 130, 135, 137, 151; *Lamberty*, II, pp. 252–253.

256 P. 272. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7068, f. 215; *Add. MSS.* 29588, ff. 330–331.

257 P. 272. *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29568, f. 101, Verney's letter, Nov. 10, 1702.

258 P. 272. For the affair at Vigo see *Corbett*, II, pp. 490–492; *Rooke*, pp. 230–234; *Martin*, pp. 56–59; *Burchett*, pp. 626–628; *Lediard*, *N.H.*, II, pp. 754–757;

Tindal, III. pp. 570–571 ; *Torrington*, pp. 91–94 ; *Add. MSS.* (*E.*) 28926, ff. 156–164, official accounts of the action by Ormonde and his secretary and by Hopsonn for Rooke ; *H. of L. MSS.* 1702–1704, p. 124 ; *Lamberty*, II, pp. 252–255 ; *Ormonde*, pp. 273–282 ; *Add. MSS.* 16459, f. 151, report in Italian by the Spanish Commandant of Vigo ; O. Troude, *Batailles navales de la France*, I, pp. 241–243 ; *De Jonge*, pp. 219–231.

CHAPTER XIII

259 P. 273. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *YY*, f. 270 ; *H.M.C. Beaufort*, p. 95 ; *Luttrell's Diary*, V, p. 235.

260 P. 275. *Fortescue*, I, pp. 408–409, sums up the Ranelagh case well. See *Parl. Hist.* and *H. of L. MSS.* 1702–1704, for the documents produced in these cases.

261 P. 277. *Hervey, L.B.* I, pp. 179–181 ; *Conduct*, p. 127 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 66 (344–345) ; *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9121, f. 12, where Sarah declares that Lord Hervey was 'the only Peer I was ever concerned in'—viz. in procuring his elevation. She says she asked for his peerage because she had promised Sir Thomas Felton to do so as soon as the Queen came to the throne.

262 P. 280. The pamphlet *Account of the Proceedings* printed and published by order of the Lords, Feb. 24, 1702 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 49–54 (336–338) ; he is wrong in saying the Bill proposed to extend its action beyond the persons affected by the old Test Act, as the text of the Bill shows ; *Feiling*, pp. 368–369 ; *Turberville*, pp. 51–54 ; *Calamy*, I, pp. 465–474 ; *Abbey*, I, pp. 17–23.

The literature on the subject is immense. A good sample of the Tory case for the Bill by a moderate man is *The Case fairly stated*, 1702, while *Moderation a Virtue*, 1703, justifies the practice of occasional conformity. The political and electoral objects of the bill and of the later Schism Act are frankly confessed by Bolingbroke in the early pages of his *Letter to Sir William Windham*.

263 P. 283. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 61 ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29589, f. 400 ; *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1900, pp. 238–241 ; Essay on Defoe by John Forster ; *Augustan*, pp. 157–170.

264 P. 287. T. Lathbury, *History of Convocation* (1853) ; Canon Beeching, *Atterbury* (1909), Chaps. III, IV ; *Burnet, sub. loc.* ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29584, f. 101, for Nottingham's attempted mediation ; *Sykes' Gibson*, Chap. II ; *Abbey*, I, pp. 13–14 ; *Wilson*, pp. 58–66. The pamphlets on all sides of this question are very numerous.

265 P. 288. *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29589, f. 107 ; 28895, f. 316 ; *Salomon*, p. 352.

266 P. 289. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 75. In 1713 Bolingbroke wrote to Oxford : 'Let the forms of business be regularly carried on in the Cabinet, and the secret of it in your own closet,' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 311.

CHAPTER XIV

267 P. 292. *Dowell*, II, pp. 71, 402–403.

268 P. 293. Acts *Annae Reginae* for each year, for text of the Property (or Land) Tax Acts. *Dowell*, II, pp. 50–53, 70–84 ; T. Cunningham, *History of Taxes* (1778), pp. 98–108 ; *Davenant*, I, pp. 1–81, *Ways and Means* : on p. 60 Davenant says, 'Probably there is nothing but excises that will truly and equally rate all sort of wealth and substance.'

269 P. 295. For Corn prices 1701–1714, see note 21 above. *H.M.C. Coke*, pp. 38, 52, 67 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 58, 110, 113 ; *Hervey, L.B.*, I, pp. 195, 345 ; *Aylesbury* (*Rox.*) II, p. 647 ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29576, f. 111, Nov. 12, 1702, C. Hatton to Visc. Hatton.

270 P. 298. Mr. G. N. Clark is the authority on this subject, see his articles in *Ec.H.R.*, Jan. 1928, and in *Br. Year Book of Internat. Law*, 1928, reprinted by Oxford Univ. Press. For Anglo-Irish trade with France see *H. of L. MSS.* 1704–1706, p. 111, and *C.S.P. Dom.* 1703–1704, p. 561 ; for Spanish American trade see *ditto*, p. 200, and *C.S.P. Am.* 1708–1709, pp. xiii, xxxvi, 56, 62, 69, 428, and *Add. MSS.* 17677 *WWW*, ff. 486–488. For Dutch trade with France and English complaints, see *H.C.J.*, XIV, p. 105 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *YY*, f. 34 ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29568, f. 111 and 29588, f. 330 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) *Holland*, 84, 227, ff. 11–12 ; 224, ff. 139, 298, 368 ; 226, ff. 156–160, 421–424. The three-power Treaty of Apr. 1703 is in *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 108, 340.

271 P. 300. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 89, 18 (*Portugal*), ff. 66, 72, 210 ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, ff. 211–212, 359.

272 P. 301. *The British Merchant* (ed. 1721), III, pp. 81–92 ; *Letter to a West Country Clothier* (1713), pp. 9–10 ; *Dowell*, II, pp. 72, 283, IV, p. 168 ; *Cunningham*, pp. 459–463 ; W. J. Ashley, *Surveys* (1900), pp. 268–303, *Tory Free Trade*.

273 P. 303. *Corbett, passim*, on value of Lisbon harbour. For the treaty, see *H.C.J.*, XIV, pp. 224–226 ; *C.S.P. Dom.*, 1702–1703, pp. 246, 670–671, 697–699 ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, ff. 20, 207, 211–212, 359 ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29595, f. 242 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 104, 204, f. 111 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 87, 4, ff. 204–205.

274 P. 304. For Hungary, see *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 104, 202, ff. 134, 258, 260 ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, ff. 99, 339, 341 ; (*H.F.*) 29593, March 16, 1704 ; *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 305–334. Nottingham's activities in foreign affairs will be evident to anyone studying the *Stepney, Coxe* and *Hatton Finch* papers in the *B.M.* We see him throughout 1703 working in apparent harmony with Godolphin about Portugal, Savoy, Bavaria and Hungary. He seems to have been trusted and liked by our envoys abroad, e.g. *Hill*, I, p. 381. For his preference of the Spanish to the Netherlands war see Appendix A above, Marlborough's letter to Heinsius of May 29, 1703.

275 P. 307. *Corbett*, II, pp. 501–513 ; *Leake*, I, pp. 118–126 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XIX, pp. 212–214 (Coxe is wrong in saying Hill arrived at Turin in Aug. 1703 ; he was kept at the Hague till December). *Hill*, I, pp. 357, 378 and *passim* ; *St. Simon* (ed. 1884), III, pp. 6–7, 19, 458, IV, pp. 8–10 ; *Tessé, Lettres* (1888), pp. xi–xii ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29595, f. 230 ; 29588, ff. 424–427 ; (*St.*) 7058, ff. 231, 351 ; 7073, f. 164. Carutti, *Storia di Vitt. Am. II*, pp. 214–247.

276 P. 307. *Lamberty*, II, pp. 574–575 ; *Corbett*, II, pp. 499–502, 507, 510 ; *C.S.P. Dom.* 1702–3, p. 698 ; Lavisse, *France*, VIII, pp. 378–383 ; Legrelle, *Revolte des Camisards* ; *Hill, passim* ; Kemble, *State Papers*, pp. 384–432 ; *Quarterly Rev.*, Apr. 1928 ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29587, f. 91 ; 29588, f. 399.

277 P. 309. *Lediard, N.H.*, II, pp. 779-780 note ; P. Chamberlen, *Queen Anne*, 1738, pp. 126–127 ; *Martin*, pp. 72–73 ; *Leake*, I, pp. 126–130 ; *Defoe*, I, pp. 121–122, 228 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 81–82 (353) ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 84 (*Holland*), 226, f. 156 ; Dangeau, *Journal*, Dec. 29–30 ; Burton, *Queen Anne*, I, pp. 104–105.

278 P. 311. *H.M.C. Rutland*, II (1889) p. 177 ; W. Richards, *Hist. of Lynn* (1812), pp. 874–875 ; Bowles' *Ken*, II, pp. 240–243 ; Defoe, *The Storm* (ed. 1704), pp. 82, 141, 175–177 ; Barrett's *Bristol*, p. 696 ; Evelyn, *Diary*, Nov. 26–27, and *Sylva* (ed. 1786), II, p. 329 ; Secretan's *Nelson*, p. 107 ; Chamberlen, *Queen Anne*, p. 127 ; Strickland, *Queens of England*, VIII, p. 188.

CHAPTER XV

279 P. 314. *Coxe*, Chap. XV ; Coxe's *Memoirs of Lord Walpole* (1802), p. 4.

280 P. 316. *Fortescue*, *Coxe*, *Taylor*, *Atkinson*, *Dispatches sub. loc.* *H.M.C. Chequers Court*, pp. 119–121 ; *Parker*, pp. 76–79 ; *Pelet*, III, pp. 1–146. For Aug. 24, see *Dispatches*, I, pp. 165–168, 173, and *Add. MSS.* 29547, f. 41, and 22196, ff. 3–4 for Cadogan's letter on it. Maps of the affair of Maastricht and the battle of Ekeren will be found in *Tindal*, III, pp. 620–621. Appendix A, above, for Marlborough's letters to Heinsius.

281 P. 317. *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letters of June–Sept. 1703, see Appendix A, above. *Dispatches*, I, p. 157.

282 P. 317. Villars, *Mémoires*, *sub. ann.* 1703. For the courtiers' dislike of Villars, see his own *Mémoires* and the prejudices of *St. Simon*, e.g. vol. III, Chap. XXII.

283 P. 318. *Stowe MSS.*, B.M., 222, f. 216.

284 P. 318. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7064, ff. 96–102, 129–132, 137 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 81, 168 ff. 18, 193–196, 285, 425–426 ; *Add. MSS.* 16459, f. 105.

285 P. 318. *Colonie*, pp. 107, 112, 173–174 ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7064, f. 132 ; Villars, *Mémoires* for 1703.

286 P. 319. *Pelet*, II, p. 429 ; Villars, *Mémoires* for 1703.

287 P. 320. *Pelet*, III, pp. 624–625, Villars' letter to the King, June 17, which bears out his subsequent statements in his *Mémoires*, and confutes St. Simon's gossip on the subject.

288 P. 321. *Pelet*, III, pp. 234–264, 642–656, 828–832 ; Pelet's *Atlas* volume gives the movements of each army each day. Villars, *Mémoires* for 1704 ; *Colonie*, pp. 140–149.

289 P. 321. *P.R.O.* (*Hanover*), S.P. 81, 160. Poley's letter of Dec. $\frac{17}{28}$, 1703.

CHAPTER XVI

290 P. 329. *Swift's Correspondence* (Elrington Ball), I, pp. 38, 44, Dec. 16, 1703, and Feb. 3, $170\frac{3}{4}$ to Tisdall.

291 P. 330. *Add.MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29589, f. 121 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XVIII–XIX, i, pp. 203–207, 216–220 ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7063, f. 38 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letter of May 29, 1703, on Nottingham, see Appendix A, above.

292 P. 331. *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29568, f. 151 ; *H.L.J.*, Vol. XVI, pp. 331, 348 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XIX ; p. 220 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 104–106 (363) ; *Davenant*, IV, pp. 274–439, V, 1–69, especially IV, p. 415 ; *The True Tom Double*, 1704 (High Tory answer to Davenant) ; *Poems on Affairs of State* (ed. 1707), IV, pp. 121–122 ; *Turberville*, pp. 55–56 ; *Tindal*, III, p. 628 ; R. S. Forsythe, *A Noble Rake* on Mohun's career.

293 P. 332. *Coxe*, Chap. XX, i. pp. 227–229 ; *Feiling*, p. 373 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 117–120 (369–371).

294 P. 333. *Klopp*, XI, pp. 92–97 ; *Feldzüge*, pp. 50–54 ; *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9114 (*Hare's Journal*), pp. 6–12 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XX, i, pp. 224-226. (I think Coxe is wrong in supposing Marlborough already regarded the Moselle plan as a blind. Hare's Journal, written afterwards with Marlborough's sanction, bears out the opposite view of Klopp based on Wratislaw's correspondence.)

295 P. 334. *Klopp*, XI, pp. 97–110 ; *Feldzüge*, pp. 54–58.

296 P. 335. *Klopp*, XI, pp. 99–104 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, see Marlborough's letter of March 24, 1704, Appendix A, above; *Lediard*, *Marl.* I, pp. 285–287, gives Wratislaw's Memorial and the Queen's answer, though otherwise misinformed.

297 P. 337. *H.M.C. Bagot* (R. 10, Pt. IV), p. 337 ; *Noorden*, I, pp. 509–510.

298 P. 339. *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1900 and Jan. 1907 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 221–222, 269–272 and *passim* ; *Augustan*, pp. 157–170 ; *The Review* and *The Rehearsal* and the *Observator*.

299 P. 340. *Feiling*, pp. 383–388 ; *Noorden*, I, p. 507 ; Bolingbroke, *On the Study and Use of History*.

CHAPTER XVII

300 P. 343. *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letter of May 24, 1703, see Appendix A, above ; Heinsius' letter to Portland, Nov. 1703, printed on p. 435 of Pt. II (1928), Japikse's *Correspondentie van William III en van Bentinck* (Nijhoff).

301 P. 347. *Coxe*, Chap. XXI ; *Klopp*, XI, p. 109.

302 P. 347. *Add. MSS.* 9114, ff. 28, 34–35 ; *Select Docs.*, p. 97 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letter of June 2, 1704.

303 P. 348. *Dispatches*, I, pp. 259, 279, 297 ; *Add. MSS.* 9114, f. 32*b* ; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letters of May 21, 25, 30, 1704, see Appendix A, above ; *Lediard*, *Marl.*, I, p. 303.

304 P. 350. *Pelet*, IV, pp. 440–445, 465–505 ; *Add. MSS.* 9114, ff. 24–25, 28*b*, 31*b* ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7063, f. 50 ; *Dispatches*, I, pp. 274–279, 286–287 ; *Select Docs.*, pp. 97, 100 ; *Colonie*, pp. 166–171.

305 P. 351. *Select Docs.*, pp. 98–101, 112–113, 142 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XXI, i, pp. 242–245 ; *Millner*, p. 83 ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 36.

306 P. 352. *Add. MSS.* 9094, f. 5 ; *Select Docs.*, pp. 101, 160.

307 P. 353. *Select Docs.*, pp. 101, 160.

308 P. 353. *Add. MSS.* 9114, f. 38*b*.

309 P. 354. *Select Docs.*, p. 102 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XXII, i, p. 256 ; *Add. MSS.*, 9114, ff. 40–41 ; *Lediard*, *Marl.*, I, pp. 315–316.

310 P. 354. *Lediard*, *Marl.*, I, p. 319 ; *H.M.C. Downshire*, I, Pt. ii (1924), p. 831 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 150 note ; *H.M.C. Coke*, pp. 37–38.

311 P. 355. *Colonie*, pp. 164–165, 173–174 ; *Mérode-Westerloo*, *Mémoires* (1840), p. 287.

312 P. 356. *Add. MSS.* 9114, f. 37*b*., 41–42 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letters of June 11, 15, 19, 25.

313 P. 364. The best authority for the battle of Schellenberg on the English side is Hare's account, written under Marlborough's eye (*Add. MSS.* 9114, ff. 43–55), most of which is reprinted in *Dispatches* (*q.v.* also for the Duke's own letters on the action). For the Bavarian side, D'Arco's exculpatory narrative (reprinted in *Journal of the Campaign in Germany*, 1704, pp. 23–25) has value, but understates the total number of the defending army and the disasters of the rout. On these and other points the best authority on the Franco-Bavarian side is *Colonie*, who took a leading part in the action, and *Mémoires du Marquis de Maffei*, 1741, pp. 29–46. See also *Millner*, pp. 94–100 ; *H.M.C. Rutland*, p. 181 ; *Pelet*, IV, pp. 531–532, for Tallard's letter ; *Mémoires de Feuquière*, 1741, IV, pp. 80–82 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letters of July 3 and 4. The excellent modern narratives of Coxe, Frank Taylor, and Fortescue should be carefully studied. For the Scots Greys and their horses, see R. Cannon's *Historical Record* of the regiment, 1837, pp. 37–43. There are numerous contemporary prints of the battle in the Donauwörth museum, particularly representing the flight and pursuit.

[314] P. 366. *Coxe*, Chaps. XXIII–V, XXX, i, pp. 268–271, 341 (p. 268, line 22, *home* should be *Rome*) ; *H.M.C. Shrewsbury* (1903), II, p. 782 ; *Hervey, L. B.*, I, pp. 206–209 ; see pp. 404–405, above, for the effect of the news of the Schellenberg in Portugal ; *Add. MSS.* 34518, f. 52*b*., Marlborough to Duchess, July 30, 1704, on *Observator* ; *Observator, passim*, especially July 1–5, Aug. 12–16, 16–19.

[315] P. 366. *Coxe*, Chaps. XXIII–XXIV, i, pp. 268, 273–274.

[316] P. 367. *Coxe*, I, pp. 272–273 ; *Add. MSS.* 9114, f. 65.

[317] P. 367. *Coxe*, I, pp. 275–276 ; *Colonie*, pp. 198–203 ; *Dispatches*, I, pp. 380–381 ; *Cambridge Univ. Lib. MSS.*, letter of Sam Noyes from Friedberg, July 19, 'Ammunition is hard to be got amongst the Germans, besides their gunners have really no skill,' hence the difficulties before Rain.

[318] P. 369. *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letter of July 16 ; *Dispatches*, I, pp. 352 note, 358, 378–379 ; *Add. MSS.* 34518, f. 52*b*, a fuller version of Marlborough's letter to the Duchess than *Coxe*, I, pp. 277–278 ; *Add. MSS.* 9114, ff. 65–66 ; *Colonie*, p. 207. See also the defence of the burning of Bavaria in Frank Taylor's *Marlborough*.

[319] P. 370. *Colonie*, pp. 209–224 ; *Pelet*, IV, pp. 563–564, printed in *Select Docs.*, p. 119.

[320] P. 370. *Mérode-Westerloo, Mémoires*, 1840, I, p. 287.

[321] P. 371. *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letter of July 31 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, III (*Prior Papers*), 1908, p. 433.

[322] P. 373. *Coxe*, Chap. XXV ; *Dispatches*, I, pp. 384–389, 394–395 ; *Add. MSS.*, 9114, ff. 73–83 ; *Heinsius MSS.*, Marlborough's letters of August ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 81, 88, Davenant's letter from Frankfurt on Aug. 17 on dangers to Southern Germany from Villeroi before Blenheim ; *Add. MSS.* 28056, ff. 114–116, for the desperate condition in Italy before Blenheim ; *Mémoires de Feuquière*, 1741, III, pp. 268–270, on inability of the Allies to remain in Bavaria if a battle had been avoided. For Prince Eugene's movements and opinions in the week before Blenheim, see *Feldzüge*, pp. 465–477.

CHAPTER XVIII

[323] P. 395. Besides guidance from *Fortescue*, *Atkinson* and *Taylor*, personal examination of the battlefield, and prints and relics in the local museums at Donauwörth and the Schloss at Höchstädt, my account of Blenheim has been composed out of the following authorities, some of which I have reprinted in *Select Docs.* :

For the French Army : The letters of Tallard and other French officers in *Pelet*, IV, pp. 566–588, 917–918 ; letters of Marsin and other French officers in *Lediard, Marl.*, I, pp. 409–410, 424–437 ; *Mérode-Westerloo, Mémoires*, 1840, I, pp. 298–319 ; *de Feuquière, Mémoires*, 1741, III, pp. 266–287 ; *Maffei, Marquis de, Mémoires*, 1741, pp. 46–58 ; *Dangeau, Journal*, Aug. 29, 1704. (See my reprints of *Pelet* in *Select Docs.*, pp. 118–133.)

For Eugene's Army : *Feldzüge*, pp. 478–531, 859–863 ; *Add. MSS.* 16466, ff. 223–240, narrative (in Italian) by an officer of Eugene's army.

For Marlborough's Army and the battle in general : *Coxe*, Chap. XXVI ; *Add. MSS.* 9114, ff. 82–83, 89*b* top, 103*b*–106*b*, for parts of Hare's Journal not printed in *Dispatches* ; *Dispatches*, I, pp. 390–409 ; *Add. MSS.* (*E.*) 28918, ff. 287–288, Cardonnel's narrative (printed in *Select Docs.*, pp. 107–111) ; *Parker*, pp. 87–95 ; *Millner*, pp. 113–129 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, I, pp. 362–437 ; *Add. MSS.* 16466, ff. 215, 219–222, letters of officers in Dutch service to the States-General on the battle ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 40 ; *Pelet*, IV, pp. 598–601, allied narratives ; *Tindal*, III, pp. 656–661 ; Boyer, *Queen Anne*, 1735, pp. 149–153.

For the taking of Blenheim village in particular : *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, Orkney's and Abercromby's letters ; *Select Docs.*, pp. 109–110 ; *H.M.C. Athole* (1891), p. 62, another letter by Orkney ; *Description of all the Seats of War*, 1707, pp. 188–190, a narrative clearly based on information from Orkney or Abercromby ; *St. Simon*, IV, pp. 125–130, for Court gossip on Dénonville and Blansac's conduct ; *Ailesbury, Mem.* (*Rox.*), II, p. 571 bottom.

For some of our subsidies to the foreign troops who fought at Blenheim, see *Add. MSS.* 17711, ff., 7–8.

[324] P. 396. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 81, 88, and *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7066, f. 15, for Davenant's letters of Aug. $\frac{6}{17}$. In one he says Parkes passed Frankfurt 'yesterday' ; in the other 'the day before yesterday.' I think the earlier date is right as Stanhope speaks of him as passing through Holland Aug. $\frac{6}{17}$. For Stanhope's letters, see *Add. MSS.* (*St.*), 7069, f. 170 and 172, and *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 84, 227, f. 27.

[325] P. 397. *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 39 ; Aug. 16, 1704 ; *L'Hermitage, Add. MSS.*, 17677 *ZZ*, f. 380 ; *Observator*, Aug. 16, 1704 ; *Luttrell's Diary*, Aug. 10 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XXVI and XXX, i, pp. 305–306, 337–338 ; *P.R.O. Ven. Transcripts*, 46, Mocenigo's letter from Windsor, Aug. $\frac{11}{22}$, 1704.

[326] P. 398. Hare's Journal, *Add. MSS.* 9114, ff. 104–107, 110 ; *Add. MSS.* 16466, ff. 242–243, French officers' letters ; *Coxe*, Chap. XXVII, i, p. 313 ; Ap. A, below, Marl.'s letter to Heinsius of Aug. 17 ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 42 ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7558, f. 26 ; *Hervey, L. B.*, I, pp. 211–212 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 105, 73, f. 117.

[327] P. 399. *Count Tallard's exile in Nottingham*, A. Stapleton ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, f. 20.

[328] P. 399. Lists of casualties in *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 87, 2 ; *Feldzüge*, pp. 522, 863 ; *Millner*, p. 128.

[329] P. 400. *Mérode-Westerloo, Mémoires*, I, p. 325 ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 42, Ap. A, below, Marl.'s letter of Aug. 28 ; *Add. MSS.* 16466, ff. 242–243, 287 ; *MSS.*, 9114, f. 110 ; *Millner*, pp. 124–127, 136 ; *Feldzüge*, pp. 868–876, 902–905 ; *Maffei, Mémoires*, pp. 95–101.

[330] P. 401. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7069, Stanhope to Stepney, Aug. 29, 1704 ; 7058, ff. 28, 35, 99, 360*b*, and 7059, f. 31 ; *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 28056, ff. 152.

CHAPTER XIX.

[331] P. 402. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7067, f. 15 (Stanhope to Stepney).

[332] P. 402. *H.M.C. Rutland*, II (1889), pp. 178–179 ; *H.M.C. Lonsdale*, p. 117 ; *Burchett*, pp. 662–666.

[333] P. 403. Berwick's *Mémoires* (ed. 1778), I, pp. 162–164 ; *Stowe MSS.* (*B.M.*), 468, ff. 73–75. On the Princesse des Ursins affair, two good modern books have recently been added to the vast literature on the subject—by Madame Taillandier and Miss Maud Cruttwell respectively.

[334] P. 405. *Stowe MSS.* (*B.M.*), 468, f. 73–75 (Richards' letters) ; Burton, *Reign of Queen Anne*, II, pp. 73–74, 88–100 (Methuen's letters) ; Berwick's *Mémoires*, I, pp. 162–164 ; *H.M.C. Chequers Court* (1900), p. 181 ; *Galway's Conduct in Spain*, 1711, pp. 1–3 ; *Fortescue*, I, pp. 447–448.

[335] P. 406. *Corbett*, II, pp. 503–506 ; *Hill*, I, pp. 345–355 ; *Leake*, I, pp. 139–150 ; *Burchett*, pp. 666–676 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1704–1706), pp. viii–x, 150–153 ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29589, f. 408 ; *De Jonge*, pp. 293–294.

[336] P. 413. The Spanish Governor's report is printed in C. F. Duro, *Armada*

Español, VI, p. 63 ; Monti, *Historia de Gibraltar*, pp. 85–87 ; Lopez de Ayala, *Hist. de Gibraltar* ; *Noailles*, III, pp. 225–226 ; *Corbett*, II, pp. 517–523 ; *Burchett*, pp. 677–678 ; *Leake*, I, pp. 152–156 ; *Camden Misc.* VIII (1883), *Haddock Corr.*, pp. 46–48 ; *Torrington*, pp. 136–146, 185–195 ; *H. of L. MSS.*, 1704–1706, pp. 167–171 ; *Lediard, N.H.*, II, p. 789 ; *De Jonge*, pp. 296–301.

The Spanish estimate of 30,000 shot cast in the town and its defences is probably not above double the reality. *Lediard, N.H.*, II, p. 789, says : '15,000 shot being made in five or six hours' time.' If there were 500 cannon playing on Gibraltar from the 22 ships, that would mean an average of 30 rounds per gun, not an extravagant estimate for six hours. We know the fleet left England with an average of 40 rounds per gun, and had an average of 25 rounds after the Gibraltar bombardment. See *Journal United Service Inst.*, Feb.–Nov. 1923, p. 373. Not much had been used at Barcelona, so Byng's squadron, only a portion of the whole fleet, must have used a great deal at Gibraltar. I therefore think Lediard's 15,000 probably right and the estimate in *Torrington*, p. 145, of '14,00 shot' as the total is, I expect, a copyist's error for 14,000.

337 P. 414. *P.R.O.* (*Port.*) S.P. 89, 18, f. 144 ; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, f. 360 ; *H.M.C. Bath* (1904), I, p. 80 ; *H.M.C. R.*, 9, p. 467, Oct. 23, 1705.

338 P. 415. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, f. 360 ; Addison, *Present State of the War* (*Works*, ed. 1736, III, p. 245) ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 42 ; *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 297 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) *Barbary States*, 71, *passim*.

339 P. 418. L. G. Carr Laughton's article on Malaga in *Journal of United Service Inst.*, Feb.–Nov. 1923, pp. 367–390 ; *Corbett*, II, pp. 524–535 ; *Torrington*, pp. 146–164 ; *Burchett*, pp. 678–680 ; *Leake*, I, pp. 156–184 ; *Martin*, pp. 76–80 ; *Tindal*, III, 665–666 note (Shovell's Letter) ; *London Gazette*, Sept. 18, 1704 ; for Toulouse's account of the action see *H.M.C. Portland*, VIII, pp. 143–147 ; Mommerqué's *Mémoires du Marquis de Villette*, 1844, pp. 154–158, 349–353 ; O. Troude, *Batailles navales de la France*, I, pp. 249–255 ; *De Jonge*, pp. 304–325 ; *St. Simon*, IV, chap. VIII, for the story told at Versailles.

340 P. 419. *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 41 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 110, 113 ; *Ward's Poems* (ed. 1706), pp. 244–245.

341 P. 420. *Conduct*, p. 146 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 137.

342 P. 420. *Carstares' Letters*, 1774, p. 730 ; *H.C.J.*, Oct. 25, 1704 ; *H.C.L.*, *ditto* ; Leadam, *Pol. Hist. England*, vol. ix, p. 65 ; *Add. MSS.* 22267, f. 123, Whig poem on Malaga ; for the historical aftermath of this quarrel, see Burnet's absurd depreciation of the value of Gibraltar and of Rooke's merit in the matter, and the equally absurd over-praising of the feat of its capture by Ralph (*Burnet*, V, pp. 153–155 and note).

343 P. 421. *P.R.O. Ven. Transcripts*, 112, ff. 14–15.

344 P. 422. *Strype's Stow's London* (1720), Bk. III, pp. 172 ; Bk. VI, p. 49 ; *Poems on Affairs of State*, 1707, iv, pp. 113–114 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, f. 40.

345 P. 423. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 62–63 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XXX, i, p. 343.

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THE NETHERLANDS

Campaigns of 1702-3

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Kerpen
Kühlseggen
Bonn
Sinzig
Andernach
Coblenz
Ehrenbreitstein
Braubach
Nastätten
Schwalbach
Wiesbaden
Frankfurt
Neudorf
Kastel
Mainz
Trarbach
Trier (Treves)
Sierck
Thionville
Zwingenberg
Worms
Weinheim
Ladenburg
Mannheim
Heidelberg
Philippsburg
Wiesloch
Sinsheim
Landau
Eppingen
Heilbronn
Lauffen
Grossgartach
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Stuttgart
Strasbourg
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Wörnitzstein
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Ingolstadt
Rain
Neuburg
Donauwörth
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Dillingen
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Biberbach
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Hohenwart
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R. Moselle
R. Lahn
R. Main
R. Neckar
R. Wörnitz
R. Danube
R. Lech

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Dublin
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Seine
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Almanza
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Cadiz
Malaga
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Tangier (English 1662-83)
Ceuta
Tetuan
Carthagena
Valencia
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Iviza
Majorca
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MEDITERRANEAN
Coast of Barbary
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Sardinia
Rome
Naples
THE TWO SICILIES
PAPAL STATES
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Genoa
Leghorn
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Mantua
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Trent
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Belgrade
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BY

GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, O.M.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE
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

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TO THAT TRUE SCOT
JOHN BUCHAN,
A PLEDGE OF
'UNION' AND FRIENDSHIP

PREFACE

THE public has very kindly received my first volume on *England under Queen Anne*, entitled *Blenheim*, and I hope this continuation entitled *Ramillies and the Union with Scotland* will be regarded with similar indulgence. Before I am likely to publish the third, and I trust last, volume, the world will have been gratified by the appearance of the authentic Life of Marlborough by his distinguished descendant. After that I trust his *manes* will be appeased for all the detraction he has suffered, in life from the Tories, and after death from one Whig. This volume shows him, at least in my estimation, at the summit of his career and performance,—Ramillies, Oudenarde and the reconquest of Belgium,—and also at the beginning of his decline, not indeed in military genius, in which he never declined so long as he took the field, but in political and diplomatic grasp of the realities of the European situation and of the possibilities of war and peace. It stands here recorded how he won the war that but for him would have been lost ; and how he failed to make the peace.

This volume is a rope twisted of three strands—the war, English politics and the Scottish problem. The close interconnections of the three are the special interest and difficulty of the historian.

The chapters devoted to the war show Marlborough in his full glory at Ramillies and Oudenarde ; the tragedy of our unsuccessful Peninsular War, when we had on our side neither a Wellington nor the sympathies of the Spanish people ; the romantic comedy of Peterborough ; our first heroic defence of Gibraltar ; the plucking of Minorca like a ripe orange, as the fruit of Mediterranean supremacy ; the firm establishment of our naval power in the world ; the

great episodes of Turin and Toulon ; the thwarted invasion of 1708 ; and the whole scheme of the war by land and sea, stretched from Lisbon to the threatening camp of Charles XII in Saxony, held in the grasp of Marlborough's capacious mind, so often marred by the failure of allies and lieutenants, but on the whole so wonderfully successful.

At home English politics move to the old tune, the harsh discord of ' those vile enormous factions,' Whig and Tory, ' the merciless men of both parties,' struggling with rude old English vigour for the favour of Queen Anne and of her subjects, yet throwing up all the while fruits of real statesmanship, the winning of the war, the Regency Act and the Scottish Union.

The making of Great Britain, the Union of the English and Scottish Parliaments, proved no less important in its ultimate effect of reconciling the two peoples on terms of equality and justice than in its immediate result of preventing civil war and the severance of the two Crowns. Scottish politics, religion and society then differed so greatly from English, that I have thought it best to introduce the history of the Union by two chapters on the State of Scotland in Queen Anne's reign, answering to the four chapters on the English scene with which my previous volume began.

As contrasted with our treatment of Ireland and our dealings with America, the Scottish Union stands out in the Eighteenth Century as a thing apart, an unwonted and surprising act of wise Imperial initiative. The men who made the Union of 1707 (Marlborough, Godolphin, Somers and Harley for England, Queensberry and Argyle for Scotland) were not selfless patriots—it was not an age productive of such. They were shrewd, worldly men, capable of looking the real facts of a situation in the face. And they studied the interest of their respective countries all the better because, unlike Fletcher of Saltoun, they could do so without too much zeal. They were, moreover, free from the religious and political fanaticisms of the previous century, which had so often stood in the way of agreement by mutual concession. In the age of Anne, religious and political passions were already cooling ; they were no longer

liquid lava, though they were not yet stone-cold, as they became under the first two Georges. The moment was, therefore, favourable for great artificers to mould the future shape of the body politic.

The action of these courageous but wary statesmen was based, not on theory, but on sound information and calculation of all the forces on the board. Such was the method of the Whigs and Tories who made the Revolution Settlement of 1689, the Act of Settlement of 1701 that fixed the Succession on the House of Hanover, and half-a-dozen years later this Union with Scotland. These three settlements, on which the British Constitution has rested ever since, are parts of a single scheme ; they were all of them made in the same spirit of compromise between parties, churches, and nations, and therefore they were never overset. The not very idealistic statesmen of that Augustan age laid the foundations of modern Britain more wisely and well than the passionate Cavaliers and Roundheads of an earlier time had been able to do. It was the heroic idealists—Laud, Hampden, Cromwell, Montrose—who had rough-hewn the issues of controversy, but the terms of settlement were drawn up by their prudently compromising successors in the reigns of William and Anne. The Scottish Union was a piece of their most characteristic and successful work.

I should like to express my gratitude to the Duke of Buccleugh and Earl Spencer for placing the MSS. of Boughton and Althorp freely at my disposition, and to the numerous friends who have helped me in the Scottish affair, especially Dr. Meikle of the National Library, Edinburgh. I have already, in the Preface to *Blenheim*, rendered thanks to the authorities of the Bodleian, of the Rijks-archief at The Hague, and to those who so kindly helped me at Gibraltar, for assistance that has been valuable to me in preparing both this and the former volume. Col. Goldney kindly had a tracing made for me of an early eighteenth-century plan in the Engineers' House, Gibraltar, on which Map II in this volume is partly based.

Note on Methods of Dating

Readers will note the difference between the New Style (N.S.) and Old Style (O.S.) of reckoning dates. Until 1752 the English at home always used the Old Style, after 1700 eleven days behind the New Style of Gregory XIII's Calendar, which was current in all continental countries except Russia. Our sailors, on service at sea and on coast operations like the taking of Gibraltar, generally used the Old Style familiar at home. Our soldiers in the Netherlands and Spain generally but not always used the New. Diplomats abroad most of them used the New, but some the Old. *I employ the O.S. for home affairs; and for affairs outside England I use the N.S. or put the double date, thus—Aug.* $\frac{2}{13}$.

Anne came to the throne on March 8, 1702—at least, so we say now. But our ancestors called it March 8, 1701. For, with them, the New Year began not on January 1, but on March 25. March 24, 1701, was followed after midnight by March 25, 1702. This is confusing to modern students of old documents, who are liable to get a year out in affairs occurring in January, February or early March, particularly in Parliamentary affairs, as the normal session was held in winter, astride of the two years. The Lords' and Commons' Journals of Anne's reign change from 1701 to 1702 only on March 25. *All modern histories, including this book, begin the new year at January* 1.

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CHAPTER I

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In the winter following the famous victory on the Danube, our countrymen took stock of the new situation. Blenheim had saved Germany from immediate conquest by France; it had dealt the first serious blow to the prestige of Louis and his soldiers; it had given a world-wide value to the British army and to the name of Marlborough; and it had renewed the fainting courage of the Allies to continue their uphill struggle with good hope of success. But the war was very far from won. The objects for which the sword had been drawn were as yet unattained. England, Holland and Austria, as signatories of the Treaty of Grand Alliance, had bound themselves to drive the French out of Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. Three years had passed since then, but the Spanish Netherlands and Italy were still in the hands of France.

Henry St. John, the Secretary at War, wrote in the summer of 1705: 'we want seven years' success to be as far advanced in Flanders as King William was when he began.'[1] Ramillies was destined to reduce the seven years to as many months, but at the time when St. John wrote so despondently no one could foresee Ramillies, or could even be sure that Marlborough would ever again be allowed to

attack the enemy in the field. For, in the very year after Blenheim, not only did the Imperialists fail to support his great designs on the Moselle, but the Dutch Generals again forbade him to give battle on their frontiers.

But if the lesson of Marlborough's genius at Blenheim had been taught in vain to those in Holland and Germany who refused to learn, it had its full effect in our island. Bishop Burnet was not the only man whose 'heart was so charged with joy he could not sleep' on the night when the news came through.[2] In manor house, farm and workshop a race of country-folk, who commonly heard and thought about little save their own quiet occupations, were stirred by the strange tidings from the Danube, which opened wider vistas to the imagination, recalled fireside talk of King Harry at Agincourt and Queen Bess at Tilbury, and pointed forward to a future of illimitable magnitude for their country and their children, dimly descried like the sun rising behind the mist. There was little fear that England would be misled by militaristic ideals or dreams of continental expansion in Europe, for her very prejudices were anti-military. But Blenheim knit her determination to trust Marlborough and to win the war. Although party politicians were still at odds on that issue, the central body of public opinion was now fixed, and the Queen exerted the great power of the Crown to give effect to the national resolve, overriding the factions of partisans. The union of Crown and people in support of Marlborough was the secret of the General Election of 1705, which sealed the doom of Louis XIV's ambition. Only after the *annus mirabilis* of Ramillies and Turin had given the essential victory to the Allies in 1706, did new situations arise at home and abroad.

Popular content with the war and with Godolphin's Ministry was increased by an accident of nature—a series of abundant harvests. Between 1702 and 1708 wheat was more often below than above thirty shillings a quarter—less than half the terrible price of seventy-two shillings a quarter to which it suddenly rose in the year of Malplaquet, when the war became rapidly unpopular. But during the critical early years of Anne's struggle with Louis, common

folk in England had enough to eat, both those who bought their food, and those who ate their own produce. In upland parishes the fare in cottage and farm was plentiful, whenever the crop had been good on the common field of the village. In those days even well-to-do gentlemen fed their large households off their own estates: 'we now buy nothing but sugar and spice in the market, having all eatables and drinkables at home,' wrote Yorkshire Squire Molesworth.*

Yet the same gentry, who rejoiced in the rustic plenty with which during these years their tables were loaded from their own fields, gardens and coverts, groaned over the miserable prices of all they sold. The seamy side of good harvests is portrayed in a letter to Thomas Coke from another Midland squire, in the Christmas after Blenheim:

> It has been thought proper by the legislators to charge four shillings in the pound upon land, but at the same time I don't hear that anything is done to enable the owners to pay so great a tax. Never was less money stirring, or commodities, except foreign, cheaper. The best beef is but 2¼*d.* a pound, mutton 2*d.*, wheat 3*s.* a bushel, and all other grain proportionable; nor can, for want of rent, any of these things be sold in quantity. Cattle and sheep are sent to fairs and return unbought, and it's reckoned good market when two or three strike of corn will go off. The Midland Counties must inevitably be ruined for want of sale of their goods, and by the Receivers [tax gatherers] sending that little money away in specie, that should circulate here.[3]

Had it not been for Marlborough's success on the Danube, these outcries against the Land Tax would have taken such effect in the House of Commons as might well have paralysed the conduct of the war. Actually the Godolphin Ministry had been reprieved by the news of Blenheim, but their position was still one of anxiety and danger when Parliament met in the last week of October 1704 to hold its annual session. The 'Triumvirate,' as Marlborough, Godolphin and Harley were now called, had the confidence of the Queen and of the country, but they

* Sept. 25, 1708. Two years later Molesworth writes: 'Our garden is as empty as it used to be when we had a Scotch Presbyterian gardener.' So Andrew Fairservice had his prototype in real life! *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), pp. 239, 247.

had no majority of their own in either House of Parliament. The Cabinet had ceased to represent the Tory party as a whole, and had not yet absorbed any Whig elements to take the place of the High Tory Ministers dismissed in the previous May.* How should the narrow basis of the Ministry be broadened? The breach with the High Tories was unbridgeable, and the Whigs, who agreed with the Cabinet's policy at home and abroad, demanded, as the price of Parliamentary support, admission to office and to royal favour. The Triumvirate, though most unwilling to share power with the Whig chiefs, were beginning to feel the necessity to do something at least in that direction.

Meanwhile a combination of the two oppositions, Whig and High Tory, was prophesied in various quarters. Defoe, in his new capacity of secret confidential adviser to Harley, warned the Secretary of State that, in the session now beginning, the Whigs would no longer be 'worded in a fool's paradise,' and that 'the two ends would be reconciled to overthrow the middle way,' unless one of the two extreme parties were propitiated by the Moderate Government. 'The Whigs of King William's reign expected to come into play again,' and were saying to each other that Harley must first be turned out from the Speaker's chair, then 'worked out' from the Secretary's office, and Godolphin driven from the Treasury. Defoe, in thus warning his patron of his danger, urged him to make friends with Somers, the former Whig Chancellor, 'whom all allow to be a great man. United, what may you not do! Divided, what mischief must ensue to both, and the nation in general!'[4]

But there were difficulties of which Defoe, in his lowly station, knew little. The Queen had the strongest prejudice against Somers, as indeed against all the five Lords of the Whig Junto. Moreover, she still moved in the constitutional ideas of former reigns. She conceived the Crown as choosing servants irrespective of party, and leaving them to make what bargains they could with the Houses of Parliament. She would never admit that her Cabinet must be in some sort representative of a majority in Parliament.

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 335–337.

Nor in this was she singular. The need to adjust the composition of the Ministry to the character of the House of Commons was not an accepted theory of the day, although the troubles towards the close of the last reign had illustrated the necessity to the full, and had finally made a considerable impression on the mind and conduct of William III.

In these circumstances, the Duchess of Marlborough,* on behalf of the Whig party, kept up all autumn a double pressure, by word of mouth on 'poor unfortunate Mrs. Morley,' who still loved 'dear, unkind Mrs. Freeman,' and by letter on her husband still in the field. At the end of October 1704, before the session began, Marlborough replied from Germany to his wife's political demands: 'while I live I will meddle with no business but what belongs to the army'—surely one of his less candid assertions. But a fortnight later he capitulated, informing her: 'I have writ to my Lord Treasurer as you desired concerning the Dukes of Buckingham and Newcastle. I can refuse you nothing.' Already, before Parliament met, Harley had put himself into friendly correspondence with the great Whig magnate, the Duke of Newcastle, whose word was law at election time in various boroughs of Notts and Yorkshire, whose 'estate is so very great he would certainly be of use' to the Ministry, and who was not one of the notorious Junto so much dreaded by the Queen. Harley saw in Newcastle a solid buttress for the system of moderate non-party government, which he desired to establish under the shield of the royal authority. It was beginning to be understood that the Privy Seal might soon be taken from the High Tory, Buckingham, and given to

* At this period of her life, intellectually her prime, Sarah must have been a more attractive and a nobler creature than the grim fury into which she assuredly degenerated. Otherwise, not even a friend, who owed his Peerage to her advocacy, could have written as Lord Hervey wrote of her to Sir R. Cocks in July 1704: 'Did you know her but half as well as I have the happiness to do, she would make you think of her as one said of the sea, that it infinitely surprised him the first time he saw it, but that the last sight of it made always as wonderful an impression as if he had never observed it before. She hath a most acute and elevated understanding, equally partaking of the solid as well as the shining faculty, a mind so richly furnished with all those amiable talents of prudence, justice, generosity, constancy and love of her native country that she ought to have been born in the golden age!' *Hervey, L.B.*, I, p. 205.

Newcastle, though the change did not actually take place till the following spring.[5]

The Whigs had recently learned much in the school of adversity. Their action was decided by the counsels of the closely united Junto and its advisers; Whig party discipline, though sometimes weak in William's reign, was strong under Anne. So the party had the sense to wait in patience for the inevitable hour of its return. It made no alliance with the High Tory malcontents. But it continued its pressure on the Ministry, lifting its hand to threaten but not to strike. That winter, Wharton declared that he 'had now the Lord Treasurer's head in a bag.' The Lords of the Junto could dictate the policies, though they could not yet share the perquisites of government. Their young henchman, Robert Walpole, was already recognized as the 'leader' of the Whigs in the Lower House. 'He will always either be laughing or talking,' a colleague complained; but the cheery and irresponsible covert-side manner of the Norfolk squire masked a shrewd and cautious instinct for the real chance in politics.

And so, when the House met, Harley, though principal Secretary of State, was allowed still to occupy the Speaker's chair, in order to prevent the otherwise certain choice of a more pronounced Tory. The session began without a government defeat, and, as it went on, the violence of the High Tory attack on policies common to the government and to the Whigs, soon drew together all to whom the success of the continental war was the first of political objects.[6]

Oct. 24 1704

High Church anger was directed all this winter, with ever-increasing personal bitterness, both against the Queen herself and against her servants. In a celebrated pamphlet entitled the *Memorial of the Church of England*, Godolphin and Marlborough were denounced as renegades, 'who owe their present grandeur to the protection of the Church, and who with a prevarication as shameful as their ingratitude, pretend to vote and speak for it themselves, while they solicit and bribe others with pensions and places to be against it.' Godolphin, though brought up a Tory, was stung by these attacks into a hostility to the Church clergy

surpassing that of the Whigs themselves. For all his apparent placidity, he was less patient of abuse than laughing Wharton. As early as September 1704 he wrote to Harley 'a discreet clergyman is almost as rare as a black swan'; and in the following September, 'I have heard of several insolences of the clergy, which are really insufferable and next door to open rebellion, and I don't find the least notice taken of it, or the least thought or disposition to reprehend any of them.' In that sentence we have the germ of the impeachment of Sacheverell four years later.[7]

From this time also we can date the bitterness of the High Tory vendetta against Marlborough, with those tales of his avarice, meanness and treachery which the genius of Swift, a few years later, stamped upon the national consciousness so indelibly that the great Whig historian of the Nineteenth Century became, in a manner, their dupe. 'The spirit of lying,' wrote Marlborough in May 1705, 'runs away with more Torrys than ever I had the honour to know.'

> His covetousness was very remarkable [wrote one of these sage critics]; as he was riding one day in Flanders, and had only a pair of linen gaiters on, they were extremely wet so that they could not be taken off without tearing; he bid his servant that took them off to take care to rip them in the seam that they might be sewed up again.

Monstrous, indeed! But worse still, his spelling was bad.

> This man who made so great a noise in the world, had the fewest qualifications. Learning he had none, for he could not spell English.

We are told, on the authority of the same critic, that the Duke was guilty of spelling *Cardinal* as *Cardonel*, like his secretary's name! * On another occasion, in 1705, Joshua Barnes, Professor of Greek at Cambridge, brought to the War Office an edition of Anacreon, which he wished

* Specimens of his actual spelling can be seen in his letters to Heinsius as printed in the Appendix, p. 407, below. It is no worse than the spelling of the great majority of educated men in his period, and much better than that of most ladies, *e.g.* Lady Wentworth's letters in the *Wentworth Papers*: 'The Duke of Molbery,' 'the Queen of Prushee,' 'Gibletor' (Gibraltar), 'yousles,' etc. Or compare the letter of James Gordon to the Earl of Seafield—'I am necessitat once mor to trobubell your Lordsip, that ye vill be pleassed to speck to hir Majesty the Quan of Great Breatten, to proquar on letter to is Majesty the King off Suadlan,' etc. *Seafield*, 1912, p. 370. For Marlborough's generous style of living on campaign see p. 62, below.

to dedicate to Marlborough, not without hope of such modest reward in guineas as a Cambridge Professor might then expect from ' the great.'

Mr. St. John, who was Secretary at War, was then in the room, the Duke comes up to him : ' Dear Harry, here's a man comes to me and talks to me about one Anna Creon, and I know nothing of Creon, but Creon in the play of Oedipus, prithee do you speak to the man.' Mr. St. John said the Duke never gave the man any, but he was forced himself to pay him.

Disgraceful indeed that we should have our battles won by a fellow who has not heard of Anacreon and has his linen gaiters slit at the seam ! But nations at war have to make what shift they can. The gentlemen who were most eager in spreading such pitiful gossip belonged to a class we should now call ' defeatists.' After the news of Blenheim one of these said it was true a great many men were killed and taken, but that to the French King was no more than a bucket of water out of a river.[8]

Against the coffee-house chat of his political enemies we may set the partial but well-informed evidence of the only human being to whom he ever revealed himself. In the muniment room at Althorp lie two papers, written by Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, in the last month of her life, a fierce old woman of eighty-four, with one tender spot left in her withered heart, where she kept still fresh the memory of her dear lord, dead more than twenty years since :

I have read Lediard's History [of Marlborough] which I never did before. . . . It begins with some verses of Mr. Addison's very true and very pretty. . . . Everything I have yet read is so true of the late Duke of Marlborough that I could not read it without wetting the paper. But then in the Dedication he says as much of the present Duke, who is the reverse of his grandfather in every particular, which makes me quite sick. (October 4, 1744, to Mr. Mallet.)

The Duke of Marlborough never had any vanity, and therefore living so many years with great employments he left a great estate, which was no wonder he should do, since he lived long, and never threw any money away ; and money was for many years at 6 per cent. And I have heard him solemnly swear, when it was of no signification

to do it to me, that he never in the whole reign of Queen Anne sold one commission, title or anything to anybody, when he had so much favour from Queen Anne. He had a great deal of compassion in his nature, and to those that he had been long acquainted with he gave money out of his own pocket to those that were poor, though they were not of his opinion. For I was directed by him to pay some pensions when he was abroad, and have letters to prove the truth of it from the persons.

He was naturally genteel [she adds] without the least affectation, and handsome as an angel, tho' ever so carelessly drest.

Marlborough was not a scholar or a student, but he won the heart of educated posterity by confessing that his knowledge of English history was drawn from Shakespeare's plays. Sarah had no more learning than he : when, after her husband's dismissal, indignant Whigs compared his ill treatment by the Tories to the ingratitude showed to the great general Belisarius, she asked Burnet who that worthy was and why he had fallen into disfavour. The Bishop, with his usual tact, blurted out that one reason of his decline in the popular esteem was that he had ' a brimstone of a wife.'

While Parliament was sitting in November and early December, the Duke was still abroad. Having at length finished the campaign of 1704 which he had begun on the Danube and ended on the Moselle,* he spent several weeks, in spite of headaches and bad health, in riding and driving fifteen hours a day over nearly a thousand miles of German roads deep in mud, on his annual winter's task of persuading prickly Princes to hire out their troops again for service next year.† The victor of Blenheim was a powerful as well as a charming advocate, but he was expected to appear in person to win his cause. So the far journey to Berlin had to be accomplished before he could return to England to receive the thanks of his own countrymen.

* See Chapter III, pp. 48–52, below, for the Moselle campaign in the autumn.

† Even luxurious travelling was not in those days comfortable. In August 1704 Lord Fermanagh wrote to Lady Cave : ' Deare Daughter, I'me glad to hear you are all well after your hot journey, for I am sincible that a glass chariot is an inconvenient way of travelling in the month of August, but tis Beauish, and that makes Amends to your sex especially when overgrown with pride.' *Verney Letters of 18th Cent.*, I, p. 218.

In Berlin lay the keys of Italy, and only Marlborough could turn them. Richard Hill, the English envoy at the Court of Savoy, appealed to him to save Turin from capture. It was true that since last summer 'the Princes of Italy fear the Duke of Marlborough's coming, especially the Court of Rome'; it was true that the authorities at Genoa and Leghorn had been frightened by the news of Blenheim and by the cruises of the English fleet into a friendly behaviour towards our merchant ships. But these favourable symptoms would quickly disappear if the French overcame the last resistance of Savoy-Piedmont. And in Hill's opinion that event was certain unless help could be devised by England. 'We have not soldiers enough in Piedmont,' he wrote to Marlborough, 'to put a garrison in Turin.' The Emperor's letters pointed to the same conclusion: he could send no more Austrian troops to Italy because the Hungarian rebels, with whom he obstinately refused to come to terms, were pressing him hard at home. He called instead upon Marlborough to find somewhere the troops to relieve their Savoyard ally. Could not Frederick I of Prussia be persuaded to hire out another 8,000 men to England, and send them into the valley of the Po in the early spring?

But there were difficulties in the way of aid from Prussia. Frederick lived in constant alarm from the presence beyond his eastern frontier of Charles XII of Sweden, with his victorious army and unaccountable temper. The King of Prussia detested the Emperor and the Austrians; and he had for more than two years past been engaged in a bitter diplomatic wrangle with the Dutch government over the will of their late Stadtholder William III, to whose property he claimed to be heir. But if Holland and Austria were ill thought of at Berlin, England was in high favour. Frederick had on hand a design to introduce a German translation of the English Book of Common Prayer, *mutatis mutandis*, as the form of service in his dominions, and so unite his Lutheran and Calvinist subjects. The golden opinions which the Prussian troops had won at Blenheim had aroused the martial pride of the Court of Berlin; and the ever provident Marlborough, throughout all the pre-

occupations of his Danube campaign, had found time to 'write often to the King and please him extreamly.'

So when, in the last week of November, the tired traveller reached Berlin, he was welcome there as no other man in Europe. In a few days Marlborough had calmed the King's anger against the Dutch, allayed his fears of Sweden, and negotiated a Treaty by which 8,000 Prussian bluecoats were to cross the Alps, and England and Holland were to pay 300,000 crowns for their year's service. Marlborough, by his painful winter's journey to Berlin, had provided bare salvation for Turin in 1705, and prepared the means by which the French were expelled from Italy in the following year.

Coming back by way of the Court of Hanover, where it was always well to pay one's respects, he sailed from Holland with the captive Marshal Tallard as his companion on the yacht, and landed in England on December 14, 1704, at the critical moment of the session, and in no good humour with the High Tories. 'I find,' he had written from Hanover, 'that only zeal and success is capable of protecting me from the malice of a villainous faction.' [9]

That winter, the victor of Blenheim, aided by his wife, brought to completion a private treaty which further strengthened his political position between Whig and Tory. His two elder daughters had already been well and usefully disposed of to Sunderland and to Godolphin's son; it was now the turn for his favourite younger daughter, Lady Mary Churchill. Tradition says she had set her heart on a private gentleman, but in that age even favourite daughters of 'the great' were no more permitted to carve for themselves than Princesses of the Blood. In March 1705, before Marlborough left for the spring campaign, he saw her married to John Montagu, whose father, Ralph, was thereupon made first Duke of Montagu. Ralph was a clever ruffian, of the worst Restoration school in public and private affairs, but he was a man of immense possessions, which made him a political power apart from party. Marlborough and he both found their advantage in the alliance, though even the Churchills dared not ask of the Queen all the rewards demanded by their new relation.

The marriage of the young people does not seem to have been unhappy. John Montagu, who succeeded to the Dukedom in 1709, was a pleasant dilettante, liked by almost everyone except his mother-in-law Sarah, who wrote him down a fool. He is still remembered in Northamptonshire as a planter of mighty avenues, and, like his unscrupulous old father, was a wise patron of the arts. He inherited the finest modern town house in London 'for stateliness of building and curious gardens'—Montagu House, on the site of the present British Museum—while the finest example of French architecture of the period to be found in rural England was Boughton House, near Kettering, which his father had built in William's reign, and adorned with splendid French tapestries, hung in panelled rooms that vied with the chambers of Wren's Hampton Court. It is to be hoped that these splendours, and an agreeable husband, consoled the beautiful Mary Churchill; and by the look of her in her pictures, at the head of her band of pages, she seems to have found her greatness very tolerable.*

When the winter session of 1704–5 began, the fate of the Godolphin Ministry seemed to hang in the balance. It lacked a majority of its own in either House, and it was liable to attack both from the Whig and the High Tory side; it was strong only in the glamour of Blenheim and in the favour of the Queen. Anne was persuaded to intervene actively on behalf of her servants. Her speech to the Houses exhorted them to be 'entirely united at home,' because 'our enemies have no encouragement left but what arises from their hopes of our divisions. 'Tis therefore your concern not to give the least countenance to those hopes. I hope there will be no contention among you but who shall most promote the public welfare.' Anne had lost all enthusiasm for the Occasional Conformity Bill, because

* Boughton House, including the furniture, is to-day (1932) probably the most perfect and unaltered example of a great mansion of the time of William and Anne, both outside and within. For Mary Churchill's marriage and her relations and houses see also *Dict. of Nat. Biog.*; *H.M.C. Buccleugh*, I (1899), pp. 351–357; Thomson's *Memoirs of Duchess of Marl.* (1839), II, pp. 8–16; Strype's *Stow's London*, Bk. IV, p. 85.

she could think of nothing but the war, while the High Tories were so angry at the repeated rejections of their favourite measure that they could not think about the war at all. The misunderstanding was therefore complete between the Queen and the loyalists who, only two years before, had ecstatically hailed the advent of their crowned pupil.

Further to protect her Ministers, Anne revived during this session an old custom of Charles II. She attended unofficially the most important debates in the House of Lords. The Merry Monarch had found it 'as good as a play' to watch Shaftesbury denounce the royal policies, with his politic eyes asquint at the face of his sovereign, standing 'incognito' with his back to the fireplace. If Anne, seated on the same spot, got less amusement she got as much instruction from the debates to which she listened. What she heard increased her indignation with Nottingham and her old High Tory friends, while the Whig chiefs seized the opportunity to mitigate her prejudices against themselves by defending her Ministers before her face. Her Majesty's presence caused such crowds to jostle for admission that their Lordships ordered

> That Sir Christopher Wren, Her Majesty's Surveyor General, do forthwith take care and give order for the making of a gallery over the lobby door across the House with four benches.[10]

Wren was also engaged at the instance of the House of Lords in another work of particular interest to historians. He was fitting up in the Tower of London apartments suitable for the preservation of the National Archives. A committee of their Lordships had discovered that 'a mountain of broken records,' Plantagenet and Tudor, were perishing by 'cartloads' under the leads of the White Tower and in Caesar's Chapel.

While Wren was thus engaged in providing quarters for 'the chronicles of wasted time,' he may well have been visited at his work by an *habitué* of the Tower, Isaac Newton, Master of the Mint; there were giants on English earth in those days.

Meanwhile a first consignment of the State Papers of the

Middle Ages was being edited at the public expense by Thomas Rymer ; the mighty tomes of his *Foedera* continued to appear, year after year, from 1704 until the end of the reign. The systematic publication of our historical records had begun, and the way was being prepared for the great antiquarian movement of the Eighteenth Century.[11]

But while the Queen watched the proceedings of 'the great' among the Armada tapestries in the Upper House, St. Stephen's Chapel was the scene of the most critical act of the session. For, although only the lesser political leaders were in those days to be found in the House of Commons, it was there and there alone that taxes could be voted to carry on the war. At the end of the last session Nottingham and other High Tories had said in their wrath that next time the Commons should 'tack' the Occasional Conformity Bill to supply.* That Bill, aimed against the Dissenters and the Whig influence in Corporations and Parliamentary elections, had been lost in the Lords in two successive sessions, after passing the Tory House of Commons with enthusiasm. It had become the touchstone of party feeling. It was hoped that by putting it in the same Bill as the Land Tax, the financial mainstay of the war, the Lords would be compelled to pass it. Before Parliament met in the autumn of 1704, William Bromley, member for Oxford University, summoned a series of meetings of the high-flying party at the Fountain Tavern. There the fox-hunters over their October ale decided on the policy of the tack, which would certainly please the dons and the clergy, but might be less agreeable to the Queen and the nation. Those who put it forward argued that if the House of Lords were compelled to choose between passing the Occasional Conformity Bill and throwing out the war taxes, they would pass the two together. But in fact this was by no means certain. For their Lordships, without distinction of party, had pronounced 'tacking' to be unconstitutional, and in defence of its corporate privileges the Upper Chamber might prove as regardless of the national interest as the Tackers themselves.

* *Coxe*, chap. xx, vol. I, p. 229. For the Occasional Conformity Bill see *Blenheim*, pp. 277–280, 330–332.

Early in the session, the motion to tack the Occasional Conformity Bill to the Land Tax was proposed by Bromley, and backed by Sir Edward Seymour and Sir John Packington, the Worcestershire Baronet, famous for his quarrels with Lloyd the Whig Bishop of that region. But otherwise there are few names of any distinction in the division list of the Tackers. On this question the Whig opposition was swelled by the Moderates and the Ministerial Tories, including Mr. Secretary Hedges, Henry St. John the Secretary at War, Sir Simon Harcourt, Henry Boyle one of the members for Cambridge University, and the cadets of the Houses of Harley and Godolphin. The fine Tory soldier, Cutts the 'Salamander,' told the House that the Tack, involving as it would the loss of the chief war taxes, 'would give the French King almost as great advantage as we had gained over him at Blenheim.' In the critical division it was defeated by 251 votes to 134.

Nov. 28 1704

The excitement in the country was such that the division list, contrary to the usual custom, was published and closely scrutinized. The Tackers' names were noted down for denunciation by war-patriots of all parties in the coming General Election. Marlborough wrote to Godolphin that, according to the laws of war, as the Tackers gave no quarter they should be given none ; and Godolphin wrote to the Duchess Sarah : 'I shall never think any man fit to continue in his employment who gave his vote for the tack.' The Tackers replied by giving the name of 'Sneakers' to those Tories who had refused to support Bromley's motion. Sneakers and Tackers went to the polls next April, hating each other worse than either hated the Whig party—the *tertius gaudens*.

An examination of the division list shows how complete had been the split in the Tory ranks from the Cheviots to Land's End. The forty Tory members for the Cornish Boroughs, not unevenly divided between the Godolphin and the Seymour influence in those parts, showed a small majority against the Tack. Oxfordshire, whose representatives had initiated the policy under pressure of the clerical dons upon Bromley, was one of the very few counties

that was solid for the Bill. An election song of the following spring comments thus :

Perusing the list of the Tackers in print,
And carefully marking what Members were in't,
Some names I observed to most counties did fall,
But Oxford afforded no fewer than All.
Nine Members, Nine Tackers ; and had there more been,
And their number as great as their spirits were keen,
A desperate risque we had presently run
Of the League being broke and the Nation undone.
But will this agree with their courtship, thought I,
When the Queen was harangu'd and extoll'd to the sky,
On her way to the Bath by the literate fry ? *
Or can we imagine it mightily sutes
With thanks for her gift of the Tenths and the Fruits ? †
Unless it be grateful in sons of the Church,
Their best benefactors to leave in the lurch ;
And when for their sakes she had lessened her store,
To shut up the purse and supply her no more.

After the defeat of the Tack, the ' Occasional Bill,' in a slightly modified form, was passed by the United Tory vote in the Lower House. But in the Lords it was thrown out as a matter of course, after a debate kept up chiefly to instruct the listening Queen. Marlborough and Godolphin for the first time ventured to vote openly against the Bill which they had now managed to out-manœuvre in three successive sessions.[12]

On the day after the defeat of the Tack in the Commons, Daniel Williams, a famous nonconformist divine, in close alliance with ' the monied interest ' on the London Exchange, wrote to congratulate Harley, whose old family connections with Puritanism served him in good stead in his rôle of secret middleman between the Whig and Tory supporters of the war.

God hath honoured you above any [wrote Daniel Williams in reference to Harley's part in the Act of Settlement of 1701] in procuring the settlement of the Protestant Succession. The Bill against Occasional Conformity is apt as well as intended to undermine it, and

* Oxford's loyal reception of Anne on the way to Bath in 1702. See *Blenheim*, pp. 213–214.

† Queen Anne's Bounty.

the best part of the present Ministry in the State as well as the Church. Nay, had you seen the tottering state of our stocks last night you would [have seen ?] the crisis the apprehended success of our violent men would cast us into.[13]

Defoe's reports to Harley of his journeys through England were giving his patron a broader idea of English public opinion and of English interests than any that found its way to High Tory chiefs or Whig aristocrats. The more pity that Harley was so slovenly a speaker and writer, so furtive a colleague, so uninspiring a leader, so inferior in all the publicity of politics to the brilliant St. John. For it was Harley and not St. John who understood his countrymen. Harley had Chatham's vision of the real workaday England that was hidden from partisan politicians and fashionable place-hunters. But he had not Chatham's power of expressing the vision that he saw. He understood the need for national unity, the futility of party and sectarian persecutions and slogans of hate. This unfitted him to be the popular spokesman either of Whigs or Tories, but it fitted him, by patient delving underground, to keep Marlborough and Godolphin in office until they had beaten France.

St. John, at present doing the nation good service as Secretary at War, and still writing to Harley as ' dear master,' was destined at the end of the reign to resume his former rôle of High Tory orator and afterwards, for six months, to act as the Pretender's secretary. After that irreparable act of folly, bitterly and vainly repented, Bolingbroke spent his later years in preaching with his pen Harley's gospel of national reconciliation, an unconscious convert to his rival's point of view. People who admire Bolingbroke's *Patriot King* do not always realize that the doctrine is the doctrine of Harley, against which the most brilliant episodes of St. John's active life had been a protest. Queen Anne, so long as she was guided by ' the Triumvirate ' of Godolphin, Marlborough and Harley, was ' the Patriot King ' of Bolingbroke's later dreams, the protestant sovereign above party, and above aristocratic cliques, freely selecting the ministers of the Crown with thought neither for Whig nor Tory, but only for the common good. It was not the ultimate form of the Constitution, which

developed instead on the lines of the Party Cabinet, with the monarch in the background. But it had its moment of realization ; its truest success was not in the early years of George III when America was lost, but in the early years of Anne, when the great war was won.

The heavy defeat of the Tack at the end of November was the true moment of crisis in the session, but danger and discomfort were still the lot of the Ministry, placed like a football between two teams of rough and angry players. As the session went on, the ball came more and more into the possession of the Whig side, as Godolphin grew into an ever-closer understanding with the Lords of the Junto. The affairs of Scotland, which had in the last few months passed completely out of his control into a highly dangerous state, were debated in the Lords, and a vote of censure on the Lord Treasurer's handling of Scotland seemed certain, when Wharton crossed over to the Bench where Godolphin sat and, in a whispered conversation, exchanged pledges with him, and 'diverted the whole debate.'* So, too, when the Whigs in the Lower House threatened to join with the Tackers to invite over the Electress Sophia of Hanover to reside in England as prospective heir—always a favourite measure of Opposition throughout the reign—Godolphin induced the Lords of the Junto to call off their hounds in the Commons, because of the extreme uneasiness that any such proposal would cause to the Queen.[14]

Dec. 1704–Mar. 1705

A similar manœuvre defeated the Place Bill. The High Tories, persuaded that the Tack had been defeated by placemen and place-hunters, moved that all who held paid office under the Crown should be excluded from the Commons.† The Whigs, not being yet in office, were tempted, as the Opposition was always tempted, to vote for this popular cure for 'mercenary

Jan. 27 1705

* See pp. 245–246, below.

† The Tackers 'found themselves so much mistaken in their numbers that they are still more and more incensed against the Ministry, who they say have debauched their party from them. And therefore they are not likely to make much difficulty of excluding any place man out of the House.' Vernon to Duke of Shrewsbury, Jan. 10, 1705. *Boughton MSS.*

Parliaments.' But Walpole had his cue, acted as teller for the 'Noes,' and brought up just enough Whigs to vote with Government and defeat the Tackers' Place Bill by six votes. If it had become law, not only would the Godolphin Ministry have been destroyed, but incidentally the growth of the English Constitution would have been diverted into a totally different channel, since the House of Commons would have deprived itself of all direct communication with Ministers of the Crown. If the House of Lords alone had been allowed to offer seats to Ministers, our Constitution must have become even more aristocratic, and the conflict between an irresponsible House of Commons on one side and a high-born Executive on the other would have become more and more dangerous to the peace and efficiency of Government.[15]

Meanwhile the House of Lords, under Whig guidance, was holding a prolonged enquiry into naval administration. The political object of the enquiry was twofold : first to diminish the glory of Admiral Rooke by an inquest upon his year's work at Gibraltar and Malaga, which his High Tory admirers had unwisely set up against the achievement of the victor of Blenheim ; and in the second place to discredit the general administration of the Admiralty as conducted by a Tory Board, presided over by Marlborough's brother, George Churchill, a better Tory than himself. Except as a political manœuvre, a form of Whig pressure on the Ministry, little came of the enquiry, beyond a collection of evidence about the Gibraltar campaign and the state of the Navy, very useful to future historians.

The Committee reported that the difficulty of finding sailors for the Royal Navy in spite of Bounties and the Press Gang lay in the higher rates of wages paid by the Merchant Service. The administration of the Naval Board was shown to be defective, and the debt of the Navy had risen by a million and a quarter in two years, out of all proportion to the very moderate debts in other branches of the administration. Such were the complaints made by the Lords' Committee, but they had few positive remedies to recommend.[16] The proposed economy of serving out three quarts instead of one gallon of beer a day to each man

before the mast would, they reported, only save £21,000, and would be 'taken as a discouragement to the seamen.' *

At length the distemper of partisanship came to a head, and a clash between the two Houses on the famous Aylesbury case of Ashby *versus* White put a sudden end to the session. The modern reader may find amusement and instruction in the social and political, as well as in the legal aspects of this great constitutional quarrel over a straw, when a cobbler's vote shook the State and dissolved a Parliament.

In the reign of Victoria the trial of Election Petitions was made over, none too soon, to the Judges and Law Courts of the land. But in Stuart times the right of trying disputes about alleged corruption or false returns at elections was one of the privileges most cherished by the House of Commons. Indeed, so long as the Judges were the removable nominees of the Crown, it would have been dangerous for the liberty of Parliament to allow Election Petitions to be tried before tribunals presided over by Scroggs or Jeffreys. After the Revolution there was less need for distrust of the Law Courts, but the Commons still clung to their ancient privilege and abused it shamefully. When a new Parliament met, the question whether Whigs or Tories were in the majority was brought at once to two tests of party strength, the voting for the new Speaker and the voting on the first batch of Election Petitions. No one pretended that justice was done on the evidence. Sir Edward Seymour, the veteran leader of the Tories of the South-West, once exclaimed in the House, 'If the Lord should be extreme to mark what was done amiss by us in the matter of elections here, Mr. Speaker, the Lord have mercy on us all.' The conduct of the Tory majority in this matter after the General Election of 1702 had been grossly partisan ; and the conduct of the Ministerialist and Whig majority on the following Parliament of 1705 was

* The seamen on service usually received money in lieu of part of the gallon due to them, which we are told was more than they wished to drink. And in the Mediterranean and hot climates where beer would not keep, 'each man may have in lieu of one gallon of beer, one pint of strong sound wine for each day'—a parlous falling off in quantity ! *H. of L. MSS.* (1704–1706), pp. 222–223.

destined to be no better, when, as Burnet himself confesses, 'Most of the controverted elections were carried in favour of the Whigs. In some few they failed, more by reason of private animosities than by the strength of the other side.'[17]

Such a system of dealing with Election Petitions encouraged returning officers to act with unfairness. If they thought that their party was likely to be strong enough in the new House of Commons to bear them out, some of them cared little what they did. And so it happened at Aylesbury, in the General Election of December 1700, when the Mayor White and other Tory constables had struck off the register several Whigs who were entitled by law to vote, including a certain cobbler named Ashby.*

Incidents of this sort were common all over the country, and nothing said. But Aylesbury was one of the boroughs in Buckinghamshire where the indefatigable Whig organizer, Lord Wharton, was building up an interest. He induced Ashby to bring an action against White for defrauding him of his vote. 'I do not think,' said Sir Edward Seymour in the House of Commons, 'there was virtue enough in the cobbler of Aylesbury, nor had he purse enough, if a Lord had not acted that part.' To which Lord Hartington replied 'I think the liberty of a cobbler ought to be as much regarded as of anybody else : that is the happiness of our constitution.'[18]

Under such distinguished patronage, Ashby brought his action at the Assizes and won it. The Assize Court ordered his name to be restored to the Register of Voters. But the Tories and the House of Commons denied the jurisdiction of any Law Court in any electoral matter. Mayor White found himself supported by all the Tories of England, as cobbler Ashby by all the Whigs, and their respective moves in a long series of lawsuits spreading over four years were dictated to them by rival coteries of 'the great.'

White appealed to the Queen's Bench to quash the proceedings of the Assizes, on the ground that only the

* By some accounts he was a cobbler, by others an ostler ; like many people in the country towns of those days, he may have had more than one occupation.

House of Commons had the right to decide cases of a claim to electoral franchise. Three out of four of the Queen's Bench Judges decided in favour of White, the House of Commons and the Tories ; but the contention of Ashby, the Assize Court and the Whigs was upheld by no less a dissentient than Lord Chief Justice Holt. The doctrine that Holt laid down was this : Election Petitions, he allowed, were the proper business of the House of Commons, with which no Law Court could interfere ; but a man's individual right to vote was a piece of his property, and if it were taken away he must needs have his remedy in the ordinary Courts. Otherwise, argued Holt, what redress has a man defrauded of his vote if there is no Election Petition ? His case will never come before the House of Commons and he will have no remedy if he is debarred from suing at the Assizes. Holt was too cautious to add what all the world was saying, that in electoral cases the House of Commons seldom did justice according to the evidence.

In reply to the Lord Chief Justice it was urged that Election Petitions, admittedly subject to the jurisdiction of the House of Commons alone, frequently involved questions of the right of individuals to vote. Both classes of questions must, therefore, come before one tribunal, and that tribunal could only be the House of Commons. Ashby *versus* White was indeed a nice case on which constitutional lawyers are still divided, but no longer, as in Anne's reign, on party lines.

The next stage in the proceedings had more serious consequences. Ashby and his Whig patrons had been beaten in the Queen's Bench, but since the Lord Chief Justice had pronounced in their favour, they carried up their case to the House of Lords as the Supreme Court of Appeal. This was in the winter before Blenheim, three years after the original wrong had been done to Ashby. It was the custom in the Lords for the whole House to vote on judicial matters—not merely the Law Lords as in our more scrupulous age. The Whigs had normally a small majority in the House, but on this occasion it was swelled by many Tory Peers who felt that they must stand up for

the jurisdiction of their Chamber, and curb the encroachments of the Commons. Jealousy between the Houses was often a stronger motive than party feeling itself. Holt's opinion, therefore, was upheld in the House of Lords, and that of his three learned brothers was upset by a vote of 55 Peers to 16, a majority greatly in excess of that normally at the service of the Whigs.

In the serious feud between the Houses that arose from this decision, the real grievance of the Tories and of the Lower Chamber lay in this, that the supreme Law Court in the land was a party interested in the suit, that it was moreover a political assembly of Whig inclination, and that in its corporate capacity it was the rival of the Commons House.* In these circumstances it was but natural that the Commons should take their stand on the somewhat mystical ground that the privileges of Parliament are not derived from the Common Law, but have an independent source which renders them exempt from the jurisdiction of the House of Lords as Court of Appeal. The cobbler's vote had become a point round which revolved the subtlest questions of legal philosophy and the angriest passions of national politics.

As soon as it was known that the Lords had decided in favour of Ashby, St. Stephen's Chapel was in an uproar. Honourable Members declared that the Upper Chamber was abusing its judicial powers to make away with the privileges of the Lower House. The Lords replied by publishing their decision and their reasons for it, broadcast, appealing to public opinion, which was prevalently on their side. The unfairness of the Commons in the electoral cases was too well known, and the subjects of the land preferred to have their franchises protected in the ordinary Law Courts where, since the Revolution, political bias was less marked.

So far the affair had gone in the session that ended in

* On the other hand it was quite possible this session for a High Tory to get personal justice from the House of Lords in its judicial capacity. A Whig had called Jack Howe, a ' Papist and Jacobite.' Howe as a Privy Councillor sued him for *scandalum magnatum* and got £400 damages in the Queen's Bench. The defendant carried it to the House of Lords, who divided on the question and upheld the judgment of Lower Court by 48 to 35 votes. *Add. MSS.* (L'H.) 17677, AAA, f. 87 ; *H. of L. J.* xvii, p. 635.

April 1704. In the following winter it came to a final crisis. Encouraged by Ashby's success in the House of Lords, Wharton put up five other humble citizens of Aylesbury to imitate his example. White had deprived all these men of their votes, and they now sued him in the Law Courts as Ashby had done, and as the Lords had declared he had a right to do. The Commons, when they heard it, were beside themselves with anger. They had not touched Ashby, but they called the five new litigants to the Bar of the House, voted them guilty of breach of privilege, and caused them to be arrested upon warrants signed by Speaker Harley, who must secretly have regarded the whole business as very unfortunate. The five prisoners, three of whom could not even write their names, may well have found their detention in Newgate an exhilarating change from the life in the slums of Aylesbury : they were feasted like aldermen on dainties from the richest tables of London, while the coaches-and-six of the Whig aristocracy blocked the street with visitors, come to encourage the latest champions of the cause for which Hampden died in the field, and Sidney on the scaffold. The Commons, hearing of these fine doings, moved their prisoners from Newgate to the direct custody of the sergeant-at-arms.

Dec. 5 1704

A motion was then made in the Queen's Bench for a *habeas corpus* to release the five. It was argued that they had broken no law in bringing an action which the House of Lords, the final Court of Appeal, had declared to lie in the similar case of Ashby. This might be true, but the Commons replied with equal truth that no Law Court had the right to release prisoners whom the Lower House chose to arrest for alleged contempt of its privileges. The Queen's Bench again decided for the Commons, Chief Justice Holt again dissenting.

Then came the final crisis. The Whigs moved for a writ of error to bring the matter before the Lords. The Lords petitioned the Queen to grant leave for the writ of error to be brought in. If she acceded and allowed the case to be brought before the Lords, they would undoubtedly order the prisoners to be released and

Mar. 1705

the Commons would no less certainly refuse to give them up. The two Houses would be in open and violent conflict. The constitutional comedy might lead to a national tragedy. If, on the other hand, the Queen refused the writ of error, she would disoblige the Peerage and would appear to many of her humbler subjects to be refusing them justice and protection against the tyranny of the Commons.

Fortunately a third course was open to the embarrassed lady. The Commons had, before Christmas last, voted the supplies for the year 1705. She therefore brought the stormy session to an end by proroguing Parliament on March 14. Three weeks later she dissolved it, hoping, not in vain, that a General Election would lay this and many other questions to rest, and that a new Parliament would find the Houses in better agreement with one another and with her Ministers.

April 5 1705

As soon as the Houses were prorogued, the five men of Aylesbury automatically recovered their freedom, for the Commons claimed no power to keep people in prison between one session and the next. When the new Parliament met neither House wished to revive the quarrel. The questions raised were left undecided in the sense that neither had the Commons admitted the right of the Law Courts to protect men in their electoral franchises, nor had the Lords admitted the right of the Commons to imprison the men of Aylesbury. Yet in substance the Commons had lost the first case and won the second. For the men of Aylesbury got back their votes by order of the Law Courts, but the Commons had kept them in prison till the end of the session. Neither the liberty of the subject nor the privilege of the Commons had suffered any dangerous wound.[19]

Ever since the New Year, all England had been astir with expectation of a General Election, due that summer under the Triennial Act. As early as January 'some neighbouring gentlemen desired to shoot' the well-stocked woods of Thomas Coke, member for Derbyshire, while he was away on his Parliamentary duties, and 'against election time no gentleman that asked' was denied. In March

'pamphlets fly thick as hail in order to influence the elections.' From the dissolution on April 5 to the polling, the country was kept for two months in fierce political agitation. It was not then usual to hold public meetings or to make speeches to crowds; but canvassing, bribery and pressure of every sort became the business of the countryside and of the market-place.[20]

April–June 1705

The Queen was induced by her Ministers to prepare the defeat of the Tackers by small but significant concessions to the Whigs, enough to give her loyal subjects a lead in the disposal of their votes, and enable Moderate Tories to use Her Majesty's name against the High Church candidates, as in the last election they had used it against the Low. In April, therefore, several Lord Lieutenancies and subordinate Government posts were taken from High Tories and given to men more Whiggishly inclined, while the Whig Duke of Newcastle, in pursuance of plans laid long before by Harley, was made Lord Privy Seal in place of the Jacobitical Duke of Buckingham.* The Queen was unwilling as yet to go further, but it was already understood between Godolphin and the Junto that if the elections went well the Great Seal should be taken from Wright and put into Whig hands. The Tackers, by their reproaches against the Queen in pamphlets† and in common talk, themselves confirmed the popular belief that the Crown was against them, an impression that proved fatal to every party in turn, at every General Election throughout the reign.[21]

Politics, especially at election time, had an important part in the friendships, quarrels and sports even of quiet country gentlemen. In most counties the Tory squires were more numerous than their rivals, but the Whigs were

* See p. 5, above.

† The famous *Memorial of the Church of England*, by Dr. James Drake, was much talked of at election time, and in the early autumn was presented at the Old Bailey and at the order of the court burnt by the common hangman. The *Memorial* (p. 5) complains that 'contrary to these fears they [the Dissenters] found the Head of the Church inclined not only to forgive but to forget past injuries, and that instead of punishment they meet not with so much as a rebuke or a reproach, but comfortable speeches and kind assurances from the Queen herself, and good countenance from some of her Prime Ministers, etc.' The language of the *Memorial* against the 'Prime Ministers,' Godolphin and Marlborough, is much stronger, *e.g.* p. 6, above.

almost everywhere formidable. On the racecourse, as the Verneys complained, 'the Whigs have the best horses, since they have all the money,' and Wharton was almost as eager for victory on the turf as at the polls. In a society thus constituted, the open breach in the Tory party between 'Tackers' and 'Sneakers' could not fail to ensure a considerable measure of electoral success to the Whigs.[22]

The policy of the Tackers and their friends was to say nothing about the war, but to appeal to the country on the Church in Danger. Ministerialists and Whigs sought to turn the issue on to the war, then at the height of its popularity. The question was which of these two potent forces —Church-feeling, or war-patriotism—was the stronger with borough-owners, forty-shilling freeholders and town corporations?

Sir John Packington had a banner carried before him whereon was painted a church falling with this inscription *For the Queen and the Church, Packington.* As they were marching through the Foregate street in Worcester they met the [Whig] Bishop's coach in which was a nonconformist teacher going to poll for the captain, but the horses at sight of the Church (as it was believed) turned tail, overturned and broke the coach and very much bruised the holder-forth's outer man, and this raised no small admiration that the Bishop's horses should be afraid of a church.

In Chester the Whig mob cried 'down with the Church,' and 'when about sixty of the clergy headed by the Dean came to poll, they said hell was broke loose and these were the devil's black guard!' They then proceeded to break the windows of the Cathedral.

In such places, where the issue was a fair fight between the Church and its opponents, the High Tories were usually successful. But many shires, boroughs and borough-owners were thinking chiefly about the war. The great popular constituency of Middlesex unseated two Tackers and chose two Whigs in their room: from Brentford, where the poll had been taken, triumphal processions of the new members and the army of freeholders who had returned them, set off, some on horseback and some in boats, to parade the streets and the river of the capital, crying out 'No Jacobites,' 'No French Government,' 'No wooden

shoes.' The London crowd that watched them was in full sympathy ; the City chose four Whigs, and Westminster got rid of a member who had voted for the Tack.*

At Coventry the High Tory candidates led the mob to overpower the constables, seize the Town Hall and hold it against all comers for the three days of the election. Venturesome Whigs who attempted to force their way in to record their votes, were knocked down and dragged along the ground by the hair, or stunned and carried off for dead. But the members thus elected were unseated by a vote of the House of Commons. In the boroughs of Wiltshire the defeated Tories complained of bribery ; Marlborough town ' was grown as corrupt as any other,' and at Bedwyn the voters ' were all in an uproar and will have £6 a man,' which the Whigs were able to supply. It was noted that the Quakers everywhere, in spite of their pacific principles, voted for the war party, rather than commit themselves to the tender mercies of the High Church zealots. Only in some regions like Dorset, the village clergy were so ' temperate ' that the Dissenters ' had nothing to complain of ' and therefore would not bestir themselves politically.[23]

At Cambridge the Whigs and Ministerialists had on their side the Heads of Houses, including the powerful but unpopular Bentley, and the University's magnificent Chancellor, the proud Duke of Somerset. These authorities, desiring the overthrow of the High Tories at the coming election, made the most of the Queen's visit on April 5, when she stayed at the Lodge, and dined in state in the hall of Trinity College. The occasion was seized to confer Honorary Degrees on Lords Sunderland, Oxford and Wharton of the Whig Junto, and the Queen knighted Isaac Newton, her Master of the Mint, who was prospective Whig candidate for the University, which he had on some

* Early in Anne's reign pamphlets occasionally appeared, vainly recommending a redistribution of seats more in accordance with wealth and population. It is remarkable that such reformers calculated that not only western England but also northern England was over-represented (Middlesex and the Capital of course under-represented) ; whereas redistribution in 1832 meant an increase in north-country representation, owing to the Industrial Revolution. *Somers' Tracts*, XII, p. 410.

former occasions represented in Parliament. But the High Churchmen were not to be thus overawed. At the election next month they spoke contemptuously of Newton as ' a late made knight ' and, according to the Whig Bishop of Ely, ' it was shameful to see a hundred or more young students encouraged in hollowing like schoolboys and porters, and crying *No Fanatic, No Occasional Conformity* against two worthy gentlemen that stood candidates.' The two ' worthy gentlemen ' were Newton himself and Godolphin's son Francis, who were handsomely beaten by a Tacker and another High Tory. The cry of ' No fanatic ' raised against Isaac Newton by a mob of young gentlemen about to take holy orders has its humorous side. Newton was right at the bottom of the poll, but he had consented to stand too late and too reluctantly and had refused to canvass ; it was said that the majority of the residents had voted for Godolphin and Newton, but had been outvoted by the non-residents, who were for the most part country parsons.

Oxfordshire was staunch to its nine Tackers, except that Marlborough's influence in his new estate where the foundations of Blenheim Palace were being laid, enabled him to secure the return of Cadogan, his jolly Irish Quartermaster General, as one of the two members for Woodstock.[24]

The South-West had proved a Tory stronghold at the election three years before, when the interests of Godolphin, Sir Edward Seymour and Sir Jonathan Trelawny, Bishop of Exeter, were exerted all on one side. But now Seymour's ' Western Empire ' was challenged in Cornwall by Godolphin ; and the hopes of Whigs, Moderates and Ministerialists were further raised by the desertion from the High Tory cause of Trelawny himself and others of his Cathedral clergy. Trelawny was still the aspiring and active prelate he had been when James II had sent him to the Tower, and his was still a name with which to conjure in Cornwall. Patriotism and self-interest now combined to make him join with the rising tide of Moderatism and Whiggism. Largely owing to his change of side, one of the two Cornish county seats was carried by a Whig, and a fair proportion of the Cornish boroughs went on this occasion

the same way—though the hold of Seymour and the Tackers on Exeter City could not be shaken. Two years later Trelawny was moved from the poor Bishopric of Exeter to the rich Bishopric of Winchester.

The movement among the abler clergy towards moderate views, as the path alike of promotion and of good sense, was not confined to Trelawny. Wake, whose learning had so well defended the Bishops in their constitutional quarrel with the Lower House of Convocation,* was Dean of Exeter, and had exerted himself on the side of his Bishop at the General Election. Immediately afterwards the Queen made him Bishop of Lincoln, and he was destined ten years later to become Archbishop of Canterbury. In 1705 the place that Wake vacated as Dean of Exeter was filled by the Sub-dean, Lancelot Blackburne, who had taken the same line in local politics ; Blackburne also rose under the Hanoverians to be Archbishop of York. This well-rewarded defection from the hot gospel of the High Church on the part of the leaders of the rising generation of clerics was ominous of much, and Queen Anne was *particeps criminis*. Her simultaneous promotion of the venerable High Churchman, Dr. Bull, to the remote see of St. David's, where he was too old to do duty, was not held in Tory circles to atone for her kindness to the Exeter rebels.[25]

Before midsummer the Grand National Pantomime of the General Election was over, but though it might seem mere clowning to an amused or cynical spectator, the elections had decided the fate of Europe and of Britain. The new House of Commons was not only certain to push on the war in the manner that Marlborough wished, but it was capable of dealing wisely with the very dangerous question of the relation of England to Scotland, now come to the decisive crisis of its long history. The Tory Parliament just dissolved had on the whole served the country well, but it would never have steered the barque of the Scottish Union through the clashing rocks. In the new Parliament, Whigs and Ministerial Tories formed a

June 1705

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 286–287.

solid phalanx that dominated both Houses and gave free play to the policies of Marlborough and Godolphin, Queensberry and Somers.

When the election results were examined, it was agreed that High Toryism had suffered a defeat, but the strength of parties could not be precisely stated in days when many members had no distinct allegiance. The Whigs claimed that the figures were 240 Whigs, 200 Tories and 73 ' who act for the Court and will hold the balance.' Godolphin reckoned that in a particular division there voted 160 Whigs, 190 Tories and 100 ' Queen's servants ' ; others reckoned the Tory Opposition at 170. In any case Whigs and Courtiers would act together and the tone of the new House of Commons would be different from the last. Of 134 who had voted for the Tack, not more than 80 sat in the new Parliament, many having met defeat at the polls. Their enemies the ' Sneakers ' had also suffered owing to the division in the Tory ranks, and the Whigs had gained at the expense both of extremists and moderates.[26]

The Ministry made haste to come to terms with the Whigs before the Houses met. Walpole was given a seat on the much criticized Admiralty Board. Sunderland, Marlborough's son-in-law and his representative on the Whig Junto, was sent to Vienna in state, to congratulate the young Emperor Joseph on his accession after his father Leopold's death. Argyle was sent as High Commissioner to Scotland.

The disposal of the Great Seal was more difficult, owing to the unwillingness of the Queen to give it to an avowed member of the Whig party, though she realized that so hot a Tory as Wright could no longer hold it. On July 11, 1705, after the result of the General Election was known, she wrote to Godolphin:

> I wish very much that there may be a moderate Tory found for this employment [the Great Seal]. I must own to you I dread the falling into the hands of either party, and the Whigs have had so many favours showed them of late, that I fear a very few more will put me insensibly into their power, which is what I'm sure you would not have happen to me no more than I. I know my dear unkind friend [Sarah] has so good an opinion of all that party that she will use

all her endeavour to get you to prevail with me. I do put an entire confidence in you, not doubting but you will do all you can to keep me out of the power of the *merciless men of both parties*.

But Godolphin felt obliged to support Sarah's request that the Great Seal should be entrusted to the hands of the moderate Whig, Sir William Cowper, an able lawyer and an agreeable man. The Queen in despair appealed to Marlborough to protect her against the insistence of his wife and of his colleague, but she received from him the following reply from abroad : ' If I had the honour of being with you, I should beg on my knees that you would lose no time in knowing of my Lord Treasurer what is fit to be done, that you may be in a condition of carrying on the war, and of opposing the extravagances of these mad people ' ; if not, she must send again for Rochester and Nottingham, and be contented to lose the war. At length she surrendered to this reasoning, urged by the combined remonstrances of her three friends ; in October, Cowper became Lord Keeper of the Great Seal. The stage was thus set for the new Parliament, and for the decisive actions of the reign at home and abroad.[27]

Henry St. John took the new situation philosophically. He thought the High Tories had overreached themselves and must pay the penalty, till the war was won. He wrote to his intimate Tom Coke, the Tory Squire of Derbyshire, to ask :

> What temper you find gentlemen in ; whether they will think it reasonable to support the Queen, who has nothing to ask but what we are undone if we do not grant ; and who, if she does make use of hands they do not like, has been forced to it by the indiscretion of our friends. The real foundation of difference between the two parties is removed, and she seems to throw herself on the gentlemen of England.*

* A letter that does credit to the writer ; more so than his letters to the same correspondent during the same years on another common pursuit. ' As to whores, dear friend, I am unable to help thee. I have heard of a certain housemaid that is very handsome ; if she can be got ready against your arrival, she shall serve for the first meal.' And again, ' Really Tom, you are missed : whoring flags without you.' There were blemishes in St. John's make-up for the two parts which he loved to play alternately—leader of the High Church Party and moral philosopher. *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), pp. 49, 61, 63.

CHAPTER II

The Defence of Gibraltar (Oct. 1704—April 1705)*

The formation of the Portuguese Alliance of 1703, that opened to the English Grand Fleet the magnificent harbour of Lisbon, had been followed next year by the capture of Gibraltar and the sea fight off Malaga.† These events speedily led to the substitution of English for French naval control of the Mediterranean and prepared the way for the Peninsular War, the great ' side show ' which some of our statesmen like Nottingham regarded as being the war itself. The effort to replace the Bourbon Philip by the Austrian Charles at Madrid absorbed, every year, more and more of England's man-power ; gave an excuse for the prolongation of the war after it had been won in Germany, Flanders and Italy ; and finally ended in failure. But the retention of Gibraltar and Minorca under the British flag gave to England those naval bases south of the Bay of Biscay, without which her maritime power in the Mediterranean could never have been established.

The winter months of 1704–5 witnessed the great effort of France and Spain to recover Gibraltar, with all the vicissitudes of six months' siege full of perilous chances. The defence of the Rock by stout old Eliott for George III is better remembered, because it flames as a bright deed in the darkest hour of Britain's world-defeat, while the similar achievement of Anne's soldiers, sailors and marines was but one laurel leaf in the Queen's crown of victory.

The Eliott of this first defence of Gibraltar by the

* *For Maps for this chapter see Map of Europe, No. X, at end of the volume, and Maps I and II, pp. 36 and 40, below.*

† *Blenheim*, pp. 298–304, and Chapter xix.

British was not himself a Briton. Prince George of Hesse Darmstadt, the best type of German aristocrat and soldier, was a loyal servant of 'Charles III,' the Austrian candidate for the throne of Madrid ; but he had the good sense, wanting to Charles's other German advisers, to appreciate how entirely the chances of success in Spain depended on friendly co-operation with the English. He knew the English well, having served with them in Ireland.* By his tact, knowledge and firmness he was as well fitted as any foreigner could be to command the garrison of Gibraltar. Even so, the fact that King Charles had set a compatriot of his own over a force consisting almost wholly of subjects of Queen Anne caused friction, which would have been fatal but for Hesse's temper and prudence.

After the battle of Malaga, the Grand Fleet started home from Gibraltar at the end of August 1704, leaving Hesse with 1,900 English marines and 400 Dutch, sixty great guns and as many gunners, all lent by the navy. In return, Admirals Rooke and Byng proposed to carry off the brass cannon and the wine of the fortress. Hesse insisted on keeping them, in view of the coming siege. The two Admirals departed, in high dudgeon. Fortunately, their ill-humour did not communicate itself to Admiral Leake, who was left on the station with a winter squadron based on Lisbon, to co-operate with Hesse for the safety of the Rock.

This absurd incident had its serious consequences. Arising from Hesse's quarrel with the Admirals, there grew up a movement in the garrison directed against his authority. At the head of the malcontents was Fox, the Brigadier of the marines. Hesse had, perhaps unwisely, appointed as Governor of the town an Irish Catholic exile called Nugent, who had been made a noble of Spain by the late King. Nugent was now, in the name of 'Charles III,' raised to the rank of a Spanish Major-General. Fox was furious to find himself thus placed under yet another foreigner, one of the conquered Irish ! The personal dispute involved the political question, whether Gibraltar was to be treated

* He had been at William's side on Boyne banks when the famous cannon ball had wounded the King's arm. Another had brought down Hesse's horse, causing William to cry out 'The poor Prince is killed.'

as an English fortress or as a Spanish town of King Charles. The quarrel waxed hot, and might well have been fatal to the defence, had not Fox and Nugent both been killed on duty early in November. The besiegers' cannon impartially solved the problem and enabled Hesse to make a fresh start. He had learnt his lesson, and for the future appointed none but Englishmen. Brigadier Shrimpton succeeded Nugent as Governor of the town ; he and Captain Bennet, the chief engineer of the garrison, became Hesse's loyal supporters until the siege was raised.

Two successive conspiracies to deliver up the place to the enemy were brought to light. The first was of Spanish origin, but the leader of the second was Major Lawrence of the marines, who moved in good English society at home, but who, according to Hesse, had inherited the feud begun against his authority by Byng and transmitted by Fox. Lawrence's treason was discovered in time ; he was tried by court martial, condemned to be shot, but reprieved and eventually reinstated. Like Benbow's action at sea, these ugly incidents remind us that officers' discipline, afloat and ashore, was not yet what it became under Nelson and Wellington, and that the treachery of the age was not confined to statesmen in correspondence with St. Germains. Hesse had reason to regret that he had not allowed the Admirals to go off with the wine, for he deplored the frequent drunkenness and insolence of the English garrison, though he was always loud in praise of their obstinate and tireless valour.[28]

If the French had attacked Gibraltar from the sea, they could not have failed to retake it. The three miles of coast between Europa Point and the Old Mole invited assault ; its defences, at best old-fashioned and inadequate, had been ruined by Byng's bombardment, and could not have withstood such another ordeal or resisted a landing in force. Twice Admiral Pointis was about to attack from sea, and twice Leake came swooping from Lisbon in the nick of time to scatter and destroy his squadron. And when Leake was away the French ships were either themselves absent at Cadiz, or were unable to attack on account of foul weather. The very defects of Gibraltar Bay as an

MAP I



anchorage helped England that winter. Leake's relieving squadron was more at home in a gale than the half-hearted seamen of the French blockade. 'The English,' wrote Marshal Tessé from the besiegers' camp, 'show us the way to keep the sea in all weathers, for they sweep to and fro over it like your swans at Chantilly.' Gibraltar was saved by 'the battle and the breeze.'

The protection that Leake gave Gibraltar on the sea side, intermittent as it was, could never have been given at all if Lisbon harbour had not been at his disposal owing to the Portuguese Alliance. It would have been impossible to relieve Gibraltar three times in one winter from bases on the other side of the Bay of Biscay. Plymouth and Portsmouth were too far away. But Leake, able to winter snugly at Lisbon, set himself there with all his energies to prepare one relief expedition after another for the Rock, fitting out his hard-used squadron once more to take the winter sea, and once more to face the foe, while he loaded up transports with soldiers, food, ammunition, tools and tackle for Hesse's use. He was well supplied from home, where the Ministry fully realized both the importance and the difficulty of saving Gibraltar. Men and stores from England were constantly arriving at Lisbon, and were thence convoyed to the besieged fortress.

Without supplies from England, Leake could have done little. He complained that he had to 'make bricks without straw,' because the Portuguese docks and magazines were empty of all necessaries, and the native officials were unfriendly and inactive. To make matters worse, John Methuen, the able envoy who had negotiated the Treaty of Alliance and had more influence at King Peter's Court than any other Englishman, was jealous of the Admiral and began to put obstacles in his way. However, the two made up their quarrel just in time to save Gibraltar, for each had that object very earnestly at heart. Leake deserves a high place in England's gratitude. As a young Captain he had cut the way through the broken boom and relieved Londonderry; as a middle-aged Admiral his energy, daring and forethought saved Gibraltar.[29]

These favourable conditions at sea made it just possible

that Hesse might succeed in holding against great odds the northern land-front. Nature, indeed, had made the place potentially impregnable on the north, but man had as yet done little to avail himself of these abundant natural means of defence. There were as yet no galleries or gun-emplacements hollowed out in the precipice. The virgin Rock still rose unpolluted into ether, as when Odysseus and the Tyrians had seen it long ago. But its huge feet narrowed the enemy's way of approach to the northern wall of the town, and the flat land there available for the batteries of the besiegers was yet further diminished by a large straggling pool. The French and Spanish trenches were carried first up to the northern edge of the pool, then round it under the lee of the rock, and finally spread out on the ground between its waters and the town. The front trenches, whence the breaching batteries fired, were scarcely two hundred and fifty yards from the Land Port, as the gateway in the northern curtain was called.* They were enfiladed by the musketry of the English in the Round Tower, and in the lines connecting the Round Tower with the Land Port.† A battery, erected at the end of the Old Mole, also greatly disturbed the enemy. And the whole system of his trenches was subject to a plunging fire of round-shot, sometimes from the sea when Leake's squadron was in the Bay, and always from Willis's Battery, far overhead on the land side ; in October 1704 that enterprising officer had, with the aid of the seamen and their ropes, erected the battery still called after his name, at a level never reached before, so making the first real attempt to bring the Rock proper into the scheme of defence for the town. Such were the positions of besiegers and besieged during Gibraltar's ordeal of six months.

* In Eliott's siege in George III's reign, the enemy trenches were much further away, on the north side of the pool or 'inundation' as it was then called, which had been by that time artificially enlarged. On the other hand, a more serious attack was then made from the sea, by the 'floating batteries,' etc.

† Later known as the King's Lines. *See Map II, p. 40, below.* The scarp had not then, nor for long afterwards, been cut so as to render it impossible, as it is now, to scramble up from the sea level to the King's Lines. The spot where the Round Tower stood has been largely, though not entirely, cut away by this later scarping.

Admiral Pointis was detached with a squadron from the French Grand Fleet at Toulon, with orders to assist the siege. Late in September 1704 he landed in Gibraltar Bay three thousand French infantry and a siege train, who joined themselves to the nine thousand Spanish troops already arrived overland. The siege was forthwith begun, but Pointis himself sailed on to Cadiz, and only occasionally appeared in the Bay to join in the operations. All October the trenches crept slowly forward round the pool under the fire of the English. By the end of the month the breaching batteries were posted and in full play. Pointis returned with his squadron and prepared to attack the sea front. And five hundred Spanish soldiers, who had sworn on the Sacrament never to return without having taken Gibraltar, went round, past Catalan Bay, on the steep eastern side of the Rock, whence, near its southern end, they scrambled by night to the top of the great ridge. Their guide was a patriotic goat-herd, Simon Susarte, well acquainted with the passages of the precipice. From its summit rope-ladders were let down to help the ascent of the rear-guard. It was such a feat of guerilla war as suited the national genius. They slept in the magnificent shelter of St. Michael's Cave. It had been agreed that Gibraltar was to undergo a triple attack—from the sea, where 3,000 men were to be landed at the New Mole ; from the trenches ; and by surprise from this mountain ambush above. Success was regarded as certain, and not without reason. But on the very day before the grand assault was to be made, Leake came sweeping into the Bay, destroyed the French men-of-war that he found there, and prevented, by a few hours, the attack that would almost certainly have put an end to the English possession of Gibraltar.

Oct. 29 / Nov. 9 1704

Next morning, the five hundred Spaniards, mast-headed on the Rock, looked down in vain to see any movement among their compatriots and allies below. Though deserted, they did not lose courage, but marched northwards along the crest of the heights and overpowered the guards at the Signal Station and on the Middle Hill. The English in the town below, perceiving an enemy force where they had

MAP II



Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

least expected it, sent up some companies of marines. With characteristic improvidence, the Spaniards had forgotten to bring with them their spare ammunition, but they put up a gallant fight. Some two hundred were captured ; the rest were killed by the English musketry or driven over the edge of the precipice. Many fell headlong and perished, but a few scrambled safely down the limestone gullies by the harsh aid of the cactus and other shrubs that broke the sheer descent, and so returned alive to Catalan Bay.

Such was Leake's First Relief of Gibraltar. He remained some weeks, lending much-needed aid to the defence, although the winter storms often rendered his presence in the Bay both difficult and dangerous. At length, at the beginning of December, he sailed back to Lisbon to convoy stores and men arrived there from England for Gibraltar.

All winter the siege went sullenly on. The rain fell in torrents, flooding the trenches. King Philip's soldiers, without shoes or pay, and with a plentiful lack of food, powder and provisions, waded about knee-deep in mud. Half the besieging army perished of disease and exposure. But the Spaniards are never more tenacious than in the defence or attack of towns, and they stuck fiercely to their task, venting their ill-humour on their allies. 'If it were not proclaimed death for a Spaniard to fall out with a Frenchman, they would be killing each other every day.' But the defenders, too, suffered scarcely less from disease and exhaustion : by the middle of November Hesse had only a thousand tired sailors and marines to man the walls ; they daily dragged themselves up to repair the ever crumbling breaches and replace the overturned cannon, of which forty were dismantled by the enemy fire. It was a rivalry in stubborn endurance, a war of attrition.*

Not a day too soon came the Second Relief, the arrival from England by way of Lisbon of food, stores, ammunition

* The reason why the enemy would not storm the breaches they were perpetually making in the curtain between the Old Mole and the Land Port, was that in front of it ran a 'covered way,' that is, a deep broad ditch below the level of the ground, at the bottom of which palisades were placed and which was swept from end to end by the fire of guns placed for the purpose.

and 2,000 Regulars of the Guard and Line, under the able command of Brigadier Shrimpton. By luck and Leake's guardian care, they had just escaped capture by the ships of Pointis, watching for them off Cadiz. Lord Galway, the Huguenot commander of the English at Lisbon, had had the public spirit and generosity to weaken his own forces for the Portuguese campaign, in order to speed on these and other troops to save Gibraltar. After this second relief the besiegers lost heart ; before the end of the year the Spanish General reported that he had lost 4,500 men by desertion. They had been starved and exposed beyond human endurance.

Dec. $\frac{8}{19}$ 1704

Anger and shame at the failure to retrieve Gibraltar from the heretic seamen were spreading through the towns and villages of Castile, among a race that lacked neither pride nor courage. National feeling was so strong that the Court of Spain dared not, if it would, give over the siege. Louis, also, still desired, though with less personal passion, to retake the key of the Mediterranean for the House of Bourbon. But co-operation between Versailles and Madrid was no longer harmonious ; the honeymoon of France and Spain had ended in sour mistrust. The Queen's favourite, the Princess des Ursins, had ventured to defy the truculent French Ambassador, the Duc de Gramont, and had championed the cause of Spain for the Spaniards. She had ceased to play her part as agent for the Court of France and had chosen, instead, to become the faithful servant of her mistress and of the country that learnt to look to her for salvation. Louis, therefore, had recalled her from Spain. The feeble King Philip, who depended for health, happiness and policy on the bright young Savoyard he had married, was obliged, in appearance at least, to support his Queen's feud with his grandfather on behalf of the Princess des Ursins. Since her enforced departure, the Court of Spain had sulked, and the French Ambassador soon found that he had no more influence after the Princess had gone than when she was present to thwart him. Moreover, her energetic spirit was now lacking in the royal counsels. All went to rack and ruin, and Gibraltar with the rest.

The only point on which the King and Queen were agreed with the Duc de Gramont, was to obtain from Louis the recall of the Duke of Berwick from the command of the French forces in Spain—an error that nearly cost them the crown. Berwick had refused to alter his military plans to suit the fancies of the Ambassador or of the Queen.* He left Madrid for France in November 1704, and, until the Princess des Ursins returned eight months later, there was no person of character and ability of either sex in charge of the civil or military affairs of Spain. In place of Berwick, Louis sent Marshal Tessé, a pleasant courtier and a great writer of literary letters from the front. He was excellently suited to negotiate the return of the Princess des Ursins, a task to which he devoted himself with tact and zeal. But it fell to him also to take over the bitter business in the plague-stricken, water-logged trenches before Gibraltar, which needed a different kind of man.[30]

The mutual hostility between French and Spaniards was not confined to Court circles. The armies and the peoples shared it to the full. At Christmas, Tessé complained that the march of the French reinforcements to the siege was impeded by the Spaniards, jealous lest it should be said that their allies had retaken the Rock which they themselves had lost. From this motive the Spanish General, the Marquis Villadarias, whom Tessé was to supersede, determined to make a grand assault on Gibraltar on February 7, three days before the arrival of his supplanter with further French reinforcements. This attack was very nearly successful, for the Spaniards fought with a furious zeal of patriotism, doubly on their mettle against the French at their side and the English in their face. They afterwards averred that they were badly supported by the French infantry, desirous that Gibraltar should fall not to Villadarias but to Tessé. Whether the charge were true or not, the jealousy of the two Latin nations was one of the causes why the Rock, by so narrow a margin, remained in the hands of England.

* The Queen called Berwick 'un grand diable d'Anglais, sec, qui va toujours tout droit devant lui.' *Tessé, Mém.*, II, p. 137. Berwick was the soldier son of James II and Arabella Churchill ; he was well worthy to be Marlborough's nephew.

The grand assault was delivered not against the covered way and the curtain down below, but on the higher ground. The objective was the Citadel, a Moorish castle built in the Fourteenth Century or earlier, but since often repaired. Its ancient walls were of great thickness, but the bombardment had made a breach 'very easy to enter,' Brigadier Shrimpton reported to Marlborough.* The fall of the Citadel would have ended the siege, but to get to it the storming party would have first to carry two lines of outer defences. These lines were neither of them very formidable obstacles: they consisted of rough limestone walls, breached in many places by the cannon; they ran parallel with one another up the steep slope to the foot of the precipice, on the top of which stood Willis's Battery, well out of harm's way. The first of these lines started uphill from the neighbourhood of the Round Tower, the principal advanced post of the defence. The second line started from an emplacement for a Battery of Four Guns, known in later days as the Hanover Battery.†

The ground traversed by these lines, where the fate of Gibraltar was to be decided by hand-to-hand fighting, consists of a steep limestone scree, overgrown to-day by wild olives and brushwood. The advance guard of the French and Spanish had climbed up at night on to this uncouth battleground, where they lay unperceived in the clefts till the grey of dawn. At the given signal, they rushed the first line, and captured the Round Tower by firing and hurling rocks upon its defenders from immediately above their heads. Thence they advanced, scrambling along over the scree, till they came to the second line, which they also carried, capturing the Four-Gun Battery. Over fifteen hundred picked infantry of France and Spain, flushed with success, were now coming on, and their leaders were within forty yards of the Castle

Feb. 7 (N.S.) 1705

* Shrimpton added: 'Had they attacked us at the same time on the covert way, the north bastion and the curtain [down below], we should have found it very hard to have kept them out.' *Add. MSS.* 9115, f. 14.

† *See Map II, p. 40, above.* Lieutenant (now Capt.) E. S. M. Goodwin and I, in 1928, discovered the lost traces of this second line of stone wall running up the slope from the Hanover Battery. It is marked in old maps, but has to be looked for carefully among the brushwood that to-day covers the steep scree.

breach, the key to Gibraltar.* The surprise had been ably managed, and the English reserves were still tumbling out and mustering in the streets of the town below. But Captain Fisher and seventeen marines held the enemy at bay for a few precious minutes. They were overpowered at last, but not before the approach of several hundred of the Guards and Line; some came running up from the town, some climbing up from the covered way, against which the enemy, by a grave error, had made no containing attack. The first reinforcements to arrive were led by Lieutenant-Colonel Moncal, a Huguenot refugee. For another ten minutes the men of the three nations shot and stabbed each other in the twilight of the winter dawn, sliding and falling on the slippery limestone and rolling together down the slope. At length the French and Spaniards began to give way. They were pushed back out of the Four-Gun Battery, back over the lines they had captured, and back out of the Round Tower which had been in their hands for sixty minutes. About four hundred men had fallen in the mêlée.

Gibraltar was never again in such danger, but it was still far from safe. Tessé arrived with three thousand infantry fresh from France; and a few days later Shrimpton reported to Marlborough that the garrison was reduced to 1,800, that they 'had not half the rest that nature requires,' that they were losing between twenty and forty every day by the cannonade, that the battalion of Guards was reduced to 250 ragged and weary men. Yet Tessé was convinced that only an attack from the sea would overcome the resistance of the garrison. The rain, a good ally to England, still fell in torrents, filling the trenches with water and the grave-pits with men. Louis at Versailles was anxious to save his soldiers and have done with the siege, but the government at Madrid was till obstinate.

It was agreed that one last attempt should be made.

* 'Came over the hill as far as the Four Gun Battery and were possessed of that too, which is within 40 paces of the Castle breach which is very easy to enter and that is the last opposition on that side.' Shrimpton to Marlborough. *Add. MSS.* 9115, f. 14.

Pointis was positively ordered, much against his will and judgment, to sail out from Cadiz and attack Gibraltar. But the foul weather again delayed the attack from the sea, and the unhappy French Admiral was beating about in the mouth of Gibraltar Bay, his squadron already scattered by wind and wave, when out of the mist, out of the heart of the gale, burst upon him Leake's squadron, come from Lisbon in despite of wind and weather to save the Rock once again and once for all.

It was not a battle but a chase. Of five French three-deckers surprised at the mouth of the Bay, one struck without a fight, two were boarded and taken, and two were driven ashore and burnt. Those ships that were far enough away to escape past Malaga made straight for Toulon. In this brilliant little action the Dutch, in Leake's opinion, did even better than the English; but the Portuguese, 'those that durst get anything near, did more harm than good. One of them, mistaking the *Pembroke* for the *Lys*, gave her a broadside, but did little damage.'

Mar. $\frac{10}{21}$ 1705

For another month the Spaniards insisted on remaining before Gibraltar, but every hope of success had now disappeared. Ships not only from Portugal but from Italy were now pouring supplies into the town, unchallenged. Louis was impatient to cut his losses, and Tessé was in a hurry to be gone. At length, as April was drawing near its end, the tired English watched the foe drag his cannon from the trenches, and his columns wind away and vanish behind the northern hills already green with spring. Silence and solitude at length settled on the desolate flats of the Isthmus, the Aceldama where so many thousands of French and Spaniards had died since last those hills were green. Five thousand men marched away, in the track of at least an equal number of deserters, who had gone before to avoid death by starvation in the trenches. In the opinion of Tessé, the King of Spain might still, like his ancestors before him, have 'the best infantry in the world, and the most capable of enduring and suffering,' if only he would pay, clothe and feed them!

The Spaniards, as they retired, looked back, embittered

by more than the loss of so many brave comrades. That skyward pointing Rock, symbol of Mediterranean lordship, was in alien hands. So once had the departing Moor looked back and sighed. Life is brief, and Empire only a little longer.[31]

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

The Marines

The marines, who played the principal part in the land-defence of Gibraltar, had only been formed as a special branch of the Service at the beginning of Queen Anne's reign (see *Blenheim*, p. 410, note). It is remarkable how soon they acquired two reputations that clung to them for many generations—a reputation for good, honest, modest service and character, and a reputation among snobs of being socially less smart than the army. In 1708, Chatham's grandfather, old Governor Pitt, of the Pitt Diamond, wrote home from Madras to his son Robert:

> I take notice of the employ you have pitched upon for my son Thomas. I wish you had bought him a very good employ in the English guards, though it had cost three times the money, for, being in Marines will oblige him to live a great deal in sea-ports, where the associations are none of the best. (*H.M.C. Fortescue* (*Dropmore*), 1892, p. 36.)

To this add Steele's delightful account of 'the honest rough relation at the lower end of the table, who is a lieutenant of Marines,' and his 'plain goodsense,' in No. 79 of the *Tatler*, October 11, 1709. The idea of the marines had not changed very much in old England between Anne's reign and Victoria's, when Meredith described the services, qualities and treatment of Crossjay's father in the *Egoist*.

CHAPTER III

The Campaigns of 1705

Marlborough's disappointments on the Moselle and in the Netherlands. Imperialist negligence and Dutch obstruction. Forcing of the Lines of Brabant. Louis's first offer of peace.

So great had been the moral effect of Blenheim that throughout the following year Marlborough was confident that the enemy would give way, whenever assaulted in a position not absolutely impregnable. 'The French will always be forced whenever they are attacked,' he wrote to Heinsius.* Yet owing to Imperialist negligence, Dutch obstruction and personal jealousy, this precious year slipped by unused. The French were given a breathing space in which to recover their morale, and though the events of 1706, the *annus mirabilis* of the war, showed that the breathing space had not been sufficient, such delay might easily have been fatal to the liberties of Europe. Two factors saved the situation, Marlborough's inexhaustible patience that never allowed anger to disturb courtesy or calculation, and the increasing strength of England's will to conquer.

When, early in September 1704, Marlborough crossed the Rhine in pursuit of the armies he had defeated on the Danube,† there were still two months before him ere he need go into winter quarters. The Allies sat down before Landau, which had again fallen into French hands the year before. The siege operations were committed to Prince Lewis of Baden who conducted them with a lethargy that

* September 5, 1705. See Appendix A, below.

† See *Blenheim*, p. 400. *For this chapter see Map IX, The Netherlands, with Moselle inset (end of volume).*

gave the first practical signs of his determination to pay out the English General for having fought the battle of Blenheim without his knowledge. 'The Prince of Baden is now sufficiently revenged for our robbing him of a share of the glory of the victory of Blenheim,' wrote an English officer in November; 'he has spun out the siege till the left wing of horse, to which that action was chiefly owing, is entirely ruined. We have not above twenty horses a troop left.'[32]

Marlborough and Eugene were to cover the siege, but as the French armies, even those that had not been in Bavaria, were much too frightened to attempt anything that autumn, the Duke determined to use the occasion for a cross-country march into the Moselle valley. Eugene was left to protect the slow operations of Prince Lewis until Landau at length surrendered. If Marlborough could arrive on the Moselle by surprise, he could take Trèves and Trarbach and establish bases for his great design of an invasion of France next spring by way of Thionville and Metz. For more than a year past he had thought of the Moselle as the short cut to final victory.* No such lines of fortresses as stood so thick in the Netherlands barred the way up that river into the heart of France. If he took Saarlouis and Thionville he would open what he himself described as 'the true route by which to pass on and reduce them to reason.' If once he reached Metz, military men observed that his mere presence there would compel the French to evacuate Alsace, that he would be in the rear of their position in the Netherlands, and that he could 'raise contributions even to the gates of Paris.'[33] In the autumn of 1704 he set out to prepare the ground with his small raiding force. Next spring he calculated he would have 90,000 English, Dutch and German troops for the great design. And indeed if Vienna and the Hague had not failed to make any reasonable effort to support him, he might very possibly have finished the war in 1705 by the route of the Moselle.

The Duke had been ailing all summer on the Danube and was a victim to ague and headache on the Rhine. Early in October he wrote to Sarah, 'I am so very lean that it is

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 316–317.

extreme uneasy to me,' and, ' your care must nurse me this winter or I shall certainly be in a consumption.' But he never thought of sparing himself or resting on his laurels. His march by cross-country roads from Landau to the Moselle lay through wooded hills which he described as ' mountains,' ' the terriblest country that can be imagined for the march of an army with cannon.' But he was favoured with ' extraordinary good weather,' so that Colonel Blood's engineering skill brought the guns through. Oct. $\frac{13}{24}$ 1704 The French were successfully surprised and made no resistance in Trèves. Trarbach surrendered after a short siege, and the Moselle, from its junction with the Saar downwards, was occupied and fitted up with allied bases for the great enterprise next spring.[34]

Having done his military work for the year, the Duke started off early in November, not yet for home, but on his self-imposed diplomatic mission to Berlin.* If Woodstock Manor was a good year's pay, it had been faithfully earned.

Next spring Marlborough came abroad betimes, eager to win the war by the way of the Moselle. It has been remarked that in every year when he started out with high hopes he was destined to disappointment, and that in those years when he crossed the sea with the worst forebodings he was nobly successful. This curious fact is not to be attributed to mere chance. Success in one campaign made the Dutch and Austrian authorities indifferent for the next, whereas after a little misfortune they were more apt to fall in with Marlborough's plans. When he reached the Hague in April 1705, the States General, who the year before had let him take so large a part of their army to the Danube, refused to send more than a small portion of it to co-operate with him on the Moselle. When in May he reached the scene of operations, he found that the magazines which he had formed at Trèves and which the Dutch had undertaken to fill with stores, were still half empty : the States Commissary had gone over to the French with the money he had embezzled.

At the same time it became apparent that the Austrians and the German Princes of the Rhine had equally failed him.

* See pp. 9–10, above.

Their promised armies were not forthcoming on the Moselle. Prince Eugene was heart and soul for Marlborough's plan, but he was back in Italy, and his influence at Court had waned with the passing of the danger that had made it supreme the year before.

The Jesuits and reactionaries were once more in the ascendant at Vienna, while Lewis of Baden ruled the war plans of the German Princes. The death of the Emperor Leopold threw matters into still greater confusion April 24 / May 5 1705 that summer, though hopes were entertained that the succession of his son, Joseph, a great admirer of the Duke, might improve the prospects of the Alliance another year. For the moment every form of obstruction was supreme. The negotiations with Hungary broke down, and, by an almost incredible piece of obscurantism, the Viennese Chancery began to address Queen Anne in formal documents as ' Serenity ' instead of ' Majesty,' denying the title of lawful queen to the sovereign to whose effectual aid last year the Hapsburgs owed it that they still occupied their throne ! This was too much even for Secretary Harley's furtive caution : he charged Stepney to let the young Emperor know in good set terms what was thought of this piece of bureaucratic impertinence, and of the ' practices ' of the Prince of Baden and the Viennese enemies of England, which had ' obliged the Duke of Marlborough to quit his design on the Moselle.' [35]

Though left with less than half the troops he had hoped to command, Marlborough did not at once abandon the enterprise. But he was not only ill supported but stoutly opposed. Louis XIV, recognizing the serious danger of his country, had applied this year to the right quarter. Villars had been sent to stop the invasion of France by ' Malbrook.' * The Marshal had chosen and prepared a strong position at Sierk, barring the passage up the Moselle to Thionville. The river on one side, ravines and deep forests on another, prevented hostile approach, and on the only weak side Villars had thrown up entrenchments. Marlborough could not attack so strong a post with his inadequate force, but he pushed through the mountain

* On Villars see *Blenheim*, p. 317.

defiles to its foot, and challenged the enemy to come out and give battle. Villars was not to be drawn ; for all his gasconades and cheerful self-laudation he had a perfect grip on reality, and knew when to be prudent and when to be bold. He despised his fellow Marshals, but he did not, like Villeroi, despise Marlborough.

The Duke, unable to force the position at Sierk, hoped to turn it by east and south, and was about to lay siege to Saarlouis, when in the middle of June he received serious news from the Netherlands. Villeroi had made a push, recaptured Huy on the Maas and was besieging Liège. The Dutch called on Marlborough to come back and save them. So he turned sorrowfully away from his 'true route' into France, to 'take the bull by the horns' amid the tangle of Netherland fortresses.[36]

He never saw the Moselle again. His allies had not the heart or the brains to let him win the war where it could be won most quickly. The Dutch would fight on their own border and nowhere else. The idea of a 'united command,' of an allied war-plan, was equally repugnant to the provincialism of Austria and the Princes of the Rhine, busy each with their own little campaigns. Only England, since the General Election had disposed of Marlborough's opponents, was eager to fight wherever he chose. The localism of the Allies set bounds within which he must confine his schemes. When his achievements are compared to those of Frederick or Napoleon, the limitations of his authority as a commander must never be forgotten.*

* Marlborough's own account of the reasons that induced him to abandon the Moselle campaign will be found in the following ill-constructed but coherent sentence, written on June 30, 1705, to the Duke of Shrewsbury. It comes from the Duke of Buccleugh's MSS. in Boughton House : 'By the failure of our friends in all they have promised me on the Moselle I have been oblig'd to march back to the Meuse. I was 15 days together in the Camp of Efft [before Sierk] without being join'd by any troupes but what were in the English and Dutch pay, tho' I was to have been considerably reinforced by the Germans emediatly upon my taking the field, and finding already a scarsety of forage, by the unseasonable cold weather, which had destroy'd all the grase and oates, with no manner of hopes of being suplied in any reasonable time with horses and carriages promis'd for bringing up our great artillery for the sige of Saar Lewis, where if we had been once posted we shou'd have been plentifully suplyed with subsistence out of Lorraine, all these disappointments obliged mee to yield to the pressing instances of the [Dutch] States and their Generals to come to their relief.'

Henceforth the Duke had to devote himself to the direct conquest of the Spanish Netherlands and their fortresses by frontal attack ; he could no longer hope to turn that whole region from the south. Under these conditions the first obstacle to be overcome was the so-called Lines of Brabant. At the beginning of the war the French had erected this barrier, and after Marlborough's first successes in 1702 had fallen back behind it. It ran from the sea to the Maas, from Antwerp to Namur. In some sections of the Line great rivers formed the obstacle, but for the most part it was an earthwork, not unlike Wellington's lines of Torres Vedras, but in length more nearly resembling Offa's Dyke.

The Dutch generals had forbidden him to attack it in 1703.* They were of the same opinion in 1705. But this time he 'perfectly bubbled them into it,' as his Chaplain, Francis Hare, wrote home, 'drawing them into it as you would manage children.' He promised that 'if he saw the Lines strongly guarded he would not opiniatre the matter,' and it was agreed that the Dutch troops were only 'to second and follow him if he succeeded, to help him to make his retreat if he miscarried, but not to share the danger with him.' The French were misled by a demonstration made some miles further south by Overkirk, Marlborough's one friend among the Dutch generals that year. There was therefore only a handful of men guarding the Lines at Elixem. The English marched secretly to that point, passing across William's old Landen battlefield at dead of night. It was nearing dawn when they reached the famous entrenchment, protected by the waters of the Little Geete on its front. The red-coated infantry stormed the bridge at Elixem, made for the earthworks, and 'were over before one thought they were at them,' and so 'with the loss of half a dozen men passed those Lines which was thought would have cost at least as many thousand.'

But the enemy had taken the alarm, and the rising sun shone on the swords of thirty-five squadrons galloping up from the south, with infantry following behind ; they might yet recover the ground, while the bulk of the allied foot was still filing over the bridges and

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* *Blenheim*, p. 316. *See Map IX, Netherlands, below.*

pontoons, and mounting the breaches which the sappers were hastily making in the rampart. The finest part of the Bavarian army that had escaped from Blenheim, the heavy cavalry in their black cuirasses and helmets, were supported by French, Spanish and Walloon horse. The variegated masses of their new uniforms blazed like the fields of tulips in Holland.

The moment was critical, but the English cavalry and dragoons were already well across the Lines, and had deployed in time. The allied cavalry were hastening to support them. With the Duke himself in their midst, Cadogan's horse and the other red-coated squadrons charged straight into the Bavarian ranks. Then was proved what Blenheim had shown already and Waterloo was to show yet again, that cuirassiers in armour could be overcome by the free swing of the sword in the hands of men clad only in broadcloth. After a hot action of two hours, the enemy horse galloped away and the infantry were glad to form hollow square and escape in that order from the cavalry of Britain. Standards, kettle-drums, cannon, and over 3,000 prisoners remained as trophies of the field. Lord John Hay, at the head of his Scots Greys, had taken 'with his own hands' the principal enemy general engaged, the Marquis d'Alègre. Marlborough had been in the mêlée; an enemy officer had struck at him so eagerly that in delivering the blow he lost his balance, fell off his horse and was taken. 'I asked my lord,' wrote Orkney, 'if it was so: he said, "It was absolutely so." See what a happy man he is. I believe this pleases him as much as Hogstet did. It is absolutely owing to him.'

The success indeed had been so great and had been so cheaply won that even the Dutch generals that morning were fain to congratulate the Duke, though they nourished against him a bitter grudge for the poor part they themselves had played. In the streets of Tirlemont the victorious English were cheering 'Corporal John,' and calling aloud to him to lead them in pursuit of the flying foe. It was only ten in the morning, and though they had been marching all night the veterans of William's wars called out to their officers that they knew the country well and that

they could all be in Louvain before dark. The retreating enemy were watching Tirlemont over their shoulders, in terror lest they should see the redcoats emerge from it on to the Louvain road. If the Duke had pushed on that day, he might have reconquered much of the Netherlands at a rush. But for such a venture he must be sure of the full co-operation of the Dutch army. His personal enemy, General Slangenberg, was at his side in Tirlemont, among the excited English regiments shouting to be led forward; he agreed with the Duke that they ought to continue their advance on Louvain, and went back, ostensibly to get the agreement of his Dutch colleagues. But the army of the States was already pitching its tents, and the men were weary after their night march in rear of the English. What precisely passed between Marlborough and the Dutch generals is uncertain; but the golden moment to advance was not seized. Whether the Duke's decision to halt was right or, as many of his friends thought, wrong, in either case the motive was his belief that he could not sufficiently depend on the active support of his allies.[37]

So the enemy were permitted to rally behind the Dyle at Louvain, and to save Brussels and Flanders for another year. But their famous Lines of Brabant were abandoned for good; in September, fatigue parties from Marlborough's regiments levelled such long stretches that nothing more was heard of the Lines in the strategy of the war. The Spanish Netherlands must henceforth be defended, not by a continuous outer line of rivers and earthworks, but by the strength of its fortresses and by the skill with which the defending army could manœuvre among them so as to baffle Marlborough's endeavours to bring it to an action. In their endeavours to avoid a battle the French had powerful allies in the Dutch generals and the civilian Deputies, through whom they spoke the word of doom to one project after another which the Duke laid before them. A full catalogue of their refusals in the next few weeks would weary the reader. Matters came to a head when a final opportunity to defeat the enemy at Overyssche, which the Duke's skill had brought about, was as usual prohibited by the Dutch generals

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and Deputies. Overkirk alone besought his colleagues to permit the attack. 'That beast Slangenberg,' as the Reverend Francis Hare called him, 'was very noisy,' and roundly abused the Commander-in-Chief to his face. It was not cowardice, but jealousy, that moved the Dutchman, who had two years before shown himself a brave soldier at the battle of Ekeren.

After the open scandal of this scene, the Duke saw that he could accomplish nothing with such men. 'As it is ordered by Monsieur Slangenberg,' he wrote to Portland, 'I have not the tenth part of the authority I had last year.' With his usual calculating forethought, he adopted a policy which sacrificed any further hopes for that campaign, in order to secure a free hand in the following year. With apparent humility the greatest soldier of the age begged that his Dutch subordinates would themselves frame the plans for the use of the allied army, which he, for his part, undertook to carry out.

I have so good an opinion of this army [he wrote to Heinsius on August 27], that I think they are able to execute whatever their generals will resolve; besides we have yet two months before we ought to think of winter quarters. I beg you will believe and assure others that I will with all cheerfulness endeavour to make everything succeed that shall be proposed to me.

And a week later he writes from Tirlemont:

The resolution I have taken of being governed by your generals the remaining part of this campaign gives me a great deal of quiet, so that I am drinking the Spa waters.*

The veiled irony of this courteous strike by the Commander-in-Chief was not lost on the world, and least of all on the Dutch Government and people. It was supported by representations from Queen Anne to the Pensionary that 'we cannot but impute the disappointments that have lately happened to their placing less confidence in the Duke of Marlborough this year than last.' The indignation of all England was shared by more than half Holland. The Duke of Shrewsbury, on his way back from his long

* See Appendix A, p. 409, below.

residence in Italy with his new Duchess,* halted in Amsterdam and noted the temper of the people.

The Duke of Marlborough [he wrote in December 1705] is beloved by the people of that city; besides his success and personal merit, they think, as being a stranger so well established elsewhere, he cannot be dangerous to their liberty. He may do them good, but can do them no hurt. They are so enraged against Slangenberg for his being his enemy, as well as a Jesuited Papist, that had he come to Amsterdam this summer, after he hindered the battle, he would have been de Witted.

The conduct of the Dutch generals was approved only by that party among their countrymen who were for patching up a peace with France without first recovering the Spanish Netherlands. And so, in the winter of 1705–6, Marlborough won his cause at the Hague. The States, pressed by Heinsius from above and by the people from below, agreed that Slangenberg should not be sent into the field next year, and that Deputies and generals should be chosen who were friends to Marlborough, and should be given instructions to agree to all that he might propose.[38]

Hardly less hopeful for the prospects of 1706 was the effect produced by the allied failure on the light mind of the French Marshal, and the stupidity of his chief, the Minister for War. In September Chamillart from Versailles wrote to Villeroi in the field:

I have a mediocre opinion of the capacity of the Duke of Marlborough.

Blenheim he attributed 'to chance alone.' Villeroi replied in the same tone that the English general was 'a mortified adventurer.' The idea was taking possession of the French official mind that Blenheim might be avenged by a battle in the Netherlands. Among the military authorities on both sides a new mentality was growing up, which led speedily to Ramillies when the new campaign opened.[39]

Louis was not, however, so confident of military victory that he could any longer despise those diplomatic arts of which, in his wiser moments, he was so great a master.

* *Blenheim*, p. 202.

His hot fit of pride, which had plunged Europe into war, had been cooled in the waters of the Danube. Before the war began he had been so confident of victory that he had planned to divide the Spanish Netherlands between France and the vassal House of Wittelsbach.* But in the autumn of 1705 he made tentative peace proposals to Holland, adumbrating the erection of the Spanish Netherlands into an independent state,—though how its true independence should be guaranteed was left dangerously vague. The Austrian candidate was in no case to be sovereign either of the Netherlands or of Milan : Louis suggested that Charles might receive Naples and Sicily in compensation for the loss of the rest of the Spanish Empire. But since Austria had no fleet, Southern Italy held on such terms would be merely a pawn in the hands of the House of Bourbon for the good behaviour of the House of Hapsburg. So long as the armies of France and her allies remained in the Milanese, they could seize Southern Italy whenever they wished, and no Austrian troops could get there at all without the war-like intervention of the Maritime Powers. Savoy-Piedmont would similarly become a vassal of France, surrounded on both sides by her power.

Louis' proposals were therefore quite unacceptable, but there was some alarm felt lest the peace-party in Holland would seek to detach their country from the Alliance as a result of this offer. Actually Buys, who represented a reasonable and loyal party more inclined to peace than Heinsius, considered that, if Louis would also give up the Milanese, the terms proposed were not so bad. But it was only the military events of 1706 that made any such an arrangement possible.

England, unlike either Holland or France, was in a mood of growing confidence, her finances stable, her population contented, and her will to conquer confirmed at the recent General Election. Therefore, in August 1705, Marlborough and Godolphin implored Heinsius not to listen to the French proposals. These were the weeks of the Duke's most aggravated trouble with the Dutch generals, but even then he was confident of ultimate victory. He

* *Blenheim*, p. 137.

and Godolphin laid down to Heinsius not only the doctrine that Holland must have a strong barrier in the Netherlands, on which point the Dutch statesman was well agreed, but also that Milan must go to the Austrian candidate. So much had been in William III's plan for the new Europe as expressed in the Treaty of Grand Alliance of 1701, and it was ultimately realized at Utrecht. But the two English statesmen went further: already in 1705, before the reconquest of the Netherlands and Italy, they pledged themselves to the dogma of 'no peace without Spain.' On August 18 Godolphin wrote to Marlborough about Louis' offer :

> If England had lost a battle at sea and another at land, I think they would still despise such a peace, and I believe you may depend upon it they will never consent to any peace that leaves Spain and the Indies or either in the hands of the Duke of Anjou.

Marlborough sent this on to Heinsius. His own comment was :

> You know as well as I do that England can like no peace, but such as puts King Charles in the possession of the Monarchy of Spain ; and as for yourselves, I think you ought to have garrisons in Antwerp, Namur and Luxemburg, besides I think the Duke of Savoy should be our particular care.

At the moment that Marlborough wrote thus, 'King Charles' and his allies occupied neither Milan, Naples, Sicily, the Netherlands, nor any foot of land in 'Spain and the Indies' except Gibraltar. It was a month later that Barcelona was added to his actual possessions.

In these letters of Marlborough and Godolphin we recognize their admirable determination to win the war, which next year at Ramillies and Turin put France in its proper place for the Eighteenth Century ; but we see also their concentration of purpose on an impossible object, which William had never contemplated. No word is said in Marlborough's letters about the Grand Alliance Treaty of 1701 and the moderate programme that the Stadtholder-King had there laid down. The Portuguese Treaty of 1703 had taken its place in determining the new war-aims of

England : Spain herself and her undivided Empire must be won for the Austrian candidate.*

Marlborough was not one to name impossible terms and then do nothing to secure them. In the winter of 1705 he made an even longer tour of Germany than the year before, laying the plans that won Italy for the Allies in the following year. First, on a visit to Dusseldorf, he persuaded the Elector Palatine to send his troops to Italy. Thence in a 'very tedious journey,' including six days' sail on the Danube to avoid the winter roads, he reached Vienna in the middle of November. The young Emperor Joseph was on ill terms with Prussia and Holland, but he worshipped Marlborough, and affairs were adjusted for the coming campaign. Thence the pacificator of the Allies travelled north to Berlin and there completed the work, and with it the arrangements for the effective relief of the Duke of Savoy.[40]

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 302–303, on the Portuguese Treaty, 1703; see Appendix A, p. 407, below; *Coxe*, chap. xxxviii, I, pp. 453–456; *Geyl*, pp. 8–10, on Dutch views of the offer; *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 364–374, on a later and more formal stage of these offers of Louis, made through the Marquis d'Alègre in Holland during the winter months of 1705–6. The Marquis was to offer Marlborough 'two million' for a peace on these terms; but the Duke was less venal than Louis and others supposed.

In January 1706 James Vernon, our envoy at Copenhagen, reported to Harley a dinner-table conversation indicating how much some of England's friends and allies would be averse to the undue aggrandisement of the House of Austria: 'The Envoy of Sweden had invited to dine with him the Imperial, Dutch and Prussian Ministers and myself. After dinner one of the company said that the affairs of Spain looked towards a general revolution [by that time Peterborough had taken Barcelona]. The saying of that provoked the Swede to such an excess of passion as would have surprised me to see in Poussin himself [the French Envoy]. He told us the Princes of Europe would never suffer that monarchy entire in the House of Austria; that there would be a stop put to that career; that he could not imagine what England and Holland meant to drive things so far and not be satisfied with a Treaty of Partition. . . . The Prussian Envoy was by all this while and contradicted none of his allegations. The rest of the company stared at the furiousness of the orator.' *H.M.C. Portland*, IX, p. 220

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

A Jacobite Nobleman visits Marlborough

Some readers may be interested in the following picture of Marlborough in private life, near the close of the campaign of 1705. It is written by his old friend Thomas Bruce, Earl of Ailesbury, a Jacobite living abroad in Belgium, with friends in both armies, though mainly on the French side. Marlborough made court to him, partly for old friendship's sake, partly, one suspects, so as to have friends among the more moderate of the Jacobite nobility. Ailesbury crosses into the allied lines to see Marlborough by special invitation.

Towards the middle of September (1705) Count Oxenstierra, my great friend and correspondent, wrote to me desiring I would come to Tirlemont, for that I had sufficiently mortified my Lord Marlborough for going from his promise (the year before) given to my wife. I went in one day in my post chaise with my own coach horses, and passing over the plain of Landen I awakened by the horrible stench of dead horses on both sides, the road passing through the Dutch line. . . . All the dead horses are to rot above ground, and the sickness was much amongst the horse in the camp of the Allies, as well as in the French.

Count Oxenstierra was quartered in a convent of Nuns and my Lord Marlborough just without the gates. My host invited several of our nation to sup with me. The next morning he carried me to my Lord's, who was in business, and the Generals in Chief and of the auxiliary troops were also attending, but he sent for us two into his chamber, and it being post day that morning, he desired Count Oxenstierra to amuse me as well as possible until dinner time, and at his little table, a great word with him, he seldom having a great one save Sundays. He embraced me much and made me many protestations. At dinner, sitting by me, he would continually take me by the hand, but politickly (at which he was great master) putting his hand under the napkin.

That night My Lord Orkney gave me a vast supper, and of consequence much company of all those he knew that had a regard for me. He had the hautboys of the regiment of footguards, and . . . a great number of books with the best airs, and all sorts of instruments, and of all countries, fit for hautboys, and the symphony was admirable. And who should come in but my Lord Marlborough, with this expression (for he was not invited, as not supping): 'My Lord Orkney, do not take it ill if I say I come here for the sake of this Lord,' pointing to me. He was perfectly merry, and for him ate much and drank heartily, and we all found the effects of the excellent wine and I never saw more mirth. The next day he asked me where I dined. I told him where he was to dine—at Count Oxenstierra's. 'I shall not be so happy,' said he, 'for I am condemned to dine with base company, and shall have as base dinner.' The three States Deputies of the Army had invited

him, and that year they were three sad fellows and great pedants, and continually thwarting him.

The next day we were all invited to My Lord Albemarle's at Landen. That morning Marechal Overkirk posted his troops and auxiliaries, the left line of the Army, in review, and my Lord Marlborough promised to come, but we going to see him in the morning he entertained us and the company so long that I put him in mind of going. He whispered in the ear that it was very indifferent to him. At last he went in his chaise for one person and one horse ; and in getting up he set foot on ground again, and told me he had forgot to shew me the plan of his house and gardens at Woodstock [Blenheim], and so went up again, and in pointing out the apartments for him and lady, etc., laid his finger on one and told me '*that* is for you when you come and see me there,' and yet it was he that out of policy and by a timorous temper, that kept me on this side [viz. in exile], together with my Lord Godolphin, and yet both in their hearts wished me most well. I asked him who was his Architect (although I knew the man that was). He answered ' Sir Jo. Van Brugg.' On which I smiled and said : ' I suppose, my Lord, you made choice of him because he is a professed Whig.' I found he did not relish this, but he was too great a courtier for to seem angry. It was at my tongue's end for to add that he ought as well to have made Sir Christopher Wren, the Architect, Poet Laureate. In fine, I understand but little or nothing of this matter but enough to affirm (by the plan I saw) that the house is like one mass of stone, without taste or relish.

Memoirs of Thomas, Earl of Ailesbury (Roxburghe Club, 1890), vol. II, pp. 584–587.

Marlborough kept high state on his campaigns. At Althorp are to be seen the great ' pilgrim bottles ' of silver, for carrying wine on pack animals, and the vast silver wine cooler, all beautifully engraved with his arms and the Imperial eagle of his German Princedom. These travelled with him, as also did a large screen, also at Althorp, of Chinese work but with figures in European clothes of the period, given him by the grateful Emperor after Blenheim. These details of his campaigning outfit recall Drake served on silver plate in the cabin of his ship, rather than the Spartan simplicity of Frederick the Great and Charles XII.

CHAPTER IV

Peterborough takes Barcelona

Already in August 1705 Marlborough and Godolphin had laid it down to Heinsius that there could be ' no peace without Spain.' They were soon to be strengthened in this resolve by the news that Peterborough had taken Barcelona ; that the eastern seaboard of the Peninsula was rapidly falling into the hands of the Allies ; and that next year a twofold advance could be made on Madrid from Portugal on one side and Catalonia or Valencia on the other.*

It is in keeping with the fantastic character of Peterborough's career that his one great achievement as a soldier probably did more harm than good to his country and to the world. Had he failed in the attempt on Barcelona, the Allies must have abandoned all serious intention of placing ' Charles III ' on the throne ; in that case the men and money that England so long continued to lavish in Spain could have been profitably used elsewhere, in Flanders, Toulon or Canada ; or else peace might have been arranged years earlier on terms at least as good as those of Utrecht.

Before Peterborough's feat changed the situation, the prospects that ' Charles III ' would ever be crowned in Madrid seemed small indeed. The capture and successful defence of Gibraltar, valuable as it proved to England's future in the Mediterranean, served little to promote the military and political conquest of Spain, and only made the inhabitants of Andalusia more than ever loyal to King Philip in their anger against the occupation of the Rock by the heretics.

* *For this chapter see Map X (Europe) at end of book, and map of Barcelona, p. 69, below.*

On the Portuguese border, the campaign of 1705 brought small success to the allied cause. The Huguenot, Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, had taken up the command on that front,* but though a competent and gallant soldier, he could make nothing of the situation. The English complained that the Portuguese were 'utter strangers to all warlike preparation' and were still 'wavering in their resolutions.' The money promised by the Maritime Powers to maintain the Portuguese regiments was duly forthcoming, but since it was not administered by English or Dutch hands, 'the army is never paid nor can be depended on, but all the money is lost and swallowed up among the Hidalgos and officers.' Our Envoy, John Methuen, was blamed by the subordinates in his office because he did not expostulate more strongly with King Peter. Methuen himself, in writing home, admitted the badness of the Portuguese army, particularly of its officers, but spoke of its 'noble train of artillery.' Much of the army existed only on paper, and the remainder was of little use. The Portuguese regiments had not, as in Wellington's day, the advantage of English officers. Galway took the field early in April 1705 with 12,000 of these doubtful allies, and 5,000 Dutch and English. But he could accomplish nothing beyond the capture of a few small towns on the Spanish frontier before the heats of June set in, when the Portuguese 'thought it high time to be at home'; flocks of deserters set the example and the whole army had shortly to follow.†

But, just when Galway was returning disconsolate to Lisbon, the English fleet came sailing into the harbour, bringing large reinforcements from home, under the command of Charles Mordaunt, third Earl of Peterborough. They were not, however, to land in Portugal: their instructions were to go on to Italy and relieve the Duke of Savoy, or failing that to take Cadiz or Barcelona.‡

June $\frac{9}{20}$ 1705

To modern naval and military historians the selection of

* See *Blenheim*, p. 404.

† See note [41], below. In the autumn, after the heats were over, Galway took the field, but failed to capture Badajos, where he lost an arm in the trenches.

‡ They had two sets of instructions, see *H. of L. MSS.* (1706–1708), pp. 361–364.

Peterborough for the command of the expedition has seemed strange. Why, they ask, did Marlborough, the sage professional soldier, with his reticence, patience and forethought, choose for the execution of his own favourite plans of amphibious warfare in the Mediterranean a man of slight experience or training in the profession of arms either by sea or land, a man well known to be everything that Marlborough himself was not—quarrelsome, boastful, light-minded, over-busy with tongue and pen, changing his plans and his friends as readily as he shifted his shirt, sudden in resolutions but unable to hold a course, ever shooting out his lively imagination to the other end of Europe and itching to follow in person, leaving the tasks of yesterday half done? A generous patron of poets and a witty and charming talker, Peterborough was loved by men of letters, to whom his reputation with posterity has owed much: but Swift could not forbear writing of his friend that he was 'the ramblingest, lying rogue on earth.' Why did Marlborough, of all men, choose such an one as commander-in-chief of the land and sea forces of the expedition? *

We have no record of the reasons that induced the government to select Peterborough. But something perhaps may be divined. Although in the course of political intrigue he had once attempted to do Marlborough a base injury, he was now on good terms with the Duke, and in familiar correspondence with Sarah, to whom he was paying political courtship with some success. What was known of him was by no means wholly to his disadvantage. He had played so spirited a part in the preparation and conduct of the great adventure to Torbay, that William for a while had thought highly of him, and, if he had had any steadiness or sense to balance his active qualities, he would have been one of the real rulers of England during the King's reign. But his irresponsible gambols in political life soon lost him the confidence of William, of his Whig party colleagues and of the country as a whole.

* His commission made him sole commander of the military forces of the expedition; and admiral and commander-in-chief of the fleet, jointly with Sir Cloudesley Shovell. Rooke was not again employed, because the High Tories had set him up as rival to Marlborough. See *Blenheim*, p. 420.

Quiet men such as Marlborough often admire those sons of Mercury who are most unlike themselves. He had the generosity to acknowledge the genius that underlay all Peterborough's nonsense. It is true that in the course of a year this strange Commander-in-Chief exhausted even Marlborough's patience, chiefly by his endless letters of complaint about everything, and abuse of everyone, till in September 1706 the Duke wrote to Godolphin 'It is a misfortune to have to do with so ill a man.'[42]

But, after all, he took Barcelona. No one else whom Marlborough could have chosen would have taken it under the circumstances : not Galway, not Stanhope—not Ormonde certainly ; Ormonde, moreover, was no longer available for service abroad, being Lord Lieutenant in Dublin. Yet the choice was limited to the not very long list of British grandees. For the object was to find, not merely a general to command a few regiments, but a grand seigneur who would supervise the naval, military and diplomatic course of the armament in the Mediterranean, and represent England in the counsels of the Allies. For such a part a great nobleman was required, according to the ideals of an age when war was less professional and more aristocratic than it has since become. Whatever his reasons, Marlborough chose Peterborough for the post, and the consequences were what they were to all the parties concerned.*

The armament commanded by Peterborough and Sir Cloudesley Shovell, having put in to Lisbon in the middle of June, was joined there by a Dutch fleet. It was further increased by two regiments of English dragoons supplied by Galway, ever generous to lend his troops to others where the service would benefit. 'Charles III' and his German courtiers also came on board, and the allied fleet, thus royally loaded, set sail for the Mediterranean. At Gibraltar the recruits fresh from England and Ireland were exchanged

* At the beginning of Anne's reign, Peterborough was a Whig and Marlborough a Tory. Yet, in the later years of the reign, Tory propaganda for party purposes exaggerated the genius of Peterborough and the faults of Marlborough in a manner that affected national opinion for two hundred years, and found its echo in the writings of Macaulay.

for the veterans of the garrison, who sailed on, to add the laurels of Barcelona to those of the defence of the Rock. The hero of that defence, Prince George of Hesse, himself joined the expedition.

The Prince of Hesse Darmstadt had great influence in Catalonia, which he had governed successfully under the late King of Spain. But he felt no enthusiasm for an attack on Barcelona. He knew, indeed, that the Catalans hated the Spaniards and French, but he knew their ways too well to believe the tales of an army of 12,000 men already in the field. Moreover, he well remembered the strength of Barcelona, which in 1697 he had himself held for nearly two months, against a French army of 26,000 men commanded by Vendôme. But the stories of the Catalan rising had fired the imagination of the English home government, and had made the gallant young 'Charles III' as anxious to put himself at its head as ever was Prince Charles Edward to appear among his loyal Highlanders. In vain Hesse advised a landing in Valencia, where horses abounded, and whence an immediate advance should be made on Madrid. The enemy forces, he pointed out, were concentrated in Catalonia and on the Portuguese frontier, so that the path from Valencia to Madrid lay open. Peterborough sometimes favoured this bold project, at other times was all for the voyage to Italy to save the Duke of Savoy. In any case, he had ceased to wish to go to Barcelona.* But the royal wishes of 'King Charles' probably carried more weight at a Council of War than those either of Hesse or of the Commander-in-Chief, particularly since Charles never varied in his desire for the Catalonian adventure, and Peterborough's plans changed from week to week. All were agreed that it was useless to attack Cadiz. A series of Councils of War resulted in the decision to attack Barcelona.[43]

Though Barcelona would have ranked as a fortress of the third class in the Netherlands, its defences were stronger and in better condition than those of any other city in Spain. The garrison, under a zealous Governor, Count Francisco de Velasco, consisted chiefly of Spanish troops, ill fitted for

* Peterborough favoured the Catalonian project for a few days in July (see his letter in *Künzel*, pp. 576–577) ; but, as usual, he very soon changed his mind.

field operations, but certain to fight with stubborn courage in defending the walls of a town. The Allies had no regular siege train, but the guns of the fleet could be landed and could blow a breach, provided an approach could be made. But on the north-east side, where alone it was possible for the assailants to disembark without opposition, marshes spread over land now covered by modern suburbs. The general officers of the Allies, after the first survey, declared that batteries could not be erected on such ground.*

On the opposite side of Barcelona the ground was firm and the defences of the town were less complete, but that side was protected by the Citadel, the famous fortress at Monjuic, crowning a steep hill that rose 575 feet straight out of the sea. The only weakness in its situation as a citadel was that it stood to the town as an Italian campanile stands to its church, a little apart, so that communications might be cut by surprise. But for three weeks after the day when the allied armament arrived in Barcelona roads, no one proposed to attack Monjuic.

Fifteen battalions of foot were at once landed on the north-east of the town, followed by dragoons and cavalry. But there were as yet no cannon and no plans for a siege. King ' Charles III ' came ashore, greeted by the shouts of nobles, priests and peasants from the neighbouring villages ; and it was known that the population held down by the garrison in the city was heartily on the same side. Hatred of the Spaniards, who encroached on their provincial rights, had been the heritage of the Catalans from of old, and hatred of the French had received fresh fuel during their occupation of Barcelona in the last war. None the less did consternation prevail among the allied soldiers when they found that the Catalans had nothing requisite for waging war, except enthusiasm and a few old

Aug. $\frac{11}{22}$ 1705

* ' The workes which we must attack are in very good condition, but the ground through which our attack must be carried is for the most part a bogg.' *P.R.O.*, *S.P.*, 94, 75, Council of War of August $\frac{19}{27}$. It is true the French in 1697, not being able to take Monjuic, had taken Barcelona by attacking the San Pedro and New Bastions on that side, but they had 26,000 men, a proper siege train and engineers, they approached by land, not from the sea, and in any case it cost them 10,000 men to take the place.

muskets. The ' army of 12,000 ' had vanished through the gate of dreams, after the manner of tales told by exiles. Some companies of ' Miquelets,' as the patriot banditti were called, consented to take their allies' pay so long as it lasted, but refused to submit to their allies' discipline.

MAP III



The next three weeks were occupied by a series of Councils of War, held by the quarrelsome chiefs of the expedition, while the army that had been somewhat hastily set ashore did nothing in particular, except prepare to re-embark. The General Officers at the council-board were unanimous against attempting the siege, and called for an immediate departure, preferably for Italy. Peterborough

sometimes supported his officers' views with warmth, but not always, for he was incapable of a fixed resolution. The naval captains, bitterly incensed against his association with Shovell in command of the fleet, supported their Admiral against him, and declared they would gladly lend guns and gunners to begin the siege.

But if there was sullen heat between army and navy, there was fire and fury between the German courtiers and the English soldiers. 'Charles III' was determined not to desert the Catalans, and was in terror lest the whole force should be diverted to Italy, with fatal results to his own chances of a throne. His civilian courtiers joined in the feud against Peterborough; in particular the odious Prince of Lichtenstein 'gave himself most horrible ayrs' at these 'ugly debates.' On one occasion he 'threw a stool at my Lord Peterborough's secretary's head.'

After a number of plans, too wearisomely many to record, had been adopted and rescinded by successive Councils of War, it was finally determined, on Peterborough's proposition, 'with great reluctance to march to Tortosa and Tarragona, for it was now too late to think of going to Valencia,' or, for the matter of that, to Italy. A worse decision could scarcely have been reached. The Catalans of the neighbourhood had been incited to rebellion by the landing and were now to be deserted to the Spanish vengeance, without a shot fired against Barcelona. The other rival projects of an advance on Madrid by Valencia, or the rescue of the Duke of Savoy, hopeful at one time, had been ruined by delay. The decision to march against two minor cities of Catalonia was, as everyone knew, merely intended to save the face of the commanders who had been unable to agree on any profitable course.[44]

Aug. 31 / Sept. 11 1705

Suddenly, Peterborough became conscious of these unpleasant truths. The fault was, in part at least, his own. He had gone very far in opposition to an attack on Barcelona. He had even caused Colonel Richards to write to Hesse, warning him that the troops would mutiny if an attack were ordered contrary to the known opinion of their Generals and the decision of the Council of War.[45] Yet he now realized

that the hazard must be run: that secrecy and promptitude must take the place of Councils of War; and, best of all, he saw the one way in which Barcelona might even yet be attacked with some chance of success.

Deserters had given the English General information 'of the ill state and condition of Monjuic.' Since only the other side of the town had so far been threatened, the Spaniards had ceased to take thought for their citadel. A long and difficult march would have to be made from the allied camp in order to reach it, but if the march were conducted at night the surprise would be all the more complete just because so arduous a manœuvre would seem to the enemy impossible. Peterborough made up his mind. If his resolutions soon sank into their own ashes, they burned fiercely while they were alight. He could carry through nothing that required a month's plan ahead, but an enterprise conceived and executed in forty-eight hours had an excellent chance in his hands.

His confidant at the moment was Colonel John Richards, a Roman Catholic officer of artillery, who, being unable to hold an English commission, had seen service under Venice and Poland, and was at present serving the Portuguese in order the better to help his native countrymen. His heart was entirely English, and his professional abilities were supported by a calm and excellent judgment, and by a thorough knowledge of the language and character of the Spaniards. He could see all round his chief, whom he declared to be 'so very inconstant as not to remain two days in the same sentiments.' His unprejudiced evidence, based on a first-hand knowledge of the facts quite unequalled by that of any other witness, solves the controversies, and disposes of the rival legends, which have so long obscured the events of the capture of Monjuic.*

Early on Saturday, September 12, Peterborough and Hesse met, and agreed on the details of the retreat to Tarragona. But in the course of the next twenty-four hours Peterborough had changed his mind and came to the resolution to attack Monjuic, apparently on no other prompting but that of the information of deserters. He disclosed his

* See Appendix at end of this chapter, p. 79.

intention to Richards and sent him to Hesse to ask for another conference. The meeting took place. No one was present except Peterborough, Hesse and Richards. The German and English generals agreed to sink their recent feuds and to co-operate in a surprise attack on the Citadel. No fourth person, not even the King, was to know whither the expedition was bound, until it was on the point of departure.

Sunday, Sept. $\frac{2}{13}$ 1705

At six on Sunday evening, a thousand picked infantry, of whom eight hundred were English, started off under Peterborough and Hesse, as though they were marching to Tarragona in accordance with the still unrescinded decision of the Council of War. At the last moment, 'King Charles' was informed of the real destination, and sent a note after Hesse to wish him God-speed. A great circuit had to be taken by way of Sarriá. The night march was wearisome, through a dozen miles of difficult country. The guides made mistakes. Time was lost. And the sun was on the point of rising out of the sea as the tired vanguard dragged itself up the steep slopes by which Monjuic Fort can be approached from the side of the land. The surprise was not complete. The 500 Neapolitan infantry who were defending the place saw the English coming and opened fire, but there was not time to send reinforcements from the town before the British grenadiers flung themselves into the 'covered way,' as the broad open ditch of the fort was technically called. Here, a great part of the garrison were encamped in their tents. They were 'unnested from thence,' and driven up the scarp and across the unfinished outer works of the Citadel, to take refuge in its 'Dungeon,' a 'little square fort of four bastions,' which they held against the first assault of the grenadiers. A good day's work had already been accomplished while the disc of the sun was still on the waves, and while Peterborough and Hesse were still some distance behind with the belated supports.

Monday, Sept. $\frac{3}{14}$ 1705

Arrived at last on the spot, the two chiefs divided their tasks. Peterborough rode down the hill again to find and bring up the reserve under James Stanhope. Hesse marched with a detachment to the left to cut off communication with the town, whence reinforcements were momently expected. He made the mistake of passing close to the Dungeon by a route where he and his men were exposed unprotected to the Neapolitan fire. A musket-ball hit him in the right thigh, and he bled to death in less than half an hour. So perished the defender of Gibraltar, the wisest head among the allied chiefs in Spain.

The moment of crisis had come. Peterborough was away at the bottom of the hill, trying to find the strayed supports. Less than half the thousand, who had marched from camp the evening before, were now in the outer works of Monjuic. They were unnerved by Hesse's fall; they saw nothing either of Peterborough or of the reserves; they expected each minute to be cut off by a sortie from the town; they had had nothing to drink all night and the heat of morning was already becoming intense; they were deceived by a ruse of the enemy in the Dungeon, who pretended to fraternize and then shot them down. Panic seized the veterans of Gibraltar. 'The officers with their swords in their breasts could not stop them,' and they fled, 'in a greater consternation than ever I saw Englishmen,' as Richards bears witness. The Neapolitans emerged from the Dungeon and reoccupied the outer works.

But the fugitives had not reached the foot of the hill before they were met by Peterborough. He was no professional soldier, but he had in him the quick temper for such an emergency. Falling 'into the horriblest passion that ever man was seen in,' he cowed the panic and led the runaways back up the slopes to recover the works they had just abandoned. Richards at the moment feared the rashness of the act, for the enemy were seen to be coming out in force from Barcelona, and the English were a mere handful. But onward and upward went the fiery little lord, 'a skeleton in outward figure,' without knowledge of war, without fear of death, and no man was so base as not to follow him. The Spaniards coming up from the town, hearing that Hesse and Peterborough were both on the spot, assumed that the Commander-in-Chief would not have come without the main body of his troops, and too prudently turned back upon their traces. The English stormed the outworks of

Monjuic for the second time that day and the Dungeon was once more closely besieged, though by a force so tiny and so far isolated from the rest of the army that a determined attack from the city must have sealed its doom. But Velasco, though he had obstinacy, had no enterprise, and permitted the Catalan 'Miquelets,' when they arrived on the scene, to seize a small fort between the Citadel and the town and so further interrupt communications.

When heavy firing had been heard at dawn coming from the slopes of Monjuic, the allied fleet and army had been as much surprised and puzzled by the sound as were the garrison and inhabitants of Barcelona. Wonder, excitement and suspense continued until Richards arrived in camp, having galloped back with a request from Peterborough to the Admirals that they would land ammunition and cannon, to bombard the Dungeon and so complete the capture of the Citadel. Guns were sent ashore, and a few days later a lucky shot from a mortar plumped into the magazine ; the explosion that followed killed the Neapolitan Commandant and his principal officers as they sat at dinner, and blew away one of the bastions of the Dungeon. A prompt surrender followed. Monjuic had fallen.

Sept. $\frac{6}{17}$ 1705

All now was eagerness and activity among the Allies, ashore and afloat. Quarrels between nations, services and persons were laid aside. Councils of War were no longer held. The bulk of the army remained on the north-east side of the town, but the siege batteries were erected at the foot of the Monjuic hill, to breach the curtain of the town wall between St. Paul's demi-lune and the Saint Anthony bastion. No regular approach trenches were made and the siege was conducted by the handy-men of the ships' crews in a manner that would have shocked Vauban or Cohorn ; but it sufficed to overcome the inert resistance of Velasco. The breaching cannon all came from the decks of the men-of-war, and, in the absence of carriages and horses, were dragged and lowered into position over the steep and broken ground by parties of shouting sailors, in high good humour at their trip ashore. Richards and Major du Terne, the most expert artillerymen in the army, directed the jolly tars in their

somewhat primitive siege operations. They had 'no authority to command or money to pay' the service of the Catalan peasants, whose presence only made confusion worse confounded, but by the help of the sailors they got 'fifty-eight great guns into battery.' And though 'our master-gunner, Silver,' was blown to pieces by the enemy fire from the town, an effective breach was made.

Meanwhile, tidings came in that every city in Catalonia, except Rosas on the French frontier, had declared for 'King Charles.' The news of the capture of Monjuic had been the signal for the rising of the Province.

To avoid a storm and sack, a capitulation was signed. On the morning of October 14, Velasco and his garrison were to march down, under treaty, to the quayside and be transported by English ships to Rosas. But as the Allies were waiting for them to appear, a frightful uproar broke out inside the town. The tocsin clashed in the steeples of Barcelona, while its fiery citizens, long held in check by the severe measures of the Governor, rose on the garrison as it filed through the streets, drove it into one of the bastions, and was on the point of killing Velasco and every Spanish soldier and sympathiser within the walls.

Oct. $\frac{3}{14}$, 1705

The English army made haste to enter. By the admission of 'King Charles' in his letter to Queen Anne, they and their General behaved admirably, refusing every temptation to plunder, and saving the lives of Velasco and his men at great risk to their own. James Stanhope, who had already seen much service for so young a man, told Burnet that he had never been in a hotter place than the streets of Barcelona that morning, 'from the shooting and fire that was flying about in that disorder.' Peterborough, as he rode up the street, met the beautiful Duchess of Popoli, flying with dishevelled hair from her pursuers ; dismounting from his horse, he led her out of the town by the hand, the bullets of the Catalans flying round him, and one passing through his wig. According to Carleton, it was more than an hour before he returned from placing her in safety ; if this were true, more credit would be due to his officers and men than to himself for averting a general

massacre. But, like much else reported by Carleton, it is highly doubtful. On the better evidence of Richards' diary we know that the Duke and Duchess of Popoli were accommodated together in Peterborough's quarters.[46]

The moment Barcelona had fallen, the quarrels of the allied chiefs broke out with fresh vigour. Hesse, the man who best envisaged the need for good understanding between Germans and English in Spain, had been removed for ever from their counsels. Poverty exacerbated ill temper. The English Government had sent out the expedition short of money to pay the troops, and now the expenses of a successful revolution were superadded. Peterborough had exhausted his private credit, never large, for in peace or war he was always in debt. The 'King and Court without a farthing' looked to England to pay everything, and were furious when cash was not forthcoming. 'Never,' wrote Peterborough in November, 'never was prince accompanied by such wretches for ministers. They have neither money, sense nor honour.' And again, 'We are at a full stop for want of money; a sum proportionable to such a design would in two months secure Valentia and Aragon, or carry us to Madrid.' *

Even without the money Valencia and Aragon were secured. The fall of Barcelona set all eastern Spain aflame with civil war, and the Carlists, as the partisans of 'Carlos III' may be called, acted with greater energy than their opponents, under the stimulus of the success in Catalonia. The revolution spread from one town to another along the eastern seaboard. Peterborough was not likely to be behindhand and took a prominent part in the partisan warfare of surprise marches, bluffs, ruses and revolutionary onslaughts which in the course of the winter won all Valencia for the Carlist cause. He was in his element in such work, and while we need not swallow wholesale all the gallant stories told about him to the British public by his admirers, Dr. Freind and Captain Carleton, there is no reason why they should all be rejected as intrinsically impossible. The historian has no such

Dec. 1705–Feb. 1706

* *P. to St.*, p. 2; *P.R.O., S.P.*, 94, 75 (October 28 and November 2, 1705).

judicious guide as Richards to enable him to distinguish truth from falsehood in regard to Peterborough's performances in the Valencian campaign.*

Thus, by the spring of 1706, Philip V at Madrid had been placed between two fires—the war conducted from the base at Lisbon by the English, Dutch and Portuguese armies; and the war conducted from Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia by another English army and by the Carlists of eastern Spain. Communication between the two wars was kept up by way of Gibraltar, by means of the English fleet, no longer challenged by the French fleet port-ridden in Toulon. But the enemy at Madrid had the great advantage of the central position, from which the French and Spanish forces could move in either direction against the widely divided armies of the Allies.

No Carlists had been found in the neighbourhood of Vigo, Cadiz, Gibraltar or on the Portuguese border, but they were found in plenty along the Eastern coast of Spain. The fall of Barcelona would have had little effect had it not been the capital of the Province most disaffected to Philip V. The Catalans stood in relation to the Castilians much as the Hungarians stood to the Austrians. They were a different race, and they were proud of medieval privileges and liberties which the Castilian Kings ignored, just as the Austrian Emperors ignored the ancient constitutional rights of Hungary. The Catalans therefore were hearty allies of the English, and loyal subjects of 'Carlos III.' Much support was also found for him in the Spanish provinces of Aragon and Valencia, where the Carlist party was moved by ancient

* One story told by *Carleton* (p. 110) is, I fear, intrinsically probable. It refers to this first winter in Barcelona: 'I was one day walking in one of the most populous streets of that city, where I found an uncommon concourse of people of all sorts got together; and imagining so great a crowd would not be assembled on a small occasion, I pressed in among the rest, and after a good deal of struggling and difficulty, reached into the ring and centre of that mixed multitude. But how did I blush when I found one of my own countrymen, a drunken grenadier, the attractive loadstone of all the high and low mob and the butt of all their merriment! It will be a thing not a little surprising to one of our country to find that a drunken man should be such a wonderful sight.' The poor fellow, very probably one of those who had saved Gibraltar, had few comforts in Spain:

'Dead or living, drunk or dry,
Soldier, I wish you well.'

provincial jealousy of Castile and of the King in Madrid. It was a civil war waged by the Spain of the Mediterranean seaboard against the Spain of centre and west.

But the will of Castile, the heart of Old Spain, proved stronger and more unanimous than the will of the Carlists of Valencia and Aragon. The enthusiasm of the Catalans for Charles was indeed stubborn enough, but Catalonia only a single province. To the majority of the Spaniards the English and Dutch armies were unpopular as heretics, and the Portuguese as ancient enemies and former subjects. It is true that they hated the French, but they hated the Dutch, English and Portuguese even more. In the winter of 1705–6 this was not yet clear, but the events of the next two years made it so, or showed it to be so. By 1707, if not before, the great mass of the nation identified Philip with Spanish nationality and Charles with alien conquest. Once that opinion had hardened, Charles's cause was doomed. For, as Napoleon found a hundred years later, the Spaniards were the most formidable civilian population in the world in guerilla warfare, though little use as troops of the line. If Napoleon's armies of 200,000 could not police Spain, still less could Galway's or Peterborough's armies of ten or twenty thousand. Diplomats could meet at the Hague or Utrecht and decide what Princes should bear rule over Italian and German States, but the throne of Spain could no more be disposed of against the will of the Spaniards than the throne of England against the will of the English. Therefore the capture of Barcelona, though it evoked a great popular rising for Charles along the coast, was a misfortune for that very reason, because it led the Allies, excusably enough, to believe that they could dispose of Spain, and because it pledged them in honour not to desert the Catalans and Carlists. Nevertheless the whole gigantic enterprise proved to be standing on a false foundation.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV

Peterborough's Part in the Capture of Monjuic

Colonel John Richards has left two accounts of the origin and execution of the attack on Monjuic—a *Diary* written at the time, and a *Narrative* written within a couple of years at latest. He was no blind admirer of Peterborough, of whom he speaks in the *Narrative* as 'so very inconstant as not to remaine two days in the same sentiments.' But his unbiassed evidence, the only first-hand evidence extant on the subject, makes it quite certain that the idea of the attack on Monjuic emanated from Peterborough, not from Hesse. The contrary statements by Leake and Martin are not first-hand, and come from naval sources, for good reason prejudiced against Peterborough.

Col. J. Richards' *Diary* (B.M. *Stowe MSS.* 467, f. 38) says :

> Sat. 13th Sept. [Sat. was really the 12th (N.S.)] The Council of flags having concluded it was too late in the year to go upon the expedition to Savoy, and the King of Spain having consented to this march [to Tarragona] my Lord [Peterborough] sent for me very early this morning, where in the presence of the Prince of Hesse we resolved to march on Tuesday next [to Tarragona].
>
> Sunday the 14th Sept. [Sunday was really 13th.] Notwithstanding the former resolution of a march, my Lord Peterborough being resolved by several deserters of the ill state of Montjuic the citadel of Barcelona, he proposed to me the surprisal of it this night by escalade, and afterwards the Prince who approving thereof a detachment of 400 grenadiers and 600 musqueteers was ordered to rendez-vous at 4 o'clock at the prince's quarters, where I likewise sent the necessary ammunition and scaling ladders. The secret was communicated to no living creature, not so much as to the King [he was told last thing as the expedition started, as his letter in *Künzel*, p. 666, shows]. We marched all night being forced to make a grand tour.
>
> Monday the 15th [really 14th]. The getting up the hill [Monjuic] was painful to us that were already tired by the length of the march, and what was worse our guides mistook the way. The grenadiers went one way, and musqueteers another, the Prince and my Lord a third, and all wrong. It was therefore break of day before we came in sight of the citadel, so that we were discovered by the enemy.

Substantially the same with some differences of detail is the other account given by Richards in his *Narrative* (*Stowe MSS.* 471, f. 15) :—

> It was the 13th of the said month that my Lord Peterborough was pleased to communicate to me certain informations which he got from divers deserters of the citadel of this town situate upon a hill on the farther side of the city. He ordered me to the Pr. of Hesse to appoint a time of conference with him.

It was then resolved to attack, and my Lord promised if he carried it that he would then form the siege of the town; and in case they did not, that then the Prince should concur with him in all future operations projected by them; and in the meantime great assurances of mutual friendship passed between them, which I was very glad to see, for not long before there appeared in their conduct nothing less.

I was the only person present at this Conference. The secret was mightily recommended, in so much as it was resolved that the King should know nothing of it. Sunday the 14th [really 13th] in the evening we marched with 500 grenadiers supported by 500 foot, the necessary ammunitions and some scaling ladders, towards Montjuic by a long way about.

See my article in the *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1931, for further quotations from Richards as to the fighting for Monjuic, on which he is the best authority, and for further discussion of the value of his evidence as against Col. Parnell's opinions. It is worth noting that while the naval men, like Leake and Martin, who had good reason to hate Peterborough, chose to believe that the idea of attacking Monjuic came from Hesse and not from Peterborough, the military men held exactly the opposite opinion. Col. Edgworth (*H. of L. MSS.* (1706–8), p. 510) told the House of Lords 'That it was the opinion of all the camp that Earl Peterborough communicated the design to no person whatsoever, but that the Prince of Hesse went thither as a volunteer.'

CHAPTER V

The Victory of 'Moderation'

Godolphin, Harley, Cowper and the Junto. First Session of the new Parliament, winter 1705–6. The Regency Act and the Hanoverian Succession. Settlement of the question of 'Placemen' in the House of Commons. The Court of Hanover: Sophia, George, Leibnitz and England.

When the new Parliament assembled in the autumn of 1705 it was clear that the Godolphin Ministry, as a result of the General Election in the summer,* would sail henceforth in smoother waters. 'Moderate men looked big.' The principle of 'Peace at home and war abroad' was triumphant, owing to the joint efforts for three years past of the Queen on the throne, of Godolphin at the Council Board, of Harley in the Lobby, and of Marlborough winning battles oversea.

Hitherto, though Anne had been the least willing to move, all four had kept step in their march away from High Tory policies. But now that the victory of Moderation was won at the polls, the difference of view as to the proper means to maintain and exploit it begins to be perceptible in the correspondence between Secretary Harley and Lord Treasurer Godolphin. The Treasurer was prepared to advance further than the Secretary along the road of Whig alliance. The Queen, indeed, had always been loath to acknowledge that because she had quarrelled with the High Tories, she must therefore make friends with the Whigs. In July 1705 she had written to Godolphin, imploring him to 'keep me out of the power of *the merciless men of both*

* See pp. 26–31, above.

parties.' * And three months later Harley begins, in his letters to the Treasurer, to lay down principles very similar to those of their royal mistress.

> I take it for granted [he writes to Godolphin in September], no party in the House can carry it for themselves without the Queen's Servants join with them. The foundation is, persons and parties are to come to the Queen, and not the Queen to them. The Queen hath chosen rightly which party she will take in. If the gentlemen of England are made sensible that the Queen is the head, and not a Party, everything will be easy, and the Queen will be courted and not a party.

Therefore the High Tory opposition must not be completely alienated by too eager a court paid to the Whigs.

> The embodying of gentlemen (country gentlemen, I mean) against the Queen's service is what is to be avoided.

Whiggish policies will, in Harley's opinion, 'shock more persons than they will gain.' Already the great 'trimmer' of the reign was preparing to redress the balance against the Whig predominance that he foresaw and dreaded.

But Godolphin thought otherwise. He had not the Secretary's cold indifference to abuse. He was indignant with the conduct of the High Tories, and especially was he vexed by the hue and cry of the clerical pamphleteers against the person of the Lord Treasurer. Moreover, he wrote to Harley that the Government with its middle party of 100 'Queen's Servants' could only obtain a majority in the Commons by courting the 160 Whigs, who could be more easily appeased than the 190 Tories.

> For every one we are likely to get from the 190 we shall lose two or three from the 160. And is it not more reasonable and more easy to preserve those who have served and helped us, than those who have basely and ungratefully done all that was in their power to ruin us? . . . As for the clergy, they always say themselves it is easy for the Queen to get them into her interests. I think so, too, if they be once thoroughly satisfied which is the right way to preferment.†

* *Add. MSS.* 28070, f. 12.

† The last remark, certainly unfair on the clergy as a whole, though true of individuals, shows Godolphin's growing animosity against their profession, see pp. 6–7, above. This letter of Godolphin's of March 1706 reads like an answer to Harley's of September 1705, although, in fact, the Parliamentary session had intervened between the two letters. *H.M.C. Bath*, I, p. 74; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 291.

These two letters may be read to mean merely that Godolphin would go on to become a Whig, and Harley go back to remain a Tory. But there is more in the difference than that. Harley, like Queen Anne, believed that the advent of pure party government could and should be avoided in England. Godolphin believed that the hard facts of House of Commons life were making party government inevitable. Harley preached, while it was still conceivably practicable, the doctrine afterwards advocated by Bolingbroke in an age too late, of the 'Patriot King,' a monarchy governing by its influence in Parliament, but detached from party ties.

This difference of policy between Harley and Godolphin was connected, whether as cause or effect, with a decided preference on the part of the Whigs themselves for the Treasurer over the Secretary. Somers and Wharton, the grave and the gay, were equally at home in driving bargains with Godolphin in whispered colloquies on the benches of the House of Lords. But Harley was suspect to every Whig, whether on account of his sly and furtive manner, or because they already had wind of the drift of his thoughts and saw in him the secret but dangerous enemy of their own power.

The Whig distrust of Harley is intimately revealed to us in the private diary of Sir William Cowper, elevated to be Keeper of the Great Seal with the promise of a peerage to follow. Cowper in office soon overcame the Queen's original prejudice against him, and won golden opinions with all men, both by his obliging manners, very different from those of his predecessor Wright, and by his disinterested refusal to accept the customary 'New Year's gifts' from the counsel practising at the Chancery Bar. He felt that these perquisites, though they might be sanctioned by antiquity, smacked of corruption, the more so as they were estimated to range between fifteen hundred and three thousand pounds every year. The chiefs of the other Courts resented his scrupulosity and refused to follow his

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example. But the public sided with Cowper against the other judges, and his good deed was celebrated in bad verse by Ambrose Philips—the poet whose nickname of Namby-Pamby has added a word to the language * :

> He the robe of justice wore,
> Sullied not as heretofore,
> When the magistrate was bought
> With ' Yearly gifts.' [47]

Cowper was disposed, by his easy temper and by the political conditions of the hour, to make himself agreeable to his Tory colleagues in the Cabinet. He was even on friendly personal terms with Rochester, the leader of the highest Tory opposition, whom he declared to be ' a good-natured man, though hot.' But Harley he could not away with. From the first he suspected him of trickery and secret opposition. In the early days of January 1706 the Secretary gave a dinner to Marlborough, Godolphin and the Whig Chiefs. It was to be a great occasion, ' to reconcile Somers and Halifax with Harley.'

> Secretary Harley [writes Cowper] took a glass, and drank to Love and Friendship and everlasting Union, and wished he had more Tokay to drink it in (we had drank two bottles, good, but thick). I replied his White Lisbon was best to drink it in, being very *clear* : I suppose he apprehended it (as I observed most of the company did) to relate to that humour of his, which was never to deal clearly or openly, but always with reserve, if not dissimulation or rather simulation ; and to love tricks even when not necessary, but from an inward satisfaction he took in applauding his own cunning. If any man was ever born under a necessity of being a knave, he was.

The Whig Chiefs, in fact, thought of Harley much as their successors thought of Shelburne. And Godolphin was beginning to harbour similar suspicions. How indeed could he not suspect hypocrisy when Harley wrote to him ' I have united my very soul to you. I have no other views, no other passions than to be subservient to your lordship.' The Secretary protested too much.[48]

* It was Ambrose Philips who, in celebrating the happy accession of the House of Hanover, was inspired by the soaring of the stocks to personify ' property ' as a racial deity of our island :

> ' O Property ! O Goddess, English born ! '

One function of government, according to the ideas of the time, was to identify and prosecute the anonymous authors of violent Opposition pamphlets. The ' freedom of the press,' released indeed from censorship, was still limited by the fear of the consequences of publication. Two years back Whig pamphleteers had suffered prosecution by the Godolphin Ministry ; now it was the turn of their rivals. The author of the High Church *Memorial of the Church of England*, Dr. James Drake, had not yet been identified.* In August 1705 Marlborough had written to Godolphin from the field :

> In this camp I have had time to read the pamphlet called *The Memorial of the Church of England.* I think it the most impudent and scurrilous thing I ever read. If the author can be found I do not doubt he will be punished ; for if such liberties may be taken of writing scandalous lies without being punished, no Government can stand long. Notwithstanding what I have said, I cannot forbear laughing, when I think they would have you and I pass as fanatics ; and the Duke of Buckingham and Lord Jersey for pillars of the Church ; the one being a Roman Catholic in King James's time, and the other would have been a Quaker or any other religion that would have pleased the late King.

Cowper found Secretary Harley slack in this business of detecting the author of the obnoxious pamphlet, and unwilling to employ his private agents and sources of information against a brother Tory. Investigations and proceedings dragged on for a year, in the course of which Dr. Drake, though not positively convicted, was worried into a fever that killed him ; and poor Ned Ward, the Tory public-house poet, a reprobate rather dear to posterity, expiated his *Hudibras Redivivus* in the pillory, where he suffered from the London mob, whom he had satirized, much more severely than Defoe had formerly suffered in a similar elevation.† Whether or not Harley's slackness in these acts of

* See pp. 6 and 26 note, above.

† It is probably to this occasion (1706) that Pope refers in the line :

> ' As thick as eggs at Ward in pillory,'

for Ned Ward appears in another passage of the *Dunciad* (I, l. 233 ; III, l. 34). In May 1706 the Rector of Sutton, condemned to stand in the pillory for a libel on Marlborough, was, on full submission, begged off by Sarah, the Duke approving. *Coxe*, chap. xlii. The physician, Dr. Joseph Browne, was also sent to Newgate as the author of *The country parson's advice to the Lord Keeper*. (*Rosebery Pamphlets, Edin.*)

party vengeance had been at all due to humanity and good sense, it was regarded as mere double-dealing by Godolphin and the Whigs, who were destined ere many years were out to have their fill of prosecuting a more famous 'Doctor' than Drake.[49]

The new Parliament met at the end of October 1705, and the first business in the Commons was to choose a Speaker. It had been known for some time that the Tory Opposition would put up Bromley, the leader of the Tackers. His opponent was to be John Smith, an out-and-out Whig. After the custom of the time, speeches were made in 'Billingsgate language,' blackening the lives and characters of the rival candidates for the Chair. The House was reminded that in the late King's reign Smith had unpatriotically voted for a standing army in time of peace. On the other hand Bromley had, fifteen years before, published a foolish book of youthful travels which was held to reveal the extent of his Jacobitism, and more certainly revealed the limitations of his intellect. His enemies had it reprinted and circulated in time to influence the division—one of Harley's sly tricks, it was said.* Smith was chosen by 248 votes to 205. Not all the supporters of Government had realized that they were expected to vote for a Whig Speaker, and fifteen office-holders had voted for Bromley; one of them, a Secretary of the Admiralty, was dismissed by way of example, in order that the Ministerial-Whig Coalition might in future rely on the votes of all Her Majesty's servants.[50]

The Queen's Speech was Whiggish. The first draft had been drawn up by Godolphin in his own hand and, as was

* The new edition was, indeed, a knavish piece of work. It contained a new Contents Table with such headings as: 'The Author compared with our Saviour, and wants of his Height, a hand's breadth by measure, p. 107.' 'The Author kissed the Pope's slipper, and had his blessing though a Protestant; but not a word of religion, p. 149.' 'Eight pictures take up less room than sixteen of the same size, p. 14.'

In *The Dyet of Poland, a Satyr*, a Whig review of political personalities, published in 1705 (*Rosebery Pamphlets, Edin.*), we read of *Bromsky* (= Bromley):

> 'In foreign parts he travelled much in vain,
> Just made a book and so came home again;
> Tells us he saw a bridge at Rochester;
> And when he was at Chatham—he was there,' etc.

usual with all royal messages to either House of Parliament, was passed at a Cabinet with Anne present. She urged on the Houses the necessity of a Treaty of Union with Scotland; she spoke with bitter indignation of those who said the Church of England was in danger under her government; and she declared that 'we have great grounds of hope that, by the blessing of God upon our arms and those of our allies, a good foundation is laid for restoring the Monarchy of Spain to the House of Austria.' The news of the fall of Barcelona had just arrived, and the salvoes of guns firing to celebrate the event had been heard by Members as they rode into London for the new Parliament. The Whig and Ministerial newspapers urged the necessity and practicability of conquering Spain for 'King Charles,' and foresaw in the consequent trade with Spanish America a means of making good more than all that the war would cost. On military expenditure a perpetual stream of lamentation flowed through the Opposition press; it was said that the nation was ruined and, very unjustly, that 'the Dutch had expended nothing on the war.' Both statements the Whig and Ministerial newspapers denied. The High Church papers had also, for some time past, been carrying on a campaign of abuse of the Scots, to prevent the project of Union: the *Rehearsal* averred that the Privy Council and magistrates of Edinburgh had caused our Saviour to be burnt in effigy—a story contradicted by the Whig *Flying Post*. Harley, who, for all his doubts as to the future, was still substantially loyal to the government policies of the hour, wrote to Marlborough:

> I hear the ill-intentioned in Holland give a very wrong turn to the part of the Queen's Speech which relates to the monarchy of Spain, as if that was to eternize the war, when there cannot be a clearer proposition than that it is the only way to a secure peace.[51]

After both Houses had replied to the Queen's Speech, welcoming the sentiments she had expressed, the Commons plunged eagerly into the attractive business of Election Petitions. As usual, party was the first consideration, and evidence a poor second. The loudest clamour arose over the St. Albans election, a close-run thing, in which the personal

canvass of the Duchess of Marlborough, who often resided there, had turned waverers in favour of the Whig Admiral Killigrew. Bromley, in the House, ventured to compare her to Alice Perrers, the politically-minded female favourite of Edward III's dotage—a comparison not calculated to please the Queen. After a stormy debate the seat was voted to the Admiral.[52]

Since the General Election the High Tories had lost control of the Commons. Seymour and Bromley were reduced to impotence : the formidable old patriarch of the West was sinking to his grave, and Bromley had not the parts to hold attention without a majority behind him. The more important leaders of the Tory Opposition sat in the House of Lords, which became the principal scene of political skirmishing in this Parliament.

In December 1705 Rochester moved that the Church was in danger, on the ground that the Ministers and Bishops and, it was implied, the Queen also, had gone over to the enemy. In the debate that followed, the Whig Bishops bemoaned the attacks made on them by their own clergy in Convocation and elsewhere. The Bishop of Ely, with experience of Cambridge,

> complained of the heat and passion of the gentlemen of the Universities, which they inculcated into their pupils, who brought the same fury with them to the parishes when they came abroad, to the great disturbance of public charity.

The Tories complained of the multiplication of Dissenting Schools and Academies, although the Dissenters paid for these entirely themselves, and were, moreover, excluded by law from the Universities. The Whigs replied that since the Toleration the Dissenters had ' softened their tempers and concurred zealously in serving all the ends of Government,' better, indeed, than those who attacked them. A large majority in both Houses voted that the Church had been rescued from imminent danger by King William the Third of Glorious Memory, and that ' whoever goes about to suggest and insinuate that the Church is in danger under Her Majesty's administration, is an enemy to the Queen, the Church and the Kingdom.' The Queen herself,

a diligent listener under the Lords' gallery, was more than ever alienated from her old friends when she heard them accuse her of indifference to the Church she so truly loved. At no moment was she nearer to the Whigs—at least, at no moment was she further removed from the heart of Toryism.*

The High Church fared ill this session, for Convocation, meeting at the same time as Parliament, was broken up by another violent quarrel between the moderate Bishops in the Upper House and the high-flying majority in the Lower. Tempers were further exacerbated by an open protest, signed by the Moderate minority in the Lower House, in favour of the Episcopal authority. The Queen at length intervened on the same side, declaring that ' she was resolved to maintain her supremacy, and the due subordination of Presbyters and Bishops as fundamental parts thereof.' She supported the right of the Archbishop to prorogue the sittings of the Lower House, which the extreme high churchmen had denied.†

Another question raised before Christmas by the Opposition in the House of Lords was our relations with the Allies. The reckless Lord Haversham, a recent convert from Whig to Tory intransigence, moved for an enquiry into the misconduct of Prince Lewis of Baden and the Dutch generals in thwarting Marlborough during last summer's campaign.

* *Parl. Hist.*, VI, 479–509 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 235–238 (435) ; *Cowper*, pp. 25–26. The Tory Dartmouth, in his notes to Burnet, gives us an intimate account of the humours of the debate : ' This dispute rather than debate was brought on by Lord Rochester's passion, without consulting anybody, and was as ill-timed as it could well be, for we all knew the Queen was little satisfied with the hands she was fallen into, and the Whigs wanted nothing more than an opportunity to justify themselves in relation to the Church. I happened to sit by Lord Godolphin, when Lord Rochester accepted Lord Halifax's challenge, and I said to him (not thinking it would go further) that I believed a scene between Hothead and Testimony would be very diverting. He was pleased with the conceit, and told it to all about him, knowing nothing damps a debate more than turning it to ridicule ; and it had such an effect that everybody was ready to laugh, when either of them spoke.'

† See *Blenheim*, pp. 284–287, on the Convocation Controversy. For the Convocation of 1705–6, see T. Lathbury, *Hist. of Convocation*, pp. 398–399, and *Burnet*, V, pp. 247–249 (442). The Lower House complained to the bishops of Defoe's *Review* and Tutchin's *Observator* as licentious publications ; of the immorality of the theatre ; and of the public services held in London by Unitarians, who enjoyed no legal protection under the Toleration Act.

The feeling in the country on this subject was naturally very bitter. Political poets, some of whom hated the Dutch more than they loved the Duke, were writing satires entitled 'The Dutch Deputies' :

> Mechanicks, base Republicans, controul
> The vast designs of Marlb'rough's thoughtful soul.
> See now, they doubt and stop the conquering hand
> That gave them victory at his wife's command.

Such popular diatribes were very well, but a motion carried in the House of Lords condemning our allies would have ugly repercussions abroad, and would not help to make things better in the field next year. There was indeed much ground for complaint, but the man who had most right to complain had most to lose by Haversham's motion, which was purely mischievous in intention. Both Houses voted an address to the Queen to maintain good correspondence with the Allies.[53]

The party manœuvrings of this winter in the Lords, paltry and ephemeral as for the most part they were, chanced to produce a measure fraught with great consequences for the future of England. The Regency Act not only supplied the machinery by which in fact the House of Hanover came unopposed to the throne in 1714, but removed from the Act of Settlement clauses which must have proved a bar to the growth of our national system of Parliamentary Cabinet government. The story is as curious as its outcome was important.

The leaders of Opposition, as they watched the sun of their party's fortunes, which had risen so splendidly at the Queen's accession, sink in a fog of war and Whiggery, were so shaken with rage against the Queen and her servants that their conduct this winter became both eccentric and dangerous. The Scottish Jacobite, Lockhart, then in London, wrote home to the Duke of Atholl that 'sure since the siege of Jerusalem, never was there such a divided, I may rather say, sub-sub-divided nation' as England, and that rather than see the Whigs come into power the Tories would rise

in rebellion. The Scot did not understand South Britain, where civil war was more alien to native custom than in his own country. But one phrase in Lockhart's letter came very near the mark. After observing that the Whigs and Tories regarded the question of the Succession from the point of view of party interest alone, he added :

> They don't so much value in England who shall be King, as whose King he shall be !

The steadfast Jacobite had been moved to utter this epigram by the spectacle of the chiefs of the High Tory Opposition, led by Lord Haversham, moving in the House of Lords that the Hanoverian successor be invited over to reside in England until the Queen's death.[54]

Rochester, Jersey and Buckingham, who supported Haversham's motion, were half Jacobite. But Rochester was also on good personal relations with Sophia, the Dowager Electress of Hanover, statutory heir to the English throne. In October 1705 he had been given to understand, by a correspondent in Hanover, that her regard for him was undiminished ; that she would be very willing to come to England 'whenever the Queen and Parliament call her,' and that her son, the reigning Elector George, 'though exceeding modest on this point,' substantially agreed with his mother.[55] Rochester was tempted to gratify his anger with his niece Anne, who, as was well known, abominated the idea of the 'Successor' setting up a rival court in England in her lifetime. The Queen once wrote to Marlborough that to have Sophia, or the Elector George, or even the Electoral Prince over here was 'a thing I cannot bear, though but for a week.' Rochester and Nottingham, seeing themselves entirely out with the reigning sovereign, who was not expected to live for long, were tempted to sacrifice all chance of royal favour from Anne in order to build up a strong claim on one of her possible successors. The plan was a shrewd one, but in 1705 it was premature, for in fact the poor invalid Queen lived for almost another decade. It was only when she was really sinking to her grave that the Whigs played the same game, more boldly, more sincerely, and with very much greater success.

There was another point in this move of the Opposition Lords. If the Ministers and the Whigs accepted the proposal to invite over the Electress or her son, they would ruin themselves with Queen Anne. But if they opposed it, would they not ruin themselves with the nation? Could they not then be denounced by the High Tories as disloyal to the Protestant Succession? And even if that charge were not very widely believed in England, might it not at least find credence in Hanover, and teach Sophia and George to think that Nottingham and Rochester were their only honest friends? The personal connection of the Whig chiefs with their future sovereign was at that time less close than it soon afterwards became. As to Marlborough and Godolphin, all Europe knew that in the last reign they had been no less Jacobite than Rochester, and very much more so than Nottingham, who was as consistent a Hanoverian as Wharton himself. It seemed, therefore, by no means impossible in 1705 to persuade the House of Hanover that Whigs and Ministerialists were less good friends to the Protestant Succession than the calumniated High Tories.

It was a clever trap, and Godolphin and his Whig allies only escaped from it by a bold and energetic movement. They refused to vote that the Successor should be invited over in the Queen's lifetime. But, at the instigation of the ever-ready Wharton, they turned the flank of the High Tories by proposing a Regency Act, which provided a practical machinery to ensure the Protestant Succession upon Anne's death.

The Lords of the Tory Opposition complained in their speeches that the Queen's presence in the Chamber was a constraint on the freedom of debate. Nevertheless she continued to sit there and listen with ever-growing indignation. She heard the Duke of Buckingham prove the necessity of inviting over Sophia on the ground that Anne's faculties might soon give way, and she become 'as a child in the hands of others.' But most of all was she astonished and outraged to hear Nottingham and Rochester support Haversham's motion. When they had been her Ministers, they had indoctrinated her with the belief that the Whigs, in proposing to invite over the Successor in her lifetime, had

designed to depose her. They themselves now pressed the policy of the invitation. Wharton, in high spirits, chaffed Rochester, Jersey and Buckingham on their 'miraculous conversion' to the Hanoverian interest, opposed the invitation, and suggested instead the outline of the Regency Bill. This important Act of State was forthwith drawn up by the Ministers with the help of Lord Somers. The great Whig constitutional lawyer enjoyed so little of Anne's favour that he was never again Lord Chancellor, but his wisdom and experience were at the disposal of the Ministers of the Crown. Though still in a private station, he took an active part in framing and passing both the Regency Act and the Treaty of Union with Scotland.[56]

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Although the Regency Act of the winter of 1705–6 was the outcome of party manœuvring, it was none the less of capital value to the future of England. It brought the Act of Settlement up to date, and supplied means to put it into force at the critical moment, when the Hanoverian successor would still be abroad. It provided that the Privy Council should not be dissolved by the demise of the Crown, but should continue to sit and should at once proclaim the successor. A Regency of 'Lords Justices' was to rule the country until Sophia or George had time to cross over from Hanover and assume the government in person. The 'Lords Justices' were to consist of the holders of the seven principal offices of State * at the moment when Anne should die, and other persons to be named by the successor. Parliament was not to be dissolved by the Queen's death, as was then the law unless otherwise provided, but was to meet at once and was to sit for six months. These arrangements would leave the Pretender little chance of slipping on to the throne through the confusion and paralysis of government. When the test actually came, the precautions proved practical and adequate. Another Act, passed at the same time, naturalized the Electress Sophia and her issue.

The High Tory Opposition could only murmur that

* The Archbishop of Canterbury; the Chancellor or Lord Keeper; the Lord Treasurer; the Lord President of the Council; the Lord Privy Seal; the Lord High Admiral; the Lord Chief Justice. The Tory Opposition in the Lords voted to omit the Lord Treasurer, out of spite to Godolphin, and to substitute the Lord Mayor of London; but they were outvoted.

these measures were unnecessary. The Jacobites among them were fairly hoist with their own petard, overreached by their own cunning. When the Regency Bill went down to the Commons it lay there for some time ' by a secret management that was against it.' Hanover and the High Tories were in communication. The Electress, who had never had any particular preference for the Whigs and was irritated by the Queen's attitude of obvious personal hostility, continued to agitate behind the scenes for an immediate invitation to England. She wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury expressing her willingness to come over when asked; the letter found its way into print, causing a high debate in the Commons, and alienating Queen Anne more than ever from her Hanoverian kinsfolk.

Sophia, a lively and adventurous lady of seventy-five, was not afraid of making a little trouble in England. A jaunt to the famous island, to ' shine there ' awhile as the much-courted ' Successor,' would amuse her declining years. By habit and affection she was less deeply rooted in Hanover than was her son George. If her heart was not ' entirely English,' neither was it entirely German—or Dutch. If she had lived to reign, ' Queen Sophy ' would have been popular.

So the High Tories in the House of Commons moved the invitation to the Successor to come to England, in place of the Regency Act. There was some danger lest the Whig private members should break away from the orders of the Junto and vote for the invitation, which used to be the Whig policy and was to be so again half a dozen years later. But the excellent discipline of the Whig party held good, the invitation was voted down, and the Regency Bill became law.[57]

The main purport of the new Act was scarcely more important to the future history of England than were two of its minor provisions, altering certain provisions in the Act of Settlement of 1701. That measure had fixed the succession on the Electress and her heirs, being Protestants, but had decreed certain limitations on the power of the Crown, to come into force whenever the House of Hanover actually succeeded.* One of these limitations provided that

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 119–121, for the text of these limitations.

all matters and things relating to the well government of this Kingdom, which are properly cognizable in the Privy Council, by the laws and customs of this Realm, shall be transacted there and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the Privy Council as shall advise and consent to the same.

This clause was intended to put an end to the recently developed system of government by the secret consultations of a Cabinet. But it was repealed by the Regency Act before it ever had the chance to become operative.

Cabinet Government with secret consultations was thereby allowed to continue. But such a Cabinet might exist and yet all its members might be disconnected from the House of Commons, as the United States Cabinet is disconnected from either House of Congress. Such was the old ideal of the English Constitution, as conceived by many Members of Parliament for many years both before and after the Revolution. The desire to get rid of the ' Royal Servants ' from the House of Commons was always strong with the Opposition members of the day, whether Whig or Tory, who regarded ' placemen ' in the House as persons bribed by the Court to vote them down. Only gradually did the idea spread that the House of Commons was in future to be, not as heretofore the focus of opposition, but itself the seat of governmental power.

The fact that, before the Premiership of Walpole, the most important Ministers sat in the Lords, still rendered the Commons suspicious of Government as such, and jealous of Ministerial influences in their midst. Therefore the Act of Settlement of 1701 had contained a provision that, as soon as the House of Hanover should succeed to the throne—

No person who has an office or place of profit under the King, or receives a pension from the Crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons.

When the Regency Act was introduced it was felt by Ministerialists to be a fitting moment to repeal this provision. The House of Lords was strongly of that opinion, though in fact the repeal has proved a chief cause of the ultimate predominance of the Lower House. It is a

curious fact that the Commons of February 1706 were far less enthusiastic to liberate themselves from a self-denying ordinance, which would have isolated their House from the real government of the country. The Ministerial Tories, indeed, were all for the repeal of a provision which would drive them either from office or from the Commons on the Queen's death. But for that very reason the High Tory Opposition were all for maintaining the clause. The Whigs were divided, but the pressure of the Junto Lords and of party discipline was exerted to make them vote for the Government. After many debates and divisions, and a formal conference between the two Houses, a compromise was at length agreed upon. After the House of Hanover had come to the throne, certain offices should no longer be held by Members of the House of Commons. But the holders of other offices, including the principal political offices of State, though they must on taking office resign their seats, might be re-elected to the House of Commons. The electors were to judge of the propriety of their continuing to sit there. This arrangement, repeated in the Act of 1707 that established the Union with Scotland, held good until recent years, when it has been modified almost out of recognition.

In the course of the debates on this subject, the Lords, who had certainly shown the higher statesmanship, reminded the Commons that

> To enact that all persons employed and trusted by the Crown shall, for that reason alone, become uncapable of being trusted by the people, is in effect to declare that the interest of the Crown and of the People must be always contrary to each other ; which is a notion no good Englishman ought to entertain.

The matter at issue could not have been put into wiser words. In spite of the memory of former strife between Stuart Kings and Parliaments, in spite of the future theories of Montesquieu,* the more closely the executive and legislative were identified, the better for the government of the country, the better even for its liberties. The separation of executive and legislative in the American Constitution of to-day, involving the frequent hostility of Congress to the President and his Cabinet for party reasons, has many very grave consequences to the United States and to the world at large. If, on the accession of the House of Hanover, 'placemen' had been excluded from the House of Commons, consequences of a not dissimilar kind would have arisen in England. This was prevented by the Regency Act of 1705–6.[58]

* Montesquieu's mistaken belief that English liberty was secured by the separation of the executive and legislative, was widely spread by his authority, not without important results in America and France. His error was largely due to the survival of the tradition against 'placemen in the Commons,' which died very hard. Montesquieu, who visited England about 1730, was a generation or more behind the times in his analysis of the English Constitution as it had then become.

If Anne had died about this time, Sophia would have succeeded unopposed to the throne of England—(Scotland was another matter)—and she would not, like her son in 1714, have been primarily dependent on Whig support. She had no intention of identifying her cause with either party in the State. She believed that the Whigs must perforce be loyal to the House of Hanover, and that her care should be to conciliate the less certain loyalty of the Tories. A Princess brought up in the ideas of the Seventeenth rather than of the Eighteenth Century, she did not care about her 'Parliamentary title,' but claimed 'hereditary right,' although she allowed that Parliament could exclude Roman Catholics. The point was perhaps too fine to be very important, but it showed her to be, like William III before her, rather Royalist than Whig in political theory.

Neither was she greatly prepossessed by ardent Whigs who came over to pay court at Hanover, such as Toland the pamphleteer. Poor Toland, a useful champion of freedom of thought in religion, like many useful champions of unpopular causes, was not personally attractive, and lacked the worldly wisdom needed to make himself agreeable to Sophia. Her philosophical friend was not Toland but Leibnitz.

She liked better such humble visitors as 'Mr. Warden of Gloucestershire,' who came in 1704 'to tell her how many good friends she hath in his county. And Her Highness is very dexterous,' the English Resident reported, 'in pleasing them that come so far to be pleased, and hath

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In the course of the debates on this subject, the Lords, who had certainly shown the higher statesmanship, reminded the Commons that

> To enact that all persons employed and trusted by the Crown shall, for that reason alone, become uncapable of being trusted by the people, is in effect to declare that the interest of the Crown and of the People must be always contrary to each other ; which is a notion no good Englishman ought to entertain.

The matter at issue could not have been put into wiser words. In spite of the memory of former strife between Stuart Kings and Parliaments, in spite of the future theories of Montesquieu,* the more closely the executive and legislative were identified, the better for the government of the country, the better even for its liberties. The separation of executive and legislative in the American Constitution of to-day, involving the frequent hostility of Congress to the President and his Cabinet for party reasons, has many very grave consequences to the United States and to the world at large. If, on the accession of the House of Hanover, ' placemen ' had been excluded from the House of Commons, consequences of a not dissimilar kind would have arisen in England. This was prevented by the Regency Act of 1705–6.[58]

* Montesquieu's mistaken belief that English liberty was secured by the separation of the executive and legislative, was widely spread by his authority, not without important results in America and France. His error was largely due to the survival of the tradition against ' placemen in the Commons,' which died very hard. Montesquieu, who visited England about 1730, was a generation or more behind the times in his analysis of the English Constitution as it had then become.

If Anne had died about this time, Sophia would have succeeded unopposed to the throne of England—(Scotland was another matter)—and she would not, like her son in 1714, have been primarily dependent on Whig support. She had no intention of identifying her cause with either party in the State. She believed that the Whigs must perforce be loyal to the House of Hanover, and that her care should be to conciliate the less certain loyalty of the Tories. A Princess brought up in the ideas of the Seventeenth rather than of the Eighteenth Century, she did not care about her ' Parliamentary title,' but claimed ' hereditary right,' although she allowed that Parliament could exclude Roman Catholics. The point was perhaps too fine to be very important, but it showed her to be, like William III before her, rather Royalist than Whig in political theory.

Neither was she greatly prepossessed by ardent Whigs who came over to pay court at Hanover, such as Toland the pamphleteer. Poor Toland, a useful champion of freedom of thought in religion, like many useful champions of unpopular causes, was not personally attractive, and lacked the worldly wisdom needed to make himself agreeable to Sophia. Her philosophical friend was not Toland but Leibnitz.

She liked better such humble visitors as ' Mr. Warden of Gloucestershire,' who came in 1704 ' to tell her how many good friends she hath in his county. And Her Highness is very dexterous,' the English Resident reported, ' in pleasing them that come so far to be pleased, and hath

used him so civilly that he says he does not doubt but by the relation of the good usage he hath received he shall send twenty more gentlemen out of Gloucestershire with more business than he hath himself.'

Godolphin, though he had heartily supported the Regency Act, was never, like the Whig chiefs, in personal correspondence with Hanover. He and Marlborough lived always under the cloud of their Jacobite past. What either of them would do in case of a disputed succession was always regarded as uncertain by the Whigs, and by the Court of Hanover, although the Duke was assiduous there in his visits at the end of each campaign. Anne's views about the Succession were regarded as even more doubtful.

In the early summer of 1706 Lord Halifax was sent out on a mission to Hanover to make all smooth there on behalf of the Whig party and the Ministers. He carried with him the text of the Regency and Naturalisation Acts, and a Garter for the young Electoral Prince, afterwards George II. But Sophia was too sore on the question of her foiled visit to England, and too certain of Whig fidelity in any case, to be at pains to display much enthusiasm. Addison, recently made an Under-Secretary of State for his poem on Blenheim, came to Hanover in the train of Halifax. Sophia had heard of his rising reputation as a wit and a man of learning and looked forward to hearing him talk. But his shyness and silence in a Court circle disappointed her.

She had no such difficulty with Mrs. Burnet, who came over the next year to present her good husband's compliments. Sophia liked the Bishop's wife and made to her the following remarkable confidence :

> She believed that if the Queen died to-day, she should succeed to-morrow, and her children after her. But the Queen might live twelve years and things might change. And she knew not how fit her son, a stranger to all, might be.

If the Whigs did not quite know what to make of Sophia herself, they began now to make better progress with her son the Elector. Halifax and he were shut up together alone 'to converse in very ill French.' The Whig chief reported to Godolphin that

> The Elector was much more easy and familiar than I expected, and took up new airs of good humour, as they that know him say, but I think him very dry. I have been wonderful fortunate, for this victory of Lord Marlborough [Ramillies] has made their countenances much more gracious than I think I should have found.

So long as his mother lived, George was still in the background in transactions about the English succession, but he was the ruler of Hanover, and as such felt a steady enthusiasm for the war and for the English Alliance. He had already learned that the England of Marlborough and the Whigs was a more valuable ally than Holland, and when disputes arose he took their side against the Dutch. But he suspected the Tory Opposition of indifference to the war. He knew and cared less than his mother about English domestic affairs, but he was eager to court England as the defender of German interests against France. Therefore he was more drawn to the Whigs than to the Tories. The circumstances in which, six years later, Bolingbroke brought the war to an end, greatly increased these prepossessions in the mind of the future George I.[59]

Wiser than either the Electress or her son was their faithful friend, the philosopher statesman Leibnitz. A letter that he wrote in August 1706 to Davenant, the pamphleteer of the Ministerialist Tories, shows his clear grasp of principles and their relation to the actual situation :

> Princes who govern according to law are for the most part those who have the greatest authority, or at all events the most durable. This English maxim deserves to be that of all nations. After having been saved by your good principles and your money, it is right that we should go to school to you—I mean you as you now are and not as you were sixty years ago. You have learnt to your cost that you may push liberty too far. Hence I hope that people will be wiser now, and will not suffer themselves to be dazzled by exaggerated Republican principles at a moment when the fear of arbitrary power will be diminished by the humiliation of France. [Ramillies had just been won.] The Whigs are at this moment on good terms with the Court. We are not sorry for it ; for we seek and desire the welfare of the nation and the agreement of parties in one same principal object, which will also be the security of the Succession.[60]

CHAPTER VI

Ramillies

In May 1706 the war had been raging for four years, but the Allies had made little progress towards the reconquest of the Netherlands and Italy from the French, which they had declared in the Treaty of Grand Alliance to be essential to the future safety of Europe. The enemy battle-fleets had indeed been driven from the sea, and a terrible blow had been dealt at Blenheim to the arms of France. But her military prestige had made a partial recovery, owing to the failure of the Allies to profit by their great opportunities in 1705. Taught by that failure, the Dutch Government was ready next spring to defer to all Marlborough's wishes in the field. But the Republic, though loyal to the Allies, was staggering under financial burdens heavier than she could bear. England had greater powers for taxation and borrowing, and her newly elected Parliament was ready to see them used to the full. But not only had she now, with the Spanish war on her back, to raise British armies twice the size of those of 1702, but the mercenary Princes of Europe were crying aloud to Marlborough for the full payment of arrears. The Kings of Prussia and Denmark refused to let their men march to the Rhine or Flanders on any other terms.

April–May 1706

In the case of Prussia, the demand for money was not the only trouble. English influence had so far kept Frederick true to the distasteful alliance with Austria and Holland. But, since the effect of Marlborough's last visit to Berlin had worn off, an intrigue among the courtiers against Lord Raby, the English Resident, threatened to

detach Prussia from all participation in the war. The Elector of Hanover, also, kept back his troops till the tension between his mother and Queen Anne was somewhat relaxed. The Emperor Joseph, sunk in bankruptcy, yet still refusing to make terms with the Hungarians, urged Marlborough to carry out his favourite scheme of invading France by the Moselle. But the Duke declined to embark again on a project which, however rightly conceived, depended for its success on the active assistance of Lewis of Baden; for that Prince, more sullen and secretive than ever, still commanded the Imperial forces in the neighbourhood of Landau.

The Alliance was stale and sick ; another year of failure would bring on the first stages of dissolution. The tonic of victory was needed, yet the coming campaign was not unlikely to end in positive defeat. The fall of the Duke of Savoy, and the final expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, seemed imminent. On April 19, Vendôme, before Eugene had arrived from Vienna, beat the Imperialists at Calcinato, and drove them into the mountain recesses above the Lago di Garda. Only Eugene's arrival prevented their complete dispersion. Some of the troops who suffered this reverse through want of Austrian preparedness, were the Prussian and Danish contingents that Marlborough had obtained for Italy. King Frederick at Berlin made it another grievance against Vienna and the Alliance.

Marlborough, meanwhile, was planning to carry his own army across the Alps, and fight an Italian campaign, ' which had been a fine jaunt indeed,' as his English officers said.* The Dutch statesmen, ashamed of the obstructiveness of their generals last year, were singularly accommodating to a plan that would have doubled the distance of the Danube march. They only bargained that no native Dutch regiments were to go.

* ' Upon our taking the field, the Duke of Marlborough ordered six hand-mills for grinding corn to be delivered to every British regiment, Horse as well as Foot. This occasioned a report that he designed to march on to Italy, to the relief of the Duke of Savoy, which had been a fine jaunt indeed. But whatever his Grace's design was, it is still a mystery, for we never had occasion of hand-mills in Flanders.' *Parker*, pp. 108–109. This makes me doubt Col. Cranstoun's statement that Marlborough only intended to take the British Cavalry with him to Italy. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 440–441.

I am to have a meeting next Sunday [the Duke wrote, to Godolphin, from the Hague], with some Burgomasters of Amsterdam, for those I have consulted here dare not agree to what I propose unless I can persuade them to approve of it.

The idea had, indeed, many attractions for Marlborough. To co-operate once more with Eugene, and, on some battlefield among the vines and mulberries on the banks of the Po, to deliver Italy from the French power ; then, to carry out in person his own schemes for amphibious warfare in the Mediterranean ; above all, to attack Toulon, in connection with the redoubled activities of Galway and Peterborough in Spain ; here was another back door to victory, not barred by Netherlands fortresses, or blocked by the jealous incompetence of Lewis of Baden.

But suddenly came ill news that dispersed for ever his dream of riding ' to Italy an Hannibal.' At the beginning of May 1706 Prince Lewis was attacked by Villars, defeated and hurled back across the Rhine. Germany was threatened, and, in the then mood of Prussia, Hanover and other States, could Germany be trusted even to defend herself ? The Dutch broke off all talk of letting Marlborough go to Italy, greatly to the relief of Godolphin, who ' could never swallow so well the thoughts of your being so far out of reach, and for so long a time.'

With a heavy heart, the Duke took the field on the Netherlands border once more, to resume there, as he supposed, the dreary round of marches and counter-marches.

In Flanders [he wrote to Sarah], where I shall be forced to be, I am afraid the whole summer, there will be very little action, for the French will not venture in this country. . . . It is impossible for my dearest soul to imagine the uneasy thoughts I have every day in thinking that I have the curse at my age of being in a foreign country from you, and at the same time very little prospect of being able to do any considerable service for my country or the common cause.

To Godolphin, he wrote :

The little zeal that the King of Prussia, the King of Denmark and almost all the other Princes show, gives me so dismal thoughts I despair of good success.

And finally, on May 15, he wrote once more to Sarah, ' my

being here in a condition of doing nothing that shall make a noise, has made me able to send ten thousand men to Italy.' [61]

Eight days later he had won Ramillies, making, ' on that loud Sabbath,' such another ' noise ' as Blenheim itself.

The Alliance was saved, because Villeroi had come out to fight. The motives of a step so contrary to the true interest of France that Marlborough had conceived it to be impossible can be read in the letters that passed between Villeroi in the field, King Louis at Meudon, and Chamillart, the Minister of War, at Versailles.

We have already seen that, at the close of the last uneventful campaign, Chamillart and Villeroi had conceived ' a mediocre opinion ' of Marlborough as ' a mortified adventurer,' and had agreed to attribute Blenheim to ' chance alone.' * How far their master had been led to share these views is uncertain, but the terrible strain of the war upon the finances and prosperity of France induced King Louis, on May 6, 1706, to bid Villeroi take the offensive, even at the risk of a battle. The King wrote to his favourite Marshal that he must have peace, and that, in order to induce his enemies to accept his terms, they must be attacked in every seat of war, and so compelled to believe that his resources were by no means exhausted.† In pursuance of this policy, he ordered Villeroi to cross the Dyle, to lay siege to Léau, and, if necessary, to give battle to Marlborough.‡

The mistake in this line of policy was the resolve to attack ' everywhere ' (*partout*). Louis had already that year attacked with success in Italy and on the Rhine, and with still undetermined results in Catalonia. The Alliance was suffering from internal dissension and war-weariness, which these displays of French power would enhance. But to attack also in the seat of war where Marlborough was in command was a fatal error, probably induced by the belief

* P. 57 above.

† ' *Je ne vois rien qui puisse mieux les déterminer à venir à un accommodement qui est devenu nécessaire, que de leur faire voir que j'ai des forces suffisantes pour les attaquer partout.*' *Pelet*, VI, p. 18.

‡ *See Map IX, The Netherlands, etc., at end of volume.*

in the ' mediocrity ' of the English general, which Chamillart and Villeroi had been fostering all winter.

In obedience to the royal orders, Villeroi, on May 19, crossed the Dyle from Louvain to Tirlemont, coming into the open field to besiege Léau, and to challenge Marlborough, who expected no such good fortune. The Elector of Bavaria and the officers of the French army rejoiced in the prospect of a battle. There was a marked similarity to the situation before Blenheim, except that Villeroi had none of Tallard's just hesitations. This was the second time, in Marlborough's opinion, when his own fortunes and the liberties of Europe were saved by the unwillingness of his opponents to stay within their lines when the game was in their hands.

Reinforcements under Marsin were meanwhile moving to join Villeroi, and it was thought that he might at least have waited till they came.* But he was deceived as to the forwardness of Marlborough's preparations ; he knew that the Prussians and he believed that the Danes had not taken the field. The Duke, however, on hearing that Villeroi had crossed the Dyle, persuaded the Danes to make forced marches to the front, partly by pledging his own credit for the arrears due to their government, partly by appealing to the soldierly spirit of the generals in command, who came without awaiting orders from the hucksters in Copenhagen. The splendid cavalry of Denmark rode into camp one day before the battle, very much as the Ironsides from the Eastern Association rode into the bivouac before Naseby.

But where were the Infantry of Prussia—the bluecoats who had borne up the allied right at Blenheim ? To Raby at Berlin, Marlborough wrote, on May 21 :

> If it should please God to give us a victory over the enemy, the Allies will be little obliged to the King for the success : and if, on the other hand, we should have any disadvantage, I know not how he will be able to excuse himself.

Yet, on the 22nd of May, as he sat giving his last directions for the morrow's march, which he well knew would be interrupted by the second great battle of the century, this Duke was at the pains to dictate and sign another letter to Berlin, to beg a pension for the widow of a brave Prussian officer recently dead. It was not only his Englishmen for whom he had a large human heart. How many of the great commanders of history would have had the combined humanity, industry and *sang-froid* to write such a letter at such a time ? [62]

* Whether Marlborough's threat to besiege Namur acted as a further inducement to Villeroi to come out from behind the Dyle, is not certain. His orders from Louis were to come out in order to besiege Léau, and it is these orders that he pleaded in apology after the battle. See *Pelet*, VI, p. 40.

Marlborough, as soon as he heard that the French had come out from behind the Dyle, moved south-westward from Tongres, meaning to march round the sources of the Little Geete, and attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Judoigne. Villeroi, who had been joined by Marsin's cavalry, though not yet by his infantry, was moving to meet the Allies, intending to occupy the plateau of Ramillies, the water-shed that stands between the marshy upper courses of the Mehaine and the Great and Little Geete. It was a fine position, where either he could await the allied attack, or decide to move eastward to take the offensive himself. The two great hosts were converging on the same spot, each with a burning desire to try the issue of battle.

Soon after three o'clock on Whit-Sunday morning, Marlborough's men were afoot, moving westward through a dense fog, over ways slippery with recent rain. The gigantic Irishman, William Cadogan, the best of the Duke's excellent staff-officers,* had been sent far ahead to scout. At eight o'clock he discerned, through the rising mist, the vanguard of the enemy, already occupying the high grounds around Ramillies. His aide-de-camp, galloping back, found the English and Dutch armies resting near a windmill ; at the news that the enemy were within their reach they sprang eagerly to arms. In a few minutes they had crossed ' the old line '—the once famous Lines of Brabant, which they had stormed and levelled the year before.

May 23 (N.S.) 1706

By ten o'clock the Duke had reached the front, accompanied by his staff, by the Field Deputies of the States and

* See Appendix at end of this chapter, p. 120.

by the veteran Overkirk, the finest of their generals, who was to win high renown for himself and the Dutch soldiery that day. The mist had by this time totally dispersed, and a splendid sight rejoiced Marlborough's eyes. There lay the rich reward of all the patience with which he had endured frustration at the hands of fools for twenty months past. For there, stretched over four miles in battle array, stood sixty thousand men—the long, white lines of the French infantry, the Bavarians in blue and red, the Swiss foot from the mountain cantons, the many-coloured troops of French, Spanish and Walloon horse, and whole brigades of Louis' magnificent Household Cavalry,* the red-coated gens-d'armerie prominent in their midst. All were resplendent in new uniforms, indicating to Europe that neither the resources nor the ambition of Louis were yet exhausted. Marlborough wrote of them to Godolphin as 'all the best troops of France,' and afterwards told Burnet 'the French army looked the best of any he had ever seen.' And the same remark was made that morning by French officers, confident of victory. The total of allied horse and foot was equal to those of the enemy. Marlborough had more cannon, but the French, magnificently equipped by their master for the last great effort that was to give victorious peace to Versailles, had been supplied with a number of three-bore field pieces, a new invention of which they were so careful that they had cased them over from observation until they arrived on the field of Ramillies.[63]

But if, in numbers and equipment, the two armies were approximately equal, a marked superiority in morale and discipline lay, as the event proved, on the side of the Allies. The staleness perceptible in the diplomatic Alliance of Princes had not infected the armies of the various nations who fought under Marlborough's command. The Danes had only just arrived in camp, without the leave of their trafficking Court, but the Duke knew that he could trust them and the Dutch cavalry as if they were his own English. Acting on that principle, he pitted Danes and Dutch against the Household Cavalry of Louis at the spot where the battle

* Students of this battle must remember that the *Maison du Roi* were the *Household Cavalry*, while the *Régiment du Roi* (at Autre Eglise) were infantry.



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

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was to be lost or won. To his redcoats he assigned the part of holding in check half the enemy's force by their appearance and conduct on the right wing ; and the fear that the French generals had of 'les Anglais' rendered this policy most effectual.* The memory of Blenheim made the victory of Ramillies the most complete in the war. The allied army went into action, confident of victory under their matchless chief. The French in the morning wished to fight and redeem the recent past, but after two hours' gallant exchange of blows they returned to the after-Blenheim mood, and cried out that they were betrayed. Their moral recovery had been superficial, and the reaction was to be doubly disastrous. Moreover, the army had weak spots, in particular the Walloon regiments in Spanish service.

The vast, rolling, hedgeless plateau, cultivated by peasants and their draught cattle, was green that morning with the young corn of mid-May. The nature of the ground enabled the two armies to enjoy a splendid view of each other, while the Allies for several hours deployed over the great arena to match themselves against Villeroi's host, already in position.

The Frenchmen's line, four miles long from Taviers to Autre Eglise, was very similar in length and tactical character to that other line of theirs from Blenheim to Lutzingen. Their right was bounded by the marshes of the Mehaine and its tributaries, which confined the area of the battle on the south, as on the former occasion it had been confined by the marshes of the Danube. Once more the French right-centre occupied a broad stretch of open country, unbroken by any obstacle, an arena clear for the manœuvres of cavalry ; the flanks of this arena were protected by the villages of Taviers and Ramillies (corresponding to Blenheim and Oberglau), and once more the twin villages stood too far apart from one another to command the field between, and both might be masked by vigorous infantry attacks, while the allied horse broke through on the open ground in the centre. But on this occasion the field for the decisive cavalry charge was not covered on its

* On May 6 Louis had written to Villeroi : 'avoir une attention particulière à ce qui essuiera le premier choc des troupes anglaises.' *Pelet*, VI, p. 19.

front by any natural obstacle like the marshes of the Nebel. On the undulating plateau of green corn, two miles in breadth between Taviers and Ramillies, Marlborough would seek the decision of the day.*

Further north, Villeroi's left, between Ramillies and Autre Eglise (like the French left around Lutzingen which Eugene had kept in play), was strong with natural obstacles, not as on that former occasion, forested hills, but the marshy bottom of the head-waters of the Little Geete, and the steep slopes leading thence to the villages on the height above. The orchards and enclosed grounds round Offuz and Autre Eglise further added to the strength of that wing.

The position chosen by Villeroi was well known for its strategical importance as a water-shed between the rivers, and had often before been surveyed by military men. When, therefore, Marlborough studied it through his telescope that morning, the Netherlanders in his company felt competent to assure him that the morass of the Little Geete was impassable, and that the enemy's left could not be assailed. The Dutch Deputies and generals had that year received strict orders not to interfere with his plans, but Deputy Goslinga personally disliked him and, civilian as he was, thought himself the better soldier. He was vexed when the Duke, in spite of his warning, ordered an attack to be made on the enemy's left with the strength of the English and Danish foot, supported by the horse under General Lumley. Marlborough's secret was in his own breast. It was a feint, to draw the enemy's troops away north. But sham attacks are most effectual when those conducting them think they are real. When Orkney and his English regiments crossed the Little Geete, they fully intended to carry the French position. Being themselves deceived, they deceived Villeroi and so enabled the battle to be won at the other end of the field.

Marlborough himself had placed his batteries, many of

* This open part of the battlefield is still exactly as it was. But the villages, though still quite rustic, have been to some extent rebuilt and enlarged, and the marshes near them have been drained. English visitors from Brussels who prefer their battlefields unvulgarized by pyramids and panoramas, and are prepared to find out the site for themselves without a guide, can be commended to try Ramillies and Oudenarde.

them along the edge of the bank overlooking the Little Geete. Between one and two o'clock the cannon opened fire on both sides, and, before three, the English and Danish infantry moved down under cover of the cannonade into the slippery bottom of the valley. They struggled over the marsh, which had been proclaimed impassable, and mounted the opposite slope in face of a heavy fire from the villages and enclosures of Autre Eglise and Offuz. Behind them Lumley, 'with very great difficulty,' brought the British squadrons through the soft ground in the valley bottom.

The two villages on the heights above were strong positions, defended by infantry of good reputation, the Régiment du Roi in Autre Eglise, and the Swiss and other French in Offuz. But the English drove them back from hedge to hedge and house to house. Villeroi, thoroughly alarmed, gave his personal attention to that wing and strengthened it with large bodies of horse and foot that ought to have been taking part in the decisive struggle to the south of Ramillies.

The feint had done its work. When the struggle for Offuz and Autre Eglise was at its hottest, Marlborough's aides-de-camp galloped up one after the other to call off the attack. Foreseeing the anger and incredulity with which the orders to retreat would be received, the Duke took the precaution to send ten messengers to Orkney, one of them being Quarter-Master Cadogan himself.*

It needed good troops to disengage themselves from the conflict in Offuz, return unbroken down the long slope and across the morass with the triumphant French close on their rear, and then to form up once more along the eastern edge

* 'I endeavoured to possess myself of a village,' wrote Orkney, 'which the French brought down a good part of their line to take possession of, and they were on one side of the village, and I on the other; but they always retired as we advanced. As I was going to take possession, I had ten aide-de-camps to me to come off, for the horse could not sustain me. We had a great deal of fire at this, both musquetry and cannon; and indeed I think I never had more shot about my ears. And I confess it vexed me to retire. However, we did it in very good order, and whenever the French pressed upon us, with the battalion of Guards and my own I was always able to make them stand and retire. Cadogan came and told me it was impossible I could be sustained by the horse if I went on then, and since my Lord could not attack everywhere, he would make the grand attack in the centre, and try to pierce there, which, I bless God, succeeded.' *E.H.R.*, Ap. 1904.

of the ravine, presenting a sulky and formidable face to the foe. There the strength of English infantry stood for the next hour, while the battle was being decided to the south. Half Villeroi's army, horse and foot, watched them from the other bank of the Little Geete, not daring to cross the marsh, and rendered useless for service elsewhere.

But the thin red line, thus reformed along the ridge, was only a façade. Behind them to the east, the ground sloped away into a shallow valley, so that the troops of the second line were hidden from the observation of the French. As soon, therefore, as Lumley's cavalry had retired up the hill again out of the enemy's sight, squadron after squadron of English and foreign horse wheeled sharply to the south, and trotted off to the field of real decision between Ramillies and Taviers. The outcome of these proceedings was that, while Villeroi had weakened his southern battle, Marlborough was strengthening his by drafts from the north. The advantage of this shuffling of weight was the more easily gained, because the allied communications were shorter than the French, since their line of battle was convex and the French concave.

The manœuvre of the false attack, by which the enemy was deceived, sounds a simple device. A schoolboy might think of it. But it required a great general and a fine army to carry it out. The honours must be divided between Marlborough and his men. Orkney in particular must be praised for keeping his head and his temper at a moment of confusion, peril and sharp disappointment, when some of his subordinates were so angry that they swore Cadogan had invented the orders to retreat.[64]

The victory was to be won on the southern half of the battlefield, an open and gently undulating water-shed, unprotected by any obstacle in front, but flanked by the villages of Ramillies and Taviers. More than half Marlborough's troops on this wing consisted of the blue-coated Dutch army under Overkirk ; some of its regiments were natives of the Republic, while others were drawn from Protestant populations as far distant as Scotland, Switzerland and Scandinavia. The polyglot Dutch army made up in discipline,

and to some extent in religious zeal, for what it lacked in racial unity.

On the extreme south wing, a detachment of Dutch infantry, after dislodging an enemy outpost from the hamlet of Francqnée, attacked Taviers, a post of some natural strength, being in those days more than half surrounded by the marshlands of the swiftly flowing Mehaine and its tributaries. Villeroi had neglected to occupy it in sufficient force, and he was now far away at Offuz, attending to the English. The meagre French garrison in Taviers was quickly overpowered by numbers. Villeroi's lieutenants attempted to repair their chief's error by sending the troops nearest at hand to recover the village, French dragoons, supported by Swiss infantry and by some regiments in the service of the dispossessed Electors of Bavaria and Cologne. The reinforcements came on against Taviers, happy-go-lucky, without any concerted plan of mutual support. Leaving their horses picketed, the dragoons in their heavy top-boots plunged knee-deep through the marsh, only to meet a disgraceful repulse on the outskirts of the village. Those dragoons who escaped out of the marsh were driven into it again by the Danish cavalry, or fled from the field on foot, leaving their horses to be taken. The Swiss perished fighting in the village. A few companies of French and Electoral infantry were held together by Colonel de la Colonie, who has narrated the affair in detail. His little force remained in the marshlands till the day was lost, when they escaped across the Mehaine southwards to Namur, on a different line of retreat from the rest of the army.[65]

Owing to this initial success of the Dutch infantry, the fire from Taviers, instead of galling the flank of the allied cavalry, galled the flank of the French. For this reason the Danish horse were able to fight their way round the extreme right of the enemy's squadrons. They ' slipped in between the enemy's right and Taviers, and flanked them.' After driving a number of the enemy's horse and foot into the marshes west of Taviers, the Danes in full career of victory galloped on for a mile or more to the west, till they reached the curiously shaped mound called the ' Tomb of

Ottomond,' a landmark visible from many points of the battlefield. There they formed a new line, facing northwards against the right rear of Villeroi's whole position.[66]

This manœuvre of the Danes on the flank was decisive of the day, because the Allies had been able to hold their own in the centre. The Household Cavalry of France had failed, after a gallant effort, to break the troops opposed to them in the open ground between Taviers and Ramillies. In that spacious arena both sides had placed the chief strength of their horse, interlined with foot according to the tactics that had won Blenheim. 'The foot on both sides,' it was reported, 'often stopped the squadrons in their career.' But too many of the French infantry had been withdrawn northwards by Villeroi, in his alarm at Orkney's attack. And when he returned to the true scene of decision there was no time to revise his arrangements.

The Maison du Roi, though inadequately supported by foot, after a severe struggle broke through two lines of Dutch horse, whom at the beginning they outnumbered. But Marlborough, as usual, was found at the point and at the moment of danger. Just to the south of Ramillies the onslaught of the Household Cavalry threatened to pierce the allied line, but the platoon firing of four regiments of foot, placed there by Marlborough, gave the first check to the triumphant charge,* and the advent of the fresh cavalry from the north turned the tide of war.

This affair was doubly the most critical of the day's doings, for not only was the line almost broken, but Marlborough himself barely escaped death or capture. When

* The Scottish private's rude verses narrate this crisis. (*Remembrance*, p. 377.)

'Two times our horsse was put to the worsse
Which Mallberie weel did see.
To Overquerke he spake, who could it not help,
"Your horsse had need of suplie."
Four regiments of foot in haste were called up
And set on the left of our horsse.
This was the third time the horsse was engagding,
And the French was put to the worsse.
The French coming down ready to fall on
Our foot shot at them with ball,
The which did them grieve and sadly mischieve,
Many horsse and men their did fall.'

the French cavalry broke through the Dutch, he had been surrounded and cut off from his friends. The splendid charger he rode carried him out from the ring of foes, but in leaping a ditch it flung him to the ground. He scrambled to his feet and ran for safety, encumbered by his heavy wig and jack-boots. General Murray was bringing up some allied Swiss infantry to his rescue. His mounted pursuers, who had recognized the identity of the Milord sprinting in front of them, rode after him so furiously that they could not draw up, and were impaled on the Swiss bayonets. Bare victor in the race, he clambered on to the horse supplied by his aide-de-camp, Captain Molesworth, the only man on his staff who was present.* Before the Duke's leg was well over the saddle, Colonel Bringfield, who was holding the stirrup, had his head torn from his body by a cannon ball. The incident struck the imagination of England and Europe. Our newspapers seized on it as the symbol of Ramillies, as they had seized on 'Tallard in the coach' for Blenheim. A monument to Bringfield in the north aisle of Westminster Abbey recalls the tale to posterity. His widow and children were, at Marlborough's special request, befriended by Sarah and pensioned by the Queen.[67]

Meanwhile, Ramillies itself saw the hottest fighting of all. The village and the enclosures around it were packed by a score of French and Swiss battalions and a dozen cannon. It was assailed by a corresponding force of allied infantry under the Dutch General Schultz, including the Scots and other nationals in the service of the States, and the English battalions of Mordaunt and Churchill.† John Campbell, the brilliant young Duke of Argyle, who had already acted as Queen Anne's High Commissioner to her Scottish Parliament, was destined for many years to play a prominent and varied part in the wars and policies of Britain, and to be retrospectively imagined by Sir Walter as the sympathetic patron, in the evening of his days, of Davie and Jeanie Deans. Not even the Jacobites dared

* The 'Dick' Molesworth of the Yorkshire Squire's family, mentioned in *Blenheim*, p. 32.

† The presence of these English infantry in the fighting round Ramillies has not been noticed by modern authors, but is proved by Orkney in *E.H.R.*, Ap. 1904, p. 315; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 310.

whisper that he ever spared to expose himself to danger. As Brigadier of the attacking Scottish infantry, he

was himself the second or third man who with his sword in his hand broke over the enemy's trenches, and chased them out of the village of Ramillies. He received three shot upon him, but happily all blunt.

The fight for the village swayed forward and back, along the streets and among the hedgerows, but Marlborough brought up more and more troops from his right to his centre, and at half-past six in the evening the enemy finally gave way. The two English battalions drove three French battalions into the morass surrounding the springs of the Little Geete. The Scots drove before them the famous Regiment of Picardy.

> With good hearts and our screwed baginets
> We advanced on a deal of rye,

wrote the regimental bard, himself a private in the ranks,

> And all our bregade they proved pretie lads,
> And the French they proved but kie.
>
> Our brigade in platouns did fire their guns.
> From hedge to hedge we beat off the dogs.

And so the gallant defenders of Ramillies, who were ' cattle ' and ' dogs ' only in the rough parlance of the camp, had met their match at last, and were rolled out of the village enclosures to mingle with the general rout in which the whole army was now involved.[68]

– The cavalry of the Maison du Roi had well borne up the European fame of their corps, but after nearly two hours of charging and counter-charging they were overborne by the numbers of horse and foot whom Marlborough's tactics had collected for their destruction. The Dutch horse had rallied round the reserves brought up fresh and eager from the right. The French were fighting with intervals between each squadron, when the allied cavalry, in a single wave of unbroken length, surged through the gaps, surrounding and destroying each body of horse piecemeal.*

* The French Colonel, De la Colonie, has left an account of the Dutch cavalry charge that won the day, of which he witnessed the southern end from his station behind the marsh. It is to be noted that the trot, not the gallop, was, as at Blenheim, the pace of the decisive charge: ' I saw the enemy's cavalry advance upon our people, at first at rather a slow pace and then, when they thought they had gained the proper distance, they broke into a trot to gain impetus for the charge. At the same moment the Maison du Roi decided to meet them, for at such a moment those who await the shock find themselves at a disadvantage. . . . The enemy profiting by their superiority in numbers, surged through the gaps between our squadrons and fell upon their rear, while their four lines attacked in front.' *Colonie*, pp. 312–313.

At this critical moment the French became aware that in the rear-flank of their whole army, the formidable cavalry of Denmark was drawn up in a new battle array. At the same time the infantry defending Ramillies were pouring out from the enclosures with Dutch, Scots and English hot on their traces. The right half of Villeroi's army was broken at every point. Suddenly the French morale collapsed, and a defeat was turned by misconduct into the catastrophe that decided the war. ' We had not got forty yards on our retreat,' writes the Irish captain, Peter Drake, ' when the words *sauve qui peut* went through the great part, if not the whole army, and put all to confusion. Then might be seen whole brigades running in disorder.'

From their position of advantage near the ' Tomb of Ottomond ' the Danish squadrons swept on to the disordered crowds, ' and did not forget how their poor natives were sacrificed at Calcinato in Italy ; so that when their generals bid them halt, they drove on, Jehu like, giving no quarter, and cutting them to pieces for several miles ; but our brave English boys were more merciful and granted quarter.'

Isolated companies of French musketeers strove to stem the tide in hollow ways and hedges ; where the allied cavalry had outridden their infantry supports, such resistance met here and there with local success. But Villeroi completely failed in his attempt to form a fresh line of battle facing southwards, stretching from Offuz to Mont St. André. For this purpose he had drawn the Spanish and Electoral horse from the neighbourhood of Autre Eglise to the high ground near St. Pierre Geest. But the infection of defeat had reached these reinforcements, and they refused to face the oncoming tide of Danish and English cavalry. According to the French official account, the whole ' fifty squadrons ' of the left wing, who had not yet struck a blow,

were seized with panic, and rode in terror through the flying infantry, whose retreat they had been drawn up to protect. Here, near the cross-roads of St. Pierre Geest, the Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Villeroi were almost captured by General Wood when, at the head of the English Dragoon Guards, he crashed at a gallop into the Bavarian horse, capturing their kettle-drums and two Lieutenant-Generals.*

One reason for the failure of Villeroi to re-form his unused troops in a new line, was the mistake he had made in leaving his baggage close behind his front, instead of sending it some miles to the rear, as was the custom of prudent commanders about to give battle. Waggons as well as fugitives encumbered the ground over which the troops of the French left wing had to move to their new positions. And, after the retreat had become general, further disaster and confusion resulted from the block of waggons breaking down in the mud of the deep sunken ways through which the country roads ran to Judoigne. The artillery could not pass, and every one of Villeroi's fifty cannon were taken.[69]

Meanwhile, the English foot, whom Marlborough's orders had balked of their victory two hours before, were pouring once more across the ravine of the Little Geete. This time they met no resistance worth the name in Offuz. The panic, spreading northwards, had reached the extreme verge of the battle, where, in and around the village of Autre Eglise, the infantry of the Regiment du Roi had their post. When Lord John Hay's Dragoons, the 'Scots Greys,' fell upon two battalions of them, '*à la hussarde*, sword in hand, and at a gallop,' they flung down their arms and the famous regiment was made prisoner. In all parts of the field the British cavalry were now charging at a gallop, having no longer need of the measured trot, their usual tactics to preserve the close order of their ranks against an

* 'Both these assured me, the day after the battle, that the Elector himself and the Marshal de Villeroy were in the crowd and not ten yards from me, when they two called out to me for quarter and that they narrowly escaped. Which had I been so fortunate as to have known I had strained Coriolanus, on whom I rode all the day of battle, to have made them prisoners.' General Wood's letter, in *Boyer* (ed. 1707), V, p. 82. Confirmed by *H.M.C. Hare* (R. 13, pt. 9), p. 211.

unbeaten foe. One French regiment after another was broken up, scattering in fragments to hide and run through the night. Eighty standards were taken, pledges of the disruption of an army.[70]

The shades of night were now beginning to fall, but there was no halt in the chase. The clatter of war rolled far away, leaving the darkened battlefield at peace under the stars, with no sound save the heavy groans of the wounded. The stream of flight and pursuit poured through the streets of Judoigne and the surrounding hamlets, thence on without a pause towards Louvain and the line of the Dyle. Only behind that river could the hunted mob hope for safety. The English horse and foot, like the Prussians at Waterloo, not having borne the worst heats of the day, undertook the joyous burden of the pursuit.*

Since resistance was no longer to be feared, each regiment hunted on its own, but all striving in the general direction of the Dyle. 'All night we knew nothing of one another,' wrote Orkney, 'and Mr. Lumley and I had resolved to march straight to the Dyle to their lines. But here we are, endeavouring to make a camp and form in some order. For we look like a beaten army.' Several English detachments halted at break of day at Meldert, nearly fifteen miles from Ramillies. Marlborough rode through the night till his guide lost the road ; then he lay

* Writers for the English public, such as *Boyer* (1706, V, 83), gladly recognized that the Dutch, 'both horse and foot, bore almost the whole brunt of the day.' The Scottish Cameronian Colonel Blackader, who disliked the English, and had declared that their heavy losses at Blenheim were a punishment for their sins, had an equally ready explanation for Ramillies : 'The English had but small part in this victory. They are the boldest sinners in our army, therefore God will choose other instruments. Also the English have got a great vogue and reputation for courage and are perhaps puffed up from it ; and so God humbles their pride, as it were, by throwing them by.' 'Give me grace, o Lord, never to forget this great and glorious day at Ramillies.' *Life of Col. Blackader*, 1824, p. 280.

The pursuit was so immediate, rapid and continuous for the next ten days on end, that some of the thrifty Scots soldiers who had thrown down their 'wallets' containing their 'stockings and linens,' when ordered to attack the village of Ramillies, never saw them again.

'Some was left behind our walats to bring
And foloued as far behinde.
Some walats was lost whatever they cost
And no redress we did find.'

Remembrance, p. 385.

down on the open ground upon his soldier's cloak, calling on Deputy Goslinga to come and share it with him, 'which I did,' says the Dutchman, 'for a quarter of an hour.' And so, halving his modicum of comfort with a civilian who loved him not, racked with headache but glad at heart, he fell asleep—hoping that Sarah would be pleased.[71]

Scenes of that flight through the darkness were deeply bitten into the memories of the pursued.

> Though the enemy appeared no more that night [wrote the Irish Captain Drake], we halted not till the break of day near Louvain, when we crossed the river, dispirited and weary, having been on our feet twenty-four hours without the least rest. It was indeed a truly shocking sight to see the miserable remains of this mighty army of seventy thousand men reduced to a handful.

All their fifty cannon, their tents, their baggage, even the sacred '*marmites*' of the regimental cooks had been left far behind on the field. The fugitives who reassembled at Louvain had for the most part flung away their arms. There the beaten generals 'held a sort of tumultuous Council of War, by flambeau-light in the market place,' where they decided to throw the stores from the magazines of Louvain into the Dyle, and be off, after a few hours' rest, for Brussels. Thus without a blow they abandoned the line of the river which a fortnight before Marlborough had feared would be his boundary for all that year. The beaten army never stopped until it had reached the protection of Lille.

The numbers killed and taken were not so great as at Blenheim, but the disbandment was even greater. The Walloon regiments deserted *en masse*, many of them joining the Allies. Spaniards and Bavarians had had enough of campaigning. Great numbers even of the French failed to rejoin their colours. The killed, wounded and prisoners in the battle were estimated for Villeroi's army at some 13,000 men, but his losses by desertion may have doubled that number. Probably half the splendid army that he had set in array was lost to him, and the remainder were a demoralized remnant, unable for months to look the foe in the face. Marlborough had all summer before him, in which to reconquer the Belgian fortresses without having to

fear any serious interruption by a field army. And his own regiments had suffered far less than at Blenheim, having lost some 4,000 in killed and wounded. 'The consequence of this battle,' he wrote to Godolphin, 'is likely to be of greater advantage than that of Blenheim, for we have now the whole summer before us, and with the blessing of God, I will make the best use of it.'

No wonder Villars wrote of Ramillies as 'the most shameful, humiliating and disastrous of defeats.' 'How many misfortunes,' he wrote to Madame de Maintenon, 'would have been avoided, if I had been allowed to act, and if safety and inaction had been enjoined on the Marshal de Villeroi.' All Villars' bright hopes of invading Germany were dispelled, and most of his troops were drafted off to Flanders.[72]

In England the news came like a thunderbolt of joy. Nothing had been expected from that quarter for weeks to come, and nothing good that year.* When the strange tidings reached London that the French army was no more and that Marlborough was advancing by forced marches on Brussels, 'most people move about as in a dream or ecstasy, God does so many marvels for us.' The reception of the news in the countryside was thus dramatized in the Whig *Observator*:

> *Countryman*—Come, Joan, make haste, bring us a full jug of October, clean glasses, clean pipes and some Moore's tobacco. Here, Tom, Jugg, everybody! Come and hear the good news. Master, before we finish here's a good health to the Duke of Marlborough. Nay let it go round. Everybody must drink it. I am sure we have no Tories or High-flyers in this house. And now, Master, one more health to Mr. Overkirk, the Dutch general, who behaved himself so bravely in this action.

Meanwhile a happy woman was reading these words:

> Monday. May 24. 11 o'clock. I did not tell my dearest soul, in my last, the design I had of engaging the enemy if possible to a battle, fearing the concern she had for me might make her uneasy;

* Defoe, though a supporter of government and of the war, had written in his *Review*, published on May 18, O.S., just before the news of the battle reached England, 'The prospect of the campaign is nowhere promising, they say, but in Spain.'

but I can now give her the satisfaction of letting her know that, on Sunday last, we fought, and that God Almighty has been pleased to give us a victory. I must leave the particulars to this bearer, Colonel Richards, for having been on horseback all Sunday, and after the battle marching all night, my head aches to that degree it is very uneasy to me to write. Poor Bringfield, holding my stirrup for me, helping me on horseback, was killed. I am told he leaves his wife and mother in a poor condition. I can't write to any of my children, so that you will let them know that I am well, and that I desire they will thank God for preserving me. And pray give my duty to the Queen, and let her know the truth of my heart, that the greatest pleasure I have in this success is, that it may be a great service to her affairs ; for I am sincerely sensible of all her goodness to me and mine. Pray believe me when I assure you that I love you more than I can express.[73]

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI

Cadogan and Marlborough's Staff

When, in the last years of the reign, the petty malice of the Tory pamphleteers against Marlborough reached its height, it became their custom to ascribe his successes to the advice of his staff, especially of Cadogan. ' It has always been the peculiar happiness of Colossus [Marlborough] to have the command of a great many more able and experienced heads in the trade of war than his own.' *Oliver's pocket looking-glass or great modern Colossus*, 1712. ' His conduct, of which we have heard so much, is all owing to Cadogan's advice.' *Character of Present Ministry*, 1712.

In reality, William Cadogan was an excellent Quarter-Master-General—tireless, patient, and devoted to the essential and difficult problems of transport and supply. But the Duke was his own Chief of Staff, and his civilian secretary, Adam Cardonnel, was therefore of great importance in the military hierarchy. See the essay on Marlborough's Staff in Fortescue's *Historical and Military Essays*, based on the staff papers of Capt. King. At Oudenarde Cadogan commanded the vanguard in a difficult operation with ability and success.

CHAPTER VII

The Consequences of Ramillies

The Belgian Revolution. Brabant and Flanders recovered. England, Holland and Austria as masters of the Spanish Netherlands. Their quarrels. Marlborough refuses the Governorship. The *Condominium*. The Dutch Barrier and the English Succession. Battle of Turin. The French expelled from Italy. The war won.

The battle of Ramillies had been fought on Sunday, May 23, 1706.* The next fortnight witnessed the revolution that secured the sovereignty of Belgium to the House of Austria for three generations. The allied army moved westward from the battlefield by forced marches on the line of Louvain, Brussels, Gavre and Bruges, causing the remnants of the French field-army to retreat southward to Lille, lest it should find itself cut off to the north of the Bruges Canal. In the ordinary course of things the Dender, the Scheldt, and the Lys rivers, and the Brussels and the Bruges canals could each have been held by the French, as the Dyle had been held, and would have afforded matter each for a year's campaign ; they were now crossed one after the other, as fast as the allied infantry could tramp over the bridges of ' copper boats,' laid by the cavalry scouting in advance. So, too, the fortresses of Malines, Ghent, Bruges, Oudenarde and Antwerp could each have held out for months of siege. Yet before the end of the first week of June, all these places, together with Alost, Lierre and Damme, had followed the example of Brussels, opened their gates to detachments of allied troops, and proclaimed Charles III as their sovereign, without a shot fired or a trench dug.

* In this chapter of foreign happenings I use the new or continental style of dating, or else give both styles. *See Map IX, The Netherlands, etc., at end of volume.*

The Duke's letters to Sarah record his feelings :

May $\frac{16}{27}$. I have been in so continued a hurry ever since the battle of Ramillies, by which my blood is so heated, that when I go to bed I sleep so unquietly that I cannot get rid of my headache, so that I have not as yet all the pleasure I shall enjoy of the blessing God has been pleased to give us by this victory. . . . We have done in four days what we should have thought ourselves happy if we could have been sure of it in four years.

May $\frac{20}{31}$. We are now masters of Ghent, and to-morrow I shall send some troops to Bruges. So many towns have submitted since the battle, that it really looks more like a dream than truth. My thoughts are now turning to the getting everything ready for the siege of Antwerp, which place alone in former years would have been thought good success for a whole campaign.

Five days later, Antwerp surrendered without a blow. Meanwhile, on June 3, the Duke resumed :

Every day gives us fresh marks of the great victory, for since my last we have taken possession of Bruges and Damme, as also of Oudenarde, which was besieged the last war by the King, with sixty thousand men, and he was at last forced to raise the siege. In short, there is so great a panic in the French army as is not to be expressed. Every place we take declares for King Charles. . . . I am so persuaded that this campaign will bring us a good peace, that I beg of you to do all you can that the house at Woodstock may be carried up as much as possible, that I may have a prospect of living in it.

Meanwhile, the Scottish Cameronian colonel, Blackader, was expressing in his diary similar gratification in a different language :

May $\frac{15}{26}$. They have abandoned Brussels and all Brabant. The Lord is taken heart and hand and spirit from our enemies.

May $\frac{16}{27}$. Passing the canal [of Brussels] at Vilvoord. No resistance from the enemy, though we thought, happen what might, they would have defended the canal.

May $\frac{19}{30}$. A fatiguing march this Sabbath. All day I met with what I fear and hate in this trade, viz. cursing, swearing, filthy language, etc., yet though it was a hell around me, I bless the Lord there was a heaven within. We are still pursuing our victory, and they

are still fleeing before us. There is certainly something in this affair beyond human working.

$\frac{\text{May } 24}{\text{June } 4}$. Marching still forward. Crossing the Lys above Ghent. Still no enemy to be seen. Bruges, Antwerp, and in short all Brabant and Flanders almost yielded. What the French got in a night by stealth at the King of Spain's death, they have lost again in a day. That old tyrant who wasted God's church is about to be wasted himself.

Although the main strength of the army crossed the Brussels canal to the north of the city, Marlborough was officially received in the capital on May 28, and many of our officers were found in its streets on errands of business or pleasure. After Ramillies, as before Waterloo, the Hotel de Ville and the Guild Houses of the Grande Place * looked down on the red-coated gentlemen, the Dobbins, Major O'Dowds and George Osbornes of an earlier day, but of much the same breed, temper and background of experience. After the campaign was over, in the winter of 1706–7, we are told that there was 'great mirth' in Brussels, 'with great and numerous company, and there was an excellent opera, and balls at the theatre that began at midnight, and where there was great play. The ladies were all masked. There were continued suppers,' the English taking the lead in all the gallantry and expense.[74]

The Belgian revolution, launched by the victory of Ramillies, had a political aspect that softened the character and speeded the pace of Marlborough's conquest. The government of the Spanish Netherlands had been carried on by the Elector of Bavaria through his Lieutenant, the Marquis of Bedmar, nominally on behalf of Spain, but for four years past really on behalf of France. The Elector was personally liked by the aristocracy, but Bedmar's rule had been marked by arbitrary acts, in contravention of the ancient liberties of the land, as set forth in the charter of the 'Joyous Entry,' and the French soldiers were insolent and unpopular. The burgher corporations of the

* Many of them, rebuilt after the French bombardment of 1695, looked the same in 1706 as in 1815 or to-day.

Netherlands cities had never wholly forgotten the heritage of freedom for which their ancestors had struggled against medieval Counts of Flanders, Kings of France, Princes of Burgundy, and later against Alva and the Spanish power. The losing battle had never been quite lost nor the flame wholly extinguished. What was left of these rights was now in more danger from Louis XIV than from the moribund monarchy of Spain. Flanders and Brabant seemed on the way to become mere provinces of France. The French-speaking Walloons had no more wish for that than had the Flemish-speakers along the Dutch border. Similarly, the Flemings had no wish to be subjected to their cousins, the Dutch. Although Belgium, as the home of two races, had little national self-consciousness, its great civic traditions and liberties made it anxious to remain a unit independent both of Holland and of France.

With this end in view, the Estates and the Cities, on the news of the total defeat of the French arms at Ramillies, hastened to proclaim Charles III as the rightful King of Spain, and to throw themselves on the protection of Marlborough. Charles, who had no troops of his own in the Netherlands, and seemed destined to live either in Madrid or in Vienna, would, they hoped, make an excellent King Log. Meanwhile, Marlborough and his redcoats would protect them from oppression by the Dutch, their fellow-subjects of long ago, but for many years past their jealous and successful rivals in trade.

Four days after the battle, the representatives of the Three Estates of Brabant completed a negotiation with Marlborough, resulting in the proclamation of Charles III by the Estates, and the recognition of the liberties of Brabant by the victorious English General. In the name of Queen Anne and of the Dutch Government, the Duke solemnly assured the great ecclesiastics, nobles and burghers who came on deputation to his camp, that 'there would not be the least change in regard to religion, and that His Catholic Majesty would renew the Joyous Entry of Brabant, as it had been granted by his predecessor, Charles II, of glorious memory.' At the same time he issued a proclamation to his army that everything in Brabant and Flanders would have

to be paid for, and that looting and marauding would be punished by death.*

On these terms, the Estates of Brabant, and a few days later the Estates of Flanders, and the municipalities of all the great cities of the region, proclaimed Charles III and made the Dutch and English armies welcome. Such prompt action by the native rulers of the land, which forestalled actual military compulsion, had a moral effect on the garrisons of the fortress cities, formed partly of French troops and partly of Belgians in the Spanish service. The native soldiery, following the lead of the civic authorities, opened the gates to the Allies and declared for Charles III, and in very few cases were the French either in numbers or in mood to prevent them. In this manner, by June 6, every town in Belgium north of the line Bruges-Ghent-Brussels, with the exception of Dendermonde, had fallen to the Allies, besides Oudenarde further to the south. Even the noble Spaniard, the Marquis of Tarazena, Governor of Antwerp, decided that Charles III was now his King, and by opening the gates of the city saved Marlborough many precious months which he must otherwise have wasted

* The army seems to have been impressed by the solemnity of the proclamation. The private who was chronicler of the Scottish regiment thus paraphrased the Duke's words (*Remembrance*, p. 383):

'King Charles the thrid he is now procleamed
The right King of Spain for to be.
This Spanish speybae [Pays Bas] it belongeth now all
To His Catholick Majestie.
Therefor at large we now discharge
Al spoiling of this countrie,
To prevent milroding or stealing or robing
Under the pain of your death.
If this country ye wrong ye are to hang
And afterwards reckon your skaith.'
And now afterhind the bouers [peasants] did come in,
With enough of provision to sell.
The price of meat and drink was agreed on, I think
And for everything money we tell.
* * * *
Our officers to the fair town of Brussels
Right frequently made their repaire.

An English officer writes home on June 2: 'The common people of the Low Countries seem very much rejoiced at the change; the priests and gentry but very reserved.' *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 71.

before its walls. 'My Lord Duke was received at Antwerp,' we are told, 'with one piece of ceremony which was odd enough, the magistracy of the town marching before him with lighted flambeaux though in the middle of the day, which is looked upon as the greatest mark of honour they can show, and which they seldom, or ever, have bestowed upon their Dukes of Brabant.[75]

So far, no siege operation had been necessary. But the remainder of the campaign, from the latter part of June to the first week of October, was devoted to the four successful sieges of Ostend, Dendermonde, Menin and Ath. In these places the French had prevailed over the Belgians in the garrison, resistance had been organized and fresh troops had been thrown in.

The decision of Marlborough to begin with the siege of Ostend had both military and political significance. The capture of its port would open a direct line between England and the army at the front. This shortening of Marlborough's communications proved invaluable to him in all the later stages of the war : for example, the grand operations which resulted in the capture of Lille in 1708 could never have been carried through if supplies from England had still been forced to go round by way of the Dutch ports and the long overland route. Godolphin, with his purely political intelligence, hoped that the Allies would begin by taking Dunkirk, the headquarters of the French privateers so much dreaded by the English merchants. But when Marlborough assured him that Dunkirk could not possibly be approached till both Ostend and Nieuport had fallen, he at once, as always, bowed to his friend's superior knowledge of war. Ostend had indeed been second only to Dunkirk as a nest of privateers, and its capture converted it into the chief port of entry for English cloth into the reopened markets of the Spanish Netherlands. Holland had her eyes on it as the most desirable of all places to be acquired under cover of her new Barrier—a point on which both England and Austria would have much to say.

The summer siege of this water-girt fortress, which had been taken by Spinola in 1604 only after the passage of

three years and the loss of 80,000 men, was accomplished by Marlborough in three weeks, with a loss of 500. His rapid success was due in part to the half-heartedness of some Walloon regiments in the garrison, and partly to the co-operation of the English squadron, which bombarded Ostend from the sea, while the Duke's land batteries fired from a narrow frontage on the sand dunes of the coast. On all other sides the fortress was completely protected by marshes and inundations.[76]

From Ostend, which fell on July 6,* Marlborough moved inland to Courtrai, which offered no resistance. He was now joined by the Prussians, whose king, after Ramillies, had no longer any thought of deserting the Alliance. Six thousand good French troops composed the garrison of Menin, a small town just inside the French territory, regarded as one of Vauban's greatest masterpieces of fortification. It was besieged and carried before the end of August. The French field-army was close at hand, but did not dare to attack the lines of circumvallation which Marlborough constructed to cover the siege.

Henceforth till the end of the war Corporal Trim was kept busy with his spade. In these sieges, following one after the other in the campaigns of the next half-dozen years, the British grenadiers of the different regiments, and the infantry as a whole, were constantly and severely engaged, losing many more men in a hundred forgotten assaults and sallies, on scarp and counterscarp, half-moon and ravelin, than ever they lost in the four famous battles of the war. Captain Parker writes of his own regiment at Menin : 'Here we paid for our looking on at Ramillies. Having had two captains and five subalterns killed, and eight officers wounded, among whom I was one.' And foremost in these desperate encounters was the Duke of Argyle, who

* Marlborough, Godolphin and the Dutch had, in June and July, a plan for a 'descent' to be made somewhere on the coast of France, Godolphin hoped against Rochefort. But though the preparations got some way, it came to nothing. It was hoped to get all the Protestants of south France to rise ; the invaders were to proclaim that they 'came only to restore the people to their liberties and *to have Assemblies of the States as they had anciently*.' It is fortunate that this design of interference with the internal affairs of France was not, in fact, attempted. *Dispatches*, II, pp. 579, 682 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 266 (453) ; *Coxe*, chap. xlvi, vol. II, pp. 45–47.

exposed himself more like a young subaltern than a grave statesman, on whom so largely rested the burden of guiding the Union Treaty through two Parliaments.[77]

Scotland was indeed well represented among Marlborough's men, in that year when Great Britain was being forged on the anvil of policy at home. As the siege of Menin drew to a close, there died of fever at Courtrai the young Colonel of the Scots Greys, Lord John Hay, son of the Marquis of Tweeddale, another statesman of the Union. Lord John, as the Duke wrote, was 'generally regretted through the whole army.' In the three brief years of his Colonelcy, on the banks of the Danube and by the Belgian streams, he had founded the European reputation of his regiment and its 'terrible grey horses,' which Napoleon was one day to watch careering through the ranks of his army as through a field of corn, at Waterloo.[78]

Meanwhile, Louis was hastening up reinforcements at the expense of his strength in Italy and on the Rhine, and calling back from beyond the Alps one of his best Marshals, the Duke of Vendôme, to take Villeroi's place and repair the situation in the Netherlands. It is more than probable that if Vendôme had been left in Italy, that peninsula would not have been lost by France in the autumn. In a dozen different ways Eugene's victory at Turin was prepared and rendered possible by Marlborough's victory at Ramillies.

On the fifth of August, 1706, Vendôme reported to Chamillart, the Minister of War, the state of things that he found on his arrival at Valenciennes, near the Netherlands border of France.

> With regard to the troops in the Spanish service, no one can answer for them; but that grieves me far less than the sadness and dejection that appears in the French army. I will do my best to restore their spirit. But it will be no light matter for me to do so, for *everyone here is ready to take off his hat at the mere name of Marlborough.**

From the capture of Menin on the French border, the Duke turned back against Dendermonde, which alone held

* '*Tout le monde ici est près d'ôter son chapeau quand on nomme le nom de Marlborough.*' *Pelet*, VI, p. 94.

out in the middle of the newly conquered Belgian territory, barring the navigation of the Dender and the Upper Scheldt to the Allies. It was a place of immense natural strength owing to the water which, in any normal year, prevented all approach. During the French invasion of 1667, when the other Low Country fortresses fell like ninepins, Dendermonde, safe behind its inundations, had successfully defied Louis in person. The old King now comforted his courtiers with the assurance that 'only an army of ducks could take it.' This sense of security was so great that the garrison had been left 'inconsiderable, sickly and half-starved, and the fortifications very ill-conditioned.' It had been loosely blockaded by the Allies since June. Seven weeks without rain gave the Duke a chance that he did not let slip. When the garrison of Menin marched out on August 25, he at once ordered an attack in force upon Dendermonde and, owing to the unusual drought, took it after a week's siege. He was not a day too soon. On September 6th, the day after its surrender, the weather broke and it rained for four days on end. Marlborough saw in this the finger of Providence; still more surely did Colonel Blackader:

> Even the people of this country say that God fights for us; for old men at seventy years observe they never saw such a drought, or the waters so low about the town.[79]

Returning in the direction of the French border, the Duke sat down before Ath. Vendôme was close at hand, near Valenciennes, with a great army collected from all the other fronts to guard the grand entry of France. Much indeed had changed in a few months. Here at the gate was the 'mortified adventurer' whom Louis, Chamillart and Villeroi had challenged to battle in the lightness of their hearts. The lesson at last had been learned. When Vendôme enquired whether he was to oppose the Duke's operations at the risk of a conflict, Louis sharply forbade him. 'He attacks places,' wrote the King, 'in the hope of enticing you thither.' So the siege of Ath went on without interruption save from the rains. The Scottish private thus chronicles the routine:

And the nixt day in the trenches we lay,
And our officers bought us the brandie.
We keept the trenches and held in the Frenchies,
And beat them back when they sallie.

On October 2nd Ath fell—the large French garrison being made prisoners of war. Marlborough had hoped to take Mons before retiring into winter quarters, but the Dutch did not wish to venture on so large a task so late in the year, and Marlborough himself finally confessed to Harley that 'the continued rains we have had for several days past have made it almost impracticable to undertake another siege.' The glorious campaign of 1706 was at length brought to an end.[80]

The conquest of the Spanish Netherlands had not been Marlborough's only task in that eventful summer. While he was planning marches, sieges and the taking in of towns, he was at the same time engaged, in spite of his headaches and other symptoms of advancing years, in an equally arduous but much less decisive series of operations in the regions of diplomacy. Here he was fighting on a triple front ; his task was to reconcile the claims of England, of Holland and of Austria to each other, and to the possibilities of a peace with France, which everyone now considered to be close at hand. The Duke was a very able statesman and diplomat, as he had shown at the making of the Grand Alliance, and on many occasions since. He spoke, too, with immense prestige, as the personal incarnation of British power and allied victory ; he was Wellington and Castlereagh in one. But he had not the twofold authority in England and Holland that had been wielded by the Stadtholder-King, nor had he the strong intention to get peace in spite of every obstacle, which had inspired William in his dealings with friend and foe at Ryswick. The Duke showed no such pacific initiative now as the King had shown then. He had the qualities William lacked, for he could not only plan, but win a world war ; but he was to fail where William had succeeded, for he could not make a world peace. Indeed, he can scarcely be said to have tried. He was not prepared to advise any sacrifices to induce the

French to accept the main consequences of the beating he had given them. For years past he had been writing to Sarah, declaring, probably with the sincerity of the moment, how much he longed for victory that should allow him to return from the wars and live with her in retirement at St. Albans or at Blenheim. But now that victory had come, he seemed to care little how long the war went on, and to have no other recipe for ending it than ever more extensive military operations.

Some expressions in the correspondence between Marlborough and Godolphin are singularly unpacific, as when the Treasurer wrote in July 1706 :

I don't think the Dutch are very reasonable, to be so much in pain about their barrier, as things stand ; but it is plain argument to me they think of joining their interest to France, whenever a peace comes, and for that very reason the longer we can keep it off, the better.

In August the Duke replied :

It is publicly said at the Hague that France is reduced to what it ought to be, and that if the war should be carried further, it would serve only to make England greater than it ought to be. In short, I am afraid our best allies are very fond of a peace.

In the same month Marlborough wrote to Heinsius :

As a good Englishman, I must be of the opinion of my country, but both by treaty * and in interest we are obliged to preserve the Monarchy of Spain entire.

The news that the Allies were in Madrid seemed that summer to justify the policy of 'no peace without Spain.' That claim emanated from Marlborough and Godolphin, but the Dutch were in full agreement. Not only Heinsius, but in 1706 even his political rival, Buys, the head of the moderate party in foreign affairs, fell in with the demand for the cession of the whole Spanish Empire to Charles. By so doing, they hoped to buy England's support and Austria's acquiescence in the matter of Holland's own claims for a

* The Treaty with Portugal, 1703, *not* the Treaty of Grand Alliance, 1701 ; see *Blenheim*, pp. 146, 302–303.

good Barrier in the Netherlands. But that was not their sole motive. The Dutch had fears on their own behalf that a French Bourbon at Madrid would endanger the position of the overseas trade of Holland in the lands of the Spanish Monarchy.

But in 1706 the difficulties of the Allies were not due to the rock ahead of 'no peace without Spain,' on which they were all fatally agreed; the immediate question that divided and perplexed them was how to deal with the Spanish Netherlands, the magnificent trophy that Marlborough had laid at their feet. The bear had been killed, and the hunters at once fell out over the spoil. England, indeed, hastened to disclaim for herself any desire to occupy Ostend or any other town in the Netherlands after the war was over. This important declaration, made by Marlborough in June with Godolphin's full concurrence, greatly relieved the fears that both Dutch and Austrians had felt on that score, and put the Duke in a strong position to act as mediator between them.[81]

On the subject of the Spanish Netherlands the ideas of Austria and Holland were diametrically opposed. William and Marlborough had found this out in negotiating the Treaty of Grand Alliance in 1701. They had therefore drawn up Clause Five in terms purposely obscure; the vague phraseology was not due to bad drafting, but was adopted so that all parties could sign the Treaty of Alliance, postponing the question of the future of the Spanish Netherlands until its reconquest had first been secured. In June 1706 the time had come when some meaning had to be given to the unintelligible verbiage of the Fifth Clause.*

The ideas of the Austrian Court were, as usual, simple in their utter selfishness. The Emperor Joseph, acting on behalf of his younger brother King Charles, absent in Spain, claimed that reconquered Brabant and Flanders should at once be put under a governor named by himself,

* 'Et afin de procurer cette satisfaction et cette sûreté [to the Emperor Leopold and to the States General] les Alliez feront entr'autres choses leur plus grands efforts pour reprendre et conquérir les Provinces des Païs Bas Espagnols, *dans l'intention qu'elles servent de Digue, de Rempart, et de Barrière pour séparer et éloigner la France des Provinces Unies.*' See *Blenheim*, pp. 146–147.

who should forthwith collect all the revenues; that England and Holland should go on fighting for the new regime at their own expense till the war was over, and then withdraw entirely from the Spanish Netherlands. If the Dutch wanted a Barrier, they must seek it in fortresses to be won from the territory of France. This highly legitimist argument ignored the fact that neither of the Hapsburg monarchies, neither Austria nor that shadowy nonentity the Spain of 'Charles III,' had supplied a soldier or a dollar to recover Belgium or to hold it now that it was recovered.

The views held at the Hague and Amsterdam were very different from those of Vienna. With the help of England, Holland had reconquered the Spanish Netherlands from France. The general had been English, but half the money and much more than half the troops had been supplied by the Dutch. At the decisive battle of Ramillies their blue-coats had borne the burden and heat of the day. All that they asked for themselves, as the prize of victory in the world war, was a secure barrier in that region against French invasion, and some compensation from the revenues of Belgium for the ruin that the Dutch finances had undergone in the cause of Belgian liberation from France. The spoils of the ocean and the lordship of the Mediterranean and Atlantic were tacitly conceded by the countrymen of Tromp and de Ruyter to the countrymen of Blake. As the resources of the little Republic failed under the stress of the long war, the Dutch quota of warships and their tale of men in Spain grew less year by year, and those of England greater. But in the Low Countries the States General maintained 120,000 of their own troops, supplying by far the greater part of the garrisons of the reconquered towns, as well as most of the field army. Having fought their way into the Spanish Netherlands at a cost ruinous to their own prosperity, the Dutch refused to march out again without some compensation for their sacrifices and some security against the armed return of the French power.

The Dutch therefore claimed that the government of Brabant and Flanders should be vested in themselves till the war was over, and that after the peace they should

continue to garrison Barrier Fortresses stronger than those which had fallen so easy a prey to Louis in February 1701.* They intended, moreover, that their military occupation of this Barrier should carry with it trade advantages.

Between these irreconcilable claims of Austria and Holland it was Marlborough's task to mediate. While claiming nothing for herself in the Netherlands after the war, England rightly claimed to share with Holland in the government of Belgium so long as the war should last. But in other respects Marlborough was more inclined to the Dutch than to the Austrian view, during the weeks immediately before and after the battle of Ramillies. The Emperor's claims on behalf of King Charles for instant possession, put forward by his emissary Count Goes, were brushed aside in June, and England and Holland proceeded to act together as caretakers of the reconquered provinces for Charles for the duration of the war, pending permanent arrangements to be made about the Dutch Barrier.

The Emperor saw that he must do something to divide England and Holland. Therefore, with considerable astuteness, he changed his original intention and at the end of June offered the Governorship of the Spanish Netherlands, in the name of King Charles, to Marlborough himself. It was an apple of discord indeed. The Duke had every reason to desire the post. It would greatly facilitate his military operations ; it would enable him to keep the Belgians loyal to the Alliance, for they trusted in him and in England, and feared oppression by the Dutch ; moreover the Governorship, perhaps the greatest post a subject could fill in Europe, was worth £60,000 a year even in the money of that day. The Queen and Godolphin rejoiced at the honour done to their friend and to England in his person. Marlborough hoped and wished to accept. But in a few days he found that acceptance would mean a breach with Holland that must be fatal to the Alliance. The rage of the States General broke out in a stormy sitting at the Hague, and Heinsius had great difficulty to control their passion. He plainly told Marlborough that Holland could not thus forgo her rights in

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 137–138.

the territory which she had done so much to reconquer, and which constituted her main interest in the war.

Reluctantly, yet with perfect temper, the Duke declined the splendid gift.* The Emperor never forgave him for having refused, and the Dutch never forgave him for having wished to accept. The days of his confidential friendship with Wratislaw on one side and Heinsius on the other were at an end.

Marlborough himself had received a wound in the house of his friends which he felt for years to come. Ever since William had sent him to the Hague in 1701, he had done more than any English statesman to cement the friendship of England and Holland, contending against the strong current of anti-Dutch feeling that prevailed in his own party at home. He had won the war for Holland by cordial co-operation, bearing with much from her Generals and Field Deputies. He knew that he was trusted and even loved by the Dutch common people, and he had hoped that their statesmen would be ready to confide to him their interests in Belgium. He expected too much of human nature, forgetting the intensity of Dutch sensitiveness about the Netherlands.

Unfortunately, like Cæsar and Cromwell, though he refused the crown, he never abandoned the hope that some day he might be permitted to wear it. He dreamed that the Governorship might yet be his. The weak spot in his character was his proneness to double-dealing learnt in the dynastic intrigues of English politics. It led him now to aspire secretly after the great post which he had so magnanimously refused. The half-hearted pursuit of a personal ambition continued for several years to hamper the initiative of his action as diplomatist. His chance of mediating successfully between Austria and Holland on the Barrier question was thereby sensibly reduced. The thick atmosphere of mutual suspicion involved all the relations of England, Holland and Austria, and Marlborough no longer towered gigantically with his head above the cloud. He too was

* So much is now understood of the Duke's real character that it is perhaps superfluous to point out that a man whose chief motive was avarice would not be likely to refuse £60,000 a year for any consideration of the public interest.

involved in it, suspected by all parties, not wholly without reason.*

By the middle of July 1706 the English and Dutch completed the negotiations for their joint control of the Spanish Netherlands, which had been interrupted by the Emperor's offer of the Governorship to Marlborough. A *condominium* of England and Holland was established over Belgium for the duration of the war, after which it was to be handed on to the direct rule of Charles III, subject to the reservation of a Dutch Barrier, the extent and nature of which had still to be settled. George Stepney, who could no longer endure the political atmosphere of Vienna and had made himself unpopular with the Imperial advisers by his constant demand that they should come to terms with the Hungarian rebels, was summoned away to Brussels to act there as England's representative in the *Condominium*. The Dutch resented the presence of an Englishman as their colleague, while the Belgians had little confidence in Stepney, since Marlborough, in whom they had put their trust, had, as they conceived, deserted them and left them to the tender mercies of Holland. The Dutch expected the inhabitants to contribute heavily towards the cost of the war and the maintenance of the garrisons. A letter of Marlborough to Stepney that winter indicates the milder and wiser policy that he would have pursued if he had been allowed to become Governor of the Netherlands.

The Condominium [he writes] contained nothing contrary to the known laws of the country. However, our chief aim ought to be to satisfy the people and make them easy under the present administration, so that the collecting at present a little money more, or less, ought not in my opinion to come in competition in a matter of this moment, especially considering when we take the field, we shall be able to leave but small garrisons in the great towns, and must depend in some measure on the faithfulness of the inhabitants.[82]

* The facts and arguments on which this view is based will be found in Marlborough's correspondence, but more particularly in the late Roderick Geikie's posthumously published work *The Dutch Barrier* (Cambridge Press, 1930), ably completed by Mrs. Montgomery. See in particular chaps. I and II and App. A. This work of a fine Cambridge scholar of the last generation, whom I had the privilege to call my friend, throws a flood of light on these complicated transactions. Coxe's view of Marlborough's conduct is too uniformly favourable. See *Add. MSS.* 7058, f. 55, for Marlborough's letter of July 12 declining the Governorship. See also *Klopp*, XII, pp. 86–96, *Coxe*, II, pp. 548–549 (at end of chap. lxxii.).

Professor Basil Williams, in his *Life of Stanhope*, p. 62, shows that Stanhope, British envoy at the court of Charles III of Spain, had, on his own account, been pressing Charles to grant the governorship to Marlborough. Charles was not enthusiastic, but fell into line with the Emperor's policy and confirmed the offer.

Marlborough foresaw that the hatred of the Belgians for the departed French might soon be turned into regret, as actually occurred with serious military results in 1708, when the ' great towns ' of Bruges and Ghent changed sides again.

Indeed the rule of the Allies was not popular for long. The Spanish Netherlands had been saved from ultimate absorption in France, but the immediate gain in liberty was not very marked, and the material conditions were worse than before Ramillies, because the war had now been moved into the heart of Belgium. The rival armies cut down the trees, burned the farms, carried off the cattle and carts of the peasantry in the ordinary course of military operations. Behind the front, the English indeed paid handsomely for all they wanted and the inhabitants ' loved the English officers and soldiers.' But the thrifty Dutch brought all their supplies by water from Holland, while they exacted heavy regular contributions towards the war.*

Stepney warned Heinsius that ' the people would be driven to despair when they apprehend they are treated too much on the foot of a conquered country,' but he could not control his Dutch colleagues at Brussels as Marlborough could have done. The unhappy business of the offer and refusal of the Governorship made it impossible for the Duke to interfere directly with the administration of the *Condominium*. In judging the conduct of the Dutch, it is

* The Jacobite Earl of Ailesbury, who had lived among the Belgians for years and knew them well, thus described the regime of the *Condominium* : ' I cannot say their laws were violated, but their purse paid well, and great sums were laid upon pretence of giving safeguards, and contributions were exacted, and for three years the fields and meadows were as bare as the high road by continued foraging for to make the armies subsist. None got but the tradesmen and artificers in towns and the eating-houses, inns, taverns and ale-houses, and especially by the English, for the Dutch were great economists, and by rivers and canals lived greatly on what came from Holland. And to give them their due they [the Belgians] loved the English officers and soldiers, but not the hoarders up of money.' *Ailesbury Memoirs* (*Rox.*), II, p. 602.

only fair to remember how deeply they had already mortgaged their own resources. If the Allies would not make peace, many evils must follow, and among others the impoverishment and alienation of the inhabitants of Belgium.[83]

During the autumn and winter of 1706 a first attempt was made by England and Holland to come to an agreement as to the extent of the Barrier that the Dutch were to obtain at the peace. The negotiation became involved in the question of the Hanoverian Succession in Britain. The Dutch wanted a good Barrier, and looked to English statesmen and soldiers to help them to get it from Austria and from France. The English statesmen wanted security for the Protestant Succession, and looked to the large army of Holland to render aid against French invasion and Jacobite rebellion whenever the crisis should come. The Act of Settlement had made the Hanoverian Succession the law of the land, and the Regency Act passed by Parliament in the winter of 1705–6 had further strengthened the constitutional rights of Sophia and George. But in view of Anne's feeble health, the open Jacobitism of half Scotland and the anti-English feeling of the whole nation, the uncertainty as to the line the High Tories of England might take, and the perpetual threat of French invasion, the question of the Succession lay like a cloud of anxiety over Britain. The difficult negotiations between England and Scotland that year kept all men in momentary fear of civil war in the north of the island, which would assuredly break out if the Queen were to die before the Union had become law. In 1706 Marlborough and Godolphin were heartily at one with the Whigs in the matter of the Succession, and were for that reason working with Somers and Halifax to secure the Scottish Union. They also co-operated with them in an attempt to get a double treaty with Holland, by which Holland should guarantee the Protestant Succession in England, and England should guarantee a good Barrier to Holland.*

* The inter-connection of the questions of Barrier, Succession and Union is illustrated in the following words, written by Godolphin to Marlborough at the Hague in October 1706: 'I hope you may soon conclude the Barrier Treaty and the guaranty of the Succession, which will be of less importance to us every day if they go on as well as they have begun in Scotland. The letters to-day from thence give great hope of carrying the Union.' *Geikie*, p. 4, note. For the close communication between the Ministers and the Whig Junto on foreign policy this year, see *Hardwicke Papers*, II, pp. 467–472.

The first part of such a treaty could be easily arranged, for the Dutch had every reason to regard the Protestant Succession as essential to their own safety. But it was more difficult to agree on the number of fortress cities to be included in the Dutch Barrier, and actually no such agreement was reached until the autumn of 1709.

The Dutch demands were extravagant, partly because they traded on the anxiety of the English statesmen to buy a guarantee for the Protestant Succession; partly because the French, all through 1706, were making separate offers to Holland, attempting to shake her loyalty to the Alliance by the promise of a great Barrier. The English statesmen were kept in constant alarm lest the Dutch should take the initiative in making peace. Heinsius therefore was the better able to raise his demands in dealing with England. He claimed her support for a most formidable list of Barrier Fortresses: Thionville, Luxemburg, Namur, Charleroi, Mons, Maubeuge, Valenciennes, Condé, Tournai, Lille, Menin, Ypres, Furnes, Nieuport, Ostend and Dendermonde.* Some of these were in the Spanish Netherlands, others were in French territory.

To such demands the English statesmen could not be induced to agree. The Lords of the Whig Junto were not yet in the Cabinet, but the Queen's Ministers consulted with them on foreign affairs, and in particular made use of the diplomatic talents of Halifax. He strongly supported the Duke in refusing Dendermonde and Ostend to the Dutch. English cloth entered Belgium by Ostend, and Halifax, 'upon first hearing Ostend named,' told Heinsius that 'the Flemings might be apt to interpret the shutting them up on that side as if the design were to keep them in servitude as a conquered people.' The Dutch statesmen answered, with some show of reason, that if Holland was to protect the Netherlands in the future from French invasion,

* The Dutch Barrier destroyed in 1701 consisted of Luxemburg, Namur, Charleroi, Mons, Ath, Oudenarde and Nieuport.

she must be able to prevent the enemy landing from the sea, and must therefore have both Ostend and Nieuport ; she must also be able to send reinforcements and supplies freely from her home territories to the distant Barrier Fortresses, and must therefore have Dendermonde to secure the line of communications. The events of February 1701 had proved how very inadequate, in the face of French attack, were the isolated fortresses that constituted the Dutch Barrier of that earlier day. This was true enough. But the real trouble lay deeper : the Barrier system, on which the Dutch had learnt to pin all their faith, was militarily unsound ; it was an artifice of diplomats rather than of soldiers. The events of 1745, when Marshal Saxe overran Belgium, gave fresh proof of it in a later age. It came to this, that unless the Dutch were effective masters of all the Spanish Netherlands they could be in no true military position to defend them against France.

Nothing therefore was agreed upon in the winter of 1706. The statesmen of the Hague were angry with Marlborough and Halifax for refusing them Dendermonde and Ostend. Harley, while denouncing the greed of Holland in his letters to Stepney, was secretly telling the Dutch Envoy in London that Halifax and the other Whigs betrayed the interests of the Republic over the Barrier in order to curry favour with the English nation. There is little wonder that, for all his merits, Harley was nicknamed 'Robin the trickster' by men of all parties, or that the Whigs next year determined to get rid of him from the Cabinet.[84]

While Marlborough had been engaged on the siege of Ath, the last military operation of his year of glory, he learnt that Eugene had triumphed at Turin, and that French dominion over Italy was at an end.

This crowning mercy, completing the list of the objects which the Grand Alliance had originally undertaken to secure, was due to the dogged courage of Victor Amadeus of Savoy, the great military qualities of Prince Eugene, and the use made of the German armies and English money which Marlborough and Godolphin had provided for several years past to make up the deficiencies of the Austrian effort.

Though not a single British unit was engaged under the walls of Turin, the victory was a triumph of our island policy. Though in the first years of the war Austria had made great efforts in Italy, she had done but little for two years past. The result of Blenheim followed by Ramillies should have been to set Austrian armies free to cross the Alps. But they were diverted to wage war on the Hungarian rebels, with whom the Emperor Joseph refused to come to terms in spite of the constant solicitations of Marlborough and the English Ministers. 'The hearts of these people,' Stepney wrote just before he left Vienna, 'are hardened by your victories ; the whole burden of the war against France lies on us.' In May 1706 Hessian troops on the way to Italy had been stopped in Bavaria by the Imperial orders. In July and August, while Turin was on the point of falling unless relieved, more Imperial troops were called from the Rhine to the Danube, where an army of 36,000 men was assembled to make war on the Hungarians. England was to pay for the reconquest of Italy for Austria's benefit, while Austria reconquered Hungary, in effect therefore at our expense.

Though bitterly incensed at such conduct, the English Ministers, inspired by Marlborough, continued their efforts to save Italy. At midsummer Harley writes : 'I sent the Duke of Marlborough 50,000 pounds to be sent to Prince Eugene, so that I hope he will be able to carve out his own revenge for the battle of Calcinato and at the same time relieve Savoy.' Scarcely half his force was Austrian ; the Prussian and other German troops whom he commanded had been procured by Marlborough's diplomacy and were in the pay of the Maritime Powers.[85]

The prospects in Italy, when the campaign of 1706 opened, were gloomy in the extreme. Louis had made every preparation for the siege and capture of Turin, which would dethrone Victor Amadeus of Savoy and bring the Italian war to an end. Vendôme scored the first success at Calcinato,* shutting up Eugene in the Alpine passes round Lake Garda, while the French general La Feuillade began the long siege of Turin. In May, Richard Hill, the English Envoy at the Court of Savoy, wrote :

* See p. 101, above.

The Imperialists are just now where they were this time five years and have not yet set their foot on the State of Milan. . . . I do not see how it is possible to keep the war on foot in Italy upon equal terms after this campaign, unless the Venetians can be brought into it. Whatever they can reasonably desire of the Queen will be less than what it will cost Her Majesty if the Duke of Savoy is quite driven out of his dominions.

Yet Hill admitted that Venice, if she ever abandoned her timorous neutrality, was just as likely to come out on the side of France. Meanwhile the French and Allied armies manœuvred and fought on her territories round Verona. English trade with the Adriatic ports of Austria passed through Venetian hands and paid heavily in the passage. Naples, Sicily and Milan, being in French occupation, were closed to English commerce. One result of the expulsion of the French from these places would be to open the trade of Italy, of the Adriatic and of Austria freely to English merchants. They would then be able to negotiate about tariffs on more equal terms with the Venetians, who so long as the French held the rest of the peninsula and infested the Adriatic, exacted what terms they liked from the embarrassed English merchants.[86]

In the darkest hour for the Allied cause in Italy, in July 1706, Eugene began his wonderful march from the foot of the Alps round Garda, up the long valley of the Po, to the relief of Turin, crossing river after river, passing through hostile territory, outmanœuvring hostile armies, week by week nearing his goal. He was aided by the recall of his able antagonist Vendôme to restore the situation in the Netherlands, and by the hopefulness infused into the Allies generally by the news of Ramillies, and of the progress of ' King Charles ' in Spain.

Meanwhile Victor Amadeus and Turin were in sore straits. In May the capital was besieged by La Feuillade, but the Duke escaped into the open field to get into touch with Eugene. La Feuillade pursued him with a flying column, and twice that summer chased him up into the Alpine valleys. On one occasion Victor Amadeus took refuge among the Vaudois Protestants, whom his family had so long and so terribly ill-used, latterly at the dictation of

France. Now that he had thrown off the yoke of Louis, the persecuted remnant were his most loyal subjects, and the pursuers dared not follow the Duke up the Waldensian valleys in face of the mountaineer militia on the heights, burning to strike a blow at the French, whose victory would mean their extermination.

All this while the siege of Turin went forward, the Piedmontese army and inhabitants grimly resisting a fierce bombardment and repeated assaults. Early in the year, the clergy had urged Victor Amadeus to make terms with France, but he stubbornly refused, and as the siege went on the patriotic enthusiasm of all classes of his subjects rose, with the news of Ramillies and the rumour of Eugene's approach. But the fortifications of the citadel were breached, and Turin was at its last gasp, when in the first week of September took place the famous junction of the forces of Eugene with the small field army of Victor Amadeus. The situation was still dangerous in the extreme. The joint relieving force numbered less than 35,000; the besiegers were nearer to 60,000. Going up to the summit of the Superga hill, that rises two thousand feet above the plain of the Po, Eugene and Victor Amadeus gazed down on the beleaguered city and the works of besiegers and besieged. From their point of vantage the two Savoyards could see it all, through their telescopes, laid before them like a map : they noted that the lines of circumvallation, made by the French to keep off a relieving force, were strong everywhere except between the Dora and Stura rivers that fall into the Po from the west. The besiegers could not imagine that relief could come from that quarter. The Prince and the Duke decided to cross the Po, march right round and attack the enemy there. The relieving force was small, but its courage was high, it was made up of some of the best German troops in Europe, and it believed that Eugene's presence meant victory. Viewing from the Superga the irresolution and disorder of the enemy's dispositions in the plain below, the Prince turned to his cousin the Duke and said, ' Those men seem to me already half beaten.'

Indeed confused and timid counsels prevailed in the French camp. The Duke of Orleans, a Prince of the Blood

nominally in command, wished to march out against Eugene, leaving the town blockaded. The size of the French force fully justified that policy. But Marsin, the old and experienced general by whose advice Orleans was bound to be guided, declared for remaining behind their lines of circumvallation. Marsin was not the man he had been at Blenheim. He suffered from a strong presentiment of his own approaching death, which had the effect of breaking his nerve; the letter he wrote to Chamillart while in this state, the day before the battle, is a curious document: 'This letter will be given you only after my death.' The French soldiers, ever sensitive to the changes of the moral barometer of the camp, had lost all faith in their own leaders, when they saw the German army, led by the redoubtable Prussian bluecoats, coming at them at the weakest point of their lines, where only twenty-four hours' work had been done upon the trenches. After a short and fierce struggle, the unfinished line of circumvallation was carried; Marsin was captured, mortally wounded as he had foreseen; the garrison of Turin issued out to complete the victory; and the French army fled across the Alps by way of Pignerol, leaving their garrisons in Milan, Naples and Sicily to be reduced by the victors. Italy had passed into the hands of the Allies. The balance of power had been restored in Europe. The hegemony of Louis XIV was no more.

Sept. 7 1706

As a result of this battle, not the French but the Austrians succeeded the Spaniards as the dominant nation in Italy, until their power was first shaken by Napoleon, and finally overthrown by Victor Emmanuel, successor to the throne and policy of Victor Amadeus of Savoy.

When Marlborough heard that the plans he had been so long laying for the relief of Savoy had been carried to success by Eugene, he wrote to Sarah:

> It is impossible for me to express the joy it has given me; for I do not only esteem, but I really love that Prince.

It does not appear that the least tinge of jealous competition ever clouded the friendship of Eugene for Marlborough, or of Marlborough for Eugene.[87]

CHAPTER VIII

The War in Spain decided, 1706

'King Charles' besieged in Barcelona. Its relief by Leake. Peterborough's conduct. Galway occupies Madrid. 'King Charles' delays and loses his chance. Retreat of the Allies from Madrid to Valencia.

The campaign of 1706, in its various, widely scattered seats of war, determined the main outlines of the Peace of Utrecht. For if, at Ramillies and Turin, the Spanish Netherlands and Italy were lost to France, in the same year Spain itself was lost to the Austrian claimant. Events in the field were dictating to the statesmen of Europe the precise system of Partition that had been laid down in the Grand Alliance Treaty by the prophetic wisdom of William III. Years might elapse before they would accept the inevitable, but the writing was already growing clear upon the wall.

In January 1706 Marshal Tessé * and his compatriots found themselves on the southern borders of Aragon, beset by the Carlist enthusiasm of the city populations, who indulged in sporadic acts of hostility against the French troops. Tessé, mistaking Aragon for all Spain, wrote to Versailles that the whole country was 'discontented and disposed to change its master,' that a separate French army would be needed 'in every province,' and that Philip, without money, soldiers or policy, was on the road to ruin. Louis being outside the trees saw more of the wood, and took a less gloomy view than his Marshal. He ordered the unwilling Tessé to undertake the siege of Barcelona. A reinforcement was sent, that raised to 20,000 the French force that sat down before the town in the first days of April.[88]

* For Tessé, see p. 43 above. *For this chapter see Map X (Europe) at end of volume, and Map III (Barcelona), p. 69, above.*

Barcelona had been surprised, and was utterly unprepared to resist. Peterborough was away in Valencia. With great haste a few troops were collected and thrown into the town. At most the garrison did not number above four thousand regulars, of whom only a thousand were English. But the enthusiastic citizen militia undertook to make good what was wanting ; and in the country around, the Catalan rising assumed such proportions that the besiegers in their turn found themselves closely encircled by the guerilla bands of ' Miquelets.' Tessé's land communications were cut, and he depended for supply on the fleet sent to his aid from Toulon.

The rival kings of Spain were present. Philip was a nonentity in the French camp. But Charles, as King among the Catalans, showed, in the early months of this fateful year, an energy of spirit which deserted him in the summer. For a while he was infected by the fever of loyal enthusiasm raging among his subjects in Barcelona. The priests and monks fostered the excitement by sermons and alleged miracles. But it was openly said that, if the Prince who was the object of all this emotion were to slink away, the town would be surrendered, and the English massacred by the enraged and betrayed populace. Charles, however, took a manly resolution befitting his one-and-twenty years. He stayed to see it out. By this decision he actually saved Barcelona, but he ran a great risk of being made prisoner by his rival, and so bringing the Peninsular War to an ignominious end. Thirty years on, as the careworn Emperor Charles VI, hawking his Pragmatic Sanction round the courts of Europe, with what thoughts did he remember these glorious days of his youth, on the breach of the beleaguered city, at the head of his fierce Catalan adorers ?

Meanwhile, the weaker elements in Peterborough's complex character were in the ascendant. In winter quarters, at Valencia, he had played Don Juan with every advantage in his favour. But he had quarrelled with all his allies of the male sex.

> There cannot be worse company than a beggarly German and a proud Spaniard [he wrote to Halifax], and were it not for the revenge we seek on the disagreeable men with the agreeable ladies, our condition were intolerable, black eyes and wit in the wives being what alone can make us endure the husbands ; the fair sex especially never failing to put in practice the making use of all opportunities in pleasures, the reverse of what our statesmen practise in business.

When he heard that ' King Charles ' was besieged in Barcelona, and might easily be killed or captured there, his first thought was to nominate a successor, reserving to himself the post of Grand Vizier. He wrote from Valencia to Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, that in case Charles were killed, ' I will give Spain to him who ought to have it ' —that is to his correspondent. ' I ask only 1,500 good horsemen, with horses, harness and arms, and I will answer for the rest.' If, indeed, Charles were merely taken prisoner, instead of being killed outright, it would, Peterborough confessed, be highly inconvenient. But, even so, though the position would be more delicate, he will do his best for Victor Amadeus, ' for your interests, Monseigneur, will always be at my heart.' The impropriety and folly of this letter are amazing, even in Peterborough. How could he suppose that, if Barcelona fell to Philip, Spain would then be in a mood to accept yet another King, chosen by the English general, and carried to Madrid by ' 1,500 good horsemen ' ? The best that can be said for the man who wrote the letter, is that he had probably forgotten all about it in two days. And then, after two centuries, historians have a way of finding these unlucky documents and reading a man's character off the forgotten and fading ink.[89]

Tessé's army was a very much larger force than that with which Peterborough had taken Barcelona. The French expected to carry the outworks of Monjuic at a rush, as the English had done last September. But this time the redcoats were the other side of the wall, and the assault was repulsed with heavy loss. Monjuic had to be approached and bombarded in form, and till it was taken the attack on the town was not pressed. This gave the inhabitants time to repair the breaches, which had been left in ruin since the late siege. Barcelona was saved by Lord Donegal and six hundred Englishmen, who held Monjuic for nearly three weeks against the French army. When, at length, it was stormed on April 21, Lord Donegal

threw himself among the thickest of them, refusing quarter twice, upon which he was shot through the head, but he had killed four of the enemy with his own hand. He acted the part of a good grenadier.

After this long delay before the fort, the French turned against the town, but even now with a certain lack of energy characteristic of the charming diplomat who commanded them. It ought to have been an easy task. The defenders' cannon were unskilfully served. The breaches, made in last year's siege, had been filled up, but not rebuilt. The best troops of the garrison had been killed or captured in Monjuic, and an army was now besieging a mob. Nothing but the enthusiasm of the Catalans, kept hot by the continual appearance of 'King Charles' at the point of danger, enabled the defence to be protracted yet awhile. The citizens, Tessé reported, 'acted as regular troops' and made frequent and effective sorties into his trenches. In this hand-to-hand fighting the monks were conspicuous, and several were killed at the head of the Catalan militia. His own cannoneers, Tessé declared, were as bad as those of the besieged, and forty of his guns had burst. But at the end of the first week in May, two effective breaches had been reopened, in and near the Sant Antonio bastion. An assault was prepared and, if delivered, could hardly fail to be successful.

On the eve of the assault the French warships suddenly left the bay. Next morning the English fleet swept in, just too late to destroy the enemy squadron, but just in time to save Barcelona. Admiral Leake had had the good sense to bring with him the 5,000 troops on board his transports, having declined to obey Peterborough's orders to land them in Valencia on the way. They were now landed on the quay of Barcelona, and marched straight up to the breach. Another thousand infantry, under Peterborough's immediate command, also entered the town in a flotilla of boats which he had collected, and which now came in under cover of the fleet.

May 8 (N.S.) 1706

If these military reinforcements had not arrived, the French might have stormed the town under the eyes of the English seamen. Indeed, the assault might have been successfully made a few hours before their arrival, even after the departure of the French fleet, if Tessé had been

a man to take risks. But he had no communications open except by sea, and he had, therefore, some reason to fear embarrassment even if he took Barcelona. It is, indeed, highly probable that if the town had once fallen, the Miquelets would have been so much discouraged that he could have opened his communications again by land. But, as his letters show, he was thoroughly alarmed by his position, and after the departure of the French fleet never thought of attempting to storm the town. A day or two later the besiegers decamped, leaving behind their cannon, ammunition and stores. They cut their way back to the French border through hordes of Catalan insurgents hanging on their flanks. Tessé lost, in the siege and retreat, a quarter of his total force.

On the very day the siege was raised, occurred an eclipse of the sun, so complete that English officers in Barcelona lit candles at midday. It seemed to the delighted Allies to portend the veiled fortunes of the Grand Monarch who, in his pride, had chosen the sun for his emblem. Medals and prints representing the symbolic eclipse filled the shops of London and Amsterdam that summer, for the news of Barcelona mingled with the news of Ramillies, and seemed the beginning of the end.

The relief of Barcelona had been due to Leake, and to Leake alone. Whether as a dashing young captain or as a sage, responsible admiral, John Leake had a remarkable way of relieving beleaguered cities with a margin of a few hours in hand. Londonderry, Gibraltar and Barcelona owed him their safety, and if the margin had always been dangerously small, the fault could never justly be laid at Leake's door. On this last occasion, he had, in making his preparations, overcome great difficulties at Lisbon, due to the recalcitrance of the Portuguese and Dutch. He had got the armament equipped and started. He had then very wisely waited till he was joined by a squadron under Byng, without which he would have appeared before Barcelona inferior to the enemy in numbers. But the necessity for haste had been kept before the seamen by General James Stanhope, sent out with the reinforcements as English Minister to the King of Spain. Stanhope was statesman enough to know that, before everything else, 'King Charles'

must be saved from capture, and he impressed this point upon Leake.

The Admiral had kept the troops on board in spite of Peterborough's reiterated orders to land them in Valencia, where they would have swelled My Lord's command, but not in sufficient numbers to enable him to cut his way through Tessé's army.*

Last of all, Leake had kept his temper under desperate provocation from the erratic Earl. Peterborough on shore had instructed Stanhope on the fleet to warn him of its approach by sending a piece of paper cut to a particular pattern. On receipt of the arranged signal Peterborough put to sea in a small boat, waylaid the English fleet as it hastened northwards along the coast, came on board, and hoisted his flag on Leake's flagship. He bore the superior commission even at sea.† But the salt-water Admiral kept his own flag flying as well as My Lord's, and said nothing. To discuss the situation would have precipitated a crisis that might have been fatal to their enterprise. Peterborough, who had only a midshipman's experience of the sea, had no intention of taking over the real command, and left everything to Leake—except the reputation of having relieved Barcelona. To that he intended to lay claim. His partisans at home wrote up the story. In those days, and for many years to come, the history of naval operations was written by landsmen. The sailors' view of the affair was seldom heard, and seldom heeded in polite society. In his claim to have saved Barcelona, the madcap Earl imposed on most of his countrymen for nearly two centuries, at the expense of the honest, unadvertising representative of the 'silent service.' [90]

The relief of Barcelona, the flight of a great French army headlong out of Spain, the news of Ramillies, the

* Peterborough's defence of these orders, which he came to see needed apology, was that, if Leake had transports with him, they would hamper him in his battle with the French fleet. Later, he began to advise Leake to take with him 'a thousand' troops for the town. But would they have been enough? *B.M. Add. MSS.* 5438, pp. 70–72.

† He had repeatedly written home during the winter that 'without the command of the fleet and troops I desire to be called home and will not serve.' *P. to St.*, pp. 3, 4, 6–7.

advance of Galway and the Portuguese on Madrid, caused, during the midsummer months, such depression on one side and such confidence on the other as to render not impossible a change in the allegiance of the Spanish people as a whole. Carlist enthusiasm in the Eastern Provinces was beginning to solidify into a fixed loyalty. Castilian pride was shaken by the proved incompetence of King Philip and his entourage, and now by the failure of the arms of France, on which the Spanish nation had confidently relied in making its choice of a King. A door was open to the Allies if they had the sense and resolution to push in. 'Wilt thou?' said the winged minute. But Charles and Peterborough would not. Instead of marching straight on Madrid, when there was no one to oppose, they spent May, June and most of July in doing nothing at all. The egoism, the irresolution and the quarrels of the allied chiefs in Spain reached the climax at the moment of their greatest opportunity.

On the other hand, Philip's affairs, so long and so disastrously mismanaged in every department, passed under strong and united control, just in time to save his throne. By the recent return of the Princess des Ursins to Spain harmony had been restored between Versailles and Madrid, and a courageous woman, schooled now by a little misfortune, again stood at the Queen's side to direct and inspire the royal couple. By itself this would not have been enough. But in February 1706 Berwick also returned to Spain. The Queen had learnt wisdom from the disasters which had followed her insistence on his recall. Philip, indeed, was a cipher, but Berwick and des Ursins, acting together, might yet save Spain from Charles and Peterborough, acting one against the other.*

* During his retirement from the Spanish scene, Berwick had, in 1705, been coping with the rebellion of the persecuted Cevennois, or Camisards, in the heart of southern France; it was the same employment that had been found for Villars in the year of Blenheim (*Blenheim*, pp. 321–322). Villars had tried pacification and toleration, but the bigots at Versailles had thrown over that policy. Berwick had, therefore, to fall back upon burnings alive and breakings on the wheel, retreading the circle of mutual atrocity in which that fearful war of religion revolved. One of Berwick's opinions is worthy of notice in an English history: 'It is astonishing that the English and Dutch, who fomented this revolt underhand, never sent the Cevennois any capable leaders, or even gave them any better counsel.' *Berwick*, I, pp. 178–183, 196–197.

While the great French army, under Tessé's command, was unsuccessfully besieging Barcelona, it was Berwick's task, with a much less powerful force, to delay as best he could the advance of Ruvigny, Lord Galway, from Portugal into the heart of Spain. The Huguenot General of the English, though not a great soldier, was more competent than Charles and more steady and disinterested than Peterborough. It was due to his initiative that the Allies came so near to final victory that summer.

Seeing the bulk of the French forces deeply engaged in Catalonia, Galway insisted that the Anglo-Portuguese on the western frontier of Spain should march into the heart of the country. He carried them forward to the important frontier fortress of Alcantara, which he besieged and took, together with its garrison of 4,000 Spanish infantry.

April 14 (N.S.) 1706

The road to Madrid was now open. For the moment Berwick had not the troops to resist the Allies. In May they took Ciudad Rodrigo in less than a week. Salamanca made no resistance at all. But the Portuguese General, Das Minas, and his men cared for nothing but plundering Spain, and had no relish for a risky adventure to the capital. Galway called in the help of Methuen. The English Ambassador at Lisbon coerced King Peter by threatening to send away the English troops by sea, and to stop the pay of their half-hearted allies.* The King submitted, and ordered Das Minas to go forward. A few weeks later John Methuen died, but meanwhile Galway and his English had arrived in Madrid, dragging with them the Portuguese army, loaded with the plunder of Spain.

June 27 (N.S.) 1706

* 'I find myself obliged to represent to your Majesty in the name of the Queen my Mistress, that, since it appears now to be in your Majesty's power by marching immediately toward Madrid to make a revolution in Spain, if any other resolution than that be taken the Queen my Mistress will look on it as the loss of the greatest occasion that could be wished. If the army shall be otherwise employed this spring than in marching into Spain toward Madrid, I am commanded to retire the English forces in Portugal to be embarked on the fleet which I expect in the next month, and in that case I am likewise commanded not to continue the payment of the Subsidies for the pay of the troops of your Majesty according to the Treaty.' *Account of what was insisted on by Mr. Methuen at the Conference of the 9th, 19th and 21st of April and presented in writing to the King of Portugal on April 22, 1706. P.R.O., S.P., 89, 19.*

The first reception of the Allies in the capital was better than they could have hoped 'considering the unaccountable absence of the King of Spain.' Galway had, in vain, implored Charles to join him at Madrid. An army of invaders, consisting chiefly of Portuguese banditti 'committing the greatest disorders and robbing the people of what they could,' and a few disciplined regiments of heretics, the countrymen of Drake and Cromwell, could not hope to be popular in Spain except as the bodyguard of the King. And the Austrian King of Spain seemed to prefer to be King of Catalonia. Even so, many thought the Bourbon cause lost. Philip V had hastened round from the trenches of Barcelona by way of France and Navarre to Madrid, only to fly thence from the approach of the enemy. The rats began to leave the ship : four Grandees of the Kingdom came to pay their respects to Galway. Cardinal Porto Carrero, who had his personal grievances against the Bourbon whom he had set on the throne, sent letters of submission to the victors, and caused the city of Toledo to declare for King Charles. Opinion trembled in the balance.

But the precious weeks slipped by, and still Charles lingered in Catalonia. The partisans of France started a rumour in the streets of Madrid that he was absent because he was dead ; two priests took oath in public that they had seen him embalmed. Every day popular sentiment in Castile ebbed back to the side of Philip. Berwick had induced the King and Queen not to seek refuge on the frontier of France, but to remain at Burgos during the dangerous days, as a rallying point to the hopes of loyal Spaniards. Residing there in poverty, misery and squalor unspeakable, the exiled Court became the centre of a national revival that was soon to carry them irresistibly back to Madrid. The Princess des Ursins appealed to the Spanish people and clergy for money, and money began to flow into Burgos from all the provinces of Central and Western Spain. The peasants of Old Castile and Leon sprang to arms in guerilla bands and cut Galway's communications with Portugal. As in Napoleon's time, so in Marlborough's, Spain, that could raise no regular army of any value in the field, was the one land in Europe that no

regular army could hold down. Meanwhile, Berwick was being strongly reinforced from France and would soon be more than a match for Galway.* The opportunity of the Allies was passing beyond recall, and Charles was not yet at Madrid.[91]

Was the young man's fatal delay to come and pick up his crown chiefly his own fault or chiefly that of Peterborough? That controversy raged in England as a question of party politics during the remainder of the Queen's reign. It was made the subject of prolonged enquiries in Parliament, with a voluminous production of documents; it became the subject of many books and pamphlets. The documents produced in those debates, and others that still lie unprinted in the British Museum, help the modern historian to form a judgment on this difficult question.

Stanhope and Richards,† two honest and unselfish soldiers who strove in vain to keep the peace between Charles in Catalonia and the English Commander-in-Chief in Valencia, were both of opinion that Peterborough was right in wishing that Charles should go to Madrid by the route of Valencia, not of Aragon. But Richards and Stanhope were also of opinion that Peterborough threw obstacles in the way of his own scheme by writing to Charles from Valencia near the end of June, to complain that he had no money to pay the troops, and no mules for transport—'though I fear he never took any measures to get them,' adds Richards. Worst of all, at this moment, when he should have been concentrating every man of his own whom he could spare at Requena on the route to Madrid, he sent off four regiments of foot to take Alicante in the far South. His mind could no more stay fixed on a point than a bladder charged with gas. Charles, on hearing these

* If the chief blame lay with Charles and Peterborough, Galway was charged with having wasted his time in Madrid. Berwick wrote in his memoirs that if, instead of waiting in the capital, Galway had pursued him hard early in July, 'he would infallibly have driven me beyond the Ebro before the arrival of reinforcements.' Peterborough, on August 25, wrote to Leake that Galway ought in July to have pursued Berwick, or else have formed a strong entrenched camp near Madrid, but that he did neither.

† For Col. John Richards see p. 71, above. It will be noted that he had no personal prejudice against Peterborough, to whom he gave the full credit for the taking of Monjuic in 1705. And he acted as Peterborough's man of confidence.

reports, was only too ready to believe that Peterborough did not really want him in Valencia—as may, indeed, have been the case for a few days. So the German Prince, in an evil hour, returned to his own fatal policy of going by the much more difficult way of Aragon. He started for Madrid by the wrong route exactly two months after the relief of Barcelona, when, in the opinion of Richards, he ought to have set out at once for the capital.

As soon as Peterborough found that his complaints on the score of money and mules had stopped the King from coming to Valencia at all, he bitterly repented of his letters, or rather forgot that he had written them. In Richards' words, 'the wind carried away all the cobwebs which he had been so long a spinning,' and 'seeing that the glory of conducting a King of Spain to the throne would be given to another,' he earnestly entreated Charles to come by Valencia after all. But the Austrian, having started for Aragon, would no longer listen, being 'nettled to the quick at this unhappy conduct of my Lord.'

The bitter hatred that had grown up between the English Commander-in-Chief on one side and Charles and his counsellor, Prince Lichtenstein, on the other, rendered both parties unwilling to co-operate and anxious to remain geographically apart. Stanhope, Galway, Richards, or any moderately tactful and disinterested English officer, could, in Peterborough's place, have brought Charles to Valencia and thence to Madrid. But the mere fact that the Earl chose the Valencian route made the German Court wish to go by Aragon, though the military opinion of the Council of War was almost unanimous on the other side. As to the want of mules and money, it may have been a serious difficulty, and may have been in part the fault of the authorities at home.* But Peterborough should have made the least of it to Charles instead of the most. The road from Valencia to Madrid being—as the

* Richards, who had direct knowledge of the matter, says that Peterborough could never have squared his accounts with Government, for all his complaints. 'The public accounts were not rightly stated, for I knew that there had been very considerable sums drawn upon the Treasury that never came into the hands of the army's paymaster, for they were put into the hands (by my Lord's order) of private officers and disbursed by them.' *Stowe MSS.* 471, f. 36.

Earl himself said—as open as in time of peace, no great force would be needed to carry the King to his capital. There his arrival was eagerly expected by Galway and his army, and was awaited by the Spanish people with a curiosity that might have been coined betimes into approval and loyalty.

One cause of Peterborough's unwillingness to act at the critical moment in June was that Galway, as he averred, had not sent dispatches to him but had appealed only to Charles. If it were so, it was a fault in Galway, but not a reason why Peterborough should sulk like Achilles in his tent. Where was the fiery energy of purpose to accomplish great things with small means which had enabled him to capture Monjuic? There was in him a flame akin to genius, but it burnt intermittently; it usually smouldered under ashes, and at the crisis of his life it was nothing but a dull glow of angry egoism.[92]

Galway was now at Guadalaxara awaiting the arrival of Charles by way of Saragossa and Molina, and of Peterborough by way of Valencia and Requena. As day after day passed by, his position became more and more uneasy. Behind him Madrid grew openly hostile. Around him the peasants rose and cut off his supplies. Opposite to him Berwick's army reached alarming proportions by constant reinforcements from France. Berwick, combining caution with activity, declined to attack Galway, but sent round a detachment to re-occupy Madrid behind his back. On August 4 they were enthusiastically received in the squalid streets of the old capital; three hundred Carlist Spaniards shut themselves up in the Palace and held it for two days till they were starved into surrender and treated as traitors to the Crown, for Berwick had none of Marlborough's clemency.

Almost on the same day Charles joined Galway at Guadalaxara. He only brought two or three thousand men. Peterborough arrived at much the same time with a handful of dragoons; he had left the English infantry in Valencia. The Allies in Central Spain numbered about 15,000 in all. Berwick had, by that time, a much larger regular force, supported by the guerilla enthusiasts of every town and village in Castile.

The game was up, and Peterborough went back to Valencia, to take ship for Genoa, on some excuse of raising money for the Duke of Savoy. His real object was to get away from the unwelcome company of his rivals and critics, nor was a voice raised, in the language of any nation represented at the Council of War, to deprecate the withdrawal of the English Commander-in-Chief. 'I intend,' he wrote to Stanhope, with whom he had quarrelled less than with any other person of note in Spain, 'I intend to mortify you with the account of our happy days in Italy;—of the nights we will say nothing.' Galway and Stanhope remained to do their unpleasant duty, to bear the burden of the defeat that was now the inevitable end of the Peninsular War. As the light-hearted Earl, all agog for his holiday, made his way down to the coast, his company had evidence of the cruel hatred of the peasant populations against English stragglers and sick.

By this time Marlborough had found out the mistake he had made in sending to Spain 'so ill a man' as Peterborough. His long, brilliant letters 'full of extravagant flights and artificial turns,' and packed with abuse of his German and Spanish colleagues, had disgusted the patient Duke, who knew what was due to foolish allies. Although he agreed with Godolphin 'that the Germans with King Charles are good for nothing,' he added that 'the anger and aversion the King has for Lord Peterborough is the greatest cause of taking the resolution of going to Saragossa, which I am afraid will prove fatal.' Already, in September, the Duke wrote to Sarah, hitherto the Earl's friend and patron: 'I do not think much ceremony ought to be used in removing him from a place where he has hazarded the loss of the whole country.' Godolphin was of the same mind: 'He is both useless and grievous there, and is preparing to be as troublesome here, whenever he is called home.'

Trouble, indeed, was the element in which he moved and had his being. Henceforth, as the Government had no more use for him, he stood as a hero to be exploited by Opposition. The triumphs and the wrongs of the Whig nobleman became, for the rest of the reign, the special theme

of the stern and unbending Tories. Swift, in his public pamphlets, praised him to the skies, and called shame on the betrayal of 'the only general who, by a course of conduct and fortune almost miraculous, had nearly put us into the possession of the Kingdom.' But it was observed that, when at length his new Tory friends came into power, they did not employ the man whose achievements they extolled above those of Marlborough.

Galway and the army soon followed Peterborough to Valencia. It was impossible to return by land to Portugal, for Galway's communications were cut. His new base must be the coast of Valencia and the English squadron in its ports. So, in September 1706, he arrived with his Portuguese and English on the east coast, having, as Berwick sarcastically said, 'made the tour of Spain.' The English fleet, meanwhile, had taken Carthagena and Alicante further down the coast, and the Balearic islands of Ivica and Majorca. In November Berwick recaptured Carthagena, and so ended the campaign of 1706.[93]

It is improbable that, at any time after this year, any combination of circumstances could have permanently established Charles on the throne of Spain. For Spanish opinion had now hardened against him. If, in that summer of decision, the Allies had kept their hold on Madrid and crowned him there, Carlist sympathies on the east coast might have solidified, and even the proud Castilians might have learnt to acquiesce in the accomplished fact. But after the vicissitudes of the actual campaign Charles lost men's confidence, and was regarded as one who could not seize occasion when it came ; while Philip, poor creature though he was, acquired the halo of a hero King, who had successfully weathered exile and defeat for the nation's cause in the struggle against foreign invaders. In the winter of 1706 the Bourbon party again became active even in Valencia, the new headquarters of the Allies. Murcia was strong for Philip, and so was every other province of Spain except divided Aragon and whole-hearted Catalonia. But the fact that the Catalans were for Charles was a reason why the Spaniards should be for Philip. The fact that the

Aragonese still hesitated was a reason why the Castilians should be doubly sure. Henceforth, in three quarters of Spain, the guerillas, the peasants and the priests devised destruction against the English soldiery, as against Napoleon's armies in days to come. The inhuman horrors of Spanish warfare, such as were depicted a hundred years later by the graphic art of Goya, were, in this earlier epoch, faced by our soldiers in a useless struggle continued long after the issue had been decided in 1706. Starved, when not sickened by strange food and drink ; unprepared and ill-equipped for a semi-African climate ; ill-paid, hated, ambushed, assassinated, massacred, the English carried on the horrid struggle, themselves miserable and inflicting misery, without any longer the remotest chance of success. The war in the Peninsula came to cost England almost as much per year as the war in Flanders.* That Marlborough — for so many years insisted on the maintenance of the war in Spain, without seriously bending his mind to the local conditions of the problem, is the worst blot on his scutcheon as England's war-lord.

But if the events of 1706 should have taught the statesmen of the Alliance that they had lost Spain, they showed no less clearly that England had won the mastery of the Mediterranean Sea. Of the Toulon Grand Fleet that year it could be said :

> We never see them but we wish them to stay ;
> They never see us but they wish us away.

The Mediterranean policy that William had bequeathed to Marlborough was fast taking shape as a principal fact in the new Europe. In 1702 the inland sea had been a French lake ; by the end of 1706 it was more nearly English. The ports of Eastern Spain, of North Africa, and of Italy were

* 'The [English] expenditures in the Low Countries, for both British and foreign troops and subsidies, amounted to £1,366,076 in 1706. For that year, in Spain and Portugal, they were £1,093,071. The relatively heavy expense of the Peninsular campaign was due to the large subsidies paid to the Kings of Spain and Portugal, the distance from England, and the high cost of forage and subsistence.' Distant *side-shows* are always expensive on account of their distance. *Letters and accounts of James Brydges 1705–13*, by Léon Harvey (Huntington Library Bulletin No. 2, Nov. 1931). Brydges (later Lord Chandos) was Paymaster to the Forces Abroad, 1705–1713.

open to the Allies and closed to France. The Balearic islands, all save Minorca, had been seized. But another and a better harbour, in addition to Gibraltar Bay, was needed as a permanent base for the English fleet. Experts agreed that Minorca was the place indicated. Would Marlborough order its capture next year? He would have done so, had he not cherished the still more ambitious design of taking Toulon and so bringing the war to a victorious close.

In December 1706 King Peter of Portugal followed John Methuen to the grave. These two men, in conjunction with Secretary Nottingham, had, contrary to many strong influences, secured Portugal's entry into the war on the English side. From that moment of decision in 1703 flowed an unbroken alliance of more than two centuries, for the Methuen Treaty was based on the real interests of both countries. If Portugal, unlike most European States, has retained her ancient colonial Empire, certainly not by reason of her own strength; if England conquered and held the sea control of the Mediterranean from the Lisbon base, we must look for the causes of these things in the Methuen Treaty and the naval activities that it rendered possible.

CHAPTER IX

England's New Place in Europe

Parliamentary *versus* despotic Monarchy. The English Treasury as the key to the working of the new constitution. Political crisis of autumn 1706. The Whigs force Sunderland into the secretaryship against the Queen's wish. Breach between Anne and Sarah begins. The Cabinet ceasing to be royal and becoming parliamentary in its allegiance. The Session of 1706–7. Height of Marlborough's popularity.

With the expulsion of the French from Italy and the Spanish Netherlands, the war was won, as its objects had been defined by William in the Treaty of Grand Alliance. Moreover, the destruction of the naval strength, the military prestige and the financial competence of France had secured the underlying principle of that Treaty, the reduction of the power of Louis to a measure compatible with the independence of the other States of Europe and the safety of its Protestant churches.

England had been the chief agent in this great deliverance, and Great Britain would be the leading power in the post-war world. England and Holland had borne up the Alliance—its finances, its diplomacy, its military operations by land and by sea. The contribution of the Dutch was very large, alike in men and money, but it exhausted the resources of a small state whose greatness depended not on population, agriculture or industry, but on trade alone. The further prolongation of the war for half a dozen unnecessary years was to complete this process, and to render Holland in the coming era no longer the rival, but the client of Great Britain. The other chief beneficiary of the victorious war was Austria, and she was even less likely to be a rival to England, least of all at sea. The territories ruled from Vienna did not constitute a modern state in spirit and institutions. They were a collection of satrapies, the leavings

of the Turk and of the defunct Spanish Empire. In French hands Italy and Flanders would have been formidable to England, but in Austrian hands they relapsed to their proper place in the English scheme of things, as markets for the vent of the island cloth. The revival of trade with the great towns of Belgium, as they fell one after the other into Marlborough's hands, was much in the minds of the English public during the summer of 1706.* Our merchants regarded the Marlborough wars as a necessary expense ; and the money invested was returned a hundredfold to them and their descendants.

The causes of the British triumph over France were in part accidental. William and Marlborough had been the two great accidents. In an hour of desperate need William had painfully founded a system of policy at home and abroad, on which his successor in a happier hour had erected trophies that would endure.

But the victory of the English had not been due merely to the chance of good leadership. It was due also to their naval and economic strength, and to a system of free but efficient government, that the national genius had almost unconsciously evolved from the struggle of its sects and factions. The possibility that Parliamentary government might be superior to despotism, as a system of finance and national efficiency, had been demonstrated in the twenty years' contest which the events of 1706 decided. It was a result that contradicted the world's expectations and established theories. The surprising outcome of the war between the Parliamentary Monarchy of England and the Absolute Monarchy of France prevented the acceptance of despotism in Church and State as the rule of perfection in the New Europe. It raised other standards, which the Eighteenth Century admired in theory and the Nineteenth Century attempted to follow in practice.

If the *ancien régime* in France received its first shock on the fields of Blenheim and Ramillies, it was brought to the ground eighty years later by bad finance and national

* The *Postman* and other newspapers of the date show this. The export of English cloth abroad was said to have gone up 15 per cent. in 1706, largely owing to the opening of the Netherlands market. *Add. MSS.* 17677, BBB, f. 457.

bankruptcy. The Revolution settlement in England survived because it could pay its way. The symbol of the new system of national government, the pulse of the machine of the new England, was her Treasury administration. The novel relations that the Treasury was now assuming to the Crown, to Cabinet, to Parliament, to the taxpayer and to the spending departments was the heart of the new Constitution. In vain would lawyers, patriots, soldiers plead, rant and fight, if their efforts were not fortified and controlled by Godolphin and his Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. William Lowndes, whose puppets, in a sense, they all were. The war would not have been won, the famed Constitution would not have worked, had English finance been as bad as French. The complicated system of relationship between Treasury experience, Cabinet policy and Parliamentary control was the most original and the least advertised invention of the English genius under the last Stuart reigns. If Montesquieu had sought the secret of English liberty in those prosaic arrangements, he would have been the less misled. He would then have seen how the new Treasury system enabled the Executive and Legislative to function harmoniously and even to co-operate actively ; how the rival principles of popular control and expert administration had been wisely reconciled by this nation of squires and shop-keepers, at least in all that appertained to the sacred cash-box.

In the Treasury of the first twenty years after the Revolution we see the emergence of the best modern traditions of the permanent Civil Service ; we see the trained and specialized servants of the Crown securing a new position under a more popular system of government, and accepting regular control of their work by the House of Commons as the price of their undisturbed continuance in the royal service.

There was a new danger in the new state of things. Since Parliamentary government would mean Party government, the security of tenure even of the lower grades of Crown servants was imperilled at every political change in the Cabinet ; ' the spoils for the victors ' threatened to become the law of English politics. Such indeed had been the claim and design of the High Tories in 1702. But the older

element in our happily ' mixed ' Constitution, the prerogative of the Crown, had saved the situation. Anne's famous ' obstinacy ' and Godolphin's essentially ' civil service ' mind had led them to defend the Treasury officials, irrespective of their views on the Occasional Conformity Bill.* The new Lord Treasurer had left the personnel of the Treasury Commissioners almost unaltered, and that of the Clerks not altered at all. The importance to the Crown of good finance, especially in time of war, caused Anne and Godolphin to save the nascent traditions of Treasury experience and skill from being offered up as a sacrifice to party. Otherwise the rage of faction, let loose on the civil servants at each successive triumph of Whig and of Tory, would have destroyed the Treasury tradition in its early youth, and would have swept away all those elements of permanence and impartiality in the public service which it is the privilege of constitutional monarchy to protect and represent.

On the other hand, the financial powers of the Crown had been reduced to complete dependence on the legislative. The control of Parliament over the levy of taxes and their expenditure when raised, was no longer either disputed or evaded. Since the Revolution it had become regularized by custom, in which the Treasury officials played a well-defined part. The taxes were not voted by the House of Commons at the irresponsible motion of private members. The Treasury officials drew up a scheme for the year's taxation, and Ministers of the Crown proposed it to the House. These proposals were not, as in later times, collected in a single all-inclusive Budget Bill ; but none the less each tax proposed to the House fitted into the general plan drawn up by the Treasury. The plan was often altered in detail by the Commons, but always in a reasonable and practicable manner. Several of the Treasury officials were members of the House, and took an active part in the lobbying and debates.† The result was that, even when the majority of

* *Blenheim*, pp. 206–208.

† William Lowndes, the famous Secretary of the Treasury, was put in by the government for Seaford, one of the Cinque Ports, throughout Anne's reign. This is an example of the use, as distinct from the abuse, of pocket boroughs. Lowndes is said to have originated the expression ' ways and means ' ; at any rate, it was adopted as the motto of his family.

the Lower House was in no very gracious mood with the Ministers, as in the second and third winter of Anne's reign, there was singularly little trouble about finance, in itself the most difficult subject of all. Except for the attempt to ' tack ' the Occasional Conformity Bill, there had been no friction over the voting of great and complicated schemes of taxation.

So, too, with regard to the appropriation of supply, the Commons had control over the way in which the money was spent, no less complete than over the way in which it was raised. Nothing more than the sum specified by Parliament could be spent on any particular service, without grave irregularity for which Ministers would have to answer. Between the Revolution and the death of Anne, the system of appropriating supply to particular purposes of war and peace was perfected, and Committees of the House regularly audited the accounts. Here again the Ministers and the Treasury officials were brought into direct contact with the legislators, explaining, defending and modifying the policy they advocated as experts, to suit the criticisms of country squires. The squires on their side were trained by these conferences in the arts of statesmanship and finance, and learnt to appreciate the needs and methods of government. Under this peculiarly English system, the Crown, the Ministry and the Treasury were all attached by leading-strings to the Commons House—but whether the House was leading or being led it was often difficult to say. It was an altogether admirable arrangement, the basis of sound finance, honest administration and free government. The mutual confidence of legislative and executive, secured by this elaborate machinery of mutual control, rendered the Commons generous in their money votes for the war, in striking contrast to the niggardly supplies their fathers had dealt out to Charles II, in days when members had only a very irregular control over the purposes and policies for which the money they voted would be spent.

Under the new system, private members were ready to leave more and more to the initiative of Ministers and of the Treasury. At the end of Anne's reign, the House passed the famous Standing Order No. 66, which still prevents public money from being voted for

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any purpose except on the motion of Ministers of the Crown.*

In the reign of Charles II the Treasury still served the King in person. This was more and more ceasing to be the case. William had depended on Parliament in matters of supply and appropriation, but he had studied and understood as a master the intricacies of State finance. Queen Anne was incapable of grasping its details. The Treasury officials had to explain their policies not to her, but to the Cabinet and to the House of Commons. The powers and the personnel of Cabinet, Treasury and Commons were so closely linked that they must move together if they moved at all. For this reason it was inevitable that the Lord Treasurer should be the real head of the Government, and should, as the reign went on, be increasingly recognized in common parlance as 'the Prime Minister.'

So, too, the debts of Government were ceasing to be personal debts of the sovereign and were becoming the nation's debts contracted through the action and on the credit of Parliament. By the end of the reign all loans were national loans made by the authority of Parliament on the advice of the Treasury.

But taxation is not merely a matter of voting and appropriating money; it also involves the difficult business of raising it from the taxpayer. This difficulty had been too great for the French Government, which had fallen back on the miserable expedient of farming out the taxes to individuals, who paid a sum down to Government for the right to extort what they could from their fellow-subjects. Scotland before the Union similarly farmed out its excise to individuals who 'took a tack' of it.[94] This 'farming of the taxes,' which has ruined so many societies and empires in the world's history, had threatened England in 1662, when the excise had been 'farmed out.' But in the course of Charles II's reign the Treasury had gradually reasserted its control, and in Anne's reign all the taxes raised were

* So, too, on March 29, 1707, Standing Order No. 67 was first passed: 'This House will not proceed upon any petition, motion, or bill, for granting any money, or for releasing or compounding any sum of money owing to the Crown, but in a Committee of the whole house.'

accounted for to the Treasury. The Commissioners of Customs and the Commissioners of Excise worked as separate bodies, but under Treasury control; every important post in the two Commissions was a Treasury appointment. But although England was ahead of other countries in the machinery for the raising of taxes, the machine had by no means attained the terrible efficiency of the modern Inland Revenue Service. It has already been pointed out that in the first year of the Queen's reign the attempt to assess the taxpayers for income-tax had broken down before the passive resistance of the subjects of the land.*

During the autumn and early winter of 1706 the Queen lost the decisive battle in the war that she waged all through her reign for the independence of the Crown in the choice of its Ministers. The Whigs, like the High Tories, considered that when they controlled the majority of the House of Commons they ought to control the Cabinet also. A great issue was at stake as to the future form of government in England—were Ministries to be servants of the Crown in reality as well as in name, or were they to be in effect the servants of Parliament and therefore of Party? Within the limits of the constitution as defined in 1689 there was room for either interpretation, and the matter had not yet been decided. For this reason the forcing of Sunderland into the Secretaryship of State against the Queen's wishes in December 1706 was a memorable step in constitutional practice; it was also the first act in the high political comedy of the quarrel between the 'faithful Mrs. Freeman' and 'her poor unfortunate Morley.'

The Lords of the Whig Junto † had made up their minds to have one of their number in the Cabinet as Secretary of State. They were politically so like-minded and personally so loyal to one another that it scarcely mattered which of them was chosen. The Queen's prejudice would not allow her to take Somers, nor her decency to take Wharton.

* See *Blenheim*, p. 293. I am much indebted to Miss D. M. Gill's article on the Treasury from the years 1660–1714, in the *English Historical Review* for October 1931, which she kindly allowed me to peruse while it was still in MS. It is most important.

† For the five Lords of the Whig Junto, see *Blenheim*, pp. 194–200. They were Somers, Wharton, Halifax, Sunderland and Orford.

Sunderland was the Marlboroughs' son-in-law, and as such it was hoped he would be more acceptable. So the Junto pitched upon him ; as they told their confidante Sarah, ' it was driving the nail that would go.' But in fact the Queen disliked Sunderland, who, though honest and able, was unconciliatory and hot-tempered, very little accustomed to conceal his opinions, or to wrap them up in fine words when they had the misfortune to differ from those of Royalty. Moreover, she realized that, if any one of the Junto were Secretary of State, the Cabinet would soon be a Whig Cabinet rather than a Cabinet of servants truly her own.

Marlborough and Godolphin would much rather have left things as they were. They had no wish to share supreme power with the Whigs or with anyone else. But throughout the autumn of 1706 the Treasurer grew every week more aware that the Whigs must be paid the price of their Parliamentary support, or the Government would be put in a minority when the Houses reassembled that winter. Marlborough, being absent abroad until the middle of November, was longer in coming to the same conclusion. In spite of his close family relationship to Sunderland, he regretted the proposed change more than Godolphin, and very much more than the fiery Whig, Sarah. But before he returned to England he had been converted to its necessity by a long series of letters from his friend and from his wife.*

Harley alone held out against the change, and against the system of government by party to which it opened the way. Already in August the Whigs were warning one another that Harley was their enemy. In September and October he was writing to Godolphin against the admission of the Whig leaders, urging that the Government could still rely on the support of the ' moderates ' of both parties, that Tory feeling ought not to be further alienated, that the unofficial Whigs would still support the

1706

* Sarah's friendship and political alliance with Godolphin was very close and always remained so. She came in later years to speak ill, not only of all the Tory chiefs, but of all the Whig chiefs except Cowper. But for Godolphin she retained a real affection. In her Bible, now at Althorp, she has written in the fly-leaf: ' The 15th of September 1712 at two in the morning the Earl of Godolphin dyed at the Duke of Marlborough's hous in St. Albans, who was the best man that ever lived.'

Ministry, whatever the Junto bade them do. To judge by what we know of Whig Parliamentary discipline in this reign, he was wrong on the last all-important point. Godolphin at least thought so, and surrendered when the Junto sent in its ultimatum. It came, towards the end of September, in the form of a letter of Sunderland to his mother-in-law Sarah :

> Lord Somers, Lord Halifax and I have talked fully over all this matter, and we are come to our last resolution in it, that this and what other things have been promised must be done, or we and the lord treasurer must have nothing more to do together about business ; and that we must let our friends know just how the matter stands between us and the lord treasurer, whatever is the consequence of it.

This was plain speaking. Yet even then another two months and more passed before Godolphin and Sarah, backed as they soon were by the Duke himself, could wear down the stubborn resistance of the Queen.

Her view was one with which it is impossible not to have some sympathy, both personal and political.

> You press [she wrote to Godolphin] the bringing Lord Sunderland into business, that there may be one of that party in a place of trust, to help carry on the business this winter. And you think if this not complied with, they will not be hearty in pursuing my service in Parliament. But is it not very hard that men of sense and honour will not promote the good of their country, because everything in the world is not done that they desire !

Alas for human nature ! But the inexorable facts, the dynamics of party politics, were carrying into the limbo of fine impossible ideals her vision and Harley's of the non-party Cabinet chosen for its merits by a Patriot Queen. Marlborough tried to make the situation clear to her intelligence :

> Madam [he wrote], the truth is that the heads of one party [the Tories] have declared against you and your government. . . . Now should your Majesty disoblige the others, how is it possible to obtain five millions for carrying on the war with vigour, without which all is undone ?

And how else was the Union with Scotland to be carried ?

In vain, therefore, she stated her own excellent constitutional doctrine :

> All I desire is my liberty in encouraging and employing all those that concur faithfully in my service, whether they are called Whigs or Tories, not to be tied to one nor the other.

In vain she declared her dislike of ' those violent persons ' the High Tories, ' that have behaved themselves so ill towards me.' Nothing would satisfy the Whigs, nothing therefore could save the Ministry when Parliament met, except the admission of Sunderland to the Secretaryship. The wearying contest between the Queen and her best friends went on until December, and left them, when at last she yielded, less good friends than before. The long intimacy between Anne and the Churchills received now its first serious shock. Sarah, at the height of the dispute, had written to the Queen :

> I must take the liberty to say it looks like infatuation that one who has sense in all other things should be so blinded by the word Tory . . . ; and that you will believe any villain or any known Jacobite, if to serve their own ends they do but call themselves Tories and other men Whigs.

And again :

> I beg of God Almighty, as sincerely as I shall do for His pardon at my last hour, that Mr. and Mrs. Morley may see their errors as to this *notion* before it is too late.

Sarah's handwriting, when she was angry, was none too clear, and Anne read the word *notion* as *nation*, a difference which made the sentiment appear more general in its censure and therefore much more impertinent as coming from a subject to a monarch. A breach ensued which was only repaired by the personal intervention of Godolphin and by explanations of the word misread. But a friendship that is endangered by the misreading of a vowel may be held to have passed its prime.

Finally Marlborough came home from his military triumphs and diplomatic failures abroad, and on December 3, the very day of the meeting of Parliament, the Queen gave way. Sunderland became Secretary of State for the

Southern Department in place of Sir Charles Hedges. Harley still retained the Northern Secretaryship, but with diminished authority in the Cabinet ; he had ceased, in fact, to be the leading Secretary of State. A brother of Lord Halifax became Solicitor-General, and other minor offices and promotions in the Peerage were given to Whig partisans. In these rearrangements the poet Matthew Prior lost his place as Commissioner of Trade ; Marlborough was still his friend, but Sarah and Godolphin had turned against him, and even ' Mæcenas ' Halifax refused to listen to his appeal. His ill-treatment and consequent poverty drove this essentially moderate politician over to the Tories, to whom he was ere long to render famous services in the diplomatic field.

The party character of the Queen's Ministry was not complete until November 1708, but by Christmas 1706 the Whig element was already beginning to prevail.[95]

The Queen's tardy surrender came just in time to have its full effect at the opening of Parliament. The Whigs were in high good humour and performed their part of the bargain. Indeed there were other reasons for rejoicing beside the triumphs of party. Belgium and Italy had been won since last the Houses met, and nothing was too much for the Queen's servants to ask and for her faithful Commons to grant. The money votes for next year, Land Tax, Malt Tax and all, were rushed through before Christmas, to demonstrate to Europe England's will to war.* When the High Tories tried to call Ministers to account for undertaking certain military expenditures on behalf of the Duke of Savoy, which had not been previously sanctioned by Parliament, the irregularity, which in other circumstances might have figured as an item in an impeachment, was indemnified by the majority of the House as a wise exercise of discretion sanctioned by the necessities of war.

Dec. 3 1706

* The Speaker, in presenting the money bills to the Queen, said : ' As the glorious victory obtained by the Duke of Marlborough at Ramillies was fought before the enemy was apprised that the confederates had taken the field, so your faithful Commons have granted subsidies before the enemy were apprised that Parliament had assembled.'

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No small part of the business of Parliament and of the whole nation that Christmas was to honour the Duke. The thanks of both Houses were conveyed to him, and faction itself dared not this time compare his achievements with those of any other British commander by land or sea. He stood without rival, the hero of the nation he had saved and exalted. The desire of the Queen to settle £5,000 a year from the Post Office on his posterity after him for ever, which four years back had been vetoed by the opposition of the High Tories, was now carried with acclamation.* The Dukedom, Woodstock Manor and Blenheim House therein were made heritable by his daughters and their heirs male in succession, since the death of poor Lord Blandford had cut off the hope that a son of his own would follow him.

Pageants of victory delighted London that winter. The flags taken at Ramillies could not be hung in Westminster Hall, for it was already filled with the flags of Blenheim. They were therefore borne with military pomp from Whitehall, passing under the Queen's window at St. James's Palace, and on through the shouting streets to Guildhall to hang there. On the way, the Duke, in one of the Queen's coaches, was met at Temple Bar by the City Fathers with the honours usually accorded to Royalty. Anne had already in June been once to St. Paul's to give thanks for Ramillies ; on the last day of December 1706 she went again, to give thanks for all the triumphs of that wonderful year. The two Houses of Parliament came in her train, and the sword of state was borne before her by the Duke of Marlborough. It was the crowning moment of their two lives. He seemed still in the prime of manly beauty, despite his fifty-six years. But the poor woman at his side could with difficulty support the fatigue and pain it cost her to appear thus before her people as the successor in fame and fortune of Elizabeth in all her glory.

The Queen's Speech, the replies of the two Houses and the debates of the session that followed showed no sign of any desire for peace. The Lords voted for the restoration 'of the whole monarchy of Spain to King Charles the Third.' The Lower House assured Her Majesty that

* *Blenheim*, p. 274.

the Commons of England are determined that no specious pretences of peace shall divert them from their steady resolutions of enabling your majesty to improve in all places the advantages of this successful campaign.

In all this there was a high national spirit and readiness to spend and be spent in the public cause ; whether there was an equal amount of wisdom and humanity in the attitude to the terms of peace, is perhaps more doubtful. In any case the true wisdom of Parliament this session, and the best vindication to posterity of the Godolphin-Whig alliance, appeared in the passing of the Treaty of Union with Scotland.[96]

CHAPTER X

The State of Scotland in the Reign of Queen Anne

The place of the Union Treaty in British history. Mutual antagonism of Scots and English. Travelling in Scotland. The Edinburgh Parliament. Nobles. Lairds and their houses. Presbyterian and Episcopalian. Education. Universities. The peasants. Agriculture. Poor Law. Bondsmen.

'Whatever we get by treaty will be firm and durable; it will be conveyed to posterity. That which you have by force, I look upon it as nothing.' So said Oliver Cromwell, and so saying prophesied the fate that befell most of his own constructive work in the British islands. His far-sighted policy of uniting England and Scotland on terms advantageous to the inhabitants of both countries perished at the Restoration, because it had rested upon 'force' alone. Forty years had passed since then, and now the time had come when a similar Union was to be sought 'by treaty,' so that it should be 'durable' and 'conveyed to posterity.'

It would be an error to suppose that the Union was passed in the reign of Anne because English and Scots were in a friendly mood. The opposite was the case. The badness of the terms on which the two nations were living was the motive of the Union. Statesmen on both sides of the Border saw the necessity of a union of the two Parliaments in one, as the only alternative to war, and as the only political machine strong enough to stand the shocks of the perpetually recurring antagonism of North and South Britain.

Fortunately, the English were in no position at that moment to coerce the Scots into a Union, as they had done in the days of Cromwell. In Anne's reign Union could

only be obtained by consent, and consent had to be purchased by sacrifices made on both sides. The Scots were called on to sacrifice their independent Parliament; the English to admit them to the jealously guarded trade with the Colonies.

The attitude of the two British peoples towards one another was very different then from anything that it has been for the last century and a half. Ever since the days of Burns and Walter Scott the English have delighted in Scottish tradition and romance, highland and lowland alike, sometimes to the point of sentimentality. They go to Scotland in crowds to admire her scenery, and in their own country and throughout their world-wide Empire they have acknowledged, not without envy, the sterling qualities of her sons.

But when Anne ascended the throne ignorance was still the fruitful parent of hostility and contempt. Contact between the two peoples was slight, and for the most part unfortunate. Wandering Scots still sought their fortunes less often in England than on the Continent of Europe,—Jacobite exiles in Italy and France, Presbyterian traders and soldiers in Scandinavia, Germany and Holland. Edinburgh lawyers went to Leyden University for the finish of their legal education at the fountain-heads of Roman law.[97] The Scots were rudely excluded from the English colonies, and they had none of their own. The English who crossed the Cheviots on business were very few, except the Borderers who nursed a traditional hostility to everything Scottish; the jealous Northumbrians used to warn travellers from the South that Scotland was 'the most barbarous country in the world.'[98] Perhaps not more than a dozen people in the year visited Scotland for pleasure. And of these few the weaker sort were speedily driven back across the Border by the badness of accommodation in the slovenly inns, where good French wine and fresh salmon could not alone compensate for the want of other palatable victuals, and for the utter filth of the lodging.* And while the English

* It is observable that Miss Fiennes (William III or Anne) and Sir John Perceval (1701), both of whom turned back in disgust, had tried to enter Scotland on the

traveller complained of his own treatment, he was no less bitter on the stabling of his horse in a place ' hardly fit for a hog-house,' where the poor beast was offered straw to eat in place of hay.[99] If indeed these tourists had come provided with introductions and could have enjoyed Scottish hospitality in gentlemen's houses, as the native gentry did upon their journeys, they would have fared less ill.

Nor was there in Scotland anything specially to attract the seeker after the beautiful as it was understood in those days. No Southerner then admired wild moorland scenery; the Scots doubtless loved, in their innermost hearts, the

land of brown heath and shaggy wood,

but they had not yet, through the medium of literature, expressed that still unconscious passion even to themselves, still less to their unfriendly neighbours. The Englishman who rode from Berwick to Edinburgh despised the Lowland scenery as divided between melancholy wastes and ill-managed fields of oats. It was unenclosed ; almost treeless ; devoid, except in the immediate neighbourhood of Edinburgh, of the fine mansions and parks, well-built farms and stately parish churches which the traveller had left behind him in his own country. As to the Highland mountains, the very few Englishmen who ever penetrated into their recesses pronounced them ' horrid,' ' frightful,' and ' most of all disagreeable when the heath is in bloom.' [100]

The coarse brutality of many English writers on Scotland,* and the want of understanding and sympathy in nearly all, with the signal exception of Defoe, embittered

west from Cumberland. If they had entered the other side by Berwick and the richer Lothians, they might have succeeded in riding as far as Edinburgh, as did Taylor in 1705, though even he complains of the ' sad entertainment ' and the ' nastiness and ill manners of the inhabitants.' *Fiennes*, pp. 170–172 ; *H.M.C. Egmont*, II (1909), p. 206 ; *Taylor, Jos.*, pp. 94–99. See also *Macky's Scotland*, p. 3.

* Lest I be thought to exaggerate, I will give two typical examples. E. B., in his *Description of Scotland* (1705), says ' The most sacred tyes, as oaths and the like, are snapt asunder by them [the Scots]. There is nothing among them to their Kings that is not vendible. . . . proverbially clownish people . . . their women ugly, stupid, immodest, etc.' And *Observator's Trip to Scotland* (1708) says : ' The people are proud, arrogant, vainglorious, boasters, bloody, barbarous and inhuman butchers. Couzenance and theft is in perfection among them.' Their Church services are ' blasphemy as I blush to mention.'

MAP V



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the relations of the two peoples throughout the crisis that ended in the Union. The Scots gave back as good as they got : *A Pill for Pork-eaters, or a Scots lancet for an English swelling*, published at Edinburgh in 1705, advises that

> For England, insolent and proud like hell,
> Whose saucie boldness nought but blows can quell,
> . . . let another Bannockburn redress
> Too long endured affront and grievances.

Among the English champions in this duel of international mud-slinging the High Tories were the foremost, for they wished to keep the two countries and Parliaments separate ; they regarded Scotland with peculiar aversion, as the land where Jack Presbyter rudely triumphed over ' rabbled curates ' and persecuted the Episcopalian remnant. But even Whigs and Moderate Tories looked askance on Scotland as the home and harbour of Jacobitism and of anti-English policies in the island.

The Scot was either a Jacobite or a Presbyterian, and in either capacity he alienated four-fifths of English sympathy. And the English of all religions or none were shocked or amused at the rigour of the social discipline of the Kirk. Cromwell's troopers, in their day of power in Scotland, used to seat themselves in derision on the ' stool of repentance ' in the parish churches ; and in Anne's time that instrument of moral reformation was as alien to the free spirit of the English Dissenting sects as it was to the mild authority of the village parson. Calamy, the leader of the English Nonconformists, in his tour of fraternization among the Scottish Presbyterians in 1709, gave offence by calling some proceedings of the Kirk Assembly 'the Inquisition revived.'[101] And apart from all questions of politics and religion, the national and personal pride of the Scot appeared to the unimaginative Englishman ridiculous when associated with poverty. That a ' gentleman ' should be proud though out-at-elbows seemed absurd to the English merchant in his broadcloth. And the Scot, when at every turn he encountered this vulgar scorn, only became more proud and more dour.[102]

The Scots, indeed, regarded the English with sour

aversion, as purse-proud and overbearing neighbours. Popular poetry, tradition, history—strong influences on an imaginative and emotional race—all pointed to England as the ancient enemy. Four centuries of intermittent warfare with the Southerner formed the subject of Scottish legend and ballad. Hardly a place in the Ancient Kingdom but its inhabitants told how the English had burnt it. And Flodden, still unavenged, was the lyric theme vibrating in every Scottish heart. Even the Union of the Crowns had been used to impose England's will on Kirk and State. Charles and Laud had invaded the religion of the Scots till they had asserted their independence in arms ; Cromwell had triumphed over them at Dunbar and held Episcopalian and Covenanter in a common vassalage to English Sectarian troopers ; Charles and James II had misgoverned the land, and filled it with the blood of those fanatics whom persecution fairly made martyrs, and whom two Scots out of three were brought up to regard as Saints. William had massacred Highlanders at Glencoe, and had been compelled by his English subjects to oppose the interest of all Scotland in the affair of Darien.

Jacobite and Presbyterian were agreed on but one thing, that this ignominious subordination of their common country to her great neighbour must cease. And the Edinburgh Parliament, acting ever since the Revolution with a vigour and independence which it had never shown before in all its long and not very splendid history, had become the mouthpiece of this national resolve.

But there were two alternative ways of effecting deliverance. Either the Union of the Crowns could be abolished and Scotland become once more a country under a King of her own. This was the desire of most of the Scottish Jacobites and of many Presbyterians. But as everyone knew, this would mean, at best, the renewal of the age of periodic wars with England, even if Marlborough's army did not at once succeed in doing what Cromwell's army had so recently done, and conquer Scotland outright. The other method was, by peaceable means, to induce the English to admit the Scots to all the commercial and other privileges of the Empire. The advantage of that, as everyone

knew, was that Scotland would become far richer than she could ever be as a separate State ; the disadvantage was that such privileges could be purchased only by sacrificing the separate existence of the Edinburgh Parliament.

That assembly held its sessions, so important in the story we have now to relate, in the great hall off the High Street, known as the Parliament House, which after the Union was assigned to the lawyers of the capital, and has remained the most famous room in Scotland. There, under its high, open-timbered roof, Nobles, Barons and Burgesses sat together ; they were reckoned as three separate Estates, but they debated and voted in a single Chamber.

The Barons, or County members, unlike the corresponding class in the English House of Commons, were not elected on a popular franchise of forty-shilling freeholders, but were each chosen by a few score gentlemen who happened to be, in the eye of the old Scottish law, tenants-in-chief of the Crown. The Burghs, too, were all of them as ' rotten ' as the rottener part of the English Boroughs. The representative element was therefore weaker in the Scottish than in the English Parliament ; such representation of the people as there actually was, could only be called ' virtual.' Partly for this reason, partly because the social structure of Scotland was still essentially feudal and aristocratic, the Nobles were the most powerful element in the Chamber. It was chiefly they who led its debates, headed its factions and formulated its acts and policies.[103]

The predominance of the aristocracy was not confined to Parliament. In each district of the countryside the common people were attached by custom, pride, awe and hope of protection to some great House that represented their region in the eyes of Scotland. The lairds, as the Lowland gentry were called, were trained to use the arms with which they commonly rode abroad ; the local nobleman entertained them royally at banquets in his mansion, espoused their quarrels, pushed their interests, and confidently expected them in return to follow his standard, if he raised it for the Government that had given him office, or against the Government that had neglected his claims.[104]

If Whig and Jacobite came to blows, as they nearly did

on several occasions under Anne, and as they actually did in 1715, it would be to the banners of Argyle, Atholl, Mar or some other grandee that each region would rally, in the Lowlands only to a less degree than in the Highlands. If all the nobility had been united against Government, the little Scottish army would not long have availed to hold them down. But the most important element in the Government and Privy Council at Edinburgh consisted of Nobles, chosen, indeed, by the Queen in London on Godolphin's advice, but chosen with a very careful consideration of their weight and influence in the political and military dynamics of Scotland. Some were convinced Jacobites, like the Roman Catholic Duke of Gordon, or semi-Jacobites like Hamilton and Atholl, and for that reason it was not easy for Anne to employ them as her Ministers. More, like Queensberry, Argyle, Tweeddale, Stair and Marchmont, stood ' on a Revolution foot,' as the phrase was, and were staunch for the Kirk and the Hanoverian succession. Others, like Mar, cared chiefly for what they could get out of politics and trimmed their sails accordingly.

Nearly all, indeed, who engaged in politics, were greedy of office, for nearly all were embarrassed by the need of keeping up feudal state on the meagre rentals and payments in kind of a countryside desperately poor ; and they had all been taught to regard office as the natural remedy of a great nobleman's finances.* But many, both in the Jacobite and in the Whig camp, were patriots as well as self-seekers, and some were, besides, shrewd and politic statesmen, who knew how to pursue their country's true interest, and whose aristocratic position and upbringing set them above the necessity of courting popularity with the mob. Such were the men who passed the Union.

* In 1703 the Earl of Seafield wrote a memorial for Government, advising what we should now call a ' cut in salaries ' of Ministers and officials, which will 'exceedingly oblige the generality of the people, both because the less subsidy will be required, and likewise because nothing is more disobliging to the generality of an unmonied nation than to see new men become rich by sucking in the public money, as they have done since the Revolution ; most of those employed since having doubled or tripled their estates.' *H.M.C. Laing*, II (1925), p. 43. For a not very edifying scene in the Scottish Privy Council of this period as imagined by Scott, see *Bride of Lammermoor*, end of chap. v.

After the Nobles came the lairds or country gentlemen. Their tall, stone mansions, each with its corbel-stepped gable roof, stood up gaunt and fortresslike in the treeless and hedgeless landscape. Architecture did not flourish as in England. Many of these country houses had grown up by clumsy additions to the war-towers of former days. There was seldom any window on the exposed north side, even when it commanded the best or the only view of the landscape. But of recent years proprietors, especially in the rich Lothian district, had begun to plant groves of trees round their houses, to shelter them from the wind and to give the meagre orchards a chance. But the day of lawns, avenues and walled gardens was yet to come. The farm-buildings, with their homely smells and litter, abutted on the mansion ; the cornfields came up to its walls on one side, and on another an ill-kept garden of physic-herbs and native flowers.[105]

The interior was equally devoid of luxuries common in the south of the island. The furniture was of the simplest, the floors had no carpets, the walls were usually devoid of paper, panelling, arras or pictures. The bed-chambers had no fire-places, except in the envied 'fire-room.' The drawing-room held a closed bed ready for guests, since it was not always safe for a convivial laird to ride home o' nights, any more than for Tam o' Shanter from his humbler rouse. Hospitality took the form of plentiful plain meats served in one course, washed down by Scottish ale and French brandy and claret—and, in the Highlands, by whisky. Tea was only known to the Scottish subjects of Queen Anne as an expensive medicine. Thrift was a dire necessity, but hospitality was a national instinct. Neighbours would arrive on horseback on surprise visits of half the day in length ; they were heartily welcome, for the means of passing the time in a country house were fewer even than in contemporary England.[106]

Near Edinburgh and other towns golf was a time-honoured institution. And all over Scotland hares, grouse, blackgame or partridges were pursued with dogs, hawks, and snares, and less often with the long gun. But the red deer, once common, were already withdrawing into the

Highland glens.[107] The extraordinary abundance of salmon and trout afforded not only good sport, but a cheap food for the people. In some parts the gentry despised salmon as a dish that cloyed, and farm-hands struck if they were fed upon it every day.[108]

The gentry of the Lowlands were divided not unevenly into Presbyterian and Episcopalian, a division scarcely distinguishable from the political division of Whig and Jacobite. Tories there were none, in the English sense of the word, for the Tory was an Episcopalian who had accepted the Revolution Settlement because it left his Church established and privileged, whereas in Scotland the Revolution left the Episcopal Church disestablished, and not even tolerated according to law ; Scottish Episcopalians, therefore, were necessarily Jacobites, looking to a counter-revolution for their relief. This was the essential difference between English and Scottish politics.

Family and religious discipline tended to be more strict in Presbyterian than in Episcopalian families. There was usually more pleasure and freedom in a Jacobite household. But deep Presbyterian piety and a strict sense of public duty did not prevent Forbes of Culloden from indulgence in hard drinking, convivial hospitality, profound learning and liberal culture. And when in 1702 a Presbyterian minister of Elgin searched houses to smell out and seize that 'superstitious bird,' the Christmas goose, a laird who shared his religion but not his bigotry wrote to an Episcopalian friend :

> Dear Archie, I am not so great a presbyterian but I can eat a leg of a goose and play at Umber on Yule-day. If you will come out here on Thursday's night, the doctor and you and I shall be as merry as we can, and if you bring Mess John [in this case the Episcopal clergyman] to be fool in the family, and make us laugh, you shall have a revenge off your lost fifteen shillings.[109]

'Mess John' seems to have been a more sociable being than his goose-hunting rival.

It must be remembered that, when Anne came to the throne, the services of psalmody, preaching and extempore

prayer were very much the same in the Episcopal Meeting Houses as in the Presbyterian Parish Churches. The Prayer-book only began to find its way into some of the Meeting Houses in the last half of her reign. The doctrines professed by the rival denominations differed little except on Church government, and not much even on that, seeing that the Episcopalians too had their Presbyteries and Kirk Sessions with their inquisition and discipline over morals. The division therefore was deep only on its political side ; it did not touch the basis of a common Scottish mentality and civilization. Free thought had not yet spread from the land of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke to the land of Hume. Nearly all families, especially those of the gentry, regularly attended either the Parish Church or the Episcopal Meeting House, where they received much the same spiritual medicine, only diluted with different quantities of water. Poverty and religious instruction and controversy combined to form a national Scottish character, overriding the acute political divisions, and uniting all Scots in a mental and moral antagonism to the wealthier, more libertine civilization on the south of the Cheviots. The popularity of Addison's and Steele's *Spectators* among Scottish ladies and gentlemen at the end of Anne's reign was one of the first instances of a real intellectual invasion of North by South Britain. As a consequence of the Union such influences began to multiply.[110]

The unity of the nation and the good understanding of its component classes were all the greater because Scottish lairds in those days sent their own bairns to the village school. The odd idea of sending a Scottish gentleman's son to an English public school was rendered unthinkable alike by thrift and by patriotism. Education in the village school strengthened the young laird's love of his native land and landscape, and inclined him when he came to man's estate to sympathy with his tenants who had once been his schoolfellows. The broad Scots tongue, of which the highest were not ashamed, the traditions and ballads of each countryside, were the common heritage of all. That was why, two generations later, in the days of Burns and Scott,

the poetry and traditions of Scotland went forth to conquer the imagination of men bred in less fortunate countries, where rich and poor had no culture in common. Scotland was at once more feudal and more democratic than England. An amazing freedom of speech, between classes that were yet perfectly distinct in a strict social hierarchy, characterized the relation of men who had sat on the same bench at school, and whose fathers had ridden shoulder to shoulder to fray and foray.

But in the age of Anne no literary or intellectual palms were won by Scotland in the world's arena. Her poverty was still too bitter and her religion still too narrow. But the seeds of greatness were there ; that very poverty and that very religion were forming the national mind and character. Already Swift, who hated the Scots as Presbyterians, confessed that their youth were better educated than the English ; while Defoe wrote, though with some exaggeration :

> You find very few gentry either ignorant or unlearned. Nay, you cannot ordinarily find a servant in Scotland but he can read or write.

When Forbes of Culloden, in 1705, went to finish his legal education at Leyden University, he was led to contrast the grave and studious habits of his own countrymen abroad, with the 'riot and debauchery' of the young English spendthrifts making the grand tour, 'who repaid the forbearance and politeness of the inhabitants with contempt and ignorance.'[111]

Scottish school education would, however, by modern standards, be judged miserably inadequate. The excellent laws of 1633 and 1696 had ordained that a well-appointed school should be set up in every parish and maintained by local rates. But the reality was very different. In Anne's reign many parishes had no school at all, and where a school was to be found it was too often a dark, draughty, dirty hovel, and the master or mistress usually lived on starvation wages. In Fife, at the end of the Queen's reign, only two men out of three could sign their names, and one woman out of twelve, while in Galloway few of the people could read.

On the other hand in many, if not most, of these schools Latin was taught after a fashion ; * and it was often very well taught in the Burgh schools maintained by the towns. The village and the Burgh schools were not merely primary schools ; some of the older and better scholars were being prepared for the University by masters who were very often themselves College men. Many, indeed, of the half-starved dominies, though they could not afford to buy books, had the root of the matter in them ; and though they taught only a part of the population, that part was the pick of the Scottish democracy, lads taught to make sacrifices to obtain education, who used the slender equipment of learning available to them as no other nation in Europe could do, and so in the end raised themselves and their country to higher ranges of civilized life.[112]

The Universities of Scotland were in a dull condition at sunrise of that century which was to set in the golden glow of Principal Robertson, Adam Smith and the Edinburgh philosophers. An age of violent civic commotion is seldom favourable to academic institutions controlled by the State. The Episcopal regime of Charles and James II had excluded half the Scottish men of learning from academic life, and the Revolution had extruded most of the other half, replacing them by men who had learnt more fanaticism than scholarship in moorside conventicles liable to be attended by dragoons. It is true that in Aberdeen the politic clemency of William allowed most of the Jacobite dons to continue in a University which served a Jacobite countryside. But in Glasgow, St. Andrews and Edinburgh the change had been fairly complete, and the new teachers were raw men.

Fortunately a great leader took Scotland's academic life in hand. William Carstares, the wisest and noblest of the Presbyterian divines, had been King William's private adviser on Scottish affairs. In the new Queen's reign, when he could no longer hope for such a place behind the throne, he returned to Scotland, to lead the counsels of her

* 'There are in the Kingdom near 1,000 parishes and in most of them Latin is pretended to be taught, though not one in fifty of the schoolmasters is capable to teach it. And no wonder for not one in fifty was tolerably taught it, and not one in a hundred has books to enable him to acquire it by his after industry.' *Proposals for the reformation of schools and universities*. 1704.

Church into the paths of moderation, and to order and inspire her academic life. As Principal of Edinburgh University * he had many difficulties to face : the pedantry and superficiality of the innumerable courses in abstruse subjects ; the monopolistic spirit of the College teachers who strove to enforce the prohibition of Greek teaching at schools lest they should compete with the function of the Universities ; the general want of liberality and learning. But Carstares himself was not only learned but liberal, in spite of all that he had suffered in the dreadful past in the torture chamber of the Edinburgh Privy Council. He won the hearts of the difficult men he now had to lead, and gave a new and larger vision not only to the Established Church and its Assembly, but to the Universities that supplied that Church with ministers.

The students were of all classes, sons of nobles, lairds, ministers, farmers and mechanics. The most part were seeking to be beneficed clergymen, and there were far too many candidates. The number of small bursaries and the Scottish peasant's zeal for knowledge overcrowded the sacred profession in days when there were few other openings for an educated man. The lot of the 'stickit minister,' the laird's tutor and the underpaid schoolmaster was hard. But those who were able to obtain charge of a parish were not so ill off by the modest standards of that day. Calamy, the English Nonconformist leader, wrote after his visit to the Presbyterians of North Britain in 1709 :

> As for the settled ministers of the Church of Scotland, though they are not so plentifully or profusely provided for as many of the Established Church in England, yet are there none but what have a competency, whereupon to live easily and conveniently and above contempt.

The Scottish lad, in his hard struggle to reach this harbour, supported life at the University from the sack of oatmeal

* He was chosen to the post in 1703, and the Town Council raised the Principal's pay from £41 13*s.* to £92 sterling. That was a higher salary than was enjoyed by the heads of other Scottish Universities. *Calamy* (II, p. 186) bears witness in 1709 to 'the entire freedom and harmony between the Principal [Carstares] and the Masters of the College, they expressing a veneration for him as a common father, and he a tenderness for them, as if they had been his children.'

leaning against the wall of the garret where he lodged in the town. On holidays fixed for the purpose, the rustic student tramped home with the empty sack, and returned with it refilled from the harvest of his father's 'infield.'[113]

The peasants on a Scottish estate lived on terms of traditionally familiar intercourse with the laird, who on his daily ride across his lands had to listen to the sharp tongues of an outspoken race. None the less they were living under him in a position of servitude at once feudal and economic. This kind of relationship was remarked on by English travellers as something new in their experience.* Private jurisdictions over tenants, civil in some cases, civil and criminal in others, were common all over Scotland, though such feudal courts had long ago ceased in England. Statesmen in London held that the Protestant succession was in imminent danger from these *superiorities*, which removed the Scottish vassal from the protection of the royal courts and subjected his person and property to Jacobite overlords.[114]

The peasantry held their small farms on annually terminable leases which left them at the mercy of the laird or his factor, and fatally discouraged any attempt on their part at improving the land they tilled. And the laird on his side seldom put capital into the improvement of his tenants' farms. Had he wished so to do, he lacked the means. A rent-roll of £500 sterling was considered great wealth in Scotland, £50 was common, and many 'bonnet lairds' supported their families on £20 of rent and the produce of their own 'infield.' Moreover rents were paid more than half in kind: sheep, poultry, oatmeal, barley and peat were brought to the door of the manor house by the tenantry—not in carts, for they had none, but balanced on the backs of half-starved horses. Another source of supply for the laird's

* 'The noblemen and gentlemen keep the common people in mighty subjection' (*North Eng. and Scot. in 1704*, p. 52). 'The commonalty are used to worship and adore their lairds' (*Kirke*, p. 16). 'Without those long and kind leases the tenants of England have, they are not encouraged by their lords in improvements' (*Morer*, p. 4). In the year 1700 the Scottish author of *The Interest of Scotland*, pp. 77–78, admits these English strictures and adds: 'I believe we have learned that method of oppressing our peasants from the French.'

modest household was the cloud of pigeons from his dovecot, which preyed on the surrounding fields, transforming a large proportion of the tenants' meagre crops into flesh for the landlord's table. For the rest, the Scottish farmer, like the villein of medieval England, had to manure, sow and reap the 'infield' of the laird, often on days between two spells of bad weather, when he might otherwise have saved his own precarious harvest and secured his family against starvation during the coming year.

A nobleman or laird was usually inclined to be a good landlord, so far as custom demanded and necessity allowed, and to reciprocate the affection of the men whose ancestors had bled in the feuds and forays of his family. But many of the hard-pressed 'bonnet lairds,' and factors acting for great men and absentees, were hard as flint. A dozen and more years after Queen Anne's death the wisest observers in Scotland were still raising the same complaint. In 1729 the author of the *Ways and Means of Enclosing* addressed the nobles and gentry as follows:

> To the great misfortune of most of these poor people, they are the property of bailiffs and chamberlains that manage your estates, very often for themselves rather than for your lordships; and by grinding the face of your poor tenants with double the service your noble souls would allow you to take of them, and by bribes to keep the highest bidder in his old hereditary possession or turn him out if another bid yet higher, become soon rich enough to buy their chamberlainries.

And as late as 1733 Patrick Lindesay wrote: 'So long as our farmers are kept low by a precarious possession upon short leases, no improvement can be expected.' It was only as the century advanced that the change towards long leases and the investment of capital in the improvement of the land began to make the rapid headway which, by the time Sir Walter Scott started on his tours of observation, had already transformed the Lowland landscape with walls, hedges, plantations and well-built farmhouses, and made the prosperity of the Scottish people.[115]

Under these conditions it is no wonder that in Queen Anne's reign nine-tenths of the fields of Scotland were unenclosed by wall or hedge. The cattle had to be tethered

or watched all day and shut up all night. Only in the Lothians the wealthier landlords had begun the process of enclosing by stone walls. Quick-set hedges were hardly anywhere to be seen, and the want of them was not regretted, for it was believed that they harboured birds which would eat the corn. There was a similar suspicion attaching to trees. Saplings were often injured by the peasants and oftener by their cattle, in spite of proclaimed penalties. But there were few trees for them to injure except close round the manor house and the kirk. The ancient forests, where, according to the instructions of Robert Bruce's 'testament,' the population used to shelter in time of English invasion, had now almost everywhere disappeared. And the modern movement for plantations to keep the wind off the land and supply the market with timber was only in its infancy.* The general aspect of Scotland was then more treeless than ever before or since. Here and there, particularly in Clydeside, could be seen woods of some size and pretension, and, in the distant and unvisited North, old forests still rustled their branches to the Highland winds. Even in the Lowlands the denes and steep banks of the burns sheltered in their dank recesses the sparse remains of the blanket of birch, alder and dwarf oak that had once been spread over the land.[116]

The houses of the peasantry were in keeping with the starved aspect of the landscape and the want of any proper system of agricultural improvement. Rightly to imagine the home of a Scots farmer in Queen Anne's reign, we must forget the fine stone farms of a later date, and think of something more like the cabins of Western Ireland. It consisted almost always of one storey and often of one room. The style and material of building and the degree of poverty varied in different regions, but walls of turf or of unmortared stone, stopped with grass or straw, were very common ; chimneys and glass windows were rare ; the floor was the

* John Clerk of Penicuick, one of the most estimable of the statesmen of the Union, notes under March 1703 : 'I fell exceedingly into the humour of planting and making nurseries. My father observing this devolved upon me all his concerns this way, and I began my first plantations on the south side of the House, near the Water of Esk, at an old coal hole on the brae, to which, from Quixote's cave, we gave the name of Montesina's Cave.' *Clerk* (*Rox.*), p. 45.

bare ground ; in many places the cattle lived at one end of the room, the people at the other, with no partition between. The family often sat on stones or heaps of turf round the fire of peat, whence the smoke made partial escape through a hole in the thatch overhead. 'Yet foul, dark and fetid as they were, the people liked these hovels for their warmth,' writes Mr. Graham. Sayings like 'the clartier the cosier,' 'the mair dirt the less hurt,' and 'muck makes luck' consoled people for the circumstances of their lot. But English travellers observed that they suffered terribly from the itch. Since also they worked on an undrained soil, half of it unreclaimed from marsh and rushes, and came back to a damp home in wet clothes for which they too seldom had any change, it followed that rheumatism and ague plagued and shortened their lives.

Men and women wore clothes made up in the immediate neighbourhood by local weavers and tailors, and often spun and dyed in the wearer's own cottage. Children always and grown-ups often went bare-foot. The men wore the broad, flat, round, blue bonnets of wool, the distinctive headgear of Scotland in the eyes of the world. The laird and minister alone sported a felt hat of the English type ; but they too wore home-spun clothes made up by a country tailor. To the surprise of even Dissenters from South Britain, the minister wore no black or clerical garments, either in or out of church, but made his rounds and preached his sermon in lay neck-cloth, and in coloured cloak and waistcoat of homely wool.[117]

In Scotland yet, as in the England of pre-Saxon times, much of the land that was potentially the best for agriculture was still undrained marsh cumbering the valley bottoms, while the peasants painfully drove their teams on the barren hillsides above. The enormous ploughs of primitive design were all of wood except the share and coulter, and were usually made by the farmers themselves ; they were dragged along the slope by eight or ten small and meagre oxen, urged on by the blows and shrill cries of half-a-dozen excited farmers. The cortège, with the united efforts of beasts and men, scratched half-an-acre a day.

A group of farmers usually tilled their lands together,

and shared the profits on the ' run-rig ' system, each farmer claiming the produce of a ' rig ' or ' ridge,'—a different ' rig ' each harvest. A farm paying £50 sterling rent might have a dozen or a score of tenants, among whom the land was every year re-divided by lot. This system, and the precarious annual leases granted by the laird, rendered agricultural improvement impossible. The quarrels inside the group of co-operating farmers—some of them of that dour type that bred Cameronians and Kirk seceders—too often held up the common cultivation for weeks at a time.

The farm was further divided into an ' infield ' and an ' outfield.' On the ' infield,' near the houses of the clachan, was lavished all the manure that could be locally collected, including sometimes the thatch covering the turf on the goodman's cottage roof.* But the ' outfield,' perhaps three-quarters of the total acreage, was left unmanured, used as rough pasture for eight or ten years on end, and then cropped for a year or two before relapsing into something scarcely distinct from moor.

The crops consisted of oats for the staple food, and barley to make either scones or the Scots ale, which was still the wholesome national drink of the Lowlander before the ill-omened invasion of whisky from the Highlands. Pease and beans also were grown for the cottage kitchen. But turnips and artificial grasses for cattle were unknown, and potatoes were grown only by a few gardeners to season the laird's dish of meat, not by farmers as part of the people's food.[118]

The tyranny of these primitive customs of cultivation, approved by the people themselves, kept them always near the verge of famine. Their grain, but little multiplied by such methods of agriculture, went in the three shares celebrated in the old saying :

> Ane to gnaw, and ane to saw, and ane to pay the laird witha'.

The lairds were bound fast by their own poverty, unable to help themselves or their tenants. Yet it was the lairds who,

* The use of lime for manure was only just beginning on a few progressive estates in the reigns of William and Anne. *Scot. and Scot.* II, p. 205; *Agnew*, II, pp. 203–204.

in the century now dawning, were able so to make use of the commercial conditions introduced by the Union as to revolutionize the system of agriculture and create a new prosperity for all classes.

The first years of Anne witnessed a slow recovery, not due to any large changes or improvements, but to the chance of better harvests. The last half-dozen years of William's reign had been the ' dear years ' of Scottish memory, six consecutive seasons of disastrous weather when the harvests would not ripen. The country had not the means to buy food from abroad, so the people had laid themselves down and died. Many parishes had been reduced to a half or a third of their inhabitants. This sombre experience, from which the nation was slowly emerging during the years when the Treaty of Union was under debate, coloured the North Briton's outlook, deepened his superstitions and darkened his political passions, especially in relation to the hated English who had watched the kindly Scots die of hunger, and had moved no finger save to make their lot worse by opposition to the Darien scheme. Fortunately a cycle of fat years under Queen Anne followed the lean years under King William. Then, in 1709, after the Union was safely passed, the failure of the harvest again produced famine, unpeopling farms and hamlets and filling the villages with beggars. Until the methods of agriculture had been completely changed, such might always be the result of a single season of bad weather.[119]

In these circumstances, the principal source of agricultural wealth, as distinct from mere subsistence, was sheep and cattle. The sheep's wool supported the home cloth manufacture, and both sheep and cattle were sold into England in great numbers. Stock-breeding flourished most in Galloway, but even Galloway had hardly recovered the depredations on her livestock made by the Highlanders and other emissaries of a paternal government in the ' killing times ' of the persecution. It was reckoned that in 1705 Scotland sold 30,000 cattle into England ; the usual price was something between one and two pounds sterling a head. This marketing of ' black cattle ' was one of the most important of a Scottish laird's few sources of wealth. The sheep

and cattle were small, even as compared to the small English beasts of that period. Their pasture was for the most part unimproved moorland. The cattle were shut up all night for want of fences. Of the remnant that had not been sold south to the English pastures, many had to be slaughtered at Martinmas on the approach of winter, for there was little hay and no root-crop on which to feed them. During the next six months salted meat supplied the tables of the gentry, and meat seldom graced the peasant's board at any time of year. On the return of the tardy Scottish spring, the poor beasts, mere skeletons after their winter-long imprisonment in the dark on rations of straw or boiled chaff, were led back from the byre to the pasture, a pitiful procession, half supported, half carried by the farmers. This annual ceremony was only too well named the ' Lifting.'[120]

The standard of life in Scotland was very low in almost every material respect, but hardships had not crushed the spirit of the people, not even after the ' dear years ' of William. To avoid the receipt of alms was a passion with common folk more decidedly than in wealthier England. The poor law system was totally different in the two countries. In England the poor had been, ever since Elizabeth's reign, a charge on the State ; they were maintained by compulsory parish rates that amounted at the end of Anne's reign to a million pounds a year, then regarded as a heavy national burden, over and above private endowment and religious and private charity. In Scotland there was no compulsory rate, and poor-relief was an obligation not on the State but on the Church. Endowments of the poor were made by private persons, announced in the kirk, and sometimes commemorated on boards hung upon its walls. In the kirk also stood the poor's box, which the thrifty Scots constantly replenished with most of the bad copper of the neighbourhood, besides a useful minority of good coins. The deacon was a lay officer of the Church, found in many parishes, though not in all ; it was the deacon's business to distribute these alms among the necessitous, who were for the most part creditably unwilling to receive it. The duty of keeping their relations independent of such relief was keenly felt and nobly undertaken by persons themselves desperately poor.

Licences to beg from door to door in a given area were also issued by the Kirk Session to privileged ' gaberlunzies,' or ' blue gowns.' Many of them, like Edie Ochiltree, acted as welcome carriers of news to lonely farms, repositories of regional lore and legend,—popular, respectable figures with a place of their own in rural society.

But unhappily there was a much larger number of unlicensed and less desirable vagabonds. The ' sorners ' of Queen Anne's Scotland answered to the ' sturdy beggars ' of Tudor England. The ' dear years ' had swelled this army of broken and masterless men, though there is no support to Fletcher of Saltoun's wild guess that they numbered 200,000, which would have made them between a fifth and sixth of the whole population. But the ' sorners ' were numerous enough to terrorize a countryside of lonely farms and clachans of two or three houses apiece ; a company of ' ill men ' could rob in the face of day, taking the last crust from the cottage, the cow from the byre, and often wresting the child from its unhappy parents. The number and power of the ' sorners ' was the penalty paid by Scotland for the want of a regular poor law like the English. And in neither country was there any attempt at a proper police.[121]

Fletcher of Saltoun, the grim republican patriot who lent a flavour of his own to the Scottish politics of the age, proposed as a remedy that the ' sorners ' should be put into compulsory servitude ; his idea was only the extension of existing practice in Scotland. Coal mines and salt mines were worked very largely by ' bondsmen,' veritable serfs, who could be caught and punished for running away. Even in modern establishments based on free contract, like the New Mills cloth factory in Haddingtonshire, there was a ' prison att the manufactory,' and hands who ran away or broke their contracts could be dealt with by summary methods. But the condition of the employees of the New Mills was not bad by the standard of those days, whereas the hereditary bondsmen in the mines were treated by their masters as chattels, and were spoken of by the rest of the population with a kind of pitying terror, as ' the brown yins ' or ' the black folk.'[122]

CHAPTER XI

The State of Scotland in the Reign of Queen Anne (*concluded*)

Trade and industry. Glasgow. Edinburgh. The Church and religion. Kirk sessions discipline. The Episcopalians. The Toleration question. The Cameronians. The General Assembly. Witches. Superstition and imagination. The Highlands.

If Scotland lagged behind England in agricultural methods, her industry and commerce were in no better way. Almost all her articles of export were food or raw materials—cattle and salmon for England, coal and salmon for Holland, salt and lead for Norway, herrings for the Iberian Peninsula. The Scots themselves wore cloth woven by village wabsters for local consumption ; but only a very little linen or woollen cloth was sold abroad. The Haddington New Mills were famous, but they were not flourishing. There were, besides, other woollen factories, as at Musselburgh and Aberdeen, all clamouring to the Scots Parliament to support them with money and monopolies, and being only in part satisfied. The wool-growing landlords, on their side, compelled the legislature to allow them to export raw wool to Sweden and Holland, to the detriment of the market for Scottish cloth in those countries, and of course clean contrary to the established policy of England. The herring trade was a chief source of the nation's wealth, but even so the Dutch fishermen took many more herrings off the Scottish coast than did the Scots themselves. A great part of the business of the Edinburgh Parliament consisted of regulations to encourage and direct the meagre manufacturing and trading efforts of the country.[123]

Though Scottish officers and regiments were winning

honour for the land of their birth in the ranks of the Allies, the war with France meant little to the Scots at home. There was no such national enthusiasm as was shown in the Napoleonic and later wars. The Edinburgh Parliament, therefore, passed in 1703 a Wine Act, to legalize the most popular part of trade with the enemy. The English were scandalized at this bold defiance of propriety, for they themselves were content with illegal smuggling to the French ports. But they dared do nothing, for if one of their cruisers had seized a ship freighted with brandy, claret and Jacobite agents, they might have woken up one morning to find themselves at war with Scotland.[124]

Since the Restoration, Glasgow had been reckoned as the second city in the kingdom, and the first for trade and manufacture. Probably on account of the famine and distress in William's reign, the population had recently declined : when the Union of 1707 was passed, it numbered only 12,500 souls out of a total of a million or more for all Scotland. The Glasgow merchants owned between them fifteen trading ships, with an aggregate tonnage of 1,182 tons, and even these small vessels had to unload more than a dozen miles below the town, as the Clyde was still unnavigable to anything larger than a boat. Since no Scottish firm was permitted to trade with an English dependency, their commerce was confined to Europe, until the Union Treaty opened the tobacco trade with the English colonies to Bailie Nicol Jarvie and his fellow-citizens. In Anne's reign Glasgow was still a pretty little country town, with colonnades at the cross roads in the centre, where the merchants met to transact their modest affairs.* It was, moreover, one of the four University towns of Scotland : ' there are only forty scholars that lodge in the College,' an English traveller noted in the year of Blenheim, ' but there are two or three hundred that belong to it, and all wear red gowns, as do likewise those at Aberdeen and St. Andrews.'[125]

The fourth university town was Edinburgh herself—

* In 1704 we read : ' the town consists of two open, long straite streets, which cross one another in the middle and the streets are well paved.' The crossing-place of these two streets ' serves as a change,' and ' on every side are piazzas or small arches under the houses, where the merchants walk and screen themselves in the bad weather.' *North of England and Scotland in 1704*, ed. 1818, p. 47.

the headquarters of Scotland's law and law courts, the meeting place of the Parliament of the three Estates, and of that other Parliament which proved more enduring—the General Assembly of the Church. There, too, was Holyrood Palace, the empty nest whence Scotland's Kings had flown. At the other end of the mile-long Canongate and High Street—'the stateliest street in the world,' as an English traveller then called it[126]—rose the Castle on its rock, where the absent Queen Anne was represented by the red coats of her small Scottish army. The idle soldiers looked down upon the reek and roofs of Edinburgh, in perpetual wonder what was brewing below in the most turbulent spot in Britain, and what riot, religious, political or economic, it would be their next duty to quell.

Although the antique City Guard of Edinburgh, with their Lochaber axes, were the laughing-stock of Scotland, yet housebreaking and robbery were almost unknown in the chief city of the kingdom, where men left their house doors unlocked all night. The fact speaks well for the honesty of the Scots, and perhaps speaks well for the religion in which they were bred. It ruled the town effectually, preventing, in Scotland's very capital and centre of fashion, all theatrical shows and all dances, and on the Sabbath all 'idle gazing from windows,' all loitering and all walking fast in the streets. No wonder Dr. Pitcairn wrote his witty rhymes lampooning the clergy, and no wonder 'Hell-fire Clubs' and 'Sulphur Clubs' met surreptitiously to flout the Kirk in ways more questionable than the drama and the dance.*

The more respectable portion of Scotland's upper class found one consolation on an Edinburgh Sabbath: the fashionable world went to the Tron Kirk in High Street to gaze upon itself there and to meditate matches: the Tron Kirk was commonly called 'the maiden market,' and the Church Assembly in 1709 vainly voted 'an act against bowing or conversing together in time of worship.'[127]

* In 1710 the first Assembly for dancing was held, in spite of clerical censure. But the theatre was unknown in Edinburgh till some years later. *Wodrow. Anal.*, III, p. 476. *Graham*, I, pp. 92–97, also p. 123 on Edinburgh police and rarity of crime.

But not even the Kirk attempted on week-days to stop horse-racing on Leith sands, golf, cock-fighting or heavy drinking. On six evenings of the week the taverns were filled with men of all classes at their ale and claret, till the ten o'clock drum, beaten at the order of the magistrates, warned every man that he must be off home. Then were the High Street and Canongate filled with parties of every description, hurrying unsteadily along, High Court Judges striving to walk straight as became their dignity, rough Highland porters swearing in Gaelic as they forced a passage for their sedan-chairs, while far overhead the windows opened, five, six or ten storeys in the air, and the close stools of Edinburgh discharged the collected filth of the last twenty-four hours into the street. It was good manners for those above to cry 'Gardy-loo' (*gardez l'eau*) before throwing. The returning roysterer cried back 'Haud yer han',' and ran with humped shoulders, lucky if his vast and expensive full-bottomed wig was not put out of action by a cataract of filth. The ordure thus sent down lay in the broad High Street and in the deep, well-like closes and wynds around it, making the night air horrible, until early in the morning it was perfunctorily cleared away by the City Guard. Only on Sabbath morn it might not be touched, but lay there all day long, filling Scotland's capital with the savour of a mistaken piety.

This famous sanitary system of Edinburgh aroused much comment among English travellers and made the Scots 'traduced and taxed of other nations,' as being, in Defoe's words, 'unwilling to live sweet and clean.' But it is only fair to quote his defence of them in the matter:

> Were any other people to live under the same unhappiness, I mean as well of a rocky and mountainous situation, thronged buildings from seven to ten or twelve story high, a scarcity of water, and that little they have difficult to be had, and to the uppermost lodgings far to fetch, we should have a London or Bristol as dirty as Edinburgh; for though many cities have more people in them, yet I believe that in no city in the world so many people live in so little room.

Edinburgh indeed was an extreme example of the French type of town, kept within its ancient limits for reasons of

safety and defence, and therefore forced to find room for growth by pushing its tenement flats high in air—in contrast to the ground plan of the easy-going peaceful towns of England, that sprawled out over suburbs ever expanding, to give each family its own house and if possible its own garden. French influence and the disturbed condition of Scotland in the past had confined the capital within its walls and diverted its growth up aloft. It was not, indeed, so long since it had been a matter of great peril for a gentleman to pass the night in a house without the walls, like Darnley in Kirk o' Fields. And so the Scottish grandees had no fine Edinburgh mansions like those of the English nobles in Bloomsbury and the Strand, but were fain, during the session of Parliament, to live each in a flat over the High Street.

Canongate and High Street kept the crest of the ridge that runs up from Holyrood to the Castle, while the steep slope fell away on either side towards Cowgate to the south and the Loch to the north. On these slopes were crowded the tall wynds and closes into which the population of Edinburgh was packed. But Cowgate, parallel to High Street on its south side, was also included in the city walls. On the north there was then no parallel street, for the future site of Princes Street and the Waverley Station was occupied by the waters of the Nor' Loch. Defoe's shrewd criticism reads like a prophecy of the future :

> Were the loch filled up, as it might easily be, the City might have extended upon the plain below, and fine beautiful streets would, no doubt, have been built there. Nay, I question much whether, in time, the high streets would not have been forsaken, and the City, as we might say, run all out of its gates to the North.

The stone houses made up in solidity for what they lacked in convenience. The tempests of the northern climate beat in vain on those gaunt, fortress-like 'Babels.' 'No blowing of tiles about the streets,' writes Defoe, 'to knock people on the head as they pass ; no stacks of chimneys and gables' ends falling in to bury the inhabitants in their ruins, as we often find it in England,' as in the brick-built London that had suffered so severely in the Great Storm of 1703. The

older houses of Edinburgh had outside stairs, unfenced and giddy to ascend, that led from the street to each storey in turn, where a separate family kept house. Contrary to the custom in English lodging-houses, the higher storeys were the more fashionable and commanded the higher rents. The newer houses usually had the staircase inside the building and had glazed windows instead of wooden shutters.

In such a town, where every flat was accounted as a separate 'house,' and no houses were numbered, it may well be imagined that it was difficult for letters to reach their destination, or for strangers to find their way.* Indeed, without the services of the self-disciplined regiment of keen-eyed, quick-witted, dependable 'caddies,' business could scarcely have been carried on in old Edinburgh.[128]

Scottish literature was centred in the capital, but it gave no sign as yet of the great awakening that lay before it in the latter half of the new century, when the high imaginative and reasoning faculties of the race and the historical and ballad lore of Scotland should be kindled by Burns and Scott, Hume and Adam Smith into a blaze to light all Europe. The material was there in the heart and mental habits of the nation, but the Promethean fire had not yet descended. The mind of the people throve on the ballads sung, the stories told, the doctrines debated round the peat-fire in the peasant's cottage. Printed books, other than the Bible, consisted chiefly of theology or political pamphlets.

There was no native journalism. The two papers, issued three times a week at Edinburgh, were the old-established *Gazette* and its rival the *Courant*, started in 1705; both existed by special permission of the Privy Council ; they were tame organs of officialdom, in form mere imitations of the London papers, full of continental and English news but telling the Scots nothing about their own affairs. With the disappearance of the Scottish Privy Council after the Union, the

* Here is a typical Edinburgh address of the year 1702 : 'ffor Mr. Archbald Dumbarr of Thundertoune to be left at Capt. Dumbar's writing Chamber at the Iron revell third storie below the Cross north end of the close at Edin^{r}.' *Dunbar*, I, p. 33.

Edinburgh press acquired a certain freedom, and in the last years of the reign began to have a life of its own, with a somewhat larger variety of newspapers.[129]

The Scottish peasant, cramped in feudal bonds and medieval poverty, had one method of escape from his material lot—religion. Other intellectual food he had none offered him. Bible on knee, in harsh, delightful argument with his minister or his cronies, he inhabited a realm of thought and imagination, deep, narrow, intense—for good and for evil utterly unlike the merry-go-round of disconnected information and ideas in which the popular mind of our own day gyrates. Never consulted by his betters about politics, and without representation in the Estates of Parliament, he took all the keener interest in the proceedings of the assemblies where his influence was felt, the hierarchy of Church courts,—the Kirk Session of the parish, the Presbytery of a dozen parishes, the Provincial Synod, and the national General Assembly annually held at Edinburgh. In all of these the laity were represented, as they were not in the purely clerical convocations of York and Canterbury. It has often been said that the Church Assembly was Scotland's Parliament more truly than the three Estates. And in the absence of any representative local government, the Kirk Session, where the lay elders kept the minister in awe, was the nearest approach to a parish council.

The parish church, with its roof of turf or thatch, was a small and tumble-down building ; it had no medieval splendours or amenities, and would in England have been deemed more fitted for a barn. In the country churches there were seldom pews, except for the elders and a few privileged families.* Most men and women stood during the service, or else sat on ' creepies,' stools such as that with which Jennie Geddes had marked her disapproval of the Prayer Book. Yet the hard place was crowded every Sabbath for two services of three hours each by a congregation

* In a church near Edinburgh, in the reign of Anne or George I, an English Colonel's wife wished to have her pew lined, as her clothes were dirtied on the ill-washed boards. ' Line the pew ! ' cried the minister's wife in alarm, ' my husband would think it *rank papery*.' *Burt*, I, pp. 51–52.

of whom many had come on foot long miles across the moor. So small was the room inside the church that an overflow of the pious was often crowded out into the churchyard, where the Bible was read to them by a lad put up upon a tombstone.

The most solemn and impressive of popular religious rites were the Communions, held out of doors at long tables, gatherings under the eye of summer heaven that reminded everyone present of more dangerous meetings held on the moorside in the killing times. Eight or ten parishes combined to hold a communion each in turn, from June to August, and many persons attended them one after the other, thinking nothing of walking forty miles over the hills to get there. In 1710 Robert Wodrow, the historian of the Covenanters, wrote: ' I have been throng with communions in this neighbourhood,' ' a mighty indrink of communicants.' Yet even so he denounced the ' sin of fondness upon trade ' and the ' worldly spirit ' it was beginning to breed in the reign of Anne, dimming a little that ' hunger and edge upon people's spirits ' that he had noticed in the ' golden tide there was for a year or two after the Revolution.' * The competition of secular interests had hardly begun, except to the keen sight of one so jealous for the Lord as Wodrow, but a little material prosperity might soon set it fairly going, in a nation that had already gone mad to so little purpose over the Darien scheme.[130]

The older Presbyterian clergy in Queen Anne's reign were men whose education had been interrupted and whose spirits had been disturbed and embittered by persecution. One who knew them in their later years described them as—

> weak, half-educated men, their lives irreproachable, and their manners austere and rustic. Their prejudices coincided perfectly with their congregations who in respect of their sound fundamentals made great allowances for their foibles and weaknesses.

' Presbyterian eloquence ' was a byword with English

* In 1696 Gabriel Semple testified in the Church Assembly : ' I was witness to the old times before the Restoration, and to the times under the persecution, and I never saw so much of the spirit poured out as I have since the Revolution.'

hearers for its uncouth treatment of religious mysteries, its familiar apostrophes of the Almighty, its denunciation of such harmless acts as wearing smart clothes in church or taking in the London *Spectator*. But it was an Englishman who wrote :

> Were the ministerial office in England discharged as it is in Scotland, in that laborious and self-denying manner, and under such small encouragements, thousands of the clergy I daresay would wish to have been brought up mechanics rather than parsons. Here are no drones, no idle parsons, no pampered priests, no dignities or preferments to excite ambition.

Indeed the ambition of a peasant's son, such as most of the ministers were in origin, was honourably satisfied with the leadership of a parish and the confidence of his people. Meanwhile there was growing up a younger generation, better educated in less troublous times, with more sense of proportion in thought and refinement in language, who were soon, as ' Moderates,' to be openly at odds with those whom Claverhouse had dragooned into bigotry.[131]

The Kirk Session of self-important lay elders, acting conjointly with the minister, interfered in ordinary life to an excessive degree. Week in, week out, the Kirk Session and the superior court of the Presbytery were trying cases of alleged swearing, slander, quarrelling, breach of Sabbath, witchcraft and sexual offences. Some of these enquiries and judgments were properly conducted and useful, being such as were dealt with by ordinary magistrates in England. Others were intolerably vexatious, as when a woman was arraigned for carrying a pail on a Fast Day, and a crowder for fiddling at a christening feast. The adulterer or fornicator of either sex was exposed on the stool of repentance in church, to the merriment of the junior half of the congregation—including sometimes Jacobite lairds who came to see the fun—to the grave reprobation of the more respectable, and to the unblushing denunciations of the minister, renewed sometimes for six, ten or twenty Sabbaths on end. There was often a long row of penitents, and the ' gowns ' in which they were clad were in such constant use that they had frequently to be renewed. To avoid this

intolerable humiliation, poor girls often resorted to concealment of pregnancy and sometimes to child murder. The Privy Council in Anne's reign was constantly dealing with the question of the remitting or enforcing of the extreme penalty in such cases.

These activities of the Kirk Session and Presbytery had much support in public opinion or they could not have so long survived the disuse of similar Church jurisdiction in England. But they aroused deep resentment in many, not least among the upper classes. It is true that commutation of penance for fines was often allowed in the case of the gentry, a worldly compromise that recalls to ill-thinking minds the policy of Church courts in the blinded days of Popery ! But, even with these mitigations, the jurisdiction over conduct claimed by low-born elders and clergymen was an offence to the proud families of lairds and nobles ; it was an underlying cause of Episcopal religion and Jacobite politics in many who had otherwise no quarrel with the services and doctrines of the Presbyterian Church. Anti-clericalism strengthened the Jacobites in Scotland, as it strengthened the Whigs in England. Yet it must be remembered that the stool of repentance and the jurisdiction of Kirk sessions had gone on even in the Episcopal days of Charles II, and had not yet ceased in those numerous parishes still ruled by Episcopal ministers.[132]

On the whole, the Episcopalian or Jacobite party depended on upper class support even more than the Presbyterian or Whig. The more rigorous the discipleship of Knox, the more democratic was doctrine and practice likely to be. The clash came in the appointment of ministers, which the true-blue Presbyterian claimed for the people of the parish, both on grounds of religious doctrine as to the call of pastors, and because the private patrons who claimed to appoint were often very doubtful in their Presbyterianism. At the Revolution, private patronage had been abolished : the right of individual nobles and lairds to appoint ministers had been taken away by the Act of 1690, and had been vested in the Elders and Protestant Heritors of the parish, while the congregation was given a negative voice. The power of the patron to name the minister was

restored by the Tory Parliament at Westminster in 1712 as one of the first-fruits of the Union. But even before that decision, which was very far from being a final settlement of the most vexed question in Scottish ecclesiastical history, the earlier years of Queen Anne had been full of the sound and fury of this debate, whenever the Presbyterian democracy of a parish had tried to induct a minister not agreeable to the local grandee.

Episcopalian pamphleteers twitted the Presbyterians with their want of policy in ' constant taking part with the mob in all the disputes that happen betwixt them and the Nobility and Gentry in the choice of ministers, as if you relied upon them for the security of your establishment. . . . The Nobility and Gentry in Scotland have the commons so much under, that it argues no small stupidity in you to have blundered in so plain a case.' Even English Nonconformist visitors to Scotland were astonished and alarmed at the boldness of the Church in its dealings with ' the Great.' Whatever its other faults, the Church of John Knox raised the downtrodden people of Scotland to look its feudal masters in the face.[133]

The position of the Episcopalians in Scotland when Anne began her reign was most anomalous. Their services, doctrines, organization and discipline—except for the presence of Bishops who in fact exercised small authority —differed little save in emphasis from those of the Presbyterian Establishment. Yet the greatest bitterness prevailed between the two communions, because the difference of the Churches answered to the political difference of Whig and Jacobite, behind which lay two generations of feuds and wrongs inflicted and remembered on both sides.

The Episcopalians of Scotland were at once better and worse off than the Nonconformists of England. On the one hand there was not, until 1712, any Act of Toleration to legalize their services. On the other hand, more than a sixth of the parish churches were still occupied by their ministers. In Aberdeenshire, in the Highlands and along their whole eastern border, Presbyterian clergymen who showed themselves were liable to be attacked by mobs as

savage as those who had ' rabbled ' the Episcopal ' curates ' of the South-West in the winter of the Revolution. When in 1704 the Presbyterian minister was to be inducted at Dingwall, he was stoned, beaten and driven away by a mob of men and women crying ' King Willie is dead and our King is alive.'

The popular feeling that thus found expression in the North-East arose less from religious differences than from political feuds, regional hatred of the Whiggamores of the South-West, and personal loyalty to old and tried pastors. In 1707 there were still 165 out of some 900 parishes in Scotland where the minister adhered to the Episcopal Church. In some cases he had taken the oaths to Government, in others his Jacobite principles had been too strong to admit of such compliance. These ' incumbents,' as the survivors of the Revolution deluge were called, were tolerated in view of the support they received from their parishioners ; but Church Assembly and Privy Council cooperated to prevent the ' intrusion ' of successors of the same breed. The Episcopalian foothold inside the Establishment would therefore not outlast another generation. After that, the Episcopalians would all be, what most of them already were, dissenters from the national worship, and, since most of them also remained opponents of the reigning dynasty, their position was likely to become worse rather than better.[134]

But the great majority of the Episcopalian clergy had been deprived at the Revolution. In Anne's reign they were living miserably enough, the more fortunate as chaplains in some great house, too many on alms collected from their co-religionists in Scotland, or from English churchmen who regarded them as martyrs in a common cause. Not only did the English Tories take up collections, but the warm-hearted Burnet of Salisbury, who, though an English Whig by adoption, was by origin a Scottish moderate, gave £200 sterling towards the needs of these unfortunate men. In 1707 some of them were driven by sheer want to appeal to the ' bowels of compassion ' of the Corporation of ' baxters ' in Edinburgh, and received from that source exactly a hundredth part of what had been given by the

much-abused Whig bishop.* The Episcopal 'Meeting Houses' had no legal claim to protection, but were often undisturbed, especially when, as sometimes happened, the officiating clergyman had taken the oaths to Government. In Edinburgh fourteen Meeting Houses were said to be 'as open as the Churches and as freely resorted to.'[135]

The Privy Council at Edinburgh was constantly being called upon to take action either for or against the Episcopalians, whose position in the country was so equivocal, who were at once so strong and so weak, many of whom refused to pray for Queen Anne and all of whom were opposed to the Hanoverian succession. In Glasgow, Dumfries and the South-West generally, mobs sometimes broke up their services. At other times popular zeal demonstrated with even more vigour and impunity against the Roman Catholics. The Privy Council itself was constantly issuing proclamations to enforce the laws against 'Jesuits, trafficking Papists and their resetters.'† But in parts of the Highlands and of Aberdeen and Banff shires the Roman Catholics had churches to which they resorted 'almost avowedly, as Protestants go to their paroch churches'—and Episcopalians and Catholics made common cause in the interest of the Pretender.

Such, when Anne began her reign, was the mutual relation of religious parties in Scotland. The accession of a Tory Queen, the High Church revival in England and the Bill against Occasional Conformity in the Westminster Parliament caused a panic among the Scottish Presbyterians. They expected that an attack on their Church

* Carstares also impoverished himself to keep the poor Episcopalian clergy from want. At his graveside two men burst into tears; they were two non-jurant Episcopal clergymen who had long been supported by their friendly foe. Story's *Carstares*, p. 366; John Watson, *Scotland of the Eighteenth Century*, p. 150.

† *Popery Reviving*, 1714; *Privy Council Register, Edinburgh, passim; e.g.* January 17, 1704, mobs in Nithsdale have broken into houses of noblemen and gentlemen under pretence of searching for priests and Jesuits; February 7, 1704. A 'convocation of lieges in a warlike manner upon 2nd of Feb. inst. marched into the town of Dumfries,' where they burnt at the cross a considerable number of Popish books and images. The Privy Council proposes to examine these riots, but also to carry out laws for the arrest of priests. For the Glasgow riot against the Episcopal meeting-house see *P.C. Registers*, March 8, 1702/3.

Establishment would at once be made by the Queen's government. 'The Lord prepare me for suffering and whatever is before me,' wrote Wodrow, the historian of the 'sufferings' of the former generation, when he heard that King William was no more. The form of argument into which these Presbyterian fears translated themselves was a warfare of pamphlets against the claim now advanced for a legalized Toleration of Episcopalians. In the first two years of Anne the number and the warmth of the pamphlets appearing in Scotland for and against Toleration * was much greater than of those dealing with the European war, into which the country was supposed to be entering. But as soon as it became clear that the English Tory Queen could not ally herself with the Scottish Jacobites, the fears of the Presbyterians and the hopes of the Episcopalians declined, and the question of the Union swallowed up all other issues.[136]

During the early months of Anne's reign, while the first alarm of the Presbyterians was at its height, a dangerous tendency showed itself among the less wise of their clergy to seek security for the Church by asserting its *intrinsic* or *jure divino* power, reviving the old covenanting claim to independence of or superiority over the State. Carstares, who knew that that way led to ruin, was diligent in damping down the rash ardour of his co-religionists.[137]

The failure of the Church, when restored at the Revolution, to reassert her *intrinsic* power according to the older Covenants, had led to the secession of the Cameronians. They may be called the Non-jurors of Presbyterianism, for they, like their English opposites, refused to take the oath to the governments born of the Revolution. An 'uncovenanted' King or Queen had no claim on their allegiance. The Cameronians of Queen Anne's reign, strongest in the South-West, formed a body of zealots, many thousands strong, with famous fighting traditions. The Jacobite agents were busy among them at every crisis of the reign,

* The tone of much of this controversy may be exemplified by a sentence from *A stone returning upon him that rolled it*, 1703: 'I am now by these presents sending my opponent another dose; and what corrupt stuff and venom it may draw from his brains and bowells, his countrymen will understand by his next.' Sage on the Episcopal side and Carstares for the Establishment held a higher flight.

inviting them to unite with their former persecutors to rise and overthrow the government. From the other side advances were made to them by the established ministers, seeking to heal the schism among Presbyterian brethren. But the Cameronians continued to plough their lonely furrow, denouncing the 'Erastian Church,' and accusing it, surely by a rather harsh construction, of 'tolerating Popery and Prelacy,' of joining in war in alliance with Popish princes, and of other national sins.[138]

If the charge of abetting resistance to the Crown always made the English High Church conscience uneasy, the Scottish Presbyterian conscience was equally sensitive to the very different accusation of Erastianism. For the Scottish Church was not, like the Anglican, a client of Tudor and Stuart Kings. It had been fashioned by the rough hands of John Knox and the Congregation of the Lord, a self-appointed body of men who had carried through the work of Reformation in the teeth of the Crown. And so the high churchmen of Scotland claimed divine right not for the King but for the Church. In the Seventeenth Century King and Kirk had fought out their quarrel, trampling Scotland's welfare beneath the hoofs of that fierce scuffle. At length the Revolution Settlement prescribed definite limits to the power both of Kirk and King. Consequently the Parliament of Edinburgh had more independent power in the shaping of Scotland during the last eighteen years of its existence than Crown and Church had ever allowed it before.

1689–1707

The Presbyterian Church, in return for her re-establishment in 1689, agreed to leave her ancient Covenants on the shelf, and to acknowledge, since needs she must, the secular power supreme. But she agreed with many misgivings and reservations. The nice line of demarcation between spiritual and temporal authority had still to be very carefully observed by both parties, particularly at the meetings of the General Assembly of the Church. That national gathering of the representatives of clergy and laity met at Edinburgh every spring. It was presided over by Queen Anne's Commissioner, some great Scottish noble, sitting throned aloft. But its business was conducted by the

clergyman who acted as Moderator for the year. Since the Royal Assent was not required to give legal sanction to the Acts of the General Assembly, there was no check on its proceedings except the royal power of dissolution. Lord Seafield as Commissioner exercised that power in 1703, though usually it was held in reserve. The knowledge that it existed prevented much wild work.

Yet the Assembly would never quite admit in theory that the Crown had the power to dissolve it.* After the dispute of 1703, a curious compromise was agreed upon to symbolize the dual control. Henceforth, at the end of every General Assembly, the Moderator from the chair declared it to be dissolved in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Head of the Church, and by the same spiritual authority named a day for its meeting in the ensuing year. Then up would rise the Royal Commissioner from his throne, and by the authority of the Queen would dissolve the Assembly and fix the next meeting for the same day as that which the Moderator had just named. And so all the canny Scots could go away content.[139]

In an earlier volume † I have explained how the belief in witchcraft had already so far declined in the upper strata of English society that the persecution of witches in accordance with the law and with the dictates of popular superstition was ceasing to be permitted, in a country that was then ruled according to the ideas of its educated class. In Scotland the same phenomena were just beginning to be observable. Part of the upper class was already weakening as to the frequency of diabolic agency, but popular and clerical fanaticism was still very strong. Several supposed witches were put to death in Queen Anne's Scotland, and several more were banished forth of the realm. In the reign of George I capital punishment was inflicted on witches for the last time in this island, in the recesses of far Sutherlandshire. In 1736 the law punishing witchcraft with death was

* It is characteristic that in Anne's reign the high churchmen of England were trying to have the right of dissolving Convocation taken from the Archbishop and given to the Crown, while the high churchmen of Scotland were trying to have the right of dissolving the Assembly taken from the Crown and given to the Moderator.

† *Blenheim*, pp. 59–60.

repealed for Great Britain by the Westminster Parliament. After yet another generation had passed, witches and ' the muckle black deil ' were a subject of jest rather than of dread to Bobbie Burns and his farmer friends.

In the England of Queen Anne, as I have already described, the case of Jane Wenham caused a pamphlet controversy which attracted public attention to the question of the reality of witchcraft, and tended to diminish the belief. A similar but more tragic case occurred in Scotland in 1704–5, and became famous as that of ' the Pittenweem witches.' But whereas English Jane Wenham escaped, Scottish Janet Corphat perished miserably as a result of three hours' ' rabbling ' by the people of Pittenweem. Thomas Brown, who had been accused with her of witchcraft, died in prison ' after a great deal of hunger and hardship.' In the long course of the proceedings the Edinburgh Privy Council interfered several times, not very effectively, but always on the side of reason. It caused the survivors among the accused women to be liberated, but Janet's murderers were not brought to justice.

Fortunately, however, this test case was brought to the bar of public opinion by the Jacobite lairds of the neighbourhood. They held more sensible views about diabolic agency than their enemy, Patrick Cowper the minister of Pittenweem ; as a young man he had ' suffered ' in the days of the persecution, and the neighbouring lairds had, probably for that reason, opposed his original entry into manse and kirk. They now took up the cudgels against him, and accused him of inciting the mob to the murder of Janet Corphat. Opposite statements of fact were made in the war of pamphlets that followed.* But whether or not he had himself tortured the women in prison, whether or not he failed to rebuke the murder from the pulpit, he had undoubtedly encouraged the belief in the reality of the

* It has been usual to quote only the pieces attacking Cowper, *A Letter from a gentleman in Fife* and *A Letter from a gentleman in Fife to a Nobleman*. But the answer to these pamphlets, *A just reproof to the false reports*, ought to be collated with them. For Cowper's previous relation with the neighbouring lairds see *Fasti. Ecc. Scot.*, 1925, *sub.* Pittenweem. The ' rabbling ' of Janet Corphat probably gave Stevenson hints for the masterpiece of horror, *Thrawn Janet*, although the rest of the story is quite different.

crimes of which they were accused. Indeed he and most of his fellow-labourers regarded disbelief in witchcraft as ' atheism ' and flying in the face of God's word.[140]

The Presbyterian Church was not the fount and origin of popular superstitions. It fostered some kinds and discouraged others. But all had their roots far back in Popish, in pagan, in primeval instincts and customs still strong in a land of mountains, moors and yet unconquered nature, amid a population which even in the Lowlands was largely Celtic in origin and which lived under conditions in many respects little changed since the remote past. Still, when the goodman came splashing home across the ford at midnight, he heard the water kelpie roaring in the spate. Fairies still lurked in the thorn trees of the dene, known visitants to be propitiated by rites lest they should slay the cattle in the byre or take the child from the cradle. North of Tay, men lit Beltan fires and danced round them, on traditional heights, upon the first of May. Crops and cattle were defended by a number and variety of local formulas of propitiation, some dating back to the earliest times of agricultural and pastoral man,

> When holy were the haunted forest boughs,
> Holy the air, the water and the fire.

Magic wells were visited, and trees and bushes were decked with rags of tartan and offerings of the fearful and grateful. In parts of the Highlands such rites were the main religion of the people ; in the Lowlands they were a subordinate but still a real part of life and belief among a nation of kirk-goers.

In the absence of proper doctors for the countryside, popular medicine was traditional, and it was sometimes hard to distinguish it from a popular form of witchcraft. There were wise men and women who helped human happiness, as well as warlocks and witches who hampered it. The Church encouraged the people to destroy the latter, but could not prevent them from seeking the aid of the former. The minister was not all-powerful. How could he be, since he forbade harmless pleasures ? Lads and lassies ' danced promisky ' to fiddle or pipes at every festal meeting, in spite

of the Church's ban ; and neither old nor young could be held back from rites older than Presbyter or Pope. There were a hundred different charms and customs to avert ill-luck, suited to every event in life—birth, marriage, death, the churning of milk, the setting forth on a journey, the sowing of a field.

Miracle was looked upon as an everyday occurrence far more than in contemporary England, where scepticism was already strong. Ghosts, omens, apparitions were of the ordinary pattern of Scottish life ; tales of living corpses taking part in the common affairs of men were told with circumstance and believed ; like the Greek of Homer's time, the Scot who met a stranger on the moor might well be uncertain whether he was what he seemed to be, or was ' no that canny.' The ' muckle black de'il ' was often seen waiting in the shadow at evening outside the cottage door, or slipping away over the north side of the kirkyard wall. The men who had been hunted on the moors by the dragoons, like Wodrow, their historiographer, were always agape for the wonderful, moving in an element of divine and diabolic manifestations of power. Ministers encouraged such beliefs in their congregations. Shepherd lads, out alone long hours upon the hills, had strange and sometimes beautiful fancies : Wodrow tells us in 1704 of one who declared that ' when herding in such a lee, there was a bonny man came to him, and bade him pray much and learn to read ; and he supposed it was Christ.' Next year he tells us of another lad who was once drowning in a well, but ' a bonny young man pulled him out by the hand. There was nobody near by at the time, so they concluded it was no doubt ane angel.' This is an older Scotland, not the Scotland of David Hume, Adam Smith or the Edinburgh Reviewers, not even the Scotland of Burns and Sir Walter, though it supplied them with matter for their argument.[141]

If even in the Lowlands primitive and natural conditions bred primitive beliefs and natural fancies, it was even more so in the Highlands, the very home of the fairies and spirits of the mountain, of the formless monster that brooded unseen in the deep water beneath the boat, of second-sight,

of omens and prophecy with which the little life of man was girt round. Beyond the Highland line, seldom passed by the Lowlander, and never without those qualms which beset Bailie Nicol Jarvie on his famous expedition, lay the grim, unmapped, roadless mountains, the abode of the Celtic tribes, speaking another language ; wearing another dress ; living under a system of law and society a thousand years older than that of Southern Scotland ; obedient neither to Kirk nor Queen, but to their own chiefs, clans, customs and superstitions. Till General Wade's work a generation later, there was no driving road through the Highlands. Nature reigned, gloomy, splendid, unchallenged—as yet unadmired—and man squatted in corners of her domain.

Far less accurate knowledge was available in London or even in Edinburgh about the state of the Highlands than can now be bought across the counter of a bookshop concerning the remotest parts of Africa. There was no tolerable book on the Highlands until Mr. Burt's letters of the following generation.* A few pages at the beginning of Morer's account of Scotland told the English of Queen Anne's time almost all they cared to know about the unreclaimed northern end of the strange island they inhabited. But those few paragraphs told much in little :

> The Highlanders are not without considerable quantities of corn, yet have not enough to satisfie their numbers, and therefore yearly come down with their cattle, of which they have great plenty, and so traffick with the Low Landers for such proportions of oats and barly as their families or necessities call for. . . . Once or tweice a year great numbers of 'em get together and make a descent into the Low-Lands, where they plunder the inhabitants and so return back and disperse themselves. And this they are apt to do in the profoundest peace, it being natural to 'em to delight in rapine.
>
> Pladds are most in use with 'em. They not only serve for cloaths by day, but as pallats or beds in the night, and for that reason in campaigns are not unuseful. The Low-Landers add that being too often men of prey, by this means they cover their booty the better, and carry it off without the owner's knowledge. These pladds are about seven

* Oddly enough there was a good book about the Islands (Lewis, etc.)—*Description of Western Islands of Scotland*, by M. Martin, gent., 1703, London. It was still the best book about the Islands in Dr. Johnson's day.

or eight yards long. They cover the whole body with 'em from the neck to the knees, excepting the right arm. Many of 'em have nothing under these garments besides wastcoats and shirts, which descend no lower than the knees, and they so gird the pladds about the middle as to give 'em the same length as the linen under 'em, and thereby supply the defect of drawers and breeches.

You shall seldom see 'em, though only taking the air, without sword and dirk, which is a short dagger. They carry muskets and other fire-arms ; and when they are on the defensive part, they depend much on the targes or targets, which are shields of that form which the Latines called by the name of *clypeus*, round and aequidistant from the center, and are made of the toughest wood they can get, lined within and covered without with skins, fenced with brass nails, and made so serviceable that no ordinary bullet, much less a sword can penetrate.*

What manner of life did the tribesman lead, unobserved at home, when he was not trading with the Lowlander or driving off his cattle ? It is a pathetic fallacy to suppose that the tribal land was the people's, and that they lived on it in rustic felicity, until the chiefs, in a sudden access of wickedness, took it from them after the 'forty-five. In fact, the crofter of Queen Anne's reign was fain to hire a patch of ground from the ' tacksman ' or leaseholder of the chief, who sublet it on rack-rent terms that were usually most oppressive. The soil on the mountain-side was thin and stony, denuded by torrents, unimproved by manure ; the agricultural implements and methods were more primitive than even in Southern Scotland ; the crofts were the merest hovels. It could not be otherwise, for the scanty population was yet too large for the glens to support. As the clansmen multiplied, the little farms were divided and subdivided with disastrous results. It might easily have

* *Morer*, pp. 5–11. I have left out sentences and words here and there, without altering the meaning. It will be noted that the kilt was sometimes of one piece with the plaid.

Defoe, writing to Harley from Edinburgh in November 1706 (*H.M.C. Portland* IV, p. 349) gives his Englishman's impression of the Highlanders : ' They are formidable fellows and I only wish Her Majesty had 25,000 of them in Spain, as a nation equally proud and barbarous like themselves. They are all gentlemen, will take affront from no man, and insolent to the last degree. But certainly the absurdity is ridiculous to see a man in his mountain habit, armed with a broadsword, target, pistol, at his girdle a dagger, and staff, walking down the High Street as upright and haughty as if he were a lord, and withal driving a cow ! '

been prophesied that if ever the Highlands were brought into connection with the outer world by roads, or by military and political conquest, a great emigration would result as soon as the clansmen had grasped the idea that change was possible in their mode of life. In Anne's reign there was only a trickle of emigration into the Lowlands for the rougher types of service, and to the Continent to join the ' Irish ' regiments in French pay, which owed much to the Highland element in their ranks.

The chiefs had the power of life and death, and exercised it to the full, keeping their clan in awe, that was always strengthened by traditional loyalty and often by affection. But it depended on the uncertain personal factor whether a chief was a tyrant or a father, or something between the two. Just as Louis XIV taxed his peasants to keep up his army, so the chief moved about with a train of armed relations and attendants, whom he supported in idleness at the expense of the rest of the clan ; but any more economical and peaceful habit of life would not have been appreciated by a race in whom personal and family pride was the dominant passion.

Many of the chiefs, besides the great Argyle, were also noblemen with a place in Scottish politics, and with something of the culture of France or of England. But always the civilized chief and his uncivilized followers had much in common—the pride of clan, the love of the harp and of the pipes, the stories and songs, in which old feuds and fancies were still being woven by tribal poets into a living Gaelic literature. If in the shadow of the glen and beside the hill-girt arms of the sea there was more of poverty and savagery than in other parts of the island, there was also more of poetry and wild imagination.[142]

It was for the chief to decide whether the clan should be Jacobite or ' on a Revolution foot.' But history and tradition had already settled that point in most cases. The Campbells, under the House of Argyle, had been Presbyterian and Whig since the quarrel first began, and for that reason many smaller tribes at feud with the predominant Campbells had followed Montrose and Dundee, and would take the Jacobite side in any future war. But there were

other tribes not definitely committed, who took very little interest in the politics of London or of Edinburgh. The Scottish Privy Council stationed a few troops in isolated posts like Fort William, and kept many of the chiefs in receipt of allowances from government. Otherwise Queen Anne relied in case of need on the loyalty of Argyle. Her writ did not run in the Highlands, where she was the suzerain, but not the direct ruler, of the clans.

Politics, religion and cattle-raiding were all connected with one another. A report to Harley, made in 1705, by a zealous Presbyterian, instructed him as follows about 'the Lennox,' ' contiguous to the Highlanders ' :

> The most part of the gentry, being nullifidians, take up with any impression. The commonalty, being zealous Protestants, are obliged, especially in the winter season, to defend themselves against the ravaging of the Highlanders committing hardships, that's robbing all their cattle. Though they are not able to reduce the Highlanders, yet do they oppose any small body or party, our fraternity having planted Christian societies whereby Christianity flourishes in the very borders of these savages. . . . The West Highlands [Argyle's country] be generally civilized and tolerable, and much hated by the others for their respect to the gospel. It may be said of the Highlands and Islands as Eusebius of the Romans, 'God Almighty suffered the Goths and Vandals to ransack the Romans, because they were not more zealous in their conversion.'

This state of things aroused the zeal of the Church Assembly and of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; from 1704 onwards many thousands of pounds were raised to initiate libraries, schools and Presbyterian missions in the Highlands, where religion was divided between Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, Episcopalian and primitive Pagan, in proportions which it would be difficult to determine. Some success was achieved at once, but in some places the mission was suppressed by violence at the orders of the chief, and in others it lapsed in the course of years. It was after the 'forty-five, when tribalism had been effectively put down by military and political invasion from the south, that the Presbyterian missionary had his chance, and the real evangelization of the Highlands took place.[143]

Such, in some sort, was Scotland, when the circumstances of the passing hour brought to a final issue the ever-recurring problem of the closer union of the whole island. In that design stark King Edward had failed, and Cromwell's arm had laxed its hold in death ; where force had been tried in vain, Queen Anne was to succeed by means more befitting her womanhood.

CHAPTER XII

Scottish Events leading towards the Union Treaty 1702–1705

Reign of William in Scotland. Darien and the Union. The 'Rump' Parliament of 1702. The first Union Commission, winter 1702–1703. New Parliament, 1703. The Act of Security. 'The Scotch Plot.' Fall of the Queensberry Ministry, March 1704. The '*Squadrone Volante*' Ministry and its failure. Act of Security receives royal assent, August 1704.

The reign of King William had been an era of economic disaster and political strife for Scotland, but it had settled her ecclesiastical policy on lines that proved permanent, and, equally by its achievements and by its failures, it had revealed to thinking minds that political and economic advance towards a happier future must lie through a closer Union with England.

As a result of the Revolution, the General Assembly had been restored, along with the Presbyterian system, of which it was the coping-stone. But it had not been permitted to reclaim those extravagant powers over the State which it had usurped in the Covenanting days. Beside it now, at once as friend and as rival, stood the Parliament of Three Estates, for the first time really free from royal control, and able to speak as the mouthpiece of the nation. In 1690 the Convention Parliament abolished the Lords of the Articles, the Committee which had held previous Parliaments in bondage to the Court and to the Privy Council. In the reigns of William and of Anne the Edinburgh Parliament was, for the first time in Scottish history, a body debating freely, introducing what measures it would, however unpleasant to the Court of England or to the Privy Council of Edinburgh. It closely imitated the precedents of the Westminster Parliament in its struggle with the Crown, adopting such English devices as the refusal of supply till grievances were redressed; yet the motive force behind all its proceedings was the championship of the country's cause against England.

This novel freedom of debate was exercised harshly and riotously but most effectively by men who, for all their differences on dynastic and religious issues, were agreed in a common devotion to the interest of Scotland. Parliament became, for the first time, the voice by which the country spoke with England on equal terms. In the bargaining that led to the Union Treaty, the Edinburgh Parliament sold its life dearly, obtaining in exchange the material welfare of the nation which it had, in the last eighteen years of its own existence, so strongly and not unworthily represented. Yet because it had so seldom, before the Revolution, stood out as the historic champion of Scotland, it was not, like its rival at Westminster, the object of affection enough to make the sacrifice of its independent existence utterly intolerable to the nation. If, down the ages, the Scots had loved their Parliament as the English loved theirs, the Union could never have been made.*

1689–1707

But if in matters political and ecclesiastical William's reign had done great things for Scotland, on the economic side it had been one long disaster. On the top of an unprecedented succession of famine years had come the Darien catastrophe. Almost every man in the kingdom who had a few pounds Scots to invest had put them into the 'Company for trading with Africa and the Indies,' equally in the hope of gain and in the spirit of patriotism. The wild project, which the Company had fathered and which had become the passion of the whole people, was to plant a Scots colony on a spot that should command the trade of Atlantic and Pacific. The site chosen was on the Isthmus of Darien, in a pestiferous climate and in Spanish territory! The merchants of England, jealous of any rival to their commerce, and her statesmen then in friendship

1698–1700

* On the more general aspects of Scotland and the Union Treaty I would recommend the reader to three fascinating and authoritative books: *Thoughts on the Scottish Union*, by Dicey and Rait; *The Union of England and Scotland*, by Hume Brown; and *Scotland and the Union*, by William Law Mathieson.

with Spain, had resented and opposed the scheme. And William had no choice but to follow the suit of his English subjects and of his continental policies. The Scots, for all their anger against England, did William the justice to realize that he had been no free agent. But that perception made them all the more hotly demand either a King who should be wholly their own, or else a Union which should identify Scotland's interest with that of England. The accredited apologist of the Darien Company * wrote :

> To be so treated by such a Prince hath some thing cutting beyond expression, and proves our disasters are no way to be remedied, but either by a total separation or a total union of the two Kingdoms.

From this time forward a number of pamphlets in favour of Union with England began to appear from the Edinburgh press, some of them displaying a remarkable grasp of the real points in the situation. If there was heat in Scotland in those days, there was also beginning to be light.

William himself had learned, by harsh experience, how impossible was the position of an unhappy mortal striving to be the common King of two countries with rival Parliaments and opposed commercial policies. His predecessors had kept the Scottish Parliament as antechamber to their Privy Council. But he and his successors had to deal with two independent Parliaments in deadly opposition to one another. The situation could only be relieved by uniting them in one. Such was his dying advice, and Queen Anne, since she inherited his difficulties, was heir to his policy. In the matter of the Union, as in the matter of the war with France, her position as Queen aligned her with the Whigs and moderate Tories, and divided her from her old friends the High Churchmen, who disliked a Union which should force England to guarantee the Presbyterian Establishment in the north of the island. In the debates that took place on

* For brevity's sake I use the common term 'Darien Company' to describe the 'Company for trading with Africa and the Indies.' The 'Indies' could be either East or West ; in fact, the Company's trade, such as it was, both before and after the great Darien aberration, was directed to the African coast and the East Indian Ocean. See *Darien Shipping Papers, 1696–1707* (*Scot. Hist. Soc.*, 1924), and a narrative of the events, *The Company of Scotland* (Scribner, 1930), also by Mr. G. P. Insh.

the subject in the two Houses at Westminster, while William lay dying, the Lords tentatively favoured the idea of a Union: even Nottingham declared that Scotland was 'a large gap for the Prince of Wales to enter at,' which might be stopped by a merger of the two Parliaments. 'The opposition,' wrote Marchmont, 'will come from the High Church party in the House of Commons.'

A few days later William died. 'Pity the Reformed Churches, whose bulwark is taken away,' wrote Wodrow, 'so excellent a Prince as he has been living and dying.' In spite of the disasters of his reign, he was deeply regretted by the great body of Presbyterians, the majority of the Scottish people. His memory was odious only to the Cameronian zealots for the broken Covenant, and to the formidable body of Episcopal and Jacobite opinion. Even such fierce patriotic orators as Lord Belhaven, in their railings against England and denunciations of William's policy of Union, spoke of him with affection as 'our Deliverer and Benefactor.' [144]

The accession of Queen Anne not only spread consternation among Presbyterians and Whigs, but aroused the eager hopes of Episcopalians and Jacobites. Surely so good a High Churchwoman would destroy William's new-fangled Presbyterian Establishment, which had only a dozen years of prescription behind it : surely this stricken mother, already rumoured to be repentant of her unnatural conduct at the Revolution, would pave the way for her brother's accession upon her own death. Was she not, moreover, under the influence of Marlborough and Godolphin, who never ceased to maintain sympathetic relations with various Jacobite agents ? Some of these ingenious gentlemen proposed in 1703 that one of Marlborough's daughters should marry the Pretender.

But Godolphin's real sentiments and Anne's real position, at least so long as the war with France should last, were expressed in a letter written by the Lord Treasurer of England to the Scottish Chancellor :

> The Queen is Queen of Scotland upon the foot of the Revolution, and if that cannot be maintained for her, I doubt nothing will be

maintained by her there. We are now in so critical a conjuncture with respect to other nations that all Europe must in some measure be affected by the good or ill ending of the Parliament of Scotland.

In time of war, the Pretender's Court was a pawn in the play of the national enemy ; Versailles and St. Germains were constantly plotting a Jacobite-French invasion of Scotland to dethrone Anne in favour of her brother, at least in her northern kingdom. If, therefore, she wished to wage war in Europe undisturbed, she could not afford to break with the Whigs and Presbyterians of Scotland, for they alone could be trusted to take her side if the flag of rebellion were raised in earnest. Jacobites would sometimes flatter her, but they would never fight for her.[145]

And so, within three days of her accession, in her first speech to the English Parliament, she expressed the desire for a closer Union of her two kingdoms.* Such a Union could not fail to guarantee the Presbyterian Establishment in Scotland, ensure the accession of the House of Hanover in the united island, and shatter all Jacobite hopes.

While the new Queen was making this significant utterance in London, the nobles of the Scottish Opposition were riding post to Court, to pay her their respects and to beg her to dismiss William's Scottish Ministers and dissolve his Whig Parliament. But when they reached London, they found that their welcome had been forestalled by weightier influence, although there had come at their head no less a person than James Douglas, fourth Duke of Hamilton.[146]

Hamilton, best known to English readers from the imaginary figure that stands for him in Thackeray's *Esmond*, carried the most important single weight in the nicely balanced scales of Scottish politics. How he would shift it from moment to moment was of great concern to all. His equivocal policies and uncertain character, joined to an immense hereditary position, made him, as the leading opponent of the Union Treaty, the instrument, under Heaven, of its almost miraculous passage. His fine presence, proud demeanour and vigorous debating power well qualified him to lead a party, if only he could have led

* *Blenheim*, pp. 202–203.

it straight. So noble was his almost royal person, so high was his prestige, that his followers, though they murmured at each fresh betrayal of their cause, had never the heart to renounce him in earnest.

In William's reign Hamilton had ably led the ' Country ' party in opposition to the Whig Government. The Country party consisted for the most part of Presbyterians angry at being left out of office, and therefore the more free to resent the subjection of Scottish policy to English needs. It contained a few Jacobites also ; but not many avowed adherents of the exiled House retained their seats in the Convention Parliament that had carried through the Revolution and was still sitting in 1702.[147] The great body of the Jacobites regarded themselves as a separate party.

Was Hamilton himself in the interest of the Pretender ? The agents of that Prince thought so, for he was constantly conspiring with them to rebel, though never rebelling. He passed as a Jacobite of the first water with the Court of St. Germains. And the Court of Versailles supplied him with their own and the Pope's money to distribute among the members of the Scottish Parliament and confound the policies of the governments of William and of Anne.* Yet he was also the leader of the Country party—the national anti-English party it might have been called—which was chiefly Presbyterian. He formed the only strong link between the Country party and the Jacobites, yet, as will be seen, he failed them both over the matter of the Union, on one occasion after another.

—What other motives, then, besides Jacobitism and patriotic jealousy of England were contending in his breast, behind the magnificent façade of his grand seigneurship ? First, the consideration of his large English estates, which

* There has been so much said about the government bribing members to vote for the Union that it is interesting to note that there was also bribery in the anti-government interest done by Hamilton with French and Papal money. I do not think that in either case bribery changed people's votes to any extent : it was common form at that period to do a certain amount of it to encourage a party. *Legrelle*, IV, p. 299, note (Louis XIV's letter to Tallard, March 24, 1701) ; *Macpherson*, I, p. 666 : ' large sums of money which he (Hamilton) laid out during the sitting of the last Parliament of Scotland ' (1703) ; Head, *The Fallen Stuarts*, pp. 130–134, 339 ; *B.M. Add. MSS.* 20242, f. 23, 27 ; *C.S.P. Dom. Anne*, II, pp. vi, 54, confirms Hamilton's receipt of enemy money in July 1703.

might well be forfeited if, with his connivance, Scotland proclaimed a different King from England ; it was the same handicap which had cramped the patriotic style of Bruces and Balliols four centuries back. On the other hand, it was whispered that, if both Hanover and James Stuart were excluded, Hamilton might himself sit on the throne of Scotland, as the Protestant nearest akin to the Royal Line. When Jacobite agents grew weary of his hesitation to draw sword for their master, they suspected him of such thoughts. And the Court of Versailles had dealings with him which were on this account kept secret from the Court of St. Germains. He and others were cautious not to breathe aloud these dangerous ambitions, equally offensive to the partisans of the Houses of Hanover and Stuart. But the thought that he might some day reign at Holyrood could seldom have been far from his mind, confusing his more avowable motives of action, and blending with the natural weakness of his character to produce the paralysis that always seemed to beset him whenever the moment came to strike for the King over the Water.[148]

Hamilton's chief rival, not for the crown but for the government of Scotland, was the Duke of Queensberry, another James Douglas, more courteous and ingratiating,* but of far stronger character and more defined political purposes. He had always stood staunchly ' on the Revolution foot.' If no very pronounced Presbyterian, he was a decided Whig. Jacobites called him the ' proto-rebel.' But he was a man of moderation, of ways and means, ready to make alliances where he could find them, provided he never lost sight of his ultimate goal. He was ready to consider toleration for the Episcopalians, but not as a step towards the overthrow of the Presbyterian Establishment. On occasions when the Presbyterians opposed him, he was capable of walking a few Parliamentary yards arm in arm with the moderate Jacobites, so long as they did not lead him out of his path. But, for all that, he was the strongest statesman in Scotland, and had saved the country as King William's Commissioner during the Darien crisis. Though he made more

* At the end of William's reign it was said that ' the Duke of Queensberry had never injured or offended any man in his administration.' *Carstares Letters*, p. 515.

than one serious mistake in the first years of Anne, Queensberry's qualities enabled him in the end to be the chief architect of the Union. He had a reputation for avarice, and, as the world then went, for honesty. In the perpetual motion of Scottish intrigue, plot and counterplot, with parties perpetually shifting their ground and merging their existence in one another like pieces in a kaleidoscope, a less supple trader would have been a less effective statesman.

John Campbell, second Duke of Argyle, was not supple, yet his downright force had its uses, when allied with Queensberry's art. Argyle was the head of the less compromising of the Whigs and Presbyterians ; he was as outspoken in his words to Queen and colleagues as befitted the great Chief and the gallant soldier that he was.*

The third of the Triumvirate of Scottish nobles who in the end carried the Union through the Edinburgh Parliament was the Earl of Seafield. He frankly offered himself to each successive government as the useful man, serving the public faithfully with his best abilities, but without party prejudice or allegiance. Always unaffected by the waves of other men's passion, he was unpopular because he had not been the dupe of the patriotic infatuation over Darien. So cool a head was a useful ally for any government.

In the first weeks of the reign Anne and Godolphin were as yet too busy with England and Europe to attend much to Scotland. Partly for that reason they rejected the advances of Hamilton's deputation, continued William's Ministers in office, and took the advice of Queensberry. His first advice to them, not to dissolve the existing Parliament, was his first mistake.

March 1702

There was no Triennial Act for Scotland. The Convention Parliament, which had bestowed the crown on William and Mary, was still in being when the King died. The circumstances of its origin and the lapse of years rendered it unrepresentative of actual opinion. The Jacobites had from the first denied that it was a legal assembly ; and even the Presbyterians held that, with a new

* See pp. 113–114, 127–128, above.

reign, a new Parliament was due, probably in law, certainly in justice. At best the old Parliament would have no moral authority to pass the Union. If it met again, it could do nothing but make itself more unpopular. A General Election was inevitable in the near future, yet Queensberry shrank from it as likely to give the Country Party, if not the Jacobites themselves, the power to overturn his government. He weakly tried to postpone the Election, and to make an unfair use of the existing Parliament, thereby enraging opinion against himself, and for the time drawing closer the union of the Country Party with the Jacobites, under the joint leadership of his enemy Hamilton.

As the law stood, framed in 1696 after the assassination plot against William, the old Parliament might be summoned within twenty days of his death, but it should then sit for no more than six months and should transact only such business as was necessary to secure the succession of Anne. In actuality it was found inconvenient, owing to the long distances, to bring together the notables of all Scotland within twenty days of the Queen's accession, nor was there any need to do so because the Privy Council sitting at Edinburgh took the necessary measures to secure her unchallenged authority.

March 1702

Was it, then, either lawful or expedient to summon this moribund Parliament after the twenty days had elapsed, to transact ordinary business? Anne asked the opinion of the Privy Councillors at Edinburgh; they took a division, and replied by a majority in the affirmative.

So the old Parliament met again on June 9, 1702, ninety instead of twenty days after the King's death. It was regarded as an illegal assembly by all Jacobites, and by all those Presbyterians who were not connected with the government of the hour. It seemed to patriots a further insult that Scotland's war with France had been proclaimed by the Privy Council on orders sent down from London, just ten days before the belated meeting of Parliament. The question of peace and war was not, it seemed, to be discussed by Scots tongues, but was to be settled at St. James's by Queensberry and Godolphin.[149]

As soon as the Nobles, Barons and Burgesses had taken

their seats in the hall, before the Parliament was constituted, Hamilton rose in his place, and, putting down the attempted interruption of the Chancellor, read a formal protest against the meeting as illegal, 'with a slow determined voice and high air, and immediately left the house, attended by eighty peers and commoners.' They marched out of the hall in a body 'with a solemn pace' in the order of their rank, the magnificent Duke at their head. Outside in High Street half Edinburgh was waiting to cheer them. So accompanied they marched on to the Cross Keys tavern, and swore themselves in at a banquet as a band of brothers united against unlawful tyranny. Queen Anne's government had made a bad start in Scotland.[150]

June 9 1702

Some hundred and twenty members, inevitably nicknamed 'the Rump,' remained to conduct the business of Parliament. They were said to be 'all one man's bairns,' that is all governmental Whigs. They passed a number of partisan resolutions of no great consequence, and voted taxes of which only a fraction could be levied, and that by constraint, in face of very common refusal to regard the Rump as a legal Parliament. Yet, however much challenged and despised, this assembly laid down the line of high national policy which its legitimate successor was fain in the end to follow. An Act was passed enabling Queen Anne to appoint Commissioners to treat with England for a Union, on the condition that Presbyterian government of the Scottish Church was regarded as axiomatic, and that the terms agreed on by the Commissioners should be referred back for approval or rejection by the Parliaments of the two Kingdoms.[151]

It was natural for a Parliament of Whigs to vote for the Union. It is more remarkable that the same assembly refused, until England had come to terms with Scotland, to do anything to gratify the English by settling the Protestant succession. All true Scots, Presbyterian no less than Jacobite, knew that the only method by which they could bring pressure on their purse-proud neighbours and extort leave to trade with England's colonies, was to keep the succession to the Scottish Crown an open question. Both

Unionists and Separatists were agreed upon that. Moreover they deeply resented the fact that the Act of Settlement of 1701, which had named the House of Hanover as heir to the throne of England, had been passed without any pretence of considering or consulting Scottish opinion. It was at once the instinct and the interest of outraged Scotland to refuse to follow the suit of the Act of Settlement until her grievances and claims had received fair dealing from the predominant partner.*

And so, when the Chancellor, Lord Marchmont, rashly introduced in the Rump Parliament an Act for Abjuration of the Pretender like that recently passed in England,† he obtained for its first reading only a bare majority of 57 votes to 53, even in that select assemblage of governmental Whigs. His ministerial colleagues compelled him to let the measure drop, and Queensberry publicly rebuked him in the speech he made a few days later adjourning the session.

June 27 1702

Thus the last act of the famous Convention Parliament, which had made the Revolution Settlement, was to initiate negotiations for a Union, and meanwhile to refuse to do anything to relieve the wholesome fears of the Englishry anent the succession to the Crown. For all their rage and faction, the Scots politicians of that era were not wanting either in shrewdness or in patriotism.[152]

In the winter months of 1702–3 the Commissioners, appointed by Queen Anne for England and Scotland respectively in accordance with the powers accorded to her by her two Parliaments, duly met at the Cockpit in Whitehall to draw up a scheme of Union. They sat repeatedly through November, December and January, and the extent and character of their agreement was remarkable. The

* Wodrow, the most sturdy of Presbyterians, wrote when he heard of the English Act of Settlement: 'It seems now to be the time to secure our religion and liberties, before we declare also. We never had such a nick since the Revolution. The Lord put it in the hearts of our representatives to see to this, and our trade and personal security, and the continuance of our Church Government, if a Prince of such loose principles as the German Protestants are, come to succeed to our Crown.' *Wodrow Anal.*, I, p. 5.

† *Blenheim*, pp. 158–161.

Scots Commissioners at once accepted the Hanoverian Succession and the merger of the two Parliaments. But the condition on which they insisted—complete Free Trade for Scotland not only with England but with her Colonies—was resisted by the English Commissioners over a number of sittings. Then suddenly, at the turn of the year, they capitulated on this all-important point, since the Scots would proceed no further on any less terms.

But in making this surrender the English negotiators outran the opinion of the jealous mercantile interest. Moreover the trend of Anne's policy was becoming more Tory than it had been in the first months of her reign, and a strong Church reaction was blowing up in England. The enemies of the occasional Conformists were not willing to guarantee the Presbyterian Church in Scotland.* In the winter of 1702 a new English Parliament was sitting, very much more Tory than that which had sat in the spring, and which would probably have passed the Union outright. Without any explicit repudiation of the concessions to which they had agreed, the English Commissioners gave sign of their growing embarrassment and waning enthusiasm, by their failure, again and again repeated, to appear in numbers sufficient to form a quorum. Finally the Queen adjourned the meetings of the Commission till October—that is till the Greek Calends. In her speech of adjournment she commented truly enough on 'the great progress you have already made, beyond what has been done in any former treaties.'

Feb. 3 1703

The work of the Commission had been cut short by forces outside itself—the Tory reaction in England and the anti-English reaction in Scotland, both of which found expression in elections to new Parliaments. A treaty of Union, that seemed so near in the first months of the reign, was rendered impossible until three more years of ever-growing discord between the two countries showed them both that they must either come to blows at once, or else

* At the private meetings of the English Commissioners, the Archbishop of York argued that Episcopacy ought to be restored in Scotland under the Union, though Nottingham hesitated and Rochester said it was impossible to suggest it in the negotiations. *Jerviswood*, p. 11.

unite on the terms adumbrated by the abortive but by no means useless negotiation of 1702.[153]

While the Commissioners were winding up their unfinished work, the General Election in Scotland produced her new Parliament, destined to be the last that ever sat. Yet the Election itself seemed at the time to be the death-blow to the Union policy. The spirit of the nation had been roused against Ministers who had truckled to England and flouted Scottish opinion by holding the illegal session of the Rump Parliament. Government made the usual efforts, by the proffer of places and patronage, to influence the small body of gentlemen and burghers who formed the electorate, but on this occasion to very little purpose. The supporters of the government were placed in a decided minority. There was an element that had been absent from the later sessions of William's Parliament—a small body of avowed Jacobites, rechristened 'Cavaliers' to denote their conditional loyalty to Queen Anne, side by side with their less doubtful devotion to her brother.

Spring 1703

But the strongest section was the Country Party, sent back to champion the wrongs of Scotland against the pride of England, but not less emphatically commissioned to defend the Presbyterian Establishment against either Jacobite or English encroachment. The rumour that such an attack would be made on the Kirk by the new Tory governors of England had helped to make the Scottish Ministry unpopular and had caused the Presbyterians to put out their best effort for the Country Party at the elections.

The government, therefore, had no majority to gratify the desires of English statesmen, either on the one hand to help the Episcopalians, or on the other hand to settle the Hanoverian Succession. England was too Whig in politics and too Tory in religion to suit Scottish popular sentiment. The Union seemed further off than ever in the anti-English atmosphere of the newly-elected chamber. Yet if in the course of events it should appear that the 'Protestant interest' could only be secured by Union with England, it was by no means certain that this same Parliament might not, however reluctantly, sacrifice some of its national pride to its Protestant principles.

The position of the Scottish government, in face of this new and more nationalist Parliament, was most unpleasant. Before the Revolution, the Edinburgh Privy Council had simply taken its orders from England, while Parliament was dumb in obedience. Since the Revolution, Parliament was suspicious, enquiring, hostile to English interference, and in 1703 it promised to be more recalcitrant than ever. Yet even now any Scottish government would have to keep in close touch with English Ministers, because in the last resort it must rely on the English power to keep down Highland tribes and Lowland Jacobites. Scotland was so torn by faction that true self-government was impossible for her. Yet the nation, Presbyterian and Jacobite alike, ardently aspired after self-government, and writhed under the sense of English dictation.

Between the elections and the meeting of the new Parliament in May, the Queen completed the process she had begun before Christmas, of reconstructing her Scottish Ministry, infusing into it an element of the Tory, which in North Britain meant Jacobite. The stricter Whigs were turned out, including Marchmont, the tactless champion of the Abjuration Act. His place as Chancellor was taken by the adaptable Seafield. Atholl also took office as Privy Seal. He and Seafield helped Queensberry, the Queen's Commissioner in Scotland, in the delicate business of negotiating for 'Cavalier' support in the new Parliament. The Queen issued a proclamation allowing Jacobite exiles to return to Scotland, and back they came from the countries at war with England, with plots enough in their pockets. There was even talk of a Toleration Act for Episcopalians, which caused the Edinburgh mob to riot, and the Presbyterians of the Country Party to denounce the Government for seeking 'to establish iniquity by a law.'[154]

March 1703

Such was the strange confusion of parties and purposes when the last Parliament of Scotland met, ushered in by the time-honoured ceremony of the 'riding' of a new Parliament. First each nobleman in his robes, then the Barons

and the Burgesses, each member escorted by a troop of retainers proportioned to his dignity, rode in solemn order from Holyrood to the Parliament House 'through a lane of citizens in arms,' a sight often seen by wondering Edinburgh in ages gone by, but never to be seen again.

May 1703

The bargain between the Queen's Ministers and the Jacobites facilitated the dispatch of the first business, and the question of the illegality of the Rump was not pressed by the Duke of Hamilton. But such was the strength of Presbyterian feeling in the new Parliament and in the country that the promised Toleration Act had very soon to be abandoned. The alliance between Government and the 'Cavaliers' proved powerless and came to an end. The men of the Country Party dominated the session and the Jacobites passed over into alliance with them, under Hamilton as the common chief of all the Opposition groups.

Queensberry's Ministry, rent by political and personal divisions within its own body, was left without a majority in the Estates. The victorious Opposition took the legislative lead, and proceeded to vindicate the independence of Scotland by compelling Ministers and their Mistress in London to accept legislation they had not desired. Instead of the Toleration Act for Episcopalians which Ministers had contemplated, an Act for securing the true Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Government was placed on the Statute Book. Anne was also compelled to sanction an Act anent Peace and War, which took away from her successors, whoever they might be, the power of declaring war without consent of Parliament. Godolphin was horrified at the passage of the measure, indicating as it did that the Scots contemplated the possibility of being at peace with England's enemies : he wrote to Atholl and Seafield that it was another strong argument for the necessity of a Union of the Parliaments. Godolphin, who was in fact Anne's Minister for Great Britain, was being driven by experience to realize the utter necessity of a Union.[155]

This astonishing Parliament of 1703–1707, which began by defying England and ended by passing the Union,

was no packed assembly sitting in awe of Ministers like the Parliaments before the Revolution. It was, from first to last, singularly free and even licentious in debate. 'The factions rubbed upon one another with great severity,' wrote Clerk of Penicuik, 'so that we were often in form of a Polish Diet, with our swords in our hands, or at least our hands at our swords.' However strangely it had been chosen according to our modern notions of mathematical representation, it did, unlike its predecessor, represent all the parties and interests in Scotland. The governmental Whigs were held in awe by the jealous patriotism of the Presbyterian phalanx. And there, too, observed and courted by all, sat Scotland's Cato, the Republican Fletcher of Saltoun, side by side with Jacobite Lords who received letters from the Court of Versailles giving advices for their conduct in Parliament, and promising military aid as soon as the success of the French in Bavaria 'will put them into condition of bringing the Dutch to terms and of assisting Scotland.'[156]

In this heated atmosphere of intrigue and very free debate, the famous Act of Security,* to preserve the country's liberties from English aggression, was built up clause by clause in the summer months of 1703. It was the work, not of the Ministers who wished to stand well with England, but of the Opposition who wished to defy her.

The object of English statesmen, Tory as well as Whig, and especially of Godolphin, was to induce the Scots to accept the Hanoverian Succession. Queen Anne's health was bad ; she might die before the war was won, and a disputed succession in Scotland might lay all Europe and England at the feet of Louis. Before Ramillies, still more before Blenheim, this fear amounted to an agony in England. But England's necessity was Scotland's opportunity. So the Act of Security calmly provided that when Queen Anne should die, the Scots Parliament should meet to choose her successor, who was to be of the Royal Line and a Protestant, but who should not be the same person as the English successor, unless England had previously satisfied Scotland as

* In the Scots Parliament a measure while still before Parliament was called an Act, not a Bill, as in England.

to her conditions of government, and conceded 'a free communication of trade, freedom of navigation and the liberty of the plantations.' * The Jacobites rejoiced in the Act as a nail driven into the coffin of the Hanoverian Succession. The 'different successor' would assuredly be James Stuart if the lad would turn Protestant, and might well be he in any case if confusion enough were caused by the fact of a vacant throne. Hamilton, indeed, must have envisaged another possible interpretation of the 'different successor' who should be a Protestant and of the Royal Line. The Act seemed to open a path towards that veiled summit of his own ambition.

But to Fletcher of Saltoun, the austere and single-minded bigot of patriotism, even the Act of Security seemed insufficient to vindicate the liberties of Scotland from English thraldom. He urged the Estates to seize their opportunity and extort from the Queen a Parliamentary Constitution of an almost republican type. Such was his famous scheme of 'Limitations' of the power of the Crown. It could be added to the Act of Security, or substituted for it, he scarcely cared which. Fletcher's Limitations would have taken from the Crown and given to Parliament, after Anne's death, the power of distributing 'all places and offices, both civil and military, and all pensions formerly conferred by our Kings, . . . so long as we shall have the same King with England.' The Prerogative was to be annihilated, because it was the instrument of English domination. If the Queen refused to sanction this change, then indeed Fletcher saw no alternative but to pass the Act of Security, and 'separate our Crown from England.'

Fletcher's scheme of Limitations was fully debated by Parliament, but was rejected by a majority of thirty-two. Ministerialists were of course against it. Jacobites had no wish to pare down the Royal Prerogative for the benefit of the Estates, especially as there might in the near future be a Parliament as Presbyterian as the present one, and a King—not so Presbyterian! Moreover the average member, though neither Ministerialist nor

July 7 1703

* The words in inverted commas are in the Act as passed by the Scots Parliament in 1703, but not in the Act as it received the Royal Assent in 1704. *Acts Parl. Scot.*, pp. 70, 137.

Jacobite, was uneasily aware that the assembly in which he sat was too like a 'Polish Diet' to be safely entrusted with the executive power. Who, save one so ardent as Fletcher, could expect such a body to preserve peace and order in the distracted land, of whose distractions Parliament was itself the epitome?

The first session therefore ended, in September 1703, with Fletcher's Limitations rejected and with the Act of Security passed through the Estates, but not yet given effect as law by the touch of the reluctant sceptre. Queensberry was so much afraid of his countrymen's humour as to advise Queen Anne to pass the Act of Security, for which a remedy could be found before it came into operation on her death: but Godolphin and Nottingham dared not yet, as English statesmen, permit her to take that course.[157]

Between the first and second sessions of the new Parliament, a sensational incident, known in England as 'the Scotch Plot' and in Scotland as 'the Queensberry Plot,' broke up the Ministry, recast the combinations of groups and parties in the Edinburgh Parliament, and increased the anger against England.

The indemnity issued by Government in the spring of 1703, permitting Jacobite exiles to return to Scotland, had swelled to a flood the usual flow of conspirators from France.[158] Besides others of more honestly treasonable purpose, came a Highland Chief named Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat. He had suffered confiscation and outlawry for his rape of Atholl's sister, and he was prepared to do anything, however base, to obtain restitution of his estates, or even cash in hand. He was ready to be in the pay of the Government or of the Jacobites or of both at once, and he had small scruple about fabricating evidence. Moreover not much fabrication was necessary in order to accuse half the statesmen of Scotland, with too much truth, of dealings with the exiled Court. Early in 1702 Fraser had offered his services to Anne's government in vain.[159] He had then gone to France, turned Roman Catholic, and insinuated himself into the counsels of St. Germains and Versailles by his plausible manners and by his promise to

produce 16,000 Highlanders in arms.* The Duke of Berwick, the best man in the Pretender's circle and the best Englishman in the French service, disliked the smell of Fraser from the first, and moreover as a soldier doubted the value of a Highland rising. Remembering the stories of Montrose and Dundee, he asked Fraser a number of leading questions, among others :

> If the men furnished will remain constantly with the King's general so that he need not apprehend having one day an army and the next day none.[160]

But the French were in a hopeful mood, for Blenheim had not yet been fought, and Marlborough was ensuring his head with high-sounding promises to the Jacobite agents, which he could never be compelled to perform.[161] Fraser was sent to Scotland with strong credentials. Among other documents he carried a letter from James II's widow, Mary of Modena, written to a Scottish nobleman unnamed ; on this missive Fraser took upon himself to write the address of John Murray, first Duke of Atholl, his own private foe and Queensberry's rival in the Ministry. The note, thus essentially falsified, he carried to Queensberry. It proved an apple of discord indeed.

The Queen's Commissioner fell straight into the trap, the more readily as Fraser was prepared to bring evidence, some of which was true enough, against Hamilton and other of Queensberry's rivals within the Ministry and without. He took the informer into his pay and protection, and sent him on to the Highlands to collect further evidence, still in the disguise of a Jacobite agent. Meanwhile the accusations against Atholl were placed before the Queen.

This step effectively broke up the Scottish Ministry and isolated Queensberry for a while from almost every politician in Scotland. In particular it drove Atholl into the arms of the Jacobites and made him a chief leader of resistance to the Union in the coming years. Though the head of a clan and family with strong Jacobite leanings, Atholl had done William good service ; being a prudent man, he

* The numbers of Highlanders (in buckram) vary from document to document, generally in proportion to the desperation of the writer's circumstances.

had his correspondence with St. Germains like any other nobleman, but hitherto it had been only of the nature of insurance against possible events. In the summer of 1703 Atholl was a loyal subject of Anne, in close alliance with her minister, Godolphin, and was hoping, through that influence, to marry his son Tullibardine to one of Marlborough's younger daughters, especially, so he declared, because 'their other daughters prove such good wives.' But by Christmas all was changed ; under the spur of the accusations of Queensberry and Fraser, Atholl flew into violent Jacobite opposition to Queen Anne's government. Yet it is to be noted that in the civil war of 1715 he took the side of the House of Hanover.[162]

Fraser's little game had been revealed too soon for success. That veteran of the political underworld, Ferguson the Plotter, discovered his connection with Queensberry and gave timely warning to Atholl, Hamilton, and the other accused. Their outcries of injured innocence filled the political world during the winter and spring that preceded Blenheim. England and Scotland were both agitated, but by very different feelings. The Scots were furious with Queensberry for conspiring with Fraser to destroy his colleagues and rivals. The English were incensed to hear that, at the most dangerous moment of the European war, a Jacobite plot had been discovered in Scotland and treated there with culpable indifference. As the Whigs suspected Nottingham of stifling the plot in order to save Atholl,* the House of Lords determined to probe the matter to the bottom and instituted an enquiry of their own, concurrent with the enquiry held by Her Majesty's servants. The Tory House of Commons protested against this procedure as an insult to the throne ; but instead of asking for a conference with the Upper House on the constitutional point, they addressed the Queen directly against the Peers. The question became yet another bone of contention between the two Houses.

* It is quite possible there was hushing up. William III used constantly to hush up these periodic revelations against his servants, a recurrent nuisance in the political world, because they were so often true. One of the witnesses in the Scottish Plot, Maclean, is said to have revealed the open secret that Marlborough and Godolphin had their Jacobite correspondents. *Leadam*, pp. 39–40.

The Lords, who had English popular feeling with them against the Jacobites, appealed to the man in the street by the publication of their case, ably stated by Somers. They also passed a resolution

> that there had been dangerous plots between some in Scotland and the Courts of France and St. Germains, and that the encouragement of this plotting came from the not settling the succession of the Crown of Scotland in the House of Hanover.

The whole procedure of the Lords, and these words in particular, aroused hot indignation north of the Tweed, as displaying the intention of the English Parliament to manage the affairs of Scotland.[163]

Meanwhile Fraser, leaving Britain in the uproar he had aroused, had the effrontery to return to France, and report to Louis XIV that he had prepared a rising of 20,000 Highlanders under Breadalbane, and had refused great rewards offered him if he had consented to enter the service of Queensberry and Queen Anne. But he had trod on too many Jacobite toes, and found himself, for too short a while, in the French prison he so richly deserved.[164]

In the early months of 1704, as a result of Fraser's plot, Queensberry had become so unpopular with his countrymen and his colleagues that he could no longer govern Scotland. March 1704 Anne and Godolphin, therefore, dismissed him and his party from office, and put in their place the chiefs of the Presbyterian Opposition, or Country Party—the Marquess of Tweeddale, the Earls of Rothes and Roxburgh, and James Johnstone. They brought with them their group of some two dozen members of Parliament, most of them Nobles, who acted together as independent Whigs, and became known about this time as the New Party, or *Squadrone Volante* (Flying Squadron).* They now, for a while, undertook the heavy burden of government. Their chief, Tweeddale, was described by the Jacobites as 'a well meaning but simple man,' and by the Whigs as 'a very good man, but not

* The term indicates the Italian literary culture of Scottish gentlemen at this period.

perfectly qualified for Court intrigues,' at which indeed he proved no match for Queensberry.[165]

The *Squadrone* had, in the first instance, come up to London to represent the Country Party and the Jacobites against the Queensberry interest. But finding the Queensberry Ministry tottering to its fall, they had thrown over the Jacobite alliance to qualify themselves for office. They lightly promised Godolphin that they would pass through the Edinburgh Parliament, at its next session, the much desired settlement of the Scottish Crown on the House of Hanover, provided the Queen would agree to certain limitations on the powers of her successors. On these terms they obtained office. Thus were Scottish Ministries, as Fletcher bitterly complained, made and unmade by bargains struck with English statesmen in London.[166]

But the *Squadrone Volante* had promised Godolphin more than they could perform. They had not reckoned with the depth of Scottish popular feeling against England, which they had themselves been so recently exploiting. They underrated the resentment of the deceived Jacobites. And above all they forgot Queensberry. It was in his power to revenge himself on those who had supplanted him, provided he was willing to shift his political principles as readily as they had shifted theirs. To that he had no objection, for he knew how to tack in order to hold his course. Since the chiefs of the Country Party had turned 'English' to reach office, Queensberry would turn 'patriot' to lead the opposition. Again he struck a bargain with the Jacobites. It was agreed that if in the next session Hamilton and Atholl would not raise the question of his recent conduct over the Plot, he would join them in preventing the settlement of the Crown on the House of Hanover. And so, when Parliament met in the summer of 1704, the rather inexperienced noblemen who had undertaken to govern Scotland for Godolphin, found themselves in a minority and as much embarrassed as their predecessors last year.* Indeed the

* At the end of the session James Johnstone, perhaps the ablest man in that not very able Ministry, wrote to Godolphin: 'I told my Lord Marlborough that I would rather go and attack the lines with him than do what I have done, and yet I knew not half of my work.' Hume Brown, *Union*, p. 182.

session of 1704 was even worse for government than the session of 1703. The Jacobites put it about that the Queen did not really wish the succession to be settled on Hanover, whatever her Ministers might pretend. Hamilton and Queensberry combined their forces, and the Act of Security was again sent up for the royal assent ; and on this occasion, till it was passed, supply was positively refused.

In the first week of August 1704 Godolphin and his royal mistress were in deep waters. Ministers had no majority of their own either in the English or the Scottish Parliament. Marlborough's campaign on the Danube, after the initial success at the Schellenberg, had failed to bring the Elector of Bavaria to his knees, and the evacuation of his territories seemed to be imposed upon the Allies by the superior forces of Tallard.* While Europe appeared the destined prey of French ambition, Scotland was fast drifting out of English control. Faced with the heavy tasks of government, the politicians of the *Squadrone Volante* had proved as light weights as their name implied. Tweeddale had failed to deliver the goods. And Queensberry, ranging for revenge, was bent on recovering his lost popularity in Scotland by forcing down the throat of England the unpalatable Act of Security. If the Queen still withheld her consent to that measure, no taxes would be voted, the little Scottish army of 3,000 men would disband for want of pay, and the north of the island would become the scene of anarchy and rebellion, at the very moment that Marlborough's failure in Germany became disastrously patent to the world. Seafield, who was still in the Ministry, warned Godolphin that invasion and insurrection were expected that autumn and that Government had not means to resist.

For these reasons, Godolphin, frightened by the darkness before the dawn, advised the Queen to yield to the pressure of her Scottish subjects. On his advice she gave her consent to the Act of Security upon August 5 (Old Style). She did not know that, three days before, her troops had conquered at Blenheim. While she was signing the Act with a heavy heart, Colonel Parke was already half way home with the good news.

Aug. $\frac{5}{16}$ 1704

* *Blenheim*, pp. 371–372.

When he arrived he was too late to affect the issue. If, on August 5, the Queen had known of the battle, she would never have signed the Act of Security, and the whole course of Scottish history would have been different.

Chance had so directed that a great step had been taken. To what end that step would ultimately lead was still uncertain. The Act of Security purported to provide for the Separation of the Crowns. But, it might lead instead to the Union of the Parliaments, since Godolphin's surrender tended towards the solacing of Scotland's pride and the softening of her opinion towards England. Moreover the presence of the Act of Security in the Statute Book forced the English to take Scotland's wishes seriously. England must now choose, once for all, between the perpetual hostility of a revived Northern Kingdom, or such full reciprocity of trade as would render the complete Union of the two countries possible. Would England choose foolishly or well ? [167]

CHAPTER XIII

The Framing of the Union Treaty, 1705–1706

Consequences of the Act of Security in England. The Alien Act. Scotland in arms. Captain Green's tragedy. The Argyle-Queensberry Ministry. The Scottish Parliament consents to treat. The Commissioners at work. The Treaty of Union framed.

The problem presented to England by the passage of the Scottish Act of Security into law was the other great issue of the winter session of 1704–1705 at Westminster, besides the famous 'tack' of the Occasional Conformity Bill.* Both issues were treated by the High Tories as means of revenging themselves on Marlborough and Godolphin, and overthrowing the Ministry, regardless of the consequences to Britain and Europe. And on both issues the Whigs saved the Moderate Tory Ministry, on the understanding that they should presently have their reward by admission into the circles of government.

It was during this winter session following Blenheim, the last of the old Parliament, that Godolphin and Harley combined with Somers, Halifax and Wharton to prescribe a wise and careful treatment for the fever of Scottish nationalism, in the hope of reaching a solution of the British question by consent of the two nations. Meanwhile the High Tories under Nottingham, Rochester and Haversham embraced the opportunity of inflaming English opinion against the recalcitrant Scots. Fortunately the drift of English politics in these middle years of Anne's reign was against the High Tory party, and the Queen herself was opposed to the rash counsels of her former friends. The years 1705–1706 were therefore more favourable, as far as

* See p. 14 above.

England was concerned, to the difficult negotiation of a Treaty of Union, than either the beginning or the end of her reign.

Early in December, the High Tory attack was opened against Godolphin as the evil counsellor who had advised the Queen to sign the Act of Security. Since it was confidently expected that the Whigs would join in the denunciation of a measure adverse to the Hanoverian Succession in Scotland, the Ministry was in grave peril. As was usual in those days, the chief debate took place in the Lords, where sat the great political chiefs whose decisions on party tactics gave the cue to their underlings in the faithful Commons. The Queen, knowing that her servant Godolphin was in danger, came down to the Lords to give him countenance, sitting 'at first on the throne, and after (it being cold) on a bench by the fire.'[168]

Dec. 1704

Lord Haversham led off the debate with an attack on Ministers for betraying the interests of England and the Hanoverian Succession. No one ventured to defend the Act of Security, not even Godolphin himself, who pleaded that he had advised its acceptance only to prevent the worse evil of an immediate revolt in Scotland. Since Blenheim had created a new atmosphere of confidence in England, such excuses appeared more timorous and foolish than they actually were. Godolphin was clearly embarrassed and spoke badly. But he spoke sense, pointing out that 'the hurt the Act could do was contingent and might be prevented.' Bishop Burnet, by birth and upbringing a Scot, uttered healing words. But what line would be taken by the Lords of the Whig Junto, in whose hands the fate of the Ministry lay? Halifax, who spoke for them first, made a damaging attack on Godolphin. If such was to be the final attitude of the Whigs, the Government was lost, and with it all hope of reconciliation between Scotland and England. But while Halifax was still on his feet, Wharton crossed over to the Government bench and was seen to 'discourse very seriously' with Godolphin. Those who watched the scene presumed that he was offering the Whig alliance to the distressed Minister upon terms. At least,

after that whispered colloquy, the Whigs 'diverted the whole debate.' In the latter part of the discussion, which lasted for several days, the line taken by Somers and Wharton was eminently prudent. They recommended that the defiance flung down by the Scots should be taken up, but not in a spirit of exasperation. An offer to negotiate should be held out together with measures of provisional retaliation on Scotland's commerce, to remind her feelingly that if she chose to become a separate kingdom she would have to face the very unpleasant consequences of such isolation.

This shrewd policy, emanating in the first instance from the Whig leaders, was accepted by Government and embodied in a measure known as the Alien Act. Though very ill received by the Scots, it eventually led them towards the Union Treaty, whereas a different and more passionate procedure on the part of England might have had results as eternally disastrous as those which unwisdom procured in America and in Ireland.[169]

The Alien Act, after long debates in both Houses, became law on the last day of the old Parliament. At once firm and conciliatory, it offered to Scotland the free choice between a Union Treaty, to be negotiated on equal terms between the two countries, or the acceptance of the Hanoverian Succession without any change in the existing international relation. Only if Scotland persisted in the design which she had announced to break the Union of the Crowns and to choose a King other than the King of England, then certain consequences were to follow. Every native of Scotland, with a few exceptions, was to be treated as an alien born out of the allegiance of the Crown of England; and the principal Scottish exports—cattle, linen and coal—were no longer to be imported either into England or Ireland. These penalties were to begin on Christmas Day 1705, if the Scots had not by that time remedied the situation created by the Act of Security in either of the ways open to her.*

Mar. 14 1705

* An excellent synopsis of the Alien Act and a commentary upon its fairness and wisdom will be found in Dicey and Rait's *Thoughts on the Scottish Union*, pp. 170–173. At the first rumour of the English intention to prohibit the importation of cattle and linen, Roxburgh wrote: 'If that's done, we are ruined.' *Jerviswood*, p. 13.

Although the Alien Act caused as much wrath in Scotland as the Act of Security had caused in England, both measures may be defended because, in the event, each had the happy effect of opening the eyes of the opposing party to the realities of the situation. The Act of Security taught the English that Scotland must be treated with on terms of equality or else she would secede. The Alien Act taught the Scots that if they chose to secede they must submit to see their poor commerce still further reduced—whereas if they took the opposite course and formed a closer Union, the whole Empire would become an open field for the trade and activity of their sons.

During the early months of 1705, while the Alien Act was on its way through Parliament, the two countries seemed to be on the point of war. The last sections of the Act of Security had provided for the arming and organization of the Scottish militia on a national scale. The spirit of their fathers, when they defied Charles I and his English bishops from Dunse Law, was abroad in the land. The local militia met twice a week at the door of every parish church. In Ayrshire alone 7,000 armed men were reported to be drilling, many of them the redoubtable Cameronian fanatics. And while Southern Scotland sprang to arms, the Highlanders sharpened their claymores and awaited the word in the glens. Presbyterian and Jacobite would march shoulder to shoulder. The Scots were still a fighting race, apt and trained to war, feared as such by those who mocked their poverty:

*Nemo me impune lacessit.**

Meanwhile the English border counties were defenceless. Northumberland and Durham could again be occupied

* The English were justly alarmed at the arming of Scotland, but the strong Scottish Whig, Marchmont, wrote to Somers pointing out a less alarming aspect of the organisation of the militia. The Jacobites, he said, were always secretly armed and ready for war; now the Presbyterians would be ready also. *Marchmont*, III, p. 282. See also Defoe, *Union*, p. 84.

In April 1705 Englishmen returning from Scotland report: 'That nation is very uppish, and the town of Dumprooz [Dumfries] are all in arms and exercise their men once every month, and that there are a considerable number of gunsmiths and sword cutters come lately from France, so they are equipping themselves might and main to force a trade with England if the Union does not succeed. This town has 700 fencible men in it.' *H.M.C. Portland* VIII, p. 177.

by the invader, as easily as when Leslie's blue-bonnets had crossed Tweed and Tyne in 1640. The coalfields could be seized and London's fuel cut off. A north-country squire wrote to his Parliamentary friend Thomas Coke :

> It's not the first time the Scots have invaded this nation with success : there's some alive that don't forget Leslie's coming into England, which gave so much encouragement to the late unhappy Civil War. The French King, I suppose, won't let them want money to go through with it.[170]

England was both angry and alarmed, but fortunately refrained from measures of panic. The Alien Act was steadily pushed through its stages till it received the royal assent. Pamphlets appeared, arguing that a Treaty of Union, even if it conceded freedom of colonial trade to the Scots, would be preferable to border fortresses, armies in time of peace and periodic war. The anti-militarist prepossessions of the English came to the rescue of their good sense in this controversy. At the end of January the House of Commons rejected the proposal that the six northern counties should arm themselves against invasion, both for fear of provoking that catastrophe in seeking to meet it, and for fear of unforeseeable trouble of all sorts : it was remembered that a very large proportion of the Northumbrian squires were Papists and Jacobites. Parliament decided instead to rely on the regular army in case of invasion, though it might mean the recall of some of Marlborough's regiments from Flanders. Godolphin was determined not to be bullied by the Scots' threat of civil war and wrote to warn Seafield :

1705

> England is not now in the condition it was when Scotland used to make inroads upon us. We have the power, and you may give us the will to return those visits. And supposing the French are more able to assist the Scots than I hope they are, the French have the character of being very good servants but the worst masters upon earth.

Indeed it is noticeable that although the Jacobite agents reported to France that now was the moment to strike, that all creeds and parties north of Tweed were united against England, and that even Hamilton was agog for action,

King Louis had also been informed that ' the Scots would not be pleased at the sight of French troops landing in their country.'[171]

At this critical stage of the relations between England and Scotland occurred the tragedy of Captain Green. It might well have precipitated war, but by a fortunate turn of events it acted as a purge to the ill-temper of the Scots, who felt better after they had been permitted to take the blood of an Englishman with all the formalities of an act of public vengeance. At this distance of time the story of the judicial murder of Captain Green can be read in pity rather than in anger, especially if we bear in mind that the conception of the nature of evidence was in those days most unscientific; and that thirty years had not passed since Titus Oates had been the most popular man in England.

On no point was Scottish opinion more sore and sensitive than on the failure of the Darien adventure,* and the continued hostility of the English East India Company to the few small Scottish ships that occasionally ventured a voyage round the Cape. Early in 1704 the *Annandale*, a vessel acting for the Darien Company, had been seized in the Downs at the instance of the East India Company, on the ground that, although a foreign ship, its Captain had enlisted seamen in England for an Indian voyage contrary to the Company's privileges. In fact the Welsh skipper had betrayed his Scottish employers and was in league with the English Company. The *Annandale* was condemned and impounded by process of law.

At the end of July 1704 the news of this piece of unneighbourly English insolence had set all Scotland aflame, when, at that ill-chosen hour, there put into the harbour of Leith an English trading vessel, the *Worcester*. Her Captain, Thomas Green, a simple young fellow of twenty-six, thought life sweet, bringing home his ship after a successful voyage to Calcutta. Fear of the French privateers from Dunkirk had caused him to make the wide circuit of Ireland and Cape Wrath, rather than take, without an escort, the direct route to London by the Channel and the Straits of Dover. Having

* See pp. 221–222 above.

reached the mouth of the Forth, he put into the port of Scotland's capital, to wait there for a convoy sailing south under proper naval protection. In time of war it was not unusual for ships returning from southern waters to take this roundabout route to the Thames, and the Dunkirkers sometimes took British ships as far north as Shetland.*

To a certain type of religious mind Green's arrival seemed ' providential ' : heaven's justice could now be done. The English ship had come to Leith like the lamb caught in the thicket for sacrifice. Roderick Mackenzie, Secretary to the Darien Company, believing the *Worcester* to be a ship of the hated East India Company, hired some ' pretty fellows ' who boarded her disguised as friendly visitors and seized her by force, under circumstances much nearer to piracy than anything of which poor Captain Green had ever been guilty.

All this had been done ' upon reprizal ' for the seizure of the *Annandale* ; but it then turned out that the *Worcester*, so far from being an East India Company ship, was an interloper, a ' Separate Stock ship,' as hostile to the tyrant of the Eastern seas as the Darien Company itself. However, it also emerged that the cargo she had brought home was valuable and that her owners, her Captain and most of her crew belonged to the hated English nation. She was detained at Burntisland on the opposite shore of Forth.

December came, and Mackenzie's lawless claim on the cargo had not yet been decided upon by law. For four months the crew of the *Worcester* had been hanging about the public houses of Leith and Edinburgh. Some of them, 'being pretty mellow with the punch,' had spun yarns to amuse the terrors of the landsmen, and one or two had hinted evil things of officers against whom they had a grudge. Their idle words dropped into the deep soil of

* E.g. *Add. MSS.* 37155, fo. 156. We now know the details of the *Worcester's* voyage and Captain Green's doings in the Indian seas, from the owner's papers ; they have been published and excellently analysed by Sir Richard Temple, in *The Papers of Thomas Bowrey* (Hakluyt Soc., 1925), and in *The Tragedy of the Worcester* (Benn, 1930). See also *The Company of Scotland*, by G. P. Insh (Scribner 1932). The affair remains an historic tragedy, but is no longer in any sense an historic mystery. Green and his crew never committed any act of piracy at all, either against the *Speedy Return* or against any other vessel. The report of the trial will be found in *State Trials*, XIV, pp. 1199–1311.

Scottish suspicion, and fructified there like dragons' teeth. The patriotic feeling of the moment, and the greed and knavery of Mackenzie, seized upon these hints to construct a charge of piracy against Green.

A Scottish ship, the *Speedy Return*, had long been missing, and the rumour now spread that Green had met her somewhere in the Indian Ocean, pirated her and murdered her captain and her crew. In fact, she had been seized in Madagascar by a real pirate, John Bowen, and afterwards burned on the Malabar coast. Some of the crew of the *Speedy Return* were already back in England ready to bear witness to the true facts, but this was not known in Scotland till the certainty of Green's guilt was too strongly fixed in the national mind to be shaken by any evidence in the world.

From January to April 1705 Scotland thought and spoke of little else save the charges against Green and his men. Passion blinded judgment in high and low, save in the case of a few of the best minds, like those of the young Duke of Argyle and the still younger Forbes of Culloden.

By order of the Privy Council, Green and his crew were arrested and put on trial. The evidence, except in the case of a perjured Indian, named Ferdinando,* did not even pretend to be more than hearsay ; another Indian and the ship's surgeon had imagined grievances to avenge, and had been worked upon by the prosecution and by the heat of Scottish public opinion to make good what they had been supposed to hint, but did not pretend ever to have seen. The witnesses contradicted each other's statements. There was no vestige of evidence of piracy to be found in the *Worcester* or its cargo, as the Privy Councillors had discovered in January, when they sent over six Lords of their own body to Burntisland to examine and report on every object on board the detained ship. If the evidence of the three hostile witnesses had been sifted, or if the rest of the crew had not been debarred from giving evidence by the prosecutors' device in putting them all in the dock together,

* He died immediately after the trial. It was said that Mackenzie murdered him because he proposed to go back on his tale. But the evidence, though it would have been held good enough to hang Green, is not enough to condemn Mackenzie, rascal though he was.

the truth must have appeared even to a Court drunk with patriotic prejudice. As it was, upon March 21, 1705, Green and fourteen of his crew were condemned to be hanged on Leith sands, in three batches to be turned off on successive weeks.*

The trial in Edinburgh was being closely watched from over the Border. The English were as fully persuaded of Green's innocence as the Scots of his guilt. When it was known that he was to be hanged, there was an outburst of fury in London, and for some days Scottish residents found it wise to stay indoors for fear of insult. Secretary Johnstone wrote home from London :

> This business of Green is the devil and all. It has spoiled all business. I am told it was two hours in the Cabinet. Somers says he knows not the laws of Scotland, but that the proceedings are illegal according to all other laws he knows, for the ship on which the piracy is committed is not libelled. In short, nobody believes it. I was surprised to find people believe that the evidence was suborned, and that those who confess it do it in the dread of torture, or upon promise of life. The Whigs make a Jacobitish business of it and it will be trumped up at all the Elections.†

Should Anne allow the executions to proceed? She found it as embarrassing to be Queen over two hostile countries as William had found his dual kingship during the Darien affair. If she pardoned the crew of the *Worcester*, as England and as justice demanded, all chance that the Scots would consent to a Union was gone, and war was at the gate. ' If the Queen shall grant them remissions,' wrote Jerviswood from Edinburgh on March 28, ' it will spoil the business of Parliament, and I am afraid will so exasperate the nation as may render it difficult for them to join with England on any terms whatever.'

At her side in London was her new Commissioner for

* The case is so fully gone into in Sir Richard Temple's two books that it is enough to refer the reader to them. The visit of the Committee of the Privy Council to Burntisland will be found in the *P.C. Reg. Ed.* Jan. 2 and 16, 1705. The statements in Alexander Hamilton's *New Account of the East Indies* (1727), I, pp. 317–320, are analysed in Temple's *Tragedy of the Worcester*, pp. 126–130.

† *Jerviswood*, p. 70.

Scotland, the young soldier Duke of Argyle, already urging her to get rid of Tweeddale and the *Squadrone* as incompetent poltroons, and trust the whole government of Scotland to himself, Queensberry and the old and tried section of the Whig party. Argyle could raise 6,000 armed men to his own whistle, twice the number Queen Anne had in Scotland. Above all, he had courage, not only in face of the French at Ramillies, but in face of his own countrymen over the Green affair. With all his faults John Campbell was a man, and in the world of Hamiltons, Tweeddales and Roxburghs this counted by contrast. He was convinced that a judicial error was being committed in Edinburgh and was refreshingly ready to say so and abide by the consequences.

He persuaded the Queen that the executions should be delayed pending enquiry. He himself, as the Queen's new Commissioner, wrote a letter to Chancellor Seafield to that effect, but this did not seem warrant enough to the Privy Council at Edinburgh to take their lives in their hands in order to save Green. Moreover, as Hamilton complained, ' Argyle's letter was in such a strain as if he had been writing to one of his chamberlains in Kintyre.' A few days later the Queen herself wrote ordering a reprieve, and the execution of the first batch, due on April 4, was postponed for a week.

The news that the Queen was interfering from London roused the Edinburgh mob to such a pitch of fury as in a later generation sealed the fate of the less innocent Porteous. Indeed the two affairs have many features in common, and if Scott had chosen the tragedy of the *Worcester* as a theme for one of his romances, he would have found it as full of matter suited to his genius as the historical setting of the *Heart of Midlothian*.

Chancellor Seafield was in grave doubt as to Green's guilt. His conduct over Darien had shown that he was not apt to be led astray by popular hallucinations. If the Privy Council had supported him, particularly if the *Squadrone* Ministers had shown the least courage, he would have helped Anne and Argyle to save the innocent men—with what consequences who can tell? But when he urgently summoned the attendance of Ministers at a meeting of the Privy Council on April 10, the day before the execution,

Roxburgh and nearly all the Queen's servants then in Scotland took care to be absent. Only fifteen Privy Councillors, about half the proper number, attended, and those for the most part holding no office under the Crown.

An express had just arrived from the Queen, dated April 3 ; she said she was studying the report of the trial which the Council had sent her ; the whole tenour of her message presumed that until her further will was known the men would not be hanged. But the Edinburgh mob had decided that hanged they should be upon the morrow. If the Privy Councillors again delayed the execution even by a day, they were in imminent danger of being ' de-Witted.' Moreover, to do them justice, they had also to consider that the pardon of Green would certainly stop the Union and not improbably lead to war. The choice was one which even men of high rectitude and courage might tremble to make.

To add to the discomfort of these not very heroic men, the Queen had sent them, by the same messenger, affidavits of Israel Phippany and Peter Freelands, sailors of the *Speedy Return*, to the effect that their ship had been seized, not by Green, but the pirate Bowen at Madagascar, on a date when the *Worcester* was far distant. This new evidence was read to the Privy Council and must have further shaken the faith of several present in the guilt of Green. The last miserable scene shall be given in the authentic words of the manuscript of the Privy Council Register :

April 10 1705

Thereon it went to the vote, ' *Grant to the petitioners a reprieve for a short day into the next week till there may be a full council, or not.*' And the rolls being called and their votes marked, there was three of the Council for granting a reprieve ; * and other three not. All the rest present being either *non liquid* [*non liquet*, ' it is not clear '] or refusing to vote, it came to the Lord Chancellor's casting vote. His Lordship [Seafield] declared he was willing to give a vote and sign the reprieve if he knew that a quorum of their lordships would sign the same, without which the order for a reprieve would be insufficient.

* The names of the dauntless three who supported Seafield for a reprieve were the Marquess of Lothian, the Earl of Buchan, and General Ramsay. *Jerviswood*, p. 74. *Jerviswood* and the *P.C. Registers* show that this decisive meeting was on April 10, although there was another meeting on April 11, the day of the execution.

And accordingly their Lordships being asked one by one if they would sign the reprieve, and all of them declined, except three besides those [three] who had voted reprieve, and the Lord Chancellor who made but seven, and so not a sufficient quorum for signing a valid reprieve. Wherefore the prisoners were left to the course of justice upon expiring of the former reprieve.

Next morning, Green's doomsday, saw the length and breadth of High Street and Canongate packed with a dense mob. They were armed, some with swords or guns and the remainder with heavy sticks. The peasants for fifty miles round had come in to support the men of Edinburgh, and it was said that 80,000 armed rioters were in the streets. The Privy Council met once more, only eleven strong on this final morning, and, to give ' authority ' to their proceedings, adjourned to the Council Chamber in Holyrood. They had to pass thither through the jaws of the mob, whose power and purpose were clear enough. What ' authority ' was left to deliberations so held ? After yesterday's meeting the result was a foregone conclusion. The Privy Council left Green and two of his companions to die that day.

April 11 1705

Chancellor Seafield proceeded back up High Street towards his home, endeavouring to clear his way by telling the mob they would soon have satisfaction. Even so, he was set upon opposite the Tron Kirk, his coach overturned, his servants beaten and himself driven for refuge into a neighbouring house. If he had announced a reprieve he would have been torn limb from limb.

The interest now shifted to Leith sands, where the pirates' gibbet had been set up within the tide mark. The great multitude moved that way, but there was not room for all on the spot, and ' one might have walked on their heads from Edinburgh to Leith sands.' The long road was lined with pitiless faces, when the Englishmen Green and Simpson and their companion Madder, a very valiant Scot, were led that way to die. An eye-witness of the horrid scene heard them—

huzza'd, in triumph as it were, and insulted with the sharpest and most bitter invectives. Being come to the place of execution, good God what a moving sight was it to see those men stand upon the very verge

of life, just launching into eternity, and at the same time see the whole multitude transported with joy, some with pleasure asking 'Why their countrymen did not come and save them.' All of which they bore with invincible patience, like innocent men, English men and Christians, and made no other returns than by forgiving them, and desiring their charity and prayers.

As soon as they were dead the mood of the fond many began to change. Some shed tears, and none demanded further victims. The rest of the *Worcester's* crew were shortly afterwards reprieved and quietly released. Not bloodthirstiness but national honour had maddened the crowd. Blood had been let as a sacramental symbol of Scotland's independence, and thereupon sanity began slowly to return. Three men—two Englishmen and one Scot—had died for the nation, for the new nation of Great Britain, which could not have come into existence if their unjust death had been prevented by the hand of power stretched out from London over Scotland. For them no Martyr's Monument stands on Calton Hill or elsewhere, but the names of Green, Madder and Simpson should be remembered with tenderness by all Britons.

The greatest and best of Scottish statesmen of the eighteenth century, Duncan Forbes of Culloden, was then a young law student of twenty. As he listened to the witnesses contradicting one another's statements at the trial of the *Worcester's* crew, he saw where the truth lay. His heart was moved within him, as it always was by injustice and cruelty even when committed by his own side. A generation later, when in the British Parliament he was defending his country's independence from English aggression in the Porteous quarrel, he thus referred to the execution of Green:

> I was so struck with the horror of the fact that I put myself in deep mourning and with the danger of my life attended the innocent but unfortunate men to the scaffold, where they died with the most affecting protestations of their innocence. I did not stop here, for I carried the head of Captain Green to the grave.[172]

The English took Green's execution very ill, but the only penalty they could safely exact for it was the removal

of the *Squadrone* Ministers, whose cowardly conduct in absenting themselves from the Privy Council at the critical meetings had made them as despicable to Scotland as they were hateful to England. Argyle, the Queen's Commissioner for the coming session of Parliament, demanded their removal and the return to office of the old Whig Ministers under Queensberry and himself. He was supported in his demand by the English Whig Lords, on whom the Godolphin Ministry was becoming every day more dependent. The double failure of the *Squadrone* Ministers in Parliament last summer and in the affair of Green this spring, had destroyed Godolphin's confidence in his favourites; and the Queen, much as she disliked Queensberry, declaring that he had 'not only betrayed me but tricked me several times,' was compelled to take him into her service again, as Lord Privy Seal, in order to retain Argyle as her Commissioner. Seafield, the adaptable and dependable public servant, remained Chancellor.

These three men were the mainstay of the reconstructed Ministry, and they were the three statesmen in all Scotland most likely, by a combination of their different tempers and talents, to save the imperilled State. It was their task, in the coming summer of 1705, to induce Parliament either to settle the Succession on Hanover, or else to initiate negotiations for a Treaty of Union. The penalty of failure would be the operation of the Alien Act at Christmas, and perhaps war.

Before the Estates met on June 28, and for nearly two months after the session had begun, the Ministry was still divided and uncertain whether to press them to settle the Succession or to treat for a Union. The omens did not seem auspicious either way. The Earl of Mar, not yet a Jacobite, was put up by Government to move that a Commission should be appointed to treat with England for terms of Union. Parliament refused to proceed with his motion, preferring to explore the alternative policy of fixing the Succession on the House of Hanover, with Limitations on the power of the Scottish Crown. But when it came to the point, the House, still distrustful of its own ability to govern Scotland, again rejected Fletcher's

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semi-republican scheme of Limitations. The Succession fell to the ground with the Limitations, and Parliament, late in the session, was forced back to reconsider Mar's proposals for a Union Treaty, as the only way of avoiding the speedy enforcement of the Alien Act by England.

It had been Seafield's opinion that, in throwing all the members of the *Squadrone* out of office, a grave risk was run that they would combine with the Jacobites and obstruct all Parliamentary progress. Queensberry had behaved in that way when he had last been turned out. The imperious Argyle, however, insisted that all the *Squadrone* must go. And, fortunately for the prospects of the Union, they behaved themselves better in opposition than they had known how to do as Ministers. The politic Seafield, their former colleague in office, never wholly lost touch with them. Real consideration for the welfare of Scotland mingled with other motives in the minds of many members of her last Parliament, both within and without the Government circle.[173]

On the last day of August and first of September 1705, a series of important votes decided the conditions upon which Scottish Commissioners should be appointed to treat for terms of Union. Anne, at the request of the Westminster Parliament, would appoint English Commissioners to meet them. If the Commissions of the two countries met and made joint proposals, those proposals would then, in the following session, come before both the Parliaments to be accepted or refused. The Jacobites and the more extreme patriots of the Country party disliked the idea of any negotiations taking place at all, but the general sense of the Estates was less unfavourable to Union, since they had just declined once again to settle the Succession on any other terms. The opponents of Union, therefore, did not directly oppose the appointment of Commissioners to treat with England, but they intended to saddle the negotiation with such conditions as must ensure its failure.

First the Duke of Hamilton moved :

> That the Union to be treated on shall not derogate any ways from fundamental laws, ancient privileges, offices, rights, dignities and liberties of the Kingdom.

This was in effect to forbid the Commissioners to treat for an incorporating Union and the merger of the Parliaments. It would confine the possibilities to a loose Federation, and it was known the English would not deal on those terms.

Aug. 31 1705 — Hamilton's wrecking motion was lost by only two voices. By such straws are the destinies of nations decided.

Next day the second attack was made. It was moved that no negotiations should be begun until the English

Sept. 1 1705 — Parliament had repealed the Alien Act. The resentment against the Act was so strong in Scotland that it was regarded as certain that this clause must pass ; and if it passed there would be no Treaty, for the English would not repeal the Alien Act under compulsion. To turn this corner, Government skilfully proposed that instead of the clause taking its place in the Act setting up the Commission, a separate address should be made to the Queen, praying that the Union should not be proceeded with until the unfriendly Alien Act had been repealed. When this amendment was put to the vote, Chancellor Seafield told some English tourists who had been admitted into the Parliament House to hear the proceedings, that the division would decide 'whether England and Scotland should go together by the ears.' Again the Government won by another small majority, and Hamilton's angry gestures betrayed his disappointment and concern.

On that eventful day a story was going round Edinburgh that Hamilton had recently been heard to declare 'The bonnet is mine, and, by God, I will wear it.' Certainly, if he aimed at the reversion of the Crown of Scotland, it was his interest to stop the Union. Up to this moment his conduct had been that of fierce opposition, and such it was again next year. But on the evening of the first of September he betrayed his cause and his followers in a manner that has never been fully explained. After the division on the Alien Act, many opposition members had left the Parliament House, thinking that all was over for the day ; but the government benches were still pretty full when the Duke of Hamilton rose, and 'with his usual haughty and bantering air,' moved that the appointment of

the Commissioners for Scotland be left to the Queen, and not undertaken by Parliament, which, he declared, was too much 'in heats and feuds' to be impartial.

He had given no notice to his unhappy followers of this change of front; indeed he had evaded their enquiries by telling them that the question would not come forward that day. The Opposition had never doubted that Parliament would refuse to leave the nominations to the Queen, governed as she always was by English advice. They were equally confident that the Estates would name enough Commissioners hostile to the Union policy to prevent the success of the negotiations. And now their own leader had come to terms with the government behind their backs, and spoiled a plan that they regarded as being sure of success.

Hamilton, it appears, felt less confident as to the result of a vote in that uncertain assembly. The government had already won several divisions most unexpectedly, and he feared there would be no majority vote to place him on the Commission.* He had therefore made a secret agreement with Argyle that, if the choice were left to the Queen, he himself should be one of those named.

The Ministers eagerly supported the Duke's motion, while Fletcher of Saltoun and some of the few Jacobites left in the House denounced his treachery. Other opposition members did not know what to think or what to do. The House voted to leave the nomination of the Commissioners to the Queen.† That night the whole Act for their appointment and instruction was read and approved, for procedure in the Scots Parliament moved quickly when it moved at all.

Sept. 1 1705

'From this day,' wrote the Jacobite Lockhart, 'may we date the commencement of Scotland's ruin.' At midnight a party of strong Unionists from the Parliament House sat up drinking success to the Treaty, in company with the English visitors who had watched the extra-

* There were others who took the same view. The Whig Sir John Clerk of Penicuik thought that the government majority would have succeeded in keeping all Jacobites and *Squadrone* leaders off the list. *Clerk* (*Rox.*), p. 57.

† *Crossrigg*, p. 171, says 'by about 40 votes'; *Lockhart*, I, p. 133, says by eight votes; and *Taylor*, *Jos.*, p. 118, says four votes. There is no official record of the figures.

ordinary and fateful proceedings of the day. 'We should now,' they said, 'be no more English and Scotch, but Brittons.' Yet next morning, in the streets of Scotland's capital, the insults to which the same visitors were subjected as the countrymen of Green, and the ballads against English 'pork-eaters' which were everywhere in demand, showed that all was not yet well. Sir John Clerk of Penicuik, when asked to be one of the Commissioners, was prepared to do his best for the cause of Union, but was convinced their work would be wasted because their countrymen would reject any Treaty they were able to make with the English. Burnet heard from his Scottish correspondents that the Estates were only playing with the negotiation as 'a plausible step, to keep matters yet longer in suspense.' The bark of the Union had already had several miraculous escapes; its luck would have still to hold if it was ever to reach port.[174]

The dangers, however, would henceforth come all from the side of Scotland. England had learned her lesson and was prepared to do her part. South of the Tweed the atmosphere was more favourable in the winter of 1705 than it had ever been before. During the summer, the General Election* had taken place which routed the High Tories and gave full power to the alliance of Godolphin and the Whigs, who were agreed on the necessity of Union, as the only method left of securing the peaceful accession of the House of Hanover in Scotland. To give the negotiations a good start, the new English Parliament, in its first session, repealed the Alien Act, in spite of High Tory remonstrance.

Dec. 1705

The Act had served its purpose by inducing the Scots to treat, and could now be discarded. 'The English frankness in this affair,' wrote Mar to Carstares, 'by doing more than we ourselves proposed, should make people in Scotland in good humour,' 'This gentle and unforced accord' of England rolled away a great obstacle from the path of the Treaty.[175]

From Christmas till the end of February 1706 the all-important business of choosing the Scottish Commissioners was going forward, not without heart-burning and dispute.

* See p. 31 above.

The Estates had left it to the Queen, and the Queen left it to Queensberry and Godolphin. Queensberry had recovered all his old prestige by his management in Edinburgh during the late session. If Argyle was the stiff backbone, Queensberry was the busy right-hand of the Ministry. And at this moment Argyle was in one of his frequent moods of ill-humour with his colleagues. Anne, advised by Queensberry, declined to nominate as a Commissioner for the Treaty so influential an opponent of Union as the Duke of Hamilton. But Argyle had promised Hamilton that he should be nominated, if only he would leave the choice to the Queen.* When John Campbell found that he could not make good his plighted word, he felt bound to refuse to serve on the Commission himself, and went off instead to the Ramillies campaign, leaving Queensberry in command of the situation.

Others besides Argyle had advised Queensberry to smooth the future path of the Treaty through the Scottish Parliament by placing *Squadrone* nobles and other opposition leaders on the Commission that was to frame it. But Queensberry feared the grit they might put into the wheels of the negotiation in London, and refused to name any but those who had already shown themselves to be good Unionists. There was an exception that proved the rule : on the panel of thirty-one Scots Commissioners, half of whom were in office, sat George Lockhart the Jacobite. Not being a great noble like Hamilton, he felt it would be useless for him to raise a solitary voice against every day's proceedings, so he sat there and suffered in silence, a reporter for his party and posterity.

The English side of the Commission was not appointed till the very eve of its first session in April 1706. Godolphin selected the members on the principles that had governed Queensberry in the choice he had made for Scotland. The only English Commissioner who could be suspected of High Toryism was Anne's favourite ecclesiastic, Sharp, Archbishop of York, deputed, together with Tenison of Canterbury, to hold a watching brief for the Church of England. In fact, Sharp never came to the meetings and did

* See p. 260 above.

not sign the Report, whereas the Whig Tenison attended frequently and signed gladly. The other Commissioners, some thirty in number, were for the most part Whigs, and the rest Ministerial Tories. Godolphin, Harley, Hedges and Harcourt were there, together with Wharton, Halifax, Sunderland, Orford, Devonshire, Chief Justice Holt, and, prominent in their counsels, Lord Somers,* whom Anne's prejudices excluded from office, but whose great talents as a constitutional lawyer and constructive statesman were now to be put to their final proof in perhaps the best piece of service that he ever rendered to his country.[176]

On April 16, 1706, the sittings of the Commissioners began, and in nine weeks they had completed the Treaty of Union, which in the end received the assent of both Parliaments and created Great Britain. The proceedings, inspired from the first by good will and fundamental agreement among the carefully chosen representatives of Unionist opinion in both countries, were guided with more than usual tact and wisdom.

Certain rules of procedure were first drawn up. The Scottish and English Commissions were to sit apart from each other, in two separate chambers of the building known as the Cockpit in Whitehall, on the opposite side of the street from the Banqueting House. They sat together only on formal occasions when the Queen was present, except once, when a public debate between the two Commissions was held, on the vexed question of the number of representatives proper for Scotland in the Parliament of Great Britain. Otherwise all business was conducted by written minutes communicated from one Commission to the other. It was also laid down that no finding was to be held obligatory till all the articles had been reviewed and accepted together ; and that all proceedings were to be kept secret until the end of the negotiations.

* Addison was no doubt prejudiced in favour of Somers, but he had inner knowledge. In his famous character of Somers in the *Freeholder*, No. 39, he writes : 'If he did not entirely project the Union of the Two Kingdoms and the Bill of Regency [see p. 93 above] there is none who will deny him to have been the chief conductor of both these glorious works,' and therefore, in Addison's opinion, the chief contriver of the quiet accession of the House of Hanover.

These were wise provisions, in view of the excited state of feeling outside, particularly in Scotland, whence the Commissioners were being watched with hostile jealousy for any sign that they were falling under English influences in London. Their enemy Lockhart was among them, 'taking notes,' and some day he might 'print them.' All things considered, it was but prudent that, by a mutual agreement, 'none of the English during the Treaty had one of the Scots so much as to dine or drink a glass of wine with them.' *

Both sides knew beforehand the limits of possible negotiation on the main issues. The abortive Commission of 1702–1703 had done preliminary work that now proved of great value.† The Scots Commissioners were well aware, before ever the sittings began, that the English would insist on an incorporating Union and a merger of the Parliaments, and would not even discuss a Federal Union. In those days Englishmen were well acquainted with the federal constitution of the Dutch United Provinces, and they knew its defects. If a Parliament continued to sit at Edinburgh, authority would still be divided and the government of Scotland might be more difficult than ever before.

On the other hand the English by this time realized that they must grant without reservation the right of the future 'North Britons' to trade with the whole 'British Empire.' In ecclesiastical matters the position was even more clear: the Scottish Commission, under the Act that set it up, had no powers to treat on religion. The Presbyterian Establishment was axiomatic. In short, if there was to be a Union at all, there must be one Parliament, one system of trade and taxation, and two Churches.

During the negotiations of 1702–1703 the Scottish Commissioners had themselves proposed an incorporating Union. But, since then, feeling in Scotland had grown more hostile to England, and the present Edinburgh Parliament was more nationalist than the Rump that was sitting in the first year of Anne. In 1706 the Scottish

* On a similar principle the Irish Nationalist Members in London, during the long Home Rule controversy of a generation and more, would never accept invitations to the tables of their English allies in Parliament, a very real sacrifice to men living for so long a time away from their homes.

† See pp. 230–232.

Commissioners dared not renew the proposal of their predecessors, though they were ready to accept it under compulsion from the English Commissioners, who therefore made the first move in the game. The famous proposal,

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drawn up by Somers and sent across from the English room in the Cockpit to the Scottish room, ran as follows:

> That the two Kingdoms of England and Scotland be for ever United into one Kingdom by the name of Great Britain. That the United Kingdom of Great Britain be represented by one and the same Parliament, and that the Succession to the Monarchy of Great Britain, in case of failure of heirs of her Majesty's body,

be governed by the terms of the English Act of Settlement in favour of the House of Hanover.

The Scots Commissioners, viewing out of the corners of their eyes the sullen face of their colleague Lockhart, and some of them remembering how the mob looked a year ago as it clamoured for Green's blood and chased the Chancellor up High Street, felt it prudent to make a demonstration of patriotic resistance. They sent back counter-proposals for a very loose Federation, under one Monarch, with free trade but no Parliamentary Union. It was a mere manœuvre. The Scottish Commissioners in fact almost all of them regarded such a Federation as an impracticable form of government for two unfriendly peoples. They trusted their English colleagues to reject it, as they very promptly did.

Thereupon the Scots Commissioners, having saved their faces by putting up a sham fight, without more ado agreed

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to accept an incorporating Union, 'with this provision, that all subjects of the United Kingdom shall have full freedom and intercourse of trade and navigation within the United Kingdom and Plantations thereunto belonging.' The English Commissioners replied that they regarded this provision as a 'necessary consequence of an entire Union.'

The foundations of the Treaty had been laid. Because the ground had been well prepared beforehand, and the Commissioners on both sides had been carefully selected

for their known opinions, a few days had sufficed, without any serious crisis, to settle the grand affair.[177]

Eight weeks more of arduous labour brought their task to an end. The two Commissions, sitting behind closed doors, decided a number of vexed and angry questions on which agreement could never have been reached in an atmosphere of public discussion.

Though Scotland gave up her Parliament, she was to keep the native part of her laws. The future British Parliament could indeed make new laws for Scotland, either particular to her, or common with England. But her old laws remained in force, except those which contravened the Union Treaty. Her system of law, so different from the common law of England, was left untouched. It remains to this day, a pledge of Scotland's intellectual independence, as the Church of her spiritual. Not only did the Scottish land law retain feudal elements and forms that had disappeared from the English, but the whole law of Scotland, like her religion, moved in an intellectual world of its own, seeking for first principles while the English law sought for appropriate writs and precedents. The mental habits of Scotland, in her golden age which still lay before her, were largely due to the preservation, under the terms of the Union Treaty, of her native law. Her venerable and famous courts, her judges, advocates and writers so racy of the soil, were to remain in Scotland 'in all time coming' and 'no causes in Scotland should be cognosible by the Courts of Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas or any other Court in Westminster Hall.' Such were the cautious words used in the Treaty. But the House of Lords did not sit in Westminster Hall, and though it was not set down in definite terms, appeals from the Scottish Courts would lie to the supreme tribunal of Great Britain.

The Edinburgh Privy Council was left untouched for the time being, but the Treaty clearly contemplated its abolition, in the words 'until the Parliament of Great Britain shall think fit to alter it.' The Privy Council was little loved in Scotland, and its abolition in 1708 was not resented. Thenceforth the executive as well as the legislative power over Scotland was concentrated in London—but not the judicial. Scotland's statesmen have had to be content with their share in ruling Great Britain, but the lawyers of Edinburgh long kept alive the native traditions and the peculiar mentality of the land that bred them.

The heritable jurisdictions, or private law-courts of the Scottish nobility, were oppressive to the people subject to them, and were a hateful anachronism in the eyes of English lawyers and statesmen. None the less, if the Treaty was to have a chance of passing the Edinburgh Parliament, the Nobles must not be offended. And so these relics of the feudal age were specially named for survival. Forty years later they were abolished by an Act of the British Parliament, after the suppression of the last Jacobite rebellion, the last spasm of dying feudalism.

The most difficult point in the negotiation between the two Commissions was to define the number of Scottish members to sit in the Westminster Parliament. Scotland was entitled by its wealth and share of taxation to thirteen members in the House of Commons ; by its population to eighty-five. After a long wrangle it was agreed to compromise on forty-five. They were to be elected by the antiquated and unrepresentative constituencies that had chosen the Edinburgh Parliament, and they continued to be so elected until the Reform Bill of 1832.* The number of Scottish Peers who were to sit in the House of Lords was fixed at sixteen, to be chosen by the whole body of Scottish Nobles. Scots were also eligible to obtain Peerages of Great Britain and sit by that right.

The financial arrangements were generous to Scotland. Her population was reckoned at an eighth, her wealth at a fortieth of that of England. And her contribution to the land tax was fixed at a fortieth. The taxation and tariff system of Great Britain was to be one. But since the Scottish taxpayer would now help to bear his part of the national debt that England had contracted before the Union, Scotland was to be given a handsome 'Equivalent' for this added burden, in the shape of £398,085 10s.—for Sir John Clerk had worked it out to the shillings.

* See p. 180 above.

There can be no doubt that the 'Equivalent' helped to win for the Union the grudging assent of the Scottish Parliament. For the Treaty laid it down that the bulk of the money thus handed over to Scotland was to be spent in two ways, highly popular both in the country and in Parliamentary circles. The shareholders of the Darien Company, who never expected to see again the money they had lost in King William's reign, were to get back every penny of their capital and five per cent. annual interest to boot. Many a Scottish home was the brighter for that clause in the Treaty, which was faithfully and fully performed. By putting his hand into his capacious pocket—a gesture to which he was now gradually accustoming himself—John Bull did something to wipe out, if not the memory of the dead who had been so dear, at least the abiding sense of a still unrequited wrong that the word Darien conjured up in every Scottish heart. The tragic accounts of that Company were well wound up, its clerks and secretaries paid off—including Roderick Mackenzie—its books closed for ever. At this hour they lie, those records of a people's agony, locked away in their own old cupboard, opened only by the curious historian, 'all passion spent.'

The other chief use to which the Equivalent money was to be put, according to the express terms of the Treaty, was the payment of the debts of the Scottish government. These debts were chiefly owed to great nobles and government officers. It was difficult for any but a Jacobite to denounce the payment of the national debts as Parliamentary bribery. But the arrangement certainly oiled the wheels of the Union Treaty. Most, though not all, who benefited by this clause, were in fact strong supporters of Union.

On July 22, 1706, the Treaty was signed by all save half-a-dozen out of some sixty Commissioners. Next day they went together from the Cockpit to St. James's Palace, to present their work to Queen Anne, where she sat awaiting them amid a crowd of the ladies of her Court, foreign Ambassadors and other notables. The procession of Commissioners itself contained most of her leading statesmen. They walked into her presence two and two, an Englishman and a Scot in each file. Chancellor Seafield spoke for

Scotland. Lord Keeper Cowper, speaking for England, hesitated, bungled, and finally drew his speech from his pocket and read it, with the imperturbable coolness of a veteran performer, 'while all the audience was in the utmost pain for him.' The Queen made a suitable reply. It was the other great moment of her reign, beside the receipt of the news of Blenheim. The scene has been not unfitly chosen as the subject of one of the frescoes recently set up to adorn the entrance lobby of the present House of Commons, occupying the site of St. Stephen's Chapel, which was in those days the House of Commons itself.[178]

CHAPTER XIV

The Passing of the Union Treaty, 1706–1707

Will the Parliaments ratify the Treaty? Division of opinion in Scotland. The arguments for and against Union. The Treaty in the Edinburgh Parliament. Riot and threat of Civil War. Hamilton's weakness. Queensberry's firmness. Attitude of the Church of Scotland. The Act protecting her. The Union passes through both Parliaments. Rejoicings in England. A glimpse into the future.

It was small wonder that the poor lady, whom two unreasonable nations expected to play the parts of Elizabeth of England and her rival the Queen of Scots at one and the same time, had received very graciously the Treaty proposed by the Commissioners to put an end to the Dual Monarchy. But it still remained uncertain whether her subjects, as represented in her two Parliaments, were prepared to accept the Union. The English Lords and Commons could be relied on to pass it; but Ministers decided not to bring it up at Westminster until it had run the gauntlet of the Edinburgh Parliament. If it were first accepted by England, the pride and suspicion of Scotland would take alarm and regard the Treaty as a piece of English goods. It had better come before the Estates as the work of their own Commissioners, before South Britain had the opportunity of damning it with its approval.

Although the English Parliament usually met in the winter months, it was the custom of the Scottish Parliament to meet in the summer. But in the summer of 1706 the Union Commissioners had been at their work, and the Estates therefore did not meet till October 3, for what proved to be the last session of the last Parliament of Scotland.

The detailed terms of the Treaty had not until then been published, but it had got abroad that the Commissioners had conceded the 'incorporating Union.' Parliament had not been sitting long before the outcry against 'the Treaters, traitors,' rose shrill from half Scotland.

The other half of Scotland shouted less and perhaps thought more. Quiet folk yearned after a settled Succession, colonial trade and the identity of Scotland's interest with that of her rich and powerful neighbour; they foresaw the dangers to peace and to Presbyterianism that must follow refusal of the Treaty, dangers which the more loud-voiced opponents either ignored, or, if they were Jacobites, secretly welcomed. Among the inducements leading the unwilling Scots towards a Union was the new prestige won for England by Blenheim and Ramillies, and the assertion of her sea supremacy in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. In the autumn of 1706 England was the acknowledged arbitress of Europe: a closer partnership with her appeared more advantageous than at the beginning of the Queen's reign, and defiance of her in league with France more hazardous. The choice was being narrowed down to that.

The Unionists moreover reminded their countrymen of the realities of Scotland's boasted 'independence.' While the benefit from Union would be substantial, the sacrifice would be to a large extent fictitious. For Scotland did not, under the system of the Dual Monarchy, stand fairly upon her own feet as an independent nation. She had no war fleet of her own to save her from invasion.* Her army of 3,000 men was too small either to police the Highlands or to put down a rising in the Lowlands, unless supported by English troops. With no diplomatic representatives and almost no commerce, her voice was unheard in Europe. For America she had ceased to exist since her disappearance from Darien. Even her domestic independence was more nominal than real. Fletcher of Saltoun spoke the bitter truth when he complained that Scotland's Ministers were chosen and dismissed by Godolphin in London, and that

* She had two small frigates, occasionally patrolling one on each coast; their doings are recorded in the Privy Council registers in detail. But the protection of Scotland from invasion was done entirely by the English fleet—as in 1708.

they took their instructions from the English Cabinet. In December 1706 James Johnstone of the *Squadrone*, discussing the Union Treaty with Marlborough, said to him :

> The true state of the matter was whether Scotland should be subject to an English Ministry without trade, or be subject to an English Parliament with trade.[179]

Scotland was not really independent. And if she aspired to attain independence by proclaiming a King of her own, she must become the enemy of England, throw herself into the arms of the Jacobites and France, and in so doing sacrifice her Presbyterian Establishment. If, as was not unlikely, she were then reconquered by England, her state would be worse than before.

These considerations ultimately prevailed in the Parliament House, persuading the *Squadrone*, in spite of their quarrel with Queensberry's government, to cast their score of votes into the balance on the side of the Union Treaty, and so decide the result.[180] Moreover, these arguments had force out of doors. A warfare of pamphlets,* which in those days did the work now done by newspapers, wireless and political speeches, put the case for and against the Union to the people. No inconsiderable part of the nation, and more particularly of the clergy and leading laity of the Presbyterian Church, were persuaded at least to refrain from joining in the attack upon the Treaty.

Some of the arguments in the opposition pamphlets were false or foolish, but others urged objections of real weight. Not all the fears expressed were unreasonable, although most of them have been happily falsified by the actual course of events. For example, it was pointed out that, although the Union purported to guarantee certain Scottish institutions, in particular the Presbyterian Establishment, ' in all succeeding generations,' there would in fact be no legal bar to their destruction by Acts of the British Parliament, wherein English ' prelatists ' would always have a very great majority. There was, doubtless, a strong moral obligation on England never to disturb the main provisions of the

* I have had the use, not only of the pamphlets in the National Library, but of a collection kindly lent me by Sir Charles Firth.

Treaty, but this obligation could not be made legally binding on posterity. In a united Great Britain there would be no high judicial arbiter to preserve Scotland's rights, no such Supreme Court as there is to-day in the Federal Constitution of the United States, to judge Bills passed by the Legislature and decide whether they were in accordance with the Treaty of Union or no. The Westminster Parliament was omnicompetent. It had often changed religion in England, and might in the future change it in North Britain. It would be in its power to pass an Act to abolish Presbyterianism in Scotland—and Christianity too, if it so chose.

The question, therefore, was—could Scotland trust her neighbour's good faith ? With bitter misgivings she decided to try the experiment.

Her reliance upon England's honour has not been misplaced. It is true that several provisions of the Treaty which were specially marked to be perpetual have been repealed or altered by the British Parliament. For instance, private feudal jurisdictions were abolished in 1747 ; and, in a later age, posts in the schools and Universities of Scotland have been opened to others beside Presbyterians. Whether these were ' breaches of the Union Treaty ' or no, they could be made legally, and, since Scottish opinion assented, with perfect justice. There have indeed been some Acts of the British Parliament which parties in Scotland regarded at the time as violations of the spirit of the pact of 1706; for example, the Whig Treason Act of 1709, and the Tory Toleration Act and Restoration of Church Patronage in 1712. But on the whole England has kept faith for two hundred years, and is not likely to break it now.

The men who opposed the Union, though posterity may think them mistaken on the balance of argument as viewed in the light of subsequent events, had strong patriotic reasons to urge. Their most valid objection was to the sacrifice of the Edinburgh Parliament. This was a real sacrifice, because, since the Revolution, the Scottish Estates were beginning to attract to themselves an interest unparalleled in their long but not very glorious history. Parliamentary life was beginning to stir in Scotland, and the Union killed it in its infancy. Yet the reason why the

Union had become an imperative necessity to Britain was precisely that the Scottish Parliament had become for the first time a reality in the reigns of William and Anne, and that its independent action, however desirable from certain points of view, was rendering the peaceful government of Scotland by an English sovereign impossible on the existing terms. Therefore there must be a joint government of Great Britain, on economic and religious conditions equitable to Scotland.

Undoubtedly there was loss to set against the gain. The disappearance of the Parliament from Edinburgh nipped in the bud the nascent interest taken by the Scot in politics proper. Religion, agriculture, trade, literature flourished in Eighteenth-Century Scotland, but not political life. The Scots took little interest in the doings of their so-called representatives at Westminster. 'The General Assembly,' writes Professor Rait, 'retaining its much more efficient representative machinery, again displaced Parliament as the body which attracted the interest of the nation.'[181] Scotland for the next hundred years prospered materially and grew intellectually as never before. But political life only began to revive, painfully enough, at the close of the century, when the agitation for and against Parliamentary Reform, and the hopes and fears aroused by the scent of approaching democracy, raised new parties and new passions.

The debates and votings on the Union Treaty, begun in the Parliament House early in October 1706, went on until the end of January 1707. Of the few speeches that were published by their authors and have so come down to us, several are well-reasoned arguments and indicate a high level of discussion upon the real issues. But the most famous of them was the most absurd. Lord Belhaven's emotional oratory had great vogue when he printed it for consumption out of doors, but it only aroused laughter in the Parliament House, as delivered by the 'rough, fat, black, noisy man, more like a butcher than a lord.'

> I think [cried Belhaven], I think I see our ancient mother Caledonia, like Caesar, sitting in the midst of our Senate, ruefully looking round about her, covering herself with her royal garment, attending the fatal blow, and breathing out her last with an *et tu quoque, mi fili.*

To which the Earl of Marchmont made answer :

> Behold he dreamed, but lo ! when he awoke, he found it was a dream.[182]

It was soon apparent that a small majority was available for carrying the Union Treaty, clause by clause, through the angry House. The tactful firmness of Queensberry, presiding as Anne's Commissioner, and the disinterested decision of the nobles of the *Squadrone* to support on this great issue the government that had supplanted them, decided the fate of Britain. The majority in favour of the Union was larger among the Nobles than among the Barons and Burgesses, but each of the three Estates recorded a majority on nearly all occasions. About forty members, between a fifth and a sixth of the House, did not vote. It was evident that only pressure from outside could prevent Parliament from passing the Treaty, and the pressure was organized and applied in three forms—addresses, rioting and the threat of armed rebellion.

Ninety addresses were presented against the Union and none in its favour. Yet of thirty-four shires only fourteen addressed ; of sixty-six burghs, only nineteen ; of nine hundred and thirty-eight parishes only sixty ; of sixty-eight presbyteries only three. The members for the protesting shires and burghs in nearly every case voted against the Union, so that there is no clear evidence that on this issue Scotland was seriously misrepresented in the Parliament House. The Convention of Royal Burghs decided to address against the Union by twenty-four votes to twenty, while twenty-two were absent. The Unionists declared that the twenty represented wealth of a far greater taxable value than the rest. The mobs of Glasgow and Edinburgh were indeed hot against the Union, but the wealthier burghers were inclined to favour the change. Opinion in Scotland was divided perhaps not unevenly. But there was more anger and enthusiasm among opponents than among supporters of the Treaty, for even Unionists were

Scots and human, and did but accept the inevitable with a sigh for ' the end of an auld sang.' [183]

The deliberations in the Parliament House were more disturbed by the rioting than by the addresses. For the rioting was, in the most literal sense, at the door. The Edinburgh mob had, ever since its successful activity in the Revolution winter, aspired to hold the government of the country in check, much like the mob of Paris in a later age. It had recently secured by terrorism the execution of Green, and it was now resolved to secure by similar means the rejection of the Union. For if the Union were passed, the political importance of the Edinburgh mob would be gone : the legislature would be moved to London, and in all probability the executive, in the form of the Privy Council, would shortly follow.

But Queensberry and Argyle were not the men to be terrorized, as the *Squadrone* ministers had been terrorized in the affair of Green. In the last week of October, as soon as the first serious riot had proved the inadequacy of the City Guard, who could not prevent the mob hammering on the locked door of the Parliament House, the Government called the Foot Guards down from the Castle, ' His Grace the Duke of Argyle mounted at the head of the Horse Guards,' and the troops occupied High Street and Parliament Close in military form. The opposition in the Estates denounced as tyrannical the protection thus afforded to their debates, and ' it was alleged that it was never known in Edinburgh before.' But the majority of members had no wish to be torn to pieces. Thenceforth the mob had to confine itself to the daily ovation to Hamilton on his way to and from Parliament, and the chase of Lord Commissioner Queensberry's glass coach, as it galloped back to Holyrood with Horse Guards in front and panting footmen behind, before the halloos and stones of the pursuing mob—an undignified but comparatively harmless performance.

Daniel Defoe was living all this while in Edinburgh, as the unofficial agent of the English Government. The long and often alarming reports on Scottish opinion, which he sent to his employer Harley, were passed on to Godolphin,

who wrote of them as ' serious and deserving reflection.' Defoe was also in secret conference with the leading Presbyterian clergy, to persuade them, as a representative of the Nonconformists of England, from whom he showed letters, that the Protestant interest in Britain imperatively required the passing of the Union. He describes himself as ' every day a member of the General Assembly,' and writes that ' every night and morning I have a reverend committee with me to answer their cases of conscience.' ' He was,' wrote Clerk of Penicuik, ' a spy among us, but not known to be such, otherwise the mob of Edinburgh had pulled him to pieces.' Though his business was not publicly known, he had Englishman written on his face and clothes, and he confessed to Harley that as he walked about—followed by cries of ' No Union,' ' English dog,'—' I cannot say to you I had no apprehensions, nor was Mons. de Witt quite out of my thoughts.' [184]

But destiny had other uses for him than to die in a bicker on High Street. At that moment, half the world away, in an uninhabited island of the Pacific, a Scottish sailorman was wandering sadly through the brushwood along the high rock ridges, his gun on his shoulder, himself clad in a queer goat-skin hat and suit, the most utterly friendless and forgotten of all Queen Anne's subjects. Defoe had never yet even heard the name of Alexander Selkirk, whose story he was to render far more widely known to remote posterity and distant lands than is the tale of Marlborough's battles or the passing of the Treaty that made Great Britain.

Throughout November and December, the critical months when the fate of the Union was decided, Edinburgh was held in awe by the display of military force. But the army of 3,000 was not enough to keep down all Scotland. In Glasgow, the Town Council had refused to petition against the Union, for Bailie Nicol Jarvie and his like were already dreaming of profitable voyages to the English plantations. Thereupon the mob rose and seized the town. Dumfries was occupied by a regiment of Cameronian rebels from the countryside. Ayrshire and all the old Covenanting districts were up. The moment had come

for the opponents of Union to march on Edinburgh and 'raise the Parliament.'

Fortunately for the prospects of the Treaty, its opponents were even more strongly opposed to one another. The West was rising to save the Kirk from subjection to a Prelatic Parliament at Westminster. But it was by no means from that motive that Episcopalian lairds in the North-East were saddling their horses and calling out their men ; nor was it for love of the Kirk that kilted clansmen were waiting in the glens for the word to march on Edinburgh. Queensberry had his paid agents, Ker of Kersland and Cunningham of Ecket, at work among the Cameronians. These men first gained the confidence of the formidable zealots by urging them on to occupy Dumfries and burn the houses of local Unionists, and then preached to them the doctrine of the sin and danger attending all traffick with Papists, Prelatists, French and Jacobites. Would they make themselves the Pretender's tools ? In this way Ker persuaded the Western fanatics to halt in their march upon the capital, and ultimately to disperse. English troops had been moving to the Border, but with no intention of crossing it unless Edinburgh were in peril.

Meanwhile the Jacobites of North and East did not march. They were ready, but no one gave the word. Their leaders, Hamilton and Atholl, were jealous of one another and would not concert plans. Enquiry had shown that no French troops were so much as promised, and that the English Jacobites refused to stir so long as Queen Anne was alive. Hamilton, as always, failed those who relied on him when the crisis came. He loved to figure in Parliament as the patriot Duke, and in High Street as the idol of the mob. But from decisive action he was restrained by a combination of motives—some remnant of political wisdom, fear of civil strife, thoughts of his English estates, his heavy financial embarrassments, his want of genuine interest in the Pretender's claim to a throne that he had dreamed of for himself ; he would not give the word for war. It is even possible that he had secret misgivings that the Union might after all be the best way out. He had discussed it as an open question with Mar in September. And in November,

as the crisis approached, he 'was four hours with the Lord Commissioner in his apartments, and went out as well as came in *incognito*,' and he was 'with the Chancellor very frequently.' Once, when the Opposition had planned to secede in a body from the House as the preliminary to revolution, he had consented to take the lead, but on the morning of action sent word that he was 'seized of the toothache.' When at length his followers had forced him to come to the Parliament House, he refused to act. Under such a leader rebellion proved impossible.

It was, moreover, noted as fortunate for the Unionists that this all-important session had, contrary to custom, been held in the winter. The depth of Scottish roads and the shortness of Scottish days around Yule were strong additional reasons why hesitating men should not leave their firesides for the miseries of campaign.

'There is a tide in the affairs of men . . .' It had ebbed, while they still hesitated to embark. Glasgow had been reoccupied by dragoons, and the mob ringleaders arrested. December 1706 had passed without catastrophe, and with the New Year a new atmosphere prevailed. The Ministers and their friends wrote to their English correspondents that the Treaty was safe.[185]

One of the chief reasons why the national discontent had just not boiled over was that the Presbyterian Church had received in November 1706 important safeguards for her position under the Union. The Scots Commissioners who made the Treaty in London had been forbidden to treat of matters ecclesiastical, which the Edinburgh Parliament reserved for its own consideration. Between November 7 and 12 it debated and carried an 'Act for securing the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government within the Kingdom of Scotland,' and incorporated it as an essential part of the Union Treaty. This Act preserved the existing privileges and monopolies of the Presbyterian Establishment 'to continue without any alteration to the people of this land in all succeeding generations.' It may be matter of argument whether or not the clauses were so drawn as to render it a breach of faith on the part of the British Parliament in

1712 to pass the Toleration Act and to restore Church Patronage in Scotland. In any case the Church Security Act put the strongest possible moral obligation on the Westminster Parliament to respect the fundamentals of the Presbyterian Establishment.

The incorporation of this Act in the Treaty did much to relieve the fears of the Church. The hot young ministers who, earlier in the autumn, had been preaching against the Treaty as a betrayal of Scotland into the hands of English Prelatists, began, as the winter advanced, to abate their fury. The Jacobite Lockhart mournfully recorded that

> no sooner did the Parliament pass an Act for the security of their Kirk, than most of the brethren's zeal cooled.

The General Assembly of the Church was sitting in Edinburgh all this time; fortunately the judicious Carstares presided as Moderator. The Assembly at first had shown some hostility to the Treaty, but after the passing of the Act to secure the Church in November, it became neutral, if not favourable. The strong, gentle influence of Carstares was now, as always, potent for the good. It was thought that the Treaty would never have won through Parliament, if the Assembly, under worse guidance, had in December passed a vote against the Union. But it voted instead in deprecation of the riots.

Presbyterians had been put on their guard by the over-great zeal of Episcopalians, in and out of Parliament, in warning them that the Union would be the destruction of the Kirk, and vowing that the Act for her security failed to secure her at all. The gentlemen protested too much. It was notorious that their real quarrel with the Union was that it made the Protestant Succession and the Presbyterian Church in Scotland essential parts, for all time to come, of the Constitution of Great Britain.

From the Presbyterian point of view there remained, indeed, one serious blot on the Treaty, the Sacramental Test. The Test of Anglican Communion, however much modified in practice by the possibilities of 'occasional conformity,'* purported to keep out Scottish Presbyterians from those

* *Blenheim*, pp. 277–279.

Ministerial and other offices of Great Britain which were held in England. It was only a partial compensation that the Treaty reserved all offices held in Scotland to Presbyterians, for the centre of political ambition and power, alike for Scots and English, was now to be fixed in London. But in fact the grievance proved more theoretic than practical, because in the latitudinarian atmosphere of the Eighteenth Century, not clearly foreseen in 1706, the Sacramental Test was readily taken by Scots Presbyterians aspiring to British official posts, or else was not in fact offered to them.* But at the time when the Union was passed, great indignation was felt in Scotland at the injustice of the Test. Since, however, it was known that the English would not alter the Test Act in their country even for the benefit of North Britons, it was necessary to endure what could not be cured.[186]

The Scottish Parliament made few alterations or additions to the Treaty as presented by the Commissioners, beyond the addition of the Act for securing the Presbyterian Church. Some amendments were accepted referring to details of trade and taxation, on which great stress was laid in Scotland. But the Ministers, in spite of severe pressure brought upon them, refused all such changes as would have led to dangerous disputes when the amended Treaty appeared before the English Parliament. For example, they successfully rebutted the claim that Scotland should continue to be allowed to export raw wool abroad, contrary to a prime principle of English economic policy.[187]

When in the course of January 1707 it became clear that, contrary to so many expectations, the Treaty was actually passing through the Estates in a form that England would accept, the chagrin of the Jacobites and extreme Nationalists was proportionate to their recollection of a dozen different occasions on which the Union would have

* Pitt's friend and Cabinet colleague, the great Henry Dundas, was a Scottish Presbyterian, at one time active in the business of the General Assembly. Yet he said to Dr. Thomas Somerville anent the Sacramental Test: 'Doctor, I did not think you had been so illiberal. Would you scruple to take the sacrament in the Church of England, or join in communion with its members?' *Somerville*, p. 232. See also the quotation from Dr. Alexander Carlyle's speech to the General Assembly in 1791, in *Dicey and Rait*, pp. 248–249, 254–256. The growth of Moderatism in Scotland greatly smoothed the working of the Test in practice.

been wrecked by the least turn of chance or by a slightly greater effort of co-operation among its opponents. Jacobites like Lockhart could not forgive Hamilton. Nor could they believe that a wider vision of their country's needs had brought round many to acquiesce regretfully but hopefully in the great change. Lockhart took refuge in the theory that the Union had been passed by wholesale bribery. The fact that he adduced in support of this charge was the advance of £20,000 by the English to the Scottish government, in two instalments, in October and November 1706. It was to be paid back, but exactly how much of it ever was paid back did not emerge from the investigation into the matter by the Tory Parliament of 1712. There was something irregular about the accounting for the transaction. But at most only a small part of it was spent in direct bribery. For the greater part was spent on the purpose for which the sum was ostensibly borrowed, the payment of debts owed by the Scottish government to individuals. No doubt some of these payments were made thus punctually in order to facilitate the passage of the Treaty. Possibly some may have gone to solve the doubts of a few waverers, but most went into the pockets of men who had all along been staunch supporters of the Union. Queensberry had long been clamouring for the settlement of the great sums owed him by government, and when he again took office in 1705 it had been agreed that he should be paid. More than half the £20,000 went to liquidate his claims. How far can payment of debts, justly due, be regarded as bribery?

Lockhart, however, stated that some of the persons so paid had no claims on Government, or else were paid twice over. But he is a strongly prejudiced witness, and he brings no evidence beyond his bare word. There is no proof or disproof in some of the cases. In others, such as those of Queensberry, Marchmont and Roxburgh, the money paid was certainly owing to them from Government. One of the beneficiaries, Atholl, remained a staunch opponent of the Union to the end.

It would be idle to pretend that no money passed to ease the passage of the Union. It would be strange if it had not, for on the most ordinary occasions, both in the English and

Scottish Parliaments, it was the custom of the age for the government to give *douceurs* in one form or another to some of its supporters. Even Opposition parties were held together, not only by hope of obtaining office, but also by more immediate inducements. Opponents of the Treaty had themselves taken French and Papal gold through the medium of their leader Hamilton, and the Scottish Whigs declared that this 'occasioned much difficulty in bringing about the Union.' But that did not prove that the Jacobites and Nationalists opposed the Union because they had been bribed *en masse*. And Lockhart's corresponding theory that the Union was the outcome of wholesale bribery of individuals is equally absurd. The Treaty was carried, as it was also opposed, for grave public reasons earnestly considered by men who were not indifferent to their country's interests, nor, it may be admitted, to their own.[188]

In February 1707 the Treaty as passed by the Scottish Estates was recommended to the English Parliament in a Speech from the Throne. In both Houses the High Tory leaders spoke against the Union, chiefly on the ground of its recognition of the Church in Scotland and admission of a Presbyterian phalanx among the Lords and Commons at Westminster. Nottingham declared that it destroyed 'the very constitution of England.' In the previous Parliament the Treaty would have had heavy going in the Commons, but Sir John Packington now harangued in vain on the impropriety of having two Churches in one Kingdom. It was indeed an anomaly according to the theory and practice of the age, but the queer, flexible patchwork of the British Empire was in future to be sustained by a long series of such anomalies, paradoxes and innovations.

In neither House did the Opposition venture to divide on any but subordinate issues. All the Whigs and governmental Tories were for the Union, and so were the North-Country members irrespective of party, in their dread of renewed Border War and the Scottish occupation of the Tyne coalfields. The majority of the Bishops supported the Treaty. Archbishop Tenison grieved the High Churchmen and placated the Scots by declaring that 'the narrow notions

of all Churches had been their ruin ; and that he believed the Church of Scotland to be as true a Protestant Church as the Church of England, though he could not say it was so perfect.' He introduced a Bill for securing the Church of England, to be appended to the Union Treaty like the corresponding Act for the Church of Scotland. Tenison's Bill gave to existing Acts, which protected the Church of England in her rights and monopolies, the character of essential parts of the constitution of Great Britain. The High Tories declared the security insufficient, but my Lord Wharton pronounced it unnecessary. He was in high good humour at the success of the Whig policies, and told the House in his pleasantest vein that ' the Church was secure enough without it, since the Scripture had declared it was built upon a rock and the gates of Hell should not prevail against it.' Coming from Tenison or Nottingham the sentiment would have been listened to with edification, but when Noble Lords heard it from Wharton they scarcely knew what face he intended them to wear.[189]

There was no need again to put the Union Treaty to a vote of the Scottish Estates. It had been passed by the English in the form in which they had received it from Edinburgh ; only the Act securing the English Church had been added on, in a manner agreed to beforehand by words in the Treaty as it had passed the Scottish Estates. Queensberry therefore had only to announce at Edinburgh the ratification of the Treaty by England. Before the end of March he had wound up the business of the last session of the last Parliament of Scotland.[190]

The First of May 1707, when Great Britain was to come into existence by Statute, was awaited in England with deep thankfulness unalloyed by regrets. But in Scotland some natural tears were shed. The public was disturbed when, in the last days of April, ' thirty-one whales ' were found dead on the sands of Kirkcaldie ; their monstrous presence was regarded throughout the land as an evil omen. On May 1 itself an Edinburgh correspondent wrote to the Earl of Mar:

> There is nothing so much taken notice of here to-day as the solemnity in the south part of Britain, and the want of it here. The first tune of our music bells this day is ' *Why should I be sad on my wedding day?* ' There being a printed account of the whales come ashore at Kirkcaldie, I send it inclosed to your Lordship.

But meanwhile Queensberry, bringing the Union with him, had been making a triumphant progress through England in the April weather. Southwards from Berwick bounds, he was received with acclamations by the people, and feasted by the magistrates of every city on the London road, while the gentlemen of each shire rode in to do him honour. ' At Barnet he was met by the Ministry of England and most of the Nobility then attending the two Houses of Parliament. Their retinue consisted of forty-six coaches and over a thousand horsemen.' Thus royally accompanied, the last Queen's Commissioner for the Scottish Parliament made entry into London through the shouting streets. The Scots in England for once found themselves popular, and observed ' real joy and satisfaction in the Citizens of London,' who ' were terribly apprehensive of confusions from Scotland in case the Union had not taken place.'

On May 1 all England made holiday. The Queen, accompanied by four hundred coaches, went to yet another ceremony at St. Paul's to give thanks for the greatest of all the victories with which God had blessed her reign.[191]

The one-sided rejoicings over the Union were soon over, and in a few weeks charges and counter-charges were being bandied about between Scots and English. The later pages of this history will record fresh instances of bad blood and misunderstanding between the two now yoked as one ; and the economic prosperity which the Scots expected to reap at once as a result of free trade with the Empire, was long in coming. But the new yoke, though it galled, held fast ; and if prosperity came late, it was one day to come in full plenty as a direct result of the Union. Meanwhile the immediate object of the statesmen who had united the Parliaments was fulfilled upon Anne's death : the House of Hanover succeeded to the throne of Great Britain, and no rival reigned at Holyrood. But, because the terms of the Union had been founded on justice and equality between Scots and English, an even greater measure of success

crowned the work in more distant years—the full reconcilement of the two peoples. The British Empire became much greater, and in every sense richer than an English Empire could ever have been with Scotland for enemy—in arms, in commerce, in colonization, in thought, science, letters and song.

And yet, though Scotland had lost her Parliament, she had not lost her soul or her personality as a nation. Indeed her full development was only rendered possible by the release from poverty and isolation that the Union brought in its train. The golden age of Scotland was still in the future—the age of Burns and Scott. Then would be seen a sight to make Defoe smile and Swift sneer—England coming to worship at the shrine of Scottish tradition and legend! The angry reluctance with which Scotland had consented to the Union was not meaningless; if she had agreed with enthusiasm, if she had nourished no resentments and no regrets, she might have dwindled down into the thing she was officially to be called—'North Britain.'

CHAPTER XV

The Check to the Allies in 1707

Allied dissension. Marlborough's visit to Charles XII. Marlborough's Great Design. Peterborough's tour in Europe. Almanza and the loss of Spain. Fruitless campaign in the Netherlands. Villars breaks into Germany. The failure before Toulon. The 'half-sinking' of the French fleet. Death of Sir Cloudesley Shovell.

The *annus mirabilis* of 1706 had put an end to French hegemony in Europe and had secured those war aims which the Grand Alliance had originally been pledged to attain. But the military events of 1707 were to reveal the limits of the Allies' power, to show that France was not impotent for self-defence and that Spain was not, like one of the Provinces of her Empire, a mere counter with which diplomats could bargain at the Hague. Almanza, Toulon, the raid of Villars into Germany and the failure of Marlborough to achieve anything remarkable in the Netherlands formed a sum total bitterly disappointing to those over-confident hopes with which the campaign began.

But, in every field, the failure of the Allies was not more due to the resistant powers of the French and Spanish nations than to the jealousies that divided Britain, Holland and Austria, all the more bitterly now that so large a measure of safety and success had been secured. The three-cornered quarrel over the Governorship of Belgium in the previous summer * bore fruit in 1707 in the supine and selfish conduct by which Austria surpassed herself in Germany and the Mediterranean, and in the partial relapse of the Dutch Field Deputies into a surly obstructiveness to Marlborough's

* See pp. 132–135, above. *For this chapter see Map X (Europe), below.*

action in the field, in contrast to the ready co-operation they had displayed throughout the campaign of Ramillies. Marlborough suffered allies more gladly than any other great commander in history, but even his letters in this year of unfulfilled renown speak bitterly of chances thrown away in every part of Europe, chiefly by Austria and in a less degree by the German Princes and by the Dutch. The refusal of the Emperor to come to terms with the Hungarians continued to enrage the English Ministers, and the recent conquest of Italy opened up a whole new series of bitter quarrels between the Duke of Savoy and the Imperial Court. According to Godolphin in June, 'Vienna has not one thought that is not directly opposite to the interest of the Allies'; whereas the Viennese Ministers had the temerity to complain that Austria alone of the Allies was gaining nothing by the war![192]

While in the West the enemies of France were held in check by their mutual dissensions, in the East a dark cloud hovered over them in the shape of Charles XII and his victorious army of Swedes, camped in the heart of Saxony and threatening to attack the Empire through its back door. It was well indeed that he had not arrived there before Blenheim and Ramillies.

Charles was the Cœur-de-Lion of Swedish history. He used his country as a base for military operations in the pursuit of glory, and died, like his English prototype, by a shot from the walls of a petty fortress. State policy of the higher sort he had none. Apart from ambition and revenge he had one ideal motive akin to that of the old Crusading King, the desire to do something for the oppressed Protestants of Eastern Europe. In that part of military strategy which consists in prudence he was almost as deficient as in political wisdom, but he was admirable in the discipline of an army and in the tactics of the field. Posterity is familiar with his Spartan figure, without hat, wig or decorations, clad in a plain military frock-coat and top-boots. The top-boots seem the essence of the man, for he could not sit still on his throne and govern, but must needs be always on the move at the head of his troops, and Leibnitz

in 1707 wrote of him to Lord Raby, that 'his demeanour and dress are those of the troopers of the old school.'*

Charles, having defeated the Russians at Narva and conquered Poland, of which his enemy Augustus, Elector of Saxony, was King, put Stanislaus on the throne in his place, and pursued him across Silesia into his German Electorate. In the autumn of 1706 the Swedish armies took military possession of Saxony, where Charles kept a rough military court at Altranstadt, a few miles from Leipzig. During his year of comparative immobility that followed, the eyes of all warring Europe were turned thither to take note of this meteor of the Northern skies, which it had been impossible to observe with attention so long as it had been flashing without rest over the Baltic fields of battle.

Altranstadt, indeed, became in 1707 the scene of the main diplomatic rivalry of Europe. It was neutral ground where France and her enemies could meet and contend for the friendship of Charles. For some years past no important international business had been transacted between the Western Powers and Sweden, because the King in the field had had little taste for interviews with foreign civilians, and his Ministers had small influence upon his decisions and no authority to deal in his name. The able English Envoy to Sweden, the Reverend John Robinson,† who knew Scandinavia better than any of his countrymen, had sometimes been privileged to speak with Charles in Poland, but to little purpose. In November 1706 he hastened to Altranstadt, where he found the agents of King Louis busily endeavouring to stir up the Swede to invade the Austrian border, so temptingly at hand, and settle all his

* Leibnitz adds: 'The King of Sweden had set out to review his troops dispersed throughout the country [Saxony] and the administrator of Holstein had run more than forty leagues after him without being able to catch him. At the moment when the King returned, I was at Altranstadt, and I saw him at dinner. That lasted a full half-hour, but his Majesty did not say a single word during his dinner, and never raised his eyes but once, when a young Prince of Würtemberg, seated at his left hand, began to play with the dog, which he left off doing the moment he caught that look.' *Kemble*, p. 458.

† Afterwards Lord Privy Seal, negotiator at Utrecht and Bishop successively of Bristol and London. It is because of his double connection with Scandinavia and Oriel that a Runic inscription to this day adorns a quadrangle in his old College.

quarrels with the Emperor by the sword. If they could succeed in that, their master might yet recover all that Marlborough had torn from him on the Danube and the Dyle.

The matters in dispute between King Charles and Emperor Joseph would scarcely have been raised between two friendly princes, or would quickly have been settled ; but they were not unlikely to cause war between these two very obstinate monarchs. The first cause of dispute was the condition of the Emperor's Protestant subjects in Silesia. Their churches had been taken from them and their liberties infringed contrary to certain clauses in the Treaties of Westphalia, of which Sweden was a guarantor. Charles made himself the champion of their cause. His attitude, recalling that of Gustavus Adolphus, stirred up the latent antagonism of the Protestant and Catholic interests throughout the whole body of the Empire. He had designs for a League of Protestant Princes in Europe, the formation of which would have shattered the Grand Alliance constructed on a different principle.

His other demands on Vienna were more personal and related to molehills which the unfriendly relation of the two courts raised into mountains—insulting words spoken of him by an Hungarian nobleman, and the escape from Austrian territory of some Russian troops who ought to have been interned.

It was the part of England and of Marlborough to appease these discords. The Emperor must be induced to do something for the Silesian Protestants, and the King of Sweden persuaded to leave the other religious problems of Germany and Europe alone. Fortunately Charles, though he detested the Emperor and his Jesuit camarilla, equally detested Louis as the arch-persecutor of Huguenots. Moreover he considered that he still had accounts to settle with the Czar : if only the Emperor would consent to stave him off with concessions and courtesies, he would disappear with his army into the depths of the Russian wilderness.

Marlborough was the obvious mediator. For some years past it had been known in diplomatic circles that the mysterious young warrior of the Polish campaigns was ' bon

Anglois,' for in spite of his economic disputes with England over the Baltic trade, he had not forgotten that England's fleet had saved him from his leagued enemies at the beginning of his career.* As early as 1704 it had been said in Eastern Europe that ' the Emperor was obliged to his alliance with Queen Anne for the quiet which his countries enjoyed ' on the side exposed to invasion by Charles. The heir of Gustavus rejoiced in the allied victories over the Revoker of the Edict of Nantes. He was full of generous envy of Marlborough, and boyish inquisitiveness about him, characteristically enquiring whether he led his troops to the charge in person, and declaring that he would be delighted to meet so great a soldier face to face.†

It was in these circumstances that the Duke, at the request of the Emperor and other Allies, undertook a journey to Saxony, before opening his campaign in the Netherlands. Driving by way of Hanover, where he again paid successful court to the Elector, he arrived at Altranstadt in the last days of April. The Swedish Minister, Count Piper, gave him better hospitality than was to be had in the King's own quarters, and took him next day into the royal presence. This meeting of the two famous soldiers, so different in their genius, temper and destiny, has always held the imagination of mankind. Marlborough presented letters from Queen Anne and ' made a short compliment in English, which was interpreted by Mr. Robinson.'

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> I present to your majesty [he said] a letter from the Queen, my mistress. Had not her sex prevented her, she would have crossed the sea to see a Prince admired by the whole Universe. I am in this particular more happy than the Queen, and I wish I could serve some campaigns under so great a general as your majesty, that I might learn what I yet want to know in the art of war.

No words could have gone more straight to the King's heart. Yet his next campaigns could only have taught Marlborough what every general in Europe except Charles

* In 1700. See *Blenheim*, pp. 9–10.

† *P.R.O.* (*S.P.*) 91, 4, Whitworth's letter from Breslau, December 7, 1704 ; *Coxe*, chap. liv. (Grumbkow to Marlborough, January 11, 1707).

already knew, that it is not prudent to lead a great army across interminable leagues of Russian marsh and forest, without proper roads, communications and supplies.

The contact thus happily established in public audience was continued in private conversation. The Englishman was not long in discovering that Charles was rootedly hostile to France and that the very insistence of Louis' agents helped to restrain him from attacking Austria. Marlborough effectively pleaded the common cause of the Allies, and showed the unseasonableness in the Protestant interest of the formation at that moment of a Protestant League. He left the Swede more unwilling to make war on Austria, and more anxious than ever to be off to dethrone the Czar before returning in a more favourable season to settle the affairs of Germany. According to Voltaire's testimony, Sarah in her widowhood told him that her husband, in this famous interview, saw a map of Muscovy on the table, noticed how the King's eyes blazed when he mentioned the Czar, and concluded that his real ambition was to dethrone Peter the Great as he had dethroned Augustus of Poland.

So, having settled English pensions on Charles's Ministers according to the custom of the age, Marlborough got into his coach and drove back again to the West. The influence of his visit on the King had been considerable as a restraint on immediate action against Austria. But it had not been in itself decisive. Until the Emperor gave way, Charles would not budge. It was not till the first week of September that Vienna capitulated on all points. Then and then only Charles broke up his Saxon camp and marched off behind the curtain of the Russian forests, to meet his fate at Poltava.[193]

Charles has much to answer for in history. His restless ambition and revenge, his inability to remain at peace and perform the proper duties of a King, went far to destroy the influence and power of Sweden, that might have been so strong for the good of civilization ; and his headlong attempt to reach Moscow raised up instead, upon the flank of Europe, the barbarous might of the Russian hordes—because Peter the Great, for all his savagery, was

a statesman, while Charles XII was only a warrior, and not a wise one,

> A hare-brained Hotspur, governed by a spleen.

Marlborough, as he started back across Germany to the Hague, hopefully revolved the Great Design he had formed and set on foot for the destruction that year of the enemy's power of further resistance. The action in all the seats of war had been planned and timed by his master mind. He did not trust to his own successes in the Netherlands alone. He hoped indeed for a battle there that would bring him within striking distance of Paris. But he knew that the Dutch would be difficult to handle this year ; he knew that the great enemy fortresses, like Lille, Mons and Tournai, lay thickest on the borders of France ; and Louis, by a great effort at recruiting during the winter's breathing space, had concentrated on that frontier a field-army of more than 100,000 men, commanded by the able Vendôme with orders to avoid a battle. Marlborough would not therefore confide in his own success to finish the war. But the very size of Vendôme's army argued that the other fronts had been weakened. The Mediterranean, never far from the Duke's thoughts, should be the scene of the *coup-de-grâce* to the French power.

The year then, as he planned it, should open with an attack across the Alps, to be delivered by Eugene from the newly acquired allied base of the Italian peninsula. Toulon was to be the objective. The forces of Piedmont and Austria, with the German troops paid and supplied by England in that seat of war, would surely suffice for Eugene to take the great French arsenal by a surprise attack, aided by the British fleet under Sir Cloudesley Shovell. If once the allied flags flew over Toulon, Louis must seek peace on his enemy's terms. Moreover, the mere fact of the invasion of Southern France would bring back thither Berwick's army from Spain and leave Madrid open once more to occupation by the armies of England and Portugal.

Such was Marlborough's Great Design. The leading part was without jealousy assigned to Eugene, the comrade-in-arms in whom he always confided, but who failed him on

this one occasion. If the Allies had become intelligent or even docile agents in the execution of the plan, Toulon must have fallen. But the statesmen of Vienna, if not also the Duke of Savoy, were half-hearted in their desire to capture the great naval base for the benefit of the Maritime Powers. They failed to consider the war as a whole, and they neglected the importance of punctual time-keeping in the elaborate plan laid down for the various actors in the piece.

While Marlborough was preparing for his wearisome journey to Altranstadt to secure the safety of Austria, the Emperor Joseph had been taking steps which upset his plans and compromised beforehand the chances of allied success against Toulon and Madrid. In March the Emperor concluded a secret and separate Treaty with Louis for the neutrality of Italy, by which the French garrisons cut off in the Milanese were allowed to return home ; in this way some 12,000 veteran troops, who must otherwise have surrendered, went to swell the forces of resistance in Spain and Provence. The Emperor's object was to put himself as speedily as possible into complete occupation of the Italian provinces, which the victory of Turin had laid at his feet.* To enjoy the immediate full possession of the Milanese and Neapolitan territories meant more to Viennese statecraft than to prepare further blows against France at the bidding of England. If the Maritime Powers would not hand over the reconquered Netherlands to their lawful owners, the House of Hapsburg would at least help itself to its own Italian property.

By the same reasoning the Emperor saw fit, in spite of the lively remonstrances of Marlborough and of the British Ministers, to send an Austrian army trailing down the length of the peninsula to expel the feeble Spanish garrisons from Naples.† This premature and unnecessary assertion

* See p. 144, above.

† With the disregard to the territories of weak neutrals common to both sides in these wars, the Austrians marched right across the States of the Church to reach Naples, gravely alarming the Pope and Cardinals by their passage. Naples, where there was strong anti-French feeling, fell without resistance, and the fortress of Gaeta after a siege. Sicily, which would have put up little resistance, was not occupied at once as the English fleet was not co-operating.

of undoubted power delayed for months Eugene's advance into Provence and weakened its force when at last it took place. Marlborough had timed the passage of the Maritime Alps for the early spring, both in order to secure a surprise attack on Toulon and to relieve French pressure on Spain. The Emperor postponed the vital operation until late summer, and long ere that Spain had been lost for good and all at Almanza.[191]

In 1706 the Allies had let slip the only real opportunity they ever had of placing Austrian Charles on the throne of Madrid with anything like acquiescence on the part of his subjects. The strange campaign had ended with the concentration of the bulk of the allied forces on the Mediterranean seaboard, Galway with the army of Portugal having retreated eastward from Madrid to join the forces of King Charles in Valencia.*

Early in the new year they received a further accession of strength. In the previous autumn Earl Rivers had been sent out from England in command of more than 8,000 troops. It had been originally intended that he should land on the coast of Guienne : he was there to proclaim that he had come as the friend of French liberty, to restore the States General and the Edict of Nantes ; he was to raise the Huguenots of all Southern France in aid of their brethren of the Cevennes, and so join hands with the attack to be made from Italy upon Toulon. But, for a variety of reasons, the rash project was abandoned, greatly to the ultimate advantage of the Huguenots and of French civil and religious liberty, which would not have benefited by the runaway knocks of foreign powers. The expedition under Rivers had thereupon been sent south, first to Lisbon, and thence by way of Gibraltar to join Galway in Valencia. There he arrived in February 1707, with little more than half his original force, the remainder of the unhappy English soldiers having perished of the miseries of the protracted winter voyage—the storms of Biscay Bay and the diseases begotten of the unwholesome conditions of transport.

True to the quarrelsome tradition of allied commanders

* See p. 158, above.

in Spain, Earl Rivers, even before he reached Valencia, had begun a feud with his future colleagues, writing home from Lisbon violent abuse of Galway, whom he accused of treachery and whom he claimed to supersede. The very extravagance of the charges he made told against him. The Ministers at home supported Galway, the more so as the old Huguenot was a great favourite with the Whig Lords. General James Stanhope, often a peacemaker between others though not without a spice of temper himself, succeeded in composing the quarrel between his chiefs, and Rivers in the end went home very decently by his own consent, leaving his troops to be led by Galway to their fate at Almanza.*

In those same first months of 1707 Peterborough returned to Valencia from his Italian holiday,† and took part in the councils of war that decided on the policy for the year's campaign. Galway and Stanhope were for taking the offensive in the rashest form of all—another advance on Madrid. Charles and his generals were for the feeblest and most dangerous of all schemes of defensive warfare—the distribution of the army in garrisons along the eastern coast of Spain. Peterborough took the side of caution, declaring that the war could only be won in Provence, and that till the blow was actually being delivered against Toulon, the Allies should remain on the defensive in Spain. The Franco-Spaniards, he declared, were stronger in the field, particularly in cavalry. After much heated debate the worst possible decision was reached, reflecting the evils of a divided command. Galway and Das Minas went forward with the English, Dutch and Portuguese under their orders, while Charles and his General Noyelles led off their Imperialists and Catalans to garrison the towns of Aragon, Catalonia and the coast. If all had marched forward as a single army, Almanza might perhaps have been won. If all had remained behind, it would never have been fought.

* Rivers was a famous rake, but Dr. Johnson was probably deceived by friendship when he believed his friend Richard Savage, the poet, to be the illegitimate son of the Earl.

† See p. 157, above.

Peterborough now received his recall from the home authorities, and in March 1707 took his final departure from Spain. To Stanhope, with whom he had quarrelled less bitterly than with any other colleague, he wrote, after Almanza, a cheerful letter to the refrain ' I told you so ' :

> You find Spanish horse will beat English foot, and that it was not so easy as you thought the getting to Madrid. I thank all those that have assisted in sending me to London.

The son of Mercury, released from serious labours, passed a happy summer rushing round the capitals and camps of Europe, persuading the statesmen of Vienna that he was the friend of Charles III and Galway the enemy, and boring or scandalizing each Commander-in-Chief in turn with the volubility of a self-invited guest at headquarters. Eugene wrote : ' his lordship thinks like a general although he does not always express himself with propriety.' At Altranstadt he would have been a danger, with his talk against the Emperor and his flattery of Charles XII as the mediator of Europe, had not that silent Prince conceived the strongest distaste for him. Last of all, in August, it was the turn of the English headquarters in Belgium :

> Lord Peterborough has said all that is possible to me [writes Marlborough in quiet despair], but says nothing of leaving the army. . . . What is worse, the ill weather hinders me from going abroad so that he has the opportunity of very long conversations ; what is said one day, the next destroys ; so that I have desired him to put his thoughts in writing.

At last he consented to cross to England, whither he had been ordered to return six months before. He arrived in London in the autumn, in time to publish the tale of his exploits and his wrongs, and to lead the attack in the next session of Parliament against the Government. He had much to tell his Peers, for the Ministry that had recalled him from Spain had been punished by the catastrophe that befell our arms in the Peninsula only a few weeks after he had left.[195]

In April Galway moved inland from Valencia with his section of the allied forces.* He intended to advance on

* Nominally the Portuguese General Das Minas was commander-in-chief. But Galway in reality was the leader. *See Map X, end of volume.*

Madrid by turning the upper waters of the Tagus ; but before marching north, he had to secure his communications by reducing certain enemy garrisons in Murcia. While he was thus engaged the Duke of Berwick approached with an army of 25,400 French and Spaniards. Galway and Das Minas commanded only 15,500 men, and more than half were Portuguese who proved worse than useless in field operations. Of Berwick's forces nearly half were French, and though the Spanish foot were of little use save for guerilla purposes, the Spanish cavalry, as Peterborough had forewarned his countrymen, proved formidable even against English troops.

In face of such odds, it was a fatal mistake on Galway's part to seek out Berwick at Almanza and challenge him to battle. It appears that, owing to the hostility of the countryside, he did not learn till too late that the enemy's force had just been increased by 8,000 men fresh from France. They had been sent to Spain as a result of the Emperor's grant of free passage to the French garrisons from the Milanese and the excentric movement of the Austrian army of Italy towards Naples. The Allies were the architects of their own ruin at Almanza.

The great plain, into which Galway had led his forces so deeply that he could not retreat when he realized the immensely superior force of the enemy, afforded no shelter or way of escape for the weaker party. Having entered the trap, they must break through or suffer complete disaster.

The action began at three in the afternoon. Both armies set their infantry in the centre and their horse on the wings, as in one of the old battles of the English Civil War. But the Allies, being weak in cavalry, 'interlined' the squadrons of their left wing with English infantry, after the model of Marlborough's tactics at Blenheim. On that flank the struggle of all arms was long and fierce. The only Portuguese who behaved well that day were the squadrons whom Das Minas himself there led into the mêlée : his mistress, who followed him in male attire, was struck dead at his side. On the same wing of the battle, Galway, entering the thick of the fight without the sword-arm he had lost in the trenches before Badajos, was

Aug. 25 (N.S.) 1707

wounded by a sabre cut over the eyes that put him out of action during the critical minutes of the battle.

In the centre, the English, Dutch and Huguenot infantry, though they began the fight that afternoon exhausted with thirst and long marches, showed all their wonted valour, and drove back superior forces of French and Spanish infantry till they were right under the walls of Almanza. Victory might have been won, or disaster at least avoided, but for the conduct of the Portuguese cavalry, of whom the allied right wing was entirely composed. They fled from the field without striking a blow.

As evening came on, the masses of the enemy closed in on the deserted remnant of the allied army. The disappearance of almost all the Portuguese horse and foot from the field left some 8,000 men to contend against more than 20,000. Das Minas and Galway, if they were neither of them great generals, were both of them gallant veterans, accustomed to keep their heads in the stress of battle and defeat. They succeeded in extricating and carrying into safety some squadrons of cavalry, 1,500 of the infantry of England and Holland, and the English train of six guns. The twenty Portuguese cannon fell to the victors.*

Another column of English, Dutch and Huguenot infantry, variously estimated at 2,000 and 4,000 men, also cut their way out of the ring of foes. Led by General Shrimpton, one of the heroes of the defence of Gibraltar, they retreated that night into the hill country, some eight miles from the field. But next day, too weary to march further, with no food or water and almost without ammunition, they capitulated on the approach of the enemy's cavalry. The decision was not taken till after an angry debate in the council of officers ; there were some present who bitterly resented Shrimpton's surrender. It was said that it was no less fatal and even more unnecessary than the capitulation of the French infantry in Blenheim village. Opinions differed, and on this later occasion the historian has not sufficient information on which to form a judgment.

* General Erle, writing to Marlborough on June 26, 1707 (*Add. MSS.* 9099), gives the English and Dutch infantry who escaped at 1,500. Berwick is wrong in claiming to have captured 10,000 men and all the cannon, besides killing 5,000 men ; there were only 15,500 allies in all, and the Portuguese had fled betimes.

The English and allied foot who thus became prisoners had borne themselves magnificently in the battle on the previous day. But Galway complained of the conduct of two ' newly raised ' regiments of English dragoons ' who did not do their duty ' ; they formed the greater part of the English horse who escaped with him from the field. The victors had lost heavily. Berwick, who exaggerated the allied loss in his *Memoirs*, reported his own at 2,000, which the Allies considered less than the truth. In any case he paid but a small price for such a victory ; the last chance that ' Charles III ' would become King of Spain had now been destroyed.[196]

A ballad, evidently of contemporary origin though still circulating many years later, gives some aspects of popular English tradition that may well have derived from the tales of private soldiers who took part in the battle :

Full twenty miles we marched that day,
Without one drop of water ;
Till we, poor souls, were almost spent
Before the bloody slaughter.

Brave Gallaway, our General,
Cry'd ' Fight on, while you may ;
Fight on, brave-hearted Englishmen,
You're one to five this day.'

The Dutch fell on with sword in hand,
And that was their desire ;
Thirty-five squadrons of Portuguese
They ran and ne'er gave fire.

The Duke of Berwick, as I have been told,
He gave it out in orders
That, if the army should be broke,
To give the English quarters.

' Be kind unto my countrymen,
For that is my desire ;
With the Portuguese do what you please,
For they will soon retire.' [197]

The religious and civil strife of that epoch had arrayed the French army under the English Catholic Berwick, and the English army under the French Huguenot Ruvigny, Earl of Galway. The High Tories, who made the most of Galway's defeat at Almanza, had a toast to Berwick as ' the brave English general who had defeated the French.'

During the remainder of 1707 the Peninsular War resolved itself into a series of sieges conducted by the victors. The allied army could not take the field again that year, but the courage and energy of Galway were unsubdued by wounds and defeat. He put heart into the remnant of his army, which was seasonably reinforced from England. Effective garrisons of regular troops were put into the cities of Valencia, where all that was left of the Carlist party joined in the defence of their homes, with the desperate valour which Spaniards have so often shown in siege warfare. Under these conditions the capture of Xativa in Valencia and Lerida in Catalonia cost the besiegers dear, and Denia repelled the utmost efforts of the French and Spaniards, who lost over 3,000 men before its walls. An incident in the defence of Denia was exultantly recorded by Archdeacon Perceval of Dublin, from a letter he received from his brother the Major, who was in the thick of the business :

> Their grenadiers, sustained by three thousand foot, were again bravely repulsed. The first that entered the breach was a priest in his habit, carrying before him a large cross and crying with a loud voice ' Here enters Christianity.' The grenadiers were all at his back, believing that the Spaniards and Portuguese would not fire at the cross, but they were mistaken, for Major Perceval had planted fifty of his Englishmen at the entrance of the breach, one of which swore a bloody oath that the priest lied, and without any more ceremony shot him dead, and all the officers that entered the breach with him met with the same fate.[198]

Nevertheless the priest represented Spain, no less than the honest soldier who shot him represented England. For the battle of Almanza, following on the allied failure to hold Madrid the year before, had decided the dynastic question in the Spanish mind. Henceforth the struggle was regarded as a national and religious war of the Spaniards and their French allies, to repel the invasion of English and Dutch heretics, joined with German, Portuguese and

Catalan foreigners, who would fain impose a German King upon Spain. Sermons and pamphlets worked up the feeling against the 'Lutheran' English soldiery, who had sacked churches and convents round Cadiz and Gibraltar. The Carlist or anti-Castilian party in Valencia and Aragon never recovered its hopes after Almanza. The open country of those two provinces was at once overrun by the armies of Philip V. Only Catalonia and those fortresses of Valencia which lay along the coast and were therefore in touch with the allied strength through the English fleet, held out stubbornly, and cost the Bourbon armies much to reduce them over a number of years.

The Allies might well have accepted the decision of Almanza and so given peace to Europe five years before Utrecht. But, just when their chance in Spain was gone, they began to make greater efforts there than ever before. Austrian troops, no longer needed in Italy, were poured into Spain from 1708 onwards. And England went on increasing her war effort in the Peninsula. London and Vienna seemed ready to do anything for Spain—except send either Marlborough or Eugene to that grave of military reputations. Marlborough declared he could not leave the Netherland frontier of France, because if he did, the French would then force their way back into Belgium. And the Emperor refused, in spite of Marlborough's solicitations, to let Eugene go to a scene of action so far removed from Germany. Since all else had failed, there grew up the notion, at once inhuman and ridiculous, of forcing King Louis to dethrone his own grandson, and perform what the Allies were unable to do for themselves. Ere long it was put forward as an essential article of peace that the French armies should compel the unwilling Spaniards to accept the Austrian Prince as their King. The proposal was a measure of the bankruptcy of allied policy in Spain.

When in May 1707 Marlborough took the field on his return from Saxony, the news of Almanza had already struck a damp into the heart of the Dutch and rendered them more timid and alarmist than ever. And the same news, that reduced the Duke's always very moderate

chances of success in the Netherlands, dimmed the confident hopes he had entertained for Eugene against Toulon. All the delicately poised, interdependent parts of the clockwork of his Great Design were shaken out of their places by the reverberation of Galway's defeat. Almanza meant not only the loss of Spain but a potential increase in French strength on all other fronts, while the Neapolitan expedition both delayed and weakened the Austrian invasion of Provence. And before the end of May another disaster occurred, further delaying and deranging the allied plans in every seat of war. Villars again demonstrated the genius that set him above the other French Marshals, by breaking through the German watch on the Rhine and forcing the lines of Stolhofen by a surprise attack. The French overran and ravaged great parts of Swabia and Franconia. Their advance parties penetrated as far as the field of Blenheim. Promiscuous plunder, and the systematic levy of immense contributions from the cities and peasants of South-western Germany, enriched the victorious general and his soldiers, and aided the desperate plight of their King's Treasury.

The blame for this fresh misfortune lay with the supine inactivity of Vienna and the German Princes. They had been warned again and again by Marlborough, but had not even condescended to answer his letters, still less to pay heed to his advice.* It might have been expected that things would have gone better that year on the Rhine, for Prince Lewis of Baden had died, but he had been replaced by an even worse general, the Margrave of Baireuth. There had been no lack of troops in South Germany, but they had been scattered about on useless garrison duties, and no one had the sense to concentrate them until after the lines of Stolhofen had been stormed and whole districts of the Fatherland overrun. When at length the German forces

* Marlborough writes to Charles III on June 13, 1707, in a very bitter strain on this subject: 'Nous nous voyons reduits a fonder toute notre esperance sur le seul projet d'Italie (= Toulon) par la negligence inouie et la mauvaise conduite qu'on a tenu en Allemagne en laissant passer le Rhyn a Mons. de Villars, quand, selon ses promesses, qu'on nous avoit fait, nous avions plutot lieu d'espérer une bonne diversion de cette cotté là en notre faveur, ayant pris toutes les paines du mond pour exhorter la cour de Viennes et les cercles par des envoyés exprés et de lettres reiteratives pendant 4 mois.' *Add. MSS.* 9093, ff. 11–12.

took the field, the victorious Villars had not, as he tells us himself, the numbers to dare to give them battle. Marlborough insisted that the command should be taken from the Margrave of Baireuth and given to the Elector of Hanover, who was at least not incompetent. The Duke's advocacy of the Elector's claims had the further advantage of pleasing the Whigs at home and securing for himself the favour of his future sovereign.[199]

Almanza and the raid of Villars into Germany went far to discourage the Dutch, who were already for political reasons much less disposed than they had been twelve months before to lend hearty support to Marlborough in the field. The peace party was growing in Holland, and such is the effect of an illogical association of ideas that those who were very reasonably anxious that peace should be made were most unreasonably indifferent to pushing on the war with vigour so long as it lasted. The Dutch had refused as a matter of course to let Marlborough operate on the Moselle this year. And even in the Netherlands their Deputies would not allow him to attack the enemy. In 1707 he was back in the same tutelage that had ruined all his plans of campaign except those of Blenheim and Ramillies.

The situation this year was not indeed likely to produce a chance of victory so obvious as to shame the Deputies to consent to a battle. Vendôme's field army numbered some 100,000 to Marlborough's 80,000, and after Almanza and Stolhofen the French soldiers had recovered their morale, at least to all appearance. Moreover Vendôme was manœuvring amid border fortresses of the first class like Mons, Lille and Tournai, while Marlborough had to cover open or half-open towns like Brussels, Bruges and Louvain, whose inhabitants had been alienated from the allied cause by a year of contact with Dutch administration. Knowing that he had the Field Deputies against him the Duke seemed at times to lose heart and initiative, or at least to be waiting first for the good news from Toulon that never came. This year was singular in Marlborough's campaigns for the absence of any battle won or any place of importance taken. But it still remained true at the end of his career that he had never fought a battle he did not win, nor sat down before a place which he did not take.*

In spite of the failures in every other theatre of war, Marlborough by no means despaired of the year's success until the master stroke against Toulon had been tried. The delay of the Imperialists in postponing till midsummer the attempt which England had wished them to make in the spring, had been largely responsible for Almanza and Stolhofen. But if the Allies could even now occupy the southern arsenal and sea-board of France, victor's terms might yet be dictated in the winter.

When Eugene and Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, at length crossed the Maritime Alps at the beginning of July, the joint Imperial and Savoyard army of invasion only numbered 35,000 men, insufficient for so great an enterprise as the conquest of Provence. Eugene had little zeal for the undertaking. And from first to last the general sentiment of the Austrian court and army was that they were being used at the dictation of England to pull the Toulon chestnut out of the fire for the benefit of the Maritime Powers.

The eagerness of the English nation for the enterprise could manifest itself only in the co-operation of the fleet under Sir Cloudesley Shovell. The British and Dutch fleets accompanied the march of the armies along the south coast of France, and, by turning the enemy's flank, assisted them to force the passage of the river Var at its mouth, where the French attempted a delaying action. Indeed, throughout this unhappy expedition the co-operation of

* It is needless, after the masterly investigation of Frank Taylor in his *Wars of Marlborough*, chap. xvii, to argue again in detail against the hypothesis of the Dutch Deputy Goslinga that Marlborough this year was not playing to win because he was sulky at not having been allowed to accept the Governorship of the Netherlands the year before. His correspondence shows him to have been throughout 1707 the life and soul of every allied effort that was made in any part of Europe. But it is probably true, as Col. Cranstoun wrote, that he made an error in his orders (or want of orders) to Count Tilly at Nivelle, and perhaps thereby lost a chance of the action he so much desired to bring on. And no doubt, as Cranstoun reported, he was towards the close of the campaign 'much out of humour and peevish' at the universal want of the allied success which he had planned for that year. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 440–444. See also *ibid.*, 416, 420; *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 172–173; *Coxe*, chaps. lvi–lvii, lx–lxi.

the naval with the land forces was exemplary. The army had to be fed from the ships, and relied on the navy for the cannon and other material for the siege. The forced march to Toulon was made under a broiling sun by not very enthusiastic soldiers, none of them English. Their sufferings were increased by the active hostility of the inhabitants, whom they plundered without restraint. The Allies had been persuaded by the tales of Huguenot exiles into the belief that they would find friends or neutrals in the oppressed subjects of King Louis. When this proved an illusion, the discovery afforded to Eugene yet another reason or excuse for condemning as impossible the enterprise on which they were embarked.

It was a race against time. Toulon, when the allied army started on its march, was almost ungarrisoned and its defences were in a deplorable condition. The French 'army of Italy' was bivouacked in many different posts along the Alpine frontier, not knowing by what valley their enemies would approach. But the moment Marshal Tessé learnt the route they were taking he divined their objective, and set his regiments racing to Toulon from their various mountain camps. He improvised a new scheme of earthwork fortifications on the hills behind the city, which was carried out with excellent speed, and called the Entrenched Camp of St. Anne. The guns of the Grand Fleet in the harbour were sent ashore and placed in the new line of fortifications, and manned there by naval gunners and officers, who well knew how to handle them. Twenty thousand French infantry reached Toulon just in time to prevent the entry of the Allies. It had been a neck and neck race between them, won by the more eager of the two runners.

Tessé's conduct throughout the whole of this critical summer was energetic and able, in contrast to his recent failures before Gibraltar and Barcelona. The Pasquinading genius of his countrymen, though grateful to him for saving Toulon, could not forbear rhyming it that of course he was successful this time, since he knew so well how sieges were raised. The spirit of France, from Marshal to private and peasant, was roused to surpass itself in defence of the soil.

Arrived before Toulon just too late to find their entry unopposed, the allied commanders, at their camp of La Valette, held counsel what they should do. Eugene, supported by the Austrian staff, was for returning at once by the way they had come. He feared that the French King would concentrate new forces in their rear and cut off their retreat. The Duke of Savoy and

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MAP VI



Sir Cloudesley Shovell angrily opposed such a feeble conclusion of so great an effort. Sir Cloudesley, speaking in the curt phrases that became his character, told the Prince that England had set her heart on the taking of Toulon, that his orders from home were peremptory, and that the attempt must be made. He had the right to use

such language, not only because the army depended for its very food on the fleet, but because most of the troops were paid by English subsidies. As to Eugene's fear lest their retreat should be cut off, the Admiral declared that if indeed retreat later on became necessary, his ships would carry back all the allied infantry and the horse could ride away. Eugene submitted, but his unwillingness even to attempt the siege was of evil omen for its success.*

Victor Amadeus had urged that the Allies, at the very moment of their arrival, should storm the still unfinished lines that Tessé was constructing over the hills outside the town. But Eugene insisted that, if the siege were to be undertaken at all, a more formal approach must be made and allied lines must be dug. The decision not to attack at once may or may not have been right in the circumstances. But those circumstances included a moral factor. The 20,000 French were full of that spirit of resistance which has so often stood their fellow-countrymen in good stead at Malplaquet, Valmy and the Marne. The 35,000 Allies had small enthusiasm for their task and were already blaming and abusing one another. In the previous September this same Eugene and Victor Amadeus had gone straight in, with a force inferior to the enemy's, and stormed the French lines before Turin without waiting to cannonade them. Now, though the numerical odds were the other way, Eugene shrank from an immediate attack. For the more important moral factor was reversed.

Even the Duke of Savoy, who had been gay and confident on the march, turned sulky and despaired of success after Eugene's refusal to co-operate with vigour. He told Sir Cloudesley that he ' never was more concerned or out of humour in his life, no not when the French had drove him out of his country.' When such was the temper of Savoyard and Austrian, angry with one another, and both

* This account is taken wholly from Eugene's own letter to the Emperor of July 29, 1707 (*Feldzüge*, IX, Appendix, pp. 177–178). It cannot, therefore, be challenged as unfair to Eugene. English writers, including I am bound to say Julian Corbett, being very excusably in love with the noble Prince and regarding him as Marlborough's *alter ego*, which he was in other campaigns, have not realised his less heroic part in the Toulon affair ; such authors have failed to study the German authorities, *Klopp* and above all the *Feldzüge* of Eugene himself.

now without hope of victory, the siege was half raised before it was begun.*

Owing to the new lines which Tessé had constructed over the heights of St. Anne to the north of the town, the allied army could not blockade Toulon, and could only attack it from the east. They succeeded in occupying the crest of Mont Faron above, and in storming the outlying fort constructed by Tessé on the heights of St. Catherine, and through those points drew their line of trenches southward to the sea. The fleet landed ship's cannon, ropes and stores, without which the army could have done nothing. But during the first fortnight of August Tessé's lines were strengthened every day, and more and more troops poured into Toulon from west and north.† The Allies lost the numerical superiority which had been their only advantage. Disease raged in their camp, and food was short when the weather made communication with the fleet difficult. The soldiers began to desert in crowds to the enemy. The French took the offensive in successful sorties. By the middle of the month all agreed that the siege must be raised. The cannon, sick and wounded were taken on board the fleet, and the army marched back by the way it had come. Stragglers were cut off by the peasants, but the new French armies which Eugene had feared to find in his rear did not materialize to intercept the return to Italy.[200]

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But there was one aspect of the attack on Toulon that was not so ill. Another serious blow had been struck at the waning efficiency of the French Grand Fleet, which had for several years past been concentrated not at Brest but at Toulon.‡

In the last days of the siege, after the capture of Fort St. Louis near the entrance of the harbour, the English and Dutch fleets had been able to come near enough to bombard the town and docks across an intervening neck of land.

* *Byng Papers* (*Navy Records Soc.* 1930), I, pp. 226–227.

† In several ways the conditions of attack and defence were not unlike those ot the Siege of Sebastopol.

‡ See *Blenheim*, p. 406.

The damage done by their bombs was not very great. Yet French sea power did not escape uninjured. For, on the first approach of the Allies in July, a measure akin to panic had been taken by the besieged : the Grand Fleet had been half sunk at its moorings in shallow water, partly to diminish the effect of bombardment on the ships, partly to render it difficult for the Allies to carry them off if Toulon fell.

Owing to this operation, hastily and not very skilfully carried out, what yet remained of the naval power of King Louis was seriously crippled for the remainder of the war. Some of the hulks were wholly under water, but most were only half sunk in the shallows, so that the upper tier of guns on the three-deckers were still in action. A few small vessels had been left afloat. It was intended to raise them all after the enemy had gone, but the work of salvage proved longer and more difficult than had been expected. Many ships were floated again, but were neither so water-tight nor so seaworthy as before. Six great ships and many second and third rates were next year scuttled, as being beyond repair. And many others were of less service and of shorter life owing to these not very well managed operations, that required more men, skill and money than could be found. The fact that King Louis could not afford to spend much on repairing his fleet rendered the half-sinking at Toulon a more disastrous affair than a similar undertaking might have been if conducted by the English at Portsmouth or Chatham. The Grand Fleet lay in Toulon, for the rest of the war, starved and neglected by Versailles, licking its numerous wounds—some of them self-inflicted—leaving the English undisputed masters of the sea.*

But Sir Cloudesley Shovell, who had from boyhood

* The facts of the half-sinking of the Toulon fleet have been variously stated by English writers from *Burchett*, p. 732, onwards. I prefer to rely entirely on French authorities. *Pelet* and *Tessé Mém.*, intent on the glory of France, say nothing about the matter. The contemporary French account, printed in the English translation, entitled *The Siege of Toulon, collected from the original Papers*, 1746, p. 183, briefly admits the fact, but minimises the extent and consequence. The detailed account of the affair is to be found in V. Brun, *Guerres maritimes de la France, Port de Toulon*, 1861, I, pp. 120–126, based on full local and technical knowledge. It is this authority from which I have drawn my account, much abbreviated.

served his country in days less fortunate for the English Navy, never came back another year to show his flag in triumph round the shores of the Mediterranean. As he sailed home that autumn, one of those mistakes that are never out of the scope of chance even with the best seamen,

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misled his fleet on a misty night among the rocks of Scilly. His flagship, *The Association*, and two more of the squadron were lost. His body was cast ashore in Porthellic cove. He was lying unconscious but still alive upon the sands, when a woman, who coveted his emerald ring, extinguished the faint spark of life. At least so she confessed thirty years later, showing the ring to a clergyman.

The Admiral's name has always been dear to his countrymen, especially in association with the charming legend that he had once been a cabin-boy. He was buried in the sands by those who had stripped him, but his body was found and moved to Westminster Abbey. The monument over his grave there is well known, and all the better known for the criticism of it that Addison wrote in the *Spectator* in March 1711 :

> Sir Cloudesley Shovell's monument has very often given me great offence. Instead of the brave, rough English Admiral, which was the distinguishing character of that gallant man, he is represented on his tomb by the figure of a Beau, dressed in a long periwig, and reposing himself upon velvet cushions under a canopy of state. The Dutch, whom we are apt to despise for want of genius, shew an infinitely greater taste of antiquity and politeness in their buildings and works of this nature. The Monuments of their Admirals, which have been erected at the public expence, represent them like themselves ; and are adorned with rostral crowns and naval ornaments, with beautiful festoons of seaweed, shells and coral.

One could almost wish these words might be inscribed in stone and placed beside the monument in the Abbey.[201]

CHAPTER XVI

The Fall of Harley

Town gossip. Abigail Hill. Harley between the Queen and the Government. The Bishoprics question. The first Parliament of Great Britain meets, winter 1707–1708. The attack on the Admiralty. The convoy system. Peterborough as a Tory hero. 'No peace without Spain.' Fall of Harley and triumph of the Whigs. The Secretary's office and Greg's treason.

War and politics are the two horses the historian must drive abreast, for they alone can be harnessed to a logical narrative of events. But, as the actual days passed over Queen Anne's London, 'the town' had many merry matters to think of besides the victories of 'the Duke of Molbery,' the Scots Treaty and what the Swede intended, what the French. There was the Italian Opera, newly come to England to put her native music out of fashion.*

Our famous Nicolini got 800 guineas for his day; and 'tis thought Mrs. Tofts, whose turn is on Tuesday next, will get a vast deal. She was on Sunday last at the Duke of Somerset's, where there was about thirty gentlemen, and every kiss was a guinea; some took three, others four, others five at that rate.

Nicolini and Mrs. Tofts, thus sought after by 'the great,' knew how to give themselves airs:

The Dutchis of Molbery [writes Lady Wentworth] had gott the Etallian to sing and he sent an excuse, but the Dutchis of Shrosberry [a sister Italian and of a sprightly disposition] made him com, brought him in her coach; but Mrs. Taufs huft and would not sing becaus he had first put it ofe; though she was thear yet she would not, but went away.

* *Blenheim*, p. 87.

Old Lady Wentworth was a dear, good soul, who 'lamented that such a yousles creature as I should outliv soe many fyne young folks'; but she still relished her share of life in the years between Ramillies and Oudenarde, had a keen ear for fashionable and domestic gossip, and retailed it to her son Lord Raby, the British Ambassador at Berlin, in letters spelt as ill as fine ladies were wont to spell in the days of her youth.

Lady Derringwater's new husband coms every day to the coffy hous in his fyne coach and twoe footmen to wait of him, and the coach waits at the coffy hous, and all elc hear walk to it, soe he is laught at for it.

I am sure could you see my fyer side, you would laugh hartely to see Fubs [the dog] upon a cushin, the cat of another, and Pug [the monkey] of another lapt up al but her face in a blanckitt.

Then, in the cold winter of 1708, poor Fubs goes to join the 'many fyne young folks,' and its mistress is desolated:

I had rather lost a hundred pound to have saved poor charming Fubs. As it leved soe it dyed, full of lov, leening its head in my bosom, never offered to snap at anybody in its horrid torter, but nussle its head to us and look earnestly upon me and Sue, whoe cryed for thre days if it had been for child or husband . . . so much senc and good nature and cleenly and not one falt; but few human creeturs had more senc then he had.

When even illiterate old ladies had the wit to write in this style the advent of the *Tatler* and *Spectator* might well be near at hand.

Another event that had excited Lady Wentworth and the town was the trial of 'Beau Feilding' for bigamy. The story breathes the very atmosphere of the 'artificial comedy' of Congreve and Farquhar, whose characters and plots of intrigue, in spite of Charles Lamb's belief in their unreality, faithfully delineated the more corrupt part of the society of that age. Marriage was regarded by adventurers as a financial investment, and was often undertaken after a few hours' or even minutes' acquaintance.

'Beau Feilding,' a Catholic and Jacobite, the 'Orlando' of the *Tatler*, dressed fantastically himself and clothed his footmen in yellow coats with black sashes. He was a gambler

and would have been a bully if he had been brave enough. He was as big a fool as Witwould and as handsome and irresistible as Mirabel. His face was his fortune, and he took it twice to the wrong market. He was enticed to marry a woman passed off on him by conspiracy as a great heiress with £60,000 to her fortune. On discovery he beat and discarded her, and in the same month of November 1705 sold his charms in bigamous marriage to no less a person than Barbara Villiers, Lady Castlemaine and Duchess of Cleveland, who had ruled Whitehall in the days of the Merry Monarch. By this time she had little of her beauty left but much of her wealth. She confessed to being fifty, and was more than sixty-four. ' She is fallen in love,' writes Lady Wentworth, ' with this young Feelding and ses she only begs he will be sevell to her, she fears he cannot lov her, though she dus him soe much, and Weding cloaths are making.' Such a loving voyage was only victualled for six months. Then he ' broak open her clossett doar and toock fower hundred pound out '—so Lady Wentworth reports to Berlin; —' there is a paper out about it. He beat her sadly and she cryed out murder in the street out of the windoe, and he shott a blunderbus at the people.' The Beau's other marriage was discovered ; he was tried and convicted as a bigamist, but not severely punished. He ended his life in poverty half a dozen years later, tended at the last by his real wife who had been fraudulently foisted upon him.

What did the ' Duke of Molbery ' think and remember, when the sordid tale filtered through to him, as he marched in triumph through the cities of Belgium in the summer weather after Ramillies ? * It was more than thirty years since the smart young officer, Jack Churchill, not yet

* The *Dictionary of National Biography* on Barbara Villiers, Duchess of Cleveland, tells us that ' towards the close of 1677 the Duchess gave the sum of £1,000 to the English nuns of the Immaculate Conception, Rue Charenton, Paris, a nunnery in which she placed as pensionnaire her youngest daughter, Barbara, to whom the Duke of Marlborough was father. This young lady, who was never married, and who subsequently, as " Sister Benedicta," made her profession as a nun, became in 1691, by the Earl of Arran, the mother of Charles Hamilton, and died Prioress of the nunnery at Pontoise on 6th May, 1737.' Questions of the paternity of the Duchess of Cleveland's children were often rather difficult. Another article in the *Dictionary of National Biography* on Charles Hamilton makes, not Marlborough, but Charles II his grandfather ! Who shall decide ?

domesticated by the love of Sarah, had been caught by King Charles in bed with the royal Sultana—now shrunk to this despicable old woman, still raking in the cinders of her inordinate passions, the dupe of a silly Beau who had himself been duped like the fool in a comedy.[202]

In the summer of 1707 another successful actress makes her first appearance on the stage of political intrigue. Abigail Hill, whose Christian name had been singularly well chosen for the part she was to play in life, belonged to the large class of humble companions whose profession was to make themselves agreeable and useful in a patron's family. Abigail was a distant relation of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, who took her into her house at St. Albans and did many kindnesses both to her and her impoverished relations. The tall, ragged brother, Jack Hill, was clothed and sent to school by Sarah, and at her orders the Duke ' made him his aide de camp and afterwards gave him a regiment,' protesting all the while that ' Jack Hill was good for nothing.' In an evil hour for herself, the Duchess crowned her work of good nature by introducing Abigail into an office in Queen Anne's bedchamber. The new courtier was more astute and less humble than she had allowed her first mistress to perceive. In competition for the royal favour Abigail would have some decisive advantages over Sarah—Tory politics, a temper perfectly under control, and a readiness to study the thoughts and wishes of those whom she could not command. Of any higher qualities she never in her life gave evidence.*

When and by what stages she began to obtain influence over the Queen, and to act under the secret orders of Harley, does not appear. But in the summer of 1707 the Churchills found themselves in the presence of something they had never known for a quarter of a century past—a rival in the affections of Anne Stuart.

Here is the first of many memorable scenes, all described

* In the MSS. at Althorp, Sarah writes that Abigail had ' no education and no qualifications, but a little *skill in mimicry*, which served to divert her mistress sometimes, and perhaps incapable of doing mischief if she had not that man [Harley] for her director in everything.'

by Sarah in the artlessness of an anger that conceals nothing against herself :

> Being with the Queen (to whom I had gone very privately by a secret passage, from my lodgings to the bedchamber) on a sudden this woman, not knowing I was there, came in with the boldest and gayest air possible, but, upon sight of me, stopped ; and immediately, changing her manner, and making a most solemn courtesy, *did your Majesty ring?* And then went out again. This singular behaviour needed no interpreter *now*, to make it understood.

In the early summer of 1707 Abigail Hill was secretly married to a Mr. Masham, in the presence of the Queen, but without the knowledge of the Duchess. Humanly regarded, such concealment on the bride's part was ungrateful to her first mistress, to whom she owed everything. Politically it had a deeper significance which the Churchills could not miss. As early as June 3, 1707, the Duke was writing anxiously to Sarah from the field : ' if you are sure that Mrs. Masham speaks of business to the Queen, I should think you might with some caution tell her of it, which would do good. For she certainly must be grateful, and will mind what you say.' On this occasion Marlborough thought too well of human nature, as he soon had reason to confess. In August and September, he, Sarah and Godolphin were in full correspondence with each other and with the Queen and Harley, on the subject of the private influence which Harley had established over Anne through the medium of Abigail Masham.*

* The growing confidence of Abigail and growing despair of the Churchills are marked in the following letters :

Abigail to Harley, September 29, 1707 : ' I had a very low courtesy [from Sarah], which I returned in the same manner, but not one word passed between us, and as for her looks, indeed, they are not to be described by any mortal but her own self.' *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 454.

Sarah to Sir William Trumbull, November 13, 1707 : ' 'Tis plain you live in the country by your writing to me to ask a favour of the Queen, to whom I never have the honour to speak of anything but what concerns my own offices, and in that I can't prevail ; all which is compassed by the black ingratitude of Mrs. Masham, a woman that I took out of a garret and saved from starving.' *H.M.C. Downshire*, I, pt. 2 (1924), p. 855.

Marlborough to Sarah, the Hague, November 8, 1707 : ' What you say of Mrs. Masham is very odd. And if you think she is a good weathercock, it is high time to leave off struggling. For believe me nothing is worth rowing against wind and tide, at least when you come to my age.' *Coxe*, II, p. 368.

The situation revealed by these letters in the autumn of 1707 was by no means simple. Marlborough did not wish to rely upon the Whig Junto more than he was already obliged to do. But he was aware that, if Harley replaced Godolphin as the power behind the throne, the Whigs would rebel when Parliament met : either they would throw the Ministry out, or else compel Godolphin to replace all Tories in the Government by Whigs. The Duke dreaded either event. He had no wish to be subservient either to a Tory Cabinet controlled by Harley, or to a Whig Cabinet controlled by the Junto. He was the more indignant with Harley for creating a situation which must lead to one or other of these results. He saw that the Queen was losing confidence in Godolphin, and told her in October that if that confidence were withdrawn from his kinsman at home, he could no longer serve her to any purpose abroad.

Harley, for his part, desired neither a government wholly Tory, nor the dismissal of Marlborough. But he wished to destroy the increasing influence of the Whig Lords over the Cabinet and to continue a Moderate Ministry, relying as heretofore not on either party but on the favour of the Queen and the support of the nation. He was courting the moderate Whigs like the Duke of Newcastle, who were jealous of the Junto ; and he was also courting the more reasonable of the High Tories. The latter, under the tutoring of misfortune, were learning ' conviction of their folly ' and were repenting that they had ever quarrelled with the Queen and her Moderate Tory Ministers. Thus neither Marlborough nor Harley wanted a Ministry completely Tory or completely Whig. But they could no longer act together because Harley now aspired to become the chief man in the Moderate Ministry, by displacing Godolphin in Anne's favour through the new female influence. The quarrel between Harley and Anne on one side and Marlborough and Godolphin on the other, largely personal in its motives, drove these four Moderate Tories apart, Harley and Anne into the arms of the High Tories, Godolphin and Marlborough into the no less embarrassing embrace of the Junto Whigs. In this way the non-party Ministry dependent on the Queen's personal

choice began to break up, and party government in the strict sense of the word established itself, in the last half of Anne's reign, as the final form taken by the British Constitution. Because Abigail encouraged the Queen to assert herself against the Churchills, the Crown ceased to hold the balance between parties and became the instrument of party Ministries, alternately Whig and Tory. No one of the persons whom this busy woman set by the ears—neither Anne nor Harley, neither Godolphin nor Marlborough—got what they wished out of the quarrel.[203]

The first consequence of the new influence in the bedchamber was to set going in country and Parliament an open struggle for power, that raged all autumn and winter until Harley fell and the Whigs triumphed. For six months the contest revolved round an issue characteristic of the politics of that age—the appointments to certain Bishoprics. The position and privileges of the Established Church were of so commanding a nature that the control of the Church was of the very essence of political power in Eighteenth-Century England. Not only would the political character of the Episcopal Bench influence in a thousand ways the direction towards Whig or Tory taken by the clergy as a whole in the rising generation, but in the immediate present the votes of the Bishops might confirm or destroy the small Whig majority in the House of Lords.*

Aug. 1707–Feb. 1708

The Whig party, therefore, took grave alarm when they heard in the autumn of 1707 that the Queen had nominated two Tories as Bishops of Exeter and Chester. It was true that Exeter had been vacated by the promotion of Trelawny to the rich see of Winchester in reward for his desertion of the High Tory standard two years before.† It was true also that the Queen's new choices, Blackall and Dawes,

* See Appendix D below, *Bishops in the House of Lords*.

† See p. 30, above. Trelawny was not, however, regarded as a proper Whig, as is shown by Burnet's acid remarks on his promotion to Winchester. The Cornish Baronet was in high spirits at thus attaining the goal of his ambition, and wrote to Matt. Prior in August 1707: 'I don't doubt of your having your eye upon the Bishopric of Winchester, but I beg you would not expect it these twenty years. After that I wish you may have it at least as many more.' *H.M.C. Bath*, III, p. 436.

were proper people to be Bishops, and that Dawes was a very moderate Hanoverian Tory. But Blackall was famous in controversy against Whig champions. The Junto were furious, and, unjustly suspecting Marlborough and Godolphin of having given the advice, threatened to withdraw their support when Parliament met in the winter, if the nominations were not cancelled.

The two kinsmen were on a lee shore, between the wind of Whig indignation and the rock-like obstinacy of the Queen. In truth Anne had not consulted them before permitting Blackall and Dawes in August to kiss hands in the closet as her nominees. But she declared that Godolphin was wrong in supposing that Harley had advised her. As on other occasions, Sharp, Archbishop of York, whom she favoured as much as she disliked Tenison of Canterbury, had been the first to suggest to her the persons selected.*

None the less the situation was governed by the fact that Harley and Mrs. Masham were urging her to be 'a Queen indeed,' and to 'act without her Ministers' in making appointments, like her Tudor and Stuart predecessors. They fed her with palatable reminders that she was breaking no law, and not even infringing the custom of the constitution as practised by William. Since he and Mary had made Whig Bishops without always consulting their lay Ministers, why should not she make Tory Bishops with a like personal freedom?

It was indeed a nice constitutional issue between Crown and Ministers, as well as a political battle between High and Low Church. Godolphin and Marlborough, though they dreaded the predominance of the Whig party in the Cabinet, feared still more what it might do if it broke with the Queen's servants. In such a case what might not happen when Parliament met? And how would the war be carried on if the Ministry fell owing to a hostile vote? The Queen

* Just before Christmas she confided to Sharp that 'she meant to change her measures, and give no countenance to the Whig Lords, but that all Tories, if they would come in, and all the Whig likewise, that would show themselves to be in her interests, should have her favour.' *Life of Sharp*, I, p. 323. Somers wrote to Tenison as early as June 1707 urging him to write to the Queen about Church appointments, 'if the way of talking is difficult,' since 'the Archbishop of York never suffers her to rest.' *Wake MSS. Epist.* 7.

refused to view the question of the Bishoprics in that light. Godolphin saw it in no other :

> The liberties of all Europe [he wrote to her on Sept. 11] and the glory of your reign depend upon the next session of Parliament. This being truly the case, what colour of reason can incline your Majesty to discourage and dissatisfy those [the Whigs] whose principles and interest lead them on with no much warmth and zeal to carry you through the difficulties of the War ? What appearance will it have, that all these weighty matters cannot stand in the balance with this single point, whether Dr. Blackall at this time be made a Bishop, or a Dean or a Prebend ?

That question, however, continued for five months to shake the State, until, at the New Year, some weeks after Parliament had met, it was finally settled. Blackall went to Exeter as Bishop, and Dawes to Chester. But, by way of compensation, the Low Church controversialist, Dr. Trimnel, formerly domestic chaplain at Althorp, was made Bishop of Norwich ; and, owing to the strong personal representations of Marlborough, the Queen reluctantly gave to Dr. Potter, Archbishop Tenison's learned Whig chaplain, the Regius Professorship of Divinity at Christchurch, to the intense disgust of the College and University. The Whig party in Parliament accepted the compromise.[204]

Jan. 1708

The political importance of a Regius Professorship may astonish and amuse a careless posterity. But it was regarded as a key position. Potter rose thence to be a Whig Archbishop of Canterbury under the Georges. The intensity of the political character of University life, when Oxford and Cambridge were valued mainly as supplying the personnel and guiding the thought of the Established Church, can be illustrated by an incident that had just occurred at Cambridge. The musician, Thomas Tudway, had been organist of Great St. Mary's for many years, as also of King's and Pembroke ; in 1705 he was made ' Professor of Music ' to the University. He was a strong Tory, and an inveterate punster. He exercised his gift once too often at the expense of the Queen, whom the High Tories accused of being too fond of Dissenters. Tudway was heard to remark that although the Queen had

refused an address from the Hertford burgesses, she would have received it ' had it been presented by Daniel Burgess,' the famous dissenting preacher. Since the dons were fools enough to take such a jest as a serious matter, it offended both Whigs and Court Tories. For this paltry witticism, the old and honoured servant of the University was in July 1706 brought up before the Vice-Chancellor and Heads and deprived of his Professorship and his three organist's posts. Eight months later he was reinstated, after making a public apology.[205]

When the first Parliament of Great Britain met, shortly before Christmas in 1707, the Whig element in both Houses was increased by the arrival of the Scottish representative Peers and Members. The Bishoprics question still hung undecided, and the Whigs, led by Wharton and Somers, determined to make their power felt. They entered into a momentary alliance with the High Tories against the Government. It was only too easy to attack the administration, for the war that year had been one long disappointment—Almanza, Toulon, and nothing done in the Netherlands.

But the grievance that was first taken up by the Opposition was the bitter complaint of the merchants of England against the Admiralty. Three years before, the naval administration had been subjected to a full dress attack in Parliament.* The grievances were old and real, and it was well in the public interest that they should again be ventilated. But it is probable that this particular subject of criticism was chosen by the politicians, because the Admiralty Board, which governed in the name of the otiose Prince Consort, was in practice controlled by Admiral George Churchill, Marlborough's ultra-Tory brother. He must be removed, or else Marlborough must save him by making terms with the Whigs. It was lucky for the administration that Robert Walpole had for some time been on the Admiralty Board, and now defended it loyally before his brother Whigs in the House of Commons.

The brunt of the battle was borne in the House of Lords.

* See p. 19, above.

There the enquiry into Admiral Churchill's conduct on the Board was pressed by Wharton with a zeal that Marlborough took very ill. The Whig chief was supported by Rochester and Haversham, but it was noticed that while the Whigs attacked only the Admiralty, the Tories denounced the Cabinet. The High Church opposition, recently crushed under electoral misfortune, again lifted its head; its members carried down to the country the newspapers and pamphlets in which the Whigs attacked the administration of the navy, and scattered them through the villages to arouse the discontent of the people. In December the High Tories won a by-election at Leicester against the government candidate.

The City of London sent in memorials to support the Parliamentary inquisition, for discontent had been aroused by the scant consideration that naval commanders too often showed for the feelings of the merchant service and for the interests of those who owned the ships and their cargoes. The perennial grievance against the press-gang, that stripped the crews from outward-bound merchantmen in harbour, was again brought to the notice of Parliament. But even louder rose the cry against the defects of the convoy system: the delays in sailing, so caused, which took the heart out of commerce; the imperfections in the network of convoy that gave so many rich prizes to the privateers of Dunkirk and Martinique. Finally there were certain yet grosser scandals. On the West Indian station, Commodore Kerr was in the habit of exacting blackmail from merchants before he would grant them protection, and ships had been lost that could not afford to pay his nefarious charges.

All this was true, yet the failure was only relative. While the naval debate was going on, the Jamaica fleet arrived at Torbay under convoy, very richly laden. And it is only fair to remember that this middle period of the war saw the high-water mark of the French privateers, because King Louis had now laid up his Grand Fleet in harbour, and was devoting the whole naval energy of France to commerce-destroying. Greater protection was therefore required, and was before long supplied.[206]

The naval debates in the winter session of 1707–8,

though initiated as a political manœuvre, served the country well. It is true that no immediate change was made in the personnel of the much-abused Board, because the Whigs were placated by the compromise on the Bishoprics, and by the fall of Harley. But Commodore Kerr was disgraced, and

these warm proceedings had a proper effect; they convinced such as sat at the admiralty-board, that it was dangerous to treat British merchants with contempt; as on the other hand it taught the officers to know that having friends on the board would not always secure them from punishment. (*Campbell's Admirals.*)

Even at the time the debate took place, we had not, as the Admiralty pointed out, done so badly on the balance. From the outbreak of war in May 1702 to Christmas 1707 we had destroyed or taken over seventy French warships of all sizes carrying 1700 guns,* besides 175 privateers and 1,346 enemy merchantmen; while we had lost thirty-five warships carrying 800 guns, and 1,146 merchantmen, of which 300 had been retaken.

In the subsequent years of the war, from 1708 to 1712, the protection of our shipping became more effective, or else the enemy's striking power diminished. No more collective complaints were heard from the merchant community after this winter, and in 1712 the tonnage of British shipping clearing outwards was greater by a fifth than when the war began. Taking the war as a whole, the protection afforded was not bad, especially if we remember that, when hostilities were first resumed in 1702, the ports of Italy, Spain and the Spanish Indies had been closed to our shipping, whereas in King William's war they had been at our service to protect us from the weather and the French.† A steady increase of British sea-power can alone account for so tolerable a result under circumstances so unfavourable. Two years before the war ended at Utrecht, Addison, in the second number of his *Spectator*, makes Sir Andrew Freeport, 'a merchant of

* Not including those half-sunk by the French themselves in Toulon harbour.

† On the other hand, the statement made by the Admiralty in December 1707 that in William's war as many as 4,000 English merchantmen were lost, was based on no lists or on any good authority, and appears to have been greatly exaggerated. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 660–661, and G. N. Clark, *Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade*, pp. 62, 127–128.

great eminence in the City of London,' call the sea 'the British Common.'[207]

Even more pressing than the problem of Admiralty was the question of Spain. The attempt to substitute King Charles for King Philip had failed, and the refusal to recognize the fact was the main obstacle to the immediate conclusion of a satisfactory and even glorious peace. But this view was not yet accepted in Parliament, not even by the High Tory Opposition. Although they used the disasters in Spain to attack and embarrass the Government, they did so not by demanding peace but by urging the transfer of our principal war effort to the Peninsula.

Their informant was Peterborough. Since the Ministers, exasperated by his erratic conduct, had called him home under censure, he had thrown himself into the arms of the Opposition. 'It is a perfect jest,' wrote Swift, who still stood as a neutral observer between parties, 'it is a perfect jest to see my Lord Peterborough, reputed as great a Whig as any in England, abhorred by his own party and caressed by the Tories.' The Opposition spoke of him that winter as the English hero basely sacrificed to the foreigner Galway. His great deeds at Barcelona and elsewhere were held up to the admiration of his countrymen in the famous volume, then first given to the world by Dr. John Freind, who had been his physician in Spain.

Peterborough's advice to his new Tory allies was that, rather than abandon Spain, England should submit to a land tax of 'nineteen shillings in the pound'; that, since the Germans would always be useless in Spain, more and more English must be sent there. The second part of the advice was more palatable to the Tories than the first, for the proposal to send English troops from the Netherlands to Spain would be a blow at Marlborough and a blow at the Dutch. Nottingham, reviving a policy he had pursued when in office,* supported Rochester's motion in the Lords that 20,000 men should be withdrawn from the Netherlands and sent to the Peninsula.

Dec. 19 1707

The proposal for once ruffled the imperturbable surface

* See *Blenheim*, p. 303.

of Marlborough's temper, and their Lordships enjoyed the unwonted spectacle of John Churchill in a rage. His speech bears careful consideration. He asserted that if the bulk of the British Army were removed from the Netherlands the French would advance and recover much of what they had lost. This calculation was justified by the events of the ensuing campaign, when Ghent and Bruges were betrayed to the enemy and only won back as a consequence of the victory of Oudenarde. Less convincing was the other part of the Duke's argument, that Spain could be won back by the dispatch of a great Imperialist army of 11,000 men or more under Prince Eugene. Such was not Austria's way. The Emperor positively refused Marlborough's earnest request to send Eugene to Spain as 'la dernière ressource du roi Charles.' The weakness of our policy was revealed by the debate: the government would neither abandon Spain nor produce any practicable plan for its reconquest.

Somers concluded the debate by carrying a motion to assert 'that no peace can be honourable or safe for her majesty and her allies if Spain and the Spanish West Indies be suffered to continue in the power of the House of Bourbon.' As yet the Tories did not oppose the formula of 'No Peace without Spain.' Only one Peer ventured to suggest that we should not commit ourselves too deeply against a partition of the Spanish Empire, which King William had contemplated and which we might yet be forced to accept. This solitary advocate of peace and prudence was Richard Lumley, Lord Scarborough, an honest and independent man, who had been converted from Romanism in the heyday of James II's power, had served William faithfully in war and was a leader of the Whig interest in the North of England.[208]

For another year Scarborough's sage counsel found no support on either side of the House. The war was still popular. Even the Tories proposed only to move the seat of operations from Flanders to Spain. The payers of land tax grumbled less at their burdens now the war was won than a few years back when there had been grave reason to fear it would be lost. They were proud to pay, because they saw more evident return for their money than during

William's barren campaigns. 'Look 'ee, Captain,' says Justice Balance in Farquhar's *Recruiting Officer*, 'give us but blood for our money and you shan't want men. I remember that for some years of the last war our armies did nothing but play at prison-bars, and hide-and-seek with the enemy. But now ye have brought us colours and standards and prisoners.'

The popular craving for peace did not begin till the following winter. It was the warlike state of opinion that rendered it possible for the Junto Whigs, in the year now opening, to overcome the Queen's opposition and form a Whig Ministry pledged to war *à outrance*.

In January 1708 a stage had been reached, publicly in the Houses at Westminster and privately in the closet at St. James's, when Marlborough and Godolphin must choose between two policies. Either they must fall into line with the Queen and Harley and revert to a union with the more reasonable elements in the estranged Tory Opposition ; or else they must accept the alliance of the Junto on Whig terms, in order to coerce the Queen into the dismissal of Harley. The reasons are clear why they chose the latter course, though Marlborough at least regarded it with regret and misgiving. In the first place the personal hatred against himself and Godolphin evinced by the extreme Tory wing whom they had extruded from power, made them dread the probable consequences of a High Church revival. In the second place the Queen confided no longer in them but in Harley, and therefore any Ministry in which he had a place would be his Ministry rather than Godolphin's. Finally, the Tory leaders in the House of Lords had announced their determination to stop Marlborough's offensive in the Netherlands, and to take the big decisions on European strategy out of his hands. But the Whigs regarded the great Duke and his achievements as the chief asset of their party in its popular appeal ; they thought of the war not only as a national necessity but as a Whig interest.

The independent position that Marlborough and Godolphin had to some extent enjoyed through the Queen's favour during the crisis of the war, was gone now that she had turned away her face, now that the period of national danger was over, and now that the two-party system was reasserting itself in the State. The two noble kinsmen must serve where they had commanded—they must serve either Harley or the Junto. They preferred to serve the Junto as the lesser of two evils.

When the Houses met again at the New Year, things marched rapidly to this consummation. For four years past Henry St. John had been a Marlborough man. As Secretary at War during the years of Blenheim and Ramillies, he had felt all the glamour of personal connection with the great Duke, for whom his pulses quickened with an admiration such as the less mercurial spirit of Harley could never feel. He had offered the Dean of Christchurch £100 to put up a statue of Marlborough 'in the middle of the area of Peckwater.' Ever since he took office in 1704, Highchurchmen had spoken of St. John as 'an errant country gentlemen,' that is to say a bad Tory. But he was now 'growing honest again.' For if he had to choose between his personal connection with Marlborough and his chances of future Tory leadership, he could not hesitate. He was still faithful to the fortunes of Harley, his 'dear master,' who had brought him into the government.[209]

Jan.–Feb. 1708

At the end of January 1708, St. John, as Secretary at War, laid before Parliament papers which seemed to show that out of 29,000 men whom it had voted last year for the war in the Peninsula only 8,000 had been present on the field of Almanza. What had happened to the rest ? Whigs and Tories, moved as much by patriotism as by desire to embarrass the Ministry, angrily asked the question. St. John made explanations that were at least partially satisfying.* But it was strongly suspected that his original production of the papers in their first damaging form was an underhand attack on his colleagues, inspired by Harley. Whether the suspicion were just or unjust, the rift between Godolphin on one side and Harley and St. John on the other was complete.

* The paper giving the gist of his explanations will be found in *Add. MSS.* 22264, ff. 16–18, an interesting study in the war-wastage and recruiting and depôt methods of the day. It brings the 29,395 who had been voted, down to 11,621 actually in the Peninsula. Each of the English regiments in the list is of one battalion, nominally between 800 and 900 strong.

At the same time, the recent arrest of Harley's secretary, William Greg, on a charge of high treason that proved only too well founded, shook his master's position at the moment of crisis now at hand.

In the first week of February the Queen attempted to dismiss Godolphin, and retain Marlborough as the servant of a Harleian Ministry. St. John acted as intermediary between his sovereign and the hero he worshipped, but in vain. The Duke wrote to the Queen in stronger terms than he often employed, denouncing 'the treacherous proceedings of Mr. Secretary Harley to Lord Treasurer and myself,' and declaring that 'no consideration can make me serve any longer with that man.' The two kinsmen resigned, but the Queen and Harley, though disappointed at the Duke's resignation, persisted in their project. 'The back stairs were very much crowded for two or three days,' and Tory hopes ran high. If a moderate Tory Ministry were formed, a General Election, it was thought, would as usual go in favour of the government as the disposer of patronage.

Feb. 1708

—But it proved impossible to form a Ministry that could face the existing Parliament or carry on the business of the country even for a week. The middle party among the Ministers, Somerset and Pembroke, refused to act without Marlborough. The Prince Consort, stirred up by Admiral Churchill, deprecated his wife's rashness. When the usual Sunday meeting of the Cabinet took place, the Queen, according to custom, took her seat at the head of the table, and Harley opened the proceedings with a lively air. He was interrupted by the Duke of Somerset, who said 'he could not imagine what business could be done as neither the General nor the Treasurer were there.' He expressed the sense of those present, and the Cabinet broke up in confusion. Two days later Harley had resigned, and Marlborough and Godolphin were back. They had survived, but it was Whigs who had triumphed.

Feb. 9 1708

St. John, Mansell and Harcourt followed Harley out of office. Henry Boyle, a moderate and useful man now associated with the Whigs, replaced Harley as Secretary of State. Robert Walpole replaced St. John as Secretary at War. John Smith, the Whig Speaker, became Chancellor of the Exchequer. Henceforth no one in the Government would oppose the policies of the Junto.

The Queen had been coerced. She had also been alienated. Henceforth she lived in a perpetual conspiracy to displace the Ministers who had been thrust back upon her. Abigail Masham was still at her side, the real ruler of the closet and the back stairs. By her management, 'while she lived at her Little House over against the gate that goes into Windsor Castle, Harley and his friends saw the Queen as often as they pleased,' wrote Sarah. 'Those that saw the Queen that were not to be known, came in from the Park into the garden, and from thence Abigail carried them a back way to the Queen's closet, which kept this correspondence secret for some time.'[210]

The long-lived 'Godolphin Ministry,' begun in 1702 as a combination of all sorts of Tories, had become in 1704 a non-party group of the Queen's servants, and now in 1708 entered on its final period as a Whig Government. The only thing common to its three phases was the presence at the Treasury of Godolphin, sometimes called 'The Prime Minister,' and his close relation with Marlborough. Round those two planted figures the rest of the Ministerial world came and went like shifting phantoms, now Tory, now Whig. Even the relation of the Ministry to the Crown had altered as often and as completely as any other of the changing circumstances of its being. In 1702 Godolphin and Marlborough had the support equally of the Queen and of the Tory party; from 1704 to 1706 they depended on her support against both parties; in 1708 they depended on the Whigs, while their royal mistress had been defeated in her attempt to overthrow their power.

Harley, as the more important of the two Secretaries of State, had conducted the office from which he was now driven in a manner that had reflected his own personality both for good and ill. He had set up an admirable system for gathering information; secret agents from every quarter of Britain retailed to him, by letter or by word of mouth, the movements of public opinion in England and of the more

strange and complicated affairs of Scotland. 'No person,' wrote his brother Edward, 'since the time of Secretary Walsingham, ever had better intelligence, or employed more money to procure it.' The most useful of these reporters, Daniel Defoe, was on such terms with Harley that he ventured in 1704 to send him a Memorial on the conduct of the Secretary's Office, based on the text 'Intelligence is the soul of all public business.' Harley had, moreover, seen the advantages of using the press to put the Government case before the public, and had employed Defoe's *Review* for this purpose.* His love of secrecy, his thirst for information, his sympathy with common folk, had inspired these useful activities in the Secretary. But his less admirable quality, the furtive and slovenly habit of his mind, which made his speech and writing so often unintelligible, and his purposes uncertain to others and sometimes even to himself, led him to conduct the business of the office with haphazard methods and lax discipline.

There was then no standard of civil service routine in the Secretary's Office. The Treasury functioned well under the methodical Godolphin, and in any case the Treasury was developing its own procedure and traditions. But it was otherwise in the office of the Secretary of State, where the clerks were chosen and paid, not as the servants of the Crown, but as the personal employees of the Secretary himself.† When Harley took over the office in 1704, Defoe's Memorial had warned him of its defects :

> I have been in the Secretary's Office of a post night when, had I been a French spy, I could have put in my pocket my Lord Nottingham's letters directed to Sir George Rook and to the Duke of Marlborough, laid carelessly on a table for the doorkeeper to carry to the post.

If these things could be corrected, wrote Defoe, the Secretary's Office, under an active and ambitious chief with a proper system of 'intelligence' on all subjects, might become the clearing-house of the nation's business in place of the Treasury, and 'be thus the only Cabinet. . . . Here would be a Prime Ministry without a grievance.' But Harley, though active in collecting intelligence and in forming secret connections with all sorts of parties and persons, not excluding his old friends the Dissenters, neglected that part of Defoe's advice which concerned the discipline of the office. He was punished by the tragedy of William Greg.[211]

* After his fall, in 1708, the *Review* supported Godolphin and the Whig Ministry until 1710.

† See pp. 163–167, above, and Mark Thomson, *The Secretaries of State 1681–1782*, pp. 128–130.

Greg had been, like Defoe, one of Harley's 'intelligencers,' at one time sent to his native country of Scotland to report on the Union crisis. He had then, by Harley's personal choice, been fixed in the Secretary's Office in London, which proved a demoralizing atmosphere for an unsteady young man. Owing to the hours of posting, work was done from eleven at night to four in the morning ; much of Greg's task was 'perfect drudgery,' for no attempt was made to discriminate between what we now call 'first and second division work,' though Greg was one of the most intelligent men in the office and the only one who knew French well. The pay was bad, and Greg, a profligate young fellow according to his own account, was seriously embarrassed by small debts.

In the autumn of 1707 temptation came in his way. An English merchant offered him two hundred guineas if he would secure a French pass for his ship that would enable her to sail to and fro without molestation by the privateers. Greg was in charge of the correspondence of Tallard and the other French prisoners in England, to which, on account of his linguistic ability, he acted as war censor. Through that medium he put himself in touch with Chamillart, the War Minister at Versailles, and offered, in return for the desired ship's pass, to supply the enemy with information from the Secretary's Office. Defoe had already warned Harley how easily a rogue or spy could sequester important documents, and so it now proved. Greg sent to Chamillart a letter of Queen Anne's to the Emperor about the proposal that Prince Eugene should go to Spain. It happened that just at this time there was suspicion in Ministerial circles of leakage, chiefly about the

movement of shipping. The French prisoners' post bag was therefore opened and Greg's guilt was at once apparent.

Greg made a full confession and pleaded guilty at his trial. He was therefore condemned to the horrid penalties of treason, without need for the court to enquire fully into the circumstances of the case. The brevity of the proceedings at the Old Bailey justified the House of Lords in seeking further light, to discover whether or no Greg had accomplices. He stated that he had none, but on a matter so important to the public weal there was good reason to test his assertions.

Jan. 19 1708

The fault of the Lords lay in the political character of the Committee they elected to enquire. It consisted of seven Whig noblemen, and no single representative of Harley's side.* Yet the point of the enquiry which for three months fixed the eyes of all politicians on Greg's cell in Newgate was the question whether or not Harley had been cognizant of the treason of the man whom he had chosen as his Secretary. In fact he was perfectly innocent ; and most fortunately for him the poor wretch who had betrayed his country for two hundred guineas would not bear false witness against his chief to avoid the noose and the quartering block.

Greg, indeed, was now in a state of true repentance of his wickedness, and the prison chaplain, Paul Lorrain, of Huguenot origin, exhorted him as he valued his soul not to save himself by accusing the innocent. According to a letter written by Lorrain three years later,† Greg was for weeks beset by men offering him life if he would speak out. He was kept in Newgate a hundred days under sentence, but in the end went to the scaffold, protesting to the last the utter innocence of Harley.

April 28 1708

The Whig Lords had not wished him to give false evidence. They had thought it highly probable that Harley was guilty. To them he was the furtive, treacherous

* The Dukes of Devonshire, Somerset and Bolton, Lords Wharton, Townshend, Somers and Halifax.

† It is to be noted that this is not quite such good evidence as a letter would have been if written in 1708. But it cannot be neglected.

'Robin the trickster,' who had deceived them and Marlborough and Godolphin.* Why should he not also have betrayed his country ? In truth they understood little about him. During the hundred days of Greg's ordeal Harley showed the best side of his character—perfect calm and dignity in face of danger that his friends considered appalling. 'Your brother's head is upon the block,' said Atterbury to Edward Harley. But Robin, when he heard of these alarms, only said to Edward, 'I know nothing that I can do, but entirely to be resigned to and confide in the Providence of God.' It was the same quiet power of waiting patiently on events that served him so well when next his enemies compassed him about, in 1715, when Bolingbroke's lack of nerve hurried the more brilliant man to disaster.

The conduct of the Committee of Whig Lords who examined Greg, or of some of them at least, bears an ugly look, though it is not necessary to believe all that Swift in later years wrote about them. Their methods would be impossible in our day, but in that day they were normal. We can even note the progress that the passage of a century had already made. No one touched Harley, and no one procured false evidence against him. A hundred years before, if the secretary of a newly fallen Minister of Elizabeth or James I had been discovered in an act of manifest treason, the fellow would have been lucky if he escaped the Tower rack. Even a short generation back some Titus Oates would assuredly have arisen to seize upon an opportunity so agreeable to the ancient profession of witness for the Crown.[212]

* See p. 84, above. An example of the talk against Harley at the time of the Greg incident is given in Archbishop King's letter to Swift, February 28, 170$\frac{7}{8}$, about the report of a French invasion : 'The great cry is that this was Harley's plot and if he had continued three days longer in his place, the French would have landed at Greenwich.' *Swift's Letters*, I, p. 78.

CHAPTER XVII

The Attempted Invasion of 1708 and its Consequences

Ill feeling between England and Scotland after the Union. Custom-house questions. The Scottish Privy Council abolished. Franco-Jacobite intrigues. The invasion launched from Dunkirk. The Pretender at sea. Byng to the rescue. Failure to effect a landing. Consequences of the attempt in Scotland and England. The General Election, May 1708. Triumph of the Whigs.

The Union of the Parliaments of England and Scotland, which in course of time drew the two peoples together in mutual amity and respect, had no such consequence during the remaining years of Queen Anne. The marriage, which was to prove so long and so happy, had no honeymoon: indeed the first quarrel arose loud at the very door of the church.

Great Britain came into statutory existence on May 1, 1707 : in expectation of that propitious event large consignments of goods had been previously imported from the Continent into Scotland, paying the old Scottish duties, which were in most cases very small. After the Union had come into force, these goods were reshipped to London for the English market, where, after May 1, they would be free of all duty as coming from North Britain. It was a game that could only be played once, but the opportunity was not neglected. A fleet of forty ships from Scotland sailed proudly up the Thames in June 1707, loaded with French and Dutch produce. The sight provoked the fury of the Londoners, who swore that if these foreign manufactures were put on the market duty-free, Englishmen would be undersold and the revenue defrauded. Under the influence

of this outcry the custom-house officials, regardless of the new law, seized the cargoes as smuggled goods. The House of Commons supported the seizure, and proposed to give it authority by retrospective legislation.

When the news of these proceedings reached Scotland, all the old Darien anger was stirred up against England's enmity and fraud. The Union Treaty, men said, had been broken already. Fortunately the House of Lords, true to its then customary rôle as pacificator, refused to support the rash action of the Commons' House, and procured delay, till the English had time to recover their tempers and release the goods duty free.

Scotland had won the first round ; but she had to submit to more permanent defeat from the presence in ' North Britain ' of a horde of English custom-house officials, sent there to exact the new duties and to teach their kindly Scots colleagues the more rigorous English methods of administration. Their irritating inflexibility, their belief that their own ways were the only ways, their self-conscious efficiency and rectitude, their contempt for poverty and dislike of dirt angered the Scots as these attitudes have angered many other races since. To throw an English gauger over the cliff seemed a work of mercy.

The custom-house became to the Eighteenth-Century Scot the symbol of a foreign oppression. Angry patriotism and the prospect of great gains combined to make the ' free trade ' a national institution. Fiscal uniformity for the whole island meant that French wine and brandy were due to pay five to eight times what they had formerly paid north of the Cheviots. But the cellars of the ' Caledonian ' gentry continued to be famous for their claret, and not much of it had seen the inside of the custom-house.

The activities of the smuggler were closely connected with those of the Jacobite agent. The same ship carried both kinds of night-birds between France and Scotland. Both acquired a sort of popularity, even with rigid Presbyterians, as enemies of England and of the Union. Till the middle of the century this association of ideas continued to operate, as among the rough population of the Solway coast described in *Redgauntlet* and *The Master of Ballantrae*.[213]

The first Parliament of Great Britain, in its first session, passed an Act that swept away the Scottish Privy Council.

Winter 1707–1708

To make the Union complete, there should be not merely a single Parliament but a single Privy Council for the whole island. This change had been foreshadowed in the wording of the Treaty of Union,* and was not unpopular in Scotland. For whereas the Edinburgh Parliament had, since the Revolution, stood up for the nation against England, the Privy Council had no such claim on the country's gratitude. Ever since the Union of the Crowns, the Council had been the catspaw of the English Court, and under Charles and James II its torture chamber has been associated with atrocities remembered with a sacred horror in Presbyterian martyrology.

The proposal to abolish the separate Privy Council for Scotland was not therefore resented by the common people as being another attack on the national independence. Scottish politicians of the various Opposition parties hated the Council as the weapon of their successful rivals for office, particularly in the control of elections. For this reason the representatives of the *Squadrone* at Westminster urged the English Whigs and Tories to abolish the Edinburgh Council. A combination of all the Opposition parties of North and South Britain carried the change against the wishes of Godolphin and the Government, who desired to retain the Scottish Council as an instrument of their own authority, pleasantly independent of control by the Westminster Parliament.

The English Whigs, who had not yet brought Godolphin completely under their control, had long been jealous of his personal position as Grand Vizier of Scotland. They still felt uncertain whether he was stout for the Hanoverian Succession in those parts. Moreover, their principles taught them to regard with aversion an irresponsible body like the Scots Privy Council, sitting in secret, subject to no Parliamentary control and liable at any moment to become an instrument of royal despotism. Somers put forward these arguments in a forcible speech. The English Tory Opposition had less theoretic but even more

* See p. 266, above.

practical objection to leaving such an instrument in hands they distrusted. The government was beaten by a large majority in the Commons and by five votes in the Lords, and the Edinburgh Privy Council became portion and parcel of the dreadful past.

It was necessary to make up for this loss of governmental power in Scotland, at a moment when a Jacobite rising and French invasion were instantly feared, and when the difficulty of levying the new customs duties was becoming only too apparent. The English system of Justices of the Peace was therefore extended beyond the Border by the same Act that abolished the Privy Council in Edinburgh. The new magistracy competed with, though it did not yet supplant, the heritable jurisdictions of feudal origin. Neither was this change resented by the Scottish people, who were not as fond of the feudal courts as were the nobles and lairds who had bargained for their continued existence under the Treaty of Union.[214]

Ever since the beginning of the reign of Queen Anne, Pope Clement XI had been urging France to send an army on crusade to restore the Catholic Stuarts in Britain, and he had supplied money to help the design. Although Rome was informed by her agents that the English and Scottish Catholics were not seriously ill-treated, the complaints, only too well founded, which were constantly made by the Irish Catholics of the persecution they suffered contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Limerick, incited and encouraged the Papal Curia to resume against Anne the policy of war and deposition which it had instituted against Elizabeth, although assassination was by this time out of fashion. But in the first years of the century Louis had not attempted the invasion of Britain or of Ireland, and the Papal money had gone instead in Parliamentary bribery, designed to keep a Jacobite interest alive in the Scottish Estates. The Parliamentary habit vied with the physical force policy in the minds of Scottish Jacobites, undermining the warlike zeal for rebellion even of such stalwarts as Lockhart, more than they themselves were perhaps aware. But now the Union had abolished the Edinburgh Parliament, and, unless

Jacobitism was to expire, it must adopt the policy of invasion and rebellion.[215]

The Court of St. Germains supported the representations of the Court of Rome at Versailles, urging the case for a French invasion of Britain, more particularly of Scotland. The Pretender's Ministers pointed out that their master's restoration was the greatest of all French interests. In 1704 they had not been ashamed to use the argument that 'a Catholic King of Britain must always be a dependent on France.'[216] It was the truth of this statement that rendered it impossible for English Tories, least of all for Marlborough and Godolphin, to be real Jacobites. The consideration was of less weight in Scotland, where popular sentiment was neutral between France and England. The unpopularity of the Union made it possible that a French invasion might detach Scotland from Great Britain at least for long enough to restore the waning fortunes of Louis in the European war.

If the French had landed troops in the winter of 1706–7, while the agitation to prevent the passage of the Union Treaty was at its height, the result would have been a very serious insurrection. But for a year after Ramillies the French had had other fish to fry. Their relative success in the subsequent campaign of 1707 put Versailles in a position to consider an invasion of Scotland for 1708. It might at least cause disturbance enough to draw Marlborough's troops back from the Netherlands, and so enable Vendôme to reconquer Belgium with the help of the changing sympathies of the inhabitants of its great cities. To make the invasion of Scotland worth the while of King Louis, it would not be necessary that the Pretender should have any chance of reaching London, or even of maintaining himself permanently in Edinburgh against the might of England. A temporary diversion in Scotland might help France to a good peace on the Continent.

The Ministers of the French Crown explored the ground through the agency of Nathaniel Hooke, who was in Scotland on their behalf from April to June 1707.* He

* Hooke, of Irish Protestant origin, seems to have liked running to extremes and was always on the losing side. He was chaplain to Monmouth on his expedition. He then became a Jacobite and a Roman Catholic, and in 1706 became naturalized as a French subject. See *Hooke* (*Rox.*), II, pp. i–xiv.

made it his boast that he acted 'blindly' on the orders not of St. Germains but of Versailles: at one moment he considered seriously whether, in view of Hamilton's desire to wear the Scottish Crown himself, France should not support his claim rather than that of the Stuarts if by so doing it would be possible to conciliate the Presbyterian interest.

In effect Hooke achieved little. But the detailed accounts of his mission, written by himself and others, throw much light on the state of Scotland in 1707, and the intestine feuds of the various Jacobite and semi-Jacobite factions. On the one hand the modern reader is astonished by the freedom with which the nobles avowed their disloyal sentiments and formed conspiracies to overthrow the State, undisturbed by a government that had neither the troops, the police nor the popular support to suppress the most open treason. But if the Jacobites were formidable in their defiance of external control, within their own body their leaders were half-hearted and divided by personal jealousies and mutual distrust.

Landing in Aberdeenshire, at Slains Castle,* one of the usual Jacobite ports of call, Hooke found himself in the region of the supporters of the Earl of Errol and the Duke of Atholl, whose chief concern was to warn him against trusting the Duke of Hamilton. Hamilton indeed played his usual part, pretending to be too ill to see Hooke, but dealing with him through the agency of a Roman Catholic priest who had assumed the name of Hall. The Dukes of Gordon and Atholl were equally shy of meeting Hooke, or of committing themselves to rise in arms. In the absence of firm leadership, no serious plan was made, although Errol and some of the less important nobles signed an invitation to the Pretender to come over with 8,000 troops. Hooke could do nothing to remove the old difference of opinion between the Scots and the French as to whether the invasion should be the preliminary condition of the insurrection, or the insurrection of the invasion. But he

* *For this chapter see Map of Scotland, p. 177, above.*

was able to tell Louis on his return that no one would move in Scotland unless at least 5,000 French Regulars first landed.

Otherwise Hooke arranged nothing, and obtained little information of value about a country of which he was not a native. He never realized that the strength of the Jacobite fighting force lay in the Highland Clans, about whom he made few enquiries. And he was deceived by the talk he heard into believing that the great body of the Presbyterians would join a French invasion to put a Roman Catholic King on the throne for the benefit of the Episcopalian party.[217]

So passed the summer of 1707, in Jacobite talk without leadership, with growing popular dislike of the Union, but with a growing sense that there was no way of getting rid of it. Meanwhile another arch-conspirator, Ker of Kersland, an impecunious gentleman of the South-West, was exerting his considerable local influence with the extreme Covenanters, whether in the interest of the Jacobites or of the Government no one quite knew. As often happens, the subtle knave had a power over the headstrong zealots which honester men could never obtain. Jacobites and Hanoverians both thought that Ker was leading in their direction the formidable fighting spirit of the Cameronians. According to his own account he was acting in the government interest, and he was certainly in the government pay.

Ker indeed took money wherever he could get it, even from the Whig and Tory Oppositions at Westminster, on the promise of proving the Lord Treasurer to be in league with the Jacobites. The defenceless state of Scotland in the winter of 1707–8, in the face of constant rumours of invasion next spring, had reawakened dormant Whig and Tory suspicions of Godolphin's loyalty to the Revolution Settlement. But in truth, although the Jacobite agents in France and Scotland still had hopes of him and of Marlborough, the two kinsmen were completely loyal to Queen Anne ; only they had chosen to leave Scotland scantily defended, rather than weaken the British military effort on the Continent. They relied upon the navy to ward off invasion, and if necessary to carry troops straight back from

Ostend to any point upon the British coasts that the enemy might threaten.[218]

Such was the state of affairs at home and abroad when in March 1708 Louis at length launched the Pretender at his foes. Six thousand French infantry were put aboard a squadron of nearly thirty sail, commanded by the gallant privateer Commandant, the Comte de Forbin, the true successor of Jean Bart, the uncrowned King of Dunkirk. Forbin was in a position to take a high tone with Versailles, whose Ministers he treated to his Provençal humours, denouncing the whole affair as madness, and insisting that if he was to go on such a fool's errand at all, the slow transports on which it had been proposed to embark the troops must be changed for fast-sailing privateers, of which good store were laid up in Dunkirk, clean vessels, accustomed to outsail the weather-beaten warships of England : otherwise, he declared, the absurd expedition would most certainly go to the bottom, with the loss of squadron, troops and Pretender together. On these altered terms he consented to sail if positively ordered, but still under protest : 'As for me, I risk nothing, I can swim,' he said gaily.

The preparations and even the intentions of the enemy were accurately known to the British government, kept well informed by agents in the Netherlands and spies in Dunkirk. Ever since the middle of February, the mouth of the privateers' harbour had been watched by a formidable extra squadron, equipped by the Admiralty with vigour and dispatch.* In the first days of March the sight of Byng's topsails in the offing caused the French to abandon their design as impracticable, the more so as the Pretender was sick of measles in Dunkirk. All seemed at an end. But in the days of sailing ships everything was subject to the caprice of the winds, and at this moment Byng was compelled by the weather to put back to the Downs, leaving his scouts on the watch. In a moment the soldiers and

* Godolphin wanted them to block up Dunkirk harbour with sunken ships, *à la Zeebrugge*, but the experts showed it was impossible. *Byng Papers*, II, pp. 125–128.

Jacobites got the ear of Versailles. Forbin was overruled; the Pretender recovered and was eager to be off; the troops were hastily embarked and the expedition sailed.

March $\frac{6}{17}$, 1708

Forbin's attitude was one of breezy scepticism about the chances; he did not conceal his dislike of the British and Irish exiles he had to carry, and his pity for their young King 'James VIII' of Scotland, who in his opinion was the only Jacobite on board his ship who showed any pluck at all.* Judging from Forbin's own memoirs, we must suppose that he was much more intent on the difficult task of bringing back his squadron unsunk, than on landing either the Pretender or the French regiments on the barbarous mountains of Scotland. To account for his subsequent conduct, it is not necessary to believe, as Lockhart and others suspected, that he had secret orders from Versailles not to put ashore either the Pretender or the troops. If his orders left him any discretion, he was safe to be very discreet indeed.

Forbin had started in a brief interval of the heavy weather that had released him from Byng's blockade. His voyage to Scotland was made in westerly gales, rain and snow. The Jacobites were soon very sea-sick: 'it pleased me,' he wrote, 'to see them so unwell, having fulfilled their desire to put to sea. *I can do nothing*, I told them. *Your wine is drawn and you must drink it.*' Some of his ships were driven back by the winds and returned to Dunkirk with one thousand of the troops. But if he could throw the remaining 5,000 ashore anywhere in Scotland the consequences might be serious enough. If he had had either the instructions or the will to sacrifice his squadron in order to land the soldiers, a civil war might have been kindled enough to paralyse Marlborough in the Netherlands. But he had no such heroic orders, and his personal desire was confined to the safe return of the French ships.

* It was as King of Scotland that he intended to make his appeal on landing. The proclamation which he had with him on board was the appeal of 'James VIII to his good people of his ancient Kingdom of Scotland,' to break the Union with England. He declared in the proclamation that he would leave everything to a newly elected Edinburgh Parliament. He gave no guarantee to the Presbyterians, and it is clear that their church would have been destroyed. *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, I (1902), pp. 218–219; *Lockhart*, I, p. 239.

It had been agreed that the landing should be made if possible in the Firth of Forth. Edinburgh was at the moment almost without defence; according to Ker 'there was not four rounds in the Castle,' or 'forty effective men,' and indeed Lord Leven was preparing for its evacuation if the enemy landed. According to one of Harley's Edinburgh correspondents, the little Scottish army, such as it was, was 'debauched' and would join the Pretender as soon as he appeared.*

But from first to last everything went wrong with the invasion. Forbin made his landfall 'six leagues' too far north, and had to sail back along the coast of Fife, losing hours that the event showed to be invaluable. On the afternoon of March 12 his ships began to draw into the mouth of the Firth of Forth and one of them communicated with the shore at Pittenweem, famous for its witch-hunts.† That night the invaders' squadron lay between Crail and the Isle of May. They showed the concerted signals to attract the attention of their Jacobite friends on land, but there was no reply. The failure to return so important a message confirmed Forbin in his prejudice that the whole of the Jacobite business was moonshine.

Next morning, the light of dawn showed the English squadron at 'four leagues' distance to the south. Byng had begun the pursuit with twelve hours to make up and with slower ships, but by hugging the coast he had kept pace and came just in time. Though he had sent a detachment to convoy British troops from Ostend to Tynemouth, he had with him thirty-two ships, some of them three-deckers. Forbin was outnumbered and outclassed, and in grave danger of being shut up in the Firth. He fled north before the Union Jack, seeking home by the route of the Armada.

March $\frac{13}{24}$, 1708

* On March 13, while the French topsails were visible in the mouth of the Firth, Leven wrote to Mar: 'Here I am. Not one farthing of money to provide provisions. None of the Commissions yet sent down. Few troops and naked. It vexes me sadly to think I must retire to Berwick if the French land on this side Forth.' *H. of L. MSS.* (1708–1710), pp. ix, 140; *Ker*, I, p. 63. Godolphin had been negligent, at least in the matter of Edinburgh Castle. On the Scottish army see *Portland*, IV, p. 466.

† See p. 212, above. See *Map of Scotland*, p. 177, above.

It was a stern chase. The quarry were the picked privateers of France, in excellent condition from cleaning and repairs in harbour. The hounds were the English men-of-war, their bottoms foul with the ceaseless patrol-work that mastery of the sea entails. But the leaders of the chase, the *Dover* and the *Ludlow Castle*, 'the only clean sailing ships we had,' got in among the French fleet and began to cannonade Forbin's flagship. The balls whistled round the head of 'James VIII,' who bore himself like his father in the Dutch sea battles long ago. But some of the exiles were ducking all over the deck, to the glee of the Frenchmen who loved them not. While the cannonade continued, the Jacobites asked Forbin to be allowed to get into a boat with the King, and land on the neighbouring coast. Forbin absolutely refused. He thought they made the proposal out of fear and a cold heart, to get out of the shot of the English ships. But as they were seconded by James himself, whose courage Forbin admits, it is charitable to suppose that his companions wished him to land, even with only a few followers, in order to raise the rebellion, since the chance of his landing with the French troops seemed already to have disappeared. Indeed the plan was itself the height of rashness, and Forbin's refusal would have been justified on that ground alone. Seasick landsmen, especially if they are exiles in sight of home, will want to get ashore at any risk.

All day and all night the chase continued, up the coast of Forfar and Aberdeen. But at dawn on March 14, off Buchanness, Byng saw the enemy's rear so many miles ahead that he abandoned pursuit, and went back to guard the mouth of the Forth against any possibility of their return. The English had captured one of the larger enemy vessels, the *Salisbury* * of fifty guns, loaded with French infantry and a few Irish and Scottish Jacobites, including old Lord Griffin. But fortunately for Anne's peace of mind, her servants had not caught her brother.

He, poor lad, was still for the bolder course. When next day the English pursuit had stopped, he again urged Forbin to make a landing near Inverness. The Jacobites

* She was an English ship, taken in 1703 and used by the French.

and the military favoured the design and at one moment Forbin consented. But the weather turned worse, adding to his fears of losing his squadron if caught in the Moray Firth by Byng, as it had been nearly caught in the Firth of Forth. The storm dispersed the fleet, and the pilots were ignorant of the coast. For these reasons all at length agreed to sail on round Cape Wrath and Ireland, and make the best of their way home.

After horrible sufferings and the loss of several ships and many men dead of the hardships of the voyage, the squadron won back to Dunkirk. Some English prisoners in the port witnessed their disembarkation, and thus described it :

> The forces relanded out of the ships in a very miserable condition both in health and clothes, and [we] saw the person called the Pretender land on the shore, being a tall, slight young man, pale smooth face, with a blue feather in his hat, and a star on his cloak ; at his first going off they mightily huzzaed him with *Vive le Roi*, but were very mute at his coming back.*

Marlborough had made his plans for throwing troops into Scotland, and they moved like clockwork. None the less, the clock had been set at least ten days behind what would have been required in order to garrison Edinburgh at the moment Forbin was in the Firth of Forth. He was there on March 12 (O.S.). On March 21 there arrived off Tynemouth the ten battalions of English infantry, sent there from Ostend under a convoy of ten English and Dutch warships. On March 24 another small army began to march north from the neighbourhood of London. Some

* My account of the attempted invasion is drawn mainly from *Forbin's* own memoirs, from the *Byng Papers*, vol. II (an invaluable source), *Burchett*, pp. 740–747, and *The House of Lords MSS.* (1708–1710), pp. iii–ix and 32–79 (see pp. 41–42 and 48 in particular). *Hooke*, 1760, pp. 152–163, contains other French and Jacobite narratives to be compared to Forbin. To these I should like here to add the Pretender's own account, taken from his instructions to Charles Farquarson, who was sent over later in 1708 to raise the drooping spirits of the party in Scotland :

'First you are to assure them of the concern and trouble we are in on their account as well as our own, that this last enterprise has failed, occasioned by our sickness, the mistakes of the pilots, and other unforseen accidents which gave the enemy the opportunity of preventing our landing in the Firth [of Forth] ; while, on the other side, violent contrary winds, the dispersing of the fleet, the ignorance we were in of the coasts and want of provision hindered our landing in any other place,' *e.g.* Inverness. *Bodleian MSS., Carte*, 180 f. 22.

15,000 seasoned English troops would have been in Scotland in April. Such a force should have sufficed to check and ultimately to suppress any rebellion that might have resulted from a French landing, but it is not likely that the ten battalions could have returned to Ostend in time to save the year's campaign for Marlborough in the Netherlands.

Not being in fact needed, the ten battalions were never landed at Tynemouth at all. After lying off the coast there for some days, they were sent back in plenty of time to help win the battle of Oudenarde. Their experiences at sea had not been pleasant. Over 5,000 of them had been packed in leaky, rotten and pest-ridden transports, while the remaining 1,700 had been crammed into the men-of-war where there was no accommodation for them at all. Stretched on the hard planks without bedding or proper food, the sick died in misery as great as the sufferings of the French troops then tossing off Cape Wrath. Even Marlborough's care for his men had not been extended to improve their conditions when at sea.[219]

When Forbin had been in the mouth of the Firth, the gleeful and vindictive glances of the Jacobites on the High Street of Edinburgh had alarmed the loyal. But it was the opinion in government circles that the Presbyterians would have opposed the Popish claimant and the Episcopalian party, if a landing had been effected : Carstares was congratulated on the loyalty shown by the Church, and Sunderland, as Secretary of State, wrote to the Earl of Leven on March 18 that 'the account we have of the good disposition of the people in and about Edinburgh is very comfortable, and particularly that of the Church, which I am sure deserve all encouragement.' Defoe's analysis of the general feeling of the 'poor, honest, but ill-natured and imposed-upon people' of Scotland, written from Edinburgh in May for Godolphin's instruction, implies uncertainty as to what would have happened if the enemy had landed :

> It began to be said at the time of the invasion '*It lay between the English and the French ; let them fight it out.*' There was nothing for the honest people, as they called themselves, to do in it. While they were increasing in this temper the French appeared. What temper then began to show itself little judgment can be made, there was so little time between the appearing of the French and Sir George Byng, being but one afternoon [March 12].

And there, with no more certain pronouncement, we must be content to leave speculation on the untried event.[220]

The Privy Council of Scotland, already under statutory sentence of death, spent the last weeks of its existence in preparing against invasion and arresting Jacobite suspects. By the end of March the castles of Edinburgh and Stirling were crammed with lords and gentlemen. Many, who had drunk Jacobite toasts in unwary moments, were glad enough to be thus honourably quit of any moral obligation to risk their necks and estates. Arrests on the eve of a rebellion often gave much secret personal relief to the outwardly indignant victim. Hamilton, who had taken care to be in England when the expedition approached the Scottish shore, was probably glad enough when the Queen's messenger came to serve the expected writ. His rival the Duke of Atholl was at Blair Atholl among his Highlanders, and it was thought prudent to leave him there on his giving a bond of £5,000 to appear if summoned. More deeply implicated were a few gentlemen of Stirlingshire who had been seen 'out' with their horses and servants incautiously soon. Much indignation was aroused when these and other prisoners were sent up to London to be tried there, or at least examined there by the Ministers.

Fletcher of Saltoun was called before the Edinburgh Privy Council and established his innocence. But poor old Lord Belhaven was sent to London, on the fame of his all too popular speech against the Union.* He was genuinely indignant at being considered disloyal to the Protestant Succession merely because he was an 'Anti-unioner,' and wrote Ministers long letters on the subject, which they passed about among each other as 'comical.' He was bailed out, but the misunderstanding of his political position had gone to the old man's heart, and he died that summer, it was said, 'of chagrin.'

* See p. 274, above.

No one died by the executioner for the affair of the invasion, not even those who were taken in the *Salisbury* in the act of levying war. One of them, the veteran Lord Griffin, was condemned to a traitor's death as a returned outlaw. But even he was reprieved 'because the Queen cannot bring herself to let him suffer, whom, she says, she has known so long.' He died in prison, a few years later. Lord Sunderland was so much disgusted by the clemency of the government to which he belonged that he wrote to Newcastle: 'their late management in relation to the Invasion and in particularly the pardoning of Lord Griffin, is a declaration to the whole world, as far as in them lies, for the Prince of Wales.'

Anne, Marlborough and Godolphin were all humane by nature and moderate in opinion. But there was a further reason for clemency. A General Election was coming on—the first to be held for a Parliament of all Britain.* The government had no wish to lose support in Scotland by undue harshness after so fortunate an escape. Moreover the Whig Lords, half in and half out of the government, were playing a game of their own on Godolphin's flank and against his interest. Hamilton struck a bargain with the Junto. He and his friends should be let out of prison to return to their homes at once, if they would support the Whigs against Godolphin's candidates in the coming elections. The Scottish representative Peers might hold the balance in the evenly divided House of Lords, and their election by their fellow-nobles of Scotland was therefore of prime importance to the English Whigs. Sunderland, though Secretary of State, was so little loyal to his father-in-law and Godolphin that he wrote to the Duke of Roxburgh while the election was pending: 'I would not have you be bullied by the Court-Party, for the Queen herself cannot support that faction long.' His anger at the clemency shown by others to Lord Griffin did not prevent him from joining in this intrigue to let out the rest of the Jacobite conspirators on the Whig terms.

Thus, by arrangements made, some with Godolphin

* In the previous session the Scottish representatives had taken their seats at Westminster in the sitting Parliament.

and some with Sunderland and his friends, all the Jacobite suspects were free men before the election in May, except the Stirlingshire gentlemen. Even they were sent back to be tried in Scotland, with a resulting verdict of 'not proven,' as few there were willing to testify even to known facts against them.[221]

The General Election of May 1708 was governed by England's alarm and anger over the attempted invasion in March. When the French were on their way to Edinburgh, a run on the Bank of England had been engineered by its rivals, the goldsmiths and private bankers, led by Sir Francis Child, Tory member of Parliament. Their unpatriotic attempt had been defeated by the efforts of Godolphin at the Treasury and by the Whig monied interest in the City. The incident told heavily against the Tories at election time. Patriotism and the desire for stability ranged themselves on the side of the Whig candidates. On March 31 the Dean of Norwich wrote to a friend:

> Had the Bank broke when the run was made upon it, I must have broke too, for I had then £4,000 in it. I reckon the matters that have been of late transacted will, on this baffle, have a great influence on this next election. I wish it do not carry the Whig interest too high, for that is best when well balanced.

On account of the invasion, many supported the Whigs who might otherwise have been inclined to vote for the Tories in hopes of a speedy peace. In the previous winter the country had seemed hardly to know whether it wanted to continue the war or not. In December 1707 Swift had written from Leicester,

> This long war has here occasioned no fall of lands, nor much poverty among any sort of people, only some complain of a little slowness of tenants to pay their rents. There is a universal love of the present government.

But only six weeks later he wrote from London:

> Preparations for war much slower, so that we expect but a moderate campaign, and people begin to be heartily weary of the war.

In face of such contradictory opinions formed by the same observer it would be rash to pronounce how the election would have gone in May 1708, if there had been no invasion in March. But an attack on our shores was a challenge and a provocation from the French King, not likely to lead a high-spirited people into the path of peace.

The polling took place while folk were talking of nothing but the invasion, and the Whigs endeavoured with some success to turn it against the Tory party as a whole. Their *Advice to the Electors*, said to have been written by 'some eminent members of the Kitkat,' 'excuses the Papists and Non-jurors as inconsiderable, the Whigs as not to be suspected, and lays the whole blame of the late invasion at the poor Tories' door.' [222]

In these circumstances many borough-owners, squires, clergy and freeholders gave their support to Whig candidates whom they more frequently opposed. In spite of division between the Whigs and Godolphin, and the similar coolness between Godolphin and the Queen, the weight of government was once more thrown against the Tory Opposition; and in Anne's reign the government of the day never once sustained defeat in a General Election. The result was that on May 27 Sunderland wrote triumphantly to the Duke of Newcastle:

> I heartily congratulate with your grace upon the Elections throughout England, being so well over as they are. I think one may venture to say it is the most Wig Parliament has been since the Revolution.

Whether it was one of those recurring moments when a Whig Parliament was what England and Europe most required may be questioned. But there was the fact, the natural outcome of the invasion.[223]

Yet governmental influence had not been exerted to the fullest extent on behalf of all the Whig candidates. Neither Godolphin nor the Queen, nor even the moderate-minded Whig Chancellor Lord Cowper, were prepared to sweep all Tory magistrates off the bench to prepare the way for the election. Sarah bitterly complained that her brother had been defeated in his candidature for her own town of St. Albans, because his Tory opponent 'had been left with the power of justice in the town.' [224]

The personal influence of the borough owner, the landlord, the patron, the official superior in Church or State, played the usual part in this as in all other elections of the reign, and bribery was administered by all sides as unblushingly as ever. The House of Commons had dallied with a mild anti-bribery Bill just before the election, but the Lords had thrown it out. If it had passed, it could no more have been enforced in that age than Prohibition in the United States to-day.

> We are coming to a Parliamentary Election [wrote Defoe in his *Review*]. It is to no purpose to talk any more about bribing, treating, buying of voices and such things as these, articles now become as necessary to Elections of Parliament men, as bread is to life. . . . Here are two gentlemen in a town on the market day; there they take up each of them a public-house. The ale-house keeper bamboosels them and charges all the ale he has in the house twice over, whether tis drunk or no. If his Worship does not like it, he does him wrong, for he has brought in all the customers to vote for him.

The public-house was the necessary headquarters for conquering a popular constituency, followed up by 'two guineas a man' for the voters, as at Ludgarshall in Wilts. But in close boroughs the Corporation could be bought wholesale, as at Thetford, where 'the election is among the magistracy, and 50 guineas for a vote is their price,' in 1708.[225]

The Cornish rotten boroughs, which were all of them 'owned,' continued a slow gravitation away from the High Tory monopoly that had existed in those parts at the beginning of the reign. A Cornish Tory correspondent wrote to Harley:

> Addison has been brought in at Lostwithiel by an interest carried on in another name and transferred by surprise. Upon the whole these two last elections [1705 and 1708] have made us rather worse than better in this County.

It had been found impossible to procure one of the Cornish seats for Henry St. John, who did not venture to contest his old seat at Wootton Bassett. He prepared for a few

years of philosophic retirement, ' a blessing,' he wrote, ' I never yet enjoyed.' And he used the opportune absence from the House to renew his old High Tory friendships and connections at Oxford and elsewhere.

When the new House met, the election petitions were carried by the votes of the House in favour of ' Whigs and Courtiers,' as shamelessly as the Tories had carried them on former occasions. Bishop Burnet, who, strong partisan as he was, had always some sense of decency and fair-play, was shocked at the injustice of his own side. There was no doubt who had won the General Election.[226]

Note on Sir Walter Scott and the Scotland of Queen Anne.

The politics of Scotland during the attempted invasion of 1708 form the historical background of *The Black Dwarf*, where Scott has drawn the least favourable of his pictures of Jacobite society and conspiracy. *The Bride of Lammermoor* is apparently meant to take place in the first few years after the Union; besides its tragic intensity and march of fate, that book has also a secondary value as a picture of Scottish society of the period, such as the great antiquary could draw with such imaginative realism and dexterity out of the fulness of his knowledge.

CHAPTER XVIII

Oudenarde, Lille, Minorca

Campaign of 1708. Ghent and Bruges lost. Battle of Oudenarde. Marlborough's proposal to march on Paris vetoed by Eugene. Siege and capture of Lille. Battle of Wynendael. Recovery of Ghent and Bruges. Leake in the Mediterranean. Sardinia. The Pope. Capture of Port Mahon, Minorca. Some diplomatic repercussions. Admiral Wager's action.

Marlborough well knew that the failure of the Allies in 1707 to achieve anything in any theatre of the war must not be repeated in 1708, if the struggle was ever to be brought to a good end. Last year's experience had also shown that there was no chance of success except through his own exertions. He determined so to contrive that Eugene should co-operate with him in the field. He had failed to persuade the Emperor to send that Prince to Spain, and since he himself could not leave the Netherlands in face of Belgian disaffection and French numerical strength, he plotted to bring Eugene thither, to win with him another fraternal victory, and make a push through the frontier fortresses into France.

But the projected union of the forces of Marlborough and Eugene had to be kept a secret. The Elector of Hanover was the Imperialist General on the Upper Rhine: though he was not, like his predecessors in that command, incompetent, he was hardly less jealous than Lewis of Baden, and he expected that the other army of the Empire, under Eugene, would be sent to join him. For many reasons Marlborough had no wish to offend the future King George more than was absolutely necessary for the common weal. It was therefore arranged as a compromise that there should be three separate armies: the Elector with 40,000 men should watch the French in Alsace;

Eugene with 45,000 should operate on the Moselle ; while Marlborough guarded Belgium with the 80,000 men in English and Dutch pay. But it was secretly agreed between the two old comrades of Blenheim that at midsummer Eugene should march from the Moselle to the Netherlands and join Marlborough in an attack on the French frontier. On May 3 the Duke wrote to Godolphin from the Hague : ' as for the joining of the two armies, we thought it best not to acquaint the Elector with it, so that I expect when that is put in execution, he will be very angry ; but since the good of the campaign depends upon it, I know no remedy but patience.' [227]

Meanwhile the French also had their plans for an offensive that should lead to a ' good peace.' The events of 1707 had gone some way to restore their fighting spirit, and though the economic conditions of France made peace imperative, Louis thought he could get it on good terms if he was again successful in the field this year.

The French plan was to make military capital out of Belgian discontent with Dutch administration, and out of the popularity which the Elector of Bavaria had formerly enjoyed as Governor of the Spanish Netherlands. His rule and his person had won the special approbation of the aristocracy and more particularly of the ladies. Indeed Max Emanuel, whom Marlborough's two great victories had made twice an exile, was a kind of Belgo-Bavarian ' Bonnie Prince Charlie.' * The hope of restoring him to power in the Netherlands had been connected with the attempted invasion of Scotland in March, which was designed to draw home the whole of the British forces for the whole summer. Their departure would have been followed by a great French advance in co-operation with sympathisers inside the Belgian cities. The failure of the Pretender's voyage and the consequent return in April of the ten English battalions that had been sent to Tynemouth from Ostend, put an end to the diversion. But even so the French attack on the Netherlands was attempted in July with a fair chance of success.

* *St. Simon* (V, chap. xxi) dwells on this. He remarks that it was, therefore, a mistake to send Max Emanuel this year to the Rhine, instead of to the Netherlands.

It was to be a grand effort. The days had long gone by when King Louis used to take the field himself to watch the easy capture of a town ; but the Dauphin's son, the Duke of Burgundy, the future King of France if harsh fate had permitted, was to go in nominal command and reap the glory of the campaign. Beside him rode the youth who was already King of England—had his subjects only thought so. In the presence of Princes the French soldiers of that epoch were expected to do battle with even more than their usual ardour. Marshal Vendôme was sent as Burgundy's adjutant or tutor—it was hard to say which. He was an experienced, bold and able soldier, a grandson of one of Henri Quatre's too numerous children, popular with the rank and file of the army, but tainted with vices of a kind which even the courtiers of Versailles found it hard to stomach. He was often sunk in sensual sloth, but could arouse himself to act with energy and courage. The camp was at once divided into the faction of Vendôme and the faction of Burgundy ; the feud was perpetually breaking out in the most violent scenes between the two commanders, and had much to do with the ultimate failure of their campaign.

All, however, went well at first. Early in July the French Generals boldly and ably gave Marlborough the slip, as he stood covering the ill-fortified towns of Brussels and Louvain. Having passed his guard, they appeared in force before the gates of Ghent, which were opened to them by conspiracy within. Bruges followed suit, and the French armies lay safe behind the cover of the Bruges Canal, in Marlborough's very rear. ' The States,' wrote the Duke to Godolphin on July 9, ' have used this country so ill that I no ways doubt but all the towns will play us the same trick as Ghent has done, whenever they have it in their power.' *

Marlborough had been outmanœuvred. He was ill at ease in body and in mind. He suffered constantly from fevers and headaches—' my blood is so heated,' he is perpetually writing to Sarah ; he was troubled by news from home of the alienation of the Queen and the in-

* *For this chapter see* Map IX, *The Netherlands, etc., at end of this volume.*

transigence of the Whigs ; he realized to the full the dangers of the politico-military state of Belgium, and he decided that nothing but a battle won could restore the situation. If, by any device, he could bring the French to action in the field, he would not let slip the opportunity, even if the delay of a few days would increase his force by the expected arrival of Eugene's army from the Moselle ; for he well knew that such an addition to his strength would render the French much more unwilling to risk a battle. The Dutch Field Deputies, as a result of last year's fiasco, had this year been instructed not to interfere with his plans. In the other camp, Vendôme and Burgundy and their respective factions were highly elated at the capture of Ghent, but were still somewhat afraid of a return stroke from Marlborough, the ' mortified adventurer ' whom, as they remembered, Villeroi had so rashly despised and challenged at Ramillies. The French Generals were therefore divided, each in his own mind, between boldness and caution ; and they were further divided by jealousy one against the other. A clear and consistent plan of action was not likely to be the result. Such was the psychological situation that led to the clash at Oudenarde.[228]

Leaving strong garrisons in Ghent and Bruges, Vendôme and Burgundy moved back towards the French frontier. But instead of marching straight home to the safe cover of Lille, they lingered on the way, playing with the idea of the capture of a fortress under Marlborough's nose. They quarrelled, of course, as to which the fortress was to be. Burgundy was for besieging Menin ; Vendôme preferred Oudenarde, and insisted on having his way. He designed that the army should move from Ghent to Lessines on the Dender, in order to keep the Allies to the east of that river, and so cover the siege of Oudenarde. But Marlborough marched from Herfelingen and was in Lessines before the French could get there.

Vendôme, thus thwarted, fell back on Burgundy's plans against Menin. He sought to cover the siege of that place by crossing the Schelde at Gavre and occupying its left bank from Gavre up to Oudenarde. Since Oudenarde and its bridges were in allied hands and Marlborough was



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

clearly in more active mood than the French generals, the plan was none too safe, as the event proved.[229]

Marlborough had been joined by Eugene. The Prince's army, now on its way from the Moselle, was several days' march in the rear, but neither comrade in arms wished to wait for it at the risk of letting Vendôme escape from the trap into which he had sauntered. Even as it was, the French would escape if they were not outmarched as well as outfought. But Marlborough's men could do both.

Before dawn, at one o'clock in the morning of July 11, Irish Cadogan, again, as at Ramillies, Marlborough's harbinger of victory, started from Lessines. He took with him the vanguard of the army, consisting of a dozen battalions chiefly of British infantry, and eight squadrons of Hanoverian dragoons including their young Electoral Prince—in whose name as George II of England the Seven Years' War was won half-a-century later ; to-day he was to serve his apprenticeship in beating the French.

July 11 (N.S.) 1709

The task of this vanguard was to construct a number of pontoon bridges over the Schelde just below Oudenarde, and hold the approach against all comers, in order to secure the passage of the river by the main army later in the day. After a march of fifteen miles, they reached the edge of the hills above Eename, about ten o'clock in the morning, and suddenly saw below them the Schelde winding through its marshes, and on the further bank the pretty fortress town of Oudenarde. Above its houses rose the tower and high-pitched narrow roof of the church, and the gorgeous architectural fantasies of the Hotel de Ville. But that morning Cadogan had no eyes for such matters ; his gaze was turned northward, where, six miles away, above the heights of Gavre, he saw the whole French army, still on the same side of the river as himself, on the point of crossing it by bridges which they had already laid. He might yet be in time, but he had none to waste. He speedily laid his ' tin boats ' in five pontoon bridges over the Schelde, hard by the town, and the vanguard—horse, foot and artillery—trundled across.

Meanwhile the French also were passing the Schelde at Gavre and moving southward in leisurely and uncertain

fashion. If Burgundy and Vendôme had been like Marlborough and Eugene, they would have flung their whole force on Cadogan as fast as they could bring it up ; they might well have driven him into the Schelde, together with the head of Marlborough's supporting columns. If, on the other hand, the French were playing for safety, they could have taken up a fine defensive position on the heights of Huysse, Lede and Wannegem. That long ridge rises, bare and smooth as a glacis, from the bottom of the Norken stream. Marlborough would not have had time to storm the position on the evening after his long march from Lessines : if the French had wished, they could have stolen away in the night ; or, if they so preferred, they could have stood the shock next morning on ground most favourable for the defence. But their quarrelsome commanders were incapable of taking friendly counsel together to arrive at any definite plan. A series of rival orders, given some by Vendôme and some by Burgundy, led the French into a battle wherein they failed either to take active advantage of Cadogan's dangerous position, or to secure the maximum of safety for a defensive action.

From the first moment of crossing the river at Gavre, the enemy's movements were planless and undecided. The bulk of the army moved in the general direction of the Huysse heights, while a detachment under Biron was sent down to occupy Eyne and dispose of Cadogan. The laying of the pontoons, which were to be Marlborough's path to victory, had held the vanguard of the Allies busy beside the river banks, until Biron's Swiss regiments had had time to occupy Eyne.

It was now afternoon and the head of Marlborough's main columns were beginning to appear on the edge of the hills above Eename. The pace at which the great army had moved from Lessines, whence it started about seven o'clock, had been a measure of the enthusiasm of all ranks. Everyone was burning to wipe out the stain of Ghent and Bruges, lost by ' treachery,' as they all said. The French had stolen an advantage and had begun to crow about it ; they must be put in their place again, as in the Ramillies year. Marlborough's presence made every man confident of victory.

English, German, Dutch, Scandinavian, Huguenot, they marched under many flags, but they had faith in one man. He had set them to race against time, and they all knew it. The day's march would be arduous, but evening would bring the battle for which they thirsted. The unlucky files who had been detained to guard the baggage deserted their inglorious post, to join in the rush of their comrades to Oudenarde. Cheerfully swearing and singing in a dozen different tongues, they pounded along the dusty highway in the poplar shade. Even dour Colonel Blackader was moved to a sombre joy : ' My thoughts were much on the 103rd psalm,' he wrote, ' which I sung (in my heart) frequently upon the march.' When, after fifteen miles of it, they reached the edge of the Eename hill and saw the shining river and the white coats of Louis's Grand Army beyond, they doubled their pace. The leading squadrons went ' at a full trot ' over the pontoons which Cadogan had laid so well. Behind them the blue-coated Prussian infantry ' ran ' across the swinging highway, and after them more redcoats. Marlborough and Eugene, riding side by side, crossed in this eager company.

At first sight of the approach of these succours, Cadogan had moved forward from the riverside and attacked Biron in Eyne. He had brought with him in his vanguard the pick of the English infantry. They advanced on the village in line with shouldered muskets, never firing a shot, or even bringing their bayonets to the charge till they were within pistol-shot of the Swiss. The mountaineers were among the best troops the French had, but three battalions laid down their arms in Eyne, and the Hanoverian dragoons cut the fourth to pieces as it attempted to retreat, together with three more battalions coming up too late from Heurne. The Hanoverian horsemen, elated by their easy victory over the enemy's foot, followed their General Rantzau to fresh adventure, and crashed into twenty squadrons of French cavalry near Heurne and scattered them in rout. In this brilliant charge, performed in presence of the two approaching armies, the Electoral Prince George distinguished himself. His horse was shot under him, and for a moment men thought that England must seek another heir. But

the choleric, spirited little gentleman was up and on again. The English ballads of Oudenarde hawked through the country that summer told of his prowess against 'Jack Frenchman.' It was a point gained for the Hanover Succession. The Pretender, too, behaved well that day, but he was fighting against England.

Such was the prelude, of happy augury for the Allies, to the main encounter, that could not now be avoided, between the two great hosts of 60,000 men or more on each side. The strength of the French army was on or near the Huysse heights, but at sight of Biron's discomforture and Marlborough's approach, it began, too late, to move down in successive detachments by way of Roijgem mill, across the Marollebeck, to crush Cadogan and Rantzau at Groenewald. Marlborough speeded on the Prussians and other troops of the main army, as fast as they crossed the pontoons, to hurry to the support of the adventurous vanguard. As the regiments on either side arrived upon the scene, the battle was joined on an ever wider front, spreading out like an opening fan. First the line was set from Herlejem to Shaerken ; and later in the afternoon along the banks of the Diepenbeck south-westward from Shaerken, as far as the moat surrounding the ruined Castle of Browaan, the left wing of the allied position. Along a line more than two miles long, one of the severest infantry actions of the war raged for hours without intermission, until night put an end to the slaughter.

The French, through their dilatory tactics, had thrown away their chance of driving Cadogan and the Hanoverians and Prussians into the Schelde before the rest of the allied army could cross ; but they did their best to make good their fault. The English declared the enemy had never fought better : certainly they had fought worse at Ramillies. Vendôme had sulkily acquiesced in the *fait accompli* of the descent from the Huysse heights, initiated by Burgundy without his knowledge. Now, however, he was fighting at Groenewald, a half-pike in his hand, no longer the slothful debauchee, but the descendant of the victor of Ivry ; and the best infantry of France thronged after him into the mêlée.

But the Allies, though they had marched more than fifteen miles that day, were more than a match for the enemy, both commanders and men. As a special compliment to Eugene, who was present without his army, Marlborough put him in command of the right wing, where the danger was greatest, and where the British soldiers fought. The Guards and that famous regiment that was even then known as 'the Buffs,' from their yellow facings, were proud to fight under Eugene. Argyle was their immediate commander, in the very thick of it, as he was in the thick of every great action in Flanders.

Oudenarde differed from Blenheim and Ramillies in its general character. There was no ranging of the two hosts in proper order of battle, on positions previously explored and selected. It was an 'encounter action.' The regiments came up happy-go-lucky, and were thrust into the gaps of the firing line as fast as they could arrive. The battle was not set, it grew. In such an affair, rarer in those days than in later warfare, a General must have an eye for rapid calculations of time and distance, a brain to make and execute plans on the spur of the moment. And at Oudenarde Marlborough showed himself as great a master of this game of catch-as-you-can as of the prearranged tactics of forcing the enemy's reconnoitred positions at Blenheim and Ramillies. As each battalion hurried up from the bridge head, he flung it in wherever it was most needed. At one moment he moved Lottum's brigade bodily from the left wing, where it had begun the fighting, to go to the support of the hard-pressed Eugene ; while he himself led the latest arrivals, Dutch and Hanoverian foot, across the Diepenbeck, driving back the enemy's right. This elaborate and nice manœuvre, carried out in the heat of such an action, shows what complete mastery he had in his mind over the course of the battle.*

There was a further difference between Oudenarde

* Marlborough had another superiority over the French commanders in better knowledge of the character of the ground, where some of his troops had recently been camped. Burgundy made an error, possibly fatal to the event of the day, in stopping a movement which Vendôme had ordered to envelope Eugene's right, under the mistaken belief that the ground over which they were to pass was too boggy for passage.

and the Duke's other two great victories in the lesser importance of the part played by the cavalry, owing to the nature of the ground. The decision was reached by the infantry. There were indeed two very effective and useful charges made by the allied horse, the first by Rantzau's Hanoverians at Heurne as already described, the other later in the evening by Natzmer and his Prussian troopers on the outside of Eugene's right flank, which they saved from being turned, plunging deep into the heart of the approaching French forces. But in the essential fighting, on the two-mile line from Herlejem village to Browaan Castle, only infantry were engaged, because the ground there did not admit of charges of horse. Even the artillery played a less part than usual because of the difficulty of bringing up the guns in time through the enclosures. The French left their whole artillery in the rear, and so saved it intact when disaster fell on the forces actually engaged. But Marlborough made good use of his artillery in the centre of the firing line.

Chance had directed that the main encounter of the two armies should take place in a region of enclosed ground, the *petite culture* and woodlands of the villages along the Marollebeck and Diepenbeck. On every side of this enclosed region the Flemish landscape wears its usual aspect of open rolling corn-lands, fit for cavalry operations ; and over such ground the Hanoverian and Prussian charges were made. But the infantry were disputing for villages, hedges, orchards, rows of poplars, scattered cottages and cabbage gardens straggling along the becks and the irrigation channels connected with them. John Marshall Deane, who fought as a ' private sentinel ' in the Foot Guards that day, thus describes the action in which he took part :

> The fight was very desperate on both sides and continued from five in the evening as long as there was any light ; it which time the enemy was beat from hedge to hedge and breastwork to breastwork, that one would have thought it impossible for them to have lost the battle, they having had time to secure themselves of strong ground as they always do, getting into villages, possessing themselves of houses, and making every quickset hedge a slight wall that we cannot come at them.

The upshot was that Eugene, thanks to the valour of the Prussians and the deadly platoon firing of the English, held his ground against the superior force of French foot on that wing, while Marlborough, with the Dutch and Hanoverian infantry on the allied left, pushed the enemy back at the bayonet's point from the Diepenbeck, and advanced in earnest as the evening shades began to show the flash of each musket shot. ' We drove the enemy,' wrote an eye-witness, ' from ditch to ditch, from hedge to hedge, and from one scrub to another, and wood, in great hurry, disorder and confusion.'

Nor was this all. Marlborough, so far from being perplexed by the urgent details of the encounter action as it developed from moment to moment, had planned a great enveloping operation. Not all his army had crossed by the pontoons. His friend among the Dutch Generals, the veteran Overkirk, led a strong force of Dutch cavalry and infantry across the fortress bridges of Oudenarde, right through the town, and up the Oycke hill, which the French had left unoccupied, though it dominated their own right flank and rear. At a certain point Overkirk detached General Week and his Dutch infantry to fall on the flank of the battle behind the Castle of Browaan ; while he himself took the cavalry through the village of Oycke on the heights, and round behind Oycke wood towards Roijgem to envelope the whole rear of the French army. The arrival of Week's foot aided Marlborough to drive back and surround the enemy's right wing. But Overkirk had not time to complete his own operation before darkness had fallen, and it was under cover of darkness that the enemy's left wing and supports escaped from the field. Another hour of evening light would have made Oudenarde a Sedan. And more than an hour had been lost by one of those unforeseeable accidents that play so large a part in the history of war. When Overkirk had been passing the Schelde at Oudenarde, the fortress bridge gave way and, according to Eugene, two hours had been lost in repairing it sufficiently for the passage to proceed.*

That strange last evening hour, while the blanket of the

* *Feldzüge*, II, i, p. 352, and Appendix, p. 155.

dark was mantling the locked combatants, and extinguishing the battle at its very height and climax, deeply struck the imagination of those who witnessed it. The French saw the circle of flame, spitting around them ever more clearly as blackness fell, and knew themselves surrounded. Marlborough, fearing lest his regiments, coming now from opposite directions, should volley upon each other in the night, gave orders to cease fire. His men pressed in to take their prisoners with the bayonet. Whole companies and battalions of the enemy's right wing threw down their arms. Cottages and ditches were gone through with the steel for hideaways. The French Huguenots played a trick on their persecutors : their drummers marched about beating the French retreat, while their officers cried aloud the names of the regiments engaged, '*A moi, Picardie*,' '*A moi, Roussillon*,' till groups of bewildered men came running through the darkness to the familiar summons, and were captured as they came up. It was a pitch-black night, and rain began to fall, adding to the misery of the wounded, whose groans were ' very dolorous.' The victors stood with bayonets fixed all night, gathering in and guarding the thousands of prisoners, while the left and reserve of the French army crept off and disappeared in the direction of Ghent. And so, as a Scottish private sang in rough rhyme,

> In hedges and dykes they lay like dead tikes
> As the dark night began to draw near.
> For fear of alarms we stood to our arms
> Until the day light did appear.

Marlborough had been suffering from fever and headache, but he and Eugene spent the dark hours on horseback upon the field with the troops, ' in a very soaking rain.' At muddy dawn, all the French who had not fled to Ghent overnight were found and secured, and pursuit was sent out after the rest. Captors and captives then left the sodden battlefield to the surgeons and their fatigue parties, and tramped off to Oudenarde to recuperate. The prisoners were ' coming by droves into the town for many hours,' by the open track across the fields from Shaerken. In the market place, beneath the towering Hotel de Ville, Marlborough

and Eugene at length dismounted—sick, famished, tired and happy—amid the chaff and cheering of their troops in like case with themselves. Around stood and lay the prisoners, their white uniforms stained with blood and dirt ; already 6000, including 700 officers, had been brought into the town, and in a day or two the total captured had risen to 9000 by further desertion or successful pursuit. A hundred ' standards and colours ' were trophies of the completeness of victory.

Between killed, wounded, prisoners and deserters, ' Oudenarde,' as the Duke reckoned, ' has lessened their army at least 20,000 men.' ' But our greatest advantage,' he wrote, ' is the terror that is in their army.' ' We could beat them with half their numbers, especially their foot.' For the moment the French were shut up again behind the Bruges Canal, where Marlborough could not get at them. Their chiefs were quarrelling violently, and many officers threatening to desert Vendôme. He kept his head and maintained his courage. Indeed he behaved well under trying circumstances in every respect except in sending a most dishonest report of the battle to King Louis, which failed to deceive him as to the real situation.

The Allies reckoned their own killed and wounded at 3000, and declared that this number had been made up within a week of the battle by ' Germans, Switzers and Savoyards,' enlisted from the ranks of prisoners and deserters. In any case the Allied losses at Oudenarde were very small compared to what they lost in the four months they afterwards spent before the city and citadel of Lille, when a single night's work once cost them 4000 casualties and the whole siege 15,000.

Oudenarde had just failed to be a Sedan. But it had annihilated the enemy's right wing, broken the fighting strength of the French field-army for the rest of the campaign, restored the moral superiority of the Allied forces, rendered possible the grand operation of the capture of Lille and effective progress against the frontier of France. A third name had been added to Blenheim and Ramillies. ' No envy or faction can reach a man that has gained three such battles,' wrote Mr. Maynwaring to the Duchess on receipt

of the news. 'And if he brings home a peace next winter, it will be as impossible for his enemies to hurt him, as for the wind to blow down Mr. Vanburgh's thick walls.' But he did not bring home a peace, and even before Mr. Vanburgh had finished laying his 'heavy load' upon the earth at Blenheim, 'envy and faction' had taught the English to forget for awhile the gratitude due to their deliverer.[230]

After a necessary day's rest for his utterly exhausted army, Marlborough sent a detachment under Lottum, from the field of battle, to seize and level the earthwork Lines which the French had constructed from Ypres to the Lys. Lottum arrived on July 15 in time to prevent Berwick from being there before him. The Lines were destroyed and the way across the French border and the approaches to Lille were thus secured by promptitude in following up the victory. Next day Marlborough wrote: 'We are now masters of marching where we please, but can make no siege till we are masters of Ghent, from whence only we can have our cannon.'

Such were the Duke's first thoughts on the strange situation created by Oudenarde and by the French retreat behind the Bruges canal. The arrival of Eugene's army after the battle raised the Allied field force to 100,000 men, elate with victory, commanded by the two greatest soldiers of the age, united in a friendship that knew no touch of jealousy. So formidable an instrument of conquest had never before taken the field in the history of warfare. No important body of troops lay between it and Paris. But behind the Allies, if they moved forward, would lie an army almost as large as their own, though by no means so good or so well commanded. And meanwhile Vendôme, by his occupation of Ghent, prevented the siege train in Dutch territory from being sent to Marlborough's camp by the usual water route, up the Schelde or the Lys. If, therefore, the Allies undertook the siege of Lille, the greatest masterpiece of Vauban's engineering skill, they would conduct the operation under conditions of peculiar danger and disadvantage. But their road to Paris lay open.

It was in these circumstances that the Duke conceived,

in the week after Oudenarde, the design of marching straight into the heart of France. He would mask Lille, occupying the channel ports so as to obtain a new and shorter line of communications with England, threaten the capital and perhaps dictate that winter a Treaty of Versailles.*

It has been observed, in defence of Marlborough's project of marching on Paris after Oudenarde, that, after Waterloo, Wellington and Blücher adopted the plan with success, masking or disregarding Lille and the frontier fortresses. But the political state of France gave Wellington a greater opportunity, and he had not an enemy force of 80,000 men behind his back. One objection to Marlborough's scheme, which the Dutch were certain to feel acutely, was the question what Vendôme might attempt if Marlborough left him behind in the Netherlands. It is indeed highly probable that he would have come racing after the Allies to save Paris, and in that case they might have brought him again to battle, which above all else they desired.

The second objection to an invasion of France was the problem of provisions. Such an advance made by a great army, with no proper base of supply, and with the enemy's chief force left behind on the line of communication, was clean contrary to all the rules of war as then recognised. No doubt it would have been hazardous. But it would not have been as foolish as the blind plunge of Charles XII across the Russian forests that year, for Marlborough trusted to establishing new communications through the Channel ports with England as his supply base; and meanwhile he looked to the rich lands of Artois and Picardy to feed his men, as the invaded lands often fed Napoleon's armies on like errands. Already before the end of July 'all the hussars were ravaging into the heart of Picardy,' having been sent thither 'to play the devil for twice twenty-four

* The design is by itself enough to destroy the ridiculous charge brought against Marlborough by the Dutch Deputy, Goslinga, and by some of the more malignant English Tories, that he was seeking to protract the war indefinitely for his own ambition and avarice. He may have been—I myself think that he was—unduly stubborn not to make peace except on such terms as only complete victory could have secured. But complete victory, at the earliest possible moment, was his aim from first to last, as his every action and every letter indicate.

hours.' France was beginning to feel and to feed her invaders, and could be made to do so on an ever more extensive scale.

But Eugene could not rise to quite so bold a flight. His veto on an immediate invasion of France, which Marlborough accepted with quiet good-temper, prevented the question from being even propounded to the Dutch. On July 26, 1708, the Duke announced to Godolphin the all-important decision, in his usual calm and unemphatic way of recording things as they are :

> I have acquainted Prince Eugene with the earnest desire we have for our marching into France. He thinks it impracticable, till we have Lille for a *place d'armes* and magazine. And then he thinks we may make a great inroad, but not be able to winter, though we might be helped by our fleet, unless we were masters of some fortified town.

The same day he wrote to Halifax :

> Your notion of entering France agrees very well with my own inclinations, and were our army all composed of English, the project would certainly be feasible, but we have a great many among us who are more afraid of wanting provisions than of the enemy.

If he had been in complete command of his own army, as were Cæsar, Cromwell and Napoleon, he would have done on this occasion as Cæsar, Cromwell and Napoleon would have done, and as he himself had done when he marched to the Danube, shifting his base and communications as he went. If Eugene had heartily agreed, it is possible that Dutch opposition could have been overcome and the Allies would have advanced into France without first besieging Lille.[231] What then would have happened, no one can pretend to tell.*

So, instead of the march on Paris, began the famous siege of Lille, one of the chief cities of France and the strongest fortress in Europe, defended by 16,000 French

* If anyone's opinion on the subject is worth hearing, it is Lord Wolseley's. Shortly after he had been engaged in the study of Marlborough's life he talked to me one day about it, and I took notes of what he said. He was strongly of the opinion that Marlborough would have got to Paris after Oudenarde if Eugene had agreed to the attempt.

under the experienced and courageous Marshal Boufflers, assisted from without by the two armies of Vendôme and Berwick, amounting together to 100,000 men, the main body of them lying right across the proper communications of the besiegers. It was a task in some respects more difficult than the invasion of France would have been. If no one but Marlborough would have dreamt of invading France, no one but Marlborough and Eugene would have dreamt of besieging Lille under such conditions. It was by far the greatest operation yet undertaken in the war ; it lasted four months and all the other incidents of the great campaign were subsidiary to it.

The first thing was to bring up the siege train from Holland. The usual waterways were blocked by the enemy's occupation of Ghent, and the cannon could only be sent from Holland by boat as far as Brussels. The roads of Belgium were very different then from what they are now, and to take a heavy siege train any distance overland was regarded as almost impossible. But, in the circumstances, it was necessary to traverse seventy odd miles of road from Brussels to Lille ; 16,000 horses dragged the 100 great siege guns, 60 mortars and 3,000 waggons laboriously across the land, ' under the nose of an army of eighty-thousand men,' as Feuquières the French military critic complained, ' which might have been assembled to stop this prodigious convoy, stretching over at least fifteen miles of road.' But such was the fear established by Oudenarde, that rather than risk an encounter, Vendôme allowed the clumsy cortège to arrive at its destination. By the middle of August the siege of Lille had fairly begun.

Eugene conducted the siege and Marlborough the vast covering operations ; both tasks were in the highest degree difficult. The fear that the Allies had established among their foes in the field had found no place among the garrison of Lille, and the arts of defence were practised to perfection in that superb fortress by Boufflers and his engineers. The attacks were by no means all of them successful. The mined breaches, the ' hellish invention of throwing bombs, boiling pitch, tar,' and all the casual slaughter of ' this murdering siege ' cost more lives than the

Allied commanders had reckoned to lose—in the end five times as many as their losses at Oudenarde. But, contrary to the expectations of the French, the siege went on, the supplies continued, though with great difficulty, to be brought up, and Marlborough's protecting guard could nowhere be pierced. The letters exchanged between King Louis, Chamillart, Burgundy, Vendôme and Berwick display them at once agitated and planless in face of a situation full of great opportunities that they were unable to grasp. For they could not trust their troops to face the Allies in battle, and were, therefore, powerless spectators of a drama in which the world expected them to be chief actors. The moral situation created by Oudenarde still overruled the strategic.

Not more than five British battalions took part in the actual siege under Eugene, but they lost 1,600 men,* over a third of their number. The total Allied loss before Lille was twelve to fifteen thousand. The great body of the English had been kept by Marlborough for his own service in the lines of contravallation which he held against the relieving armies, and in the vital work of convoying the supplies through the zone of French activity.[232]

Towards the end of September the siege reached a dangerous crisis. Eugene had been wounded and Marlborough, though in very poor health, had for a time to take over the siege itself as well as the covering operations. It was just as well that he did, for he writes to Godolphin :

> Upon the wounding of Prince Eugene, I thought it absolutely necessary to inform myself of everything of the siege ; for before I did not meddle in anything but the covering of it. Upon examination I find that the engineers did not deal well with the Prince, for when I told him that there did not remain powder and ball for above four days, he was very much surprised. I own to you that I fear we have something more in our misfortunes than ignorance. Our circumstances being thus, and the impossibility of getting a convoy from Brussels, obliged me to take measures for getting some ammunition from Ostend, which we could never have attempted but for the good luck of the eight English battalions there.

The French had closed the route from Brussels by which the besiegers had at first been supplied from Holland. But

* *Millner*, p. 249.

Ostend, the direct sea route from England, made good the deficiency. It would indeed be a shorter line of communications if it could once be established. But the crisis in the last days of September was acute. If the train of ammunition then on its way from Ostend had been intercepted, the siege must have been raised at once.

The convoy on which the success of the campaign depended was under the immediate protection of Major-General Webb and 6000 infantry. He had no artillery and practically no cavalry—150 sabres. He was attacked by General La Motte with a force of all three arms, amounting to 12,000 men. The disparity between the two forces was more than the difference in numbers of two to one, for it was all three arms against infantry alone. Webb, undismayed, sent the convoy on its way and occupied a passage through woods at Wynendael, placing an ambush in the brushwood on either side of the enemy's approach to his front line. La Motte's artillery, unanswered, bombarded the recumbent allied infantry all afternoon without shaking their nerve ; as the shades of evening began to fall, the French horse and foot delivered their attack. The double crossfire of the ambush surprised them, and they were repelled after a stiff fight, in which Webb lost nearly a thousand killed and wounded, and La Motte many more. The French officers were unable to induce their men to march again to the assault, in spite of the difference in strength. The moral superiority of the Allies was emphasised even more than at Ramillies or Oudenarde. The French Generals and writers fully admitted that their men had behaved ill. In Holland the cry was that the Deputies should never again prevent Marlborough attacking whenever he wished, for no one could resist his troops. Not more than two or three British battalions had been present among Webb's band of brothers, but Dutch, Hanoverians and Prussians had all fought in Wynendael wood as became 'Marlborough's men.'

Sept. 28 (N.S.) 1708

But the hero of the day was Webb himself. Cadogan had been in general charge of the arrangements for the passage of the convoy, and had done well in that capacity, but he had only arrived at Wynendael with reinforcements

after the battle had been won. Unfortunately the first news in the *London Gazette* spoke of Cadogan and not of Webb. The error was speedily corrected in later issues, but the harm had been done. It was said that Marlborough was jealous of a rival. The Tories took up the cry, and Webb, a fine, honest soldier but not without vanity, allowed himself to conceive a permanent grievance and to become the puppet of our factious politicians. *Esmond* has immortalized his legend. Yet, as early as September 29, Marlborough had written to him :

> Mr. Cadogan has just now arrived and has acquainted me with the success of the action you had yesterday in the afternoon against the body of troops commanded by M. de la Motte at Wynendael, which must be attributed chiefly to your conduct and resolution. You may assure yourself I shall do you justice at home.

The same day the Duke wrote to Sunderland ascribing the victory to Webb and not even mentioning Cadogan.* And he continued to urge the Queen to promote Webb to Lieutenant-General, as she did in the following winter. On December 13 the Whig House of Commons unanimously voted thanks to Webb 'for the great and eminent services performed by him at Wynendael,' but in the debate the Tory speakers sneered at Marlborough. The mischief was afoot and it became an article of faith in some Tory quarters that the Duke had been bribed by the French to allow Webb's convoy to be cut to pieces by a superior force, so as to have an excuse for raising the siege of Lille.[233]

If Marlborough had been in search of reasons to rise up from before Lille, he had plenty to hand without treating Webb as David treated Uriah the Hittite. The next move of the French was to cut the dykes and swamp a great area round Ostend, rendering land passage for supplies impossible for some miles. Cadogan fitted out a fleet of flat-bottomed boats which 'is troublesome, but will do,' as Lord Stair wrote. Then the French

October 1708

* But on September 21 (O.S. October 2, N.S.) Sunderland writes to Marlborough of 'the news of Major General *Cadogan* having defeated M. la Motte's party'; this was before Sunderland received Marlborough's letter of September 29 (N.S.), as his next letter (September 24, O.S.) shows. *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers* (1881), p. 33.

let in more water, deep enough to float galleys which they launched on the flooded meadows to waylay the allied flotilla. The besiegers of Lille would have been starved, had they not been able to recoup themselves by raids into Artois at the expense of the French peasantry. Even so they went hungry, and it was none too soon for them when on October 22 Boufflers surrendered the great city and retired into the Citadel of Lille.[234]

It was November, well past the usual time for going into winter quarters, but Marlborough and Eugene would not relax the hold upon their prey. Vendôme made a last effort. He marched on Brussels, hoping to draw the Allies away from Lille to its relief. But when the French appeared before Brussels, it was not betrayed from within as Ghent and Bruges had been betrayed. Marlborough, by a great effort of strategy on his own part and by forced marches on the part of the English Guards, came to its rescue just in time, while Eugene still battered the Citadel of Lille.*

Nov. 28 1708

On December the 9th Boufflers surrendered the Citadel. Lille had fallen.

Yet even now, though winter had come, Marlborough was not content till Ghent and Bruges had been recovered, for 'without them,' as he wrote, 'we can neither be quiet in our winter quarters or open with advantage the next campaign.' His army, which had never forgiven the French for taking these two towns 'by treachery,' was prepared to keep the field in the bitter Christmas weather, contrary to all the customs of war, in order to recover them. Vendôme, for his part, wished to remain with a portion of the Grand Army behind the Canal all winter, to save Bruges and Ghent ; but Louis, advised by the jealous Burgundy, called him home and bade leave the two towns to be defended by their garrisons under the incompetent La Motte.[235]

When Marlborough drew near, the dykes and moats were thick with ice over which his troops could march.

* Pious Colonel Blackader, recording a day of thanksgiving for the 'relieving of Brussels' (date given wrong in *Blackader*, p. 335), notes 'The Duke never fails to give thanks after victory and success. But these things are mocked and ridiculed in our army.' 'Atheists,' he finds, 'despond most.'

The resistance made was poor and half-hearted. Round about the New Year of 1709 he crowned the longest and perhaps the greatest of all his campaigns by the recovery of Ghent and Bruges. The fickle citizens of Ghent cheered him obsequiously and illuminated their town in his honour, and though the troops 'believed this joy to be fictitious,' the Duke prudently accepted it at its face value. 'This campaign,' he wrote to Godolphin, 'is now ended to my own heart's desire.' [236]

In January 1709 the military situation, which had not been so bad for France twelve months back, had turned against her once more. Her economic condition for some years past had been terrible. And now came on a winter that killed her vines and froze her seed-corn in the earth. The fierce cold fixed its jaws upon warring Europe, destroying the strength of Charles of Sweden's army, lost in the Russian forests, and killing the starved French peasants in their hovels. Even the Grand Monarch felt pity for his people and was ready to cast off his pride and become a suppliant for peace. The time had come for the Allies to make up their minds what terms they would exact.

In September another success had attended the arms of Queen Anne, more easily achieved than the capture of Lille, but of no less consequence for the future of Britain. Port Mahon, in the island of Minorca, had been taken. Its deep, long, land-locked harbour, just not too narrow for the largest ships of the sailing era, enabled our war-fleets to winter and repair there as they could not in the more open roadstead of Gibraltar. Mahon, from its island situation, was as impregnable as the Rock itself, so long as England held the sea. 'And, could we keep it in time of peace,' wrote Lord Raby, ''twould be better than Tangier ever could have been to serve our Turkey trade.'* It used to be a saying in those latitudes that 'June, July, August and Port Mahon are the three best harbours in the Mediterranean.'† With Gibraltar, it made England mistress of

* Raby to Robinson, October 30, 1708, *Add. MSS.* 22198, f. 99.

† 'Junio, Julio, Agusto y Puerto Mahon
Los mejores puertos del Mediterraneo son.'

the inland sea in the Eighteenth Century, as Malta in the Nineteenth.

It was not by chance that Minorca fell into our hands. In 1708 all the advantages which its possession would bring to England were fully understood by Marlborough, Leake, Stanhope and Sunderland, the Secretary of State in charge of our affairs in Southern Europe. It was a commonplace in their correspondence that since Toulon had not been taken, it was essential to have a harbour where a squadron could winter near at hand to watch the relics of the Toulon fleet, and that such a harbour could be found to perfection in Port Mahon. It was indicated alike by the needs of the moment and the hopes of the more distant future. After the failure of 1707, the war on the east coast of Spain could only be carried on if the English ships could winter in close proximity. For this reason 'Charles III' urged his Allies to occupy for him his island of Minorca, as could so easily be done from the bases of Barcelona and Majorca already in their hands. The Englishmen agreed with the 'King of Spain's' arguments, secretly determining that Port Mahon should remain not in his hands but in England's, when the war was over.

In June 1708 the Council of the Admiralty reported that the fleet ought to winter in the Mediterranean and that Port Mahon was the place required for the purpose; and Sunderland on the 25th wrote to Marlborough, 'Indeed I believe they are right, that it can be with no safety but at Port Mahon.' Thereupon, two days after Oudenarde, Marlborough wrote to Admiral Leake in the Mediterranean the model of what a soldier's and statesman's letter to a sailor should be:

> You have the copy of the letter from the Admiralty to the Earl of Sunderland about the wintering of the squadron in the Mediterranean. I send it only for your information, . . . for it is certain our sea-officers are the best judges of what may be done with safety in this case.

And then came a postcript, written in the Duke's own hand:

> I am so entirely convinced that nothing can be done effectually without the fleet, that I conjure you if possible to take Port Mahon.

Thus, while leaving freedom of choice to the Admiral on the spot, the Duke indicated as strongly as possible his own opinion that Minorca should be taken at once.[237]

Early in August Leake was occupied in reducing the island of Sardinia to the obedience of Charles III, thereby scoring an important point for the Allies in the coming peace negotiations. Its capital town of Cagliari surrendered to the English fleet after a short bombardment, though one of our Captains described it as 'a City much stronger than Barcelona.' Leake himself wrote of it that 'five or six hundred might defend it against an army of 20,000.'[238]

Aug. 13 (N.S.) 1708

Leake then turned his attention to the Pope, whom he had Sunderland's orders to call to account. He addressed to Clement XI a letter in the following terms:

> Holy Father,—My royal mistress, the Queen of Great Britain, being assuredly informed that your Holiness did not only promote and encourage the late intended invasion of Her Majesty's dominions by the pretended Prince of Wales, assisted by the French, but also advanced a considerable sum of money for that end, and in the most public and insolent manner ordered prayers in the Churches of Rome for the success of the expedition. . . . Her Majesty has commanded me to demand of your Holiness the sum of four hundred thousand crowns, and to acquaint Your Holiness that, if this demand is not instantly complied with, your country will be put under military execution. . . .
>
> I am, Holy Father,
> Your Holiness's most, etc.,
> J. LEAKE.

The Admiral was preparing to follow up this missive by an attack on the Papal port of Civita Vecchia, when a felucca arrived in the fleet, bringing dispatches from Barcelona, in which General Stanhope and King Charles III besought Leake to co-operate with them at once in the seizure of Port Mahon. At a council of war Leake and his Captains wisely determined not to let slip the moment when allied soldiers from Spain were available for a purpose so dear to the heart of the senior service. The Pope was left to think over his future conduct in relation to the mistress of the

seas, and Leake and Stanhope brought their combined forces to the reduction of Minorca.

Again, as on so many other occasions in the War of the Spanish Succession, the co-operation of army and navy was admirable. The problem was the reduction of Fort St. Philip, about two miles from the town of Mahon, commanding the narrow entrance of the envied harbour. First of all Stanhope landed with a small party at some distance from Fort St. Philip, and marched up to the town of Mahon, where he was welcomed by the inhabitants. Philip V had deprived them of their ancient privileges, and the Minorcans were Carlists to a man. They even raised a few militia who aided the Allies in the subsequent operations. The fleet sent ships round the island and reduced with little loss the other two places of importance, Civadella and Fornelles, the latter being a fort commanding a harbour second only in excellence to Mahon itself.*

Sept. 14 1708

But all was of no avail unless they could reduce Fort St. Philip, with its hundred cannon and its garrison of 500 French and 500 Spanish troops. Stanhope commanded about 2000 soldiers, some half of them English, and 500 English marines lent by the navy. Leake himself had sailed home, having made every arrangement that Stanhope could desire, and leaving a squadron, chiefly English and partly Dutch, under Admiral Sir Edward Whittaker to co-operate in the reduction of the island.†

The first operation of any real difficulty was the landing of the siege guns. Before the British occupation of the island there were practically no roads; the first of any pretension was constructed a few years later by General Kane, the 'roadmaker' of Minorca. The ground near Port Mahon was hilly and covered with rocks and brushwood, making it altogether unfit for the transport of cannon. It was therefore necessary to shorten the distance by landing them as

* After the reduction of Minorca, Stanhope wrote to Sunderland: 'I hope the want of Ports will no longer be an objection to wintering a squadron here, Her Majesty being now Mistress of the two best Ports in the Mediterranean, this [Mahon] and Fornelles in the same island.' *Byng Papers*, II, p. 301.

† Stanhope was not generous in his account of the naval co-operation, as emerges from *Leake* (*q.v.*). Mr. Basil Williams in his *Stanhope*, p. 78, holds the balance even.

near as possible to Fort St. Philip, and this was a delicate operation. The first attempt was prevented by fire from the fort, so that 'we were forced to remove our landing to a cove further off, from whence we immediately made a very good road for the cannon.'* This indispensable work of disembarking forty-two cannon and fifteen mortars, transporting them over difficult country and mounting them in the batteries, was principally done by the sailors.

At length, some ten days after Stanhope had first set foot on the island, his batteries were ready, having been erected by arduous labour under a severe fire. The outer works of Fort St. Philip consisted of a dry-stone wall, some nine feet high, with four towers on it each carrying cannon. The British bombardment began, breaches were made, and the cannon in the towers were silenced or dismounted—but not before the death of Stanhope's well-loved brother Philip, Captain of the Milford galley, had saddened his comrades. He had 'been very instrumental in engaging the seamen in this enterprise,' as his brother reported. He had gone up to the enemy's wall, and made two of his sailors hold him up so that he could look over it, where a shot in his forehead ended a promising career and struck grief into all the camp.

Sept. 23 1708

Brigadier Wade, afterwards the roadmaker of the Highlands, commanded the right of the besiegers. Some of his Grenadiers, without waiting for orders, rushed forward to seize the battered wall, and it was thought fit to support them with the rest of the army. Stanhope rode his horse over the breach, under a hot fire. The whole outwork was captured, together with the small town that lay between it and the Citadel of Fort St. Philip. The Citadel would still have been hard to take, for it was well stored with food and ammunition. But its commandant, La Jonquière, surrendered to Stanhope's threats of the slaughter that would result from further resistance, and his offer of good terms of capitulation. The presence in the Fort of a large number

* See the excellent account by Stanhope's aide-de-camp, John Cope, afterwards the 'Johnnie Cope' of Preston Pans, in the somewhat mutilated letter *Add. MSS.* 22231, f. 78. It was near the point where the guns were landed that the 'First Camp' was formed, as marked in the contemporary map. (*Map VIII, opposite.*)


Maon
Sheal
2 Camp
The Attacque of fort S.t Phillip Described
A. Fort Phillip
B. Fort Charles
C. Fort Phillipet
D. 4 Towers Covering the Lines
F. Battery of 17 Guns
F. 10. Guns
G. 9. Guns
H. New Battery for 8 Guns
1 & 11. The 1.st & 2.d Battalion of Harrison's
2. & 10. Marines
3. & 12. Portugeze
4 & 9. Spaniards
5 & 8. Neapolitans
13.
6. Spanish Horse
7. English Horse
Scale of eight Furlongs or one Mile

THE CAPTURE OF FORT ST. PHILIP, PORT MAHON, MINORCA, 1708.

(*From a contemporary map at Boughton, by kind permission of the Duke of Buccleugh.*)

near as possible to Fort St. Philip, and this was a delicate operation. The first attempt was prevented by fire from the fort, so that 'we were forced to remove our landing to a cove further off, from whence we immediately made a very good road for the cannon.' * This indispensable work of disembarking forty-two cannon and fifteen mortars, transporting them over difficult country and mounting them in the batteries, was principally done by the sailors.

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MAP VIII



THE CAPTURE OF FORT ST. PHILIP, PORT MAHON, MINORCA, 1708.

(From a contemporary map at Boughton, by kind permission of the Duke of Buccleuch.)

of wives and children of the Spanish garrison is thought to have weakened the wish for further hostilities. When La Jonquière returned to France he was tried and sent to prison.[239]

Thus on the last day of September 1708 the Union Jack waved undisputed over the whole island of Minorca, not to be hauled down for half a century, when the son of Queen Anne's Admiral Byng paid so dear a penalty for its loss.

As the tidings spread through Europe that England had taken Port Mahon, men knew that she had come to stay in the Mediterranean, no longer as a yearly visitor but as a resident with a house of her own. The permanent presence of an English squadron with a base between Italy and Spain had many consequences. The first was to 'terrify the Italian Princes and States from engaging in the Pope's quarrel,' as Sunderland wrote. It helped indeed to frustrate the endeavours that King Louis was making to build up again a French party in Venice, Tuscany and Genoa under the leadership of the Pope, in defiance of the Austrian armies in Naples and Milan. Clement XI, Francophile as he was, had no wish to receive the postponed visit of the English fleet ; and he was put under even stronger pressure from the occupation of the northern part of the Papal States by an Imperialist army and the threat of its advance on Rome. With bitter reluctance he abandoned the French alliance that lay so near his heart, and in January 1709 recognised Charles as King of Spain, a great point gained for the Allies in the approaching peace conference. Admiral Whittaker, who had been preparing to attack Civita Vecchia, was told to desist, as the Pope had changed sides. Henceforth, instead of fomenting French invasions of Great Britain, Clement joined with Austria in perfectly proper remonstrances to the British Ministers against the treatment of the Roman Catholics in Ireland, with which Vienna was wont to counter English complaints about the treatment of Silesian and Hungarian Protestants.[240]

The Minorca question added fresh fuel to the discords of the Allies. The English were determined to keep it for

themselves, and Stanhope, the man on the spot, was the most determined of all. He was a soldier-statesman of strong will, as the features of his countenance betokened, and of a very pure zeal for his country's interests. He saw the full importance to England of Port Mahon, in peace and in war, and wrote home constantly urging that money should be spent on making it impregnable, and unselfishly offering to 'stay and live there himself three or four years to put it in order.' 'All our seamen,' he wrote, 'agree that it is in all respects the most convenient harbour in Europe.' No wonder that, when in the next reign he was made a Peer, he took the title of Lord Mahon.

But even Stanhope felt obliged, in the first instance, to name a Spanish Governor of the Island to act for Charles III. He was careful, however, to leave none but English soldiers and marines in Fort St. Philip, and to instruct their commander to take no orders save from British authorities. He then turned his attention to securing from Charles III the formal cession of Minorca to Great Britain. In that he was supported by Marlborough and Sunderland, though they were more alive than he to the diplomatic difficulties, which presented themselves with even greater force to Godolphin.

In the first place the negotiation had to be concealed from the Dutch, who thought that the continued presence of the British in Port Mahon in time of peace would do a serious injury to their own rival trade interests in the Mediterranean. Vryberg, one of their leading diplomats, declared that 'Minorca in English hands would be as hazardous to the Republic as Ostend.' Under these circumstances at the Hague, Stanhope's work at Barcelona of extorting Minorca from Charles III had to be conducted in secret. Charles for his part was most unwilling to render himself odious to his potential Spanish subjects by giving away such a jewel of the Crown. But the hold the English had over him was very strong. He was deeply in their debt for subsidies which he could never hope to repay, and if they withdrew support he could not carry on the war in Spain a single month. For the Dutch were weary of it and were reducing their quota of men, money and ships.

Already Charles had been compelled in January 1708 to make a secret treaty with Britain, consigning to her the trade with Spanish America when the war was over. An Anglo-Spanish company was to be formed to enjoy the monopoly. That, too, was an ugly secret kept back from the Dutch.

So, when Stanhope pressed Charles to cede Minorca, making it the condition of further British support in the Peninsular War, he dared not refuse point blank, but by evasions, promises and compromises kept the negotiations spinning out through the whole year 1709. In the autumn Heinsius got wind of it, and was helped by the knowledge to extort better terms in his famous Barrier Treaty which he was then making with the English Government.

Meanwhile the French had intercepted dispatches which revealed Stanhope's harsh pressure on Charles to obtain Minorca. In January 1710 they published the facts in Amsterdam with explosive results on all other negotiations then on foot. To appease the anger of the Dutch people, the British Ministers disingenuously threw over Stanhope, repudiating the negotiations for the cession of Minorca which they had officially authorised him to undertake. But, treaty or no treaty, Port Mahon remained in the power of the English garrison of Fort St. Philip, and the whole island was legally acquired at Utrecht, together with Gibraltar, the more easily because it was no longer Charles the ally but Philip the enemy who was acknowledged to be King of Spain.[241]

Meanwhile in the West Indies and off the Spanish Main the rival claims of King Philip and King Charles further confounded the confusion of those lawless and romantic coasts. The doubt as to who was king enabled Spanish colonists who saw their interest in trading with the English, to do so with some show of legality, and a brisk commerce sprang up under the cannon's mouth.* But

* In August 1708 we read: 'Some trading sloops came from the Spanish coast [to Jamaica] five or six days ago. And there are now going out to Porto Bell ten or twelve sloops under convoy of two men of warr, with the manufactures of Great Britain and the prize goods lately brought in here.' *C.S.P. Am.* (1708–9), p. 56.

the English privateers, who interpreted their commissions as giving them leave to rob all French and Spaniards indifferently, compromised the more peaceful efforts of those of their countrymen who were trying to establish a trade.

The power of the English flag in Spanish-American waters grew greater each year as the war went on, but rather by the increase of the privateers than of the Royal Navy. For in colonial waters, captains of men-of-war were not permitted to recruit as at home by means of the press-gang, although their crews were perpetually deserting to the easier and more lucrative life on board a privateer. Captains thus rendered shorthanded had orders to return to England. The natural lawlessness of the region that was the native home of the buccaneers was increased by this crippling of the Royal Navy for the benefit of privateers who were often half pirates. Even the avowed pirates were active and formidable enough to negotiate with both belligerents; though commanded by a Frenchman, the ruffians scorned the proffered French alliance and sought the protection of Queen Anne.[242]

In the last days of May 1708 occurred Admiral Wager's action against the Spanish treasure-galleons from Porto Bello—the most celebrated event of the whole war in those regions, with the possible exception of Benbow's action.* In both cases the commanders of the other English ships deserted their Admiral, leaving him to fight an heroic battle almost single-handed against the enemy squadron. But Wager was more fortunate than Benbow. Though the odds against him were great they were not, as against his predecessor, utterly impossible, and his own and his crew's courage won him a victory which made him famous and rich for the rest of his long life.

The wealth of the South American mines, that was to have put King Louis and King Philip on their feet again for another year of war, lay stored chiefly in the hold of the enemy admiral's galleon of sixty-four guns, in bars and pieces of eight to the value of several million sterling, variously computed. In a midnight battle Wager's flagship, the *Expedition* of seventy guns, was firing broadsides into her at pistol-range

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 252–254.

when the great treasure-ship blew up, almost sinking the *Expedition* and scorching her men with burning planks and timbers. The great galleon 'sunk immediately, with all her riches, which must have been very great,' and seven hundred soldiers and seamen besides. Salvage was impossible and Wager at once attached himself to the second great galleon, and after three hours' fighting captured her with a smaller quantity of treasure. A third galleon escaped into Carthagena. A fourth, of forty guns, was chased ashore, where the Spaniards blew her up. All the serious fighting against the squadron of fourteen enemy sail had been done by Wager's *Expedition*. The captains of the two recalcitrant English men-of-war were afterwards court-martialled and broke, though many thought they should have been shot like those who had deserted Benbow.

The wealth captured was great; the wealth destroyed was enormous. 'This must in all probability,' wrote Sunderland to Marlborough, 'prove a fatal blow to France, for I believe this was one of their last resources for carrying on the war.' It can be imagined how the news stirred the greed and imagination of our forefathers. As the visitor enters Westminster Abbey by the north door, he will see, hard on his right, overlooked by Chatham from his monument, the tomb of Admiral Wager, whereon a bas-relief records in marble the forms of those old ships, battling for the treasure in the tropic midnight, at the moment when the great galleon bursts asunder in flame and smoke, and disappears from before the startled eyes of its English enemies.[243]

Whether in the Mediterranean or off the Spanish Main or in home waters, the triumph of England at sea had been made manifest in 1708. The shipowners no longer, as in the last winter session, complained to Parliament that they were insufficiently protected. This year 'the merchants were better served with convoys and no considerable losses were sustained.' At sea, as on land, the enemy's strength was giving out.[244]

CHAPTER XIX

The Failure to make Peace

The Queen, Sunderland and his kinsmen. Tory reunion and the question of Peace. Death of the Prince Consort. The Junto gains possession. The new Parliament meets, winter 1708–9. The Scottish Treason Bill. The Third Secretary of State. The Great Frost of 1709. Negotiations for peace. Marlborough and Berwick. Torcy at the Hague. The 'Preliminary Articles' of May 1709. Causes and consequences of the failure to make peace. The era of Party Government in Great Britain.

The Whigs had forced Harley out of office at the beginning of 1708 and had won the General Election in May,* but even in the autumn they were not yet admitted to the innermost counsels of Queen Anne and her two chief servants. The Lords of the Junto were an external power with whom Godolphin and Marlborough had at every important step to come to terms, but they were not the government itself. It is true that Sunderland was Secretary of State, but, as he constantly complained, his influence was not paramount. He was closely related by marriage to the Churchills and through them to the Lord Treasurer, but as a statesman he thought more of party than of family, and he was more faithful to his colleagues of the Junto than to his colleagues of the Cabinet. Throughout the year of Oudenarde he spoke of the political conduct of his two kinsmen with more suspicion and bitterness than the gay Wharton or the prudent Somers. In October he wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, a less fiery Whig than himself, that it was impossible for the party—

> with any reputation to themselves, or safety to the publick, to go on any longer with the Court, upon the foot things are at present, for that if one looks round every part of the administration, the management of the fleet, the Condition of Ireland, the Proceedings in Scotland, the management of the late Invasion, the disposall of Church Preferments, etc.; they are all of a Piece, as much Tory, and as wrong, as if Ld. Rochester and Ld. Nottingham were at the head of every thing, under the disguise of some Considerable wigs, in some considerable places, but with so little creditt or to so little purpose, that they can neither obtain any right thing to be done, nor prevent any wrong one.

* See pp. 328, 349 above.

This is the language of exaggeration, more befitting an Opposition orator than a Secretary of State. No wonder Queen Anne disliked Sunderland. In June she had demanded his dismissal, because he had acted in avowed opposition to the Government of which he was a member, in forming a separate party against his Cabinet colleagues in the Scottish elections :*

> I cannot but still resent this usage [she wrote to Godolphin]; though I have not yet taken the seals from him. I cannot forbear putting you in mind of the promise you made to me when I first took this person into my service, which was that if he did anything I did not like, you would bring him to make his leg and take his leave.

But Sunderland's relations, however little pleased by his public conduct, were in no position to dismiss him. They understood, and tried in their letters to make the Queen understand, that after the Whig success in the General Election there must needs be not fewer but more Whigs in the Cabinet. Only they were willing to put off that evil day so long as they could, in other words till the meeting of the newly elected Parliament in November 1708.[245]

The Queen, secretly receiving Harley's advice through Abigail Masham,† was every month more deeply alienated from Sarah; but she remained during the summer of Oudenarde on tolerable epistolary terms with Marlborough. In her letters to him she still asserted that her aim was independence of both Whigs and Tories :

> The parties are such bug-beares that I dare not venture to write my mind freely of either of them without a cypher for fear of any accident. I pray God keep me out of the hands of both of them.[246]

Her prayer was not to be answered.

* See p. 348 above.

† See p. 329 above.

Meanwhile a rumour was afloat in political circles that Marlborough intended to cut out the Whigs in the favour of the House of Hanover, particularly with the young Electoral Prince who had served under him with such distinction at Oudenarde. Harley was informed, with what truth it is hard to say, that :

> The Duke will next winter bring him or his grandmother [Dowager Electress Sophia] over hither, in such manner that they shall have the obligation neither to Whigs or Tories, but entirely to himself and Lord Treasurer. . . . The Whigs are much alarmed and swear the Duke shall not run away with the credit of so popular a thing.

The Whigs, it was said, intended to get in before Marlborough and Godolphin, by themselves moving, next session, that the Electoral Prince be invited to visit the country. Lord Haversham had the face to go to Anne and complain that the Whigs intended to advocate the very policy which he and his High Tory friends had formerly proposed at the price of losing her royal favour.* Thus warned, the Queen repeated her objection to a visit from any member of the Hanover family with such bitter emphasis that both Marlborough and the Whigs abandoned the plan, if in fact they had ever entertained it. In October 1708, therefore, the Tories were able to flatter themselves with the belief that :

> There are great discontents at Hanover. That Court is exceedingly dissatisfied with our two Kings,† who now again are grown very cold towards them, and say nothing more of the invitation upon which they were so hot last spring.

Meanwhile Sunderland continued sourly to suspect his two kinsmen of meditating a Jacobite restoration on the Queen's death, though it is probable that their thoughts were then less inclining to St. Germains than on various other occasions, both before and after.[247]

The Tories, on the other hand, accused the Duke of aiming at sovereignty himself, and muttered of 'Cromwell.'

* Pp. 91–92 above.

† At this time 'The two Kings of Brentford' was a cant phrase for Marlborough and Godolphin.

A friend wrote to Harley :

> History furnishes many examples of men who from the command of less force [than Marlborough's army] have aspired to sovereignty. But I believe there is no instance that ever any man who had tasted of absolute power could ever retire to a private life and become a good subject.[248]

Fear of the British general was already in the summer of 1708 operating as one among several reasons why the Tories were turning towards a policy of immediate peace and disarmament, even at the price of Spain.

Other circumstances were drawing the party in the same direction. The forced recruiting of the unemployed into the army was unpopular, and the proposals of the Government for a larger measure of conscription, denounced by all Tories and some Whigs as French militarism, failed to pass into law. The original objects of the war had been attained. War taxation was felt as an increasing hardship by the mass of the people. The national expenditure was more than twice what it had been in the years of peace and disarmament at the end of William's reign, and was soaring higher and higher as the operations of the war increased each year in magnitude, and as each year Britain's share of the burden became proportionally larger than that of her allies. The Land Tax could not be further increased without such a mutiny of squires as would sweep the Tories back into power. But the attempt to assess all incomes for a general Income Tax had failed, for want of a proper civil service machinery,* and Godolphin therefore had to go on increasing indirect taxation, much of which fell on the poor or on the ordinary middle classes, and made the war generally unpopular as a burden bearing heavily on all. The Treasurer's other expedient was borrowing through the Bank of England, with the loyal support of the rich City men who were mostly Whigs. Every year that the war went on increased the National Debt, and increased Godolphin's obligations to the Whigs and the monied interest.[249]

For these reasons even the more moderate Tory leaders were in 1708 veering round to a policy of peace. If Harley

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 292–293, on taxation; and pp. 218–219, on Recruiting Acts.

and St. John, the 'war Tories,' now demanded peace, it would be easy for them to recover the leadership of the High Tories who had always disliked the war. Every consideration, partisan and patriotic, was pushing them in that direction. Peace would now be a popular cry, and to stop the war would be to check the control exercised by the Whig monied interest over government. St. John in October wrote to Harley urging him to be reconciled to the High Tories, on these terms :

> What can redeem us from more than Egyptian bondage ? There is one person [Anne] who with a fiat resolutely pronounced might do it ; but when I recollect all I heard and saw last winter I despair of any salvation from thence. There is no hope, I am fully convinced, but in the Church of England party, nor in that neither . . . without more confidence than is yet re-established between them and us. Why do you not gain Bromley entirely ? . . . *You broke the party, unite it again.* . . . This hollow square will defend you who seem to be singled out for destruction.

And then again, on November 6, on the eve of the meeting of the new Parliament, he writes to Harley in anticipation of the measures likely to be proposed by the war ministry :

> That they should think of raising sixteen regiments more, and of mortgaging either land or malt, is to my apprehension downright infatuation and what I am glad of. They hasten things to a decision, and our slavery and their empire are put upon that issue. *For God's sake let us be once out of Spain !*

At last he had said it. The exigencies of party had driven St. John to pronounce the forbidden word of common sense which was to prove the 'open-sesame' for England and for Europe.[250]

As the time for the meeting of Parliament drew near, the Lords of the Whig Junto pressed their claims for fuller representation in the Cabinet and admission to the innermost counsels of government. Moderate Whigs, such as Newcastle and Devonshire, lent them their full support. The party had won the election in the summer and claimed power as a consequence. It might be a novel doctrine, but it was slowly and surely working its way into the theory of

the Constitution, because it was not to be resisted in practice. Marlborough and Godolphin, though they would in their hearts have preferred Anne's time-honoured principle that the servants of the Crown were above party, knew that if they did not appease the Whigs by giving office to their chiefs, supply would not be carried through the new House of Commons.

The Queen was all the harder to move because the Whigs demanded the substitution of the Earl of Pembroke for her beloved husband, Prince George, at the head of the Admiralty. The Prince Consort, though not himself a strong partisan,* was under the personal influence of Marlborough's brother, Admiral George Churchill, a hot Tory, and had at his instigation opposed the claims of Somers to office, and helped to foment his wife's prejudices against him. Marlborough, hoping to placate the Whigs without removing the Prince, told his brother to resign from the Board. But the Whigs were not satisfied and claimed that the Prince also must go. Their object was to give his post to Pembroke, in order that the two posts that Pembroke then held—the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland and the Presidency of the Council—might be given to Wharton and Somers respectively. To save her husband Anne might have surrendered on other points, but, just as the crisis was coming to a head, the Prince removed all difficulty by dying, a fortnight before Parliament was due to meet.

Oct. 28 1708

The disappearance from the scene of this dull and kindly man, who had neither used nor abused his position in England, made everything easy for a settlement. A new Lord High Admiral had to be chosen, and Pembroke, the most Whiggish of moderate Tories, was politically unobjectionable at the Admiralty. Nor was Queen Anne in a state any longer to resist the other Whig demands. For some weeks she was prostrate with grief, locking herself up in Prince George's room from the two women who were wrangling for her favour, each of whom tortured herself

* The Earl of Westmorland, who knew him well, declared he would, if he had lived, have used his influence with his wife against the High Tory reaction of 1710. *H.M.C. Westmorland*, p. 50.

with the belief that the other was secretly at their mistress's ear.* She had good reason to mourn. The death of her husband and the quarrel with Sarah had made a desert of her private affections. The mean-souled Abigail could be a servant and humble companion to Anne Stuart, but hardly a true friend.

Unable for some weeks to attend to business, Anne gave her indifferent consent to the new arrangements. The Lords of the Junto marched into the conquered citadel of power. Wharton was sent to govern Ireland, where Whig and Tory factions among the Protestants were growing as bitter as in England. Somers became Lord President of the Council, with an influence over great decisions, domestic and foreign, equal to that of Godolphin and Marlborough.

It was not long before Somers exerted over the Queen the personal charm of his wise and courteous speech. Hitherto she had only known him by the reports of his political rivals. He soon conquered her prejudices against him, as Peel, when Prime Minister, overcame the similar prejudices of Queen Victoria. Moreover Somers, alone of the Junto Lords, maintained excellent relations with Marlborough and Godolphin. What unity and stability the new Cabinet had, came from the good understanding of the new Lord President with the Treasurer and the General. Halifax and Sunderland never ceased to show their hostility and suspicion of all who had ever borne the name of Tory. Sarah was up in arms on behalf of her husband and her friend Godolphin. Before many weeks were out, she was writing to Marlborough in terms as abusive of the Whigs as any she had formerly found for the Tories. Since Marlborough also was deeply incensed by the personal attitude of his Whig colleagues, husband and wife at last saw eye to eye on domestic politics. That must have been a great consolation, for nothing else had ever divided them, and times were coming when the joint philosophy of husband and wife would be put to the test.

* 'When, upon the death of the Prince,' wrote Sarah (*Conduct*, pp. 222–223), 'one would have thought that her Majesty's real grief would have made her avoid every place and every object that might sensibly revive the remembrance of her loss, she chose for her place of retirement his closet and for some weeks spent many hours in it every day. . . . The true reason of her Majesty's chusing his closet to sit in, was that the back stairs belonging to it came from Mrs. Masham's lodging.'

On the other hand, Mrs. Masham wrote to Harley, eleven days after the Prince's death: 'Since the misfortune, the Lady Pye [Sarah] has hardly left her so long as to say her private prayers, but stays constantly with her. My lady's friends say it is fit she should, to keep that jade my cousin Kate [Mrs. Masham] away from her.' *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 511. I deduce that the poor Queen really shut herself up with her grief away from both these importunate comforters.

Even Somers failed to propitiate Sarah.

> I was a martyr upon his account [she long afterwards wrote], pressing the Queen so much to comply in that matter. And I remember just before I got him in, I met him upon the road as I was going to Windsor, and he did a thing very uncommon upon the sight of me. He stood up in his coach, when the custom was only bowing as one passes by. But after he was in possession of his employment he never made me but one visit, but employed himself wholly to worship Abigail.*

It is untrue that he paid any court to Abigail, at least until 1710, but it is possible that, owing to lack of encouragement, his visits to Sarah were few. At any rate the new Whig-Marlborough alliance, though consummated, had little in it of mutual affection. Its want of inward cohesion made it the more vulnerable to attempts from outside to divide it by intrigue or overthrow it by open attack.[251]

At the time of these Cabinet changes following on the death of the Prince, the Reverend Jonathan Swift was enjoying the privilege of interviews with the Whig chiefs. He was already a person with whom 'the great' liked to consort, though they did not yet perceive that his company could only be safely enjoyed upon his own terms. He was over from Ireland on one of his periodic missions on behalf of the interests of the Irish Church Establishment, to which he was heart and soul devoted against either Presbyterian or Papist. He wrote to Archbishop King at Dublin, describing the change in the English government and its possible effect upon his fortunes:

> There is a new world here. . . . Although I care not to mingle

* *Althorp MSS.*, the interesting letter of Sarah to Mr. Mallet, September 24, 1744, a month before her death. As she grew older, Sarah grew more 'impossible.' But she was always capable of generous friendship where there was not opposition. The account of her real kindness to Lady Hervey at this time (March 1709) is pleasant reading: 'so much tenderness that she would not have done or said more to any child she has.' *Hervey, L. B.*, Vol. I, pp. 240–241.

public affairs with the interest of so private a person as myself, yet upon such a revolution, not knowing how far my friends may endeavour to engage me in the service of the new government, I would beg your Grace to have favourable thoughts of me on such an occasion ; and to assure you that no prospect of making my fortune shall ever prevail on me to go against what becometh a man of conscience and truth, and an entire friend of the established Church.

Since he did not agree with the Whigs on ecclesiastical questions, he would prefer, rather than engage as pamphleteer to the new government, to go out as Queen's Secretary to Vienna. The Ministry, he declares, had promised him the post. If they had either held their promise or engaged him as pamphleteer on suitable terms, the history of English literature and politics might have been different. 'The author of the *Tale of a Tub* goes Queen's Secretary to Vienna,' Harley had been told. But it was not so. And the fact that Swift was thus in common parlance designated by his authorship of that unconventional defence of the *via media*, stood across the path of his chances of Church promotion under the pious and simple Queen. His time was not yet.[252]

Since the meeting of the new Whig Parliament synchronised with the entry of the Whig chiefs into office and power, the session was one of the easiest. At Westminster the Tories put up no serious resistance in either House, although in the country the unseen tides of opinion were noiselessly changing. The only heats of that session were not between Whig and Tory but between England and Scotland, anent the Treason Bill, which bore the question-begging title 'An Act for improving the Union of the Two Kingdoms.'

Nov. 1708–March 1709

The recent escape, in the Scottish courts of justice, of the Jacobite gentlemen of Stirlingshire * had aroused alarm in governmental and Whig circles. The English supposed that it resulted from some defect in the Scottish law of Treason, though in fact it had been caused by the temper of Scottish opinion. The new Government introduced into

* See pp. 347 and 349 above.

the new Parliament a Bill to have one law of Treason for the whole island, and that to be the English law. In a moment all Scotland, without distinction of party, was in a blaze of indignation. Every Scot in either House of Parliament, not excluding Queensberry, Argyle and Bishop Burnet, denounced a measure which seemed to infringe on the judicial separateness promised to Scotland in the Union Treaty. The opponents of that Treaty had always warned their countrymen that its interpretation would lie with the English, and so indeed it was proving. The Scots at first had the House of Commons with them against the Treason Bill, but the party tie and Government pressure eventually carried it through both Houses, with some slight modifications to placate Scottish opinion.

Whether the English or the old Scottish law of procedure in treason trials was the best on the balance is perhaps an open question. Each had strong and weak points. Marchmont, a former Scottish Lord Chancellor now in retirement from public life, wrote to Somers in the following July :

> I have ever been of opinion that the laws and trials relating to treason were safer in England than in Scotland. I mean that innocent persons were more safe and the guilty as obnoxious.

One memorable change was effected in Clause VIII of the new Treason Act, which declared :

> that no person accused of any capital offence or other crime in Scotland shall suffer or be subject or liable to any torture, except in the case of pressing to death as permitted by the English law in the case of persons indited for felony who refuse to plead.

The use of the 'boot' and the 'thumbikins,' already obsolete in practice, was thus forbidden by law.

But, whatever the merits or demerits of the Act in itself, the overriding of the unanimous opinion of Scotland by the English Whig majority at Westminster formed a precedent for the action of the English Tory majority a few years later in questions affecting the Kirk. The sum total of these proceedings, and the spirit of indifference to Scottish opinion that they revealed, very nearly caused the repeal of

the Union in the last years of Anne and was a principal cause of danger in the Rebellion of 1715.[253]

In May 1708 the Duke of Queensberry had been created Duke of Dover, so that he could sit in the House of Lords in his own right as a British Peer, not as an elected representative Peer of Scotland; and the same independence had been conferred on Argyle, as Earl of Greenwich. But Ministers paid no attention to the protest against the Treason Act of these, the two chief supporters of the Whig and Government interest in North Britain. By way of compensation, perhaps, a Third Secretaryship of State was created, principally to deal with the affairs of Scotland; and Godolphin, against the wishes of his Whig colleagues, named Queensberry the first holder of the office.* He became at once engaged in a quarrel with Sunderland for a proper share of the Secretaries' fees. Till Sunderland fell he was unsuccessful in his claim, but when in 1710 the Tory Government was formed, they secured Queensberry's adhesion by continuing him in the office, and attaching to it a full share of secretarial fees, together with charge of British relations to Russia and the Baltic Powers.[254]

Feb. 1709

While Parliament was sitting, Thames was freezing. The great cold began the night before Christmas Day, and by January 3, 1709, people were putting up tents on the river for an ice fair, where a few days later Swift 'ate gingerbread in a booth by a fire on the Thames.' Dear old Lady Wentworth † wrote to her brother:

> My ink is fros, and tho I writ with it as it comes boiling from the fire, it's white. If I might tell you all the stories are daily brought in of accidents accationed by the Great Frost I might fill sheets, as children drown upon the Thames, post-boys being brought in by their horses to their stages frose to their horses stone dead, and we are obliged to the horses for having our letters regular.

Marlborough, meanwhile, had retaken Ghent and Bruges by crossing the ice,‡ and some of his English correspondence was held up for weeks, because the messenger ships were frozen in to the port of Harwich. The staple of conversation of all classes in town and country was comparison with the well-remembered Great Frost of 1683–4,—since which how much had happened! The Great Frost of the Merry Monarch's day was voted to have been the kinder of the two. It had been shone upon by a bright sun, and followed by a dry summer and a good harvest. The Great Frost of 1709 was accompanied by dark clouds and comfortless cold; and went on, with intervals, for an interminable time, while cattle, sheep and birds perished. It was followed by prolonged rains, and a thin harvest that doubled the price of corn in England, and reduced France to starvation. In both countries these natural disasters stimulated the craving for peace by greatly increasing the miseries of war.[255]

It was during this cold February of 1709 that Epworth Rectory, with its thatched roof, was burnt down, for the second time in the Queen's reign, and the Reverend Samuel Wesley, stern and perplexed sire of that strong brood of sons and daughters, was once more houseless and well-nigh ruined. In the hurry of escape, his son John, then five years old, was almost forgotten, 'till I was taken out of the nursery window,' as he afterwards testified, 'by a man strangely standing on the shoulders of another, . . . a brand plucked out of the burning.' The history of religion sometimes turns on straws, no less than the history of war and politics.[256]

At the beginning of 1709 the war against France had been won. The soldier and sailor had done their part, and it was the golden moment for the statesmen to garner the gains. Louis was beaten to his knees and was ready to buy peace at almost any price. But the Allies failed to seize their opportunity, because Austria, Holland and England equally misunderstood the situation in one important respect. They thought there was only one war, against Louis, and that they were its victors. But there were in fact two wars: the great war against France which they had won, and the lesser war against Spain which they had lost. The net result of

* See *Blenheim*, p. 290, on the two other Secretaries of State (Northern and Southern). See Appendix B, p. 410 below, list of offices and their holders.

† See p. 313 above.

‡ See pp. 373–374 above.

five years' fighting in the Peninsula had been to attach the Spanish people to Philip V, no longer as the French candidate but as the Spanish King. In 1702 Louis could have withdrawn his grandson from Spain by a word. At midsummer of 1706 he could still have said that word with effect. But in 1707, and still more in 1709, no orders from Versailles would have sufficed to make Philip abdicate, and all Europe could not compel the Spaniards to accept King Charles. The reason why the negotiations for European peace broke down in 1709 was that the Allies refused to admit these facts, and still insisted, several years after it had ceased to be possible, in trying to dispose of the throne of Spain by a treaty with France alone. Louis knew he could not deliver the goods in that form, and he said so. The war was therefore allowed to proceed on its aimless, endless way, until a revolution in English politics placed in power the Tory party, whose chiefs had already, in November 1708, been privately writing to each other, ' For God's sake let us be once out of Spain ! ' *

During the years 1707 and 1708 there had been no serious negotiations for peace. But a certain neutral diplomat named Petkum, envoy of the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein at the Hague, had been keeping up an indirect correspondence between the Dutch and French statesmen as to possible terms. The chief interest of this correspondence is an expression of opinion by the Marquis of Torcy, Louis' able Foreign Minister who eventually negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht. As early as October 1707 he wrote to Petkum a letter which shows that he had already grasped the new situation in Spain, which the allied statesmen still declined to recognise more than two years later :

> As to there being no need to consider the views of Spain [wrote Torcy], I differ. So long as the war was carried on in Italy, France had a determining voice in the matter. But now the King of Spain is defending his kingdom by his own troops paid by himself, and I was speaking two days ago to a well informed man, who comes from Madrid, and who answered me that the King would rather die than give up Spain and the Indies.[257]

* See p. 388, above.

During the siege of Lille in 1708 Marlborough opened a secret peace correspondence on his own account with his nephew, the Duke of Berwick, Marshal of France. He always kept in friendly touch with his Jacobite nephew, partly, it may be supposed, to be sure of a powerful friend in case Berwick's half-brother, James, should ever chance to sit on the throne of Britain. The negotiation came to nothing, because the advisers of Louis were still hoping that Marlborough would fail to take the citadel of Lille or to recover Ghent and Bruges ; they therefore showed curiously little eagerness for peace that autumn, compared to their desperate pursuit of it in the following spring. Berwick, who at no time suffered from illusions as to the military situation, was vexed at the failure of Versailles to make the most of his uncle's offer, and declared that ' it was a chief cause of the aversion the Duke of Marlborough ever afterwards showed to the making of peace.'

Be that as it may, the interest of this abortive negotiation lies in the fact that it was initiated by Marlborough in person, desirous of procuring peace for Europe, though he failed so miserably next year to discover a method by which it could be attained. But most curious of all is a single sentence in Marlborough's initial letter to Berwick of October 30, 1708 :

> You may be sure that I shall be heartily in favour of peace, not doubting that I shall find the proof of goodwill [*l'amitié*] which was promised me two years ago by the Marquis d'Alègre.

It cannot be doubted that he refers to a transaction in the winter of 1705–6, when the Marquis d'Alègre had been instructed by Louis to offer him two million *livres* for peace, on terms which, however, he considered inadequate to England's interests.* The money which he had then refused as a bribe he was now fishing for as a *douceur*, which he saw no harm in accepting if he negotiated a peace on terms agreeable to Britain. His conduct, both before and after, shows that he had no intention of being bribed to betray his country's interests, but he hankered after the French gold with a cupidity that can only be partially

* See p. 60, note, above.

excused by the bad customs of the age in which he had been brought up.

When, in the following spring, Louis on his own account sought peace from the Allies at the Hague, he gave instructions that Marlborough should be offered four million *livres* if he could obtain Naples and Sicily for Philip as an inducement voluntarily to quit Spain. The Duke, though he again talked to Torcy significantly about the 'Marquis d'Alègre,' did not take the bribe. 'When I mentioned his private interests,' wrote Torcy, 'he blushed and seemed desirous of changing the topic of conversation.' He had good reason to blush. Behind the façade of his impenetrable reserve and godlike calm, strange debates were too often being held between his baser and his nobler self.[258]

It was early in November 1708 that Louis had rejected the proposal to negotiate made to him through Berwick. In a few weeks he had ample reason to repent. The fall of the citadel of Lille, followed by Ghent and Bruges, still more the horrors of that Russian winter, the destruction of the vines of France, the starvation of her peasants, who swarmed into the towns in search of food and died in the streets because none was to be had, all these accumulated misfortunes made a crisis in the land without precedent in memory and converted Louis into a sincere and almost abject suppliant for peace.

Throughout the early and middle part of 1709 the negotiations for a general pacification went actively forward at the Hague, whither Torcy had been sent to act for Louis. Point after point he and his master were forced to concede. In their desperate need for peace they refused nothing asked that it was in their power to give. The King of France did not stand out to keep his grandson in Spain, but he understood, what the Allies refused to recognise, the difficulty of compelling him to give up the throne which the Spaniards wished him to keep. Louis therefore proposed that Philip should be given some inducement to abandon Spain by the offer of a compensation elsewhere, for instance Naples and Sicily. But neither Austria nor England would consent to establish a Bourbon anywhere in Italy, and the proposal

was rejected on the ground that there must be no partition of the Spanish Empire.

After much negotiation, the Allies at the end of May drew up their demands in forty 'Preliminary Articles,' which the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain and the States General signed and presented as an ultimatum to France. To all these Articles save one Louis eventually gave his consent. The whole Spanish Empire in all continents was to be surrendered to Charles, barring such places as might be reserved for Holland or Britain. Louis also ceded to the Dutch the great French fortress town of Lille, together with Menin and Maubeuge. As surety of good faith he was at once, on signature of the preliminaries, to surrender to them the places he still garrisoned in the Netherlands, such as Tournai, Ypres, Mons, Namur, Charleroi and Luxemburg. He was at once to surrender Strasbourg and its fort of Kehl, and to abandon many of his rights in Alsace.* He undertook, moreover, to destroy the fortifications of Dunkirk and to leave that bugbear of English merchants as an undefended harbour. Newfoundland and all French rights in it were to be ceded to Britain. Portugal and Savoy were to get the readjustment of boundaries for which they had stipulated. Louis even undertook in general terms, by Article IV, to co-operate with the Allies for the coercion of his grandson if he refused to quit Spain.

May 1709

The only Article which Louis refused to sign was the famous Thirty-seventh, which declared that the cessation of arms could be brought to an end if the whole monarchy of Spain was not delivered up and yielded to Charles III within two months. This meant that if Philip refused to quit Spain and could not at once be driven out, the Allies could renew the war against his grandfather and invade France from the bases of Strasbourg, Tournai and the other frontier fortresses that would be already surrendered to them under the Treaty. Good faith and strict fulfilment of the terms on the part of Louis could not secure him against a renewal of the war under military conditions rendered far worse for him by his attempt to conciliate the

* Next year, 1710, he offered to give up Alsace entirely. *Torcy*, II, p. 74.

Allies. He refused to sign Article Thirty-seven. The negotiations were broken off on that point alone in the summer of 1709, and the campaign, which had already been resumed, went forward to Malplaquet.

> I must confess [wrote Torcy to Petkum in July] that the more I seek a solution as to Article Thirty-seven, the less able I am to find it. We need not have been troubled by it, had we arranged the partition that I demanded for the King of Spain. By insisting on leaving him without States you drive him to fight for his crown and deprive the King of France of any means of influencing him for peace.

Great was the sorrow and surprise of Europe at the resumption of the long war, which men had all that spring regarded as being over at last. The first result was to rouse France to a last effort of desperate patriotism, on behalf of a king who had offered to make such immense sacrifices to give his people peace, and had offered all in vain to the insulting enemy. The fighting spirit of the armies defending the border of France rose from the level of Wynendael to the level of Malplaquet. The shock of disappointment in England was less immediate in its consequences, but in a year's time it had, in conjunction with the Sacheverell affair, aroused a passionate demand for peace, and a great anger with the statesmen who had refused the offer of such terms.

That, however, was not the immediate reaction. The bulk of the English people in the spring of 1709 believed that they had won the war, and they had long been taught to regard the cession of the whole Spanish Empire to Charles as the prize of victory.

The root trouble was that no diplomatic agreement with France could secure Spain for Charles, not even the clumsy and barbarous machinery of Article Thirty-seven. Godolphin thought that even if Louis accepted the 'Preliminaries' entire, the situation would be full of danger for England. For if once the Dutch obtained possession of the Netherland towns to be ceded by Louis under the Treaty, they would not, the Treasurer thought, engage in another war with France; if, therefore, war were to be renewed under Article Thirty-seven it would be a war fought by England, very little aided by the other allies, against France and

Spain. For these reasons Godolphin was not sorry when the negotiation was broken off and the war continued as before.*

His conclusion against peace was wrong, but his premises were right. He correctly saw the difficulty of winning Spain by a treaty with France. The right conclusion which he did not see was that Spain should be left to Philip and the Empire partitioned as William III had desired to partition it; that conclusion could be drawn only by the Tories. Neither the Whigs nor Marlborough nor Godolphin would yield the point, and it was therefore in the interest of Europe that their newly formed Ministry should, as speedily as possible, be overturned.

Marlborough and Eugene had both acted in these negotiations with a feebleness that betrayed their embarrassment and their inability to formulate any practical plan. Neither of them made an effort to alter the preposterous character of the Preliminaries, yet both, immediately after the failure of the negotiation, privately confessed how preposterous they were. On July 10 Marlborough wrote to Heinsius, 'If I were in the place of the King of France I should venture the loss of my country much sooner than be obliged to join my troops for the forcing of my grandson.' But he had done nothing to find a way out of the *impasse*, being content to shift the responsibility, in part at least, on to the shoulders of the Whigs, the new men who understood the real difficulties less than he, and could therefore feel happy so long as they could continue to repeat the slogan of 'No peace without Spain.' To that formula Marlborough and Godolphin still adhered, though without any clear knowledge how to give it effect. It was indeed they, and not the Whigs, who had originally forced upon the Allies the dogma of the indivisibility of the Spanish Empire. They had first asserted it in the Treaty which

* *Geikie*, pp. 129–130. Godolphin was not the only person in England who had these fears of the insufficiency of the Preliminaries. Thus on June 3, 1709, Secretary Boyle wrote to Townsend: 'no cautionary towns are of much significancy in this case, unless such as are maritime and essential towards reducing Spain by force. It seems very plain that the French King does not intend the whole Spanish Monarchy.' *R.H.S. Diplomatic Instructions, France* (1925), Wickham Legg, p. 16. Even Marlborough's chaplain, Francis Hare, wrote in August 1709, 'A Spanish war may prove very troublesome as well as expensive, and the load will lie entirely upon England, when the other Allies have got all they want.' *H.M.C. Hare*, p. 228.

they and Nottingham had made with Portugal in 1703, and they had confirmed it by their insistence with the recalcitrant Dutch in 1705–6.

In 1709 the Dutch themselves, encouraged by the tide of victory, strongly supported the cession of Spain and the Indies to Charles. They did so partly in order to justify and earn their own claims to a large part of the Netherlands by way of 'Barrier,' to be obtained by the help of the Barrier Treaty which they were negotiating with the English Whigs to the detriment of the sovereignty of Charles in Belgium. But the Dutch had other and more direct reasons for supporting the claims of Charles to Spain and the Indies. As a trading nation they, like the English, believed that their commerce with Spain, Italy and America would be safer under the House of Austria than under the House of Bourbon.* The responsibility for the failure to make peace may fairly be divided between the statesmen of England, Austria and Holland, none of whom made any such effort as that made by Torcy and his master to find a solution to the very real difficulties of the case.[259]

One reason for the unpractical character of British statesmanship at the Hague in 1709 was that the war party had been put into office in the previous November, at the very moment when the question of the hour was the problem of peace. If the Whigs had been given power four years earlier—as they might have been if Anne had so willed—the change would then have been suited to the nature of the time, while the exorbitant power of France had still to be reduced. In fact the war had only been won because the Whigs, while kept on the outskirts of office, had consented to support the war ministry against High Tory recalcitrance and defeatism. The victories of Marlborough, the Regency Act and the Union with Scotland were due to the active support of the Whig party outside the circles of government. The services of the Whigs to the country, while they were being rendered, had been indifferently rewarded owing to Queen Anne's objection to a party

* On this as a chief motive of the Dutch attitude in the negotiations of 1709 see *Geyl*, pp. 14–20.

government. At length, in November 1708, the Junto had forced its way through the Queen's resistance into power, largely owing to the General Election of that summer, itself to some degree the chance result of the attempted Jacobite invasion in the spring. The Whigs were established in office at the very moment when they could do least service and most harm.

The two great services which the Whigs could render to the country in this epoch were the reduction of the power of France and the securing of the Protestant Succession. On both these questions the Tory party was divided. But they were the two questions of prime importance. If the power of Louis as it stood in 1704 had not been reduced by war, or if the Roman Catholic Stuarts had returned to the throne, our country would have been thrown back into the internal feuds and external weakness of seventeenth-century England, from which the Revolution had done so much to rescue her. The prosperity, unity and power of Great Britain in the eighteenth century would not have been realised without the victories of Marlborough and the accession of the House of Hanover. In the early years of Anne the Whigs had enabled Marlborough to win the war; in the last months of her reign their firm stand amid the frightened and divided counsels of their opponents secured the peaceful accession of King George. But in the year 1709 the need was neither the war nor the succession, but the peace. And that the Whigs could not give.

They were sincerely convinced of the necessity, in the interest of British trade and security in the coming era, of depriving the House of Bourbon of the whole Spanish Empire. But they had no idea how to accomplish it, except by interminably continuing the war against France. That did not seem to them so great an evil as it should have done. Their enemies said of them, with some measure of truth:

> The party that is founded upon war and a senseless jargon of France, Jesuits and an invisible army of 100,000 pilgrims mounted upon elephants, have not yet acquired power enough to support themselves in that most difficult and slippery state of peace.*

* Thomas Harley to Edward Harley, December 30, 1708. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 516.

Half-consciously the Whigs hoped that, as long as the war went on, their power would be safe ; and it is not impossible, though I know no proof of it, that a further consideration helped to reconcile them to the continuance of a state of war with France. If Anne died while we were still fighting the Pretender's patron, the accession of our Hanoverian ally would be certain and unopposed. England would not go to the enemy's camp for a King.

At any rate the Whigs were useless as peacemakers. And Marlborough and Godolphin were no better. Moreover the confusion of British counsels at the Hague in 1709 was worse confounded by the fact that Marlborough was pursuing a different line of policy from the Lords of the Junto. The Whigs had sent over to Holland their own emissary, Charles Townshend ; he was in close touch with Somers, Halifax and Sunderland, but he was not in the confidence of Marlborough. Townshend's instructions were to drive to a speedy conclusion the Barrier Treaty with the Dutch Government, by which Britain would guarantee a long list of Barrier towns in the Netherlands to Holland, and Holland would engage, in case of need, to send over troops to secure the accession of the House of Hanover in Scotland or England.* Marlborough wished these negotiations to be spun out inconclusively, as he feared the Allies would give Holland too much, particularly as Charles III still promised him that he should enjoy the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands after the peace, and he had therefore personal as well as public reasons to deprecate their dismemberment.

Not only, therefore, was the Duke alienated from his old friend Heinsius, but he was not really in the confidence of Townshend and the Junto, both on account of party and personal rivalries at home, and on account of the Barrier question. This division between the English negotiators at the Hague prevented them from taking reasonable counsel together on the terms to be demanded of France and the famous Article Thirty-seven. Neither Marlborough nor the Whigs were likely to take effective action to compel the other Allies to make peace, but the fact that

* See pp. 138–140, above.

they were not on intimate terms with each other rendered it doubly impossible that the British delegates could do any good at the Hague.[260]

And so the war went on. Even before Malplaquet some of Marlborough's men began to feel, what they had never felt before, that their lives were being wasted. In August Colonel Revett wrote home from before Tournai :

> I am so great a lover of peace and the good of my country, that I among the majority wish that there had not been any cause for the loss of so many good men and officers that have fallen at this siege.

The writer was a brave soldier and no politician : he was killed at Malplaquet next month.[261]

In these circumstances it was inevitable that the British army should become increasingly divided, the peace party against the war party, Tory against Whig, the partisans of Argyle or of Webb against those of Marlborough. These threefold divisions, though not exactly corresponding, strengthened one another ; and the army, recently a band of brothers, was torn by feuds and factions. So when the Queen, as she presently did, began to make promotions without consulting Marlborough, discipline was seriously affected. The Duke was soon writing to Godolphin :

> If it be the intention of the Queen that I should serve her, which I am ready to do with all my heart, she must, in order to bring the dissipline of the army back to that happy posture in which it was some time ago for the service, let me have in my power to oblige the officers, and not to have anybody incoraged to think thay can meet with preferment by others.*

Meanwhile, at home, the failure of the negotiations of 1709 gave the Tories their cue for an agitation for peace and disarmament, coupled with an attack on the Whigs and Marlborough as militarists aiming at another Cromwellian regime. The national dislike of a standing army and the dread of a redcoat appealed to many instincts and traditions besides the Cavalier tradition of the Tories themselves. These feelings were exploited in the cause of High

* From a letter in my possession, undated but of 1710 probably, addressed 'for yourself' [Godolphin] in Marlborough's handwriting, though without signature.

Church and Sacheverell. Ned Ward, the Tory public-house poet and pamphleteer, published in 1709 *Mars stripped of his Armour*, a ferocious attack on the army beginning :

> An army is the reverse of a Church, for as we learn piety in the first, 'tis ten thousand to one but we are taught prophaneness in the other. As all religions concur and meet together in Amsterdam, so all vice in an army. A regiment is a corporation which consists of individuals detached from Bridewell, the Queen's Bench, Fleet, Newgate and the Counters.

The cry against soldiers as such, singularly ungrateful after the unparalleled services they had just rendered to England, was raised as loud as the cry against Dissenters. Both must be suppressed, or Marlborough, another Cromwell, would lead on the redcoats, the Whigs, the ' fanatics ' and the monied men to destroy the Church and the Monarchy and make him perpetual dictator. The abject nonsense of such cries, with which England was to be filled for the next few years, was a measure of the terrible mistake that had been made by the opposite party in refusing peace. The nonsense did its appointed work, according to the wont of political England, and produced in good time the Treaty of Utrecht, a blessing to Britain and to the world. Then the nonsense went raging on till it became dangerous and, at the Queen's death, reached in its turn its appropriate calamity.

In spite of Queen Anne, Harley, Godolphin and Marlborough, and partly through the defects of their respective qualities, the attempt to govern England on non-party lines had come to an end, after a not inglorious period of trial. Party henceforth was to rule in alternate manifestations of Whig and Tory ; but the foundations of Great Britain and her constitution and her place in the world had been well and truly laid, if party could be wise enough to treat them with respect. The temptations to violence in public life are always great, but of the two parties that one which should first recover its temper and walk in the ways of prudence would be the winner in the end, and would be the true successor of the great traditions of patriotic government which had been established under the ministry of Marlborough and Godolphin.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Marlborough's Letters to Heinsius, 1705

As in the appendix to my earlier volume, *Blenheim*, here again I print some of the letters of Marlborough to his coadjutor in the Alliance, Heinsius, Grand Pensionary of Holland ; they are taken from MSS. in the Rijks-archief at the Hague. They are written in English, in the Duke's own hand. Later letters of this correspondence, from 1706 onwards, have been printed by Vreede and are available for students. These letters of 1705, which are here printed for the first time, illustrate the crisis of Marlborough's struggle for emancipation from the control of the Dutch Generals and Deputies in the field (see pp. 55–57, above) ; they also show that the principle of ' No Peace without Spain ' was enunciated as a slogan of British statesmanship, even before Ramillies (see pp. 59–60, above).

1705. July 30 [N.S.]. Meldert. Since my last to you, I prevailled with the Generall, to consent that we shou'd march as we did this last night to try if we cou'd pass that River before the french cou'd know it. I did promise them that if the ffrench army shou'd be there I wou'd not attempt the passage, til I had there consent. . . . I am afraid this was known to Mons. de Villeroy, otherwis I do not think he wou'd have ventur'd to be there. But God forgive those that are better pleased when any thing goes ill then when wee haue success.

Aug. 2. Meldert. I am very uneasy in my own minde to see how every thing here is like to goe, not withstanding the superiority and goodness of our Troupes, which ought to make us not doubt of success. However it is Certaine that if affaires Continue on the same foot thay now are, it is impossible to attempt any thing considerable with success or advantage, since Councils of War must be called on every occasion, which intirely destroys the Secrecy and dispatch, upon which all great undertakings depend ; and has unavoidably another very unhappy effect, the private animostys between so many Persons to be assembled being so great, and their Inclinations and Interest so different, as allways to make one part oppose what the other advise and consequently never agree.

I do not say this because I have the honour of being at the head of the army, but it is absolutely necessary that such a power bee lodg'd with the General as may enable him to act as he thinks proper according to the best of his Judgment, without being oblig'd either to communicate what he intends further than he thinks convenient. The success of the last campane [1704] with the blessing of God was owing to that Power, which I wish you would now give for the good of the Publique, and that of the States in particular, and if you think anyone can execute it better than myself, I shal be willing to stay in any of the towns here, having a very good pretext, for I really am sick. I know this is a very nice point, but it is of the last importance, for without it noe general can act offensively.

Aug. 13. Meldert. We shall march on Saturday, and the troupes are so good that if it were possible to haue secresy, and obedience, with the blessing of God, I think we haue a much fairer prospect then we had this day twelfmonth [Blenheim day, Aug. 13]; but we have tempers here that we are never pleas'd, but when they are sowing dissention. . . . I must own that my patience is very much tryed. I have write again to Vienna to presse that Court to lose no time in sending more troupes to Prince Eugene, but I foresee that when ever those orders are given Pr. Lewis of Baden will make difficulty, by which there will be time lost.

Aug. 19. . . . On this occasion I can't forbear saying that if your Generals wou'd have allow'd of our attacking the enemy, you might in my opinion have been in a condition of proscribing to ffrance what Peace you pleased. . . . I wish I cou'd be with you for one hour that I might talk freely to you, as to what is propos'd for the Preliminaries to the treating for a Peace. I do before God declare to you that I am persud'd that if Slanenbourg [= Slangenberg] had not been in the army at this day we might have prescribed to ffrance what peace we had pleas'd. But as the circumstances now are I agree with you that it will be very difficult to persuade ffrance to consent to such conditions, as are absolutely necessary to make the Peace lasting. You know as well as I, that England can like no peace, but such as puts King Charles in the possession of the Monarke of Spain; and as for yourselves, I think you ought to have garrisons in Antwerp, Namur, and Luxembourg, besides I think the Duke of Savoy shou'd be our particular care. And if wee will have a lasting Peace and the blessing of God, we must do somthing for the advantage of Protestants.

Aug. 18, 1705. [A letter from Godolphin to Marlborough sent on enclosed to Heinsius.] Since you desire my thoughts upon the extract of a letter from the Pensionary which you were pleased to send mee, I must beg the freedome to tell you if England had lost a battell at sea and another at land, I think they would still despise such a peace, and I believe you may depend upon it they will never consent to any peace that leaves Spain and the Indies or either in hands of the Duke of Anjou. Nor will they be pleased with the Treaty of partition, tho' that bee not altogether so bad as this proposall. Godolphin.

The remainder of the letter shows that the Partition Treaty here referred to is the Second Partition Treaty (1699). This correspondence shows that even in the winter before Ramillies Marlborough and Godolphin were determined to have 'no peace without Spain' for the Austrian candidate.

Aug. 27. Marlborough to Heinsius. Mr. Slenenbourg [Slangenberg] hitherto has oppos'd everything that has been propos'd by mee. So that I have taken a resolution of not exposing my own honour, nor the Publick good, by making any schem, but went that very afternoon I receiv'd yours, to beg of the deputys that they wou'd speak to Mons. Slanenbourg, and such other of their Generals as they thought fitt, to know what they thought might be done for the Publicke good and the particular Interest of the States, and did then asssure them, and did desire thay wou'd lett their Generals know that I wou'd joyn in what ever they thought might be done; for I have so good an opinion of this army that I think they are able to execut what ever their Generals will resolve, besides we have yett two months before we ought to think of winter quarters. I beg you will beleive and assure others that for the remainder of this Campagne I will with all cherfulness endeavour to make everything succed that shall be propos'd to mee; by which I hope at last Mons. Slanenbourg will be brought to do me the Justice to beleive that I act by no other principle but that of the Publicke good.

Sept. 5. Tirlemont. Marlborough to Heinsius. I have receiv'd a letter from Pr. Lewis of Baden to acquaint me of his having forced the Lyns of Hagnau, this Conferms me more and more in the opinion I have, that the ffrench will always be forced when ever they are attacked. I am very glad to find by your last letter that there was no designe to mortefie me. What is thought for the good of the publick, it is very fit I shou'd bare itt, and shall from henceforward endeavour not to trouble my friends with complaints. The resolution I have taken of being governed by your Generals the remaining part of this Campagne gives me a great deal of quiet, so that I am now drinking the Spaa watters.

APPENDIX B

PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF STATE IN THE GODOLPHIN MINISTRY, 1705–1708

(Whigs are printed in italics.)

	1705	1706	1707	1708
Lord Treasurer	Sidney, Lord Godolphin	Created Earl of Godolphin, Dec. 1706		
Lord President of the Council	Thos. Herbert, Earl of Pembroke	. . . . .	. . . . .	Nov., *Lord Somers*
Lord Privy Seal	John Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham. *Succeeded by John Holles, Duke of Newcastle*			
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Hon. Henry Boyle*	. . . . .	. . . . .	Apr., *John Smith*
Lord Keeper of the Great Seal	Sir Nathan Wright *Succeeded by Sir William Cowper*	Created *Lord Cowper*, Dec. 1706		
Lord Chancellor			*Lord Cowper*, becomes Lord Chancellor	
Secretary of State (Northern Department)	Robert Harley	. . . . .	. . . . .	Feb., *Hon. Henry Boyle**
Secretary of State (Southern Department)	Sir Charles Hedges	Dec. *Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland*		

APPENDIX B—*continued.*

PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF STATE IN THE GODOLPHIN MINISTRY, 1705–1708

	1705	1706	1707	1708
Secretary of State	(Third Secretary, created Feb. 1709 chiefly to deal with Scottish affairs, see p. 394, above)			Feb. 1709, *Duke of Queensberry.*
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland	James Butler, Duke of Ormonde		Thos. Herbert, Earl of Pembroke	Nov., *Thomas, Earl of Wharton*
Lord High Admiral	Prince George of Denmark, Prince Consort	. . . . .	. . . . .	Nov., Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, on death of the Prince
Secretary at War	Henry St. John	. . . . .	. . . . .	Feb., *Robert Walpole*
Master-General of the Ordnance	Duke of Marlborough			
Comptroller at the Household	Thomas Mansell	. . . . .	. . . . .	*Earl of Cholmondeley*
Master of the Horse	*Duke of Somerset*			
Lord Chamberlain	*Henry Grey, Marquess of Kent*			
Lord Steward	*Duke of Devonshire*			

* Henry Boyle, always a Moderate, and a friend of Harley, may perhaps be said to have become a Whig during this period.

APPENDIX C

Sunderland's Letters to Newcastle. Relations of the Junto to Marlborough and Godolphin in 1708

The following letters of Sunderland to the Duke of Newcastle (never, I think, printed before) are from the *Lansdowne MSS.* in the British Museum, 1236, ff. 242–253. They show the degree to which Sunderland, while Secretary of State, was incensed against the Lord Treasurer Godolphin; they show the suspicion he entertained in the summer of 1708 that not only Godolphin but even his own father-in-law, Marlborough, had been playing into the hands of the Jacobites in the affair of the attempted invasion of Scotland in March (see pp. 340, 343 note, above). The belief of the Junto clearly was that the Hanoverian Succession was not safe unless the Whigs had full power in the State.

The later letters show how, using the lever of the Whig majority in the Commons secured at the General Election in May, the Junto in the autumn pressed for a more completely Whig administration; how the opposition of the Queen, and in a less degree of Godolphin and Marlborough, to the removal of the Prince Consort from the Admiralty to make room for Whig control, was only overcome by the Prince's death. (See p. 389 above.)

Whitehall May 27. 1708.

My Lord.

I was very sorry, I had the misfortune of missing of y^r Grace the night before you went out of town, but I happen'd to come in to My Ld. Steward's [Devonshire's], the minute you were gone, I hope you have already found benefitt, by the Country air, which onely can make amends for our loosing you here; I hope y^r Grace will pardon my giving you this trouble now, but it is at the desire of My Ld. Steward, Ld. Sommers & Ld. Halifax, who think this matter of the D. of Queensberry's Patent, [see p. 394 above] of so very great consequence, that they have desir'd me to lay their thoughts before you, that since you have told y^r opinion of this matter to the Queen, in the honest, plain, & noble way, you have done it, whither it would nott be right, before you putt the Privy Seal to it, to write a letter to the Queen once more, to represent this matter & its fatall Consequences to her. with this view, that in case she continues obstinate in her resolution, (as I take for granted she will) that at least you have done all in y^r power, which justifies you sufficiently afterwards, in putting the seal to it, & in acting afterwards in relation to this affair in Parliament, as you shall judge proper; these are the thoughts of y^r humble servants here upon this subiect, the other Lds. I mention'd would have writt themselves, but that they thought one letter would be lest troublesome; I am so much of this opinion my self, that if the Queen had thought fitt, to have order'd me to prepare the warrant, (as she did M^r Boyle) I thould have took this method, that I might have had the Copy of my letter by me, upon occasion; y^r Grace I am sure will pardon this liberty, since it's mean't purely for y^{rs} & the Publick service.

I heartily Congratulate with y^r Grace upon the Elections throughout England, being so well over as they are, I think one may venture to say, it is the most Wig Parliament has been since the revolution, so that if our friends will stick together, & act like men, I am sure the Court must, whither they will or no, come into such measures, as may preserve both us & themselves; I Beg my most humble service to My Lady Dutchess, & am allways with the greatest respect

My Lord, Y^r Grace's most obedient humble servant
Sunderland.

The Lords abovemention'd
have all charg'd me with
their Compliments to y^r Grace

Althrop Aug. 9^{th} 1708.

My Lord.

I Believe Lord Sommers, & Ld. Halifax have acquainted y^r Grace, with the unlucky accidents, that have prevented our waiting you at Welbeck, however I should have done my self the honour to have gone alone, butt that since my Coming here, I have had the ill luck to sprain my foot, which has putt me to a great deal of pain and trouble, but is now something easier, I own I am extreamly Concern'd at this disappointment for besides the pleasure of waiting upon y^r Grace, it would have been of use to have talk'd together, of the present posture of our affairs, which tho' they are very fortunately and unexpectedly mended abroad, by our success in Flanders, and in the West Indies [Oudenarde and Wager's action]; yett seem to grow worse and worse every day at home; for without running over all the Particulars, such as the villainous management of Scotland, the state of the fleet which is worse than ever, the Condition of Ireland in which the Protestant interest is lower, and the Popish higher than ever; their late management in relation to the invasion, and in particular the pardoning Ld. Griffin, is a declaration to the whole world, as far as in them lies for the Prince of Wales, & against the Protestant succession, these are such proceedings that if there is not a just spiritt shewn in Parliament we had as good give up the game, & submitt to My Ld. Treasurer's & My Ld. Marlborough's bringing in the Prince of Wales; My reason of troubling y^r Grace, with all this, is to Conjure you, nott to deffer Coming to town too long, till just the Parliament meets, for whatever is proper to be done, must be Concerted before hand, & that cannott be done without y^r presence & influence:

I know you are very averse to Coming to town before y^r^ time, but three weeks or a month, sooner or later I hope will break no squares, & it is so absolutely necessary, that it is the joynt request of y^r^ friends & humble servants, & indeed our all is at stake, for if next sessions of Parliament does not redress the mischiefs, there's an end of the Revolution & the Protestant succession.

I hope y^r^ Grace has y^r^ health well in the Country, & beg you to believe that I am with the greatest truth and respect

My Lord

y^r^ Grace's most obedient humble servant

SUNDERLAND.

London, Oct. 19^th^ 1708.

My Lord.

I give y^r^ Grace this trouble, at the desire of the Duke of Devonshire, the Duke of Bolton, Ld. Dorchester, Ld. Orford, Ld. Wharton, Ld. Townend, Ld. Sommers, & Ld. Halifax, to give you an account of what has pass'd between them & Ld. Treasurer, in relation to the present posture of our affairs, in which they hope, what steps they have made will meet with y^r^ approbation ; they have upon the best Consideration among themselves come to this resolution & opinion, that it was impossible for them with any reputation to themselves, or safety to the publick, to go on any longer with the Court, upon the foot things are at present, for that if one looks round every part of the administration, the management of the fleet, the Condition of Ireland, the Proceedings in Scotland, the management of the late Invasion, the disposall of Church Preferments, &c ; they are all of a Piece, as much Tory, & as wrong, as if Ld. Rochester & Ld. Nottingham were at the head of every thing, under the disguise of some Considerable wigs, in some considerable places, but with so little creditt or to so little purpose, that they can neither obtain any right thing to be done, nor prevent any wrong one ; they Consider'd, that the management of the fleet, as it is of the greatest Consequence, so it is under the most scandalous management of all & that this is never to be cur'd, but by the Prince's quitting, for that whatever Councill he has, George Churchill will in effect be allways Ld. high Admirall ; so that they have in a body declar'd to Ld. Treasurer, that if this is not immediately done, they must lett the world & their friends see they have nothing more to do with the Court; the man they propose to be Ld. high Admirall, is Ld. Pembroke, (which would open a redress for Ireland, & what is much desir'd by all honest people, the President's place, for Ld. Sommers.) My Ld. Treasurer seem'd to agree with them in opinion, (as his way allways is in words) but at the same time pretends great difficulties & that when Ld. Marlborough comes all will be sett right, which by the way can't be much before Christmass ; to this the Lords told him, that they could no longer rely upon Promises & words, & that therefore they must take their measures, till this thing was actually done, as if it never was to be done & they told him therefore plainly that they would & must oppose the Court, in the choice of the Speaker, that being the first point, to come on, for that they had no other way left to lett the world see, & all their friends that they were upon a different

foot ; to this, he was pleas'd to make a proposall, which was as ridiculous, as it shew'd the unsincerity of their intentions, to do any thing that was right, & that was, y^t^ there should be an act of Parliament obtain'd to allow the Prince to continue Ld. high Admirall, & to empower his Councill to act for him, it would be tedious to repeat all the objections the Lords made to this proposall, as absurd, ridiculous, & ineffectuall, & what no Parliament ever would hear off. I will onely mention one Particular, which is very remarkable, & pretty extraordinary, that Ld. Treasurer told them, that he had mention'd this proposall to Ld. Chancellour [Lord Cowper], & that he had entirely approv'd of it. Ld. Chancellour since has been told what Ld. Treasurer said, & he dos positively affirm that he dos nott remember, that ever Ld. Treasurer spoke to him, or he to Ld. Treasurer of any such proposall. This extraordinary proceeding has been a further Confirmation to these Lords of the reason they have to declare against the Court, which they are resolv'd to do in this first point of the Speaker, by setting up S^r^ Peter King, & I am Confident when the Court see this, that the wigs will no longer be fool'd, they will then do all reasonable things, which they will never do, whilst they hope that words & promises will pass ; I must nott forgett telling you that this day, unexpectedly without any body knowing any thing of it, S^r^ James Mountague has been made Attorney Generall, & M^r^ Eyres Sollicitour, which I believe, has been owing to the vigour, with which those Lords spoke to Ld. Treasurer, & confirms them in their opinion, that if they go on in their resolution & stand together, the other more essentiall things will be also done ; My Ld. Steward to morrow, is to speak to Ld. Chancellour, to acquaint him with the resolutions they have taken, & to try to perswade him to act, with spirit & vigour, with the rest of his friends. I Beg a thousand pardons for this long long letter, but as I have been forc'd to omitt a great many particulars for fear of being too tedious, so I was very desirous my self, as well as at the Command of these Lords, to explain this whole affair to y^r^ Grace as well as I could hoping you will approve of what they have done, for in our present Condition all depends on our acting of a piece & in Concert, & if we do so, we must carry our point, & save our Country, which indeed I think, is in as great danger as ever I knew ; I must add the request of all these Lords to y^r^ Grace, that you would lett them have y^r^ Company, & assistance here in town as soon as may be ; I am ever with the greatest respect My Lord

Y^r^ Grace's most obedient humble servant

SUNDERLAND.

London Oct. 26^th^ 1708.

My Lord.

I have the honour of y^r^ Grace's letter, & am heartily sorry y^t^ any accident should have happen'd to occasion a delay in y^r^ coming to town, for indeed it is of the last Consequence, to have all our friends together, at this juncture, & I am sure there's none whose Presence is of so much Consequence & weight as y^r^ Grace's ; so that you will give us leave to depend upon y^r^ hastening all you can ; I am now desir'd by those Lords y^r^ h^ble^ servants, that I mention'd in my last, to beg you would either speak or send to M^r^ Jessop about this matter of the Speaker, to engage him for S^r^ Peter King, & that he would

take what pains he can among the Northern Members, among whom he has a generall acquaintance, besides the weight in using y^r^ name; they beg too that you would write upon this occasion to M^r^ Monkton & M^r^ Peyton; I beg a thousand pardons for this trouble & am ever with great truth & respect

My Lord Y^r^ Graces most obedient humble servant

SUNDERLAND.

I have obey'd y^r^ Commands to Ld. Halifax & S^r^ James Mountague, who present their h^ble^ service & are truely sensible how much they owe, to y^r^ kindness in this affair.

To his Grace the Duke of Newcastle Lord Privy Seal
at Welbeck
Nottinghamsh

SUNDERLAND

London Nov. 4^th^ 1708.

My Lord.

Since I writt last to y^r^ Grace, & had the honour of y^r^ Answer, the Death of the Prince, has made so great an alteration in every thing, & particularly in what was most at every Body's heart, the affair of the Admiralty, that as soon as it happen'd, those of our friends of the house of Commons, that were in Town, & that were the most zealous with us, in setting up S^r^ Peter King, begun to Press us to accommodate the matter, & nott to make a Division, since by this accident, there was room, to have every think [*sic*] sett right; since that My Ld. Treasurer has acquainted us, that the Queen had agreed to make Ld. Pembroke Ld. high Admirall, Ld. Sommers President & Ld. Wharton Ld. Lieutenant of Ireland. Ld. Sommers is out of Town, so that whither he will be perswaded to accept of it, or no, I can't tell, but he would be so much in the wrong, if he should nott, that I won't doubt, but he will; These Proposalls are so great in themselves, towards putting things upon a thorough right foot, that those Lords in whose names I writt last to y^r^ Grace, have desir'd me to acquaint you with it, & that their thoughts upon it are, that since these main things are like to be done, it would by no means be right to venture a division of our friends upon the first point of the Speaker, & therefore they have allready spoke with S^r^ Peter King, in order to endeavour to make him easy in it, so that if y^r^ Grace is of the same mind, & approves what they have done, you will please to lett y^r^ friends of the house of Commons know it, in the manner you shall judge properest; we are in expectation of seeing you here every day, however these Lords directed me to acquaint you, with it as soon as possible; I am ever with the greatest truth & respect

My Lord, Y^r^ Grace's most obedient humble servant

SUNDERLAND.

APPENDIX D

BISHOPS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS

IN Queen Anne's reign a hard-working and conscientious Bishop—and such nearly all the Bishops were—was expected to reside in London from November to April inclusive in order to perform his duties in Parliament. Contemporary opinion, clerical as well as lay, Tory as much as Whig, regarded that as the first charge on a Bishop's time in the winter and spring months. Such was the conception of the close relations of Church and State, and the importance of the Upper House of Parliament, where the Bishops' votes were still liable to be decisive, and where their influence was not so very much less than it had been in mediæval times. Modern critics, usually unjust to the eighteenth-century Church, have neglected this important fact in judging of episcopal habits of residence. Pre-occupation at Westminster was the chief reason why even the most active Bishops, like Wake of Lincoln, found it difficult to get round their dioceses, geographically so enormous, on visitations which had to be carried out on the bad roads of the day, either in the heavy coaches of the period or on horseback, as most episcopal visitations were performed. The Bishops of William's and Anne's reign were not sluggards, and were at least up to the level of their predecessors. On this whole subject see the very interesting work of Professor Norman Sykes, who is becoming the historian of the eighteenth-century Church. In his article on *Episcopal Administration in England in the Eighteenth Century*, in the *Engl. Hist. Rev.* for July 1932, he writes:

> In passing to the consideration of the activities of the Bishop, it is essential to remember continually one fundamental factor, that of the long residence each year in London required of an eighteenth-century prelate. The secular English tradition of the association of the Episcopate with affairs of State suffered a change of form rather than of principle with the Reformation settlement. And towards the end of the seventeenth century in particular, the rise of the two rival political parties of Whig and Tory had given a

new turn to that position by emphasizing the importance of the attendance of the Bishops upon their duties in the Upper House of Parliament. In addition to their period of waiting upon the court, their presence in the debates and divisions of the House of Lords was of great importance to the successive party administrations of Anne and of the early Hanoverian kings. In the conventional [modern] complaints of the non-residence of eighteenth-century prelates, this aspect of their office is commonly aspersed, though esteemed highly by contemporary opinion.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

MSS.

Add. MSS. = British Museum, *Additional MSS.* (*B.M.* = British Museum, other collections).
Althorp MSS. = MSS. belonging to Earl Spencer in Althorp House, Northants. Some papers of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough among others.
Bodleian MSS. = MSS. in the Bodleian, Oxford.
Boughton MSS. = MSS. belonging to the Duke of Buccleugh, in Boughton House, Northants. Papers formerly belonging to the Dukes of Montagu and Shrewsbury.
Heinsius MSS. = Letters of Marlborough to Heinsius in the Rijks-archief at the Hague (see Appendix A, above, for some excerpts).
P.C. Reg. Ed. = *Privy Council Registers, Scotland*, in Register Office, Edinburgh.
P.R.O. = Public Record Office (S.P. = State Papers ; Tr. = Transcripts).
Wake MSS. = Archbishop Wake's MSS. in the Christ Church Library, Oxford.

PRINTED MATTER

Abbey = Chas. Abbey. *The English Church and its Bishops 1700–1800* (1887).
Acts Parl. Scot. = Vol. XI of the *Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland* (1824).
Agnew = Sir Andrew Agnew. *The Hereditary Sheriffs of Galloway*, 1893.
Argyle, Int. Letters = *Intimate Society Letters of the Eighteenth Century*. Ed. by the Duke of Argyle, 1910.
Atkinson = *Marlborough*, by C. T. Atkinson (*Heroes of Nations* series).
B. Williams, Stanhope = Professor Basil Williams, *Stanhope* (Oxford 1932).
Ballard = General Colin Ballard. *The Great Earl of Peterborough*, 1929.
Berwick = *Mémoires du maréchal de Berwick*, ed. 1778.
Blackader = *Life of Col. Blackader of the Cameronian Regiment*, 1824.
Burchett = Josiah Burchett. *Transactions at sea*, 1720.
Burnet = Bishop Burnet's *History of his own time*, ed. 1823 (figures in brackets refer to pagination in some earlier editions).
Burt = *Letters from a gentleman in the North of England* (Ed. Burt, *circa* 1726), ed. 1815.
Burton, Anne = *History of the Reign of Queen Anne*, by John Hill Burton, historiographer royal for Scotland, 1880.
Burton, Scotland = *History of Scotland* 1689–1748, 1853, by the same author.
Byng Papers = *The Byng Papers* (Navy Records Soc., 1930–31).
Calamy = J. T. Rutt's *Life of Edmund Calamy*, 1830.
Carleton = *Memoirs of Captain Carleton*, 1929, ed. by C. H. Hartmann (see his Introduction on the question of authenticity).
Carstares Letters = *State Papers and Letters addressed to William Carstares*, 1774.
Chambers = W. and R. Chambers, *Domestic Annals of Scotland*, 1861.
Clerk (Rox.) = *Memoirs of Sir John Clerk of Penicuik (Roxburghe Club*, 1895).

Colonie = de la Colonie. *Chronicles of an old Campaigner 1692–1717* (1904).
Conduct = *Account of the Conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough* (by herself), 1742.
Corbett = Julian Corbett. *England in the Mediterranean*, ed. 1917.
Cowper = *Private Diary of William, 1st Earl Cowper* (*Rox.* 1833).
Coxe = Archdeacon Coxe, *Memoirs of Marlborough* (page references are to the ed. of 1818).
Crossrigg = *Diary of proceedings of Parl. and P.C. of Scotland, 1700–1707*, by Sir David Hume of Crossrigg, 1828 (Bannatyne Club).
C.S.P. = *Calendar of State Papers* (*Dom.* = Domestic ; *Am.* = *America and West Indies* ; *Tr.* = *Treasury*, 1702–1707).
Culloden = *Culloden Papers*, 1815.
Cunningham = Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, ed. 1903.
Defoe = Defoe's *Tour through Great Britain*, ed. 1 ; reprint by G. D. H. Cole, 1927.
Defoe, Union = Daniel Defoe, *History of the Union between England and Scotland*, ed. 1786.
Dicey and Rait = *Thoughts on the Scottish Union*. Late A. V. Dicey and Prof. Rait.
Dispatches = *Marlborough's Dispatches*, ed. by Sir G. Murray, 1845.
Dowell = St. Dowell. *History of Taxation in England*, ed. 1884.
Drake, Mems. = *Memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake* (Dublin, 1755).
Dunbar = C. D. Dunbar, *Social Life in former days* (Scotland), 1865–1866, 2 vols.
E.H.R. = *English Historical Review*.
Edgar = Rev. Andrew Edgar, *Old Church Life in Scotland* ; I = 1st series, 1885 ; II = 2nd series, 1886.
Feiling = Keith Feiling, *History of the Tory Party*, 1924.
Feldzüge = *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen*, Wien, 1879, Serie I.
Fortescue = Sir John Fortescue, *Hist. of the Br. Army*, I, 1899.
Foulis = *Foulis of Ravelstone's account book, 1671–1707* (*Sc. Hist. Soc.*, 1904).
Freind = *An account of the Earl of Peterborough's conduct in Spain* (Anonymous, but by Dr. John Freind), 1707.
Galway = *The Earl of Galway's Conduct in Spain and Portugal*, 1711.
Geikie = *The Dutch Barrier*, by R. Geikie and Mrs. Montgomery, 1930.
Geyl = *Nederland's Staatkunde in de Spaansche Successieoorlog*, Prof. Geyl, 1929.
Goslinga = *Mémoires de Sicco van Goslinga*, 1857.
Graham = H. G. Graham, *Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century*, 1899.
Hervey, L. B. = *Letter-Books of John Hervey, first Earl of Bristol*, 1894.
Hill = *Diplomatic Correspondence of Richard Hill*, 1845.
H.M.C. = *Historical MSS. Commission* (e.g. *H.M.C. Marchmont and Seafield* = *Historical MSS. Commission*, 1894, *14th Report, Part III, Marchmont and Seafield MSS.*). *R.* 5 = *Report* 5, and so forth.
H.C.J. = *House of Commons Journals*.
H.L.J. = *House of Lords Journals*.
H. of L. MSS. = *MSS. of House of Lords*, printed under authority of the *H.M.C.*
Hooke, 1760 = *Secret History of Col. Hooke's negotiations, written by himself*, 1760.
Hooke (*Rox.*) = *Correspondence of Col. N. Hooke* (*Roxburghe Club*), 1870.
Hume Brown, Scotland = P. Hume Brown, *History of Scotland*, 1909.
Hume Brown, Union = Hume Brown, *The Union of England and Scotland*, 1914.
Jerviswood = *Correspondence of Baillie of Jerviswood* (Bannatyne Club), 1842.
Kemble = *State Papers*. Edited by John Kemble, 1857.
Ker = *Memoirs of John Ker of Kersland*, ed. 1727.
Kirke = Thomas Kirke, *A Modern Account of Scotland written from thence by an English Gentleman*, 1679.
Klopp = Onno Klopp, *Fall des Hauses Stuart*, Wien, 1875–1888.

Künzel = Heinrich Künzel, *Das Leben des Landgrafen Georg von Hesse-Darmstadt*, 1859.
Leadam = *Longmans' Political History*, Vol. IX, by J. S. Leadam.
Leake = *Life of Sir John Leake* (Navy Records Soc., 1920).
Lediard, N. H. = Thomas Lediard, *Naval History*, 1735.
Lediard, Marl. = Thomas Lediard, *Life of Marlborough*, 1736.
Legrelle = A. Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'espagne*.
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Mackinnon = James Mackinnon, *The Union of England and Scotland*, 1907.
Macky, Scotland = *A Journey through Scotland*, John Macky, 2nd ed., 1732.
Macpherson = James Macpherson, *Original Papers*, 1775.
Marchmont = *Papers of the Earls of Marchmont*, 1831.
Martin = *Life of Capt. Stephen Martin* (Navy Records Soc., 1895).
Mathieson = *Scotland and the Union*, William Law Mathieson, 1905.
Miller = O. B. Miller, *Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford* (Stanhope Essay, 1925).
Millner = John Millner, *Journal of Marches, etc.*, 1733.
More Culloden = *More Culloden Papers*, edited by Duncan Warrand.
Morer = Thomas Morer, *Short Account of Scotland*, 1702.
Noailles = *Mémoires politiques et militaires*. Duc de Noailles, ed. 1777.
P. to St. = *Letters of Peterborough to Stanhope in Spain* (from the originals at Chevening ; not published and only 50 copies printed), 1834. Most of these letters are reprinted as an appendix to Vol. II of Col. Frank Russell's *Peterborough*, 1887.
Parker = Capt. Robert Parker's *Memoirs*, 1746.
Parl. Hist. = Cobbett's *Parliamentary History*, Vol. VI.
Parnell = Col. Arthur Parnell, *The War of the Succession in Spain*, ed. 1905.
Pelet = General Pelet, *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d'espagne* (the French official military correspondence of the period), 1835.
Priv. Corr. = *Private Correspondence of the Duchess of Marlborough*, 1838.
R.H.S. = *Royal Historical Society* publications.
Rox. = *Roxburghe Club* publications.
Remembrance = *The Remembrance*. A metrical record of the Flemish campaigns by a Scottish private soldier, *Scots Brigade in the service of the United Netherlands*, Vol. III, 1901.
Ridpath = *Proceedings of the Parliament of Scotland*, 1703, printed in 1704. By George Ridpath.
Rogers = Charles Rogers, *Social Life in Scotland*, 1884.
Rosebery Pamphlets = Collection of pamphlets, formerly belonging to Lord Rosebery, now in the National Library, Edinburgh.
Russell = Col. Frank Russell, *The Earl of Peterborough*, 1887.
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Scot. and Scot. = *Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century*. Ed. by Alexander Allardyce, from the MSS. of John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, 1888.
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Taylor = C. W. Taylor, *The Wars of Marlborough*, 1921.
Taylor, Jos. = *A Journey to Edinburgh in* 1705, by Joseph Taylor, ed. 1903.
Terry, Chev. = *The Chevalier de St. George*, C. S. Terry, 1915.
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Tessé Lettres = *Lettres du Maréchal de Tessé*, 1888.
Tindal = Tindal's continuation of Rapin's *History of England*, ed. 1744.
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Vernon = *Letters addressed to the Duke of Shrewsbury by James Vernon*, ed. 1841.
Wodrow Corr. = *Correspondence of the Rev. Robert Wodrow*, 1842.
Wodrow Anal. = *Analecta*, by the Rev. Robert Wodrow (*Maitland Club*, 1842–1843).

NOTES

CHAPTER I

[1] P. 1. *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), p. 841.

[2] P. 2. *Coxe*, Chap. XXX, i. p. 339, ed. 1818.

[3] P. 3. *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 52. For the so-called 'four-shilling land tax' see my *Blenheim*, pp. 292–293. For the big farmers' dislike of a 'swinging crop' and consequent low price of corn, see Vanburgh's letter of July 3, 1703, Dobree and Webb's *Vanburgh*, IV, p. 8.

[4] P. 4. *Feiling*, p. 375; *Vernon*, III, pp. 267–270; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 146–149.

[5] P. 6. *Coxe*, Chap. XXX, i., pp. 343–346; *H.M.C. Portland*, II, pp. x–xi, 184–190; IV, p. 150; Miller, pp. 12–13.

[6] P. 6. Boyer's *Queen Anne*, ed. 1735, p. 177, note (a); *Coxe's Walpole*, II, p. 5; *H.M.C. Lonsdale*, p. 118.

[7] P. 7. *Memorial of the Church of England*, 1705, p. 5; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 63, 76.

[8] P. 8. *B.M. Lansdowne MSS.* 825, ff. 120–121; *Coxe*, Chap. XXX, i. p. 341; for Marlborough's letter of May 1705, quoted, see *H.M.C. Buccleugh*, I (1899), p. 354.

[9] P. 11. *Coxe*, Chaps. XXX, XXXI; *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 62; IV, pp. 150–151, 157; *H.C.J.*, XIV, p. 501; *Life of Archbishop Sharp*, I, pp. 403–449; *Abbey*, I, pp. 105–106; *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 84, 224, ff. 5, 32, 448–452; (S.P.) 90. 1 and 90. 3 *passim*; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*), 7061, ff. 121, 141; 7070, f. 153; 7073, ff. 164, 166; *Hill*, I, pp. 466–480.

[10] P. 13. *H.L.J.*, XVII, pp. 567, 579; *Burnet*, V, 183 (405); Boyer's *Queen Anne*, ed. 1735, p. 165.

[11] P. 14. *H.L.J.*, XVII, pp. 574–575; *H. of L. MSS.* (1704–1706), pp. xix–xx and no. 2029.

[12] P. 16. *Feiling*, pp. 376–377; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 359–367; *H.C.J.*, XIV, p. 437; *Coxe*, Chap. XXXII, i. p. 361; *H.M.C. Bagot*, p. 338 and *H.M.C. Bath*, I, p. 64, for the Fountain Tavern meetings; *Burnet*, V, pp. 176–178, 183 (401–405); on Tackers and Sneakers, see *Poems on State Affairs*, IV (1707), pp. 1–5, and *B.M. Stowe MSS.*, 354, f. 161; *Somers Tracts*, XII, pp. 469–486.

As to the suggestion that Harley secretly prompted the Tack in order to discredit the High Tories (*Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 359), I agree with *Feiling*, p. 376, that no proof exists of it and that it is inherently improbable. It is true that Defoe, with characteristic over-ingenuity, wrote to Harley on Nov. 2 that it would be a good thing to 'blacken and expose' the High Tories by 'bringing an Occasional Bill upon the anvil,' 'by trusty hands,' and 'blast it at last' (*H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 148). What Harley thought of this sufficiently macchiavellian proposal we do not know, but not even Defoe had suggested that the Tack should be proposed. Moreover, the letter of Godolphin to Harley on Nov. 16 (*H.M.C. Bath*, I, p. 64) shows the reasons why the Triumvirate were annoyed that either Bill or Tack had been brought forward in the House of Commons at all.

[13] P. 17. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 152.

[14] P. 18. *Burnet*, V, pp. 179 and 220, Darmouth's notes; *Vernon*, III, pp. 279–280; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 154; *Bod. MSS., Ballard* 7, Dec. 23, 1704, Smalridge's letter on Tory decline in the House of Commons.

[15] P. 19. Pamphlets on the subject of Place Bills in Trin. Coll. Library Cambridge (I. 3. 21). See *Blenheim*, p. 275; *Burnet*, V, p. 196 (412); *H.C.J.*, XIV, pp. 489, 499; *Vernon*, III, p. 275.

[16] P. 19. *H. of L. MSS.* (1704–1706), pp. vii–xiv, 383–387. By 1710 the Navy debt had grown to four millions and a half, and had 'much affected the credit of the Navy,' see the report of the Commissioners of the Treasury in *B.M. Lansdowne MSS.* 829, f. 128.

[17] P. 21. *Burnet*, V, p. 192 (Onslow's note), 224 (429); *Blenheim*, p. 211, Sir John Guise's statement.

[18] P. 21. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 255–257.

[19] P. 25. *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), pp. xxvi, 259–262; (1704–1706), pp. xxi–xxii; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, and *State Trials*, XIV, *sub loc.*; *H.L.J.*, XVII, pp. 676 *et seq.*; *H.C.J.*, XIV, pp. 443–445, 569–576; *Turberville*, pp. 58–71 *Wharton, Life* (1715), pp. 44, 50–55; Pickthorn, K., *Some Historical Principles of the Constitution*, pp. 126–127; Holdsworth, *Hist. of Engl. Law*, VI, pp. 271–272; Amos, M., *English Constitution*, p. 25 note; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 161–165; *Burnet*, V, pp. 112–116, 187–192 (367, 408); Sir Humphry Mackworth *Vindication of Right of Commons of England* (1704), pamphlet.

[20] P. 26. *Add. MSS.* 4743, f. 32; *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), pp. 54–55.

[21] P. 26. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 210–212, 233, 271; *Feiling*, pp. 377–378; *Coxe*, Chap. XXXIII.

[22] P. 27. *Verney Letters 18th cent.*, I, pp. 241–242. This volume and the *H.M.C. Coke* (1889) give an instructive picture of the relation of the ordinary life of quiet country gentlemen to party and politics.

[23] P. 28. *H.C.J.*, XV, pp. 276–278; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 187–190, 213, 320; Foxcroft's *Burnet*, pp. 417–419; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 310–311; *H.M.C. Ailesbury* (1898), pp. xiii, 190; *Return of M.P.s Blue Book* (1878); Hearne's *Collections*, I, p. 117; *Rehearsal* and *Observator*, passim, May–June 1705.

[24] P. 29. Monk's *Bentley* (1833), I, pp. 183–184; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 496; Brewster's *Newton* (ed. 1855), II, pp. 215–218; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 188–189.

[25] P. 30. *E.H.R.*, April 1930, Mr. Norman Sykes' remarkable article; *Portland*, IV, p. 177; *Burnet*, V, pp. 185–186 (406–407); *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 214.

[26] P. 31. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 322–323; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 248, 291; for number of Tackers returned, *cf.* list of Tackers in *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 362, and *Return of M.P.s* (*Blue Book*), Pt. II for 1705. *Stowe MSS.* (*B.M.*), 354, f. 161*b*, give another curious analysis of the New Parliament, on a 'confessional' basis.

[27] P. 32. *Coxe*, Chap. XXXII, pp. 373–375, and Chap. XL, pp. 482–484; *Burnet*, V, pp. 219–220 (426); Campbell's *Chancellors, Cowper*, Chap. CXIV; *Add. MSS.* 28070, ff. 12–13 for the Queen's letter of July 11.

CHAPTER II

[28] P. 35. *Künzel*, pp. 465–466, 469–470, 516, 524–525, 553–554; *Parnell*, pp. 79–86 and notes; *Wentworth Papers* (1883), p. 40; *Corbett*, II, pp. 536–537; *Leake*, I, pp. 228–229.

[29] P. 37. *Tessé, Mem.*, II, p. 147; *Leake*, I, pp. 195–197, 215 and *passim*; *Künzel*, pp. 502–503. *Corbett*, Chap. XXXII; *B.M. Add. MSS.* 5440–5441, correspondence of Methuen, Hesse and Leake; 5441, f. 26, after final relief of Gibraltar, Hesse writes to Leake: 'it is only to you the public owes and will owe the many great and happy consequences of it.'

[30] P. 43. Berwick, *Mémoires, sub* 1704–1705; *Tessé, Mem.*, II, pp. 136–138, 154–156; *Tessé, Lettres*, pp. 219–238; *Noailles*, III, pp. 251–253, 269–275. For the Princess des Ursins, the two good and recent books are those by Madame Taillandier and Miss Maud Cruttwell.

[31] P. 47. For the siege of Gibraltar see *Corbett*, Chap. XXXII, and *Leake*, Vol. I. See also Hesse's correspondence in *Künzel*, and Tesse's in *Add. MSS.* 9773, ff. 140–143; 9774, ff. 60–61, 72, 88, 109, 147, 155, 186, 204, 214, 246; and in *Tessé, Mem.* and *Lettres*; and Shrimpton's correspondence in *Add. MSS.* 9115, ff. 14–16; *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 89, 18, ff. 165, 171–182, 239, Hesse, etc.; *Add. MSS.* 5442, f. 90, 92–94; 5441, ff. 1–38 on Methuen's part; 28916, ff. 149, 169; *Fortescue*, I, pp. 446–450; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 149–150, a letter by an English engineer, perhaps Captain Bennet; *Galway*, pp. 4–5; *H.M.C. Chequers* (1900), pp. 177–179; Allister Macmillan, *Malta and Gibraltar* (1915), pp. 429–430; Drinkwater's *Gibraltar* (1790), pp. 9–14; Sayer's *History of Gibraltar*, pp. 130–139; *Parnell*, Chap. X; Berwick's *Mémoires, sub* 1704–1705; *Burchett*, Bk. V, Chap. XVII; *Noailles*, III, pp. 252–253, 270–277; De Ayala, *Hist. of Gib.*, translated by Bell, 1845, pp. 149–155; Monti, *Historia de Gibraltar*, pp. 93–102, 192; Montero, *ditto*, pp. 290–291. Monti contains much valuable detail on the Spanish side, but is unfair to the French and badly confuses the date of Susarte's escalade of the precipice.

I have also had the advantage (in 1928) of going over the ground carefully under the guidance of Lt. (now Captain) E. G. M. Goodwin, and of discussion with Col. Goldney at the Engineers' House, Gibraltar. Both of them were most kind and helpful to me. The map on p. 40, above, has been constructed from observations then made, off a large-scale eighteenth-century map in the Engineers' House, Gibraltar, of which Col. Goldney most kindly had a tracing made for me, and off Col. Harcourt's contemporary plan of Gibraltar, 1705 (*Fortescue*, I, p. 450); also from the contemporary maps of this first siege reproduced in *Leake*, I, p. 232, and *Fortescue*, I, p. 450. The map in *Tindal*, III, p. 664, gives a totally wrong impression, for 1704–1705, of the size of the inundation and the situation of the enemy trenches, because it refers to the later siege of 1727, and was only drawn in 1738.

CHAPTER III

[32] P. 49. *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 51.

[33] P. 49. *Dispatches*, II, p. 5; *Portland*, IV, p. 186.

[34] P. 50. *Coxe*, Chap. XXIX, i. pp. 330–336; *Atkinson*, pp. 241–243; *Taylor*, I, pp. 246–251; *Parker*, p. 98; *Dispatches*, I, p. 518; *Pelet*, IV, pp. 648–673.

[35] P. 51. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 186–187; *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7059, ff. 65, 67, 69–70; *Coxe*, Chap. XXXIII.

[36] P. 52. *Coxe, Taylor* and *Atkinson, sub loc.*; *Lediard, Marl.*, I, pp. 480–489; *Pelet*, V, pp. 383–480; *Villars Mémoires, sub ann.* 1705; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 250.

[37] P. 55. *Coxe, Taylor* and *Atkinson, sub loc.*; Millner, pp. 155–158; *Lediard, Marl.*, I, pp. 492–503; *Parker*, pp. 103–106; *E.H.R.*, April 1904, pp. 311–314 (Orkney); *H.M.C. Hare* (1895), pp. 201–203; *Blackader*, p. 254; *Pelet*, V, pp. 52–58, 574–586; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 251–253 (Major Cranstoun on the happenings in Tirlemont). See also *The Cavalry Journal*, July 1931, Major Stacke's article on Elixem, especially for Bavarian uniforms.

[38] P. 57. *Taylor* and *Atkinson, passim*. *Coxe*, Chaps. XXXVII–XXXVIII; Marlborough's *Letters to Heinsius*, Appendix, p. 409, above; *H.M.C. Downshire*, I, 2 (1924), pp. 841–842; *H.M.C. Hare*, p. 205; *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 64; *Lediard, Marl.*, I, pp. 511–522; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, 230, 237, 253–255. For popular feeling in Holland see *H.M.C. Buccleugh*, II, 2 (Shrewsbury, 1903), pp. 710, 796; *Coxe*, I, p. 445 (Marlborough's letter of Aug. 31); *Priv. Corr.*, I, p. 11.

[39] P. 57. *Pelet*, V, pp. 75, 90, 608.

[40] P. 60. *Coxe*, Chap. XLI; *Geyl*, pp. 8–10; Marlborough to Heinsius, Nov. 14, 1705, *Rijks-archief MSS.*; *Atkinson*, pp. 275–280.

CHAPTER IV

[41] P. 64 note. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 89, 19, no. 41 Milner to Hedges after Methuen's death in 1706, a criticism of Methuen; *Add. MSS.* 28916, ff. 208, 213, 220–228; 9115, ff. 1–3; *Galway*, pp. 5–27; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 89, 18, ff. 239–240, 331, for Methuen's own views of the Portuguese army; *Parnell*, Chap. XI.

[42] P. 66. *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9097, f. 1, letter of Sept. 3, 1706.

[43] P. 67. *Burchett*, pp. 684–686; *Galway*, pp. 15–16; *Leake*, I, pp. 273–280; *Künzel*, pp. 571–577; *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 471 (*Richards Papers*, Vol. XXV), pp. 12–13; *cf.* also *Parnell, Russell, Ballard, Stebbing, Carleton, sub loc.*

[44] P. 70. *Leake*, I, pp. 280–287; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 94, 75; *Künzel*, pp. 656–666; *Add. MSS.* 8056, f. 323; Richards' narrative in *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 471, pp. 13–15; cf. *Parnell* and the other secondary authorities.

[45] P. 70. *Künzel*, pp. 656–658; the date of the letter given is clearly an error.

[46] P. 76. As regards the capture of Monjuic, I have given in the *Cambridge Historical Journal* for 1931 my reasons for preferring Richards' evidence, as both unbiassed and first-hand, over that either of the seamen on one hand, or of Carleton on the other. I have printed in the Appendix to Chap. IV, pp. 79–80, above, the most important part of Richards' narrative, from the *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 467 (diary) and 471 (narrative).

The other authorities for the taking of Monjuic and Barcelona are: *Leake*, I, Chap. IX, *Martin*, pp. 82–84, both prejudiced against Peterborough but safe for the action of the fleet; *Künzel*, p. 666, for Charles III's letter. Künzel's narrative is too much based on *Carleton*, who should be read but distrusted (on the authenticity but limited value of *Carleton*, see review in *History*, July 1930); *P. to St.*, p. 5, on Major du Terme; some documents printed in *Russell*, Chap. VIII. *Add. MSS.* 28056, ff. 329, 373; 5442, ff. 102–108; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 94, 75, the letter of Charles III to Queen Anne; *Burnet*, V, pp. 209–215 [420–422] for some evidence of Stanhope at second-hand, and I am sure incorrect in detail. *Freind* is valueless except for the documents, which can be found elsewhere now. See also the second-hand narratives in *Parnell, Stebbing, Russell, Ballard* and B. Williams' *Stanhope*.

CHAPTER V

[47] P. 84. Campbell's *Chancellors*, IV, pp. 296–300 ; *Cowper*, p. 30 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 243–244.

[48] P. 84. *Cowper*, pp. 15–16, 25, 33, 36, 39 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. vii, 72–73.

[49] P. 86. *Coxe*, Chap. XLII, i. p. 515 ; Nichols' *Lit. Anecdotes*, I, p. 134 ; *Cowper*, pp. 35–36, 39 ; *London Gazette* Nov. 18, 1706 ; *Luttrell*, VI, pp. 36, 57, 107.

[50] P. 86. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 268 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XL, i. p. 485 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, pp. 487–489, 496–498 ; *Hearne's Collections*, I, p. 59 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 460 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 223 [428] ; Oldmixon, *Hist. of England*, 1735, p. 345 ; *Remarkes in the Grand Tour of France and Italy, performed by a person of quality in 1691*, 2nd ed. 1705.

[51] P. 87. On the Cabinet, Godolphin and the Queen's Speech, see *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 65, 78–79, and E. R. Turner, *Cabinet Council of England*, I, pp. 456–457 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 451–454 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XL, i. p. 490 ; Newspapers in *B.M., passim*, e.g. *Review*, no. 116, Dec. 1705 ; *Flying Post*, March 20, 1705 ; *Rehearsal, passim*, e.g. no. 28 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 513–514.

[52] P. 88. *H.C.J.*, XV, pp. 37–39 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 224 (429) ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 531–532, 550–551 ; *Add. MSS.* 4743, f. 50.

[53] P. 90. *Cowper*, p. 17 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 238–239 (436) ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*), 17677 *AAA*, ff. 521–524, 529–533, 551–552, 571–574 ; *The D . . . Deputies, A Satyr* 1705 (*Rosebery pamphlets, Edin.*).

[54] P. 91. *H.M.C. Atholl R.* 12, Pt. 8 (1891), p. 63.

[55] P. 91. *Correspondence of Clarendon and Rochester* (1828), II, pp. 459–460 ; A. W. Ward's *Electress Sophia*, p. 382 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 233 (Onslow's note).

[56] P. 93. *Burnet*, V, pp. 225–229 and notes by Dartmouth and others ; *Conduct*, pp. 150–160 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 521–524, 529–533, 571, 582 ; *Cowper*, p. 15 ; *J.H.L.*, XVIII, p. 19.

[57] P. 94. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 519–532 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 228–235 (432–434) and notes ; *Ward*, Electress Sophia, pp. 379–394 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, f. 582 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1704–1706), pp. 321–328 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 5–19 ; *Life of Archbp. Sharp* (1825), I, pp. 307–311.

[58] P. 97. *H.C.J.*, XV, pp. 132–133, 153 and *passim* ; *H.L.J.*, XVIII, pp. 94–96 and *passim* ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 234–235 (434) ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*), 17677 *AAA*, f. 583, *BBB*, ff. 80–81, 95.

[59] P. 99. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 81, 161, Poley's letters of 1704, *e.g.*, April 4, June 27 ; Ward, *Electress Sophia, passim* ; Foxcroft, *Life of Burnet*, pp. 429–430, 458–460 ; *H.M.C. R.* 9 *Morrison*, p. 468, Halifax' letters ; *H.M.C. Stopford-Sackville* (1904), p. 33 ; Macpherson, *Original Papers*, II, pp. 26–73 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 22–32.

[60] P. 99. *Kemble*, p. 451.

CHAPTER VI

[61] P. 103. *Coxe*, Chap. XLIV ; *B.M. Add. MSS.* 7062, ff. 231, 235–243 (Raby from Berlin) ; *Priv. Corr.*, I, pp. 17–22, II, pp. 235–236 ; *Dispatches*, II, pp. 475–485, 510, 514, 521 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 73–74 ; *Add. MSS.* 4741, f. 239 on Calcinato ; *Taylor*, I, pp. 366–370 ; *Pelet*, VI, pp. 617–620, the intercepted letter of Count of Maffei, March 5, showing origin of the idea of Marlborough going to Italy.

[62] P. 105. *Dispatches*, II, pp. 517–521 ; *Pelet*, VI, pp. 16–30, 40 ; *Taylor*, I, pp. 370–373 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XLIV, i. pp. 17–18 ; *St. Simon, Mém.*, Chap. XXII ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 74–75 ; *B.M. Add. MSS.* 7062, ff. 235–238.

[63] P. 106. *Drake, Mems.*, p. 82, on the three-bore guns ; he was in the French army at Ramillies ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 261–262 (450–451) ; *Colonie*, p. 305 ; *Pelet*, VI, pp. 30–31 ; *Millner*, pp. 170–171 ; *Remembrance*, p. 376 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XLV, ii. p. 30, and Chap. XLVI, ii. p. 37, letter to Godolphin.

[64] P. 110. For the operations on the northern half of the field, see *Pelet*, VI, pp. 33–34 ; *Goslinga*, pp. 4, 19 ; *E.H.R.*, April 1904, p. 315 (Orkney) ; *Millner*, p. 173 ; *Parker*, p. 111 ; *Colonie*, p. 306 ; Boyer, *Annals* (1707 ed.), V, p. 79, reproduced in *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 16–17 ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 72 ; cf. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 310 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 82–83, 96 ; *H.M.C. Hare* (*R.* 14, pt. 9), p. 211.

[65] P. 111. *Colonie*, pp. 306–316 ; *Pelet*, VI, pp. 31, 35–36, 38 ; Feuquière, *Mémoires* (1741), IV, p. 17 ; *Tindal*, III, pp. 747–748 and map, useful, though in both text and map Taviers is wrongly called Franquenies.

[66] P. 112. *Millner*, p. 172 (for *Javieres* read *Tavieres*, another form of *Taviers*) ; Taylor, I, p. 383 ; *Parker*, p. 112.

[67] P. 113. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 310–311 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 17–18 ; *Pelet*, VI, p. 35 ; *H.M.C. Clement* (*Molesworth*), pp. 233–234 ; *B.M. Newspapers, passim*, e.g. *Observator* ; *Taylor*, II, pp. 383–384 ; Kane's *Campaigns* (1745), p. 66 ; *Parker*, pp. 110–112 ; *Colonie*, pp. 312–313 ; *Millner*, p. 173 ; *Goslinga*, p. 20 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XLV, i. pp. 30–31 ; *Luttrell's Diary*, VI, p. 49 ; Picture in map in Boyer's *Annals* (ed. 1707), of the Bringfield incident.

[68] P. 114. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 309–310 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 27 = Boyer, *Annals* (ed. 1707), V, p. 83 ; *Remembrance*, pp. 378–379 ; *Goslinga*, p. 21 ; *Pelet*, VI, p. 36.

[69] P. 116. *Pelet*, VI, pp. 37, 63 ; Boyer (ed. 1707), pp. 81–82, or *Lediard Marl.*, II, pp. 20–21, 38 ; *Millner*, pp. 173–174 ; *Taylor*, I, pp. 384–385, II, pp. 383–387 ; *Goslinga*, pp. 21–22 ; *Drake, Mems.*, p. 83 ; *Tindal*, III, p. 748. *H.M.C., R.* 5, p. 348.

[70] P. 117. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 311 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 19 ; Millner, p. 174 ; *H.M.C., R.* 5, p. 348.

[71] P. 118. *Goslinga*, p. 22 ; *Millner*, p. 174 ; *Parker*, p. 113 ; *E.H.R.*, April 1904, p. 316, Orkney's letter, dated from 'Braunchein,' which cannot be, as the editor says Branchon, near Ramillies, but must be Beauvechain (*alias* Bavechien), west of Tirlemont : see *Taylor*, I, p. 392, and *Dispatches*, II, pp. 521–522.

[72] P. 119. *Drake, Mems.*, p. 84 ; *Pelet*, VI, p. 38 ; *Villars, Mém., sub* 1706 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 29 = *Boyer* (ed. 1707), V, p. 85 ; *Millner*, p. 177 ; *Parker*, p. 114. It will be seen that the losses on both sides were variously computed.

[73] P. 120. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *BBB*, ff. 287, 294 ; *Observator*, May 18–22 ; and English newspapers generally for May ; *Hardwicke State Papers*, II, p. 467 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XLV, ii. pp. 29–30. Marlborough wrote *Bingfield*, but the real name was *Bringfield*, as the tomb in Westminster Abbey and other evidence proves.

CHAPTER VII

[74] P. 123. *Coxe*, Chap. XLVI, ii. pp. 37–40 ; *Blackader*, pp. 280–282 ; *Memoirs of Ailesbury* (*Rox.*), II, pp. 602, 604.

[75] P. 126. L. P. Gachard, *Documens inédits concernant l'histoire de la Belgique* (1835), Vol. III, pp. 219–236 ; ditto, *La Belgique sous Charles VI* (1838), I, pp. lxliii–lxliv ; *ditto, Hist. de la Belgique au commencement du* 18 *siècle* (ed. 1880), Chaps I–IX ; *Dispatches*, II, pp. 529–531 ; *Pelet*, VI, pp. 56–57 ; *Parker*, p. 114 ;

Taylor, I, pp. 392–396 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XLVI ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 72, on the entry into Antwerp.

[76] P. 127. *Coxe*, Chap. XLVI ; *Lediard's Marl.*, II, pp. 85–93 ; *Remembrance*, pp. 386–387 ; *Millner*, pp. 181–185. There are good maps of the siege of Ostend in Tindal's *Rapin* (1744), III, p. 749, and in *Description of the Seats of War*, 1707, p. 322.

[77] P. 128. *Parker*, p. 115 ; *Millner*, pp. 185–190 ; *Remembrance*, pp. 387–389 ; *Blackader*, pp. 284–285. There are good maps of the sieges of Menin, Dendermonde and Ath in Tindal's *Rapin* (1744), and in the Atlas of *Pelet*. On the changed attitude of Prussia after Ramillies see *Add. MSS.* 7070, ff. 200, 216, and 7062, f. 243.

[78] P. 128. Richard Cannon, *Historical Records of the Scots Greys* (1837), pp. 40, 50 ; but *Dispatches*, III, p. 105, gives the date of Lord John's death more correctly—Aug. 25, not 15.

[79] P. 129. *Coxe*, Chap. XLVIII, ii. pp. 75–77 ; *Lediard's Marl.*, II, pp. 108–111 ; *H.M.C. Hare*, pp. 212–215 ; *Blackader*, pp. 285–287 ; *Add. MSS.* 37155, f. 158 ; 28057, f. 316.

[80] P. 130. *Pelet*, VI, p. 125 ; *Dispatches*, III, p. 160 ; *Remembrance*, p. 391; *Blackader*, pp. 288–290 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XLVIII, ii. pp. 78–79.

[81] P. 132. *Coxe*, Chap. L, ii. pp. 111–113 ; *Geyl*, pp. 13–15 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, p. 105. Marlborough writes, 1706, Oct. 7, N.S., to Harley : 'For the good of Europe I think this war must continue another year.' *Klopp*, XII, pp. 85–87 ; Vreede, *Correspondance Marl. et Heinsius* (1850), pp. xxix–xxxii and *passim*.

[82] P. 137. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, ff. 65–66 ; 7075, f. 44 ; 7064, ff. 5, 8, 62 ; 28916, f. 252.

[83] P. 138. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7064, f. 25 ; 7058, f. 62 and *passim* ; *Geikie*, Chap. I and pp. 56–57 on the *Condominium* ; on the sufferings of Belgium after 1706, and the sacrifices of Holland to maintain the war there, see *Geyl*, p. 11 and *passim*, and the Dutch Apology of 1712, *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 87, 4, ff. 202–208, bearing out Ailesbury's words ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 86–96.

[84] P. 140. *Geikie*, pp. 38–89 (for Harley's double-dealing see p. 82–83 and note.); *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7058, ff. 64–66 ; 7064, ff. 25–26, Dec. 1706, for the objections of Marlborough, Halifax and Stepney to the inclusion of Ostend and Dendermonde in the Barrier ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 105–107 ; *Dispatches*, III, pp. 166, 168, 194, 223.

[85] P. 141. *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 7064, ff. 1, 5, 8, 62 ; 7059, ff. 101, 103.

[86] P. 142. *Hill*, II, pp. 695–699 ; *P.R.O. Ven. Transcripts* 112 (Mocenigo), ff. 30–31 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 99, 57, Consul Broughton, Venice, April 30, 1706 ; Horatio Brown, *Studies in Venetian History*, I, pp. 360–364.

[87] P. 144. *Coxe*, Chap. XLIX, i. pp. 82–84 ; *Pelet*, VI, pp. 188–288, 655–685 ; *Feldzüge*, VIII, pp. 240–270 ; Pietro Fea, *L'Assedio di Torino* (1905), *passim* (pp. 164–165 on the Waldensian episode) ; Carutti, *Storia di Vitt. Amedeo*, chap. xvi ; *Add. MSS.* 4741, ff. 241, 243, 245.

CHAPTER VIII

[88] P. 145. *Tessé, Mém.*, II, pp. 210–218 ; *Tessé, Lettres*, pp. 271–272 ; *B.M, Add. MSS.* 9776, ff. 1–175, 250, an important collection of Tessé's letters, Jan.–March 1706 ; *Berwick*, I, p. 196.

[89] P. 147. *Add. MSS.* 28057, ff. 93–94.

[90] P. 150. For the siege and relief of Barcelona in 1706 see *B.M. Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9115, ff. 6–9, 20–31, 74–76 ; *Add. MSS.* 9776, ff. 176–271 (Tessé's letters) ; 5438, ff. 47–55 (Peterborough to Leake) and ff. 70–72 (Charles III to Leake from Barcelona ; *B.M. Stowe* 471, ff. 32–35 (Richards) ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 94, 75, Stanhope on May 9, and 89, 19 Paul Methuen on May 9 ; also Paul Methuen's letter of May 26, printed in Marlborough's *Dispatches*, II, pp. 571–574, note ; *Boyer, Annals* (ed. 1707), V, pp. 114–131 journal of the siege ; *P.R.O.* (*Tr.*), 14, 46, letter in French from Barcelona, May 12 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 62–71 ; *Tessé, Mém.* II, pp. 215–225 ; *Tessé, Lettres*, pp. 277–280 ; *Leake*, Book II, Chap. XII ; *Kemble*, pp. 443–445 ; *Burchett*, pp. 692–693 ; *Martin*, pp. 94–95 ; *Camden Misc.*, VIII (*Haddock Corr.*), pp. 49–50 ; *H.M.C. Hare* (1895), pp. 209–210 ; *H.M.C. R.* 5 (*Cholmondeley*), p. 348 ; *H.M.C. Chequers*, pp. 192–193 ; *Byng Papers*, I, pp. 99–101 ; *B. Williams' Stanhope*, pp. 45–49 ; *Burton, Anne*, II, pp. 150–152 ; *Freind, Carleton, Parnell, Russell, Stebbing*, etc., *passim*.

[91] P. 154. *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 89, 19, Methuen July 9, and Milner July 27 ; 94, 76, Stanhope's letter of July 24 ; and Peterborough's of Sept. 3 ; *Galway*, pp. 49–54 ; *Berwick*, I, pp. 213, 222 ; *B.M. Add. MSS.* 5438, ff. 66–67, Peterborough to the Admirals ; 9115, ff. 9–10 ; 22200, f. 3 ; Cruttwell, *Des Ursins*, pp. 191–198 ; Taillandier, *Des Ursins*, pp. 125–134.

[92] P. 156. *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 471, ff. 35–45, Col. John Richards' narrative, most important ; for Peterborough's letters to Leake see *Add. MSS.* 28058, f. 23 ; 5438, ff. 59–68 ; for his correspondence with Stanhope at Charles's court, *P. to St.*, pp. 10–34 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.), 94, 76, Stanhope's letter of July 24, 1706 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1706–1708), pp. 470–492, *cf.* to *Klopp*, XII, pp. 140–146, 543–549. The story told in *Add. MSS.* 9115, ff. 10–11, of the fatal effect of a message from Galway bidding Charles come by Aragon may be true, but needs confirmation ; that was one of Peterborough's statements, see *Add. MSS.* (*St.*) 22200, ff. 2–3.

[93] P. 158. *Berwick*, I, pp. 223–239 ; *H.M.C., R.* 9, II (1884), *Morrison*, p. 468 ; *Add. MSS.* 28057, ff. 194–307 ; 28058, f. 25 ; *Add. MSS.* (*Coxe*) 9115, ff. 11–13 ; 9097, f. 1 (Marlborough to Godolphin) ; 28058, ff. 23–26 ; *Add. MSS.* 5438, ff. 65–67 (Peterborough to Leake) ; for an example of the letters of complaint by which he had wearied Marlborough, see *Add. MSS.* 34518, f. 45 ; *Leake*, II, Chaps. XIII–XV ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 986–988 ; *Galway*, pp. 63–69 ; *Priv. Corr.*, I, p. 24 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XLIX ; Swift, *Conduct of the Allies* ; *Corbett*, II, p. 550 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 140–149 ; *B. Williams Stanhope*, pp. 50–52 ; *Kemble*, pp. 452–454 ; *Carleton, Freind, Parnell, Russell, Ballard, passim*.

CHAPTER IX

[94] P. 166. *Dunbar*, II, pp. 131–137.

[95] P. 171. *Coxe*, Chap. LI–LII ; *Althorp MSS.* for some unprinted letters of Sarah to the Queen ; *Priv. Corr.*, I, pp. 43–65 ; *Conduct*, pp. 160–173. For Harley's position at this time see *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 109–111 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 195 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, p. 622–625 ; for Prior, see Wickham Legg's *Matthew Prior*, pp. 128–137.

[96] P. 173. *Coxe*, Chap. LIII ; *H.C.J.*, XV, pp. 200–219 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 543–552 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 294 (469) ; *Strype's Stow's London* (1720), Book III, p. 173 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *CCC*, f. 111.

CHAPTER X

[97] P. 175. See Th. A. Fischer's *Scots in Sweden*, *Scots in Germany* and *Scots in Prussia* ; John Davidson and Gray, *Scottish Staple at Veere* and *Caldwell Papers* (*Maitland Club*), I, p. 177 on Scots in Holland. The literature of Scottish Jacobites in France and Italy is too large for citation. On Scots lawyers at Leyden see *Culloden*, p. viii, and Hill Burton's *Lovat and Forbes*, p. 280.

[98] P. 175. *Taylor, Jos.*, p. 95.

[99] P. 176. *Calamy*, II, p. 204 ; *Morer*, pp. 2–3, 19 ; *North Eng. and Scotland in 1704* (ed. 1818), pp. 53–54 ; *Kirke*, p. 15.

[100] P. 176. *Taylor, Jos.*, pp. 95–99 ; *Burt*, II, pp. 6–10. Burt made his observations from his residence in the Highlands in George I.'s reign ; I know no English account of travels in the heart of the Highlands in the reign of Anne.

[101] P. 178. *Calamy*, II, pp. 156, 199.

[102] P. 178. My account of the English travel in and attitude to Scotland is taken from so many places I cannot refer to them all. But see *Swift, passim* ; *Hue-and-cry after East India Goods* (1701), pp. 3–5 ; The *Rehearsal, passim* ; *Observator's New Trip to Scotland* (April 24, 1708) ; *Kirke* ; *Taylor* ; *A Description of Scotland and its Inhabitants*, by E. B., 1705 ; *North of England and Scotland in 1704*—journey by an unknown author, published 1818. More friendly are *Morer* and *Calamy*, ii, Chap. vii.

[103] P. 180. The best book on the Scottish Parliament is Rait's *The Parliaments of Scotland* (1924). On the county vote see introduction to Elphinstone Adam's *Political State of Scotland in the Last Century* (1887).

[104] P. 180. For curious evidence on the power of the Nobles see *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 46–49.

[105] P. 182. *Graham* (*Social Life of Scotland in 18th Century*), I, pp. 4–5, 16, 195–196. I take this opportunity of recording my debt to that most valuable work ; its fault is that Graham did not verify his references properly, with the result that the pagination in his footnote references is often wrong ; he also sometimes puts into inverted commas what are really paraphrases. See also *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 92–108, and other references too numerous to cite.

[106] P. 182. *Graham*, I, pp. 7–13 ; *Somerville*, pp. 329 note, 331–337, 369 ; *Culloden*, pp. xx–xxi ; *Dunbar*, I, pp. 194–195 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 75–79 ; *Foulis*, p. 327, July 2, 1703.

[107] P. 183. *Dunbar*, I, pp. 42–46 ; *Clerk* (*Rox.*), p. 63 ; *Foulis*, pp. xxv–xxvii ; *Seafield Corr.* (*S.H.R.* 1912), p. 381 ; *Essays on Ways and Means of Inclosing* (Edin., 1729), p. x.

[108] P. 183. *Scots Kitchen* (Marian McNeill, 1929), p. 20 ; *Fiennes*, p. 171 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, p. 68 ; *Chambers*, III, p. 353.

[109] P. 183. *Dunbar*, I, p. 128 ; *Culloden*, Introd. *passim* ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, p. 73 ; *Graham*, I, pp. 27–28 ; *Burt*, II, pp. 206–207.

[110] P. 184. *Scot. and Scot.*, I, pp. 6–7, II, pp. 52–53, 60 ; *Rogers*, II, pp. 356–359 ; *Graham*, II, pp. 12–14. In *Caldwell Papers* (*Maitland Club*, 1854), I, pp. 259–272, will be found some very interesting ' remarks on the change of manners in my own time ' by Miss Elizabeth Mure, 1714–1795, on the life of Scottish gentry and gentlewomen. It bears on much that I have written above.

[111] P. 185. *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 57–59 ; *Graham*, I, pp. 21–22 ; Swift, *Essay on Modern Education* ; Defoe, *Compleat Gentleman* (1890), p. 117 ; *Seafield*, 1915, Introd., p. vii ; *Culloden*, p. ix.

[112] P. 186. James Grant, *Hist. of the Burgh Schools of Scotland*, Chap. XIII and *passim* ; *Graham*, II, pp. 149–168 ; Morgan (A. M.), *Rise and Progress of Scottish Education*, Chaps. V and VI ; *Edgar*, II, pp. 63–66, 73–79, 120–121 ; James Campbell, *Balmerino and its Abbey*, ed. 1899, p. 448, inaccurately cited in *Graham*, II, p. 155.

[113] P. 188. *Calamy*, II, pp. 152–153, 157–159, 186, 216–219 ; *Carstares* (R. H. Story), pp. 92–95, 272–280 ; John Watson, *Scot of the Eighteenth Century*, Chap. IV, *Wodrow Corr.*, I, pp. 1–2, and *Seafield*, 1915, p. 21 on Carstares' influence; *Graham*, II, pp. 182–203 ; *Culloden*, p. viii ; *Scot. and Scot.*, I, pp. 225–227, 288 ; *Dunbar*, I, pp. 1–4 ; *Proposals for the Reformation of Schools and Universities*, 1704 ; *Scots Kitchen* (McNeill), pp. 14–15 ; *Morer*, p. 50, bears out *Calamy* (II, 219) on Ministers' incomes : ' They have greater equality in their benefices than the C. of E., few exceeding £100 sterling, and as few below £20.'

[114] P. 188. *Bodleian MSS. Carte Papers* 197, pp. 96–103, Memorial by W. Logan of Logan on Scottish feudal jurisdictions, 1707.

[115] P. 189. *Graham*, I, pp. 4–6, 162–166. The *Economic History Review* (Jan. 1931, p. 128) speaks of Graham's ' vivid and gloomy account ' of Scottish agriculture at this period as ' so far unchallenged save in minor details and in *obiter dicta*.' *Dunbar*, I, p. 93 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 188–190, 200 ; *Essays on Ways and Means of Enclosing*, 1729, p. vi ; Lindesay's *Interest of Scotland*, 1733, p. 38 ; *Foulis*, p. xi ; *Seafield*, 1912, p. 428.

[116] P. 190. *Graham*, I, pp. 5–7, 16, 169, 195–200 ; *Defoe*, II, pp. 696–698 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 103, 105, 116–121 ; *Barony of Stitchill* (Sc. Hist. Soc.), p. 153 ; *Calamy*, II, p. 182 ; *Morer*, p. 4 ; *Kirke*, p. 3 ; *Ways and Means of Enclosing* (1729), pp. xlvii–xlix ; *Macky, Scotland*, p. 272 ; W. Hamilton Wishaw, *Sheriffdoms of Renfrew and Lanark compiled in 1710*, pp. 52–55, 65, 67, 71, 143.

[117] P. 191. *Agnew*, II, p. 186, 190 ; *Calamy*, II, p. 177 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 201–202 ; *Graham*, I, pp. 180–185, II, p. 16 ; *Burt*, I, pp. 86–89 ; *Morer*, pp. 18–19 ; *Taylor, Jos.*, pp. 134–135 ; *North Eng. and Scot. in 1704*, p. 53 ; *Observator's trip to Scotland* (1708), for the brutality of English contempt for Scottish housing.

[118] P. 192. *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 192–193, 198, 202–203 ; *Rogers*, I, pp. 205–209 ; *Scots Kitchen*, pp. 18–19 ; *Barony of Stitchill*, pp. xvii–xviii ; *Graham*, I, pp. 152–158, 171 ; *Agnew*, II, pp. 184–185 ; Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. I, Chap. XI, pt. 3.

[119] P. 193. *Graham*, I, pp. 146–152.

[120] P. 194. *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 68–69, 203, 222 ; Guy Miege's *State of Scotland*, 1707, pp. 25–26 ; *Graham*, I, pp. 155, 175–176 ; *Annals of Visc. Stair*, I, pp. 254–255 ; *Morer*, pp. 3, 19 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, p. 426 ; *Agnew*, II, pp. 182–186, 203–204 ; *Defoe*, II, pp. 733–738 ; Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Bk. I, Chap. XI, pt. 3.

[121] P. 195. *Graham*, Chap. VII ; *Edgar*, II, pp. 3–10, 22, 32–33, 51, 61–62 ; on the English poor law see *Blenheim*, pp. 19–21.

[122] P. 195. Thomas Johnston, *History of the Working-classes in Scotland*, pp. 69–81 ; *New Mills Cloth Manufactory* (Scot. Hist. Soc. 1905), pp. xiv–xv, 37, 264 ; *Graham*, II, pp. 264–267.

CHAPTER XI

[123] P. 196. *Acts Parl. Scot., passim, e.g.* Sept. 1–3, 1703 ; *Defoe*, II, pp. 701, 704, 782–784 ; *Dunbar*, I, pp. 55, 144 ; *Scots Kitchen*, pp. 20–21 ; *Chambers*, III, p. 353 ; article by W. R. Scott in *The Union of 1707* (Glasgow Herald publica. 1907), pp. 93–103 ; *Interest of Scotland considered*, 1733, pp. i–iv and 146–147 ; *New Mills Cloth Factory* (*Scot. Hist. Soc.* 1905), pp. li–lv, lxxx–lxxxii ; Scottish pamphlets of 1704–5 in National Library, Edinburgh, on badness of trade and on the question of export of raw wool.

[124] P. 197. *Mathieson*, pp. 86–87, 90 ; *Portland*, IV, pp. 70–71 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 95 (357).

[125] P. 197. Denholm's *Glasgow*, ed. 1804, pp. 110–111, gives the population figures, but adds that there may be a defect in the parochial records that show a decline in the population since 1660. But the famine and distress in William's reign might account for it. *Graham*, I, pp. 127–129 (Graham is not as good or as full on trade and industry as he is on agriculture) ; *Glasgow, its origin and development*,

John Gunn, editor, 1921, pp. 8, 40, 43 ; *North Eng. and Scot. in 1704*, pp. 47–49 ; *Defoe*, II, pp. 744–747.

126 P. 198. *Macky, Scotland*, p. 65. See also the admiration of *Burt* (I, p. 17) for the High Street.

127 P. 198. *Scot. and Scot.*, II, p. 61 ; *Wodrow Corr.*, I, p. 5. On Dr. Pitcairn and on Hell Fire Clubs see *Graham*, I, pp. 93, 111 ; *Wodrow Anal.*, I, p. 323, III, p. 309.

128 P. 201. *Defoe*, II, pp. 710–711 ; *Graham*, I, pp. 81–126 ; *Burt*, I, pp. 16–20 ; *Morer*, pp. 70–73 ; *North Eng. and Scot. in 1704*, p. 43 ; *Description of Scotland*, by E. B., 1705, p. 4 ; *Kirke*, p. 6 ; *Taylor, Jos.*, pp. 100–101, 107, 130–131 note, 134–135 ; *Culloden*, p. 27 on the ' babells.'

129 P. 202. Scottish newspapers in the National Library ; *Edinburgh Periodical Press*, W. J. Couper, 1908, I, pp. 40, 86–98.

130 P. 203. *Wodrow Corr.*, I, pp. 49–50, 165, 167 ; *Anal.*, p. 344 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 24–25 ; *North Eng. and Scot. in 1704*, pp. 54–55 ; *Graham*, I, p. 161, II, pp. 20–25, 82–83 ; *Morer*, p. 53 ; Alex. Carlyle, *Autobiography*, pp. 4–5 ; *Edgar*, I, pp. 18–20.

131 P. 204. *Scot. and Scot.*, I, pp. 219–223 ; *Burt*, I, pp. 169, 172 ; *Graham*, II, pp. 8–11 ; Defoe, *Memoirs of the Ch. of Scotland*, 1717 (ed. 1843), p. 105 ; John Watson, *Scot. of the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 138–158.

132 P. 205. *Graham*, II, pp. 13–14, 18–19, 28, 55–60, 65–66 ; Maitland's *Edinburgh* (1753), p. 282 ; *P.C. Reg. Ed., passim* ; *Edgar*, I, pp. 193–223 ; Arnot's *Trials*, p. 311 ; *Foulis*, pp. xxxiv–xxxv ; Thomas Mair, *Records of the Presbytery of Ellon, passim, e.g.*, p. 207 ; *Burt*, I, pp. 182–185 ; *Kirke*, pp. 7–8 ; Scott's *Fasti* (1867), I, pt. ii, p. 657 ; Cramond's *Illegitimacy in Banffshire*, p. 9 ; Cramond's *Parish of Ordiquill*, pp. 21–22.

133 P. 206. *Causes of the Decay of Presbytery in Scotland*, 1713, pp. 3–4 ; *Right of Church members to choose their own overseers*, by James Hogg, minister at Carnock, 1717, and other tracts on patronage ; *Calamy*, II, pp. 153–154, 214 ; Th. Johnston, *Working Classes in Scotland*, p. 87 ; *Wodrow Corr.*, I, p. 15–16 ; *Edgar*, II, pp. 367–369.

134 P. 207. *Graham*, II, pp. 5–7, 12–14, 48 ; Carstares reckoned the ' episcopal ministers continued in churches under the protection of the law ' at 154 in 1703 (*H.M.C. Portland*, VIII, p. 113), while Defoe reckoned them at 165 in 1707 : see Defoe, *Mems. of Ch. of Scotland*, p. 103. The pamphlet, *Presbyterian persecution examined*, 1707, gives the complete list of them, 165 ; Th. Mair, *Presbytery of Ellon* (1898), pp. 240–245 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, II, pp. 51–52 ; *P.C. Reg. Ed., passim, e.g.* April 25, 1704, the assault on the Presbyterian Minister of Dingwall ; *Wodrow Corr.*, I, p. 216 for another such affair ; *Somers Tracts*, XII, pp. 360, 366–367 ; *Add. MSS.* (*H.F.*) 29588, ff. 496–500, Athol to Nottingham.

135 P. 208. *P.C. Reg. Ed., passim* ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 54, vol. 3, subscriptions for Scottish episcopal clergy collected in England, on appeal of Bp. of Glasgow ; *Life of Archbishop Sharp* (of York), I, pp. 387–388, on Burnet's gift ; *Graham*, II, p. 10 ; Dunlop, *Anent old Edinburgh*, pp. 28–29 *re* the Edinburgh ' baxters ' ; Foxcroft's *Burnet*, pp. 421, 451.

136 P. 209. *H.M.C. Mar.* (1904), pp. 227, 241 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 190–193 ; *Wodrow Anal.*, I, pp. 13–17 ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 27, 54–55 ; Cunningham, *Ch. Hist. of Scotland*, II, pp. 209–210 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, pp. 21–22 ; *Lockhart*, I, p. 66 ; the controversy between Sage and Meldrum, *passim* (*Works of Rt. Rev. John Sage*, vol. i, pp. li–lii ; Meldrum's *Sermon against Toleration of Episcopacy*, preached May 16, 1703 ; Sage's *Reasonableness of a Toleration*). It was not till 1712 that Carstares wrote his *Scottish Toleration Argued*, the most nearly reasonable statement of the case against Toleration. See also *H.M.C. 3rd Report* (*Webster*), p. 421, Stair's letter of 1703 ; and *5th Report* (*Erskine*), p. 638 (37), shows many of the Episcopal clergy will not pray for Queen Anne, as their own champions are forced to allow.

137 P. 209. Story's *Carstares*, pp. 274–275 ; *Wodrow Anal.*, I, p. 13 ; *Calamy*, II, p. 153 ; *H.M.C. Marchmont*, p. 153 ; *Mackinnon*, pp. 79–81.

138 P. 210. *The Nonconformists' Vindication*, 1700 (Cameronian Tract) ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), II, pp. 308, 371, 477 ; *Ker*, I, pp. 14–16, 28–37, 58–65 ; *H.M.C. Laing*, II (1925), pp. 101–109 and *Clerk* (*Rox.*) pp. 54–55, for abortive attempts in 1705 to reconcile the Cameronians to the Church.

139 P. 211. Arnot's *Edinburgh* (1779), pp. 266–267 ; *Morer*, pp. 118–120 ; *Wodrow Corr., passim*, for General Assemblies from 1709 on ; *Dict. of Nat. Biog., sub* George Meldrum ; Cunningham, *Ch. Hist. of Scot.*, II, p. 210 (ed. 2).

140 P. 213. *P.C. Reg.*, June 13 and Oct. 3, 1704 ; *Dunbar*, I, pp. 261–273, and *Chambers*, III, pp. 298–302, are based on *Letter from a gentleman in Fife*, but should be compared with *Just reproof to the false reports* and *Fasti. Ecc. Scot.*, 1925, *sub* Pittenweem on Cowper's conduct. There are half a dozen pamphlets on both sides in the National Library. *Graham*, II, pp. 62–65 ; *Burt*, I, pp. 222–226, 265–269 ; Arnot's *Celebrated Trials*, pp. 366–367 ; *History of Galloway*, II, p. 343 note.

141 P. 214. *Graham*, I, pp. 187–193 ; *Scot. and Scot.*, Chap. XIV ; *Edgar*, I, pp. 269–270 ; *Wodrow's Anal., passim, e.g.* I, pp. 51–52, 57, 105.

142 P. 217. *Scot. and Scot.*, Chaps. XIII, XIV, XV ; *Graham*, I, pp. 184–185, 224–225 ; D. of Argyle, *Scotland as it was and as it is*, 1887, *passim, e.g.* I, pp. 217–221, II, pp. 1–79 ; *Defoe*, II, pp. 838–839 on Highlanders in ' Irish ' regiments in French service ; *Home Life of the Highlanders, 1400–1746*, Maclehose, 1911, *passim*, especially on the music, poetry and superstition. *Burt*, I, pp. 45–49 and vol. ii, *passim*.

143 P. 218. *H.M.C. Portland*, VIII, pp. 373–374, the report to Harley ; Cunningham, *Ch. Hist. of Scot.*, ed. 2, II, pp. 211–212 ; Wm. Mackay, *Sidelights on Highland History*, 1925, pp. 119–123 ; *Moral Statistics of the Highlands and Islands*, Inverness, 1826, *passim* and pp. 14–17 ; *Wodrow Corr.*, I, pp. 73, 216, *Anal.*, III, p. 357, IV, p. 235. Many pamphlets and broadsheets in the National Library deal with this movement. Miss Cunningham's recently published work, *The Loyal Clans* (= the Jacobite clans) contains, as one would expect, much interesting matter ; but I confess that I do not think she has proved that the root of Highland Jacobitism was objection to feudal jurisdictions.

CHAPTER XII

144 P. 223. *Mathieson*, p. 71 ; *Ridpath*, p. 319 ; *H.M.C. Marchmont* and *Seafield*, pp. 154–155 ; *Wodrow Anal.*, I, pp. 14, 17 ; examples of excellent Scottish pamphlets in favour of Union, written soon after the Darien experience, are *The Interest of Scotland*, 1700 (anon. by Sir William Seton of Pitmedden), and *Parainesis Pacifica or a persuasive to the union of Britain*, Edinburgh, 1702. Sir Charles Firth kindly lent me his collection of Union pamphlets.

145 P. 224. *H.M.C. Marchmont, Seafield*, p. 199 ; *Macpherson*, I, pp. 601, 606, 628 and *passim*, Q. Anne's reign ; *P.R.O.* (*Tr. France*), 190, ff. 56–57, 73–79 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*) and *Ker, passim*.

146 P. 224. *Carstares, Letters* (1774), p. 714 ; *Lockhart*, I, p. 43.

147 P. 225. *Lockhart*, I, p. 58 ; *Letter from one of the country party to his friend in country*, March 1704.

148 P. 226. *Ker*, I, p. 22 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, p. 24 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 54–56, 58 and *passim* ; *Macpherson*, I, pp. 623–628, 645. For Jacobite and French suspicions

of Hamilton's own designs on the throne see Hooke, *Negociations* (ed. 1760), p. 40 ; *Legrelle*, pp. 298–299 and note. See also Hume Brown, *Scotland*, III, p. 81, and *Union*, pp. 27–28, 71 note ; Lord Rosebery, *The Union of England and Scotland*, 1871, is good on Hamilton. Salomon, *Königin Anna*, p. 328, for the Pretender's final belief in his loyalty.

149 P. 228. *P.C. Reg. Ed.*, letter from members of Sc. P.C. then in London, March 8—division and decision of P.C. at Edinburgh, March 13—May 12, war declared ; *Crossrigg*, pp. 80–82 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 75, 88 ; *Jerviswood*, p. 2 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 20–23 (320) ; *Dicey and Rait*, pp. 154–157 ; *Letter from a member of Parliament of Scotland to his electors*, 1703, good on the illegality of the Parl. in June 1702.

150 P. 229. *Dalrymple Memoirs*, 1790, III, Pt. IV, p. 257 ; *Lockhart*, I, p. 276 ; *Mathieson*, p. 75 and note ; *Crossrigg*, p. 83 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, p. 5 ; *Marchmont*, III, pp. 240–241 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 23–24. Burnet, a Scot by birth and upbringing, understands Scottish affairs ; moreover, being a Whig but not a Presbyterian, he is not so complete a party man in Scottish affairs as in English.

151 P. 229. *Lockhart*, I, pp. 47–51 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, pp. 18–28.

152 P. 230. *Marchmont*, III, pp. 243–250 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, p. 28 ; *Carstares, Letters*, pp. 714–716 ; *Lockhart*, I, p. 48 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 75–76 ; Hume Brown, *Union*, pp. 39–43 ; *Ker*, I, pp. 21–22 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 54, vol. i, letter of June 30, 1702 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 75, 85.

153 P. 232. For the proceedings of the Commissioners see *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 54 (*Scotland*), vol. ii, also *Defoe, Union*, pp. 728–751 (Appendix) ; Burton, *Anne*, I, pp. 142–148 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 77–79, 114, 117.

154 P. 233. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 54, vol. i, Mr. Keith's letter of Aug. 7, 1702, on influences at the coming elections. *Ridpath*, pp. 1–20, 42 ; Boyer, *Queen Anne*, 1735, pp. 52–53 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 79–81 ; Hume Brown, *Scotland*, III, pp. 85–87, *Union*, pp. 50–56 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 50–58.

155 P. 234. For the 'riding of the Parliament,' see *P.C. Reg. Ed.*, Order of May 3, 1703 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, pp. 104–107 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 57–68 ; *Ridpath*, pp. 28–52 ; *Add. MS.* 29587 (*H.F.*), f. 146 ; 29588, ff. 496–500 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 81–82 ; *Stair, Annals*, I, pp. 203–208, should be compared to Lockhart's complaints on the question whether the Jacobites first deserted Queensberry, or Queensberry the Jacobites. For Godolphin's views see *Stair, Annals*, I, pp. 380–381, and *H.M.C. Atholl* (1891), p. 61.

156 P. 235. *Dicey and Rait*, pp. 157–158 ; *Clerk* (*Rox.*), p. 49 ; *Stowe MSS.* (*B.M.*) 222, f. 216, intercepted Jacobite letters.

157 P. 237. *Speeches by a Member of the Parliament which began 6th of May, 1703*, Edin. 1703 (=Fletcher's speeches), pp. 5–9, 39–41, 73 and *passim*. Several of these speeches are also in *Ridpath, q.v., passim* ; *H.M.C. Laing*, II (1925), pp. 25–28 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, p. 68 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, p. 23 ; *Seafield, 1915*, pp. xviii, 2 ; for Queensberry's and Godolphin's views on accepting the Act of Security see *Add. MSS.* 29589, f. 97.

158 P. 237. *Macpherson*, I, p. 630.

159 P. 237. *H.M.C. Annandale* (1897), p. 120.

160 P. 238. *Add. MSS.* 20311, ff. 38–45 ; 31249, f. 15.

161 P. 238. *Macpherson*, I, pp. 673, 676.

162 P. 239. *Macpherson*, I, pp. 629–632, 639–681 ; *Terry, Chev.*, pp. 23–27 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 72–73, 79–84 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, p. 24, speaks of Atholl as '*Jacobite déclaré*' already in 1704 ; see also *Major Fraser's Manuscript* (1889), I, pp. 142–144 ; for Atholl's correspondence with Godolphin in 1703, and his desire for alliance with Marlborough, see *Add. MSS.* 28055, ff. 25–72, especially f. 39, and *H.M.C. Atholl* (1891), pp. 60–61.

163 P. 240. *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), pp. 300–308 ; *Turberville*, pp. 46–50 ; *Mackinnon*, Chap. V ; *Tindal*, III, pp. 629–639 ; Boyer, *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 104–118 ; W. C. Mackenzie's *Simon Fraser* (1908) makes the best of a bad case for Fraser ; it is a valuable study.

164 P. 240. *Add. MSS.* 31250, f. 46 ; *Macpherson*, I, pp. 641–671.

165 P. 241. *Lockhart*, I, p. 97 ; *Clerk* (*Rox.*), p. 48 ; *Marchmont*, III, p. 328.

166 P. 241. *Clerk* (*Rox.*), pp. 47–53 ; *Marchmont*, III, pp. 263–267 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 92–97 ; Mathieson, pp. 91–96 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 166–169 [396].

167 P. 243. *Crossrigg*, pp. 136–151 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, pp. 127–137 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 98–107 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 169–174 (397–400) ; *Seafield*, 1912, p. 377 ; *Add. MSS.* 28055, f. 90 ; Hume Brown, *Union of England and Scotland*, pp. 174–183, Johnstone's letters ; *H.M.C. Marchmont and Seafield*, p. 204.

CHAPTER XIII

168 P. 245. *Jerviswood*, p. 14.

169 P. 246. *Vernon*, III, pp. 279–280 ; *Jerviswood*, pp. 14–23 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne* (1798), p. 618 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 179 and Dartmouth's note ; Hume Brown, *Union*, pp. 75–78 ; *Turberville*, pp. 78–79 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 369–374 ; *Boughton MSS.*, letter of Vernon to Shrewsbury, Jan. 10, 1705 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 513–514, 539, 570–571.

170 P. 248. *H.M.C. Coke* (1889), p. 53 ; *Ridpath*, pp. 258–260 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, p. 137 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, p. 159.

171 P. 249. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *AAA*, ff. 63, 69 ; *H.M.C. Marchmont and Seafield*, p. 207 ; *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, pp. 166–167, 203–207.

172 P. 256. G. P. Insh, *The Company of Scotland* (1932) ; Sir R. Temple, *Papers of Thomas Bowrey* (Hakluyt Soc. 1925) and *The Tragedy of the Worcester* (Benn, 1930), especially the latter, *passim* ; *Seafield*, 1915, pp. 17–28 ; *Seafield*, 1912, pp. 386–398 ; *Add. MSS.* 28055, ff. 154–155 (Seafield's letter) ; f. 158 (Roxburgh's) ; *Jerviswood*, pp. 64–75 ; *H.M.C. Bagot* (1885), p. 339 (Hamilton's letter April 8) ; *More Culloden*, II, p. 5 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, VIII, pp. 178–179 ; *H.M.C. Hope Johnstone of Annandale* (1897), p. 121 ; Defoe, *Union*, pp. 80–82 ; *Argyle, Int. Letters*, I, p. 11 ; *Taylor, Jos.*, pp. 121–126 ; *P.C. Reg. Ed.* ; *State Trials*, XIV, pp. 1199–1311. Numerous pamphlets, broadsheets and poems in the Nat. Lib., e.g. *A Pill for Pork Eaters* and *Observations made in England on the trial.*

173 P. 258. *Argyle, Int. Letters*, I, pp. 1–32 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 108–124 ; *Jerviswood*, pp. 70–113 ; *Seafield*, 1912, pp. 395–397 ; *Seafield*, 1915, pp. 16–17, 32–33, 37, 47, 52–64, 76–77, 82–83 ; *Add. MSS.* 28070, f. 10, the Queen on Queensberry ; 28055, ff. 158, 162, 168, 172, 357–362 ; Hume Brown, *Union*, pp. 189–190 (Annandale's letters) ; Mathieson, pp. 105–109 ; *Crossrigg*, pp. 152–164 ; *H.M.C. Johnstone of Annandale* (1897), p. 122 ; *H.M.C. Laing*, II (1925), pp. 114–116, Queen's instructions to Argyle as Commissioner of the Scottish Parliament, June 1705.

174 P. 261. *Acts Parl. Scot.*, pp. 235–237 ; *Crossrigg*, p. 171 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 126–137 ; *Seafield*, 1915, pp. 82–88 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie* (1904), p. 235 ; *H.M.C. Laing*, II, pp. 118–122 ; *Taylor, Jos.*, pp. 112–127 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 221 (427) ; *Clerk* (*Rox.*), pp. 57–58 ; *Add. MSS.* 28055, ff. 360–363.

175 P. 261. *H.C.J.*, XV, p. 69 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1704–1706), pp. 318–319 ; *Marchmont*, III, p. 290 ; *Carstares, Letters* (1774), pp. 738–740, 742 ; *Stair, Annals*, I, p. 210 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, pp. 239, 243 ; *Defoe, Union*, p. 92.

176 P. 263. Hume Brown, *Union*, pp. 108–109 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 112–113 ; *Marchmont*, III, pp. 288, 293 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 136, 152–153 ; *Stair, Annals*, I,

pp. 211–212 ; *Jerviswood*, pp. 144, 147 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, pp. 240, 242. *Burnet*, V, pp. 273–274 [458], is quite wrong in saying that the policy had been adopted of naming enemies to government and the Union on to the Commission : the opposite was the case. The full list of the Commissioners, with their attendances and proceedings, will be found in the Appendix to *Acts Parl. Scot.*, XI. For Somers' part, see Hardwicke's note to *Burnet*, V, p. 287.

177 P. 266. *Acts Parl. Scot., Appendix*, pp. 165–166 ; *Carstares, Letters*, pp. 743–744 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 115–120 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, p. 271 ; *Lockhart*, pp. 152–156 ; *Clerk* (*Rox.*), pp. 59–60.

178 P. 269. *Clerk* (*Rox.*), pp. 61–63 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, p. 271 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 194–196 ; the Union Treaty and the Commissioners' Signatures will be found in *Acts Parl. Scot., Appendix*, pp. 201–205. For the question of Commissioners' attitude to the right of appeal to the House of Lords, see *Dicey and Rait*, pp. 192–193, and *Defoe, Union*, 158–161.

CHAPTER XIV

179 P. 272. *Jerviswood*, p. 177 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 121–123.

180 P. 272. That the Squadrone were honestly persuaded by such arguments as these to support the Union, in spite of their little love for Queensberry's government, emerges from *Jerviswood, passim, e.g.*, 141, 152, 174–177 ; *Marchmont*, III, pp. 328–320 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, p. 371 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 125, 129–130 ; *Seafield*, 1915, pp. 99, 101 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 278–280 (460).

181 P. 274. Rait, *Parliaments of Scotland*, p. 124.

182 P. 275. *Defoe, Union, passim* for speeches, pp. 317–328 for Belhaven's speech and Marchmont's answer ; also *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, p. 309 ; for Belhaven's personal appearance, '*Macky's*' (?) *Characters*, p. 135, *Roxburghe Club*, 1895.

183 P. 276. *Defoe, Union*, pp. 245–246 ; *Mathieson*, p. 132, *cf.* Rait, *Parliaments of Scotland*, p. 121 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 282 [462]. For the division lists throughout this Parliament see *Acts Parl. Scot.*

184 P. 277. *Clerk* (*Rox.*), p. 64. Clerk is wrong in thinking Defoe was employed by Godolphin—his employer was Harley, to whom he wrote his reports from Edinburgh, afterwards shown to Godolphin, see *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 340–341, 352, 374, 382, and *passim* ; see also *Defoe, Union*, pp. 236–241, *Crossrigg*, pp. 176, 184 ; *Argyle, Int. Letters*, I, pp. 42–43, 50–52, 58 ; *H.M.C. R.* 9 (*Morrison*), p. 469.

185 P. 279. For Hamilton's dealings with the Ministers, see *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, p. 278, and *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 347 ; for the 'toothache' and his other failures see *Lockhart*, I, pp. 200, 212–214, and *passim* p. 194 *et seq.* ; *Ker*, I, pp. 25–39 ; *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* on Ker ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 362–380 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 266–281 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne* (1798), pp. 219–220 and notes. *Hooke* (*Rox.*), I, pp. 208–214, II, pp. 85–93, and *Lockhart*, I, pp. 147–149, on Jacobite communications with France and England.

186 P. 281. *Lockhart*, I, pp. 173–175 ; *Marchmont*, III, p. 305 ; Story's *Carstares*, pp. 291–301 ; *Carstares, Letters*, pp. 754–756 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, pp. 278, 315 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 130, 187–188 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 340, 343, 346–348, 365, 382–383 ; *Crossrigg*, p. 195 ; *Clerk* (*Rox.*), p. 245 ; *Rait and Dicey*, p. 228 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 338–342, 469, 557–561 ; *Acts Parl. Scot.*, pp. 314–322 ; *Letter from a gentleman in Scotland to his friend in England against the Sacramental Test*, London, 1708, pp. 4–7 and *passim* ; *Seasonable warning of the Pope and King of France* (Edinburgh ?), 1706, p. 15 and *passim* ; *Add. MSS.* 7078, ff. 237, 241–243 ; (*L'H.*) 17677 *CCC*, ff. 38, 46.

187 P. 281. *Marchmont*, III, pp. 433–434 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 368–369 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 136–137 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *CCC* ff. 38, 46.

188 P. 283. *Lockhart*, I, pp. 262–272 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1110–1115 ; *H.C.J.*, XVII, pp. 207–208 ; *Marchmont*, I, pp. xcviii–cxxxiv ; *Mathieson*, pp. 144–147, 148 note, 157–158 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 222–223 and note ; *Jerviswood*, p. 160, on Roxburgh's claim on government, contradicting Lockhart's statement ; *Jerviswood*, pp. 55, 82–83, on Queensberry's desire for a speedy liquidation of his claims ; *Hume Brown, Scotland*, III, pp. 126–127 ; *Dicey and Rait*, pp. 227–228.

189 P. 284. *H.C.J.* and *H.L.J., sub loc.* ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 551–578 ; *Add. MSS.* 7078, f. 245 ; *Carstares, Letters*, pp. 759–760 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 285–288 [463–465] ; *Feiling*, p. 391 ; *H.M.C. Marchmont and Seafield*, pp. 158–159.

190 P. 284. *Acts Parl. Scot.*, pp. 446–491 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 522–523.

191 P. 285. *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, p. 389 ; *Clerk* (*Rox.*), pp. 67–69 ; *Seafield*, 1912, p. 432.

CHAPTER XV

192 P. 288. Besides letters of 1707 printed in *Coxe* and elsewhere, see *Add. MSS.* 9093, ff. 11–12, Marl. to Ch. III ; 9099, f. 120, Godolphin to Marlborough, June 1 ; and, for the Austrian complaints, Prince of Salm's and Wratislaw's letters to Marlborough, 9098, ff. 21–24 and 53–54. The latent ill-feeling behind this interchange of courtesies must have been very strong. For the Hungarian question, see *Add. MSS.* 17677, xxx, ff. 273, 277–278 ; for Savoy *v.* Austria see *ditto*, f. 306 and *passim*.

193 P. 292. *Coxe*, Chaps. LIV–LV and letters of Aug. 1 and 5–16 in Chap. LIX ; *Diplomatic Instructions, Sweden* (*R.H.S.* 1922), pp. 14–15, 30–38 ; A. E. Stamp, *Meeting of Marl. and Charles XII* in *R.H.S.* 1898 ; *Dispatches*, III, pp. 347, 350, 357–9 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 383–390, 419–446 ; *Add. MSS.* 9099, ff. 120, 171, 180 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 157–179 ; Voltaire, *Hist. de Charles XII*, livre 3, compare *Tindal*, IV, pp. 15–19 and notes ; F. W. Head, *Fallen Stuarts*, pp. 120–121.

194 P. 295. *Klopp*, XII, pp. 295–325 ; *Dispatches*, III, pp. 326–330, 340–342 ; *Add. MSS.* 9093, f. 8 ; 9098, ff. 162–165, 201–202 ; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 3–4, 21–25 and notes ; *Corbett*, II, pp. 550–553.

195 P. 297. *Parnell*, Chaps. XXIII–XXIV ; B. Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 52–58 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. ix–x, 146–150, 154–155 ; *P. to St.*, p. 51 ; *Marchmont*, III, pp. 453–460 letters of Rivers and Galway ; *Add. MSS.* 7058, f. 87 ; 9099, f. 156 ; Russell's *Peterborough*, II, pp. 121, 145–157 ; *Coxe* (*ed.* 1818), II, pp. 235–238, 295, 298, 305–306, for Peterborough's European tour ; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 4–6 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 616 (Feb. 18, $170\frac{7}{8}$) on losses of Rivers' men on the voyage, and pp. 985–993 on Galway *v.* Peterborough ; see also *Galway*, pp. 75–81, and *Freind*, pp. 178–187.

196 P. 300. For the whole battle, and particularly for Shrimpton's surrender, see the eye-witnesses' account in *Tindal*, IV, pp. 5–10 ; *Berwick*, I, pp. 251–254 ; Stanhope's *Succession*, pp. 230–235 ; *Historical Records Sixth Regiment of Foot*, 1837, pp. 42–45 ; *Galway*, pp. 82–85 ; *Add. MSS.* 28057, f. 338 ; 31134, ff. 399–400 ; and 9099 (General Erle, June 26, 1707) ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 284–288 ; for Galway's dispatch of April 27 describing the battle to Sunderland, see *Coxe*, Chap. LVI. Paul Chamberlen's *History of Queen Anne* (1738), pp. 260–262, gives another good account of the battle. He blames Shrimpton's surrender as 'most dishonourable,' and made 'upon a false report that the enemy was surrounding them.' But how this may have been I cannot tell. In the *Relacion de la gran*

victoria en el campo de Almanza, Seville, 1707, Shrimpton's surrender is described as being made to cavalry alone. The same pamphlet contains a map of the battle purporting to mark each regiment in both armies.

197 P. 300. W. H. Logan's *Pedlar's Pack*, pp. 82–83.

198 P. 301. *H.M.C. Egmont* (1909), II, p. 223. For the sieges of 1707 see *Parnell*.

199 P. 304. *Pelet*, VII, pp. 185–280 ; Villars' *Mémoires*, sub 1707 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 492–505 ; *Dispatches*, III, pp. 327, 392, 396 ; *Add. MSS.* 9093, ff. 11–12 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 441.

200 P. 309. For the siege of Toulon see *Pelet*, VII, pp. 109–153 ; *Tessé, Mem.*, II, chap. xi ; *Feldzüge*, IX, pp. 96–132, 335–347, and Appendix, pp. 175–188 ; *Klopp*, XII, pp. 326–349 ; *Byng Papers* (Navy Records Soc. 1930), I, pp. 195–235 ; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 25–28 (Chetwynd's journal) ; *Siege of Toulon collected from the original papers and personal knowledge of some gentlemen concerned* (from French sources), 1746 ; V. Brun, *Guerres Maritimes de la France, Port de Toulon*, 1861 ; *Burchett*, pp. 731–732 ; *Coxe*, Chap. LXI.

201 P. 311. *Burchett*, p. 733 ; *Spectator*, no. 26 ; above all Professor Laughton's article on Shovell in the *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* ; Campbell's *Lives of the Admirals* gives the old traditions, not reliable.

CHAPTER XVI

202 P. 315. *H.M.C. R.* 7 (*Egmont*, I), p. 246 ; *Wentworth Papers* (1883), pp. 39, 50–51, 58–59, 61–62, 64, 66 ; *State Trials*, XIV, pp. 1327–1372 ; *Tatler*, nos. 50–51 (1709), and notes in 1789 ed.

203 P. 318. *Conduct*, pp. 177–211 ; *Coxe*, II, chaps. LXII, LXIII *passim*, for the correspondence, Aug.–Nov. 1707 ; see also Marl. Papers in *H.M.C. R.* 8, p. 41, which should be read with knowledge of the cipher : 4 = Harley, 10 = Godolphin, 40 = Marlborough, 17 = the Queen, 41 = Sarah ; *H.M.C. R.* 9 (Morrison Papers), pp. 469–470 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 448 (Newcastle to Harley), 454 (Abigail), 426 (High Tories repentant) ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 180–181 ; *Miller*, pp. 16–17 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 326–330 ; *Feiling*, p. 397.

204 P. 320. *H.M.C. R.* 8 (Marlborough Papers), p. 41 ; *Coxe*, II, chaps. LXII, LXIV, pp. 337–338, 343, 348, 380–381 ; *Feiling*, p. 399 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 328–330 [488] ; *Conduct*, pp. 174–176.

205 P. 321. *H.M.C. R.* 4 (Emmanuel College Papers), p. 419 ; see also *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* under Tudway.

206 P. 322. For the evidence behind the attack on and defence of the Admiralty see *H. of L. MSS.* (1706–1708), pp. xv–xxi, 99–334, and *H.L.J.*, Vol. XVIII, under Dec. 17, 1707 ; Jan. 9 and Feb. 17, 170$\frac{7}{8}$; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 597–600, 612–613, 619–662 ; *C.S.P.* (*Am. and W.I.*), 1706–1708, pp. 602–603 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 332–338 [489–492] ; *Coxe*, II, pp. 370–374 ; *Feiling*, p. 398 ; *Taylor*, II, pp. 61–64 ; *Klopp*, XIII, pp. 2–3 ; Defoe's *Review*, Feb. 24, 170$\frac{8}{8}$ on Whigs and Tories. For the Leicester election see *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 464. For the Jamaica fleet's arrival see *Add. MSS.* 7078, f. 247.

207 P. 324. *H.L.J.*, XVIII, pp. 410, 420–422 ; G. N. Clark in *Ec. Hist. Rev.*, Jan. 1928, pp. 263–264 ; *Chalmers' Estimate*, printed in *Cunningham*, p. 932 ; Campbell's *Lives of the Admirals* (ed. 1817), IV, pp. 27–28 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 645–646, 660–661 ; *C.S.P. Dom.* 1703–1704, pp. 496–497 on prizes.

208 P. 325. *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 67, 73 ; *Freind*, ed. 1707 ; *Coxe*, II, pp. 370–378 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 605–608 ; *H.M.C. Egmont*, II (1909), pp. 220–221, perhaps the best account of the debate ; see also *Vernon*, III, pp. 300–301 ; *Burnet*, V, p. 338 [492] ; *B. Williams' Stanhope*, pp. 66–67.

209 P. 327. *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, p. 68 ; *H.M.C. Downshire*, I, pt. ii (1924), p. 862.

210 P. 329. *Feiling*, pp. 399–401 ; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 74–76 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 339–345 ; *Portland*, V, p. 647 ; *Noorden*, III, p. 220 ; *Portland*, IV, pp. 477–478 ; *Klopp*, XIII, pp. 25–26 ; *Conduct*, p. 212 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 188–190 ; *Coxe*, II, chap. LXIV, pp. 385–388 ; *Althorp MSS.*, Duchess of Marlborough's letter to Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744.

211 P. 331. For Defoe's paper on the Secretary's office in 1704 see *E.H.R.*, Jan. 1907, pp. 130–140 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 647, Edward Harley.

212 P. 333. *H.L.J.*, Feb. 9 and March 18, 170$\frac{7}{8}$; *H. of L. MSS.* (1706–1708), pp. xxxvi–xxxvii, 548–551 ; *State Trials*, XIV, pp. 1371–1396 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 481–484, 488 ; V, pp. 647–649 (Edward Harley) ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 341–348 ; *Report of the House of Lords, being the Trial and Confession of W. Gregg*, 1708 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, p. 177. Lorrain's letter of 1711 will be found in *State Trials*, XIV, p. 1390, also in *Secret Transactions, etc.*, by Francis Hoffman, 1711 ; see also Hoffman's *More Secret Transactions*, 1711, and Swift's *Remarks upon a pamphlet entitled A Letter to the Seven Lords*, 1711. Also *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 75–76. For modern writers cf. *Leadam*, pp. 132–133, to *Taylor*, II, pp. 76–92. I think Taylor trusts too much to what Swift wrote against the Whig Lords in 1711.

CHAPTER XVII

213 P. 335. *Burton, Scotland*, II, pp. 15–20 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 277–280 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 567–578, 582–585 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 289–291 [466] ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 579–580 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 223–224 ; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie* (1904), p. 394.

214 P. 337. *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 296–298 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 666–667 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 280–283 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 348–352 [498–499] ; *H.M.C. Lonsdale* (1893), pp. 117–118, where the letters dated Nov. 1705 should be Nov. 1707. *Burton, Scotland*, II, pp. 20–24 ; *Carstares, Letters*, pp. 767, 770–771 ; *Defoe, Union*, pp. 696–697 ; *Somers, Tracts*, XII, p. 624.

215 P. 338. F. W. Head, *The Fallen Stuarts*, pp. 128–140, 335–345 ; *Add. MSS.* 20241 ff. 18–19, 20242 f. 23, *Gualterio Papers* ; *Add. MSS.* 20311 ff. 68–74, 31248 ff. 139–142, Irish appeals, 1705–1707. For the contrast of treatment of Catholics in England and Scotland to their treatment in Ireland, as reported to Rome, see *P.R.O.* (Tr.), *Rome*, 101, and *Blenheim*, p. 57 ; *Carstares, Letters*, p. 766.

216 P. 338. *Macpherson*, I, pp. 683–684.

217 P. 340. *Hooke* (*Rox.*), II, *passim*, especially pp. 347–409 ; *Hooke*, 1760, *passim*, especially pp. 14–91 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 227–238 ; *Terry, Chev.*, pp. 36–82.

218 P. 341. *Ker*, I, pp. 40–64 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 238, 302–309 ; *Hooke*, 1760, pp. 43–47 ; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 26, 84 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1708–1710), pp. ix, xiv.

219 P. 346. *H. of L. MSS.* (1708–1710), pp. 44–46 ; *Byng Papers*, II, pp. 96–99, 108–109, 118 ; *Taylor*, II, pp. 96–99 ; *Parker*, pp. 119–120 ; John Deane, *Journal of Campaign in Flanders*, pp. 4–6 (see *Blenheim*, p. 228, for quotation from Deane's account of lying off Tynemouth).

220 P. 347. *Add. MSS.* 9101 f. 187 ; cf. Defoe's *Review*, April 29 and May 4, 1708 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1708–1710), p. 45 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 243–244 ; *Carstares, Letters*, pp. 764–765.

221 P. 349. *P.R.O., S.P.*, 54, Sunderland's letter of March 9 and Dodswell's of March 30 on the arrests show the first initiative came from ' the Councill of Great Britain ' at London ' for the seissing of 31 persons suspect.' *Lockhart*, I, pp. 248–249 ; *H.M.C. R.* 8 (*Marlborough Papers*), pp. 34, 41–42 ; *H.M.C. Marchmont Seafield* (1894), pp. 159–161 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 489 ; *Marchmont*, III, pp. 331–335 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1708–1710), pp. x–xiv,

79–262 *passim* (144–146 on Belhaven); *Chambers*, III, p. 345, for a curious incident at the trial of the Stirlingshire gentlemen; *The other side of the Question*, 1742, p. 380, for Sunderland's letter to Roxburgh; for his letter about the pardon of Ld. Griffin see Appendix C, p. 412, above.

222 P. 350. *Letters of H. Prideaux* (Camden Soc., 1875), p. 199; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 62, 71; *H.M.C. Downshire*, I, pt. II (1924), p. 858. Andréadès, *Hist. of Bank of England*, pp. 120–121, and *Leadam*, p. 137, for the run on the Bank.

223 P. 350. See Appendix C, p. 413, above.

224 P. 351. *Priv. Corr.*, I, pp. 116, 130, where 'Mr. Gapp' means John Gape, who got in for St. Albans this election.

225 P. 351. *H. of L. MSS.* (1706–1708), pp. xxxix, 563–564; Defoe's *Review*, May 4 and June 8, 1708; *Prideaux's Letters* (Camd. Soc.), p. 200; *H.M.C. Ailesbury* (1898), p. 199, for Ludgarshall.

226 P. 352. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 489–490; *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), p. 862; *H.M.C. Bagot*, p. 341; *Burnet*, V, p. 385 [517].

CHAPTER XVIII

227 P. 354. *Coxe*, Chap. LXVI (II, p. 415 for the letter); *Taylor*, II, pp. 103–105.

228 P. 356. *Taylor*, II, pp. 116–124; *Coxe*, Chaps. LXVIII, LXIX (see his letters to Godolphin of July 9 and July 12, 1708); *Pelet*, VIII, pp. 3–34, 381–385, 388–390; *H.M.C. Hare*, pp. 217–218; *St. Simon*, if he cannot be trusted on details of what befell in the field, is evidence of the bitterness of the open quarrels between Burgundy and Vendôme; *Priv. Corr.*, I, p. 132.

229 P. 357. *Pelet*, VIII, pp. 29–34; *Coxe*, Chap. LXIX (II, pp. 465–466); *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 257–258.

230 P. 366. For the battle of Oudenarde, see *Feldzüge, Serie* 2, *Band* I, pp. 339–363 and Appendix, 151–156; *Pelet*, VIII, pp. 31–38, 388–391 (most dishonest accounts as regards the result of the battle, as Louis seems to have suspected, see p. 399); even *Berwick*, II, p. 8, admits the loss of 9,000 prisoners (see also *Dispatches*, IV, p. 137), and speaks of the 'débris' of the army after the battle; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 260–293, with some valuable letters from French officers; *Taylor*, Chap. XX; *Coxe*, Chap. LXIX, and letters of July 23 and 26, in Chap. LXX; J. M. Deane, *Journal of Campaign in Flanders* (ed. 1846), pp. 11–16; *H.M.C. Hare*, p. 218; *Parker*, pp. 122–125; *Priv. Corr.*, I, p. 135; *Remembrance*, pp. 410–413; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 102–104, 137; *Millner*, pp. 214–220; *St. Simon* for court gossip as to quarrels of the generals; *Historical Records of the Buffs*, by Richard Cannon, 1837, pp. 153–157; *The Fighting Forces* for Sept. 1924, pp. 489–497, *Oudenarde, the Missing Order of Battle*, by C. T. Atkinson; Atkinson's *Marlborough*, Chap. XIV; *Col. Blackader* (1824), pp. 317–320; Dr. Francis Hare's *Thanksgiving Sermon* preached before House of Commons for Oudenarde, Feb. 17, $170\frac{8}{9}$; *Goslinga*, pp. 52–61, though the Dutch Field-Deputy's account of how he snatched victory from defeat when Marlborough had lost his head is only worthy of the treatment it receives in *Taylor*, II, pp. 144–147, as another example of Bill Adams winning the battle of Waterloo.

231 P. 368. *Coxe*, Chap. LXX; *Dispatches*, IV, p. 129; *Taylor*, II, pp. 152–160; *Feldzüge, Serie* 2, *Band* I, p. 375; *H.M.C. Hare*, pp. 219–220. There is a good discussion of these issues in *Burton, Anne*, III, pp. 23–31, and *Atkinson*, pp. 345–350. Mr. Atkinson's military opinions are always worth noting.

232 P. 370. *Feuquières, Mémoires*, ed. 1741, IV, p. 119; *Pelet*, VIII, pp. 40–168, 393–533; *Berwick*, II, *sub. ann.* 1708, and letters of 1708 at end of vol.;

Atkinson, Chap. XV; *Taylor*, Chaps. XXI–XXII; *Coxe*, LXXII–LXXIII; *Feldzüge, Serie* 2, *Band* I, pp. 364–495; *Remembrance*, pp. 418–457.

233 P. 372. *Pelet*, VIII, pp. 103–106, 444–449 (La Motte's dispatch); *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 242–243; *Coxe*, Chap. LXXIII, Vol. II, pp. 552–559; *Atkinson*, pp. 357–360; *Taylor*, II, pp. 206–215; *H.M.C. Round*, p. 331; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 760–761; Boyer's *Queen Anne*, ed. 1735, pp. 362–363.

234 P. 373. *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 266–269; *H.M.C. Mar and Kellie*, pp. 465–467 (Stair's letter); *Coxe*, ii, pp. 562–565 (Chap. LXXIII).

235 P. 373. *Pelet*, VIII, pp. 151–154.

236 P. 374. *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 419; *Coxe*, Chap. LXXIV.

237 P. 376. *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers*, p. 33; *Dispatches*, IV, p. 108.

238 P. 376. *Leake*, II, pp. 254–270, 279; *Rapin*, IV, pp. 94–95 and notes.

239 P. 379. *Add. MSS.* 22231, ff. 78–80, John Cope's narrative letter; *Leake*, II, pp. 271–306; *Byng Papers*, II, pp. xxi–xxii, 299–303 (Stanhope's dispatch; *Burchett*, pp. 752–754; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 95–97; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 349–351; *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers*, p. 35; and two excellent secondary authorities, *Corbett*, II, pp. 555–564, and *B. Williams, Stanhope*, pp. 71–78; for the naval value of Minorca see also Admiral Sir H. Richmond in *The Study of War* (ed. Sir G. Aston), p. 77.

240 P. 379. *Boyer, Queen Anne* (1735), p. 351; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 98–100; *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers*, p. 35; *Klopp*, XIII, pp. 93–106, 256–273, 547–550; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 460–462.

241 P. 381. *B. Williams, Stanhope*, pp. 79–85; *Geikie*, pp. 147–154, 180–182; *Klopp*, XIII, pp. 278–281; *Dispatches*, IV, 409, 562.

242 P. 382. *C.S.P. Am.* (1708–9), pp. xi–xiii, 56, 486.

243 P. 383. *C.S.P. Am.* (1706–8), pp. xii, 753; (1708–9) pp. xi, 38–40, 56, 95; *Burchett*, pp. 705–707; *Lediard, N.H.*, II, pp. 835–838; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 101–102; *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers*, p. 33, Sunderland's letter wrongly dated May 2; Laughton's article on Wager in the *Dict. of Nat. Biog.*

244 P. 383. *Tindal*, IV, p. 101.

CHAPTER XIX

245 P. 385. Appendix C., p. 414, above, for Sunderland's letters to Newcastle; *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers*, pp. 42–43

246 P. 385. *H.M.C. Marl. Papers*, p. 42.

247 P. 386. Sunderland's letter, App. C., pp. 413–414, above; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 490–491, 507; *H.M.C. Bagot* (1906), p. 341; *H.M.C. Marl. Papers*, p. 42; *Conduct*, pp. 151–153.

248 P. 387. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 506.

249 P. 387. *R.H.S.* 1910, pp. 22–25, *The Finance of Lord Treasurer Godolphin*, by I. S. Leadam; *Dowell*, II, pp. 67–84; *English Taxation 1640–1799*, William Kennedy (1913), *passim*, on the principles underlying taxation at this period. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 784–787, borrowing operations sanctioned Feb. 1709.

250 P. 388. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 191–194.

251 P. 391. *Coxe*, Chaps. LXXV and LXXVII; Addison, *Freeholder*, no. 39, on Somers and the Queen; *Althorp MSS.*, Sarah's letter of Sept. 24, 1744, to Mr. Mallet. It has been asserted that Wharton had evidence of Godolphin's correspondence with St. Germains and used the threat of disclosure to force an entrance for himself and his colleagues into the Cabinet at this period (Charles Hamilton, *Transactions during the Reign of Queen Anne*, 1790, p. 110–121, and, from same source, James Macpherson, in his *Hist. of Gr. Britain*, tells the same story).

It may or may not be true, but no such explanation is necessary. The Parliamentary situation suffices to explain the entry of the Whigs into the Ministry.

[252] P. 392. *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 116–117, 120; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 502.

[253] P. 394. *Stats. of Realm* (1822), vol. IX, pp. 93–95; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 794–799; *Marchmont*, III, p. 354; *Burnet*, V, pp. 389–397; *Hume Brown, Scotland*, III, pp. 142–145.

[254] P. 394. *The Secretaries of State*, Mark Thomson, pp. 31–32, 164–166; *Tindal*, IV, 119; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 72–73.

[255] P. 395. *Tindal*, IV, p. 119; *Geikie*, p. 101; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 68; *Swift, Letters*, I, p. 134.

[256] P. 395. J. Nichols's *Literary Anecdotes 18th Cent.*, V, p. 233 (Wesley gets the dates and his own age wrong).

[257] P. 396. *H.M.C. Round* (1895), p. 322, 327 (pp. 317–359 for the Petkum-Torcy correspondence 1706–1711).

[258] P. 398. A. Legrelle, *Une négociation inconnue* (1893), *passim*, p. 22 for Marlborough's letter of October 30; *Torcy's Memoirs* (Engl. translation 1757), I, pp. 300, 303–304, 316; *Berwick*, II, pp. 34–35; *Atkinson*, pp. 371–373; *Taylor*, II, pp. 228–233.

[259] P. 402. For the negotiations of 1709 see *Torcy's Memoirs*, Vol. I; *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 459–504; *Klopp*, XIII, pp. 214–256; *Geyl*, pp. 14–20; *Coxe*, Chaps. LXXVIII–LXXIX; *H.M.C. Round*, pp. 338–343; *Geikie*, pp. 127–132, especially on Godolphin's and Marlborough's views.

[260] P. 405. *Geikie, passim*, Chap. IV; *Taylor*, II, pp. 303–304, 318–319; *Coxe*, II, pp. 548–549 (end of Chap. LXXII).

[261] P. 405. *H.M.C. Chequers Court* (1900), pp. xx, 199.

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

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Campaigns of 1702-8

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
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ENGLAND UNDER QUEEN ANNE

THE PEACE
AND THE
PROTESTANT SUCCESSION

BY

GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, O.M.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

* * *

WITH MAPS

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Vouchsafe to those that have not read the story,
That I may prompt them : and of such as have,
I humbly pray them to admit the excuse
Of time, of numbers and due course of things,
Which cannot in their huge and proper life
Be here presented.

Chorus, Act V, *Henry V.*

ENGLAND UNDER QUEEN ANNE

(PREVIOUS VOLUMES)

BLENHEIM

RAMILLIES AND THE UNION WITH SCOTLAND

PREFACE

WITH this third volume I complete *England under Queen Anne*. I have told the story of those dozen decisive years during which the stormy and heroic life of Seventeenth Century England, constantly giving birth to new and wonderful things, was transmuted into the classic calm of Eighteenth Century Britain. Henceforth our country appeared to her neighbours no longer as an incalculable island of warring factions, sometimes a volcanic and sometimes a negligible force in the world's affairs, but as the steady, sole mistress of the seas, a power coequal with France, and the seat of an ordered freedom admired by continental philosophers of the coming era.

At Utrecht the bigwigged Plenipotentiaries ended an epoch, and liquidated the fifty years' struggle of the smaller States of Europe to save themselves from the hegemony of France, and of the Protestants of Europe to save themselves from the fate of the French Huguenots. These two movements of self-defence, combined by the political genius of William, had triumphed through the military genius of Marlborough. England, entering late into the struggle, had decided the issue. Her success had demonstrated that a country of free institutions could defeat a State based upon autocratic rule. This was a new idea in the world, and caused men to think afresh on the maxims of State.

If we consider the relative positions of France and of England from 1680 to 1688, and compare them with the situation when Anne died, the contrast is great indeed. England, lately despised abroad and distraught at home, had become the chief instrument in winning the world war, and had then dictated the Peace. With sea-power no longer rivalled either by France or Holland, with financial

and commercial pre-eminence hardly less remarkable, and endowed for the moment with the martial greatness lent her by Marlborough, Great Britain was relatively more important in the world in 1713 than in 1815 or 1919. No country save France was then a rival to her greatness. Bolingbroke settled the terms of Utrecht to a far greater degree than Castlereagh those of Vienna, or Lloyd George those of Versailles. But whereas Lloyd George negotiated the peace with his allies and dictated it to the enemy, Bolingbroke negotiated it with the enemy and dictated it to the allies. Broadly, his peace was a good one, whatever we may think of the methods by which it was obtained. No doubt he saw that England fared the best and showed a keener eye for her interests than for her honour. In the last year of the war he deserted our allies in the field and betrayed their military secrets to his French friends. And he ordered the British Fleet to take part in the reduction of Catalan resistance in Barcelona. He regarded the Barrier Treaty, which England had unwisely signed with Holland in 1709, as ' a scrap of paper,' and set on Swift to abuse the Dutch when they objected to this breach of faith. Yet neither the Dutch nor any of the other allies except the Catalans came off badly at Utrecht. And the ex-enemy France, though her power of aggression had been taken away, remained unembittered and unprovoked to revenge. The fortunate Eighteenth Century was well launched upon its reasonable and civilized course.

The general lines of the Utrecht settlement, particularly in the matter of leaving Spain to the Bourbon Philip, were for many years denounced by the Whigs as infamous. But in my opinion Bolingbroke was right. It is interesting to note that Macaulay thought so and said so, though Seeley, who accused Macaulay of being a Whig partisan, himself reiterated in the first number of the *English Historical Review* the old-fashioned Whig condemnation of ' a Peace without Spain,' for reasons which appear to me too speculative in relation to the later history of the ' Family Compact.'

Unfortunately for the Tories, the making of the Peace became involved, through the fault of their leaders, with

the question of the Succession to the throne of Britain. The statesmen who negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht, in so doing entangled themselves in a close intimacy with the French Ministers through the medium of French Jacobite agents, and became correspondingly hostile to Holland and the German Princes, including George of Hanover. The question of the Peace and the question of the Protestant Succession became closely intervolved. The Whigs denounced the Peace and stood up for the Succession ; the Tories defended the Peace and in so doing half of them were drawn to desire a Jacobite Restoration. They assumed that James would pleasure them by turning Anglican. He refused, and so left them without a policy, a great host divided and distraught, when the news of the death of Queen Anne sounded in their ears like the trump of doom.

Such is the story here told. It is highly complicated in detail, but intensely dramatic in the march of events. I hope that I have been able so to tell it that the wood may be observable in spite of the trees.

The key to the history of the last four years of Queen Anne, especially for the close connection of the peace negotiations with the Jacobite conspiracy, is to be found in the Archives of the French Foreign Office, whose officials I beg to thank for their courtesy towards me. I wish also to express my gratitude to Earls Spencer, Stanhope, and Dartmouth for allowing me the free use of their ancestors' papers ; to the Duke of Bedford and his librarian, Miss Scott Thomson, for communications most kindly volunteered from the Woburn MSS. ; to Mr. Arthur Bryant for the use of the Shakerley MSS., and to the Reigate Corporation and Dr. W. Hooper, of Redhill, for the use of the Somers MSS. ; to Mrs. Mustard, of Baltimore, for leave to reproduce the miniature which Queen Anne gave to her ancestor, Col. Parke, for bringing the news of Blenheim ; to Professor Norman Sykes for information kindly given ; and to Professor Geyl for valuable assistance and advice. The late Miss Thora Stone, whose untimely death is much to be deplored,

kindly allowed me the use of her unpublished *Struggle for Power on the Senegal and Gambia 1660–1713*.

I wish also to thank Mr. Staton, of Emery Walker Ltd., for the excellence of his work as map-maker for my books, ever since 1907.

Note on Methods of Dating

Readers will note the difference between the New Style (N.S.) and Old Style (O.S.) of reckoning dates. Until 1752 the English at home always used the Old Style ; after 1700 it was eleven days behind the New Style of Gregory XIII's Calendar, which was current in all continental countries except Russia. Our sailors, on service at sea and on coast operations like the taking of Gibraltar, generally used the Old Style familiar at home. Our soldiers in the Netherlands and Spain generally but not always used the New. Diplomats abroad most of them used the New, but some the Old. *I employ the O.S. for home affairs ; and for affairs outside England I use the N.S. or put the double date, thus—Aug.* $\frac{2}{13}$.

Anne came to the throne on March 8, 1702—at least, so we say now. But our ancestors called it March 8, 1701. For, with them, the New Year began not on January 1, but on March 25. March 24, 1701, was followed after midnight by March 25, 1702. This is confusing to modern students of old documents, who are liable to get a year out in affairs occurring in January, February or early March, particularly in Parliamentary affairs, as the normal session was held in winter, astride of the two years. The Lords' and Commons' Journals of Anne's reign change from 1701 to 1702 only on March 25. *All modern histories, including this book, begin the new year at January* 1.

Mr. Churchill, Macaulay, Mrs. Manley and Marlborough

As Mrs. Manley and her notorious *New Atlantis* figure in this volume (pp. 38–39 below) I think it desirable to reprint here (by kind permission) a letter of mine that

appeared in *The Times Literary Supplement* on October 19, 1933 :

To the Editor of The Times

Sir,—I have no criticism to make of the review of Mr. Churchill's *Marlborough* in your last number, but its appearance gives me the opportunity to say something on a particular point in Mr. Churchill's book, to which I feel it my duty to call attention. Before doing so I wish to express the great admiration I feel for the book as a whole and my earnest hope for its popularity and success. It combines qualities too seldom found together in historical work—swinging narrative, careful study of the authorities, clear technical exposition, acute insight into several of the principal characters, and an understanding of the conditions of the period so different from those of our own day. I am also in agreement with his general view both of the domestic and foreign questions of the time and of Marlborough's character.

I have stated elsewhere that I think Macaulay was wrong in his reading of Marlborough. Indeed, I think it is the worst thing in his History, and I have no wonder that Mr. Churchill's family piety has aroused him to take revenge. All the same, he has no right to call Macaulay a 'liar.' A 'liar' is not a man who misreads another man's character, however badly, or who sometimes accepts inadequate evidence ; if that were so, almost all historians would be 'liars.' A 'liar' is a man who makes a statement that he knows to be false. Now, the facts that Macaulay states, barring the Camaret letter, are not very different from Mr. Churchill's facts. Mr. Churchill admits that he took for patron the man who kept his sister ; that he himself took money from his own mistress and invested it well ; that he deserted James while high in his military service ; that he afterwards corresponded with the Jacobites. I agree with Mr. Churchill that his desertion of James was in the circumstances commendable, and the other three actions by the standards of the time not unpardonable. But there is a surface case against Marlborough, and many people in his own day thought ill of him. An historian who, before the days of our modern research, was deceived by these phenomena into thinking Marlborough a bad man was not necessarily dishonest.

Now I come to my particular point. When Mr. Churchill states, on Paget's authority, that Macaulay took Mrs. Manley, the authoress of the *New Atlantis*, as 'his witness,' it is untrue. I admit that Macaulay, for all his alleged Whig bias, trusted far too much to Jacobite and High Tory libels about Marlborough. For instance, he was too much influenced by Swift ; and his innuendo

that there may have been truth in the allegations of 'The Dear Bargain' is very bad; Mr. Churchill is right there (p. 482). But Macaulay drew the line at Mrs. Manley.

Mr. Churchill has relied in this matter too much on Paget, who like other good historians was fallible, and in this case has failed Mr. Churchill. Paget (*Examen*, p. 8) writes: 'Little do the readers of Lord Macaulay suspect that his eloquent denunciation of Marlborough is but a *réchauffé* of the forgotten scurrility of a female hack scribe, whom Swift used to call one of his "under spur-leathers."' And to establish this charge Paget says in the note: 'See the history of "Count Fortunatus" in the *New Atlantis*, i. 21–43. The passage is too long, and part of it is wholly unfit, for publication. Any reader whose curiosity may lead him to verify our assertion may compare p. 27 with Macaulay, Vol. ii. 8vo. 1856, p. 254, containing the account of Marlborough's marriage, and pp. 26, 31, 41 and 43, with i. 457, 458 and ii. 251, 252, 253.'

I have most carefully compared these passages; and the oftener I read them the less I can understand what Paget means. There is very little in common, and nothing that Macaulay could not have got elsewhere. He gives his references to Burnet, Chesterfield and others, but not to Mrs. Manley. If he has misinterpreted Marlborough's motives, he was quite capable of doing that for himself without her help. When he rejects the story she invented about Marlborough refusing money to Barbara in later years, he does not even deign to quote Mrs. Manley as responsible for it; he quotes Pope, who repeated it in another form. It would be impossible to gather from his narrative that he had so much as read Mrs. Manley. To say that Macaulay has 'transcribed whole passages' of the *New Atlantis* into his History, as Mr. Churchill does on p. 53, is as inaccurate as anything in Macaulay. It is entirely untrue. But I am sure it was written in good faith. We historians are a fallible folk, and must be charitable to one another.

Mr. Churchill (pp. 130–2) tells two of Mrs. Manley's most disgusting stories as being worthy of confutation because she was 'Macaulay's witness.' He repeats the phrase three times in the three pages, so that some hasty readers might suppose that Macaulay countenanced these two stories; but he never did. It is Mr. Churchill who has dragged them to light.

I believe that a main cause why Macaulay misunderstood the character of Marlborough was the Camaret letter, in the false light of which he misread the rest of his life's actions. Mr. Churchill has now given us reasons to doubt whether he ever wrote any such letter at all. I think his reasoning so cogent that I intend to alter a passage

of my own in *Blenheim*, p. 181, in any later edition. But Macaulay, like every one else in his day and long after, thought Marlborough did write the letter. And moreover Macaulay failed to examine the circumstances that afterwards showed Paget and Wolseley that the French already knew the secret of the intended Brest expedition and that Marlborough knew they knew it when he 'revealed' it—if reveal it he ever did. Now this does not make Macaulay a 'liar.' I do not think Mr. Churchill makes enough allowance for the 'pioneer' historians of a hundred years ago. They had not the machinery we moderns have, the masses of published documents, the Historical Manuscripts Commission volumes, the learned periodicals, and whole libraries of monographs and studies of particular points. A pioneer historian who had to find the straw for his own bricks, and was moreover 'cock-sure' by temperament, could make ghastly mistakes without being a 'liar.' Macaulay's weakest point was his study of personal motive and character, which he did in blacks and whites. His strong points were the political, constitutional and legal history of our country, which come very little into Mr. Churchill's scope in this biography. Maitland said to me once that Macaulay was always right in the points of law he discussed in his History. But he was certainly not right on all the points of human character.

G. M. TREVELYAN.

CAMBRIDGE

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ERRATA.

Page 245, line 18, *for* Duke of Portland, *read* Earl of Portland.

Page 305, line 15, *for* on whom all depended, *read* on which all depended.


THE RIVAL CLAIMANTS TO THE THRONE
James I
Charles I
Elizabeth = Elector Palatine
Sophia = Ernest Elector of Hanover. born 1630, ob. 1714.
George I ob. 1727.
George II ob. 1760.
(4) Henrietta = Philip D. of Orleans.
(1) Charles II ob. 1701
(3) James II = i Anne Hyde ii Mary of Modena.
(2) Mary = William II of Orange ob. 1650.
William III = Mary II ob. 1702. ob. 1694.
Monmouth and others (illegitimate).
Anna Maria = Victor Amadeus D. of Savoy.
Prince of Savoy, possible candidate for English throne.
Mary II = William III dau. of i, born 1662, ob. 1694.
Queen Anne dau. of i, born Feb. 6, 1665, ob. 1714.
James, the 'Old Pretender,' or 'James III.' Son of ii, born 1688, ob. 1766.
William Duke of Gloucester and others, died young.
Charles Edward, the 'Young Pretender,' ob. 1788.
James FitzJames, Duke of Berwick, born 1670, son of Arabella Churchill, Marlborough's sister.

THE PEACE
AND THE
PROTESTANT SUCCESSION

CHAPTER I

MALPLAQUET

Over-confidence of the Allies. Villars reanimates the French army. His Lines of La Bassée check Marlborough and Eugene. Siege of Tournai. Investment of Mons. Battle of Malplaquet. Effect on opinion in England. The mine of Alicante. Birth of the *Tatler*. Steele on Duelling.

WHEN the Allies, in the spring of 1709, refused to make peace on any reasonable terms,* they were encouraged by the expectation that the resistance of the French army would soon be brought to an end by famine, and that the road to Paris would lie clear. The *Tatler* for June 4 amused the Town by an address to 'Lewis le Grand,' taunting him with the poverty and starvation to which he had reduced France, and ending with the advice :

> Then, sir, the present minute chuse,
> Our armies are advancéd ;
> Those terms you at the Hague refuse
> At Paris won't be granted.
>
> Consider this, and Dunkirk raze,
> And Anna's title own ;
> Send one Pretender out to graze
> And call the other home.

The 'other' Pretender was his grandson, Philip V of Spain.

Indeed, the famine in France that year threatened to put an end to the national resistance. The British Government made corn contraband, and in the summer an English squadron under Sir John Norris was sent to the Sound to stop the exportation of corn to France in Scandinavian and other neutral bottoms. The

June–July 1709

* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 398–402.

cargoes thus stopped were not confiscated, but bought, for the Maritime Powers were throughout the war most anxious not to quarrel with the Baltic States. At the Hague the French negotiators confessed that they could no longer resist ' Famine, the hand of God.' [1]

It was believed that the enemy forces were in a state of dissolution ; and such, in truth, was the case when Villars first took over the command on the Franco-Belgian frontier. He himself tells us that, when he arrived at Tournai in March, the privates had sold their arms and jackets for bread and that even the subaltern officers were parting with their shirts. Men were fast drifting away from the colours in search of food. Hope and discipline were dead. If in April Marlborough could have gathered 80,000 men ready to attack, he could have marched to Versailles. But when he actually took the field at the end of June, 120,000 proved not enough : Paris had been saved by the customary six months' pause in military operations.* During the spring and early summer a new French army had come into being, largely new in personnel and wholly new in spirit. How was this miracle accomplished ?

All France knew that Villars was the only man who could stop Marlborough, as he had stopped him on the Moselle four years before. The French Marshal's air of jovial gasconade, expressive of unbounded self-confidence, was tonic to his depressed and anxious fellow-countrymen. Though always swaggering as if he alone had the secret of victory, he was no dupe of his own optimism ; he seldom miscalculated chances and was far less rash in the presence of Marlborough than Marsin, Villeroi or Vendôme. He had, moreover, something of the equalitarian spirit of the French armies of the Republican age unborn. He was no courtier, no observer of persons, and seemed out of place in the *ancien régime*. He bullied Versailles till it sent bread to the army ; he spoke in open scorn of the Marshals and Princes whose failures in the field had landed the country in this pass. It was his hour. Neither priests nor nobles dared murmur

* Marlborough's campaign of 1708 had been prolonged until the beginning of January 1709, but to make up for that he only took the field in 1709 late in June, long after his usual season.

against him, for he was their only hope. Madame de Maintenon supported him and he wrote her the frankest letters on the situation.

It might have been said of Villars as it had been said of Cromwell : ' In the dark perils of war, in the high places of the field, hope shone in him like a pillar of fire, when it had gone out in all the others.' And from him it rekindled itself and spread. The habitual expression of his face was a smile in which were blended high spirits, self-approbation and sheer good humour. The soldiers saw in him their comrade, to whom they could speak man to man. The spirit of discipline could not have been restored in that army without confidence and the personal touch. He went round among the starving troops and heard their griefs, thanked them for their endurance, stirred their pride, awoke their expectations. Often, so he tells us, he promised them bread on such and such a day, when he did not in fact know whence it was coming. But the soldiers knew that at least he was making the most strenuous efforts to ransack France on their behalf. ' *Monsieur le maréchal a raison*,' they would answer, ' *il faut souffrir quelque fois*.' Others said to him ' *Nous vous demandons du pain : du reste, nous nous passerons d'habits et de chemises*.' *

King Louis, having named Villars to the command, supported him with all his might. The Provincial Governors were set on to furnish the army with bread at the expense of everyone else. The peasants starved, the rich ate black bread and sold their plate, that the soldiers might live. Villars gave rations to a regiment on the days when it marched ; on days of repose it fasted. After this fashion they weathered that dreadful spring. When the peasants heard that food was to be had in the camp, sturdy youths came in by thousands to enlist and follow the bread waggons. The thinned ranks filled again. Frost and famine such as France had not known for a hundred years acted as recruiting sergeants for a force still dependent on voluntary enlistment.

* This answer, which Villars records, reminds us of the remark of the Republican soldier of 1794 : ' Le Représentant a dit *avec du fer et du pain on peut aller en Chine*. Il n'a pas parlé de chaussures.'

And so, beneath the tattered flags, a hollow-cheeked army was formed under its gay commander. Men who had been through that experience would fight, under Villars, more stubbornly than the French of Ramillies and Oudenarde. Villars asked that some Princes of the Blood should come to share the campaign, but, suitably enough, none came except the gaunt young 'King of England,' fit company for men in misfortune. Another exiled Prince had been found by Villars on his first arrival on the frontier, the Bavarian Elector, from whom he had parted in anger the year before Blenheim. 'I found him,' he wrote, 'in a very different condition from the brilliant surroundings where I had last seen him at Munich.' But in misfortune the two men, both of them brave and generous, speedily forgot their old quarrels.[2]

While Villars was thus at work, the Allies at the Hague were helping to revive the spirit of France. Their gross rejection of the almost abject terms which Louis offered as the price of peace,* while it defeated the hopes and disconcerted the politics of many quiet folk in England and Holland, put Louis in unity with his people. As early as October 1706 Vendôme had advised that the King should convoke the States General, in abeyance for a hundred years past, and 'expose to them the insolence of the foe.' The Grand Monarch could not stoop to that, but he took a new departure when in June 1709 he issued with great effect a proclamation to his subjects, setting out the case as it now stood between himself and his enemies, recounting the sacrifices he had offered to make and calling for 'new efforts, since the immense concessions I was ready to grant prove useless for the re-establishment of peace.'[3] A war begun in the pride and world-ambition of a despot had been turned by the victories of Marlborough into the defence of a country by its citizens. The French spirit, sometimes so blind and overbearing, now appeared in its pure and legitimate shape.

On the other side an immense army was being assembled in the Spanish Netherlands to march on Paris under Marlborough and Eugene. The abnormal winter caused suffering throughout all Europe, but to nothing like the same

* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 399–405.

extent as in exhausted and besieged France, where, moreover, the harvest prospects were worse affected than elsewhere by the power of the long-continued frost. Food and money were more plentiful among the Allies. Before the new year, the Whig Parliament had voted an increase of 10,000 men to the British contingent in Flanders. The Opposition dared only murmur that the decision might well have been left over till they learned what the Dutch were ready to do; and a few days later came the news that the States had decided to raise an additional 6000 men for 1709.[4] The war-party was at length in full control of Holland, at the very moment when peace had become the most pressing need of the impoverished Republic. The greatest force ever yet raised by the Dutch was sent into the field under the charge of Deputies who, however little some of them like Goslinga loved the Duke, no longer dreamed of putting their veto on his use of the blue-coats in battle.

While Marlborough's command was thus increased, Eugene appeared beside him at the head of an unusually powerful German and Imperial contingent. The King of Prussia, according to his wont every winter, had grumbled and threatened to withdraw his troops, but had once more yielded to a personal letter of Marlborough and sent 5000 extra men.

And so, at the end of June, the Allied Army entered the plains of Lille some 120,000 strong, nearly twice the number that had triumphed at Ramillies. Villars had by that time gathered 80,000 or 90,000 to oppose. Shortage of food for men and horses continued to hamper the French movements throughout the Campaign,* but at least Villars was now in a condition to put up some resistance to the Allied advance.

June 1709

Caution was still demanded of him: he was inferior in numbers, in supplies and in the prestige of victory, and his was the last army of France. Another Ramillies or Oudenarde would put an end to the war. He could not risk a battle in the open, yet he must stop the advance on Paris,

* *De la Colonie* (pp. 345–346) speaks of 'the famine which raged in our army,' stopping movements even after Malplaquet, and says the horses that had escaped that action 'perished of hunger at their picket ropes.'

and he was well aware, as he tells us, of the truth of Turenne's dictum, that 'the general who is absolutely determined to avoid a battle surrenders his country to the general who appears to seek one.' He therefore adopted the system of field entrenchments, always dear to the soldiers of King Louis. As Uncle Toby said, from his experience of the wars of King William :

> If the French have the advantage of a wood, or you give them a moment's time to entrench themselves, they are a nation which will pop and pop for ever at you.*

Combining caution with boldness, Villars constructed 'the Lines of La Bassée,' forty miles long, from the neighbourhood of Aire to the neighbourhood of Douai.† His own headquarters were in the centre at La Bassée, only ten miles from the enemy's quarters at Lille. In spite, as he tells us, of 'the timorous counsels of several general officers,' he had constructed the Lines in the most advanced position that could be defended, yielding to the invader as little as possible of the sacred soil. The marshy reaches of the upper Lys and Scarpe greatly added to the strength of the earthworks, and in some stretches altogether took their place. Heavy rains in June made the position more formidable, and the approach more difficult.

Cadogan, disguised it is said as a peasant, conducted a reconnaissance of the Lines of La Bassée, and his report was discouraging as to the chances of an attack. Marlborough and Eugene knew that they could not take such liberties with Villars as with Villeroi or Tallard. 'If it had been reasonable,' the Duke wrote to Sarah on June 27, 'this letter would have brought you news of a battle ; but Prince Eugene, myself, and all the generals did not think it advisable to run so great a hazard.' They reluctantly turned instead to the siege of Tournai.

In a sense this decision was the crisis of the campaign and indeed of the whole last phase of the War of the Spanish Succession. For if, instead of an immediate march to Paris, a long course of sieges was after all necessary to clear the

* *Tristram Shandy*, Bk. V, Chap. XXI.

† *For this chapter see Map of the Netherlands at end of book.*

way, the chance was considerable that the patience or cohesion of the Alliance would be exhausted before the last frontier fortress was taken under the eyes of the vigilant Villars.

Having decided to besiege Tournai, Marlborough and Eugene deceived the French Marshal as to their real intentions, by a movement which seemed to threaten the north-western end of his Lines of La Bassée. To meet it he shuffled his troops, and withdrew a portion of the Tournai garrison. Then Marlborough, by a rapid turn of the Allied Army on its night march, invested the town before the men withdrawn from it could be sent back, or the place itself revictualled.*

Except Lille, that had fallen the year before, Tournai was the strongest fortress of the age. But the Allies hoped, in the circumstances, to take it in a month. It was, however, gallantly defended by its reduced and famished garrison of 6400 men, and more than two months elapsed before both town and citadel had fallen.

Next after Lille, Tournai afforded the siege of the war most interesting to professional soldiers. Its elaborate system of mines and underground galleries involved the attacking parties in a novel species of warfare in the dark, amid unseen dangers, 'more terrible than ever is met with in any other part of a soldier's duty.' 'Not a foot of ground,' wrote Colonel Revett, 'that is not undermined and casemated,' in this 'the finest and strongest fortification in Europe.' 'Our miners,' wrote Marlborough, 'have discovered one of their galleries at each attack, but dare not advance to make the proper use of this discovery, because of the enemy's continual fire of small shot under ground. We are preparing to roll bombs into these galleries in order to dislodge them.' When at length the citadel fell on September 3, the Allies had lost over 5000 killed and wounded, including a large proportion of British.[5]

The campaign had begun late, and when Tournai fell

* The Allied siege train was at Menin. It was sent round by water, down the Lys to Ghent, and thence up the Schelde to Tournai. The water route, though many times longer than the land route from Menin to Tournai, was quicker for heavy traffic, owing to the badness of the roads of the period during a wet summer.

autumn was already at hand. Villars' Lines, which he had now extended eastward from the Scarpe to the Schelde above Condé, denied all approach to Valenciennes, Douai or Béthune on the route to Paris. Marlborough and Eugene decided that the best use they could make of the remainder of the year was to take Mons. Its capture would afford a pledge of some diplomatic value, but it would do little to open the road into France. Only if, to save Mons, Villars left his Lines to offer battle, could anything great be accomplished. It is probable that Marlborough now realized that nothing except a battle could put a speedy end to the war, and that he was proportionately eager to bring one about.

Another skilful and secret movement, and a long circuitous route involving prodigies of marching by the Allied troops, placed them between the enemy and Mons. Villars arrived on the scene too late to throw in succours. But instead of returning at once to the shelter of the Lines of La Bassée, he remained to see what opportunity might occur of disturbing the progress of the siege.

Between the two armies lay a long screen of forest, which could be traversed either by the Gap of Boussu to the north, or near the southern end by the Gap of Malplaquet.* Villars hung about behind the western edge of the trees, keeping the Allies in uncertainty and rendering it necessary for them to guard the debouchment of both the Gaps, lest he should attack them through one or the other. When, therefore, by a sudden march southwards he appeared in the Gap of Malplaquet, he caught Marlborough's Dutch and British army encamped near Blaregnies at some distance from Eugene's smaller German army, which was camped further north watching the Gap of Boussu. The French were in strong ground of woods and marshes, not yet reconnoitred by the Allies. Moreover, Marlborough's field artillery had not yet fully come

Sept. 9 1709

* Often called the Gap (Trouée) of Aulnois. But I prefer to call it after Malplaquet, since that village gave its name to the battle that took place at the Gap. The names that I use for the various Woods are those used in 1709, some of which have since been altered.

There is an excellent professional modern account of the battle by Major Burne, in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, April 1933.

MAP I



up.* Those authors, therefore, who have blamed him for not attacking Villars on September 9, when he first appeared in the Gap of Malplaquet, may well be mistaken.

But the opposite school of critics, who blamed Villars for not himself attacking the Allies on that day, may be equally unjust. His was the last army of France, and he had no right to risk the freedom of his country on such a hazard. It would have taken many hours to deploy his 80,000 men into line ; and, after that, it would have been no light task to crush the enemy's best troops, fighting under Marlborough's eye. Before he had disposed of the Dutch and English, Eugene's Germans might have arrived, like Blücher's at Waterloo, to overwhelm him with the superior numbers of the united Allied force. Moreover, the revived morale of his own troops was still unproven ; his decision to test it behind entrenchments but not in the open field was very probably the salvation of France.†

On the morning of September 10 Eugene's army was united to Marlborough's in face of the French, who were drawn up in the Gap of Malplaquet and in the parts of the forest contiguous on either side. It would have been possible for the Allies to refuse battle, to draw lines of contravallation against Villars, and proceed with the siege of Mons under his nose ; and some, though not all, of the British officers thought this would be the wiser course.[6] But Marlborough and Eugene were playing for high stakes. There lay the enemy within their reach. Let them strike him as they had struck at Blenheim and at Oudenarde, and bring the war to an end.

It remained to be decided whether they should attack that day or wait till the morrow. The argument for delay was that eighteen battalions under General Withers were still on the march from Tournai and could join in the battle on the 11th but not on the 10th. Rightly or wrongly it was decided to give them time to come up. The extra day enabled Villars to render more formidable the system of

* This important fact is noted by Orkney (*E.H.R.* Apr. 1909, p. 317) : 'Wee had no guns come up.' But the French accounts show that Marlborough had some artillery which he used with effect on that day.

† See Appendix, p. 25 below. I. *Should either side have attacked on September 9 ?*

field defences from which he derived so immense an advantage in the battle. After the event, it became usual to think that the decision to wait had been wrong, though nothing is certain in the might-have-beens of war.*

At any rate, Villars used to good purpose the two nights and the whole day that passed between his arrival in the Gap of Malplaquet and the actual engagement. The army was set on to entrench itself in the open ground in the centre, and to fortify its woodland flanks with abatis of felled trees. In the Wood of Sars, line behind line of defences sprang into being. In the open country formidable earthworks were erected, with re-entrant angles, taking skilful advantage of the contours of the ground. Everyone, cavalry as well as infantry, toiled with a will. Only, wherever Villars appeared, the soldiers dropped spades and axes and ran up to tell him how they meant to defend their handiwork next day.†

A recent event had raised the enthusiasm of the army to its height. Boufflers had arrived in camp. The veteran of so many wars was the only other French Marshal whom Villars respected, and he had been wisely chosen by the King to go and strengthen his hands. Villars had responded generously and had offered to serve under his senior ; but the old man had replied in the same spirit that he came only 'as a volunteer.' His presence and the manifest concord between the two best generals of France increased the ardour of the troops, as much as the notorious discord between Tallard and Marsin at Blenheim, and between Vendôme and Burgundy at Oudenarde had discouraged the temperamental and sensitive French *poilu*.[7]

The plans of the Allied commanders to force this formidable position could not have been better laid. But they failed to reckon on the renewed spirit of the French soldiery : no doubt they expected a long and hard struggle and grave losses all along the line as at Blenheim, to be followed once more by the moral disintegration of a large

* See Appendix, p. 25 below. II. *Who made the decision not to attack on the 10th ?*

† See Appendix, p. 25 below. III. *Should Villars have taken up a position behind the woods ?*

part of the French army when the day was lost, opening the road to Paris.

The ground in the French centre, between the woods, was strongly protected by a series of 'redans' and entrenched batteries. This part of the line was 'refused'—that is to say, withdrawn behind the protruding wings. In particular, the Wood of Sars was so situated that, until the Allies had occupied its skirts,* they could not attack the French centre without being subjected to a devastating cross-fire. Orkney, therefore, with fifteen battalions of British infantry, stood motionless in the centre during the first half of the battle, gazing at the high 'redans' that he was ultimately to storm and so cut the French army in two.

But on both flanks an attack was to be begun in the morning, at seven by the Germans on the Allied right against the Wood of Sars, and half an hour later by the Dutch on the left. The great army of the States General, nominally under the command of Count Tilly, but led and inspired that day by the gallant young Prince of Orange, was to assault the entrenchments on Villars' right, within and without the Wood of Laignières. But this operation, though it was to be pushed hard in order to hold the French forces in that quarter from being sent elsewhere, was only meant as a 'containing' attack, like that of Eugene on the enemy's northern flank at Blenheim.†

The object of the Allied commanders was to break the enemy's left wing in the Wood of Sars, and to pierce his centre after it had been weakened by withdrawals of troops to strengthen the threatened flanks. To secure success, a fine strategic combination, unique in the wars of that period, was planned and effected: General Withers was coming up from Tournai with his eighteen battalions, partly of British infantry, accompanied by six squadrons of horse; he was ordered to join the main army on the field of battle, as he came into action on the extreme right wing. Indeed, Withers was to approach the field by an isolated and dangerous route. He was to push through the forest belt

* The skirts of the Wood of Sars, where the fighting took place, were then known as the Wood of Taisnières, now Wood of Blaregnies.

† See Appendix, p. 26 below. IV. *Did Orange disobey orders?*



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MAP II



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

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

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by an undefended track to the north of the general battle, debouch on to the western or French side of the woods, and, passing through the village of La Folie, fall on the left flank and rear of the enemy behind the Wood of Sars at the moment of crisis. This operation, requiring careful timing if it was not to lead to disaster, is of the same type as the arrival of the Prussians at Waterloo, or the junction of their two armies on the field of Königrätz. It succeeded to a nicety and won the day.

Sept. 11 1709

A dense blanket of morning fog enabled the Allies to deploy and begin their approach, unmolested by the enemy cannon. When it lifted, shortly after six o'clock, a majestic sight was disclosed. Line behind line, in perfect order, the infantry three-deep, the cavalry behind them in the same formation, a hundred thousand men were moving to the attack, while over their heads flapped like sails a forest of huge flags, unfolding the blazonry of a score of the greatest States and Princes in Europe. The artillery, already mounted in earthwork batteries which the Allies had constructed overnight, were bombarding the French positions, and the enemy guns were replying as the mist rose.* The sight thrilled spectators the more because nothing could be seen of the 80,000 defenders, except here and there a three-cornered hat showing above a parapet. The rest were hidden in the woods to left and right, or concealed in the centre behind the high entrenchments.†

* Colonel Blood, the celebrated head of Marlborough's engineers and artillery in the campaigns of Blenheim and Ramillies, had died in 1707; he had been succeeded by the able Col. Armstrong, who also won the Duke's confidence (Porter's *History of the Royal Engineers*, I, pp. 113–115). His figure, mounted on a white horse, appears prominently in the Blenheim tapestry of Malplaquet.

† Major Burne, R.A., who has made much the best and closest examination of the battlefield, writes in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery* (April 1933, pp. 47–48): 'The French cavalry were drawn up on the ridge on which the French Custom-house is situated. We are told they suffered severely from the Allied guns. But from the position of the latter only the French front line can be seen on the near crest. It is unlikely, to say the least, that indirect fire was employed by the artillery. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that, as at Landen, it was the "overs" and ricochets fired at the infantry that did the damage to the cavalry. The French cannon-balls, on the other hand, directed at our infantry would have a plunging effect; hence a comparative absence of ricochets and a corresponding small damage to our cavalry.'

'It was hardly seven o'clock when we marched to attack,' wrote Orkney, 'and it really was a noble sight to see so many different bodies marching over the plain to a thick wood where you could see no men.' 'It was the most deliberate, solemn and well-ordered battle I ever saw,' wrote Colonel Blackader, second in command of the Cameronians that morning; 'a noble and fine disposition and as nobly executed. . . . I never had a more pleasant day in my life. I was kept in perfect peace; my mind stayed, trusting in God.'

But, in bosoms less serene, more devilish passions were soon aroused. The failure to come to terms at the Hague had enraged the two armies against one another. Little quarter was asked or given, especially in the hand-to-hand struggle that raged in the deadly shadows of the Wood of Sars. The entrenchments along its edge had been carried by the high-hatted grenadiers charging at the head of their respective regiments; but deep in the heart of the forest stretched line behind line of felled trees, each shaped into a rough abatis, each to be defended, taken, retaken and lost again, as hour after hour the glades re-echoed to the thunder of volleys and the crash of companies bursting through the trampled underwood.

Thirty-six battalions of Eugene's Germans had entered the forest on the north, supported by twenty-two battalions of Prussians, Hanoverians and British under Lottum. 'Before the end of the day,' writes Marlborough, 'we had eighty battalions in that wood, and I believe they had more.' The bulk of the British infantry were still waiting in the centre under Orkney, but he detached his own regiment the Royals and a battalion of Guards, to join the Buffs in the Wood of Sars at a critical moment of the struggle for its possession. Under cover of fire from the Allied battery of forty guns, they forced their way in across a marsh, 'so that we got possession of the corner of the wood which flanked the retrenchments of the enemy.'[8] There they found the Buffs, who were fighting behind their Colonel, the Duke of Argyle. As John Campbell was putting himself up as a rival to Marlborough, he felt all the more bound to lead the charges on foot, like the proud Highland Chieftain that he was. After one repulse from before a woodland abatis, he tore open his waistcoat and shirt to show each private of the

Buffs that he wore no privileged breast-armour, and led them again to the attack.[9] Indeed, in this Homeric battle the leaders in all parts of the field exposed themselves to encourage their men. Before evening, Eugene and Villars had both been hit, and innumerable general officers and colonels on both sides were laid low.

Disputing every tree, the French were being driven back out of the Wood of Sars; Withers and his eighteen battalions were approaching their flank and rear through the village of La Folie, drawing Villars to that spot as the scene of crisis; and gradually the 'redans' in the centre were being stripped of defenders, hurried off to repel Withers or to hold the last corner of the woodland. And so, about one o'clock, Marlborough launched Orkney and his remaining thirteen British battalions at the 'redans.' Those formidable 'retrenchments upon the top of the hill,' Orkney tells us, were taken 'without firing a shot; for we found nothing to oppose us.' The key to the French position was won.[10]

The Allied cavalry, following close behind, passed through the gaps in the 'redans' and formed up under cover of the fire of Orkney's infantry from the captured ramparts. Ten of the cannon from the forty-gun battery had been brought forward in the wake of the English foot, and now opened fire at close quarters on the French horse. The protection thus afforded to our horse was welcome, for they had to deploy on the far side of the entrenchments in face of the cavalry of France. The Maison du Roi, commanded by Boufflers in person, were drawn up, line behind line, across the wide heath of Malplaquet. A great cavalry action ensued on very even terms, that eventually ended in the defeat of the French.*

* The Scottish private (*Remembrance*, p. 496) thus sings of the doings of the Scots Greys, now commanded by Stair:

The Earle of Staire in person was there
Commanding the Scotish Dragouns.
And Sir James Campbell their Lieutenant Cornall
Did ordour them in squadrouns.
A French officer in that ramcounter
Meet Cornall Campbell indeed,
Then with fair play and without delay
The Cornall stroke of[f] his head.

No wonder Orkney wrote home that his brother Scot, 'Jemmy Campbell, at the head of the grey dragouns, behaved like an angel.' It was a good fight, and

Meanwhile, on the Allied left, the Dutch army—the same splendid troops who had broken the resistance of the French at Ramillies—moved up to the attack. They assaulted the trenches partly in the Wood of Laignières, but chiefly in the open ground near it. Led on by the young Prince of Orange, their infantry stormed the first line, but were broken before the second and chased back. Again and again they came on, but were each time repulsed ' with such a butchering that the oldest generall alive never saw the like.' The ' Blue Guards,' beloved of William III, went down in swathes. The flower of the army of the States General was sacrificed in just such a way as the Field Deputies in years gone by had been wont to fear overmuch. But on this occasion the principal Deputy, Goslinga, was galloping gladly about the field, displaying a courage and presence of mind that won him golden opinions ;[11] neither before nor after the battle did he blame his old enemy Marlborough for making the attack. Nevertheless, things went so ill with the Dutch that the Duke had to intervene in person with reserves in order to prevent a French advance.

About three o'clock the decision was reached upon the other wing. Withers, debouching from La Folie, made contact with the troops of Eugene and Lottum emerging on the west side of the conquered Wood of Sars. Some of the German artillery had been dragged right through the forest in the wake of the infantry and now came into action on the far side. The Irish ' Wild Geese ' had been sent to repulse Withers, but the platoon firing of the Royal Irish broke the gallant charge of the exiles, and the decision of the Boyne and Aghrim was repeated beside the Flemish wood.[12]

> The Household of France was good men and horsse
> And near broke the Scotish Dragouns.

But ' Marlborie,' as usual, ' sent suplie ' :

> Til the French was beat and sadlie defeat
> And forced in batell to flee.
> The Jandarms of France they had a great loss
> At the batell of Malleplackie.

The French officer *De la Colonie* (p. 342) speaks of ' the Scotch Guards of the Queen of England,' clearly meaning the Scots Greys, ' most excellent troops ' who led the charge, which was ' a most violent one.'

It was at that critical point in the field that Villars, ever present where he was most wanted, received the wound in his knee that put him out of action. Boufflers, on whom the command devolved, drew off the army of France, defeated but neither demoralized nor pursued. They left behind most of their artillery, but very few prisoners, except some fifteen hundred of the wounded whom they had not been able to move. They returned to the Lines of La Bassée and left Mons to its fate. After forty days Villars was well enough to be moved to Paris. ' My passage through the towns on the way, lying on a stretcher, was a kind of triumph '—and, though it is he who tells us so, we can well believe it.

Marlborough, racked with headache as always after any great exertion, was kept hard at work for many days. He paid assiduous attention to the wounded of all nations. According to an excellent custom of that polite age, many of the enemy officers were sent back on parole to be cared for by their own folk. One of these, an Irish adventurer named Peter Drake, has told us the tale of his personal appeal to the Duke upon the field :—

> I made shift to advance five or six yards toward his Grace, who, on seeing me in that condition, was so good as to stop and ask what was the matter. I told him as loud as I could that I had the honour to serve in the Gens d'Armes, and that I was a prisoner of war, very much wounded, and in danger of losing my life for want of a surgeon to dress my wounds, and begged he would please to take my parole of honour, which was a favour generally granted to prisoners of our corps, and to order some method to carry me to the French army where I should be taken care of. He immediately called for Cardonnel who was his secretary and then at hand, and asked him how came all these poor gentlemen (meaning the prisoners) were not sent away, he having sent orders for that purpose, and desired carriages to be got ready for those that were not able to walk, for that there were no surgeons enough to dress our wounded.

As a result, Drake and his companions in misfortune were, as he tells us, sent to their friends at Bavay that very afternoon. But it is to be feared that, with the best will in the world, the regimental surgeons of the Allies could have done little enough for the wounded privates of all the nations,

of whom nearly 15,000 must have remained upon their hands.*

Meanwhile, pious Colonel Blackader, left at the head of the Cameronians by the death of Colonel Cranstoun in the battle,

went to view the field to get a preaching from the dead, which might have been very edifying, for in all my life I have not seen the dead bodies lie so thick as they were in some places about the retrenchments, particularly at the battery where the Dutch Guards attacked. The Dutch have suffered most in the battle of any ; their infantry is quite shattered so that it is a dear victory. It is a wonder to me the British escape so cheap, who are the most heaven-daring sinners in this army. But God's judgments are a great depth.[13]

What would be the effect of Malplaquet upon opinion in Europe and England ? The feelings of Orkney, a friend to Marlborough, were frankly expressed in a letter home to his brother five days after the action.

I can liken this last battle to nothing so much as an attack on a counterscarp from right to left, and I am sure you would have thought so, if you had seen the field as I did the day after. In many places they lie as thick as ever did a flock of sheep. I really think I never saw the like ; particularly where the Dutch Guards attacked it is a miracle. I hope in God it may be the last battle I may ever see. A very few of such would make both parties end the war very soon. The French are very proud they have done so well. I do not believe they have lost so many as we. I doubt it is with us as it was with the French at the battle of Landen. . . . None alive ever saw such a battle. God send us a good peace.

'A good peace.' No word of a march to Paris ![14]

The attacking force had lost between sixteen and eighteen thousand men ;[15] the defenders probably not much over 11,000. Yet the Allies had again asserted their

* *Drake*, p. 190. Drake's story is borne out in essentials by Marlborough himself (*Dispatches*, IV, p. 599). 'Upon viewing the field of battle on Thursday, and finding great numbers of French officers and soldiers who had crept into the neighbouring houses and in the woods, wounded, in a miserable condition for want of assistance, I wrote to both the Marshals to acquaint them with it, that they might send a number of waggons to fetch them away, and told them I would order L.-General Cadogan to Bavay to meet such officer as they should send to agree on the manner of carrying them off.'

military superiority, for they had driven the enemy from a position so strong that Marlborough, inspecting the captured lines next day, wondered at his success, especially since, to use his own words, 'the French have never, during this war, fought so well as this time.'[16] If he had known beforehand that they would fight so well, would he have attacked such a position ? Had he reckoned, wrong for once, that after a stout resistance they would give way to panic as so often before ? These questions find no answer either in his letters or in his recorded conversations. If he had been Wellington, a word dropped to a friend in the ease of conversational retrospect would some day have let out the secret of his thought. But Marlborough was one who never boasted and who never confessed.

If such a field as Malplaquet had been won during the wars of William, England would have been all aglow with pride and joy. But Marlborough, by the glory of his deeds, had set up a standard of expectation not attained by a victory in which the victors lost more than the vanquished. Moreover, the battle had been fought when men were growing weary of the war. They had been disappointed by the Allies' refusal to make peace in the spring, and held that it could only be justified by a decisive battle and a march to Paris.

There was an element of sound political sense in the Tory outcry against Malplaquet, but as military criticism much of it was questionable. The 'butcher's bill,' denounced as so extravagant, amounted for the British army to less than 600 killed and less than 1300 wounded, out of 14,000 engaged.[17] Our humane and enlightened generation slaughters ten times as many every year rather than limit the speed of its road traffic in time of peace ; and it was a thirtieth part of the British losses in a single day of the Battle of the Somme. The Dutch, indeed, might have complained with better reason, since more than 8000 of their troops had been killed or wounded ; but the Tories who talked of the 'butcher's bill' cared nothing what happened to the Dutch.

If in 1709 England and Holland had still been fresh and eager to push their advantage, Malplaquet would, like

one of Grant's costly victories, have helped to open the road to the enemy's capital in a few years' time. Professional military critics therefore regard the battle as being an Allied success—justly from their point of view. But there is always a diplomatic and political situation behind every act of war in relation to which it must be judged. So viewed, Malplaquet was a French success. Marlborough, by attacking, had intended to destroy their army and it was not destroyed. Villars, by awaiting the attack, had intended to foster the nascent confidence of his troops, and on the whole they were more confident after the battle than before. But his success had only been relative to their former discouragement. The French made no further attempt to prevent the fall of Mons, and in no succeeding year did they dare give battle to Marlborough in the open field.

The first news of the storming of the enemy's Lines was received with joy in England. 'The guns went off all the afternoon,' we read, 'and the evening is concluding with bonfires.' Even St. John and Peterborough wrote to congratulate the Duke on his fourth great victory.[18] But before the end of the month the losses were known and Malplaquet became a party question. The Tories began to talk of 'the late carnage,' and to declare that the battle would not have been fought in the way it was, 'could a great man have found in his heart to have parted with intelligence money,'—although, in fact, no General of the age was so well served with intelligence as Marlborough. Hearne, the Oxford Jacobite, had heard, unmoved, of Blenheim, Ramillies and Oudenarde, which find no mention in his voluminous daily jottings. But at the news of the slaughter at Malplaquet the learned diarist was all agog :

> As this has been the most obstinate so it has been the most direful battle to England that has yet happened, and there is not, in the opinion of all honest men, the least reason for bragging. Private letters frequently come which give most impartial accounts, and we are well assured that from the greatest to the meanest officer hardly one escaped but was either slain or very much wounded,

a statement which was grossly untrue, particularly of the British regiments.

The Whigs, on the other hand, carried through the

national thanksgiving for the latest victory with pomp and ceremony uncurtailed, hymned Marlborough to the skies and prophesied the speedy fall of Paris. A Malplaquet song was set to music :

> Now cannon smoke clouds all the sky,
> And through the gloomy wood
> From every trench the bougres fly,
> Besmeared with dust and blood.
> While valour's palm is ours in fight,
> And Mons to terms we bring,
> Let bragging Boufflers vainly write
> False wonders to the King.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Monsieur, Monsieur, leave off Spain.
> To think to hold it is in vain,
> Thy warriors are too few.
> Then without more ado
> Be wise and strait call home little Anjou.

So sang the Whig politicians in their taverns, but it was no longer the full national chorus.[19]

In one important quarter there was no weakening. The City, on whose goodwill the Government so largely depended, was still for 'No Peace without Spain.'

> Upon the strength of your victory [wrote Godolphin to Marlborough nine days after the battle] I spoke yesterday to the Bank, that, pursuant to the latitude given in the last session of Parliament, they would now contract with me for the circulation of £600,000 more in Exchequer bills to the carrying on the public service. What I said seemed to be pretty well received, and I hope it will succeed. But upon that occasion Sir Gilbert Heathcote, who is Governor [of the Bank of England], said to me, 'Pray, My Lord, don't let's have a rotten peace.' 'Pray tell me,' I answered, 'what you call a rotten peace?' 'I call anything a rotten peace,' he said, 'unless we have Spain.' 'But, Sir Gilbert,' I said, 'I want you a little to consider the circumstances of the Duke of Marlborough and me; we are railed at every day for having a mind, as they call it, to perpetuate the war.' He replied very quick, 'They are a company of rotten rogues : I'll warrant you we'll stand by you.'[20]

The policies of the Bank of England with regard to the disposal of the crown of Spain had not been forwarded by

the events of the year's war in that country. So far from accomplishing anything in the Peninsula in 1709, the Allies had lost further ground, and by the autumn little outside Catalonia was left to the Austrian candidate, 'Charles III.' The last fortresses that still flew his flag along the coast of Valencia, under the partial protection of the English fleet, were falling one by one to the Bourbon armies. The French General, D'Asfeld, a cruel man, skilful in siege warfare, put to the sword the Spanish adherents of Charles in one captured town after another. In November 1708 he had at last taken Denia, and subsequently Alicante after a five months' siege of the rock on which its Castle stood.

Alicante Castle was gallantly defended by 800 English and Huguenots under Major-General John Richards, who had first become known to fame as Peterborough's faithful but critical lieutenant.* The rock was so tall and steep that it was useless to approach it by the ordinary methods of siege. D'Asfeld therefore spent three months in boring a mine fifty-six yards long in the living rock, at the end of which he placed 1200 barrels containing about 17,000 pounds of gunpowder, said to have been the greatest charge ever, till then, used in war. It was 216 feet below the parade ground of the castle. When all was ready, D'Asfeld called on Richards to surrender, inviting him to send officers to examine the mine. After carefully drawing up a paper of arguments in two columns 'for' and 'against,' Richards decided to stand the shock; the explosion would be terrific, but its effect would be uncertain because the body of the rock was traversed in all directions by clefts. To encourage his men, he determined to take his stand exactly over the mine. Some of his officers expostulated at his unnecessary self-immolation, but when he insisted they too claimed the right to stand by his side.

And so, on the morning of Monday, March 3, 1709, a little group of English and Huguenot officers, headed by the Governor, John Richards, in full regimentals, walked

* For Richards see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 71–73, 154. Being a Roman Catholic, Richards was nominally in the Portuguese service, really one of the most loyal servants of England. *See Map of Europe at end of this volume for the war in Spain.*

quietly into the middle of the parade ground and stood there, having ordered the privates of the guard to retire. In the streets of the town below, the enemy could be seen running for shelter from the force of the coming explosion.

The mine was blown up, and with little or no noise made an opening in the rock, on the very parade, of some yards in length, about three feet wide, into which the Governor, Lt.-Colonel Thornicroft, Major Vignoles and other officers fell, and the opening instantly closing upon them, they all perished.

There were some who accused Richards of having sacrificed himself and his staff to 'a fond curiosity,' but the more general feeling was an awed appreciation of an incident recalling the leap of Curtius into the gulf rather than an actual incident of modern warfare. The garrison held out more than a month longer, and capitulated in the middle of April on honourable terms. Nothing else of importance happened that year in Spain.[21]

In the year 1709 England had made her greatest effort in war, with no answering degree of success. But 'peace hath her victories . . .' While the red-coated grenadiers were playing their game of hide-and-seek with death in the charged chambers of Tournai and in the woodland alleys of Sars, the Londoners were eagerly buying and discussing a new wonder and delight, Steele's *Tatler*, born on April 12, and making its appearance every second week-day on a single unfolded sheet. Its influence, and that of the *Spectator* which grew out of it in two years' time, did more to launch Eighteenth Century civilization on its characteristic course than all the blood shed at Malplaquet. England's foreign wars, even at their most extravagant and burdensome height, did not in those happy days prevent the progressive softening of manners and the growth of the civilized arts in our island.*

Addison wrote in the paper, but the idea and the enterprise were Steele's, who brought his friend's shy genius into

* In January 1710 Thomas Coke, M.P., received a pleasant family letter from the country: 'You won't expect any news from Melbourne, but we thank you for that you send us; especially the *Tatlers* have of late been very entertaining, and between the hopes of hearing of you and reading the *Tatler* your daughters are impatient for the hour of the post' (*H.M.C. Coke, R.* 12, *Ap.* III, p. 83).

play side by side with his own ever-marketable wares. Defoe's *Review* had shown the way in this style of publication, but the larger and better part of the *Review* had been political. Defoe's great gifts did not include the deft touch on social comedy which the Steele-Addison partnership gave to a delighted Town. And the *Tatler* was not only amusing but moral and rational—an unusual combination at that date. Humour changed sides and came to the rescue of good manners and good feeling. It was characteristic of the new influence that, in the summer of 1709, Steele preached in the *Tatler* a series of sermons against duelling—an unusual course for a man of fashion to take in those days. Most men thought such a view fit only to be held by parsons, but here was an ex-soldier who had, in his day, been compelled unwillingly to ' pink ' his brother officer, a Whig who supported the army against its clerical detractors, here was Dicky Steele taking up his pen against the duel. ' I shall talk very freely,' he wrote, ' on a custom which all men wish exploded, though no man has courage to resist it.' He denounced, in particular, the Gothic barbarism of the usage by which even the seconds were compelled to stab at one another, sometimes with fatal results, though, busy as the Devil is, there was no pretence of quarrel between them. This attack on a practice peculiarly associated with military habits, being launched at the height of our war-effort by a supporter of the war, is an evidence of the essentially unmilitary character of English society, although more than a hundred years were to elapse before duelling completely disappeared from among our national customs.*

* *Tatler*, Nos. 25, 26, 39. In No. 39 appears the following very interesting dialogue :

'*Col. Plume.* I remember that a rencounter or duel was so far from being in fashion among the officers that served in the Parliament army [1642–60], that on the contrary it was as disreputable, and as great an impediment to advancement in the service, as being bashful in time of action.

Sir Mark. Yet I have been informed by some old Cavaliers that they were much more in mode among their party than they have been during this last war.

Col. Plume. That is true too, sir.

Mr. Sage. By what you say, gentlemen, one should think that our present military officers are compounded of an equal proportion of both those tempers ; since duels are neither quite discountenanced, nor much in vogue.'

On Steele, see Aitken's learned *Life* of him.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

Some Differences of Opinion about Malplaquet

I. *Should either side have attacked on September 9 ?*

Although the German Nineteenth Century author of Eugene's *Feldzüge* (Serie 2, Band II, pp. 98–99) thinks Marlborough ought to have attacked on the 9th, so did not Eugene, who was at Marlborough's side that day (though his army was distant) ; Eugene wrote that evening (9th) to the Kaiser explaining with complete conviction why it would have been impolitic to attack that day. See also *Add. MSS.* 9107, f. 22. *Feuquières* (ed. 1741, IV, pp. 34–38) on the other hand blames Villars for not attacking Marlborough on that same day. I follow *Taylor* (II, pp. 359–361) and *Atkinson* (pp. 393–395) in thinking both these opposite opinions very doubtful, for the reasons given in the text, pp. 8–10 above.

It is, of course, quite another question whether or not they should have attacked next day (10th) instead of waiting till the 11th. That I discuss on pp. 10–11 above.

II. *Who made the decision not to attack on the 10th ?*

Was it Eugene or Marlborough who on September 10 insisted on delaying the attack until the 11th ? On this point there is a conflict of contemporary rumour, but no first-hand evidence. Prince Lichtenstein, in family archives (cited in *Feldzüge*, 2, II, p. 101), says that Marlborough vetoed the attack on the morning of the 10th But Lichtenstein was in Spain that morning. Rousset, on the other hand, who was present at the battle on the Allied side, asserts that Marlborough wished to attack at once and that Eugene insisted on waiting till the 11th (*Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 542, for text of Rousset). But Coxe (III, ed. 1819, p. 78 *note*) says he knows no confirmation of Rousset's statement ; neither do I. Neither Marlborough nor Eugene made any statement either way. On the reasons for the decision itself see *Add. MSS.* 9107, f. 23.

III. *Should Villars have taken up a position behind the woods ?*

Some critics, such as *Feuquières* (IV, pp. 39–42), think that Villars, once he had decided to stand on the defensive, should have entrenched himself in the open ground further back, so as to fire on the Allied forces as they tried to debouch from the Wood. Villars, however, explains that he took up the more advanced position with a view to drawing on a battle and raising the siege of Mons. See his *Mémoires sub* 1709, and his letter to Louis after the battle, ' La vérité est que j'ai souhaité d'être attaqué.' Boufflers wrote that Villars' dispositions

had been *parfaitement bonnes* (*Pelet*, IX, pp. 377, 345). The question is well discussed by Major Burne in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, April 1933, pp. 44–46.

IV. *Did Orange disobey orders?*

The plea advanced by English apologists for Marlborough both then and now (even by *Taylor* and *Atkinson*) argues that the Dutch attack was meant only for a 'feint,' that Orange had been so instructed and that contrary to orders he turned it into a real attack, with disastrous results. I am sceptical on this point. Where are the alleged orders to Orange to make a 'feint,' or what first-hand evidence is there that he received any such? Marlborough never said so, and never complained of Orange's conduct in any of his numerous letters about the battle. Neither his printed letters, nor *Add. MSS.* 9107, ff. 20–40, contain any hint of that kind, *e.g.* on f. 38 he writes: 'Our left was the Dutch troops only, who behaved themselves extremely well, but could not force the enemy's retrenchment, so that their effort has suffered more than any other nation.' Nor does the Allied plan of battle, as given in *Feldzüge* 2, II, p. 101, contain anything about a 'feint.'

Moreover, what was Marlborough's usual practice? When, at Ramillies, he sent his English troops to make a 'feint,' he kept the secret in his own breast. He did not tell their commander, Orkney, that his was not to be a real attack; he let the attack develop seriously, and then called it off himself (see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 108–109). Marlborough was in command of the Dutch army at Malplaquet, and it was his failure if he allowed his subordinates to push the 'containing' attack harder than he intended. He never said that they did. And whether they did or not, it was his ultimate responsibility. He is big enough to bear it.

CHAPTER II

The Barrier Treaty and the Twilight of the Whigs

The Barrier Treaty, October–December 1709. The negotiations at Gertruydenberg, spring 1710. The War and the Ministry grow unpopular. The 'Palatines' and Mrs. Manley's *New Atlantis*, 1709. 'Captain-General for life'? Anne, Abigail, the Marlboroughs and the Whigs. Shrewsbury and Harley conspire for Peace.

Whatever effect Malplaquet was destined to have on English public opinion, the government only hardened its heart. Indeed it was during the six months following the campaign of 1709 that the Whig Ministers surpassed their previous record in demands that rendered peace impossible. During this period, Marlborough and Godolphin, already on bad terms with their colleagues owing to personal misunderstandings and rivalries at home, adopted a detached and critical attitude towards the foreign negotiations, from the conduct of which the Duke gradually retired, leaving them in the hands of Lord Townshend, the special representative of the Junto at the Hague.

The Duke and the Treasurer, in the days of their own undisputed power, had themselves initiated the policy of 'No Peace without Spain,' and they did not abandon it now. But Marlborough at least was beginning to see the difficulty of carrying it out, and he disapproved of the methods by which the Whigs sought to achieve the impossible task. He had, however, no alternative policy to suggest, and by refusing to take an active part at this crisis of European affairs he reduced himself to a cypher as diplomat and politician. But as a soldier he remained one of the most important pieces on the diplomatic board, because the fear that the French felt of 'Malbrook' at the head of the Allied armies still gave a certain reality to the attempt to force upon

France terms that the Duke himself privately declared to be monstrous. On October 9, 1709, he wrote to Godolphin :

> It is most certain that the great and only difficulty of the peace is the evacuating of Spain. I believe it was in the power of France at the beginning of the Treaty to have given us possession of several places in Spain, but how shameful a part that must have been I leave to others' judgment. It is certain there is no relying on French authority, so that I see no good end to the taking of measures for the forcing of them out of Spain.[22]

The victor of the war had, in short, no plan for harvesting the peace. He was content to sit with hands folded before the difficulties of the situation, and to watch his Whig colleagues break themselves against it in vain. If he had been as great a statesman as he was a soldier he would not have been content to play the part of onlooker at foreseen disaster.

In order to carry through their policy of securing Spain and Spanish America for the Austrian Charles, it was necessary for the Whig Ministers to purchase at a high price the support of Holland, whose people were weary of war, and whose statesmen were critical of the demands that had led to the rupture of negotiations in the spring of 1709. There was only one way to secure the unwilling adhesion of Heinsius and Buys to further extravagant demands on Louis : let England guarantee to the Dutch all they asked in the Spanish Netherlands, in defiance of Austria and at the expense of Charles III ; and let England herself forgo the monopoly of South American trade and the possession of Minorca in deference to Dutch susceptibilities. On those terms the Whig Ministers could not only obtain Dutch support in the renewed negotiations with France, but they could bind the States General to give military support to the Hanoverian Succession, in case the Jacobites challenged the Act of Settlement. Such were the principles underlying the famous Barrier Treaty.

Holland was sorely in need of peace. Her strength was ebbing away with the drain of war. With nothing equivalent to England's agricultural and industrial resources, she depended for her greatness on trade alone. Yet she shared with England the annual burden of naval armaments, and

of subsidies to the Allies ; and the Dutch army in the field and in the garrisons greatly outnumbered the British. The Tories gave it out that Holland was growing rich by her occupation of the cities of Belgium, but so long as the conflicting armies wasted the Spanish Netherlands, the States General spent there far more than they were able to raise.[23] Every year that the war continued exhausted still farther the strength of the little Republic, and left her, when peace returned, deprived beyond recovery of her position as a first-class Power. In the Eighteenth Century, Holland was to be no longer the colleague but the vassal of England.

For these reasons the Dutch statesmen should have insisted upon peace. Unfortunately the offer that the Whigs made them in the Barrier Treaty was too tempting to be refused. The course now taken by the statesmen of Holland proved ultimately disastrous to their country's interests. But at the moment it was very difficult for them to do anything else. William III, no doubt, could have resumed the whole negotiation with France into his own hand, in the joint interest of the Maritime Powers ; but there was no longer a Stadtholder-King, and Heinsius had inherited neither his dual position nor his genius.*

The only apparent alternative to close alliance with England, on the attractive terms she now offered, would have been for the Dutch to initiate a separate agreement with France, like Bolingbroke two years later. But such a proceeding smelt of treachery, and it would have been full of danger for the Republic. England might be strong enough to flout and betray Holland, but Holland could not with impunity flout and betray England. By a separate peace with France the Dutch could no doubt have obtained everything they wanted in the Netherlands—so far as it was in the power of France to give it. But England was offering as much, apparently on better security, for Heinsius did not foresee how short could be the term of British Ministries and of British faith. Moreover if Holland, depending on her old enemy France, were to defy England and Austria, the

* Portland, whose influence was potent behind the scenes in keeping the policies of England and Holland in harmony, was always strong for a continuance of the war. He died suddenly in November 1709.

English fleet, now greatly superior to her own, could cut her off from the trade of the world by which she lived. Then, whether ' Spain and the Indies ' went to Charles or to Philip, they would be closed to the Dutch.

On the other hand, by the Fifteenth Clause of the Barrier Treaty conceded by the Whigs, it was stipulated that Great Britain and Holland were to enjoy equal trade privileges in the Spanish Empire. The Whig Ministers thus abandoned the monopoly rights of trading with Spanish America which Stanhope had secured for Britain by a secret Treaty two years back with Charles III* ; and at the same time they were forced to concede that Minorca, in spite of its capture by the English, should remain the property of the Austrian King of Spain. On no other terms would the Dutch trading community accept the Barrier Treaty and the further prolongation of the war.[24]

In short the Junto promised Holland everything she wanted, even at the expense of British interests, not only in the Spanish Netherlands but in the Mediterranean and in the New World. Delusive as the offer eventually proved on all counts, it seemed at the time too good for the Dutch statesmen to refuse. They signed the Barrier Treaty in October 1709. Townshend alone signed for Great Britain, since Marlborough refused to have anything to do with so bad a bargain. After further negotiations it was ratified before Christmas, with the addition of two separate articles.

By the Barrier Treaty the Dutch were to be allowed to garrison a long list of cities and fortresses in the French border and throughout the Spanish Netherlands. The key position of Dendermonde was included, although the Junto had indignantly refused it a few years back. The effect of these Dutch rights of garrison and of the financial and commercial provisions that accompanied them, was to strip Austrian Charles of half the value of his property in the Netherlands and to endanger the freedom of British trade.

* The draft of the Treaty in Stanhope's handwriting, dated July 1707, is at Chevening. A joint Anglo-Spanish company was to be formed to monopolize the trade of Spanish America. This treaty Charles III signed, but the Barrier Treaty of 1709 annulled it.

Upper Guelders, to which the King of Prussia laid claim, was also to go to Holland.*

The interest of all the principal Allies had thus been sacrificed to the Dutch, nominally to secure, as the Treaty declared, their armed support of the Hanoverian Succession. But in fact Holland, for her own safety, would in any case be obliged to lend all possible aid against a Jacobite Restoration. The thing that had really been purchased by Great Britain in the Treaty was not mentioned in its terms—namely the assistance of Holland in the coming diplomatic struggle to win Spain for Charles III. If that negotiation were to break down, the Barrier Treaty would appear as a sacrifice of British interests that had been made in vain, and the Ministry who had made it would in all probability fall.

But until the renewed parley with France had actually broken down, the Barrier Treaty was accepted as a fact. Prussia could only grumble. The Austrian statesmen were unable to do anything effective against it, although Marlborough was now in sympathetic consultation with them and with Eugene. The worst fears of the Emperor had been realized ; the Dutch under the pretext of ' a barrier against France wished to get the entire Catholic Netherlands into their power.' [25]

The intended sequel to the Barrier Treaty of Christmas 1709 took place in the negotiations with France at Gertruydenberg in the following spring. Dutch support for the full programme of ' No Peace with Spain ' had been bought at a dear rate and was duly forthcoming. The Dutch statesmen, including Buys who had been the leader of the peace party, were compelled to negotiate on behalf of the Allies, and to demand from the French envoys all that England and

* The Treaty is printed in full in *Geikie and Montgomery*, pp. 377–386, and epitomized and commented on pp. 155–164. For the Dutch policy in the matter, see *Geyl*, pp. 17–20. The towns which the Dutch were to garrison were Nieuport, Ypres, Menin, Lille, Tournai, Condé, Valenciennes, Maubeuge, Charleroi, Namur, Liere, Hal, Dendermonde, besides the Castle of Ghent, and Knocke, Damme and other forts. For the very different Whig policy of 1706 see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 139–140. The only important town that the Whigs in 1709 refused to yield to Dutch demands was Ostend, the port of entry for British trade into Belgium.

Austria required. The orders were even more monstrous than the year before.* Austria and England were united in the demand that Louis, by the interpretation now put on Article Thirty-Seven of the Preliminaries, should with his own forces compel his grandson to abandon Spain in two months' time. If he failed, the Allies were then to be free to renew the war on France, with the advantage of possessing those cautionary towns which Louis was to cede them in order to obtain the two months' respite. Under these penalties the Allies sought to burden King Philip's grandfather with the task, to which they themselves were unequal, of the expulsion from Spain of the King chosen by the Spaniards. No wonder Chancellor Cowper said of his Cabinet colleagues, 'For my own part nothing but seeing so great men believe it, could ever incline me to think France reduced so low to accept such conditions.'

March–July 1710

Louis had not been unduly elated by Malplaquet. At Gertruydenberg he offered more than he had offered the year before. He would give up Alsace. He would pay a subsidy to help the Allied armies to dethrone his grandson. He had already recalled all his regiments from Spain, leaving the Spaniards to their own resources. Only he could not undertake to fight Philip and the Spanish people with French troops. It would 'wound his honour,' as Torcy declared on his behalf, 'to make war on his own flesh and blood and on a Prince who had always obeyed him. He desired peace, but not a truce for two or three months, bought at the price of Kingdoms and of his own frontier fortresses.'

There was scarcely anything the Allies might not have had from France in Europe or America except the one absurdity on which they insisted. Buys and the other Dutch negotiators, who really wanted peace, made some feeble efforts to obtain for France a mitigation of Article Thirty-Seven, or at least some compensation—a Kingdom in Sicily or elsewhere,—which might induce Philip voluntarily to quit Madrid. But the moment the Dutch began to murmur of reason the Whig Ministers frowned upon them, and compelled them to present to France the rigour of the Allied

* For the last year's negotiations see *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 398–401.

demands. Bound by the Barrier Treaty, the Dutch had no choice but to make themselves the cat's-paw of England and Austria, reviving the animosity that Louis had formerly felt against the insolent burghers of Holland.*

It might not seem strange to Englishmen, but it could not fail to amaze the Dutch, that England, after bribing Holland by the Barrier Treaty to become the agent of the Allies in thus heaping insults on France, should, in the very next year, herself go secretly to France and offer to leave Philip in Spain and to tear up the Barrier Treaty, while a campaign of contumely was begun against Holland by Swift and the pamphleteers in the pay of the new Cabinet. To an Englishman such changes may seem the natural consequences of a General Election, which of course overrides all international engagements and friendships. To the Dutch it could only seem bewildering bad faith. Indeed the preposterous conduct of the Whig Ministers in 1709–1710 had rendered it very difficult for their successors to obtain peace for Europe without bad faith. But the traditional Tory dislike of the Dutch enabled them to make the *volte-face* with peculiar gusto and ruthlessness at the expense of the duped Republic.

While the Whig doctors of State were thus ordering away the banquet of peace from John Bull's table, the weight of the war was being increasingly felt by common folk. It is true that some favourable circumstances encouraged the Ministers in the course they pursued: the trade with

* Petkum truthfully wrote to Rouillé: 'Had you [the French] only to do with the Dutch you would not have much difficulty. But there are two other powers [Austria and England] who would give you no quarter save for the Dutch.' See Petkum's correspondence in *H.M.C. Round*, pp. 340–351. Professor Geyl writes of the Conferences at Gertruydenberg as 'one of the most disastrous and truly humiliating episodes of Dutch diplomatic history. The Dutch delegates, who seemingly fulfilled the proud task of conducting the negotiations for the whole Alliance, were in reality the puppets of the Hague conference, in which England and Austria pulled the strings, and all the Republic gained by them was the deep resentment of the French, who were at last cured of the delusion that it was through the States that the coalition could be best approached,' *Geyl*, pp. 20–25. See also Professor Geyl's criticism in *History*, July 1926, p. 164, of Mr. Wickham Legg's *British Diplomatic Instructions, France, 1689–1721*, and see pp. 17–19 of that volume; *Torcy*, II, pp. 3–95; *Klopp*, XIII, pp. 396–420, 445–451; *Cowper*, p. 41.

Portugal was bringing into the country much gold from the mines of Brazil, then the chief source of the world's supply, and much excellent port wine, in exchange for English cloth;[26] the convoy system had got the better of the enemy privateers, and British merchants no longer complained that their ships were unprotected; the City was eager to lend money to the government to enable it to fight on till Spain was won. On the other hand distress was becoming general, especially in the country districts. Two bad harvests raised the price of corn in 1709 and 1710 to twice what it had been in the earlier years of the reign.[27] The four-shilling Land Tax continued to afflict the Squires, and as no House of Commons would vote for its further increase, Godolphin had each year to meet the ever-rising war expenditure by higher indirect taxation that fell heavily on the people at large. And even so the Treasury was falling behindhand in its payments at home and abroad. From all these causes shopkeepers and retailers felt the decline of demand for goods; and shutters went up in London streets and market squares.

The enforced recruiting of the unemployed, under the new Acts to replenish the army, often served as a weapon of tyranny in the hands of local magistrates* and was so widely unpopular that the Whigs in the House of Commons refused a government Bill to strengthen the compulsory powers for recruiting; members feared that it would lose them their seats at the next election.[28] The dread and dislike of the regular army was strongest among Tory squires and parsons, but was by no means confined to those classes. It was a general English sentiment, to a degree hardly imaginable in our day. Tutchin's *Observator*, which came as near to being Radical as any organ of that period, inveighs against a standing army, and, after attacking the Game Laws for disarming the peasantry, thus proceeds:

Jan. 1709

> What will be the end of spending our money and the lives of our men in a foreign war, for the interest of foreign princes and to make the fortunes of a few families at home? 'Tis true the times are good for some. But we must not judge of the face of the country by the face of some courtiers. We must not look at the great palaces that are built out of the monies got by the war, but at the little cottages.

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 218–219.

That had been written by a Whig democrat as early as June 1707, and two years later such sentiments were being widely expressed.

Another independent Whig of a very different type from poor Tutchin, the great Duke of Shrewsbury, watching the world from his lonely and lofty eminence, observed the changing mood of his countrymen. He had been 'great friends' with the disgraced Harley ever since Christmas 1708, and in the following November he wrote to him the result of his reflections:

> I do not doubt but the generality of the nation long for a peace, and the majority of those who represent it, when discoursed [with] singly in the country, agree in that opinion. But how they may change their minds when they come to London and submit to their leaders, I will not take on me to determine. However it is evident so many circumstances from at home as well as from abroad make peace desirable, that if the nation could see how they might have a good one, it is my opinion they would be very uneasy till they had it.[29]

The course of intrigue and ambition followed in the next two years by the writer and receiver of this letter was in no small degree inspired by the patriotic conviction which they held in common that peace was needed and demanded by the nation, but that before peace was to be had the character of the Ministry would first have to be changed.

The distress in the country and the desire for peace began the reaction against the Whigs during the summer of 1709. One sign of popular discontent was the outcry against the 'Palatines.' Whig and Tory had long differed as to the degree of encouragement that should be given to Protestant refugees. The fact that foreign immigrants were never Church of England men tended to alienate the sympathies of the Tory; to the Whig it was enough that they were fellow-Protestants. The advantage derived by the country from the French Huguenot immigration was too

great to be denied : in William's reign our raw levies had been taught their business largely by officers driven from the French army on account of their religion ; and the secret of new crafts had been brought into the island by a skilled and industrious population, who in twenty years had very much more than repaid to the country of their adoption the charity bestowed on them when they landed after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Whigs in the House of Commons declared in 1709 that the Huguenots had 'subscribed near £500,000 into the Bank of England.' But to the Church of England they subscribed less liberally, and as Protestant Dissenters they voted Whig.

During the negotiations for peace with France in 1709–10, Lord Portland wrote to Lord Somers regretting that the terms to be imposed on Louis did not contain provision for the Re-enactment of the Edict of Nantes. Portland gives the reason why this idea, so often mooted, has now been dropped : people in England and Holland are unwilling to pave the way for the return to France of so much industry, ability and wealth. But in fact these fears, he writes, are groundless : the Huguenots have struck such deep roots in England and Holland and are doing so well, that very few of them will return to the land of their fathers ; the people who will benefit by Toleration in France will be the million who have not migrated but have pretended to become idolaters ; their souls and their children's after them ought, writes Portland, to be a consideration with the victorious Allies. The letter is both interesting and sincere, yet it is doubtful how much a Toleration enforced by foreign bayonets would have been worth, or how it would have been guaranteed in time to come. It was perhaps better to leave the matter to Voltaire.[30]

In the spring session of 1709 a Bill was introduced into the British Parliament for the naturalization of foreign Protestants, if they would take the oaths to government and receive the sacrament in any Protestant church. Tory amendments, that proposed to restrict the test to communion with the established Church, were defeated in both Houses, and the Bill became law in its Whig form. During the Lords' debate, Burnet of Salisbury had as usual spoken for

the larger latitude, to the indignation of many of his brother churchmen.*

In the following year an immigration took place which seemed to many to justify the High Church objectors. There was distress in the Rhenish Palatinate, due partly to the ravages of the war and of the French, but in part to the persecuting policy of our ally, the Roman Catholic Elector, towards his Protestant subjects. Queen Anne's good reception of fifty Lutherans from the Palatinate, co-religionists of her late husband, being reported in their native land, attracted a tide of immigrants in the summer of 1709, coincident with the great rise in corn prices and distress among the English poor. More than ten thousand 'High Dutch,' as Germans were then called, came over in a state of complete destitution. Some were genuine religious refugees of a good type ; others, who had nosed John Bull's wealth and bounty from afar, proved 'inactive and mutinous.' Two thousand of them turned out to be Papists and were sent home at once. The most part remained, a charge on English charity, and competitors for English employment in a bad year.

Much generosity was shown, not only by the government but by private persons. The Queen subscribed heavily ; and one pious lady gave £1500. They had 'plentiful relief,' and 'canvas hutches both at Blackheath and Camberwell' were erected for them till they could be drafted elsewhere. England paid but grumbled.

> The case of the Palatines is all our domestic talk [Ralph Verney heard from his uncle] ; I find there will be circular letters to all the parishes and all vestrys in order to receive some families at £5 per head. But what to do with them is hard to imagine, and 'tis thought Parliament will enquire into the invitation they had hither.

The cry that 'Charity begins at home and these foreigners are a plague to us' was popular that year among the English of all classes, particularly among the labouring poor.

Eventually several thousands of these unwanted strangers were drafted to the American colonies, and three thousand

* Burnet records this in his *History*, and Swift writes on the margin 'Dog.' *Burnet*, V, p. 399. For the text of the Act see *Stats. of Realm*, 7 Anne, cap. V.

to Ireland, where no one was likely to look a gift Protestant in the mouth. Swift's friend, Archbishop King, vied with Wharton, the Whig Lord Lieutenant, and the Dublin Parliament, in the business of planting them in Southern Ireland, where they would serve to resist the next native rising or French invasion. They were granted land on better terms and on longer leases than the Catholic peasantry around, for whom anything was good enough. None the less, the plantation proved a failure. Many of them had been craftsmen, not peasants, in their own country, and nearly all disliked the strange soil and stranger inhabitants. In less than a year more than half of them had thrown up their farms and drifted back to England or to the fatherland.

When the Sacheverell trial began, the talk in England against the ' Palatines ' and those who had encouraged them to come over, helped to foment the indignation of the mob against the persecutors of the High Church champion.[31]

The change of national opinion in 1709 was very real below the surface, but it was not apparent to careless observers. Before the Sacheverell trial, it found no adequate voice in literature, journalism or public speech. Harley was preparing the great change in secret, by closetings with Shrewsbury, Abigail and the Queen. St. John, who had lost his seat in the House, was enjoying the pleasures of retirement—' in this obscure and private life,' he wrote to Harley in September, ' I am perfectly easy, and shall with the same ease return to the noise, whenever the service of my country calls me forth.'[32] Swift was still unattached to either party and was living quite as much in Whig as in Tory society during his visits to England. Steele, Addison and Defoe were all writing for the government. Indeed the publication that did most harm to the Ministry that year was a book of the lowest order, the *New Atlantis*, wherein Mrs. Manley, a woman of no character, regaled the public with brutal stories, for the most part entirely false, about public men and their wives, especially Whigs and above all the Marlboroughs. For example, Sarah was accused of being Godolphin's mistress, with Marlborough's connivance! Fancy names thinly veiled the persons libelled. The book

soon had a second volume and passed through many editions. At the end of October the government had Mrs. Manley arrested, but she was bailed out and the prosecution was dropped.*

In September 1709 the *Tatler* described the authoress of the *New Atlantis* as using ' artificial poisons conveyed by smells.' The criticism, rightly or wrongly, has been attributed to Swift. At any rate a year later he wrote to Addison that her characters only ' happened to be right once in five hundred times.' It was not till 1711, when the passions of party had seized the Doctor, body and soul, that he wrote of her as the ' poor woman ' and tried to get her a pension ' for her service in the cause, by writing her *Atlantis* and prosecution, etc., upon it.' Finally he declared that she ' has very generous principles for one of her sort and a great deal of good sense and invention.' ' Invention,' in one sense, she certainly had, but it is difficult for anyone who has read her garbage to admire the ' generosity ' of her ' principles.'[33]

In sight of the gathering storm the Ministry should have closed its ranks and reconsidered its policies at home and abroad. But while it refused to make peace, and provoked its domestic foes by the Sacheverell trial, it was too patently divided by personal jealousies, which encouraged Harley and Shrewsbury in their plot to break it up piecemeal. Throughout 1709 and the early months of 1710 the rift between the Junto and the Marlborough-Godolphin interest was constantly widening. Each side suspected the other of intrigues with the common enemy. Sarah was always being told by her henchmen that one or other of the Junto—now Somers, now Halifax—was paying court to Abigail, Lady Masham. The Duchess, indeed, no longer trusted any of her old friends the Whigs except Lord Chancellor Cowper. Shrewsbury drew Somerset, the other

* It is curious that Mrs. Manley libelled the Cowper family under the name of 'Volpone' (*New Atlantis*, 2nd ed. 1709, I, p. 213 *et seq.*), whereas a few months later Sacheverell, as is well known, was thought to refer to Godolphin by the same word. Indeed, the context of Sacheverell's sermon shows that he meant Godolphin, as an ex-Tory. I suppose the name of Ben Jonson's character was in general use to denote a hypocrite. The key to the names in the *New Atlantis*, Vol. I, will be found in *Hearne's Collections*, II, p. 292.

independent Whig Duke, into correspondence with Harley in May 1710 ; and, long before that, Somerset had been trying on his own account to make trouble in the Whig party, by telling Wharton that ' he had been ill-used by the Lords that he thought his friends.' Wharton did not believe him, but he suspected Godolphin of having set on Somerset to divide him from his colleagues of the Junto. The air was full of stories of intrigue and betrayal.[34]

Meanwhile Lord President Somers was basking in the unaccustomed warmth of royal favour. Anne had for many years disliked him on report and kept him at arm's length, but now that he was able to approach her as one of her confidential servants, she soon fell under his charm. He received, by a private arrangement with the Queen, three additions of £1000 each to his salary, paid respectively in April and October 1709 and in June 1710. The royal bounty appears to have affected his conduct, which became disloyal to his colleagues. Sarah was not far wrong when she suspected that Somers was intriguing to replace Godolphin as Lord Treasurer, and that Harley and Anne for a while deluded him with the hope.[35] The Cabinet had long been lacking in cohesion and mutual trust, when, in the summer of 1710, the plan to break it up, carefully prepared by Shrewsbury, Harley and Abigail, was at length brought into action by the Queen.*

Marlborough's sense of the insecurity of the political situation led him to ask that his post of Commander-in-Chief, or ' Captain-General ' as it was called, should be secured to him during life. As early as May 1709 he bade the unwilling Lord Chancellor, Cowper, to hunt for precedents, but none were forthcoming. He then employed his client, James Craggs, in the same search with the same result. Marlborough believed that Monk had been rewarded by Charles II with the Captain-Generalship for life, but he

* For the payments of secret service money to Somers see *P.R.O.*, T., 38, 737, ff. 273, 289, 307. The secret service money accounts contain some curious but few, if any, scandalous, items. £200 a year is paid to the saintly Non-Juror Ken, through Hooper, his friend and supplanter at Bath and Wells. Three payments of £10 (all too little) are made to Margaret Farquhar, widow of the excellent dramatist, who left his family in dire poverty on his death in 1707.

was informed on enquiry that even the King-maker's commission had been held during the pleasure of the Crown. Cowper could not conceal his opinion that to make the command of the army irrevocable would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, an injury at once to the Queen's prerogative and to the liberties of a country in which the military must be strictly subordinate to the civil power. But the Duke was obstinate, and in the autumn made his demand of Anne herself, and when she refused in indignation and alarm, wrote her an angry letter, complaining of her attachment to Abigail.

It was one of the very few imprudent acts of his life. He had touched both the Queen and the country on the raw. For although he had only sought to set his relation to the army above the ebb and flow of political parties, his action was represented as an attempted treason. The Tory Chiefs and his rival Argyle accused him of seeking to make himself ' Perpetual Dictator.' They raised the cry of ' Cromwell and the military power,' with more semblance of reason than they could squeeze out of any other circumstance of the time. The Duke had disconcerted his friends and played into the hands of all his enemies. Indeed the affair was one of the chief causes of the ingratitude and contumely with which he was, for some years to come, treated by the nation he had saved.[36]

Meanwhile the quarrel between Anne and Sarah was growing worse every week. The situation had indeed become intolerable for all parties. Sarah, who had for many years been the Queen's most intimate friend, was still Mistress of the Robes, Groom of the Stole and Keeper of the Privy Purse, and was still officially in charge of the domestic concerns of the royal household, whereas her hated supplanter was already the sole confidante and favourite. Given the temper of the three women, a war of petty insults and reprisals was inevitable. One day the Queen disposed of rooms in Kensington Palace that had been ascribed to Sarah, without letting her know, and, when challenged, equivocated and took refuge in sulky silence. On other occasions the offence came from the Duchess.

Sarah's partisans upbraided her because she did not visit Anne every day : [37] she would have been better advised not to visit her at all. Marlborough, wiser in his wife's case than in his own, warned her not to weary the Queen with complaints :

> . . . as it has always been my observation in disputes, especially in that of kindness and friendship, that all reproaches, though ever so reasonable, do serve to no other end but to make the breach wider.

Thus he wrote to her very sagely at the end of August 1709, while he was taking the Citadel of Tournai. But two months later Anne found occasion to write to him :

> You seem dissatisfied with my behaviour to the Duchess of Marlborough. I desire nothing but that she would leave off teasing and tormenting me, and behave herself with the decency she ought both to her friend and Queen.

At the same time she wrote to Sarah :

> It is impossible for you to recover my former kindness, but I shall behave myself to you as the Duke of Marlborough's wife and my Groom of the Stole.

> Upon the receipt of this letter [wrote the unteachable Duchess], I immediately set myself to draw up a long narrative of a series of faithful services for about twenty-six years past. And knowing how great a respect her Majesty had for the writings of certain eminent divines, I added to my narrative the directions given by the author of *The Whole Duty of Man* with relation to friendship.

Behind the comedy lay tragic facts. The Queen, who had lost all her children and the husband she loved, was now losing her one intimate and life-long friend. How many old memories, once sweet, must the quarrel have turned sour to Anne's recollection ! Nor could Sarah's place in her heart be filled by Abigail Masham, a new-comer with no part in her past life, an adventuress, a listener at keyholes. If the fault was mostly Sarah's, the tragedy was mostly Anne's. For Sarah was left less forlorn. She had more resources in herself ; and she had the unchanging love of her husband, of which she was far more proud than she had ever been of the royal friendship even in its palmiest days.[38]

Harley, admitted up the back-stairs by Abigail whenever he wished to see the Queen, prompted her at the New Year to an action calculated to bring on a crisis. Jan. 1710 Without consulting Marlborough she made Earl Rivers Lieutenant of the Tower of London, then the most important military arsenal, and offered his regiment to Abigail's brother, Jack Hill, whose only claim to a Colonelcy lay in his relationship to the woman most odious to the Commander-in-Chief. Marlborough was furious : ' It is, madam,' he told the Queen, ' to set up a standard of disaffection to rally all the malcontent officers in the army.' He claimed the dismissal of Abigail : unless that woman ceased to attend the Queen, he would no longer command her troops. Sunderland and Walpole wished to have an address for the favourite's dismissal to be carried by the House of Commons. But Somers, Cowper and Godolphin were for more moderate counsels.[39]

After many heated consultations, much heart-burning and mutual suspicion among Ministers, a compromise was finally agreed to by the Queen and the Duke, both of whom bitterly resented the constraint put upon them by the intermediaries. Hill did not get his regiment, but Rivers remained at the Tower, and Abigail in the closet with the key of the back-stairs. Up them Harley continued to come, bearer of suggestions from Shrewsbury for further undermining of the Ministerial power. The Cabinet had antagonized the Queen and had lost all internal cohesion and mutual trust. Marlborough perhaps had been right. Perhaps he and all the Ministers had better have resigned rather than go on upon such terms :

> This physic but prolongs thy sickly days.

If the crisis that ultimately came in August 1710 had been anticipated in January, Europe might six months the sooner have enjoyed the blessings of peace.[40]

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

Politics and the Army

The following letter written by Marlborough from the field to Godolphin in England, lets us into the pulse of the machine of politics as it was then conducted. It has no date, but must have been written in 1709 or 1710. I have put the explanation of the cypher in brackets after each cypher figure, and I have preserved the original spelling. The letter is unsigned and unaddressed, but must have been enclosed in a packet addressed to Godolphin. It is now in my possession, and a facsimile of the first side is produced opposite.

for yourself

By the different accounts I have from 108 [England] it will be a great ease to mee to know from you how far 38 and 39 [you and I] may safely depend upon the sincerity of 28 [Shrewsbury]. The encouragement 221 [Argyle] has received by the favour 42 [the Queen] has shown him, makes it absolutely necessary for 39 [me] to countenance 37 [Ld Orkney] in opposition to 221 [Argyle], which makes me beg of you that you will use your intirest with 42 [the Queen] that thay [*sic*] wou'd be pleased to allow me to give assurance to 37 [Orkney] that when any of his Countrymen [the Scots] are made Pears that he shall be made an English Baron, if it be the intention of 42 [the Queen] that I shou'd serve Her which I am ready to do with all my heart, she must in order to bring the dissipline of the army back to that happy posture in which it was some time ago for her Service, let me have in my power to oblige the officers, and not to have anybody incoraged to think thay can meet with preferment by others. If 42 [the Queen] dose not think this absolutely necessary and good for Her, I shall be as well contented to be quiet, and retier, which may make mee happyer, if I were not morally sure that Her service can't succeed any other way, pray lett me have your mind freely, and your advice as a faithfull friend, for I can't be at ease in my mind, til I have fixt my resolution, as to my behaviour, for the remaining part of my life, which will bee very much guided by what I shall hear from you.


for yourself

By the different accounts I have from 108. it will be a great ease to mee to know from you how far 38. and 39. may safely depend upon the sincerity of 28. the encouragement 221. has receivd by the favour 42. has shown him, makes it absolutely necessary for 39. to countenance 37. in opposition to 221. which makes me beg of you that you will use your intirest with 42. that thay [illegible] to allow me to give assurances to 37. that when any of his Country men are made Pears that he shall be made an English Baron, if it be the intention of 42. that I shou'd serve Her which I am ready to do with all my heart, she must in order to bring the dissipline of the Army back to that happy pos-ture in which it was some time ago for her ser-vice, let me have in my power to oblige the officers, and not to have any body incoraged

CHAPTER III

SACHEVERELL

The last Whig Parliament of Anne. Financial straits: the Lottery. Dr. Henry Sacheverell. His sermon and impeachment. Whig and Tory theories of the Revolution. The Sacheverell riots. The Lords' decisions. The Middle Party. Effect of the Sacheverell agitation in the country.

PARLIAMENT, as usual, met during the season when the world's armies were in winter quarters. It was the last session of the Queen's reign to be held under Whig auspices. The business was finance and Sacheverell, both strong Tory arguments.

Nov. 1709–April 1710

The endless war was telling even on the English financial system, the strongest in Europe. Thirteen millions was now the annual expenditure; it had been less than three millions in the last year of peace. And the war was costing annually twice what it had cost in 1703. Spain alone ate up more than a million a year, although our forces in the Peninsula were diminishing in number and were cruelly ill provided. Government was heavily in debt; the Navy alone was four millions in arrears. The 'poor seamen' were going unpaid, very much as in earlier reigns. Foreign contractors exacted their dues, while English creditors and public servants had often to wait and borrow. To be a British Envoy abroad always meant embarrassment and might mean ruin. Payment was the more difficult as there was then no national system of paper money. All this rendered the Whig war unpopular with many who had at first found their advantage in it. Over and above the fixed revenue, the Commons this winter voted more than six millions, by means of the usual four-shilling Land Tax, and increased charges on many articles, including candles,

beer and coal. Such burdens were resented in a year of dearth.[41]

One financial expedient, however, was popular enough, and caused pleasurable excitement, particularly in the fashionable class. The device of the Lottery, employed early in William's reign, had been discarded and made illegal in 1699 as ' a common and public nuisance.' It was now revived by the House of Commons on the advice of the Treasury officials.

It served to render ordinary investments in government loans more attractive, by adding to their certain profit the chance of larger gains. Ten-pound shares, represented by ' tickets,' were to be bought, and any ticket might prove in the draw to be a lucky number, carrying extra annuities. But even the blank tickets registered sound claims on government.

The letters and diaries of this year reveal the most respectable ladies and gentlemen immersed in this safe and patriotic form of gambling. Even the saintly Rachael, Lady Russell, dead to the vanities of the world ever since her husband's execution long ago, expresses a kindly hope that her grand-daughter may be ' gratified in the lottery.' Fathers bought tickets for their daughters, and distant country-houses were all agog on days when the prize numbers were publicly drawn from the wheel of fortune by the ' Blue-coat Boys,' chosen for the task as the most innocent persons in town ! ' The Jackanapes gave themselves such airs in pulling out the tickets,' growled Swift, ' and showed white hands open to the company to let us see there was no cheat.' [42]

Sarah's friends, the Herveys of Ickworth, invested deeply, in an almost pious spirit. Lord Hervey in his private diary writes :

> 1710 June 15. Thursday I took out mine and dear wife her lottery tickets, mine being 110 tickets, hers and her childrens 45, in all 155 lottery tickets, numbered 32802 inclusive to 32956.
>
> Aug. 12. Saturday I had (by God's good Providence) a benefitted ticket of five hundred pounds per annum come up in the State-lottery against one of the numbers of my tickets, viz. 32847, commencing from Michaelmas 1710 for 32 years.

And, a week later, God again providently catered for his Lordship in the matter of ticket 32868.*

As all the world knows, Godolphin and the Whigs precipitated their own ruin by the State prosecution of a parson for a foolish sermon. But Doctor Henry Sacheverell was not, as has sometimes been said, an ' obscure ' parson, who would never have been heard of if he had not been impeached before the Lords. On the contrary, ever since, in the first year of the reign, he had ' hung out the bloody flag of defiance ' to Whigs and Dissenters from the University pulpit, and poured foul abuse on half the Bishops in his pamphlet entitled *The Character of the Low Churchman*, he had been the principal mouthpiece, if not the leader, of high-flying clergy in Oxford and elsewhere. Atterbury had far greater talents but was relatively unknown ; he had never revealed his authorship of the famous *Letters to a Convocation Man*, and until the last years of the reign he did not figure so prominently as ' the Doctor ' whose defence before the House of Lords he composed. Ken, who would have led the High Church party with the dignity and charity it so often lacked, had with characteristic scrupulosity seceded from the Establishment as a Non-Juror. Many thought that Sacheverell should have done the same. Hearne, the bitter Oxonian Jacobite, wrote of him at the height of his fame that such an advocate of Non-Resistance ' was not to be excused, he having taken the oaths ' ; and set him down as ' conceited, ignorant and impudent.' But whatever his faults may have been, Sacheverell was a power in the land long before his trial.[43]

In December 1705 he had preached, with great applause,

* *Diary of John Hervey* (1894), p. 52 ; Miss Scott Thomson, with the kind permission of the Duke of Bedford, has given me notes of some of the accounts of Mrs. Elizabeth Howland, mother-in-law of the then Duke, herself a careful investor, as became a daughter of the great Josiah Child. She dealt largely in the Lottery, *e.g.* one of her entries runs : ' Blank lottery tickets of 1710 ; 329 sets at £9 13*s.* 0*d.* per set, 25 years to go . . . £3207 15*s.* 0*d.*' Partly on account of their connection by marriage with the great East Indian magnate, the Duke of Bedford at this period traded on a large scale in the East India Company Two ships in the Company fleet were named the *Bedford* and the *Tavistock*. The Russell wealth, ever since the fifteenth century, was largely made by trade.

another University Sermon attacking Whigs, Dissenters and 'moderate' Tories. Four years later, he delivered the substance of it with large additions in St. Paul's before the Lord Mayor of London.[44] The occasion was the Fifth of November, a day consecrated to the double event of Guy Fawkes and William's landing at Torbay. Such a sermon, if preached on January 30th, might have passed unnoticed amid a thousand other fulminations launched that day against rebels and fanatics who had executed Charles I and whose successors were said to be still busy in the land. But a sermon which reasserted the doctrine of non-resistance in its most extreme form as the duty of subjects in all circumstances whatsoever, when delivered on November the Fifth seemed an attack on the Revolution, intended to undermine its corollaries, the Act of Settlement and the prospective Hanoverian Succession. And when this sermon, dedicated to the Lord Mayor, was printed and circulated as a party pamphlet to the extent, it was said, ultimately of 40,000 copies, the affair assumed a national importance.

Nov. 5 1709

On these grounds, and not from mere vindictiveness against an 'obscure parson,' the Ministers decided on an impeachment, in order to argue out before the highest tribunal of the land the lawfulness of the existing Constitution and the prospective rights of the Protestant Succession. As Burke long afterwards wrote in his *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, on behalf of the same Constitution when threatened no longer by the Jacobites but by the Jacobins :

> The Impeachment of Dr. Sacheverell was undertaken by a Whig ministry and a Whig House of Commons and carried on before a prevalent and steady majority of Whig Peers. It was carried on for the express purpose of stating the true grounds and principles of the Revolution, what the Commons emphatically called their *foundation*.

But there is usually more than one reason for any political act. There had been other parts of the Sermon that helped to provoke the decision to prosecute. Whig pamphleteers complained that Sacheverell 'had exhausted all the topicks of Illnature and Billingsgate to patch up his discourse.' He had denounced Dissenters in brutal terms, and made

a personal attack on the servants of the Crown, particularly on Godolphin as the Tory who had betrayed his party. The text of the sermon was 'In perils among false brethren.'

> Nor indeed [said the preacher] could any one be supposed so sottish as to place the least confidence in these men, did they not bait their hook and cover their treachery with the sacred and plausible pretences of friendship. In what moving and living colours does the holy psalmist point out the crafty insidiousness of such wily Volpones ? *But it was even thou ! my companion, my guide, mine own familiar friend !*

—and so forth. Everyone made the application to the Lord Treasurer. And he, for years past, had been more sensitive to the attacks of the pulpit than his Whig colleagues, who took it as all in the day's work to be belaboured by parsons. As early as 1705 Godolphin had been writing to his friends about 'the insolences of the clergy,' and the need that government should prosecute them as it prosecuted lay pamphleteers who overstepped the mark.*

There may therefore be some truth in Swift's statement :

> About this time happened the famous trial of Dr Sacheverell, which arose from a foolish, passionate pique of the Earl of Godolphin, whom this divine was supposed, in a sermon, to have reflected on under the name of Volpone ; as my Lord Somers, a few months after, confessed to me ; and at the same time that he had earnestly, and in vain, endeavoured to dissuade the Earl from that attempt.

Whether Somers had been always opposed to an Impeachment is not, however, certain. Sarah, a prejudiced witness no doubt, long afterwards wrote :

> When there was something very material to be done in the House of Lords concerning Dr Sacheverell's trial, Lord Somers excused himself from coming to vote because his mother was dead. This was an odd thing for a man when he could not possibly take his mother out of the grave, and especially on a business that he had himself to my knowledge and to my hearing pressed all the Ministry to have Sacheverell prosecuted. And I heard him myself say in a meeting in my lodgings, if it was not done the clergy would take the Crown from the Queen by preaching.[45]

* *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 7.

Indeed the other main object of the Impeachment, besides the most public and solemn restatement of the *foundation* of the Revolution Settlement, was to put a curb on the party use of the pulpit in the approaching political crisis. The expectation was that after the condemnation of the Doctor

there will be an injunction to all the Clergy not to meddle with the Toleration, Administration and Politics.

The Whigs were in high glee. 'Nothing was in their mouths,' wrote Lord Ailesbury, 'but that they would roast the priest, which proved a fatal dish for them and their adherents.' The House of Lords was chosen as the national theatre, rather than any lower Court, partly to give solemnity to the statement of Revolution principles by the Managers of the prosecution for the Commons, and by their Lordships as Judges, partly also, as the Tories believed, because no ordinary Court of Law would 'condemn a man for innuendoes'; and because a Jury must be unanimous, but a majority sufficed in the Lords.[46]

Having once determined on an Impeachment, the Whigs staged the scene with all the circumstance of a great historic pageant. Sir Christopher Wren prepared Westminster Hall with wooden scaffolding, as it had been prepared for the trial of Strafford. But even when it was crowded to the roof it could not contain the whole world of fashion and power that clamoured for admission. The younger Lords, besieged by fair applicants, demanded eight tickets apiece. The members of the House of Commons took up one whole side of the Hall. To get more room, Sir Christopher was bidden to put a gallery above the box where the Queen was to sit, but he was obliged to tell their Lordships 'that the Queen was positive *she would have no body over her head*, which made the House laugh, coming so pat to what had been so lately the discourse of the Town.'

Colley Cibber complained on behalf of the legitimate drama that 'our audiences were extremely weakened during the trial, by the better rank of people's daily attending it.' 'Sacheverell,' wrote old Lady Wentworth, 'will make all the Ladys turn good huswivs, they goe att seven every morning' to secure their seats. The Tory ladies 'wet all

their clean handkerchiefs' with tears over the dear Doctor's defence. But the brigade of Whig beauties, not being inspired by the soft emotion that agitated the breasts of their rivals, found the long constitutional arguments vastly tedious; they and their lords were soon regretting to one another the nuisance of 'this nasty trial.'

The Tories in Parliament had at first hesitated, for many of them liked neither the man nor his sermon. But, encouraged by the fury of their partisans in the country, they adopted the Doctor's cause as their own. The Queen, during the preliminaries of the Impeachment, told Burnet 'it was a bad sermon and he deserved to be well punished for it.' But party spirit is contagious and she too was drawn into the strong Tory current. At the bar, the defendant appeared surrounded by her Chaplains, 'encouraging and magnifying him.' Every day she came in her sedan chair from St. James's Palace, escorted by a vast crowd shouting 'We hope Your Majesty is for a High Church and Sacheverell.' And every day she dined on the premises of Parliament, to lose no word of the proceedings. Indeed neither Queen nor subject could stand neuter in such a heat of partisanship. 'The great amusement of this town,' wrote a cynical observer, 'is the affair of Sacheverell, about which all companies squabble and box.' For his part, Sacheverell came every day from the City to Westminster Hall, in his glass coach surrounded by a countless multitude armed some with bludgeons and others with drawn swords. The Tories borrowed from their foes the arts with which Shaftesbury's 'brisk boys' were wont to overawe the capital.[47]

The speeches for the prosecution and for the defence brought out very clearly the single Whig and the several Tory points of view on the Revolution that was past, and by implication on the Hanover Succession that was still to come. The united front of the one party, however unpopular at the moment, in contrast to the discordant and embarrassed arguments of Sacheverell and his defenders, portended the Tory catastrophe of 1714, though the trial itself led first to the Whig catastrophe of 1710.

Feb. 27–March 23 1710

The exponents of the Whig point of view all said one

thing. Robert Walpole, General Stanhope and the other Managers of the Impeachment for the House of Commons, and the Noblemen and Bishops who spoke against Sacheverell when their Lordships adjourned to discuss the case in their own Chamber, all declared that the nation had laws and rights that should in extremity be defended by force even against the Crown. The Revolution had been such a case of just resistance against a King who had broken the laws. And the title of Queen Anne, and of the House of Hanover after her, rested on Acts of Parliament overriding strict hereditary right. The doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance incapable of any exception, as Sacheverell had preached it, would make the Revolution criminal, and would vitiate the Queen's title to the throne.

In so arguing the Whigs tacitly abandoned the tale of the warming-pan. They assumed that the Pretender was Anne's brother. For this they were taken to task by Tory speakers for the defence, for whom the warming-pan still had its uses, as the dim cave where the ancient doctrine of divine hereditary right might continue to hibernate. The Whigs, it was said, had done Queen Anne and the House of Hanover an ill service by resting their claims solely on Acts of Parliament, and ' many thousands were alienated by this impolitic discovery.' * It is, indeed, probable enough that the Whig acknowledgment of the Pretender as James II's son did something to stimulate the Jacobite movement then gaining ground in the Tory party. Nevertheless the Protestant Succession was safer in the long run for being based on truth and common sense, instead of on sophistical arguments drawn from a lying tale.

* Constantine Phipps, in his speech on behalf of Sacheverell, said : ' I do not think that the Doctor, who asserts the hereditary right of the Queen, can be charged with an intention to bring in the Pretender. I am in your Lordships' judgment whether the denying Her Majesty's hereditary right be not the most likely way to bring him in. For I submit to your Lordships whether the denying the hereditary right of the Queen be not to suppose an hereditary right in somebody else.' (*State Trials*, XV, p. 225.)

Swift, who, as an Irish Protestant, was always a strong Hanoverian, blamed the Whigs in 1711 for dropping the warming-pan story. The denial of it, he says, ' whether it be true or false, is very unseasonably advanced, considering the weight such an opinion must have with the vulgar.' *Examiner*, No. 40 (39 in the reprint).

See also *Coxe*, Chap. LXXXVII (ed. 1819, p. 167) on Hare's letter.

The House of Commons speakers for the Defence, when their turn came, adopted a different line from that chosen by the Doctor himself. Sir Simon Harcourt advanced, in defence of Sacheverell, doctrines which in the mouth of a Whig would have been condemned as Republican. He told their Lordships that the Obedience and non-Resistance which, as set forth in the Sermon, admitted of no exception, was due not to the Crown but to ' the Legislative Power '; but in fact Sacheverell had neither said nor thought any such thing.

If that defence failed, Sir Simon fell back on another explanation :

> An unlimited Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance [he admitted] is a slavish notion. My Lords, Dr Sacheverell does not contend for it. I humbly apprehend, my Lords, that extraordinary cases, cases of necessity, are always implied, though not expressed, in the general rule.

But neither of this plea of exceptional cases would Sacheverell avail himself. He stood by the doctrine of his Sermon, ' the utter illegality of Resistance upon any pretence whatsoever.' *

Since Sacheverell and Atterbury disliked and regretted the Revolution though they dared not say so, their argument about it was pure sophistry. The Revolution, Sacheverell had said in his Sermon and now repeated before the Lords, was not Resistance at all, because William in his Declaration had proclaimed that he did not come to conquer England. Therefore there had been no resistance in the winter of 1688 ! Walpole's reply was all that so paltry an evasion deserved :

> It cannot now be necessary to prove Resistance in the Revolution. I should as well expect your Lordships would desire me, for form's sake, to prove the sun shines at noon day.

The more effective part of the oration that Atterbury had so well composed and that Sacheverell delivered with all the arts of the orator to that vast and excited audience, was an appeal for the liberty of the clergy to comment from

* For a very curious letter of De Foe's on Sacheverell's views, see Appendix C, p. 332 below.

the pulpit on State affairs—the other real point at issue besides the lawfulness of the Revolution. His defence then slid into a High Church harangue against the Dissenters, who though tolerated by law, still bear the guilt of schism—'which guilt may still rest upon their souls, however it may cease to affect their bodies and estates.' In particular he denounced their 'Seminaries,' where they had the insolence to bring up their own youth excluded by law from Oxford and Cambridge. In his sermon Sacheverell had denounced these Dissenting Academies in yet hotter terms, as

> seminaries wherein Atheism, Deism, Tritheism, Socinianism, with all the hellish principles of Fanaticism, Regicide and Anarchy are openly professed and taught, to corrupt and debauch the youth of the nation.

The Schism Act of 1714, that took away from Dissenting parents the liberty of educating their children according to their own beliefs, was one outcome of the Sacheverell trial. All the issues of the trial were in fact one. The Schism Act was repealed because the House of Hanover came to the throne.[48]

The opinion of a very large part of the Tories, who were not like Atterbury and Sacheverell crypto-Jacobites, but who disliked the Whig doctrine and attitude, was expressed in the Lords' debate by Hooper, the excellent Bishop of Bath and Wells :

> He allowed, indeed, of the necessity and legality of Resistance in some extraordinary cases ; but was of opinion that this ought to be kept from the knowledge of the people, who are naturally too apt to resist. That the Revolution was not to be boasted of and made a precedent ; but we ought to throw a mantle over it, and rather call it Vacancy or Abdication. And that the original compact were two very dangerous words ; not to be mentioned without a great deal of caution.[49]

The Whig prosecutors, on the other hand, had begun their case by stating that 'the law is the only measure of the Prince's authority,' and that the law 'derives its being and efficacy from common consent.' But 'instead of this, at later times, patriarchal and other fantastical schemes have

been framed to rest the authority of the law upon ; and so questions of divinity had been blended with questions of law.'[50]

These are high matters. Sacheverell may have been a mean man, but the debate he aroused was no mean argument.

Meanwhile, outside the doors of Parliament, a storm of popular passion was raging in minds quite incapable of distinguishing these nice points in the theory of the constitution. The lapse of time and the desire for peace had engendered a Tory reaction in the *Mobile Vulgus*, already called 'the Mob' for short. Tens of thousands, who in the uncared-for suburbs of London had never been taught any religion and never attended any divine service, were Protestants in their hatred of Popery and High Churchmen in their hatred of Dissent. The two frenzies, which in their true nature were anti-clerical rather than religious, held alternate sway. A few years ago the London mob had cheered De Foe in his pillory ; roared round the bonfires into which Pope, Devil and Pretender were pitched on November the Fifth ; and smashed the unilluminated windows of Papists. But now the time had come to burn the Dissenting chapels, thickly strewn over the metropolitan area outside the City to make good the paucity of parish churches in that dense hive of humanity.*

The ill-timed impeachment of the High Church champion had let loose these passions on the Capital, and for the moment there was nothing to restrain the forces of destruction. 'The Watch' was a jest as old as Dogberry and Verges, unreformed since then. Indeed in the suburbs outside the City there was scarcely the pretence of a Watch, however feeble. By law the duty rested on all citizens in turn ; in practice it devolved on no one. In winter, when it was most required, it was argued that the obligation did not exist.[51] The prevalence of burglary by professional thieves and of street outrages by young bloods was the

* Parish churches were thick inside the City but were sadly lacking outside its ancient boundaries, see *Blenheim*, p. 58. A population of some 400,000 was served by 28 parish churches, 18 chapels of ease and 88 Dissenting chapels.

talk of the Town. The householder could rely for his defence only on himself and his roused neighbours. Still less, in time of popular excitement, was there any force that could attempt to quell a mob, until the train-bands were called out in the City, or the Queen's Guard marched down from St. James's Palace. And on this occasion the precautions were taken dangerously late.

Ministers had neglected the warnings sent them by the Reverend Daniel Burgess, whose spirited and often amusing sermons were the delight of a large and wealthy Presbyterian congregation.* On the night of March the First his well-appointed chapel was torn down by the mob, who made a glorious bonfire in the neighbouring Lincoln's Inn Fields of pulpit, pews, cushions and of the famous japanned clock :

> The faithful clock which oft before
> Had pointed to the pudding hour.

Half a dozen other meeting-houses went up in flame. The mansions of Whig Lords and Bishops were threatened by the insurgence of ever new mobs, who took complete possession of the town. At length the cry was raised to storm the Bank of England, the greatest Whig citadel of all, full to the roof, as the mob believed, of golden guineas. The Directors sent an urgent message to the Secretary of State. At last the authorities awoke to their duty.

The only available force was the Queen's Foot and Horse Guards, responsible for her person at St. James's. She met the hesitating suggestion of the Ministers half way, scouted the idea of danger to herself and insisted that horse and foot should march at once to quell the riots. Captain Horsey, commanding, would have been more at ease charging the French lines, for he declared that ' he ventured his neck by going upon verbal orders without anything in writing to warrant his march.' Supposing the Palace were attacked, during his absence, by one of the marauding bands caring more for plunder than politics !

All, however, went well. When the troops reached the scene of operations, the rioters, many of whom were armed with swords, put up a show of resistance. But the Horse Guards, on their plump, bob-tailed chargers, broke in among them, slashed off one man's hand, cut down a good few more and put the rest to flight. Mob after mob was dispersed, and the City Militia took charge when the Guards returned to their duty round the Palace.

* Burgess once told his flock that the Jews were called Israel-ites because the Lord did not wish his chosen people to be called Jacob-ites.

London had been saved from the fate that befell it seventy years later in the Lord George Gordon riots. A number of arrests were made, and next month several ringleaders were tried for High Treason, convicted by a jury, and pardoned by the Queen.[52]

When at length the Lords retired to their Chamber to consider their verdict they were divided between alarm at the strength of feeling in the country and unwillingness to appear to approve, under mob violence, of Sacheverell's doctrine of Non-Resistance. They sought refuge in a middle course. The accused was voted guilty by 69 votes to 52—seven bishops voting him guilty and six not guilty. He was then condemned to the mildest possible punishment—to abstain from preaching for three years ; his sermon was to be burnt by the hangman, but that ceremony would not impede its circulation.

March 20 1710

In the debates and divisions by which their Lordships arrived at this result, a Middle Party, consisting of Shrewsbury, Somerset and Argyle, began to make its power felt as a new factor in British politics. These noblemen were determined to overthrow the existing Administration and obtain Peace for Europe. But they were not less staunch for the Hanoverian Succession. They hoped to secure both ends, as they ultimately did, greatly to the advantage of the State. Shrewsbury had for some time been in secret league with Harley, but it was a fact of great import that he now came out in public against the Junto and voted Sacheverell Not Guilty, though expressing his disagreement with his doctrines. Somerset voted neither way, but took, behind the scenes, an active part against the Ministry. Argyle, who sat in the House of Lords as Earl of Greenwich, made his weight felt. Harley sent an emissary to him who reported back as follows :

I have obeyed your commands to the Duke of Argyle ; he says he can't bring himself up entirely to vote for acquittal, because he has very freely and openly given his opinion that the sermon deserves censure. He thinks too that an absolute acquittal would rather tend to promote a high Tory scheme than to ruin the interest of the Junto; besides he's afraid he should prejudice his interest in Scotland by it. However he thinks he may fairly oppose any excessive punishment that shall be proposed and he believes the Duke of Somerset may be brought to concur with him in that.

And a few days later :

He has now come to a resolution to oppose all sorts of punishment that shall be proposed by the Junto . . . I wonder the Queen does not give the Duke of Argyle the garter.

And so, by the time the Trial was finished, it was known that the great chief of the Campbells and of the Scottish Whigs had gone into opposition to the Government in league with Harley, although he voted for the Doctor's condemnation and in explaining his vote delivered himself of the Whig sentiment :

That the clergy in all ages have delivered up the rights and liberties of the people, and preached up the King's power in order to govern him ; and therefore they ought not to be suffered to meddle with politics.

Whether this applied to ' North Britain ' he did not say.[53]

The light sentence on the Doctor was celebrated by the Tories as a moral victory. An admirer had just given him the living of Selattyn on the Shropshire border of Wales, and his journey thither by way of Oxford and Worcester was organized as a triumphal progress, like a King's, or like Monmouth's of old. The gentlemen of each shire rode in troops beside his carriage ; when he came to a town the bells rang and the municipality received him with addresses and banquets. The more old-fashioned of his supporters feared it ' savoured of vanity and inordination ' in him to accept such honours. Meanwhile, all over England the Tories took heart, and the more violent began to insult Whigs and Dissenters when they met them in the streets and country lanes. Some great change was in the air.[54]

By favour of the good Queen a General Election was

hoped for soon. That summer the gentlemen and clergy in many shires chose the hottest candidates they could find, and undertook to support them not only against the Whigs but even against the sitting Tory member, if like Thomas Coke of Derbyshire he had done nothing to help the Doctor. The heat of a man's zeal for Sacheverell was made the test of his suitability as a candidate.

Moderate Tories began already to be frightened at the success of their own extremists. Although the course of the impeachment had been described as ' nuts for Mr. Harley,' a member of his family wrote in March :

This business in all probability will break the Whigs. My foolish fears are it will raise the Tories to their old madness. The extravagance of every party is to be dreaded. If the clergy take up their old way of railing in their pulpits, as some already practice, this will certainly be the consequence, to empty the churches and fill the meeting-house.[55]

Indeed the violence of the language that some of the clergy now used against Dissenters, as we read it in their sermons and pamphlets, is astonishing to modern ears. The outcry for the closing of the Dissenting schools and academies which Sacheverell had raised, was taken up with fury. If the Toleration Act was not to be repealed it was at least to be circumvented. In June the *Observator* wrote :

You may see by the address from Hereford that the pulse of the [Tory] Faction beats so high against the Toleration Act that they solicit Her Majesty to leave the Church in such a condition that they may not be distracted by what they call Schism, and arraign the poor little schools of the Dissenters in the language of that trumpeter of sedition, Sacheverell.*

The forces that had been roused by the Impeachment of Sacheverell could not fail, with the Queen's help, to sweep on to victory and achieve part at least of their intents. And, by the good luck that so often blessed our history in those days, that part of their purposes which came to fruition

* *Observator*, June 10, 1710. As an example of clerical language about Dissenters, exceeding others in impropriety and wit, but not in brutality, see Swift's remarks on the Sacheverell riots in his *Letter to the Bishop of St. Asaph* (1712), where he compares Dissenting chapels to houses of ill-fame.

was the best—to be rid of the Whig Ministry so as to make peace with France. A lesser convulsion would scarcely have sufficed for that end. But the other part of the Tory dream, not so easy to fulfil, was to crush out of the island every manifestation of religion and intellect that could not be fitted into the four walls of the Church of England ; to deny all varieties of religious experience ; to leave no place in the national life for heterodoxy, religious or irreligious, anywhere to subsist. In seeking to do that, the Tories were fighting against the future and against the true spirit of the Church of England herself.

Nevertheless this great upheaval left an important impress on our ecclesiastical polity. The Whigs never forgot the Sacheverell year and its consequences, and therefore, when they recovered power under the House of Hanover, they never provoked the churchmen or attempted to deprive the establishment of any of the formidable monopolies that had been left to it at the Revolution Settlement. The bulwarks of Church ascendancy remained until the first of them were removed during the ministry of Wellington and Peel.

And so the Sacheverell uprising, which might easily have ushered in a generation of civil strife, was overruled first to give us peace abroad, and ultimately to secure the observance of peace at home.

CHAPTER IV

The Fall of the Whigs

The Queen uses the power of the Crown. Last scene between Anne and Sarah. Tactics of Anne, Harley and Shrewsbury bring about the gradual dissolution of the Ministry, April–September 1710. Godolphin dismissed. The General Election in October.

The Sacheverell agitation in March 1710 indicated that the Whig Ministers had lost the confidence of the country. But they seemed to be safely entrenched behind their majority in both Houses of Parliament, at least until the General Election, which under the terms of the Triennial Act could be deferred till 1711 but no longer. And meanwhile no step would be taken in the direction of peace. It was during the months immediately following the impeachment of Sacheverell that the Whigs presented to Louis their extravagant terms at Gertruydenberg, through the agency of the unwilling Dutch. And after the breakdown of those negotiations, the letters of Somers and Godolphin show that both of them regarded it as axiomatic that the war must be continued till Spain could be won by the conquest of France.*

But the day of peace was hastened and the wishes of the people forestalled by the action of the Crown. Anne took advantage of the Parliamentary recess to change her Ministers, not as a consequence of the General Election but as a preparation for holding it under Tory auspices.

At the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, custom still enabled the sovereign to dismiss Ministers in possession of a majority in Parliament without incurring any charge of unconstitutional action—such as was brought against

* See Appendix B, pp. 326–330 below, nos. 1 and 3. See also Hardwicke's note to *Burnet*, VI, p. 7. For Gertruydenberg see p. 32 above.

George III and again against William IV when they dismissed Whig Ministers under very similar conditions. By this bold, but then perfectly legitimate operation, Anne rendered a second service to her people, comparable to her dismissal of the High Church Ministers, who early in her reign had obstructed the conduct of the war. The overthrow of the Whig Cabinet to pave the way for peace, was the last great independent activity of her waning life. When, four years later, she handed the White Staff to Shrewsbury on her deathbed, at the unanimous request of the Privy Council, it did not imply so personal and active a choice on her part as these earlier instances of policy.

In 1710 the Queen was encouraged to change her Ministers by Abigail, Harley and Shrewsbury, who were daily about her person after her breach with Sarah. And the same trio arranged with her the cautious stages by which she was to part with her too masterful servants, lest Marlborough, Godolphin and the Whigs should make a united stand at any one point and threaten to resign *en masse*. The gradualness of the process of dismissal, spread from April to September, and accompanied at each step by reassuring promises to the remaining Ministers, was a tactical device, but it also represented the genuine ' moderation ' of Shrewsbury, Harley and the Queen herself. ' Tactics ' are often most successful when those who practise to deceive are only half conscious of their own hypocrisy. The Queen and her unofficial advisers did not know precisely how far they wished to move along the path of reaction. They wished to be quit of the Junto, but not to fall under the dictation of the Tory zealots.

The ideal of a ' Queen's Ministry above party ' was cherished by Harley and Shrewsbury as well as by Anne herself. Like Marlborough and Godolphin before them, they hoped to govern the land by favour of the Queen and by the goodwill of the many moderate men among her subjects. They intended to lean on the Tories as much perhaps as Godolphin had leant on the Whigs five years back, but no more. As late as September, a month after the dismissal of Godolphin, Harley wrote to the Duke of Newcastle :

> As soon as the Queen has shewn strength and ability to give the law to both sides, then will moderation be truly shewn in the exercise of power without regard to parties only.

In writing thus he was not conscious of deceiving Newcastle, for he was also deceiving himself. But all these nice calculations and balancings were swept away by the catastrophic results of the General Election in October, which bound the Queen and Harley to the chariot wheels of the High Tories, left Shrewsbury, Newcastle and Somerset in the air, and proved once more that Parliamentary Government could only mean Party Government.[56]

The last meeting in this life of the Queen and the Duchess, on April 6, 1710, formed a fitting prelude to the removal of Sarah's political allies from power. It was a painful and needless scene, for the breach was complete already. Anne had wished never to see her Mistress of the Robes again ; and Sarah, advised by her husband, had acquiesced in the separation as final. Unfortunately, she was warned by a friend at Court that certain untrue tales—apparently of her use of very disrespectful language about the Queen—were being circulated in the Palace and believed by Anne. To contradict these slanders, she forced herself into the presence, in spite of the royal command to write what she had to say : she declared it was impossible to commit to paper such delicate concerns. To her flood of passionate eloquence, Anne replied by repeating over and over again, ' You may put it in writing,' and ' You desired no answer and you shall have none.' At length Sarah's nervous system gave way, and she was seized by a fit of hysterical weeping which her old friend surveyed unmoved. In some respects the Duchess was the more finely constituted nature, or the weaker vessel, of the two.

A whole generation later, Marlborough's widow told to a grinning world the story of this scene, with a candour that preferred truth to her own dignity, and an unreserve that could not be surpassed by any of the memoir writers of our own day.[57]

In the middle of April the first overt step was taken by the conspirators—if the Queen and her council of the back-stairs

may be called so without disrespect.* The moment was opportune, for Marlborough was away among diplomats and generals at the Hague, and Godolphin among squires and jockeys on the Heath. The Queen, made bold by their absence, sent for the Marquis of Kent, the least important and able of the Whig Ministers, purchased his resignation with a Dukedom, and made Shrewsbury Lord Chamberlain in his stead.

April 13–14 1710

In other circumstances the change would have signified little, for Shrewsbury was a Whig in principle, if no longer in party connection. But *ex pede Herculem*. It was, as Marlborough wrote, the first hole in the dyke, and who could stop the flood of waters piled up behind? Moreover, all the world clearly saw Harley's hand at work. Godolphin from Newmarket wrote a letter of strong remonstrance to the Queen, pointing out that Shrewsbury had voted against the Ministry at Sacheverell's trial, and complaining on constitutional grounds of

> Your Majesty's having taken a resolution of so much consequence to all your affairs both at home and abroad, without acquainting the Duke of Marlborough and me with it till after you had taken it.

The alarm and outcry in the political world was such that for two months the conspirators made no further move, and during those two months the negotiations with France at Gertruydenberg came to their appointed end in failure. In the ministerial discussions Shrewsbury spoke in vain against the unwillingness of his colleagues to offer reasonable terms of peace. None the less, he worked hard to placate their anger at his presence in their midst. Godolphin and the Whigs were far from being persuaded by his blandishments, but their own mutual suspicions prevented agreement on any united action to coerce the Queen. The accomplished fact of Shrewsbury's intrusion was accepted. The storm it had aroused died down.[58]

It is the first step that counts. Impunity made the plotters more bold and recruited their ranks. In May the proud and timorous Duke of Somerset was put in touch

* In *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 540, is a characteristic letter of Mrs. Masham's to Harley, asking for an appointment to meet him secretly, *contrary to the Queen's orders*. Apparently Anne thought the useful Abigail somewhat too busy.

with Harley, and in June and July held a series of meetings with him, conducted with all the clandestine pomp of conspiracy so dear to them both. The Duke would only come to Harley's house in a sedan chair with the curtains drawn, which the porter had strict orders to admit unexamined through the hall door.*

In June, largely at the instigation of Somerset, the next blow was struck. Sunderland was dismissed, and was succeeded by the Tory Lord Dartmouth. As member of the Junto and as son-in-law to Marlborough, Sunderland was the hyphen uniting the two parts of the ministerial alliance. If the other members of the Cabinet accepted his removal, they themselves were doomed. But though their protests were loud, their action was nil. One by one they paid their visits of congratulation to Dartmouth as the new Secretary of State. All they could agree on among themselves was a round-robin to implore Marlborough not to resign his command of the army because of his kinsman's disgrace.[59]

June 14 1710

From this moment forward the retreat became a rout, everyone running separately for cover, or secretly intriguing for terms with the victors. Somers dreamt of forming a new Ministry with Harley and Shrewsbury by sacrificing Godolphin. Marlborough and Godolphin clung to office, the Treasurer from official habit and the soldier in the hope of reaching Paris in spite of the troubles at home.

Before we condemn as contemptible the failure of the Ministry to defend itself or even to fall with dignity by a unanimous resignation, it must be remembered that the modern theory and practice of the unity of the Cabinet was then only in process of evolution. There was no recognized duty of Ministers to protect one another and stand or fall together. They were the Queen's servants and she could pick and choose them as she wished. The only principle of cohesion in the Cabinet was derived from Party allegiance, and that bond did not include Marlborough and Godolphin.

* *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 542, 545, 553; see also pp. 548 and 553 for the Duke of Argyle, who could take no direct part in politics this summer owing to his absence abroad in the field. But he warmly approved the changes at home, and was getting more and more personally bitter in his expressions against Marlborough.

Moreover, since the Whig Shrewsbury and Somerset and the Moderate Harley were conducting the changes, Ministers hoped, by a compromise with them, to avert the dreaded General Election.[60]

It was on August 8 that the dismissal of Godolphin gave the *coup de grâce* to the Ministry called by his name. It had governed England for eight years. At first Tory, then neutral, and finally Whig, Godolphin's Ministry had done a great work. It had completed the tasks of William III ; it had liberated Europe from the power of France, joined England and Scotland in a Union that has proved permanent, raised the island over which Anne reigned to a height of glory, and set it on the road of immense future prosperity and influence. The Ministry, like all things mortal, had served its uses and it was time for it to go. But it is impossible not to regret that the Queen, who owed her present greatness and future fame in so very large a measure to Godolphin and his kinsman, chose to dismiss the Treasurer as a squire would discharge a cheating bailiff. Anne treated Godolphin even worse at parting than Victoria treated Gladstone. She refused to see him at all ; she sent him no message of kindness or gratitude, but merely an order to break the White Staff of his office.*

On such an occasion it would have been well if the sovereign, however much displeased with the subject's conduct at the time, had remembered old and long service, and in this case still older private friendship. Queen Anne was quite as ungrateful as any of her Stuart ancestry who have been charged with that fault. She has been called stupid : she was not stupid in the policies she adopted, but there is a certain stupidity in her personal relations with anyone against whom she had taken umbrage. She could not rise out of the circumstances of the moment as poor mortals should when saying a long farewell.

* See Godolphin's letter to her on this occasion, Appendix B, no. 2, p. 327 below. Sarah says Anne sent her message of dismissal to the Treasurer ' by a liveryman,' but Dartmouth says by Godolphin's friend, Mr. Smith. *Burnet*, VI, p. 9 note ; *Coxe*, Chap. XCIV ; *Conduct*, p. 260. A version that to some extent reconciles the two stories is given by Swift in his letter to Archbishop King, Sept. 9, 1710, *Swift Letters*, I, p. 194.

Even after the fall of Godolphin the Whigs still hoped, though with growing desperation, to make their own peace with the new lords of the hour.

On August 10, two days after the Treasurer's dismissal, Halifax wrote to congratulate Harley as the successor in charge of the nation's finance, which had once been the writer's own province.* Somers appeared to regard Godolphin's fall as a circumstance wherein he might hope to find his own advantage. On August 5 Harley wrote to Newcastle :

> Lord Somers is so full of himself and his own schemes that he would have Lord Dartmouth and myself assist him in serving his revenge on Godolphin, and his ambition in the other matter, and then he would be at liberty to act as he pleases. But I am to go this night to the Queen and I hope the chimerical matter will be at an end.[61]

The Whigs were soon undeceived, and after the head of the Government had fallen, were one by one removed from their posts and replaced by Tories.

Yet even now Harley desired not High Toryism but those moderate policies, by the promise of which he had drawn Shrewsbury, Somerset and Newcastle into the plot to overthrow Godolphin and the Junto. On this basis Defoe, who had been serving the Whig Ministry, returned to his old allegiance to Harley as the true ' moderate,' declaring unabashed that ' Providence seems to cast me back upon you and lays me at your door.' Till eclipsed by the sudden rise of Swift in the following winter, Defoe was the most formidable pamphleteer and journalist of the age. And he was Harley's link with the Puritan parties in the island. In September he was fee'd and sent back to his former hunting-ground in Scotland to plead Harley's cause there

* *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 560. Harley was made Chancellor of the Exchequer in August 1710, and was promoted to be Lord Treasurer only in the following May, the Lord Treasurership having remained vacant during the winter. It had been discussed by the Queen's secret advisers in July whether Shrewsbury should succeed Godolphin, but he had declined : ' I have ten strong reasons, every one strong enough to hinder my doing it, but that of engaging in an employment I do not in the least understand is in itself sufficient.' Shrewsbury was not a financier. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), p. 198, and Turberville's *Shrewsbury*, p. 179. When he accepted the Treasurership at the Queen's deathbed in 1714, it was to govern in the brief crisis and so secure the peaceful accession of King George.

among his old friends, the Presbyterians of Edinburgh, and allay their very natural fears as to what a High Church Ministry would mean for 'North Britain.'[62]

On the day Godolphin fell, Harley expounded his 'moderate' programme in a letter to the Duke of Newcastle :

> The Queen is assured you will approve her proceedings, which are directed to the sole aim of making an honourable and safe peace, securing her allies, reserving the liberty and property of the subject, and the indulgence to Dissenters in particular, and to perpetuate this by really securing the succession of the House of Hanover.

And a month later he had the temerity to say to Lord Chancellor Cowper that 'a Whig game was intended at bottom.'[63]

Harley desired to keep Cowper in office because the Queen liked him personally, and because he had never been identified with the Junto. He had even criticized his colleagues' obstinacy in refusing to make peace, and if he could be induced to retain the Lord Chancellorship when all the other Whigs had been dismissed, he would serve to uphold moderation in the new Cabinet against the oncoming flood of High Toryism. But Cowper was too honest and too shrewd to accept such a position, which, as he said, he would be forced to surrender the moment 'any Tory of interest would press for my place.' Though Cowper was singularly free from the prejudices of party, he understood better than Harley the inexorable laws under which party government would have in future to be conducted in England. Five times the Queen refused to accept his resignation of the seals, but he insisted day after day, until at last on September 23 she took them back with many expressions of regret and personal esteem. With that, the process of exterminating the old Ministry was completed at last.*

It is Cowper who deserves the reputation of the wise and honest Whig which has, with less reason, become traditionally attached to Somers. He had urged reasonable terms of peace with France, yet he, almost alone among the

* *Cowper*, pp. 42–47. Walpole, already dismissed from the Secretaryship at War, lingered on in the subordinate administrative post of Treasurer of the Navy, till in January 1711 he was dismissed from that also.

Whig chiefs, continued to visit the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough when they were being violently attacked and slandered by the Court, the Tories and the base tribe of pamphleteers.

> My Lord Cowper [wrote Sarah], whom I likewise brought in to be Chancellor, was the only Whig that behaved himself like a gentleman to me. He owned me when I was under a hurdle.[64]

The change in the personnel of the Ministry, though it had taken five months to accomplish, had been very rapid according to the ideas and practice of the age. It had taken five years to extrude all the Tories from Godolphin's Cabinet. But Swift was able to write in November to Stella :

> The Queen passed by us with all Tories about her ; not one Whig, and I have seen her without one Tory.

Marlborough still remained in command of the army. The Whigs urged him to stay there and conquer France. And the new Ministers had no wish to precipitate the inevitable quarrel with the Allies or to relax the Duke's pressure on the enemy until they had made their own arrangements with Torcy for the peace.[65]

Harley's 'moderation' took effect in shielding many magistrates and civil servants from the clamour of partisans demanding the spoils for the victors. The same clamour had been raised eight years before, when the Moderate Godolphin had saved the Treasury officials from dismissal. In 1710 Harley repeated this work of mercy and wisdom and again guarded the nascent Treasury traditions, and the permanency of the Civil Service, from the blows of party warfare. Neither the great William Lowndes nor any of his Treasury clerks appear to have been dismissed, though they had been closely associated with the fallen Ministers.[66]

Harley indeed had reason to walk warily in finance and take the best advice he could get : for the national balance sheet told an alarming tale of debt and deficit ; and the Governor of the Bank of England and other big City men were trying to frighten the Queen back into the arms of the

Whigs by declaring that 'credit' would not survive a change of government.[67]

Tory candidates, with their eyes on the coming General Election, wrote to Harley demanding new Lords Lieutenant, Justices of the Peace and 'Excise and Custom House officers, whose influence on Boroughs is greater than can be imagined.' But these expectations were only partially fulfilled.[68]

The change of Ministry, effected by the Queen's will, had preceded, not followed, the General Election. This was fully in accordance with the constitutional ideas and practice of the age. The question whether or not there should be an immediate Dissolution of Parliament had agitated political circles all summer scarcely less than the changes in the Cabinet. The Whigs had kept on terms with Harley and Shrewsbury in the hope of averting the Dissolution, which was loudly demanded by the Tory rank and file. The extent of the changes in the Ministry determined the issue. As Sir Thomas Hanmer wrote to Matt Prior in June :

> A new Ministry with an old Parliament will be worse than the Gospel absurdity of a piece of new cloth in an old garment, or new wine in old bottles.

But it was not till the middle of September that the decision was taken. On the 14th Harley wrote to Newcastle :

> I send this flying packet to acquaint [you] that the Queen is resolved in a few days to have a Dissolution, it being resolved in her own breast, and indeed it is impossible to carry on Parliament without intolerable heats.[69]

When the Dissolution was announced, public enthusiasm for Sacheverell was still unabated.* To speak against the idol of the hour required some courage. Kennett, the antiquarian Dean of Peterborough, had written a

* Swift wrote to Stella a year later, in August 1711 : 'Sacheverell hates the new Ministry mortally, and they hate him and pretend to despise him. They will not allow him to have been the occasion of the late change ; at least some of them will not ; but my Lord Keeper owned it to me t'other day.' The statesmen who competed for the friendship of Swift disliked the notion of owing their power to so foolish a fellow as Sacheverell.

pamphlet against the Doctor's famous sermon, and had more recently refused to sign a Tory address to the Queen. The Rector of Whitechapel, accordingly, had an altar-piece painted and set up in his church, representing the Last Supper, with Kennett as Judas, and the words *The Dean, Traitor* inscribed underneath. Multitudes came daily to the church to admire this masterpiece of piety and wit. The Rector, it was believed, had wished Bishop Burnet to figure as Judas, but the painter, fearing prosecution for *scandalum magnatum*, would rise no higher than a Dean. After a while Compton, Bishop of London, ordered the picture to be removed, but it is said to have reappeared over the high altar of St. Albans. In any case, Kennett was consoled with the Bishopric of Peterborough, when George I came over and 'moderate men looked big' once more.[70]

At the polls in October 1710 the reunited Tory party swept down their antagonists, as easily as eight years before in the summer after the Queen's accession. The desire for peace, and the intensity of the passion for High Church and Sacheverell, would together have sufficed to defeat an established Ministry at the polls. But the authority of government and the glamour of the Queen's name were now on the popular side, and the large class of persons who, alike from public and private motives, made a practice of supporting the government of the day, were all for the Tory candidates. The mob was violent and the atmosphere of unanimity was infectious. The clergy electioneered with a zeal that even they had never displayed before. It was a particularly drunken election. Defoe in the *Review* declared that the Tories 'first made the poor freeholders drunk and then told them to vote for the Church,' but it is not likely the Whigs were far behind. 'I am always drunk for a week at every election and I won't vote for the man who won't make me drunk,' one honest miller declared.

Harley had succeeded in dividing the Presbyterian and 'orthodox' Nonconformist vote in some constituencies by his promise to respect the Toleration Act, though efforts to detach the Quakers, Baptists and Huguenots from the Whig cause failed.[71] Some of the more country-keeping Whigs appear not to have resented the turning out of the

Junto in the name of 'moderation'; Yorkshire squire Molesworth wrote to Harley during the election:

> My principles are the very same they were from the first moment you knew me, and I cannot be persuaded that you and the Duke of Shrewsbury, after having rescued the nation from the tyranny of one set of men can be for subjecting it to another of priests.

But ere long Molesworth, like the Presbyterian waverers, was reduced to despair by the high-Tory policy of the new government.[72]

Even before the election, those Whig grandees who had conspired with Harley to oust the Junto felt uneasy at the consequences of their work. The Duke of Newcastle hedged, putting in two Tories for Boroughbridge, and 'two sworn junto men' for Aldborough, another of his Yorkshire pocket boroughs.[73] This did not prevent him from taking Cabinet office in the new Ministry, as Lord Privy Seal. The Duke of Somerset used his whole interest for the Whigs, but his candidates in the Wiltshire boroughs were defeated by popular enthusiasm for Sacheverell, since 'His Grace was against the Doctor.' Somerset came up to the new Parliament diminished in power and credit, despised by both parties as a man on whom no one could depend, 'rather a ministry-spoiler than a ministry-maker,' and, in spite of his pretensions to Roman virtue, 'a false mean-spirited knave.'[74] Shrewsbury, on the other hand, stood firm by Harley in the elections, and hoped so to consolidate his power as to be able to hold his own as a moderate Whig in a Tory Ministry—a game he played not without some measure of success.

In all parts of the country Whig strongholds were stormed. The squires of Kent still stood by 'the good old cause,' but the clergy and freeholders beat them and returned two Tories for the shire.[75] Elsewhere the country gentlemen joined the clergy in leading the Tory cry. In Derbyshire the squirearchy, in their zeal for Sacheverell, overbore the yeomen and ousted the Moderate Tory member, Thomas Coke, on the charge of being lukewarm in the cause of 'the Doctor.' Coke found a safe seat in the rotten borough of Grampound.[76]

Out of the ninety-two county members elected for England and Wales, not a dozen were Whigs. And the Boroughs were swept by a wave only one degree less overwhelming. The regions where the losing party held its ground to some extent, by the help of lordly borough owners, were Yorkshire, Cumberland and Northumberland, Beds* and Bucks, and the close Cinque Ports.

Addison's great friends returned him for Malmesbury. 'I believe if he had a mind to be chosen King,' wrote Swift to Stella, 'he would hardly be refused.'

Among the Cornish pocket boroughs, thanks to the local influence of Godolphin and of Bishop Trelawny who still adhered to the party that had translated him to Winchester, the Whigs kept a dozen out of some forty members; they had secured only one in the first election of the Queen's reign when Godolphin and Trelawny had both been in the Tory interest.

But in the Boroughs with anything like a popular vote, where the Whigs used often to do well, they were on this occasion smitten hip and thigh. The City of London returned four Tories. At Westminster, General Stanhope, the hero of Minorca, Almenara and Saragossa, serving in the Peninsula on what then looked like a victorious campaign, was, in spite of the Huguenot and Dissenting vote, defeated by the Tories after a most bitter election, in which the soldier absent in the field was freely bespattered with the mud of personal slander, and his supporters subjected to mob violence. Even in war time, popular sentiment had much less regard for soldiers than it has in our own day.[77]

When the last polls were announced, England and Wales were represented by about 320 Tories, 150 Whigs and 40 'doubtful.' The Whigs were beaten by more than two to one. The 45 Scottish members showed at least a fair proportion of Whigs, and brought to Westminster a new element of avowed Jacobites, for beyond the Border there were no Tories of the English type.

* So strong was territorial influence that in Bedfordshire, where Lord Russell and another Whig were returned for the county, the majority of the Church clergy, led by Archdeacon Frank at the instigation of Wake, Bishop of Lincoln, voted for the Whigs and the House of Russell, even in this election. *Wake MSS.* Professor Norman Sykes pointed this out to me.

A marked feature of the Parliament was the increasingly rigid division of almost all the English members between Whig and Tory. There was a great diminution in the class of members independent of either faction. In 1705 Harley had spoken of Whigs, Tories, and 'a hundred Queen's servants,' but there was no such century in the Parliament of 1710. Party was swallowing up every other kind of allegiance.[78]

CHAPTER V

Decision reached in Spain

Some consequences of Poltava. Marlborough's indecisive campaign of 1710. Last phase of the Peninsular War: Stanhope and Starhemberg; The flash of success and final catastrophe—Almenara, Saragossa, Brihuega. Death of Emperor Joseph and its effect on the question of Spanish Succession.

While the decisive result of the General Election rendered it possible for the new Ministers to set about treating for peace with every chance of overcoming the resistance of the Whigs, the disastrous outcome of the Peninsular War that same winter made it easier for them to expedite an arrangement with Louis by conceding that Spain should be left to Philip. Nor had Marlborough's operations in the summer, on the Netherlands frontier of France, done more than prepare the way for the advance on Paris, to be executed next year, some time, or never.

When the preparations for the year's campaign had been on foot early in 1710, the allied plans had been disturbed and endangered by reactions consequent on the overthrow of the Swedish power by Russia the year before. Charles XII, bereft of his army on the field of Poltava, had fled south with the Cossack Hetman Mazeppa, of romantic equestrian fame, leaving his Swedish dominions open to the revenge of all those neighbour Princes over whom he had so long been riding rough-shod. Augustus, Elector of Saxony, recovered his Polish crown. The rulers of Denmark, Prussia and Hanover turned their eyes from the war in the West to the war in the North. There was imminent danger that all these jealous monarchs would simultaneously withdraw their 60,000 men from the various French fronts, to fight out their rival claims in a general scramble for Charles XII's lost inheritance. Queen Anne's Whig

Ministers, then still in power, feared the departure of the German and Danish troops from the West and feared also the dismemberment of the Swedish kingdom, which would overturn England's policy of the Balance of Power in the Baltic. Our diplomats patched up a Convention to avert the spread of hostilities; it was the best that the Swedes could hope for in the circumstances, and their Regency made haste to accept it.[79]

March 1710

Meanwhile Marlborough, by the help of this Convention on Baltic affairs, had succeeded in taking the field against Villars in strong force. But the French Marshal had lost none of the caution which seasoned his more dashing qualities. The Duke could not bring him to battle, and the net outcome of the campaign of 1710 was the capture, by the Allies, after costly sieges, of the four fortress towns of Douai, Béthune, St. Venant and Aire. These fortresses gave Marlborough a better control of the upper reaches of the Scarpe and Lys, completing the river system by which his supplies could be brought up from Holland to the front in France. This would render more easy his next year's progress. But his design for the capture of the Channel ports by co-operation with the fleet had not even been attempted; and between him and Paris still lay various obstacles, including yet another line of inundations and earthworks which Villars prepared to replace the lost lines at La Bassée, and called by the boastful title of *Ne plus ultra*.

April–Nov. 1710

The rate of Marlborough's advance had been slowing down each year since Oudenarde, and though he might yet reach Paris some day, the English people were tired of waiting, and the new English Ministry, for a variety of reasons, domestic and European, had no desire to see him occupy the enemy's capital. Such a consummation, even if it were practicable, would open out more questions than it would solve.*

* I do not know of any document in which either Harley or St. John expressed this view, but I think it is a fair conclusion that they held it. Their colleague and representative Lord Strafford wrote it in clear words to the Electress Sophia from Utrecht on August 27, 1712 (*B.M. Stowe MSS.* 224, ff. 303–305): 'Nothing less was to satisfy than going to Paris, to serve, I suppose, the French King and his Grandson as the King of Sweden did King Augustus; to dethrone them both. This was carrying things much farther than the balance of Europe demanded.'

If the outcome of Marlborough's campaign still left it doubtful whether or not the Allies would ever pitch their tents in the gardens of Versailles, a military decision was reached that year in Spain.

The last phase of the Peninsular War had opened in the summer of 1710 under changed conditions. The French troops had been withdrawn by Louis, partly to protect his own threatened frontier, partly to persuade the Allies that he meant what he said when he promised no longer to support his grandson's cause. But the grandson was now better able to look after himself. All Spain, save Catalonia —the exception that proved the rule—had accepted Philip as King, and as the nation's leader against foreign invasion. Outside the Catalan province, the Allies held no fortress or foot of ground beyond Gibraltar's Rock.

In July 1710, therefore, the Bourbon field army consisted entirely of Spaniards and a few Walloons in the Spanish service, in all some 5000 good horse and 15,000 indifferent foot. Then, as in the days of Wellington, the Spanish infantry, so courageous behind walls or in the ambushes of guerilla war, would not submit to the discipline necessary to translate them into regiments fit for the field. This army was under the command of the Marquis de Villadarias, the Spanish General who had unsuccessfully besieged Gibraltar five years back.

The Allies in Catalonia had a field army slightly exceeding that of the enemy in numbers, but no longer containing so large a proportion of red-coats as in former years. The British troops in the Peninsula had wasted away with disease and hardship, and their ranks had not of late been replenished from home. General Stanhope was kept miserably short both of money and of men from home. On the other hand, Marlborough had sent him Palatines and Hessians who would otherwise have been under the Duke's orders in Flanders.[80] And the Emperor Joseph, secure now in his Italian possessions, and able at last to pay attention to the fortunes of his brother Charles in Spain, sent over considerable Austrian forces to his support. When, therefore, the Allies took the field on the Catalan border in the summer of 1710, they consisted of some 14,000 Germans, 4000

English, 1400 Dutch, 1400 Portuguese in English pay, and over 3000 Spanish Carlists.

Still, as in the days of Peterborough and his rivals, the movements of the army were determined not by any one General, but by a confusion of discordant advice. King Charles presided uneasily over an international Council of War, divided between the factions of Starhemberg and Stanhope. The Austrian Field-Marshal was capable but unadventurous. Stanhope was a fiery and chivalrous fighter, a fine type of English executive officer, but liable in matters of the higher command to be carried away by the ardour of his temperament, and not understanding on the spot, any better than Marlborough understood far away, the limitations imposed on the Allies by the profound hostility of the population of Castile. By sheer force of character, and by his position as representative of England, Stanhope on one occasion after another beat down Starhemberg's resistance to the forward policy, and led the Allies on, twice to victory and finally to disaster.

In July Stanhope urged invasion of Aragon and battle with Villadarias. His instructions from home ordered that full advantage should be taken of the departure of the French. He told Charles that he would never be King of Spain if he lingered on the borders of Catalonia, and that the Spaniards could easily be defeated if they were attacked before the French came back over the Pyrenees. So far he was right, as the event proved. He dragged Charles and Stahremberg into battle, first at Almenara.* In a letter to his friend, Robert Walpole, Secretary at War, he gives a confidential account of the circumstances bringing on this action :

> Three days after the date of my last to you which went by Mr. Craggs, our succours joined us about nine in the morning, upon which, a Council being called, it was strenuously urged by the English, Dutch and Palatines to march immediately on Lerida, in order to force the enemies to a battle by cutting them off from that place. But the King and Marshal [Starhemberg] as strongly opposed and showed themselves determined not to venture anything. . . . Our next thought was to cross the bridge at Balaguer, to which purpose

* *For the war in Spain, see Map of Europe at end of volume.*

> I was detached. I marched at midnight and took post on the Aragon side of the Noguera at six in the morning of [July] the 27th. . . . The enemy came up apace and formed before me about 15 squadrons, which I was going to attack when the Marshal came up and prevented me, seeming still determined not to hazard anything. Both armies continued marching to get up, and, about six, all our infantry had passed the river. . . . The Marshall was pressed several times to attack the enemies' horse which was before us, their foot marching at a great distance behind them. About six the enemies having got up with all their horse, they marched several squadrons down a little hill which was between us. Upon which we all cried out 'Shame,' and I did earnestly press the King we might have leave to dislodge them, which was at last complied with but not till sunset.

Thus at length unleashed, Stanhope, with eight English squadrons, four Dutch and six of German Palatines, dashed at the forty-two squadrons of Spanish cavalry, and after a severe struggle drove them off the field. In this action of Almenara, as fine an achievement of the British cavalry as any at Balaclava or Waterloo, Stanhope killed a Spanish General with his own hand ; his modesty forbade him to mention the classical incident in his dispatches, but it became the talk of the Town.

July 27 1710

The Spanish foot, many of whom were still straggling up in column through the broken ground, were not yet in battle array ; on witnessing the defeat of their horse, they fled without more ado. Thanks to Starhemberg's long delays, the fall of night saved King Philip's army from complete destruction, and he himself just escaped capture.[81]

The defeat at Almenara induced Philip to change his Generals. He replaced Villadarias by the Marquis de Bay, but he had no real confidence in any Spanish commander, and implored his grandfather again to supply him with a French Marshal. Louis felt himself released by the breakdown of the negotiations at Gertruydenberg and free to interfere once more in Spain. He therefore dispatched Vendôme, but before he could reach the Pyrenees the Marshal was met by the news of a second and more serious disaster that had befallen the unaided forces of King Philip.[82]

The Spaniards had retreated from Almenara, through Lerida and along the south bank of the Ebro as far as Saragossa, leaving north Aragon undefended. Again yielding to Stanhope's pressure, Starhemberg had reluctantly seized his chance and occupied Aragon between Ebro and Pyrenees. He was even induced to approach Saragossa from the North. But he decided not to cross the Ebro, because the enemy's army was on the other side. For the same reason Stanhope had come to the opposite determination, and showed the Allies the way over the river. He then proceeded ' contrary to orders ' to approach the enemy so close that Starhemberg was obliged to march up to his support.*

There, almost in sight of the anxious citizens crowding the walls of Saragossa, a battle was fought to the south of the town, on hilly ground sprinkled with vineyards and groves of olive. The modern combatants advanced against each other across the dried bed of a torrent called, after some old slaughter of the Moors, the *Barranca de los Muertos*, now to be once more a ' ravine of the dead.'

Aug. 20 1710

The Spaniards were half beaten before the fighting began, for they believed that the Marquis de Bay was betraying them by accepting battle. The story ran round the camp fires that secret orders had come from France for an engagement in which the Spanish forces should be destroyed, with a view to giving King Philip a good excuse to obey his grandfather and abandon the contest for the crown. This wild legend had demoralized whole regiments, and not a few officers deserted on the eve of action. The Allies, on

* Stanhope's part in bringing on the battle of Saragossa is made clear by General Carpenter's letter to Walpole on the evening after the affair (*Somerville's Queen Anne*, p. 639): ' This business and that of Almenara is entirely owing to Mr. Stanhope, both for pressing in council and indeed forcing our march forward in order to action, and for the execution his resolution carried the day. All her majesty's troops did well and the officers, but no pen can do justice to Mr. Stanhope, having hectored the court and Marshal into these marches and actions . . . and now passed the Ebro with 2000 horse and marched so near the enemy here that the Marshal could not avoid bringing up the army to him, which was absolutely the occasion of the battle ; his march so near them was contrary to orders.' This confirms the more general statement in Stanhope's dispatch, printed in *Mahon*, Ap., p. cxvi. *Parnell* seems as unfair to Stanhope as to Peterborough.

the other hand, were in high spirits, and though they were starving for want of supplies, the English marched into battle with a high courage which Stanhope's infectious energy had done much to instil into their hearts. There were about 20,000 on either side, though the Allies were weaker in horse.

Starhemberg, when once he found himself committed beyond avoidance to a battle, had drawn up the army with ability and care. The main struggle was on the Allied left wing, where the best of the Spanish cavalry were encountered by Stanhope. He had ' interlined ' his squadrons with four battalions of English foot, and by that means was just able to resist and ultimately break the repeated charges of the Spanish horse. But a part of the enemy's cavalry penetrated his line ; they pursued too far, falling upon the reserve train of artillery, while behind their backs Stanhope and Starhemberg advanced and won the day. The allied centre and right had an easy task. The Spanish infantry soon broke or surrendered. Over five thousand were made prisoners, about three thousand were killed or wounded, and many dispersed to their homes. Less than half the army rallied next week to King Philip's standards. Almanza had been avenged by a victory no less complete.

Saragossa received King Charles with some show of enthusiasm. In parts of the province of Aragon the Carlist cause might yet be galvanized into life by victory, but nowhere in Castile.

Stanhope's lieutenants, Carpenter, Wills and Wade, afterwards famous in the annals of anti-Jacobite warfare and Highland road-making at home, had contributed much to the success of the day. Their Chief was the hero of the battle which, but for his enterprise, would never have been fought. Saragossa was the crown of Stanhope's military career. If he had fallen in the hour of victory beside the *Barranca de los Muertos*, he might be remembered to-day as Wolfe and Moore are remembered. He survived, to lose at a single blow his reputation as a General, and to earn another, more enduring, as one of the best Foreign Ministers who ever led England and guided Europe in the paths of peace.[83]

A week after the victory beneath the walls of Saragossa, a Council of War was held in the town to decide between the rival policies of Stanhope and Starhemberg.

Aug. 27 1710

The English General urged the immediate occupation of Madrid to end the war at a stroke. He assumed, rashly as the event proved, that the Allied army in Portugal would march to join them in the capital of Spain. The bold plan he propounded had behind it the authority of Marlborough, who, never having fought in the Peninsula, never fully understood the local peculiarities of its warfare. A year back Marlborough had written to Godolphin :

> The reduction of Spain will never in my opinion be effected until the army in Catalonia and that in Portugal be in such a condition as that they may both march the nearest way to Madrid ; for if we shall think of forming projects for the reducing of the provinces of Spain, the war is likely to last much longer than I shall live.[84]

As Stanhope's forward policy had been vindicated by success on every occasion in the disputes of the last two months, the majority of the Council of War took his side in the fatal decision of August 27. Indeed Starhemberg's Fabian tactics went much against the humour of the English, Dutch and Portuguese officers : they were heartily sick of Spain, and they leapt at the prospect of being so soon and so well quit of the ill-omened land. Their impatience was shared by the Spanish Carlists at the Council Board, who, like partisans and exiles in all ages, deluded themselves as to the real feelings of their fellow-countrymen.

It was, therefore, in vain that Starhemberg reminded the Council that the experiment of occupying Madrid had been tried in 1706 with disastrous results and that Castile's willingness to submit was not to be judged from that of Aragon. The heart of Spain, the Austrian Marshal believed, could only be reduced to yield by a long process of isolation and blockade. His plan was to occupy all Aragon and Navarre ; to hold the Passes at either end of the Pyrenees so that no French force could enter Spain ; to rouse once more the Carlists of Valencia and the eastern seaboard ; to get in touch with the forces in Portugal and

Gibraltar and induce them to occupy Galicia in the north and Andalusia in the south ; to take Cadiz and so control the trade of Spain. When Castile had been isolated by these measures, Madrid might at last submit. And, if not, Charles at the worst would be able at the next peace conference to bargain at advantage, with half Spain in his hand.

It might have been hard work to accomplish the whole of this programme, but the advice to block the Pyrenean Passes and not to invade Castile was right. Unfortunately, Starhemberg's policy of caution had always proved wrong in the disputes of that summer, and the Allied Generals thought that he must surely be wrong again. Charles was of one mind with his Marshal, but was forced to yield to the more general opinion. ' If this plan of the English should succeed,' he wrote gloomily to his wife, ' all the glory will be theirs ; if it fail, all the loss will be mine.' *

The victors of Saragossa were soon in Madrid, but from that moment everything went as wrong as Starhemberg had foreseen. Philip left his capital, but he went accompanied by a crowd of loyal subjects of all ranks of society, so vast that it was computed at thirty thousand. And those who stayed, remained behind shuttered windows and bolted doors. The foreign conquerors tramped through a city as dead to them as the Paris of 1871 to the triumphal passage of the Germans. In the days and nights that followed, many of the foreign soldiery were assassinated in the dark alleys of old Madrid.

Sept. 21 1710

Meanwhile the expected aid from Portugal did not arrive or even draw near. But Vendôme entered Spain at the head of some eight thousand French troops, whom he had mustered from various points on the Pyrenean border. The descendant of Henri Quatre acted throughout the campaign that followed with the energy which he could always

* It is to be noted that Stanhope so far supported Starhemberg that he proposed, a few days after the Council at Saragossa had taken the decision to march on Madrid, to send a detachment to Pampeluna to prevent the French entering Spain. But this was vetoed by the Council, whether because, as was said, all wanted to share in the plunder of Madrid, or possibly because they thought the army was not large enough to serve both purposes at once. *Bacallar*, II, pp. 355–364 ; B. Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 98–100 ; *Tindal*, IV, p. 179.

display whenever he chose to shake off his habits of luxury and sloth. At the news of his coming the Spanish people sprang to arms. Vendôme was soon at the head of a regular force larger than that of the Allies. It included 10,000 excellent cavalry. He placed himself on the Tagus between Madrid and Portugal.

Besides the regular troops arrayed under the French Marshal, guerilla bands under more savage leadership were scouring the country, destroying convoys, driving in foragers, cutting the throats of stragglers, aides-de-camp and scouts. The Allies in Castile, ill provided from home, had no money and soon no food, save what they could rob from the countryside. These habits of plunder destroyed their discipline and morale, while starvation, varied by bouts of debauch, undermined their health. 'Our soldiers,' wrote an English critic, 'are not good for to suffer heat and want of victuals, and, besides being the most disorderly in the world, great devourers of fruit, and that could not abstain from wines when they came in their way, which would fling them into fluxes and colentures.'[85] The anger of the countryside was inflamed by the excesses they actually committed, and by tales, some of them invented for the purpose, of outrages perpetrated by the English heretics against images and shrines. This pious propaganda took, it is to be feared, an air of verisimilitude from the report of actual events near Cadiz and Gibraltar half a dozen years before.[86]

Altogether, it needed no great gift of prophecy when Peterborough, one day near the end of October, said to Harley that 'Stanhope would lose Spain before Christmas; and though Mr. Harley argued to the contrary,' says Swift, who was present, 'he still held to his opinion.' Indeed, the talk of the Town, after the General Election, among the Tories who did not love Stanhope, was that 'he has carried his men on but won't know how to get them back again.' It was already expected that he would shortly be replaced by Argyle.[87]

In the second week of November the Allies finally evacuated Madrid, compelled thereto by fears of starvation and of the approach of the enemy now in superior force. Three months after Saragossa, its consequences seemed to

have been reversed without another battle, by some black magic of the sun-baked, inhospitable soil. The red-coats turned their backs on Madrid for another hundred years.

The retreat of the Allied forces towards Saragossa was begun from Chinchon, a place some twenty miles south-east of Madrid. Since they had invaded Castile without the supply bases usual in the warfare of that day, they could only live by stripping the bleak countryside as they passed. They therefore marched from Chinchon in three parallel columns, to give the foraging parties wider scope. It was agreed at headquarters that Stanhope with the left-hand column of some 4500 men, nearly all British, should pass by way of Brihuega. He arrived there on December 6, and stayed there for two days to levy meal from the town stores and bake it into bread.

While thus occupied, it gave him little concern to observe squadrons of Spanish horse gathering on the limestone scars that look down upon the vale. He believed the infantry and artillery of Vendôme to be a hundred miles away at Talavera on the far side of Madrid. But in fact the French Marshal had already passed through the capital, not allowing King Philip to stay there to celebrate its liberation, and by forced marches drawing nearer every hour to the English, whom his cavalry had marked down in Brihuega. The peasants, who might have warned the Allies, hated them and held their peace. And Stanhope, with a mistaken confidence that cost him dear, put no scouting parties on the hills that surrounded the bottom in which he lay.

When, on the afternoon of December 8, enemy infantry and guns appeared on the heights overlooking the town, it was too late for him to escape. At six that evening his aide-de-camp, Captain Cosby, started on a perilous and circuitous ride to avoid the enemy's lines, and in five hours reached Starhemberg, at Cifuentes, with a message that the English were trapped in Brihuega, short of ammunition, but would try to hold out till help came. But it must come at once.*

* See Appendix D, p. 334 below, Pt. II, Criticisms of Stanhope.

Vendôme, dragging King Philip with him, had surrounded the British with a force of more than twice their number, and of all arms. The defenders of the town had no artillery, for the English guns were with Starhemberg's column. The old Moorish wall, a mile and a quarter in circumference, was composed of a mixture of limestone, gravel and mud ; it 'was nowhere flanked,' wrote Stanhope, 'and in very few places was broad enough to put any men upon it, so we could not hinder their lodging themselves at the foot of the wall in several places.' On the morning of December 9, after a preliminary bombardment of Brihuega from the hills so near that 'even with small-shot they commanded most of the streets,' the cannon were brought down to the valley and run up close to the walls, which were soon breached. The English had improvised defence-works overnight, especially round the gates and inside the town. But they fought under every other disadvantage.

Early in the afternoon Vendôme was informed that Starhemberg had begun to move, after his slow fashion, from Cifuentes, a dozen miles away, to the relief of Brihuega. Thereupon the French and Spanish infantry were loosed to the assault, and the short winter afternoon was occupied by hand-to-hand fighting on the breaches, at the gates, and finally in the trenched and barricaded streets. As the attack progressed, cannon were dragged into the town itself, to ply the English with grapeshot. The modern Spaniard, as has since been proved at Buenos Ayres and elsewhere in both hemispheres, is never so formidable as when opposed to better disciplined troops in street fighting, where drill counts for least and individual valour for most. French, Spanish and English had never in the whole war fought more fiercely than at Brihuega ; it was like the defence of Gibraltar over again, but with a different result.

Dec. 9 1710

If Starhemberg had been a Blücher, he would have come in time, caught the enemy between two fires and inflicted on him a severe defeat. He received Stanhope's message late on the night of December 8, and had the whole of the 9th in which to traverse the dozen miles that divided Cifuentes from Brihuega. He started early enough in the morning, but he halted on the way for long hours to give time for the

very last of his units to come up.* Night closed down over Brihuega, and he had not arrived. It was said that his distant signal guns were heard by Vendôme outside the town but not by Stanhope in the midst of the mêlée. The defenders had only 700 rounds of musket shot left. Stanhope, who had been driven back into the citadel, decided that without ammunition he could not hold it till daylight, and surrendered on terms, to save the lives of his men. His decision, though criticized by some of his ill-wishers, seems to have met with the approval of most of the officers and men, who had borne themselves so well in the fight.[88]

The capture of 4000 British troops would not in itself have decided the issue of the war in Spain, had it not been already a foregone conclusion. But Stanhope's defeat made the realities apparent at last to all the world. Starhemberg next day repulsed the attack of the victorious Vendôme at Villa Viciosa, but none the less he had to resume his retreat and continue it, past Saragossa, till he was safe within the walls of Barcelona. Aragon was again abandoned. All Spain belonged to King Philip, except Catalonia ; and the Catalans also, having served British purposes for six years, were soon abandoned to Bourbon vengeance. When that disastrous night had closed down on the burning streets of Brihuega, the Peninsular War had been brought to a decision.†

Each successive turn of the Spanish campaign of 1710 was reflected in the negotiations for peace, which under a cover of careful secrecy were proceeding that autumn between Lord Jersey on behalf of Queen Anne's Ministers and Torcy's London agent the Abbé Gaultier. From the moment of its formation, the new English Ministry had been strongly inclined to abandon Spain to Philip. But the news of Stanhope's victory at Saragossa compelled Jersey in the first days of October to say to Gaultier 'We must wait for the face of things in Spain to change a little before negotiation, and see if the King of Spain will be absolutely

* See the first-hand evidence printed in *Tindal*, IV, p. 181 ; Capt. Cosby, who was with Starhemberg on the 9th, also thought he was to blame for delay, *Wentworth Papers*, p. 185.

† See Appendix D, pp. 333–334 below, on Brihuega.

driven out by his rival King Charles.' But the evacuation of Madrid by the Allies in November, shortly followed by Brihuega, enabled Jersey to send Torcy the following message just before Christmas :

> We will no longer insist on the entire restoration of the Monarchy of Spain to the House of Austria, or if we do it will be weakly and *pro formâ*, and we shall be content provided France and Spain will give us good securities for our commerce ; and as soon as we have got what we need and have made our bargain with the two crowns, we will tell our Allies.[89]

The principle of ' No Peace without Spain ' had been once for all repudiated.

After Brihuega, the English Ministers would in any case have had less than no hesitation in abandoning the Austrian pretensions to the Spanish crown. But the argument for their new policy was immensely strengthened, in face of Whig and Allied criticism, by an event that took the world by surprise next spring. The young Emperor Joseph died of smallpox. He left no son, and his brother Charles thus unexpectedly became the Hapsburg successor. He was elected Emperor in Germany, under the title of Charles VI. Austria, Bohemia, Silesia, Hungary were his own, and already the war had put him in possession of Italy and Belgium. Surely that was enough. Were England and Holland to go on fighting to add Spain and half America to his vast inheritance ? To carry out the Whig programme of ' No Peace without Spain ' would now mean the revival of the Empire of Charles V, and the overturn in another direction of that Balance of Power, to save which from French hegemony had been the great object of the war. The partition of the Spanish Empire, always desired by William III, had been inscribed by him in the Treaty of Grand Alliance as the chief object of the war. It was St. John's part to impose the terms of that treaty on France at the Peace of Utrecht. In so doing, Bolingbroke in the retrospect pronounced himself to have been heir of William's policy and fulfiller of his wise intents.*

April 17 1711

* See his Letter VIII, *The Study and Use of History*, written in 1735–6. For the Treaty of Grand Alliance, Sept. 1701, see *Blenheim*, pp. 145–147.

CHAPTER VI

The New Scene. Winter 1710–1711

The issues of the Peace and the Succession. Conversations with France begun through a Jacobite medium. Hanover and the Tories. '*Cujus est. Reddite.*' Harley and St. John. The October Club. Swift and Addison. *The Examiner* and *The Spectator*. Pamphlet warfare. London Life. Duels, Opera and Party. Bank and East India Company Elections.

The new Ministers, from the very moment of their entry into office, found themselves in the presence of two questions that dominated every other—the Peace with France and the Succession to the Throne. Their Whig predecessors had had no practical policy about peace, but a strong and simple policy about the Succession—to put the existing Act of Settlement into force whenever Anne should die. The Tories, on the other hand, knew how to obtain peace, but knew not whom they wished to succeed the Queen.

The great party that emerged triumphant at the polls in October 1710 was united in the intention to stop the war. But there agreement ended. The Tories were divided between Jacobites, Hanoverians and a large middle body of uncertain allegiance, attached by reason and patriotism to the Protestant Succession, but by tradition and sentiment to the House of Stuart. The October Club was Jacobite when drunk and Hanoverian when sober. But what if the Pretender would listen to the advice conveyed to him by so many of his English friends and join the Church of the country that he aspired to rule ? Then might not all sorts and conditions of Tories unite to repeal their own Act of Parliament and bring back James III by legal process, on his sister's death ? Then, for all time to come, the Whigs and Dissenters would be the disloyal men, suspect and penalized as such. No

wonder a prospect so delightful to the party mind dazzled the judgment.

Such was the hope that kept so many Tories aloof from Hanover. Yet it was from first to last a delusion. In all that concerned his faith, the pious, melancholy young man was most truly his father's son. He had none of the easy indifference of his uncle Charles or of his great-grandfather Henri Quatre, to whose example his English friends referred him in vain. In their ignorance of his real nature, the Tories loved to dream of him as one of themselves—encouraged thereto by the interested reports of Jacobite agents. And so they continued, waiting for an impossible conversion, halting between two opinions, until the fatal hour had struck.

But in 1710 Queen Anne was in no immediate danger, and it was not the Succession but the Peace that craved immediate action. The Tories were therefore the men of the hour, called in to do what the nation demanded, and equal to the task. But their good fortune in the present became linked with the catastrophe awaiting them in the future. For the peculiar course which our statesmen adopted to obtain peace drew the great body of the Tories every year further away from their original loyalty to the Act of Settlement, which they had themselves passed in 1701. The Ministers obtained, indeed, a reasonable peace for Europe, with specially good terms for England ; but they did so by becoming fellow-conspirators with French statesmen and Jacobite agents to coerce the Whigs, the Dutch and the Elector of Hanover into the acceptance of terms dictated by England and France. Our Allies became our enemies and our great enemy our ally.

This change of sides was carried very far. In the last year of the war (1712) St. John withdrew the British army from the fighting line, and afterwards boasted to his friend Prior that he had thereby saved the French from ' being beat ' ; and a few months later Harley and St. John, then become Oxford and Bolingbroke, betrayed the military secrets of Prince Eugene to the French.[90] In return for these good offices they received from Villars in the field letters of abuse of the Whigs and Allies, warning them to

beware of a counter-movement in England, contrary to the common interest of France and Britain.[91] And they obtained from the Grand Monarch assurances of personal sympathy and protection in their struggle against the common enemy, the House of Hanover and the Whigs.[92]

Bolingbroke in later life argued that he had had no choice, because the obstinacy of the Whigs and the Allies, in refusing to accept the terms dictated by England at Utrecht, compelled him to adopt these methods, and to co-operate with the great European champion of the exiled Stuarts, in order to bring the Dutch to ' submit ' to terms less advantageous to themselves than those which England had guaranteed to them in the Barrier Treaty of 1709. Whatever we may think of this justification, the consequence of the Anglo-French *entente* against the Dutch and the German Princes was to draw the Tories into the orbit of Jacobite France, and to drive the Elector of Hanover into the arms of the Whigs, with the result that the land had Whig rule for forty years.*

Less than six months before the Queen's death, James succeeded at last in persuading Oxford and Bolingbroke that he would not change his religion to solve their perplexities. But even then they would not heartily and actively espouse the Hanoverian cause. They had already gone too far in the opposite direction. Although Bolingbroke declared that the Grand Turk would become King of England more easily than James as a Roman Catholic, the Tory Minister could not shake himself free from the sympathies and antipathies that had been engendered at home and abroad in the course of the long struggle over the Treaty of Utrecht. He was too closely bound to France, too widely alienated from Hanover, to be able to retrace his steps.[93]

March 1714

The remainder of this volume must be in large measure devoted to presenting the successive scenes of this complicated domestic and European drama. To many of those engaged on either side in the conflict, the questions of the

* When, a few years later, George I's Whig Ministry made friends with France, the Regent Orleans ceased to favour the Pretender. The death of Louis XIV for a time deprived the exiled Stuarts of support from France.

Peace and the Succession came to appear inseparable. Posterity, standing above the dust of the actual arena, is able better to distinguish the issues, and may be inclined to think that the Tories served their country well in making Peace, and the Whigs in securing the Succession.

Even before the dismissal of Godolphin in August 1710, there was already a close connection between Jacobitism and the negotiations that led to Peace. During the years of war the French Minister Torcy had employed a certain Abbé Gaultier as his most trusted agent in England. He lived here under various disguises, seldom venturing to write to Versailles ; he was at one time attached to the household of the Tory-Jacobite Earl of Jersey, whose wife was a Roman Catholic. He was in close touch with the English Jacobites, and as a true servant of King Louis desired to effect a restoration of the Stuart Prince who was bound to his master by so many ties of interest and gratitude. Priest though he was, Gaultier hoped that James would at least simulate conversion to Protestantism in order to attain the Crown. For he had lived in England long enough to be sure that no one could win or wear it on any other terms.[94]

In July 1710, when the change of Ministry was as yet only beginning in England, Torcy took time by the forelock and instructed Gaultier to approach the new favourites, Shrewsbury and Mrs. Masham. In the first days of August Jersey sent for Gaultier and asked him if he had no message from the French Minister. So began the negotiations that ended at Utrecht. Shrewsbury, stout Hanoverian as he was, became associated with the Jacobite Jersey and had to act through the French Jacobite agent, Gaultier, in order to pave the way for the pacification of Europe which he had so deeply at heart. In September Jersey sent word to Torcy that the Queen would never again take Whigs as her Ministers, that she was determined on a ' prompt peace ' and that the Dutch would be roundly told to submit. Early in October, while all England was occupied with the General Election, Gaultier wrote a remarkable letter to Torcy in their usual cypher :

> As to Mons. de Montgoulin [the Pretender] the new merchants [Ministers] have a great regard for him, and it appears that if he would think as they do [on religion ?] they would have no difficulty in giving back to him what belongs to him *mortuâ tamen Prothosâ* [when Queen Anne is dead].

In this way, long before St. John took the matter in hand, the first approaches were made towards the peace negotiations in an atmosphere not only of intimate understanding with Versailles but of professed goodwill to St. Germains, which on the part of Jersey were certainly sincere.[95]

Meanwhile, in the same autumn of 1710, Marlborough and various Whig agents were writing to the Elector of Hanover that Harley and the Tories meant to restore James III.[96] And George was hardly less perturbed when he discovered next year that they intended to make peace without Spain, a subject on which he happened to have conceived a strong prejudice. ' Everyone sees,' the Elector wrote to the Duke of Buckinghamshire, one of the new Ministers, ' what an addition of power France would receive if the Duke of Anjou should support himself on the throne of Spain and the Indies, and you fill too deservedly the post the Queen has committed to you, not to exert yourself to prevent such a misfortune.' [97]

The Tories were on better terms with George's mother, the Dowager Electress Sophia, the heir presumptive to the English throne. She read with attention whatever her friend Lord Raby wrote to her in defence of the foreign and domestic policy of the British Government. But even she was growing uneasy ; moreover she was an old woman and must soon die, leaving her rights in England to her son.[98]

At this juncture an affair took place in Scotland which revealed to the Elector of Hanover how much the new Ministers of Great Britain were dependent upon the support of his foes. Ever since the General Election the Edinburgh Jacobites had acted as if the country belonged to them. ' It is so open a thing,' wrote Defoe thence to Harley in November 1710, ' and so much the mode of the place to own the Pretender, drink his health, and talk most insolently of his being restored that I think it my duty to represent this

to you.' In the following July the Roman Catholic Duchess of Gordon presented to the Faculty of Advocates—perhaps the most influential body in the Scottish capital—a medal representing the Pretender's head on one side with the legend *Cujus est*, and on the other a map of the British islands with the word '*Reddite*'—restore.* By a majority of sixty-three to twelve, the Advocates accepted the treasonable gift, after a debate in which some of the speeches had been openly Jacobite. In London, whence Scotland was supposed to be governed under the Union, no notice was taken of the affair until, in the autumn, the indignant representation of Bothmar, the Hanoverian Envoy, caused Ministers to make some pretence of action.[99] Harley had begun to play the double game that was to ruin him in the end, courting the Jacobite vote at Westminster, which was, by orders from St. Germains, put at the disposition of the Queen's government. There is little wonder that Bothmar in London became increasingly attached to the Whigs, and that his master conceived an ill opinion of the English Tory Ministers.

The fall of the Junto had been engineered by Harley and Shrewsbury, but it was Harley and St. John who emerged as the *dioscuri* of the Tory revival. If the General Election had been less of a party triumph, Shrewsbury and Harley might have continued to figure as the Moderators of the nation and of Europe. But in a Ministry that had to work through a High Tory Parliament the Whig Duke could exert only a secondary and restraining influence, a part with which his own unambitious nature rendered him perfectly content. Even before the Election, he had scouted the proposal that he himself should become Lord Treasurer. It was only in great crises of decision, like 1688, 1710 and 1714, that Shrewsbury cared to play a leading part. On each of these occasions the country had the benefit of his brief but powerful exertions on its behalf. But he had

* In the British Museum there are a number of these medals of various sizes, some of the larger having the variant *Reddite igitur*. They were struck in great numbers in France for import into Great Britain. They were the work of Norbert Roettier, the French Government's Engraver-General.

neither the health nor the inclination for the long strain of workaday government.*

Henry St. John was a very different man. As early as March 1710 he had told Harley that he would not again be content with a minor Cabinet post.[100] In the following autumn he was made Secretary of State for the Northern Department ; the Southern Secretary was Harley's friend Lord Dartmouth, who was treated by his ' brother Secretary ' with a studied insolence calculated to keep him in due subordination. Dartmouth suffered under St. John's treatment, and thought that Harley did not stand up well for his friends.[101]

St. John aimed at the highest. In the winter of 1710 it was still his part to play the faithful friend and colleague to Harley, but, before the first session of the new Parliament ended, his rivalry had become apparent.

> For 'tis all one to courage high
> The emulous or enemy ;
> And with such, to enclose
> Is more than to oppose.

The instrument of his ambition lay ready to hand in the October Club, and in the animosity of the High Churchmen against his rival. Harley, ' the spawn of a Presbyterian ' as the Dean of Christ Church at this time called him, was reported to be still in the habit of attending a Dissenting chapel, like the ' Occasional Conformist base ' that he was. The charge was perhaps a slander ; but Tory suspicion of him was so far justified that he was in fact still receiving from Halifax of the Junto a constant succession of letters, full of flattery and of advice on Treasury expedients, and occasionally suggesting a conference with the Whig leaders.[102] Harley was unfitted to be leader of a party, alike by the defects of his character and the breadth of his mind. His love of secret intrigue made him always pursue two or more policies at once ; and his wisdom made him aware, before Walpole, that moderation was the secret of government in the new England.

* For Shrewsbury see *Blenheim*, pp. 200–202. For his refusal of the Treasury in July 1710, see p. 67 above, note.

Such a doctrine was not suited to St. John, till years of exile had tamed his fiery spirit to accept the dull, true opinions of the rival whom he had so long despised. He himself has left on record, in the famous *Letter to Sir William Wyndham*, the nature and motives of his policy as Secretary of State to Queen Anne :

> I am afraid that we came to court in the same dispositions as all parties have done ; that the principal spring of our actions was to have the government of the state in our hands ; that our principal views were the conservation of this power, great employments to ourselves, and great opportunities of rewarding those who had helped to raise us, and of hurting those who stood in opposition to us . . . The view therefore of those amongst us who thought in this manner, was to improve the Queen's favour, to break the body of the Whigs, to render their supports useless to them, to fill the employments of the Kingdom down to the meanest with Tories. We imagined that such measures, joined to the advantages of our numbers and property, would secure us against all attempts during her reign ; and that we should soon become too considerable not to make our terms in all events which might happen afterwards ; concerning which, to speak truly, I believe few or none of us had any very settled resolution.

It was a policy doubly unwise. Kindly old England has always in the long run revolted against ' fascist ' experiments at the permanent suppression of ' the other side ' ; nor could a party which confessedly had ' no settled resolution ' of any sort on the Succession, hope to win popular confidence at the crisis that must ensue on the Queen's death, or royal favour in the next reign.

The ' October Club ' of High Tory members of Parliament who met to drink October ale and abuse the Whigs, was said to have existed since the reign of William. But no one had heard much about it until the meeting of the new Parliament of 1710, when the great increase in the number of its members, particularly of ' young gentlemen of estates,' gave them a sudden political importance. The youthful vigour of their indiscretion rebelled against Harley's Cabinet of ' old men,' whom they suspected of Moderation. They ' meet every evening at a tavern near Parliament,' wrote Swift to Stella, ' to consult affairs, and drive things on to extremes against the Whigs, to call the old Ministry to account, and get off five or six heads. . . . The Ministry is for gentler measures and the other Tories for more violent.' ' The Ministry is upon a very narrow bottom, and stand like an isthmus between the Whigs on one side and violent Tories on the other. They are able seamen, but the tempest is too great, the ship too rotten and the crew all against them.' [103] Nevertheless Harley, in spite of his friend's forebodings, weathered the storms of the first session with increased prestige.*

Of all the important happenings of the winter of 1710, the one that most attracts the attention of posterity is Swift's sudden leap to fame and influence. For some years past the Irish parson had paid frequent visits to London to solicit, on behalf of the authorities of the Church of Ireland, the remission of ' first-fruits and twentieths ' of livings, on the same principle that had recently been applied to England by Queen Anne's Bounty. The total sum in question would only have cost the revenue one or two thousand pounds a year. Swift, in pursuit of this small act of justice to the island he hated and the Church he loved, had consorted with Whig Ministers and literary men, had been well received by Somers and had formed a friendship with Steele and Addison, which the bitter political divisions of later years only very gradually dissolved.

An an Irish Protestant, Swift was, by English standards, Whiggish in politics ; for he revered the memory of William and regarded Jacobitism with contemptuous horror. On the other hand he was never a complete Whig, for the author of the *Tale of a Tub* had as little liking for Jack as for Peter, and warmly advocated the monopolies of the Established Church in both islands. In Ireland he hated the Presbyterians of Scottish origin, whose numbers, organization and energy seemed to him to threaten the existing ecclesiastical order ; and when he came to England it was

* According to Dartmouth (*Burnet*, VI, p. 37 note) Nottingham proposed to Harley, Shrewsbury and St. John to adopt the October Club's policy of prosecuting the ex-Ministers, beginning with Sunderland, and only after this had been refused, went into opposition, and even made alliance with the Whigs. But Dartmouth, in his notes to Burnet, is not always a very reliable witness, writing as he does long after the event.

natural for him to extend these sentiments to the English Dissenters who, if less formidable in themselves, were strong through their alliance with the Whig Lords. And he detested free-thinkers, unless, like St. John, they were politically good churchmen.

In 1708 he could not refrain from publishing a pamphlet against the abolition of the Sacramental Test for office in Ireland, which was being then proposed in order to unite the Protestant interest, but which he thought would have the effect of undermining the Establishment. Earlier in that year Lord Somers, as he tells us, had 'thought of me for the Bishopric of Waterford.' But it is probable that he lost his chance with the Whigs through this pamphlet, which should be studied as the most disinterested and careful expression of Swift's real views on Church and State. At any rate, the Godolphin Ministry neither settled his business of the first-fruits nor gave him any post or preferment.*

Harley, on attaining power in September 1710, at once secured Swift's gratitude by remitting the First Fruits,[104] and by showing a desire for his literary companionship and conversation which was the more flattering because it was three parts genuine. A few weeks later St. John was competing for his friendship, and these three strangely assorted men of letters and affairs became inseparable at dinner time. It is a pity no Boswell was present on our behalf. Never before had a denizen of Grub Street been so courted on equal terms by 'the great.'

The better treatment that he received from the Tories was a main reason why he became so violent a partisan. His views would have led him to be a moderate of the Harley type: but his wrongs, real and imaginary, and his proud, angry brooding over them, made it impossible for him to write of the Whigs with moderation. That autumn he wrote to Stella again and again that he would have 'revenge' on Godolphin for his coldness at

* *Swift Letters*, I, pp. 80–89, 116–117, 165–166, 176; *Letter Concerning the Sacramental Test* (*Prose Works*, IV, p. 15) defines his own position and that of other Irish Churchmen as 'moderate Whigs,' opposed to 'the Presbyterians and their abettors.'

an interview, and on the Whigs at large for their previous neglect:[105]

> 'Rot 'em for ungrateful* dogs; I will make them repent their usuage before I leave this place.'
>
> 'I am already represented to Harley as a discontented person, that was used ill for not being Whig enough; and I hope for good usuage from him. The Tories dryly tell me I may make my fortune if I please; but I do not understand them, or rather *I do* understand them.'

And when in November he began his attacks in the *Examiner*, he took revenge out of all proportion to the Whig sins of omission in his regard. Where he touched he scorched. Marlborough was held up as the monster of meanness and avarice that he has since remained in the imaginations of all too many of his countrymen. Swift's hatred of the great soldier was in part professional; for, as he loved the black coat, so he loathed the red. But it was hardly to the credit of his cloth that he should stoop to revive the lies and slanders which he had despised when Mrs. Manley had put them about in her *New Atlantis* the year before; now, to glut his revenge against a party, he himself could hint the utterly unjust charge of 'bigamy' against Lord Cowper, accuse Sarah of being Godolphin's mistress, and allow no shred of private character to any Whig. Promiscuous slander was a weapon quite unworthy of the genius that could state the general arguments of party as cogently as Swift was able to do in the more serious parts of his *Examiner*.

The ferocity of his native temperament, when once fairly roused, carried him far beyond the 'moderate' policy of Harley. It was St. John's hounds that he hallooed on to the prey. Yet, if Swift could have stopped to think, he might have perceived that such violence must hurry the party towards Jacobitism, to seek a King who would continue the policy of crushing Whigs and Dissenters after Anne was dead; otherwise the rebound might be fatal.

* It is hard to see why he called the Whigs 'ungrateful'; 'neglectful' of his interests they had been, but not 'ungrateful,' for he had done nothing for them.

But Swift, the Irish Protestant, so loathed the Pope and the Pretender that he could never believe that half his English friends were crypto-Jacobites. To the last he was kept in ignorance of St. John's negotiations with the Roman Catholic claimant, and declared all rumours of that sort to be Whig lies. Posterity, which has the use of the documents in the French Foreign Office, knows much that was never revealed to Swift.

In post-revolution England, a land where the struggle for political power was conducted by persuasion and free controversy, 'the Press' might already have been called 'the fourth Estate of the Realm.' The value of Swift's *Examiners* to the party was very great, nor was their influence confined to London. The Tory member for Scarborough, for example, sent off a copy every Thursday to his constituents: after its arrival there on the following Sunday 'the honest parson,' we are told, 'invites a good number of his friends to his house after evening service, where he first reads over the paper and then comments on the text, and all week after carries it about with him to read to such of his parishioners as are weak in the faith.' [106]

In the days when ordinary newspapers contained little or no political argument, when speeches in Parliament were seldom reported and few were made anywhere outside its walls, pamphlets like *The Conduct of the Allies* and periodicals like the *Examiner* were the very life-blood of politics. After the fall of the Godolphin Ministry, the intensity of party conflict multiplied such publications. The pamphlets bearing dates from 1711 to 1714 are by many times more numerous than those of the early and middle parts of the reign. The Whigs, in spite of frequent prosecutions and imprisonments of publishers and reputed authors, put up a good fight. Harley was informed 'Tis a notion in the pamphlet shops that Whiggish libels sell best.' [107]

But they were none of them a match for Swift. Indeed the change of government for a time silenced the best Whig writers. Defoe in his *Review* took to preaching Harleyism as the true Moderation. Though he confessed to grave alarm at the rising tide of High Church intolerance, he

affected to trust his patron's power to stem it, and stuck to him in spite of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts. He had drifted, in his poverty, into an equivocal position, and no longer exercised his former influence on his more downright countrymen.

Steele was bolder and more reliable as a Whig controversialist. But he too allowed himself to be muzzled during the first three years of the Tory government, by retaining his place in the Stamp Office until June 1713, through a friendly conspiracy of Addison and Swift on his behalf, after he had been turned out of his post as Gazetteer. The Press was free from censorship, but the rewards of successful journalism were in the hands of Government, and the Opposition suffered from the fact.

Even Addison, as soon as the Tories were firmly in the saddle, gave up in October 1710 the *Whig Examiner* that he had been writing during the previous month with a success that extorted admiration from Swift himself. Though always true to his principles, Addison was not made to be the martyr of a cause, and his heart was never more than half in politics. In a fortunate hour he turned for awhile from the service of party to that of mankind.

'Have you seen the *Spectator* yet,' wrote Swift to Stella in March 1711, 'a paper that comes out every day? 'Tis written by Mr. Steele, who seems to have gathered new life, and have a new fund of wit. It is in the same nature as his *Tatlers*. I believe Addison and he club.' Addison, indeed, did something better that year than rage against the new Ministry; he gave the world Sir Roger de Coverley. The coffee-houses and drawing-rooms of fashionable London were charmed by a breath of the rural life that still was the essential England, still in the background even of the Londoner's consciousness. Thus the most lovable portrait in our literature of a Tory country gentleman was drawn by a Whig. While Swift too often used his genius to brutalize, Addison employed talents, possibly less remarkable, to sweeten life and civilize the coming era.*

* But Addison also wrote a very amusing, not wholly ill-natured, caricature of a Tory squire in Nos. 22, 44, 47 of his *Freeholder*, 1715. There is no reason to doubt the general opinion of his contemporaries that the reformation of manners

If the Eighteenth Century owes much of its reasonableness and good manners to the Whig scholar, it owes much of its realistic force to the Tory parson. Swift is the Hogarth of the pen. While the General Election was going on, he delighted the town by a picture of its outward self, that still shows to posterity the vivid humours of London in days when its streets were not speedways for machines but markets and playgrounds for mankind. It was entitled 'A City Shower.'

> Now in contiguous drops the flood comes down,
> Threatening with deluge this devoted town.
> To shops in crowds the daggled females fly,
> Pretend to cheapen goods, but nothing buy.
> The templar spruce, while every spout's abroach,
> Stays till 'tis fair, yet seems to call a coach.
> The tuck'd-up semstress walks with hasty strides
> While streams run down her oil'd umbrella's sides.
> Here various kinds, by various fortunes led,
> Commence acquaintance underneath a shed ;
> Triumphant Tories, and desponding Whigs
> Forget their feuds, and join to save their wigs.
> Box'd in a chair, the beau impatient sits,
> While spouts run clattering o'er the roof by fits,
> And ever and anon with frightful din
> The leather sounds ; he trembles from within.

Soon frost followed the rain, and Swift writes to Stella :

Delicate walking weather, and the Canal and Rosamund's Pond [St. James's Park] full of the rabble sliding, and with skates, if you know what those are. Patrick's bird's water freezes in the gallipot, and my hands in bed.*

owed much to his writings. But he must, I think, have smiled at the over-emphatic statement of the case by his friend and client Tickell in the lines :

To the Supposed Author of the Spectator

> 'Thy spotless thoughts unshocked the priest may hear ;
> And the pure vestal in her bosom wear.
> Lashed in thy satire, the penurious cit
> Laughs at himself and finds no harm in wit :
> From felon gamesters the raw squire is free,
> And Britain owes her rescued oaks to thee,
> His miss the frolic Viscount dreads to toast,
> Or his third cure the shallow Templar boast ;
> And the rash fool, who scorned the beaten road,
> Dares quake at thunder and confess his God.'

Here is reformation indeed !

The Whigs were still strong in financial and in fashionable circles, and in spite of their rout in the country held together in town with a courage that alarmed the possessors of a majority of two to one. Political duels, 'some with sword and pistol,' were frequent that winter, though discouraged by Parliament. The Duke of Argyle 'had a penny post letter sent him by an unknown hand that, the night before, his health was proposed to be drunk and that Colonel Cout said damn him he wouldn't drink the health of a man that had changed sides.' The fiery Campbell, though under orders to take up the command in Spain, called out the Colonel and disarmed and wounded him in Hyde Park at early morning.[108]

Even the stage became a property of faction. The Italian opera had always been regarded askance by Steele, Addison and other Whigs, as un-English.† And now, during the first session of the Tory Parliament, we read that

since the Whigs have espoused Mr. Porrel, he has turned his ordinary show into an opera in ridicule of *Hydaspes*, in which Punch most heroically kills a pig and sings *Io Pean* in Italian music. This has affronted Nicolino and he threatens to tread the stage no more. But this folly was acted six weeks by subscription at a crown a ticket. Mr. Walpole and Mr. Mackertney were managers, received the tickets at the door, and suffered no Tory to mix with them in this extraordinary pleasure.[109]

The political complexion of the Bank of England and of the East India Company was a more serious matter. A great attempt was made by the Tories in the spring of 1711 to storm these Whig strongholds by the use of Ministerial influence. The elections for the Directors of the great Company and of the Bank were held amid scenes of intense

* *Stella*, Jan. 31, 1711. They seem to have had a series of hard winters. On Dec. 14, 1712, a country gentleman writes : 'Mr. Chester is with me in full expectation of hunting, but the weather has proved cross and unseasonable, that I have had less of that dear diversion than was expected at the prorogation of Parliament. But the practice of the pipe has been customary in frosts.' *Verney Letters of the Eighteenth Century*, I, p. 243.

† See *Blenheim*, p. 87.

excitement. Sacheverell himself took shares and solicited votes in vain. The other shareholders were alarmed at the parson's interference with matters he did not understand. The Whigs carried their candidates, and the greatest institutions in the City did not pass into Tory hands.

The Duchess of Marlborough had worked for this end with her usual vigour and zeal. Lord Hervey, who owed her his Peerage, hated London and, even at her bidding, would not come up to vote. He could not tear himself away from Newmarket races and from his own lovely park at Ickworth, Bury St. Edmunds. His wife, devoted to the pleasure and bustle of the town, wrote to him thence :

> Thursday is the day of election, and the Duchess of Marlborough says it is a terrible reflection upon anybody that can stay to see a horse race though there were but a possibility of the Bank of England put into ill hands by it ; and, if the Tories get the better, Mr. Hopkins says you may all make use of your horses to run away.

In spite of these reproaches, Hervey preferred, as he said, ' seeing all the pride of nature opening itself day by day at Ickworth,' and anyone who knows that park to-day of an April morning may well understand his choice.[110]

But in town the Bank Election caused more excitement than horse-racing or the spring ; it even got into schoolboys' letters to politically minded parents. John Cocks writes from school in London to his Whig father at Worcester :

> I am now second captain of the seventh form, so that my removal into the next may be expected to be suddenly heard of. Dr. Sacheverell to his great mortification, has been hissed at in the Bank, being come thither to give his vote.[111]

It was while the Bank Election was coming on, that Addison wrote one of his rare political numbers of the *Spectator*, to point out the economic consequences of a Jacobite Restoration. He saw in his vision the fair lady, ' Publick Credit,' seated amid a heap of money-bags in the Bank, when there entered

> a young man of about twenty-two years of age, whose name I could not learn. He had a sword in his right hand, which in the dance he often brandished at the Act of Settlement ; and a citizen, who stood by me, whispered in my ear that he had a sponge in his hand.

Credit faints, and the money-bags shrink like pricked balloons.

> Whilst I was lamenting this sudden desolation that had been made before me, the whole scene vanished. In the room of the frightful Spectres, there now enter'd a second dance of Apparitions very agreeably matched together and made up of amicable Phantoms. The first pair was Liberty with Monarchy at her right hand : the second was Moderation leading in Religion ; and the third a Person whom I had never seen, with the genius of Great Britain.

With the entrance of the Hanoverian heir ' the bags swell'd to their former bulk, and the heaps of paper changed into pyramids of guineas.' This was no mere poetic fancy of Addison's. The most solid men in the City believed that the Restoration of James III would mean the repudiation of government debts contracted since the Revolution, and it was not a little this fear that kept the members of the Bank of England faithful to the Whig cause in the hour of its deepest depression.[112]

CHAPTER VII

The First Session of the New Parliament, November 1710–June 1711

The October Club *versus* Harley. Tory measures, ministerial and other. Landed Property Qualification Bill: squires and moneyed men. The new London churches. The Spanish debates in the Lords. Argyle in Spain. Peterborough again. Marlborough and the Ministers. Sarah removed from her places at Court. Swift, Sarah and the Duchess of Somerset. St. John *versus* Harley. St. John's Quebec project. Guiscard stabs Harley. Triumph of Harley, Lord Treasurer and Earl of Oxford. The South Sea Company. Ministerial changes. The Bishop of Bristol in secular office. Atterbury at Christ Church. Academic independence of Oxford and Cambridge.

Ever since the Revolution the Tories had been a Parliamentary party no less than the Whigs, and their return to power tended to increase rather than diminish the importance and activity of the Commons House. The new regime was ushered in by a long session of seven months, which was occupied by a veiled struggle between the spirit of the October Club in the Commons and the spirit of moderation in a Cabinet presided over by Harley. With the help of the House of Lords and of Harley's tactful management, the Moderates upon the whole prevailed in this first session. But the end was not yet.

The Queen's Speech was almost impertinently moderate, and gave a little satisfaction to the House that had just chosen the High Church champion, Bromley, as its Speaker. No promise was made of any Bill against the Dissenters, to whom Harley wished, if he could, to keep his electioneering pledges of protection. No specific measures were proposed against the Whigs, of whom it was known that many still occupied posts in the army, magistracy and civil service. The Queen did not even promise

Nov. 1710

peace, but asked for supplies towards 'carrying on the war in all parts, particularly in Spain.' Yet her Ministers had already made secret approaches to France, and were on the point of deciding, if they had not already decided in their own minds, to give up Spain to Philip. The House of Commons accepted the Speech, probably knowing that more was intended about peace than was expressed; and Sir John Packington of Worcestershire roused the loud cheers of his fellow-members by his declaration that an end ought to be put to the war, 'to prevent the beggaring of the nation, and to prevent moneyed and military men becoming lords of us who have lands.'[113]

The Commons were ready to trust the Ministry to make peace, but they themselves took in hand the attack on their domestic enemies. Members as distinct from Ministers had more control over legislation than they have in our own day. An important part of the business of every session consisted of Bills introduced by private members, and these were often carried contrary to the wishes of the 'placemen.' It was only in regard to proposals for taxation that the initiative of servants of the Crown was acknowledged to be expedient.* The October Club, therefore, was able to give vent to its feelings by passing a number of Bills to which Ministers were indifferent or hostile, and which the House of Lords threw out to the secret satisfaction of Harley. Such were a Place Bill further limiting the posts under the Crown that could be held by any member of the House of Commons, and a Bill resuming all grants made by William III—hardy annuals of Tory intransigence.[114]

Robert Walpole, though dismissed from the War Office, had been left in his Treasurership of the Navy, in hopes that he would carry over to the Tory camp the ablest brain among the Whigs: he 'was worth half his party,' Harley told him. But as he failed to oblige, he was turned out in January 1711, and a charge of peculation was at once initiated by the Tories against the man whom they had tried in vain to attract into their service. It had been

* The famous Standing Order of the House of Commons, No. 66 (to use the present-day enumeration), that gives effect to this principle, was passed in June 1713. See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 164–166.

reported to the House that thirty-five million pounds had not been accounted for, and the October Club was all agog. But Walpole's able defence, and a further examination of the facts, dissipated the whole charge. St. John behaved well, warmly defending his Whig friend, James Brydges, afterwards first Duke of Chandos, the Paymaster of the Forces, with whom he himself had been associated when he was Secretary at War. This act of personal loyalty displeased the October men whom it was his cue to lead, and gave a temporary check to his ambitions as Harley's rival.[115]

St. John, in defending Brydges, was following the dictates of private friendship. But it was as spokesman for the whole Ministry that he had opposed the Place Bill which the Lords afterwards threw out; he had urged the Commons to pass in its stead the Landed Property Qualification Bill.[116] That strange measure purported, like the Place Bill, to secure the true independence of future Houses of Commons, and it had the advantage of doing so by a method even more pleasing to High Tory sentiment. For instead of excluding Placemen, who were now for the most part Tories, it proposed to exclude professional and moneyed men, who were generally Whigs. It was the first sop thrown by the Ministers to the October Club.

The avowed object of the Qualification Bill was to prevent any Englishman who was not a squire from sitting in the Commons. Henceforth no one was allowed to sit who was not possessed of land to the annual value of £600 if a knight of the shire, and of £300 if representative of a borough. The heirs of Lords or of persons qualified to be knights of the shire might be chosen, but all landless younger sons were to be rendered ineligible. The provisions of the Act did not apply to Scotland on account of her poverty, or to the Universities on account of their learning and religion. A similar Bill had been passed by the Tory Commons in 1703 and thrown out by the Whig Lords,* but this time the Lords dared not oppose; it became law, and was not repealed until the reign of Queen Victoria.

The action of the Bank of England in trying to prevent the recent change in the Ministry, and the unpatriotic

* *Blenheim*, pp. 192–193.

efforts of some of the Whigs to shake public credit and refuse money to Government under the new regime,[117] had blown to flame the indignation always smouldering in the Tory mind against the interference of the moneyed power in politics. St. John told the House that, unless they passed the Qualification Bill, 'we might see a time when the moneyed men might bid fair to keep out of that house all the landed men, and he had heard of societies of them that jointed Stocks to bring in members.'[118]

The Qualification Bill was clean contrary to the older principles of the Constitution, that had been based on free election and the permissive representation of boroughs by their own citizens. The new law was intended to make the landed oligarchy omnipotent. Men of both parties seriously feared and hoped that it would perpetuate the Tory power in future Parliaments by excluding all save squires from political life.[119] Such, however, was not its result. Its bark proved worse than its bite. The ingenuity of lawyers sufficed, by a little easy conveyancing at the approach of each General Election, to enable professional and moneyed men and younger sons of squires to become landlords in name alone, and take their seats by the use of legal fictions. Had it been otherwise, the Act must have been soon repealed, or else Pitt, Fox, Burke, Sheridan, Canning and half the brightest luminaries of our Parliamentary firmament would, during all or part of their lives, have been excluded from their predestined spheres.

It is, indeed, possible that the Act was to some slight degree effective by encouraging the process, always going on in English social history, by which great merchants invested their wealth in landed estates and became, they or their descendants, country gentlemen. Partisans might orate on the opposing interests of the 'landed' and 'moneyed' classes, but they were more closely connected in England than anywhere else. A Swiss who visited our country in the reign of King William had written of the English merchants:

> They seem to me to differ from other merchants in many things: they are neither in so much haste as the French to grow rich, nor so niggardly as the Dutch to save; their houses are richly furnished and

their tables well served. There's something very singular in their character, and which in my opinion distinguishes them still more from other merchants ; *no sooner do they acquire wealth but they quit traffic, and turn country gentlemen.*[120]

It was largely for this reason that, in the Eighteenth Century, English agriculture was so greatly improved by the application of capital made in industry, and that the amenities of rural life, building and scenery were carried to so high a pitch of perfection. For in every county, and most of all in the orbit of great towns, such as London, Bristol or Newcastle-upon-Tyne, the wealth of trade, mines and manufacture was being poured into the development and embellishment of landed estates.

Scarcely had this unjust but ineffective measure on behalf of the Landed Interest received the assent of Parliament, when a better-conceived plan for showing favour to the Church was evolved by the Commons, in close consultation with the clergy of the Lower House of Convocation. The proposal, which speedily became law, was to build fifty new churches in outer London, with the help of £350,000 of public money. It was to be raised over a number of years by an increase in the coal duties in the Port of London, the method that was still paying for the rebuilding of St. Paul's and the churches destroyed by the Great Fire. The movement in London church-building which had been associated with Wren was extended into a new era by the Commons' vote of 1711. Sir Christopher himself was now an old man, but the ' new churches,' which were actually erected under George I, gave opportunity to his successor, James Gibbs.

It was indeed the most positive outcome of the Convocation movement, which otherwise proved so unfruitful of all save strife. Here was a better way of waging the Church's battle against Infidelity and Dissent than angry sermons and pamphlets, Occasional Conformity Bills and Schism Acts. The persecuting Statutes have been repealed long ago, the angry sermons are read only by students amazed or amused by so much noise and fury, but Gibbs's St. Martin's in the Fields and St. Mary le Strand still adorn London, and the

religious and charitable work done in these and many other parishes as a consequence of this vote of the Tory Parliament has been continued from generation to generation.

In modern times the grant of public money to build more churches for the Establishment would not be approved. But in those days it seemed perfectly natural, and was in fact the only practical method of expanding the inelastic parish system in accordance with the nation's needs. The fixed character of the parochial ministry of the Church of England had long restricted the sphere of her influence, and proved an ever-increasing hindrance during the coming century of Industrial Revolution.* The administrative geography of the Church, little changed since mediaeval times, made no provision for the new mines and factories as they came into being. Their population was left to heathenism or to John Wesley. In the reign of Anne, while the Industrial Revolution and little John were both in their infancy, a similar state of things was already observable in the Metropolitan area. The grant of money to build fifty churches there was a real effort to meet a real need.

The House of Commons declared that it was ' sensible how much the want of churches hath contributed to the increase of Schism and Irreligion.' Confessedly the movement was inspired by rivalry with the existing 88 Dissenting chapels in Greater London, where there were in 1711 only 28 parish churches and 18 chapels of ease. Though the zealots of Convocation could not see it, there was much to be said for ' Schism ' and competition in religion, if only to stimulate the relaxed energies of the Church and her partner the State.

In the end not half the proposed fifty new churches were built.† But what was done was all to the good, and much of the money was used not in building new churches but in restoring and repairing the old. After a while the effort

* The difficulty of setting the cumbrous machinery of Parliament in motion to create a new parish is illustrated by the Bishop of Lichfield's correspondence with Lord Somers about the attempt to build ' a new church at Birmingham,' 1706–7, in *Somers MSS.* ; see also *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 135.

† It is difficult to say exactly how many ' new ' churches were built : *e.g.* St. Martin's in the Fields was an entirely new building, but in place of a former building, become ruinous and insufficient.

died out for another hundred years, till the policy of church building out of State funds was revived, from much the same motives, by the Tories after Waterloo.[121] But it was only the reform of ecclesiastical revenues, carried out by the 'sacrilegious' Whig governments of the Reform Bill era, coinciding with the revival of Church life after the Evangelical and Oxford movements, that enabled the Church to cope with modern conditions by the proper use of her own revenues, by her own reformed machinery and by the voluntary contributions of her children which had been too little forthcoming either in the High Church days of Queen Anne or in the Latitudinarian times that followed. Until the era of Reform, she was fain to rely on State subventions, which in this wicked world were not likely to be perpetually renewed.[122]

Although there was still a Whig or Moderate majority in the Lords to throw out violent measures that came from the Commons without the full backing of the Ministry, the number of Peers who, like Argyle, were inimical to Marlborough or the Junto for a mixture of personal and public reasons, was enough to serve most ministerial purposes against the Whigs. An examination into 'the late ill success in Spain' was, therefore, staged in the Upper House. Party capital must be made out of it and the blame put upon Marlborough, the late Ministers and the Whig generals in the Peninsula, Galway and Stanhope. Peterborough, whom Marlborough and the Junto had recalled, must be magnified at their expense. Since Galway was directly responsible for Almanza, and Stanhope for Brihuega, this was not very difficult. Peterborough and Argyle, in high feather, led the attack. Less was said against Stanhope, from a feeling that it was unfair to attack a prisoner of war in enemy hands. But Galway was arraigned and censured by their Lordships for having given battle at Almanza four years back; and Sunderland, who as Secretary of State had ordered a vigorous offensive in Spain, came in for his share of denunciation. Almanza indeed had been a terrible mistake, and Peterborough had advised against the policy that led to it. Galway could not evade the responsibility for the disaster.

The enquiry was enlivened by outbursts of Highland temper from Argyle and flights of fancy by Peterborough. And one day, Lord Tyrawley, being examined on the nature of the councils of war held before the Almanza campaign, at some of which he had been present, spoke of them as 'privy councils which the Spainiards call *Juntos*, at which the House laughed.'[123]

At the end of these debates, the only thanks the late Ministry received for winning the war against France in Europe and on the sea, was to be censured by Lords and Commons for having lost it in Spain. Peterborough was acclaimed by resolutions of both Houses as the national hero, less from any real gratitude to him than out of spite to the victor of Blenheim and Ramillies.

After this triumph over their personal enemies, in which Peterborough showed some good nature and Argyle much vindictiveness, both were hurried abroad. The Ministry indeed had no intention whatever of employing Peterborough, their 'greatest general,' in military operations. He was dispatched on a diplomatic errand to Vienna. Thence in the following November it was intended to send him on to the Italian courts; Lord Dartmouth 'feared he would do more hurt than good at Turin,' but the Queen wrote to Harley 'I think he should be sent somewhere, for I fear if he comes home while the Parliament is sitting he will be very troublesome.' St. John wrote contemptuously 'I have a letter of twenty sheets from Lord Peterborough, wherein the whole world is parcelled out, as if with a fiat and the breath of his mouth it could be accomplished.' That was how his new political allies regarded the quicksilver of the age.[124]

Argyle was sent to take up the command of the English remnant in Spain. He had refused to serve again under Marlborough in the Netherlands. The Ministry were, not without reason, afraid of his personal pride, his fiery temper and his fundamentally Whig principles. He would do very well as far away as Barcelona, quarrelling there with 'King Charles' and his Germans, till the peace with France had been arranged by cooler heads. Argyle was not long in discovering that he had been sent on a fool's errand. He

was not expected to wage war, and therefore he was not supplied with the means. He complained that the army in Spain was unpaid and unprovided, as indeed it had been before Brihuega. By this time, he wrote, it was 'the shadow of an army,' and he himself was 'tore to pieces from morning till night for what I can't remedy.'

He formed the same opinion of 'Charles III' and his German councillors as all English generals before him. He found this King, who had lost all the other provinces of Spain, engaged in a violent quarrel with his only remaining subjects, because he claimed absolute rule in Catalonia in contempt of her ancient rights. Shut up in Barcelona, Charles addressed the Catalans as if he was dictating to them from Madrid with the whole power of Castile behind him.

Argyle, starved of money and of all real support, remained, as he wrote to Harley, 'chained to the galley' until the summer of 1712, when he carried the remnant of the British army to Minorca; there they remained, ragged and unpaid. The treatment that Argyle had received from the home government in his Spanish command prepared the way for his breach with the Tory Ministers after his return. He then thought they had betrayed the country over the peace and that they were working for the return of the Pretender. Argyle was a gallant soldier and a fearless statesman, but he was not an easy colleague for either Tory or Whig.[125]

Marlborough, having lost support in both Houses of Parliament, was entirely at the mercy of Ministers. But until they had secretly arranged the outlines of the peace with Louis, they had no wish either to quarrel with the Allies or to relax the military pressure on France. They had therefore to induce Marlborough to continue at the head of the army in the field for one more campaign. Their policy was, as St. John wrote, 'to break Lord Marlborough's faction without giving him any just mortification as general'; —a nice operation requiring all Harley's tact.[126]

In December 1710 three officers of the Duke's faction—Meredith, Maccartney and Honeywood—were forced to sell out, for drinking his health and confusion to his enemies,

or more specifically 'damnation to the new Ministry' as the Tory version ran.[127] And next month the Duchess was dismissed from all her places about Court. St. John, when he had served as Minister at War under the Duke, had conceived for him so strong an admiration that he had offered the astonished dons of Christ Church to set up his statue in their college; and in years to come he wrote of Marlborough in retrospect as 'the greatest general and the greatest Minister that our country or perhaps any other has produced.' But at this crisis of the Duke's fortunes he showed towards him a vindictiveness of which Harley was as incapable as of the higher flights of admiration. Marlborough, wrote St. John, had been clearly told 'that his true interest consisted in getting rid of his wife, who was grown to be irreconcilable with the Queen, as soon as he could, and with the best grace he could. Instead of this he teased the Queen and made the utmost effort to keep this woman in her places.' St. John wished at once to cashier many more of Marlborough's men.[128]

But Harley, of milder mood and more moderate policy, so handled the incensed Duke as to persuade him to take the field yet another year. The payment of the public moneys, due for the building of Blenheim, was part of the inducement offered him to keep on terms with the Ministers who had 'broken his faction' and with the Queen who had dismissed his wife. Another motive was the strongly expressed desire of the Whigs and of the Dutch and German Allies that he should not resign the command. And he himself, little as he trusted the peace policy of the new government, realized that the terms granted by France would be even more inadequate if he stultified the war effort of the Allies by playing Achilles in his tent. Indeed there was always more of Odysseus than of Achilles in the Duke of Marlborough.[129]

The Duchess would have done well if, when her quarrel with the Queen was clearly beyond repair, she had resigned her posts about Court. Since she never saw Anne again after the painful scene in April 1710, her political influence was nil, and her retention of the offices and salaries so

strongly coveted by her victorious rivals had at least the appearance of monetary greed, although desire to keep Mrs. Masham from their enjoyment was probably an even stronger motive. Swift in November led the cry against her with a false charge of peculation.* When the clamour against the 'fury,' the 'plague,' 'the worst of women' was at its height after Christmas, the Queen dismissed her from her posts of Groom of the Stole, Mistress of the Robes and Keeper of the Privy Purse, in spite of her husband's somewhat undignified appeals. Anne however was ready to contradict in private the charges of peculation, declaring that 'everybody knows that cheating is not the Duchess of Marlborough's crime.' Harley, although he passively countenanced Swift's attacks, had previously written to Sarah testifying that her careful and unselfish administration had saved great sums for the Crown.

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Indeed, as Sarah showed in papers she drew up on the subject, she had not only stolen nothing and sold no favours, but she had effected reforms and economies in the Royal Household, where wild extravagance by the courtiers and cheating by tradespeople had been the age-long tradition. Sarah was justly indignant at being 'cried about the country for a common cheat and pickpocket' by Swift. Yet she was herself in part to blame. She had held on too long to her posts, and after her fall from favour she had asked and received from the Queen the arrears of an annuity which she had declined nine years before, now amounting to £18,000. On moving from St. James's Palace she was graceless enough to carry off all she had added to the apartments at her own expense, down to the brass locks from the doors. It was an act dictated by anger rather than by avarice, but it seemed to confirm all that her enemies were saying against her.[130]

In bitter rage she established herself in her newly built mansion of Marlborough House over the way. The

* *Examiner*, No. 17 (16 in the reprint), Nov. 23, 1710. In later years he was so absurdly venomous as to accuse Sarah of being Godolphin's mistress, a charge which throws light not on Sarah's conduct but on Swift's mind. See *Memoirs relating to the change in the Queen's Ministry in 1710*, *Prose Works* (ed. T. Scott), V, p. 368. Some editions gracefully substitute 'friend' for 'mistress,' but Mr. Scott's edition is based on the real text.

triumphant Tories kept watch from the upper windows of St. James's Palace to see what bold visitor would dare to approach Marlborough House, and report it to his disadvantage. Alone of the Whigs, the good Lord Cowper was seen to enter the door of the fallen favourite.[131]

Sarah's places at Court were divided between Abigail Masham in the High Tory interest, and the Duchess of Somerset for the moderate Whigs. The Queen still gave expression to her persistent desire to be 'above party,' by keeping Somerset's wife at her side. Harley was glad enough to see a 'moderate' influence behind the throne, but his followers raged against 'Carrots,' as they called the red-haired Duchess. She was the daughter and heir of the last Percy Earl of Northumberland, and, though she was much abused by the High Tories, we have the word of the Tory Lord Dartmouth, who knew her well, that she was much to be preferred to her proud and wayward husband, that she was 'the best bred as well as the best born lady in England,' and that she 'maintained her dignity at court, with great respect to the Queen and sincerity to all others.' Swift observed with chagrin that 'she quickly grew in higher credit with the Queen than all her Ministers together.' To pull her down, he wrote and privately circulated some witty rhymes about 'Carrots,' reviving an old and false story that she had murdered her former husband, Thomas Thynne.

This piece of pleasantry proved the most impolitic act of Swift's life. The influence of the Duchess, added to that of the grave Archbishop of York, easily persuaded the Queen that the author of the *Tale of a Tub* and of brutal lampoons on private persons was unfit for high clerical preferment.* In the midst of a more licentious generation, Anne had something of the standards of Queen Victoria.

* Swift's own account of the causes of his failure to get the preferment he wished for is well known :

> 'By an old [murderess] pursued,
> A crazy prelate and a royal prude ;
> By dull divines, who look with envious eyes
> On ev'ry genius that attempts to rise,
> And, pausing o'er a pipe, with doubtful nod,
> Give hints that poets ne'er believe in God.'

If Bolingbroke had not been a notorious rake and of dubious financial integrity, he might have been her Lord Treasurer ; if Swift's writings had been as pure as his life, if he had been as decent towards his foes as he was true to his friends, she would have made him an English Dean. It was not, perhaps, wholly unjust that his inability to keep his bitter tongue silent even about a woman was the deciding cause why he never obtained the ecclesiastical reward which his political services had, according to the usage of that time, so very amply earned.[132]

According to Harley's reckoning, it was in the beginning of February 1711 that

> there began a separation in the House of Commons, and Mr. Secretary St John began listing a party, and set up for governing the House. Upon this a meeting at dinner was appointed, where the Duke of Shrewsbury, the Earl of Rochester, Lord Dartmouth, Earl Poulett, Robert Harley and others preventing any such attempts, in which Lord Rochester took much pains. This was the last time Robert Harley was ever invited to Mr. Secretary's House.

This direct evidence of Harley's, couched in characteristically clumsy and ungrammatical language, dates the origin of the most famous personal quarrel in our political annals. But intercourse was not broken off, and for another three years St. John occasionally wrote friendly letters to his rival.[133]

The struggle for power between the two chiefs, rendered inevitable by their respective characters, and invited by the differences of temperature in the body of the Tory party, first took the form of a quarrel over the expedition to Quebec, a project on which St. John had set his heart. His motives were various. It had always been the High Tory doctrine that the maritime and colonial sphere was the proper place for England's action in war time, before William diverted it to the mainland of Europe. To win French Canada would redound to the lasting advantage of the English race and to the personal glory of St. John, and would enable the Tories to show themselves no whit less patriotic than

Marlborough and the Whigs, mingling the olives of peace with the laurels of victorious war.

There was indeed a great deal to be said for the taking of Quebec, if only St. John had known how to take it. Unfortunately, though he had served well in the War Office under Marlborough, he had not, when left to himself, the qualities requisite to organize war with success. Nor was the national interest the only one considered in his thoughts on a military problem. It was an essential part of his design against Quebec to employ Mrs. Masham's brother, the notoriously incompetent 'Jack' Hill, in command of the troops, because Abigail's favour would be a key position in the coming struggle with Harley for the headship of the State. It was not on such grounds as these that Pitt chose Wolfe for the same enterprise.

Harley, supported by Rochester, opposed the whole scheme. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, he feared that St. John was planning to relieve his distressed private finances by illicit commissions upon twenty-eight thousand pounds worth of contracts for 'clothes sent to Canada.' Indeed it was only on the express orders of the Queen that Harley consented to pay the money for the contracts, without making those enquiries which he thought the case merited, but which St. John deprecated 'with much passion.' And according to Harley, who considered his rival a rogue, 'upon the return of that expedition, it was discovered that the whole had cost but £7000 and that £21,036 5*s*. was divided' between St. John and his confederates.[134]

The question whether to proceed with the Quebec expedition was hotly dividing the Cabinet when, on March 8, 1711, the rivalry of the two leaders was complicated by the attempt of Guiscard on Harley's life.

Antoine de Guiscard, a French noble, at one time an abbé, had been compelled for misconduct to leave France. He had been employed by the Godolphin Ministry for various services during the war, but had lately fallen on evil times. Harley did not like the seedy rascal and had reduced his pay. St. John had refused to help him and the Queen

would not listen to his petitions. In despair he sold himself back to France and began a trade in British military secrets. His treasonable correspondence was discovered; he was arrested and brought before the Committee of the Privy Council, in the Cockpit at Whitehall.

The principal Cabinet Ministers were present at his examination and at the unexpected scene by which it was interrupted. Guiscard, who had concealed about his person a small penknife which he had picked up in the office, leant over and stabbed Harley in the breast. The frail weapon broke at the first blow, or the second might have proved fatal.

Harley's passive courage, which never forsook him in any crisis of life, kept him the coolest person in the room during the wild minute that followed. Cabinet Ministers tumbled over each other as they flew to the rescue. 'The villain has killed Mr. Harley,' cried St. John, as he ran his rapier into Guiscard's body. Others cried out 'spare him to confess.' The wounds received from the gentlemen's swords were less serious than the pummelling from the State Messengers, who rushed on him and with furious violence 'knocked him down and tied him neck and heels.' Harley, before he himself was carried away, bade them attend to his assailant's hurts.

Three weeks later Guiscard died in Newgate, not of the stabs but of the blows he had received. His wild talk about his intention to kill Marlborough, to kill St. John, was of little account. In his desperate mood he was like a mad dog and might have bit anyone. But already the world of political and personal intrigue was seeking to make the most of the incident. The adherents of St. John put it about that the Secretary had been the intended victim, hoping to steal the credit from the actual sufferer. According to Harley's friends, 'a party was formed against him while he was ill of his wounds.' The preparations for the Quebec expedition were pushed forward fast in his absence, greatly to his chagrin when he heard the news on his sickbed. While he still thought he might die of the fever following on his wound, he vainly sent to his friend Rochester, the President of the Council, his 'dying request' that the Canadian project should be laid aside.[135]

Thanks to Guiscard, St. John secured the Quebec expedition; but the Frenchman had in some respects done the Secretary an ill turn, for Harley's narrow escape turned public and royal sympathy so strongly in his direction that no intrigue and insinuation could for awhile divert it. 'The poor creature lies stabbed in his bed,' wrote Swift, 'by a desperate French Popish villain,' a priest to boot and a spy in enemy pay, who, as the Tories took care to note, had previously been in the favour and employ of the Whig Ministers. The address of the two Houses of Parliament to the Queen declared that Harley 'had drawn upon him the hatred of all abettors of Popery and faction,' and ended with the request, usual on these occasions, that the Queen would 'cause Papists to be removed from London and Westminster,' for the greater safety of herself and her subjects. To the sentimental popular mind Guiscard's attempt was in itself proof of the victim's patriotism, and of the baseness of all his enemies, from whatever quarter they might come. Queen Anne, whose simple heart registered the general feeling of her subjects as surely as Queen Victoria's, seized the moment to bestow on Harley the highest honour and advancement. As soon as he recovered —if indeed it were granted him to recover from the dastard blow—he should be promoted from Chancellor of the Exchequer to Lord Treasurer—'Prime Minister' as some people were beginning to call the post—and should be raised to the Peerage as Earl of Oxford and Earl of Mortimer.[136] Even the Whigs, through Halifax, sent him private messages of support, exhorting him to take firm charge of the government of the country, which tottered while he lay sick. The death of the Emperor Joseph, throwing all Europe into confusion, demanded a strong hand on the helm of State. It seemed Lord Oxford's hour indeed.[137]

Yet if St. John had understood the trend of our constitutional practice better than those around him, he might have felt, instead of the bitter pangs of jealousy, a secret satisfaction at being left alone to lead the Commons. But he had not the foresight of Walpole, who first of our statesmen made the shrewd choice to govern the country from its true seat of power rather than be buried in the dignity

of the Upper House. In Anne's reign no one saw things in that light. And St. John was no wiser than the rest. His one object now was to follow his rival to the Peers and outshine him there.

Already indeed the inconveniences of turning all great men into Lords was being felt in the political world. Swift wrote to Stella on April 22 :

> Another difficulty is that if Mr. Harley be made a Peer, they will want him prodigiously in the House of Commons of which he is the great mover, and after him the Secretary [St John] and hardly anyone else of weight.

Yet the obvious solution, that Harley should remain where he was wanted, never occurred to anyone. He had earned his promotion and no one would deny him the reward.

A circumstance that further enhanced the triumph of the wounded statesman was the confusion that reigned in the House of Commons during his six weeks' absence. Whether St. John was to blame for mishandling the House it is hard to say. But in fact the October Club ran amuck, and, joining with some Whig members ready to fish in troubled waters, threw out the tax on leather, an essential part of the year's supply, proposed on behalf of the Treasury by Lowndes. They had some months before passed the hated four-shilling Land Tax for yet another year of war, but they now rebelled on a minor issue, to vindicate their right to revolt. In vain the Secretary besought his followers to come to heel. The leather tax was thrown out and all was confusion. In the lobbies it was said that money matters must wait till the Chancellor of the Exchequer recovered and came back to the House—though only for the fag end of the session before he departed for ever to higher regions. ' Several politicians,' reported Peter Wentworth, ' that could not endure Mr. Harley, say they see now there's no man the Court employs has address enough to manage the House of Commons but him.'

All this was gall and wormwood to St. John, and doubtless his failure on this occasion made him all the more eager to leave the House of Commons. He was the greatest orator there, but he was no financier, and he had not that

genius for managing his party in the House, which was one of the many ways whereby his professed imitator Disraeli so greatly surpassed him. Meanwhile a Norfolk squire watched from the Opposition benches and smiled his fat, cynical, good-natured smile.[138]

When at the end of April Harley reappeared for his last weeks in the Commons, he took the financial affairs of the country powerfully in hand. It was not enough to provide taxes for the year. A weight of debt lay heavy on the nation, the legacy of the long war. Everywhere, at home and abroad, the soldiers and sailors and public servants were going unpaid. And the proportion of unfunded debt was alarming. The ' lottery ' to induce private persons to lend their money to government was no ultimate solution, though the expedient had been taken over by Harley from Godolphin, and good Tories now hastened to buy lottery tickets as good Whigs had done a year before.*

In these circumstances Harley produced his famous plan to consolidate the floating debt, which was said to have been in part suggested to him by Defoe. A South Sea company, of which Harley himself became Governor, was set up. The creditors of the State were to become its first shareholders. The floating debt of ten millions was assigned to it, with a guaranteed interest at the rate of six per cent. The South Sea Company was not in 1711 the wild-cat scheme it had become by 1720. It represented the trade with South America that Britain would be privileged to drive, free of French and Dutch competition, as soon as the terms of peace designed by the Ministry were secured. ' The Monopoly of the South Sea trade,' writes Mr. W. R. Scott, ' was the bait that tempted people to consent to the funding of their share of certain debts, on an insufficient guarantee of interest which they would not otherwise have entertained.

Thus the finances of the country were based in May 1711 on the assumption that the *Asiento*, or monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America, would be wrested from France as an integral part of the terms of peace ; and

* See p. 46 above. Halifax wrote to Harley approving the terms of his new lottery, but some of the Whigs decried it for Party reasons. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 658, 663 ; *H.M.C. Kenyon*, p. 446.

moreover that no share of it should be conceded to the Dutch, as should have been done according to the Fifteenth Clause of the Barrier Treaty of 1709, which bore the signature of Townshend for Great Britain. Harley's South Sea Act effectually pledged government to make peace, and to make it on these terms at the expense of France and Holland.

On the May morning when Harley revealed the plan to the House of Commons, the Tories were wild with delight. This was better than their unfortunate and lamented Land Bank : here at last would be a solvent and flourishing rival to the Whig Bank of England. The State creditors, however, were less enthusiastic. Till peace was actually signed they liked not the security. But they took it as the best they could get.[139]

Before the end of the month the Earl of Oxford and Mortimer * took his seat in the House of Lords for the last few days of the closing session, from which, contrary to the expectations of his friend Swift, he had emerged in glory, as the Lord Treasurer, with all his enemies and rivals at his feet. It was in part a personal triumph over St. John, in part the triumph of moderate over extreme Toryism. But both victories were due rather to the changeable favour of the Queen and the passing accident of Guiscard's attempt than to the balance of power in the new Parliament. Harley would be a great man indeed if he could long maintain the position he had won, and use it to give Great Britain not only Peace abroad but an undisputed Succession at home.

At his best, there was much that was wise in his policy

* *H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 309. With regard to the double title, Harley's brother Edward tells us : 'The title of Oxford that had so long continued in the family of the de Veres being lately extinct, the Duke of Newcastle proposed that the Chancellor [of the Exchequer, Harley] should take the title, which he said no family had more pretence to than his own and the Chancellor's ; and therefore had mentioned it to the Queen, which he said her Majesty had consented to. This being known, the Earl of Lindsey, encouraged thereto by the Lord Wharton and others, endeavoured to obstruct, and entered his claim before the Duke of Newcastle, then Privy Seal, but his grace was so zealous in this matter that in spite of the caveat he immediately passed the Bill for granting the title for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was so cautious in this matter that, to prevent any slur on her Majesty or himself, he took with it the title of Mortimer, to which family he was allied by blood.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 656. Compare in our day the somewhat similar question about the assumption of the title of Earl of Oxford and Asquith.

and lovable in his character. It was not for nothing that Swift on May 22, 1711, wrote to the two Irish ladies of his friend's triumph :

> This man has grown by persecutions, turnings out and stabbing. What waiting and crowding, and bowing will be at his levee ? Yet, if human nature be capable of so much constancy, I should believe he will be the same man still, hating the necessary forms of grandeur he must keep up. 'Tis late, sirrahs, and I'll go sleep.

To Swift, indeed, as to all his private friends, he always remained 'the same man still.'*

During the summer there was a reconstruction of the Ministry, due partly to Oxford's promotion, and partly to the deaths of Rochester, the Lord President, in May, and of Newcastle, the Lord Privy Seal, in June. Both men had been staunch supporters of Harley against St. John, though Newcastle was a Whig and Rochester a High Tory, and their removal doubly weakened the Treasurer's position. There was some talk of bringing Nottingham, the veteran leader of the High Tories, into office again, but Oxford's friend Lord Poulett warned him :

> If you put Nottingham in and he oversets the balance, you can no more raise the scales again. You know him of no great consequence as he is out, and what service can he do you with the Tories, to make amends for misleading others to be desperate ?

The Duke of Buckinghamshire was therefore made Lord President, as one 'who can never be dangerous.' When next month the Duke of Newcastle died of a hunting accident, the Privy Seal was given to John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol.†

* Pope told the following anecdote to Spence (Spence's *Anecdotes*, ed. 1858, p. 134) : 'Lord Oxford was huddled in his thoughts, and obscure in his manner of delivering them. It was he who advised Rowe [the dramatist] to learn Spanish, when Rowe was asking for an appointment abroad. And after all his pains and expectations, only said "*Then, Sir, I envy you the pleasure of reading Don Quixote in the original.*" ' I have more than once heard this story told as of Lord Palmerston's dealings with an applicant for a consulship. It is thus that stories are fathered on one great man after another down the centuries.

† *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 684. *For list of principal Ministers, see p. 322 below.* The enormous monument erected by filial piety to Newcastle cannot escape attention in the north transept of Westminster Abbey.

Robinson was primarily a diplomat, who had done the country good service in that capacity in Scandinavia. For this he had, in November 1710, been rewarded with the Bishopric of Bristol, by one of the first acts of the Tory Ministers. In the Middle Ages high clerical preferment had been the customary reward of State servants, such as William of Wykeham, and hundreds of other great administrators, including a long line of Chancellors.* After the Reformation the custom had declined, but not disappeared. Charles I had used Bishops in State offices. But the lay nobles regarded the practice with jealousy ; moreover the idea that a Bishop was first and foremost a servant of the Church was growing, though it had not yet attained the complete recognition it enjoys to-day. Encouraged by mediaeval precedent and by the practice of the Martyr King, the Tories regarded the Princes of the Church as the natural rulers of the land—were not so many of them such sad Whigs. On the other hand the more secularly minded Whig laity raised an outcry when the Bishop of Bristol was made Privy Seal in August 1711. 'The Whigs,' Swift gleefully wrote to Stella, 'will fret to death to see a civil employment given to a clergyman. It was a handsome thing in my Lord Treasurer and will bind the Church to him forever. But what care you who is Privy Seal, saucy sluttikins ?'

Next year the Bishop was seconded from his English duties, ecclesiastical and lay, to go as British Plenipotentiary to Utrecht. But the long Whig regime that followed the death of Anne put an end to this overlapping of lay and clerical careers.

The Queen and her new Ministers were at one in raising only High Churchmen to preferment, and in the last four years of the reign much was done to redress the superiority of the Low Churchmen on the Episcopal bench, which William had created. Oxford University was completely in the ascendant, and though Whig Bentley trimmed his

* In a Tory pamphlet of 1711–12, *Reasons of the Clergy being employed in the Government*, defending the Bishop of Bristol's appointment as Lord Privy Seal, these mediaeval precedents are set out at great length.

political sails somewhat, his biographer tells us that in the course of the four years of Tory rule 'scarcely a Cambridge man was preferred.' [140]

If Bentley of Trinity, Cambridge, was in the shade, his old enemies of the Phalaris controversy, the gentlemen Grecians of Christ Church, were in the blaze of Ministerial favour. It may even be said that they were scorched by its beams. Dean Aldrich, who had ruled the House so benevolently ever since the flight of the Popish Dean at the Revolution, died at Christmas 1710, and after seven months' delay the formidable Atterbury was appointed in his stead. There had been no opposition from within the college. The Christ Church men did not know, what they very soon learned, that the great champion of Convocation had, like Bentley, a temper as tyrannical as his talents were superb. For two years Christ Church was in the same case as Trinity, trampled under the hoofs of a contest between old indifference and an arrogant, merciless will to reform. Indeed Atterbury appears to have been more brutal than Bentley himself. On one occasion, at Christmas 1712, one of the Canons, Dr. William Stratford, records that

> He fell on a sudden into a violent passion ; he hopped up to Dr. Gastrell from whom he had not had the least provocation ; he pushed him with great violence several times, and cried 'Get out of my house, you pitiful fellow.' I never saw any man so much under the power of rage ; his face looked black and every joint in him trembled.

When in June 1713 Atterbury departed to be Bishop of Rochester and Dean of Westminster, there was more joy in Christ Church Meadows than lower down the Thames. The Queen had yielded to the pressure of the more violent of her Ministers, but she knew the character of the man she was promoting 'with so much reluctancy' at their request, and told them that she did do only to avoid the worse scandal of making Sacheverell a Bishop as the Lord Chancellor had asked. It was well for the Church that the accession of the House of Hanover prevented a man at once so able and so violent as Atterbury from rising to be Primate of All England.[141]

Except in the case of Atterbury, the Queen followed the

advice of Oxford rather than of Bolingbroke and Harcourt. Therefore, although all the Bishops whom she made between 1710 and 1714 were Tories, most of them were moderates, at least to the extent of being staunch for Hanover. Such a one was Dawes whom in 1713 she chose to succeed her favourite Sharp in the charge of the Province of York, at the advice of the dying Archbishop himself. And so, at the crisis that occurred on the Queen's death, the leaders of the Church, with few exceptions, acted as open and sincere advocates of the Protestant Succession, although the character of the Bench was very much less Whig than on the day that King William was alive and dead.

Apart from a few Crown appointments, like the Christ Church and Trinity Headships, Oxford and Cambridge had ever since the Revolution enjoyed a very complete immunity from Royal and Ministerial interference—an academic liberty that held in it the seeds of intellectual freedom for the whole country, as compared to the practice in many other lands down to our own time. The quarrel of James II with the Universities was constantly in the recollection of the dons, who, whether Whig or Tory, would never, in his daughter's reign, permit the least interference with their internal government by royal mandate or request. Any such attempt was promptly met by expressions of the hope that Queen Anne would 'reflect upon what was done in Magdalen College in her father's time.'[142] Meanwhile politics swayed College elections, as in the case of poor 'Mr. Entwissle's pretensions' to a Fellowship at Brazennose, for the young man was found to be a Whig, 'which was against the present humour of the College.'[143] Such an incident in 1711 is not surprising, but it is a remarkable proof of academic freedom from government control that Oxford was permitted to continue such practices and to remain Tory, and largely Jacobite, under the Hanoverian kings and their Whig governments. Academic and scholastic freedom, which is a necessary condition of intellectual and political freedom, was established as against the State in Eighteenth Century England. In a great part of Europe it does not exist to-day. It is one of the island blessings we have inherited from our Whig and Tory ancestors.

CHAPTER VIII

Marlborough's Last Campaign

The forcing of the *Ne Plus Ultra* Lines, 1711. Bouchain. Marlborough and England.

During the summer of 1711, while secret negotiations were being pushed forward between the English and French Ministers to lay the foundations of a general peace, operations of war were conducted in various parts of the world, the success or failure of which would affect the terms of the bargain to be struck between Torcy and St. John.

In Spain the war was dead. In Italy and on the Rhine it was moribund. But on the Netherlands border of France, where Marlborough and Villars stood opposed, it was likely to show signs of life. And if St. John's venture against Quebec should prove successful, it would change the whole character of the North American settlement to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace.

The Duke was no longer the recognized chief of the Alliance, laying its plans of campaign by land and sea all over the world. Even Britain's fleets and armies were no longer at his disposal. He was only the commander of the British and Dutch forces in the Netherlands, and that on a most uncertain and humiliating tenure. Much to his chagrin, St. John took five British battalions away from him to send to Quebec. Worse still, Eugene, followed soon by the Imperial army, was withdrawn from co-operation with Marlborough and sent to do nothing on the Rhine. The cause of this movement was the death of the Emperor Joseph in April. The approaching choice of his successor by the Electors, though practically certain to alight on his brother Charles, rendered the statesmen of Vienna nervous

lest a revival of the claims of the House of Bavaria should be supported by French arms and intrigue. To ensure the situation, Eugene and his troops were moved back to the German frontier, thereby destroying the last chance that Marlborough could take Paris that year.

He was left with the British and Dutch armies, inferior in numbers to the French mustered against them under Villars. The Marshal, whose natural prudence was fortified by strict orders from Versailles, was content to lie safe behind the famous 'Lines' which he had constructed to stop Marlborough once for all, giving to them the boastful title of the *Ne Plus Ultra*. They ran from Oppy on the head waters of the Canche, through Arras and Bouchain, to Valenciennes. At their western end, where there was no natural defence, earthworks had been erected for a distance of ten miles; but from Arras to Valenciennes protection was afforded by the Scarpe, the Sensée and the Schelde. Their waters had been let out over the countryside, and the few practicable roads across the inundations, like that at Arleux, were guarded by elaborate entrenchments.

Operating from the fortresses he had captured the year before—Aire, St. Venant, Béthune and Douai—Marlborough determined to force the Lines by stratagem and take Bouchain in the face of Villars' superior force. In the political conditions of England and of Europe there could be no question of fighting another Malplaquet, yet that was precisely what he pretended that he would do, deceiving his own army and even his own staff in order the better to deceive the French. He affected a morose ill temper, which, after the treatment accorded to him and his wife in England and the departure of Eugene, would have been natural in any other human being as subject as he was to headaches; but it appalled his officers, who had never before seen his military judgment clouded by passion. Having moved his army across the plain of Lens to the neighbourhood of Aubigny, he threatened there to attack the French army entrenched behind the western end of the Lines. The Dutch and English gloomily prepared to be led to a useless sacrifice, while in the French camp all



rejoiced at the prospect of an assault which they felt certain to repel. Villars withdrew his men from the east end of the Lines to meet the coming attack on the west—as Marlborough had intended he should do.

The night before the expected battle, the scene was suddenly changed. The Allied army received with fresh astonishment the orders to march off in column to the east. For awhile the enemy was ignorant of their departure. Throughout the hours of darkness they re-crossed the plain of Lens, and next morning were met by a message from Marlborough, announcing that the detachment under Generals Cadogan and Hompesch had traversed unopposed the causeway near Arleux, and were in possession of the French Lines : 'the Duke desires the infantry will step out.' And out they stepped, restored to more than all their old confidence in 'this man,' as Captain Parker called him, 'who never led us in any one action that we did not succeed in.' The English humour appreciated the joke of Corporal John's feigned ill-temper the day before, and Villars' very real ill-temper that morning.

Aug. 4–5 1711

> Our army [wrote Captain Parker] continued their march with all the cheerfulness imaginable, not making the least halt, or observing any kind of order ; but every Regiment of Foot brought up as many men as they could, without waiting for any that dropped behind. The enemy also pushed on their march with the utmost expedition, insomuch that it was a perfect race between the two armies. But we having the start of them by some hours, constantly kept ahead of them.

Thirty-six miles were covered in sixteen hours, a marvel of marching for a great army weighted with arms and accoutrements. The English won the race and arrived in time to reinforce Cadogan and Hompesch before Villars could bring back his forces from the west. Without the loss of a single man killed, Marlborough had placed his army on the southern side of the Sensée, within the 'impregnable' Lines, and was standing triumphant between the enemy and Bouchain.

Elated by a success that was in fact due solely to Marlborough's skill, the Dutch Deputies clamoured that he should attack Villars' army as it lay before Cambrai. But

he refused to assail a force at least as large as his own, protected, as he wrote to St. John, by 'hollow roads and precipices of which that country is full,' especially as his own retreat in case of a repulse would be impeded by the rivers he had just passed. His English enemies took up the cry from the Dutch Deputies ; according to some Tory pamphleteers Marlborough was an incompetent coward, who had neglected a chance of defeating Villars. But if, at the suggestion of the Dutch, he had fought a bloody and indecisive action, the same writers would have demanded his impeachment.

The Duke proceeded to reduce Bouchain, in the face of Villars' superior force, which he kept off by lines of contravallation. When this difficult task had been accomplished, scarcely any fortifications except the minor fortress of Le Quesnoy lay between him and the open road to Paris. He was eager to end the year's campaign by taking Le Quesnoy, and wrote for the necessary supplies from Holland and England. But the authorities in both countries failed to answer his demands. He was bitterly surprised at the want of Dutch support ; [144] he was more bitter but less surprised at his failure to secure help from England, whence his emissary, the Earl of Stair, returned empty-handed in September, 'with a bamboozling letter from Lord Oxford.' The fact of the peace negotiations with France had begun to leak out, owing to the detention of St. John's secret emissary, Matthew Prior, by the over-zealous Mayor of Deal, on the watch for spies landing from France.[145]

Bouchain was Marlborough's last siege. It can be said of him, as it cannot be said of Wellington, that he never sat down before a fortress that he did not take. And he never fought a battle that he did not win. The passage of the *Ne Plus Ultra* Lines without the loss of a man was his last and not least glorious victory in the field. He himself regarded that operation, followed by its sequel, the taking of Bouchain, as his professional masterpiece. It is significant that the beautiful Blenheim tapestries, executed by de Vost in Brussels with map-like fidelity according to the careful instructions of Marlborough, show as many as three

scenes dealing with this episode, and only one representing any other event of his military career.*

His success left the Allies in a position to begin next year with a chance of reaching Paris, if they decided to fight the war to the bitter end, and if they chose to concentrate their forces in the Netherlands instead of dispersing them along the Rhine. The Tory Government may indeed have been right in declining further to pursue the uncertain chances of war. And it may even be that a treaty dictated at Versailles, as more treaties than one have since been, would have proved a less good basis for ultimate European security than a negotiated peace. Such questions are decided, in a well-governed country, by the civil power, and it is the just boast of England that ever since 1660 the civil power has been supreme. None the less the soldier who serves the State should be thanked for doing his part, and no English soldier has ever done it better than Marlborough. The thanks he received, on his return home that winter, was to be arraigned in Parliament as a swindler, attacked in the Press as an incompetent and even a cowardly soldier, and driven back, an exile in disgrace, from the island he had saved to the continent he had set free.

* The best account of the forcing of the *Ne Plus Ultra* is to be found in Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, Vol. I, Bk. VI, Chap. X ; Captain Liddell Hart, in *The British Way in Warfare* (p. 233) writes : 'Look at Marlborough, twisting and turning in such bewildering manœuvres that his men thought him mad, until he walked through the Ne Plus Ultra Lines without sacrificing a life, except a few in marching.'

CHAPTER IX

Queen Anne's Empire

The English and French Colonies in America. Deerfield and French-Indian outrages. The Capture of Port Royal, Acadia, 1710. Failure of the Quebec Expedition, 1711. Hudson's Bay. The West Indian Islands. Forts and Factories in Africa. The Slave Trade. The Levant Company. The East India Company. Governor Pitt.

Prior to the reign of George III there was no difference of principle between English Whigs and Tories in Colonial policy. Both regarded the 'Plantations' as markets for our goods, indispensable in days when all countries, as far as possible, excluded foreigners from the trade of their overseas possessions. Colonial commerce was to be encouraged in so far as it supplied England with the articles she herself required, and in so far as it enabled her to sell to the Plantations the products of her own manufacture. Tobacco, naval stores, sugar and furs from beyond the Atlantic should be exchanged for English clothing and hardwares ; but the trade of our American Colonies with foreign lands, and even with the British West Indies, must be circumscribed by Navigation Laws and otherwise, according to the supposed interests of British manufacturers and merchants.

In return, the Colonists had no bad bargain. They obtained, free of charge, naval protection against French fleets and privateers, and some measure of military assistance on land. In time of war, they could not have carried on their external trade at all without the protection of the British fleet. They enjoyed in their Assemblies a degree of self-government to which there was nothing that answered in French or Dutch Colonial life. Freedom was the hallmark of the English settlements. In religion, too, they were allowed to go each their own way. In the Southern

MAP IV



Emery Walker Ltd. sc

Colonies the Church of England flourished ; in the Middle Colonies, round New York, a number of different religions imported from the British Islands and the European Continent prospered side by side ; in New England, Puritanism was established in a spirit at least as monopolistic as Anglicanism in the old country. Louis XIV would allow no Huguenots to go to Canada, but Anglican England rejoiced to see her Puritans take themselves off to Massachusetts and her Roman Catholics to Maryland.

Yet if the principle of colonial liberty was old, so also was the tale of trouble between the mother country and her children. From the reign of Charles I onwards there had been constant friction. The remnant of political authority retained by the Crown in the person of the Governor of each Colony, came into conflict with the spirit of democracy natural to a new world with no feudal or regal backgrounds. Colonial Governors and military and naval officers came out from England with monarchical and aristocratic habits of mind, consonant with the tone of society and politics at home, but not consonant with American conditions. The Colonists sometimes strove to bring the Governors into submission by making their salaries dependent on the votes of the Assemblies. Each of these petty parliaments was singularly unwilling to co-operate even in time of public danger, either with their own Executive, or with the Assembly of any other State. The spirit of freedom too often showed itself in obstructive provincialism.

The commercial restrictions, the most serious grievance from which the Colonists suffered, led to smuggling and law-breaking on an extensive scale, largely from New York, but most of all from seafaring Massachusetts. The revenue laws of the English Parliament had been broken wholesale every year in New England, as well as in the old country, for a century before the tea-chests were emptied into Boston harbour.

Many things made for mutual misunderstanding. Conditions of life and thought in the pioneer Continent of unfelled forests were necessarily very different from those prevailing in the garden of England. The ocean, that still took two months to traverse, kept the two parts of the

Empire in gross ignorance of one another. The traditional animosity between Anglican and Puritan ; the fact that America was even more, and England far less, democratic and equalitarian than is the case to-day ; all these circumstances were preparing the divergent growth of two distinct nations, and no one on either side of the Atlantic then dreamed of the possibility of an Empire that should include two or more distinct nations in an unforced loyalty to the Crown. The Crown, instead, made spasmodic efforts to assert its power and dignity, often through some proud and tactless Governor, with the result of further irritating the most insubordinate communities in the world.

The character and extent of the tension were as clear at the end of Anne's reign as at the beginning of George III's. In 1712 Caleb Heathcote wrote to Lord Oxford :

> It is my opinion that through all North America, for every member of the Church there are thirty or forty Dissenters. In the Colony of Connecticut, until I went there, the prayers of the Church had never been read in all that colony. . . . It very much concerns the nation of Great Britain to take some speedy care of us, and as these countries increase in people, the best of religions, the Church of England, may take root, lest in time the seed of rebellion should spring up. . . . Both in New England and Connecticut the people talk as if they were now in a condition to set up for themselves, and were not now to be governed by England.

Ten years before, Lord Cornbury, Governor of New York, had written to the Council of Trade and Plantations that the Colonists ' hate everybody that owns any subjection to the Queen.' [146]

But Old and New England still had one great interest in common, shared only to a less degree by the Middle and Southern Colonies—defence against France. In time of war, the Colonists, from Maine to Carolina, lived in the shadow of two terrors—the French privateers at sea, and those Indian tribes whom the Jesuits sent to murder and scalp along the English frontier. As early as 1710 a Frenchman in Canada was wise enough to prophesy that if ever the French power in America was annihilated, the English Colonies ' will then unite, shake off the yoke of the English Monarchy and erect themselves into a democracy.' [147]

The British settlements on the mainland of America had increased from an aggregate population of 200,000 in the year of the English Revolution to nearly 350,000 at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, although twenty of those twenty-five years had been spent in war.* There had been no large immigration ; the increase was in the main due to the fertility of the pioneer stocks, in a healthy climate, with good trading facilities and a boundless reserve of cheap land. The total population of French Canada was estimated at 15,000 or less.[148] With such disparity in numbers, a little active co-operation between the various English Colonies, vigorously supported by the mother country, would have enabled them to conquer Quebec during the twenty years' war with Louis XIV, anticipating by two generations the exploit of Wolfe and Pitt,—with what consequences to the history of America and the British Empire it is interesting but idle to speculate.

But neither the Colonies nor the mother country cared enough to take the necessary steps. Indeed, the initiative in the War of the Spanish Succession came rather from the enemy's side. French Canada formed a compact political unit, governed harmoniously by priests and feudal seigneurs, who were popular enough ; and its policy was directed by orders from Versailles which no one thought of questioning. Small as Canada was in number of inhabitants, her concentrated and easily mobilized power tempted her to take the offensive against the ill-organized bulk of her southern neighbour. The English Colonies were jealous of one another and still more jealous of the home government. They were, moreover, as pacific and unmilitary as English-speaking peoples usually show themselves, till roused by insult or stirred by greed. The French trappers and fur-dealers, on the other hand, were accustomed to life in the forests in company with the Indians, and many of them were always ready to go on the war-path with their allies.

In every way the French lived on closer terms with the

* In 1713 the New England Colonies were reckoned at 110,000, the Middle Colonies at 73,000, and the Southern Colonies (Maryland to South Carolina) at 150,000 ; this last figure included a certain number of negroes, but slavery had not yet grown to the proportions it reached during the Eighteenth Century. *C.H.B.E.*, I, pp. 266–267.

red men : the Jesuits had converted numbers of them to a kind of Christianity ; many of the French intermarried with their women. The land-hunger of the white farmer, so fatal to the redskin, was less marked in the French than in the English colonies. The English, therefore, tended either to neglect or to ill use the Indians, except indeed the Quakers acting on Penn's principles, and the agents of the Hudson's Bay Company seeking furs that could only be obtained by the help of the inhabitants of the forest. Generally speaking, the Indian tribes, with the notable exception of the Iroquois or Five Nations, were on the side of the French. And even the Five Nations tended to neutrality during the wars of Queen Anne.[149]

The French Canadians were well aware of the danger of their own position, shut in between the Hudson's Bay Company to the north and the teeming populations of the British colonies to the south. Moreover the English-speaking traders, in dealing with the Indian tribes in time of peace, had the advantage of providing cheaper goods, especially cheaper cloth from home—not to mention cheap liquor which was a great article of commerce in the woods. Fears for their ultimate position in North America drove the French to push forward up the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi, seeking to circumvent the English who otherwise threatened to surround them. The sense of being outnumbered and undersold in time of peace, made them welcome the opportunity of war with England to attack the isolated posts of the Hudson's Bay Company, and to engage the Indian tribes who were still under their influence in operations of savage war against the colonies to the south of Canada.

Under these circumstances, the renewal of war in 1702 brought suffering on the subjects of Queen Anne, in a form calculated to awake their resentment against the French and their Indian allies, and to arouse the fighting spirit latent in the Anglo-American. The christianized tribes under Jesuit control were let loose upon the English frontier to perpetrate the most loathsome cruelties. Crossing the broad screen of primeval forest that still divided the English and French possessions, the redskins kept up, throughout Anne's reign,

spasmodic attacks on isolated points along the whole frontier, as far south as the Carolinas,[150] but most of all against outlying New England farmsteads, particularly the widely scattered settlements that lay between the forest and the shore of Maine.

In these raids horrible atrocities took place, as for instance in the destruction of Deerfield in the outlying parts of Massachusetts, in 1704, perpetrated by 300 Indian and 100 French and half-breeds, when English women and children were massacred, and some of the male victims were scalded or boiled to death to amuse the savages. The survivors were carried off to Canada to be brought up there as Roman Catholics, their conversion being accomplished by the cruel methods usually employed by Gallican propaganda under Louis XIV. These doings had an effect easy to imagine on the minds of the farming communities of Puritan New England.*

The cry arose for vengeance. But it was not easy to be revenged on Canada, whence the offence came, for Quebec was hid in the depths of the guardian wilderness. But, since the Bostonians held their own seas, vicarious retribution might be exacted from Acadia. Its capital, Port Royal, was moreover obnoxious as ' the nest of spoilers ' whence privateers issued forth against Boston's shipping ; in 1707 the militia regiments of New England went by sea to take it. But the attack of the landing party was mismanaged. In the words of Parkman, while ' Canadian feudalism developed good partisan leaders,' such at this period ' was rarely the case with New England Democracy.' [151]

After this repulse of their unaided efforts, the Colonists applied to the mother country for help. Marlborough's scheme of war had been to defeat France in Europe, and to establish British naval control of the Mediterranean as the basis of maritime supremacy throughout the world. Colonial expeditions did not attract him, as they attracted the High Tory statesmen. He believed that if England held the seas, and if France were not allowed to dominate Europe, French Canada would be a nut in England's cheek,

* *Parkman* (*Half Century of Conflict*, Chaps. I–V) gives full details, for which see also *C.S.P., America 1710–11*, pp. 73–77.

to be cracked whenever she wished.* In the main he was right, but it is possible to carry even a right theory too far, and in the last years of the victorious war there was ample opportunity to do something direct for the English overseas.

Early in 1710 a Colonial deputation arrived in London, accompanied by four Mohawk Chiefs of the friendly 'Five Nations,' whose strange and romantic appearance took the fancy of the Town. It was agreed that Indians were fine fellows 'when not poisoned by priests.' The Archbishop of Canterbury presented each chief with a Bible. They were fêted at the Queen's expense, and followed everywhere by wondering crowds. After the performance of *Macbeth* at the Haymarket, a social function of the highest dignity and importance, an Epilogue was spoken in their honour, promising them that the Five Nations should be

> Secured against the threats of France and Rome.

What the silent red men made of it all, is not on record! But we may suppose they went back vaguely impressed with the reserves of English power; the Five Nations remained loyal, thereby keeping open the land route for the attack on Montreal and Quebec.†

Their visit had been the success of the season in London, and the consequent fashionable interest in things American was not without its effect on the policy of government. The year before, Ministers had promised much but done nothing for the Colonists.[152] But in 1710 one of the last acts of Godolphin's government before it fell was to dispatch an expedition to North America. The result was that in September four hundred British marines and fifteen hundred New Englanders landed at Port Royal, and easily captured its small stone fort, guarded by a few hundred men. Acadia thus passed into English hands and was re-christened Nova Scotia, while Port Royal became Annapolis, in honour of the Queen.

Thus, belatedly, but effectively, the Whig government

* I notice that in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (I, pp. 326–327, 522–524) the view is taken that Marlborough's policy was right in the interest of the Empire.

† It was only in 1722 that the Five Nations became Six Nations, as thereafter they were called.

had taken the step which caused St. John to secure Nova Scotia at the Treaty of Utrecht. Sunderland had also, with the connivance of Marlborough, laid plans for the taking of Quebec; but they ended by leaving that more difficult task to their successors.[153]

It was under these circumstances that, in January 1711, St. John, as the new Secretary of State, revived his predecessor's idea of an expedition to sail up the St. Lawrence against Quebec. He first attempted to persuade Harley to co-operate:

> Pray do me the justice [he wrote] to believe that I am not light or whimsical in this project. It will certainly succeed if the secret is preserved, and if it succeeds you will have done more service to Britain in half a year than the Ministers who went before you did in all their administration.[154]

But Harley was obdurate; the quarrel began next month between the hare and the tortoise of the new government, and St. John would never have succeeded in launching the Canadian expedition at all, had not his rival been laid up for several weeks by the wound dealt him by Guiscard.*

St. John chose Sir Hovenden Walker to command the squadron. He confided the secret of its destination to him but not to the Lords of the Admiralty, whom, indeed, he took elaborate pains to deceive. His object in such close secrecy was probably twofold, to prevent leakage to France through clerks and underlings, as had happened in the case of Greg; and to ensure that 'service opposition' from the Admiralty should not put a stop to the expedition altogether, as it well might in the divided state of opinion in the Cabinet. He may possibly have been right, but it was only natural that, after disaster had overtaken Walker in the St. Lawrence, the Sea-Lords disclaimed all responsibility for the result of counsels to which they had been kept strangers.†

* See p. 120 above.

† *Burchett*, p. 778, writes: 'The design on which they were bound was very industriously hid from them [the Lords of the Admiralty] as may appear by some letters to Sir Hovenden Walker before he sailed from Spithead, by which a *certain person* seemed to value himself very much that a design of this nature was kept a secret from the Admiralty, who, had they been consulted, would not, I am apt to think, have advised the sending of ships of 80 and 70 guns to Quebec, since the

Unfortunately he had chosen the wrong Admiral in Walker, and it therefore mattered the less that he had also chosen the wrong General in Hill ; for Walker's seamanship deprived Hill of the opportunity of displaying his military incompetence. St. John, however, succeeded in one of his main objects in the business : he laid the foundations of his political alliance with Abigail Masham, the Queen's favourite and General Hill's sister. From this moment she began to turn against her former patron Harley, because he opposed the expedition which St. John had selected her brother to command.[155]

Walker and Hill reached Boston near the end of June. The arrival of so considerable a military and naval force aroused the warlike enthusiasm of the Colonists to a point never reached at any other moment of the war. Not only New England and the Five Nations did their part, but the Middle Colonies sent their quotas of men, stores and ships. When a French emissary from Canada came to Boston to persuade the men of Massachusetts that the armament was intended by Britain to take away their provincial liberties, no one was in the mood to listen.

Yet even during this summer of enthusiasm and co-operation, mutual ill-will made itself felt. The Queen's officers complained bitterly that hundreds of their men were lured to desert by farmers in want of hands, and Colonel King, the Quartermaster, wrote of ' the ill-nature and sourness of these people,' whose ' government, doctrine and manners, whose hypocrisy and canting are insupportable.' Colonial opinion of the British was scarcely more flattering.

At length, after long delays and much quarrelling, two expeditions against French Canada started, late in the season of 1711. The land armament of Provincial Militia under

navigation up the river St. Lawrence was generally esteemed to be very dangerous.' This passage has led modern historians (*e.g.* Professor Callender in *Leake*, II, p. 365 note) to suppose that the *certain person* was Harley, always so secretive. But in fact it was St. John, as is clear from his letter of April 21 to Walker ' before he sailed from Spithead,' in which St. John says that ' *the Admiralty will be led into the error we desire* ' as to the destination of the squadron, if certain deceptive measures are taken. *Walker*, p. 179 ; see also *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 233. It is only fair to St. John and Walker to add that in 1759 Saunders took a ninety- and an eighty-gun ship up the St. Lawrence to Quebec. I am much obliged to Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond for advices and information.

the able command of Colonel Nicholson, and well supported by the Indians of the Five Nations, took the land route by Albany for Montreal ; while the British ships were to convey the British soldiers and more Colonials up the St. Lawrence to Quebec. If they had got so far, even Hill could scarcely have failed to take the town, which was defended by only a few hundred local militia, very different from Montcalm's army of 15,000 men with which Wolfe had to deal on a later day.[156]

But Admiral Walker was incapable of reaching his destination. He had left Boston without securing expert pilots for the St. Lawrence, and he neglected to use the services of Vetch, the Colonial whose local knowledge was best able to supply the want of professional guidance. In the broad mouth of the river, Walker lost his way in a fog, and according to his own account thought he was off the South shore when he was really off the North shore. He consequently gave the wrong orders, and when a storm arose, eight transports were cast on the rocks and about 700 soldiers were drowned.

Aug. 22–23 1711

There was still an ample margin of survivors to take Quebec if they could get there. But the catastrophe had shaken the nerves of the Admiral and his Captains, who had no confidence in their own powers of navigating the St. Lawrence ; in spite of Vetch's offer to guide them, they decided forthwith to abandon the enterprise. They were afraid that, even if they reached their destination, the French would desert Quebec and leave them to starve there during the Canadian winter on the insufficient supply of food that they had brought. Perhaps the best thing these ill-provided and incompetent people could do was to turn back. Such at least was their decision.

When Nicholson's land expedition heard that the fleet had returned, they also retreated, for no one supposed they could reduce Canada by their unaided strength.

A disappointment so complete, after such high hopes and earnest endeavours, had the worst effect on the relations of America and England. Contrary to their usual custom, the various Colonies had on this grand occasion united their efforts, and given of their best in order to co-operate with

the mother country, and the result had been the most disgraceful of failures. To make matters worse, the British naval and military officers had not concealed their contempt for the Provincials, yet proved themselves to be wanting in all the arts of leadership. The good effects on the Colonial mind of the taking of Acadia the year before were obliterated. The Empire had not gained much by the substitution of Tory direct action for the Whig method of winning America in Europe.[157]

The capture of Acadia and the failure to reach Quebec were laying down the map of the North American section in the Treaty of Utrecht. The terms of peace to be made in Europe would also decide the fate of the English Hudson's Bay Company, which traded in furs in the inhospitable regions to the north of French Canada, ' in such a climate as only to be navigable once a year.' The Company had fared ill at the settlement of Ryswick, and its servants, in their isolated geographical position, were much at the mercy of the foe. Unless St. John secured them a better and more definite boundary under the new Treaty, the French would soon complete the process of seizing their last forts and extinguishing what was left of their trade. Throughout the War of Spanish Succession, the Company had been constantly petitioning successive English Ministries not to forget them at the Peace. And in fact they were not forgotten.[158]

The dozen years of war had done nothing to alter the allegiance of any of the West Indian Islands, except St. Kitts. Its sovereignty had hitherto been disputed between the English and French, but in the summer of 1702 it had been seized by the spirited action of the English section of its inhabitants and by a small force from the neighbouring Leeward Islands under their Governor, Christopher Codrington, who bluffed a timid French Major into capitulation.[159] Codrington was less fortunate in his attempt next year to seize Guadeloupe, where he failed for want of the proper kind of ships and men from home requisite for such an enterprise.[160] Otherwise the war in the West Indies had been confined to privateering, convoying, and

waylaying of merchantmen or at most of Treasure Fleets. The attacks on islands had seldom been more than buccaneering raids, as when in 1708 a party of French landed in the thinly inhabited Bahamas and tortured English women to make them reveal where they had hidden their wealth.[161]

At the end of the Queen's reign, the British West Indian Islands were reckoned to contain 200,000 inhabitants ; but of these three-quarters were negroes, and the proportion was growing larger with the increase of British slave-trading from Africa.[162] Sometimes, indeed, white men and women were still sold into servitude, either as criminals condemned by the law, or as victims of crimping and kidnapping, for which Bristol had an evil reputation. But the worst days of these practices were over. In 1713 died Lord Carberry, Governor of Jamaica in the reign of Charles II, of whom it was reported that he had taken out with him ' many shauntlemen of Wales, and sold 'em there as slaves, as he did his chaplain, to a blacksmith.' [163]

The more closely settled of the West Indian Islands were not unprosperous even in wartime, and in time of peace would, with their tobacco and sugar plantations, be a source of ever-increasing wealth to their white inhabitants and to plantation-owners and merchants in England. But the islanders depended, for supplies necessary to their very existence, on trade with the American or European continents, and therefore on the British fleet.[164]

Jamaica was the emporium of commerce for the islands and for the smuggling and the legitimate trade with the mainland Colonies both of England and of Spain. Above all, it was the *entrepôt* of the slave trade from Africa, in which all English and Spanish America, from Virginia southwards, was increasingly interested. The Seventeenth Century had felt few scruples about the trade in human beings, but had not possessed shipping enough to practise it on a vast scale. The Eighteenth Century, scarcely more troubled in conscience until its later years, was better equipped for the operation, and England's share in the ever-expanding wickedness was an exact measure of her supremacy in maritime commerce.

In Anne's reign the slave trade was already of the first

political and international importance. In 1713 the Mayor of Bristol declared, on behalf of his fellow-citizens, that it was 'the great support of our people,' and Liverpool, Plymouth, London and other ports, had each its group of traders increasingly engaged in the traffic.

The settlement of the Asiento at Utrecht would decide whether English, French or Dutch should have the legal right to supply Spanish America with negroes. And the Parliamentary dispute that raged round the quarrel between the English Africa Company and the free-traders or 'interlopers' from the English ports, turned on the great question of Imperial policy, how best the Colonies could be supplied with cheap slaves. The interlopers, backed by Colonial opinion, declared that a Joint Stock Company, if its monopoly were enforced, would raise the price of slaves from £15 to £50 a head and ruin the Plantations. The Company replied that nothing short of the profits of monopoly could defray the expenses of its forts, Cape Coast Castle of seventy guns on the Gold Coast, and Fort James on an island of the Gambia River. Parliament, as umpire, had decided in William's reign to throw open the African trade, but to exact a ten per cent. duty on all goods, to compensate the Africa Company for the expense of its forts and armaments. The duty was not easily levied and proved insufficient. During the wars of Anne, the Company's business was ruined, partly by the competition of the English interlopers, partly by the raids of enemy privateers.

Their French rivals, trading in the Senegal hard by, were, however, scarcely in better case. The English and French Africa Companies, both in desperate financial straits, realized that they had common interests against interlopers and privateers. They therefore made a gentleman's agreement

1705 to live at peace with one another during the war waged by their respective nations, and to 'assist each other against the negroes and whomsoever else should disturb their trade.' This private Treaty, so strange to our present-day notions of State omnipotence, was faithfully observed by the contracting parties, but it could not save their ships and settlements from attack by those whom the Treaty did not bind. On three several occasions French privateers

took Fort James on the Gambia River and held it to ransom paid in gold and negroes. After 1709 the Company, in despair, left the fort derelict, and practically retired from business, abandoning the field to the French traders and to the English 'ten per cent. men' as the interlopers were then called.

Its prospects were, however, suddenly revived by the government's Asiento policy, when the managers of Harley's new South Sea Company* undertook to buy from the Africa Company all the slaves that they hoped to sell in South America under the monopoly rights secured by the Treaty of Utrecht.

So the Joint Stock Africa Company and the free-traders continued their nefarious work in rivalry, after Anne's death as before. Both parties employed the same general method of obtaining slaves. They bought them on the coast from native kings, who drove down the long files of captives from the dark forests of the interior; by what cruelties and wars the victims had been there obtained, no white man had the curiosity to enquire. Then followed a period of imprisonment in a stockade on the coast, under a guard of white sailors armed with cutlasses, waiting for a ship; and after that the horrors of the 'middle passage' across the Atlantic —living human bodies lying crushed side by side in the pitch-dark, tossing dungeon. As the long weeks of the voyage drew on, many died and were thrown overboard like ballast. It was the same method in the reign of Anne as in the time of Wilberforce, only there was as yet no public man to denounce it as wrong. Posterity reads such a piece of news as this with different feelings from those with which the diarist recorded it in March 1702:

> Our merchants have letters from Barbadoes, that the *Betty* frigate is arrived there from Guinea with negroes; that in this passage the negroes mutinied, killed the captain and all the ship's crew except seven, who with their scimitars defended themselves, and forced the negroes into the hold, and brought the ship into Bridgetown.[165]

In January 1709 the Council of Trade and Plantations was able to make the following report to the House of

* See p. 123 above. *Add. MSS.* 25495, ff. 185–186 on the co-operation of the Companies in 1714.

Commons on the excellent effect of opening the trade, in spite of the outcry of the Africa Company :

> By the Company's own account of the negro trade from 1680 to 1688 in 9 years and in a time of peace, there were but 43,396 negroes delivered in the plantations ; whereas 'tis computed by the separate traders that, since the opening of the trade, within the like term of years, notwithstanding the present war, there have been imported by the separate traders into those parts, 160,950 negroes.

Such are the blessings of an open trade.[166]

In England herself, though it was long since white people had been treated as slaves, neither law nor current morality forbade the ownership of blacks. Fashionable ladies had each their negro page, whose thick lips and swarthy, grinning features made an admirable foil to Beauty. And some elegant gentlemen had their black body-servants. ' Sambo ' wore an ornamental collar of servitude, and if he ran away, his master or mistress advertised for him in the newspapers as for lost property. There is no evidence that this small class of domestic slaves was ill-treated, and fortunately no one sought to introduce coloured labour into the island wholesale for purposes of industry or agriculture.

The Africa Company had been driven to the verge of ruin by the free-traders, but the Hudson's Bay, the Levant and the East India Companies each maintained the privileged position its needs required. Experience had persuaded Parliament and public opinion that merchants trading on distant coasts, beset by foreign foes and rivals from Europe, and in face of unreliable native potentates, could thrive only if they were closely organized in a Company with a strong policy of its own, and with its own stations, armaments and administrators in parts of the world beyond the reach of the arm of the English state.*

* A distinguished economic historian has recently written on the subject of these great Companies : ' Is it unreasonable to suggest that the distant foreign trade, so dear to the mercantilist, and, because of its privileges, so suspect to Adam Smith, was conducive on the whole to business strength, Imperial growth and general liberty ? To business strength because men had to unite closely if they were to trade in distant parts at all : so that in foreign trade was learned the potentiality of the business corporation which now dominates all business, domestic and foreign. To imperial growth, because it staked out distant claims and thus permitted the characteristic growth of Great Britain from without inwards, from commercial world-marketing to industrial production on British soil. To economic liberty, because it was staged on the high seas which are the breath of freedom, and such trade least of all threatened the political liberties of the British people.' *C. R. Fay, The Mortality of Empires.* The Levant Company was a ' regulated ' not a joint stock company, but these remarks may apply to it as well as to the Hudson's Bay and East India Companies. See *Lipson, Economic History of England*, II, pp. 339–352 on its constitution.

The Levant Company, protected by Marlborough's naval policy in the Mediterranean, had in the course of the war become by far the most important European influence in Turkey and the Near East. When in 1712 the Tory Parliament charged our Dutch Allies with having failed to supply their full quota of warships in the Mediterranean, our former rivals in trade replied that the commerce of those parts had passed into our hands during the war, that it therefore was only fair that we should bear the chief burden of protecting it against the French.[167] Opinion at home highly approved of the Turkish trade, because the Sultan's subjects, unlike those of the Great Mogul, were purchasers and wearers of English cloth.

It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Queen Anne's government was represented in the Turkish dominions by the Levant Company. Her Ambassador to the Porte was paid and, in part, chosen by the merchants. He spent nearly all his time over the Company's business, presiding in its Court at Pera in Constantinople, and settling the disputes of the merchants with one another and with their native customers. The colonies of English merchants at Angora, Alexandria, Smyrna and Aleppo all paid ' consolage ' towards the Company's expenses, and recognized the jurisdiction of its Court at Pera. The close union of our Levant traders under the shield of the Ambassador, and the knowledge that the British Squadron was within call, won them excellent treatment from the Turks. Neither did there occur, during Queen Anne's wars, any such failure of the convoy system, as the loss of the ' Smyrna Fleet ' to the French which had darkened the year 1693 in the lasting memory of the City of London.[168]

The Levant merchant lived a life more remote from home news and interests than that of the Anglo-Indian to-day.

His lot was in many respects enviable. He belonged to a proud and privileged community, growing rich fast without fear of the envy of pashas and beys, of whom every other wealthy man lived in terror, but who themselves courted the English merchants. Letters written home by these exiles and their wives give an attractive picture of social intercourse with the Turkish ruling class and of many other amenities in life. At Smyrna they coursed hares ' with an excellent pack of hounds.' Just after the death of Queen Anne, Nathaniel Harley, who had spent the best part of his days at Aleppo, wrote thence a capital uncle's letter to his nephew, whom he wished to attract out to the Levant. After an account of a strange sort of hunting, the ' pursute of antilopes or gazels ' with hawks, he proceeds :

> If that I have been so long recounting to you doesn't please you, my next shall bring you a journal of hunting the wild boar, which with other sports we have here, I fancy you would like better than going to Westminster School. If you'l undertake the voyage and come hither, I'l promise that besides the sports I have mentioned already, you shall go a hunting twise a week, hawking and coursing as often as you will. And what is more you shall always ride such horses as my lord Harley's dun. Now, Robin, this is worth thinking on.[169]

Whereas the prestige of the Levant Company in face of the Turks derived from the presence of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, the East India Company had to fend for itself. No Queen's ship rounded the Cape. No English regiment yet boasted the title 'Primus in Indis.' It was the Company's own East Indiamen of all sizes, from first-rates to frigates, who defended the goods they carried, doing battle, not always with success, against the French privateers who swarmed in the Eastern seas, and the pirates of all nations not excluding our own, who lived undisturbed in Madagascar, sole European occupants of that great island that lay along the flank of the route to India.*

* In January 1703 Governor Pitt wrote from Madras : ' Our seas are here infested with pirates and French privateers. . . . Two French men of war met the *Canterbury* and *Chambers* frigate in the Strait of Malacca coming from China. The former they took and brought with them to Pollecherry [*sic*], the other narrowly escaped by running in among the sands. There are two more St. Malo's men [French privateers] at Canton, which they say the Dutch are looking out for.' *Add. MSS.* 28093, f. 144. Governor Pitt also complains in 1702 of piracies by Arab ships, and of ' a hellish contrivance of some of our own countrymen ' in attributing these piracies to the Old Company's own servants. *India Office MSS. Pitt's Diary, Fort St. George* 12, f. 15. For a very curious account of the Madagascar pirates and their unchallenged sovereignty in that island see *Add. MSS.* 17677 *WWW*, ff. 659–661. *Wheeler*, II, pp. 22–27, quotes a narrative of a typical encounter with pirates, one of the pirate vessels being the *Speedy Return*, under Bowen, the pirate who had really taken her, not poor Green (see *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 251). And see *Hamilton*, I, p. 236, for another fight with pirates in those seas.

During the wars of Anne, the French confined their attacks on the East India Company to the sea, where the Dutch Company's ships now acted as our Allies. No Dupleix had yet conceived the idea of intriguing with Indian Princes for the destruction of the English settlements.

Although the French troubled them little on land even in time of war, the Company's servants were in perpetual danger from the whims and the greed of Indian rulers. The long decay of the Mogul Empire, in which process the death of Aurungzebe in 1707 marked an important step, was already exposing the English traders to the dangers of the anarchy that eventually provoked them to conquer the Peninsula.

As yet they had no such thought in their hearts. But there were already among them men who would not ' let their beards be shook with danger and think it passtime.' Thomas Pitt was now the governor of Madras. Once he had been the most notorious of interlopers, ' that roughling immoral man ' as Josiah Child had called him. Now he was the great support of the Old Company's interests—a classic example of ' poacher turned gamekeeper.' In the same year 1702 when he bought his famous ' Pitt ' diamond from the mines of Golconda, he successfully defended Fort St. George containing the European part of the town of Madras, against the plundering Nabob of the Carnatic, whom he had defied to do his worst rather than pay him extravagant blackmail.

By the Treaty that ended the four months' siege, Madras was to receive full renewal of its trading privileges and restoration for the wrongs done, in return for the paltry sum of twenty thousand rupees, hardly a tenth of the amount

which Pitt had just given for his diamond. Next year he proceeded to throw a defensive wall round the 'Black town' of Madras, the great settlement outside Fort St. George, where 80,000 Indians dwelt under the Company's strong and tolerant rule. It was the English policy to attract craftsmen and manufacturers to live under their protection and ply their trades at the door of the European market.[170]

The similar settlements at Bombay and Calcutta were essential, in the disturbed state of India, for the conduct of the Company's business in safety and quiet. That was the sole object. The English traders never dreamed of territorial expansion or political power. Nevertheless these enlarged fortresses and the settlements which they protected held the seed of future British rule throughout the Peninsula. The government of a considerable population was already being carried on within these narrow limits of space. In a petition of 1703 against a new tax, the Indian inhabitants of Madras declared

> Ourselves and fathers before us have long experienced the quiet and moderate English government and hope our children's children may enjoy the like.[171]

And in dealing with the Indian Princes around, the English were learning the arts of war and diplomacy, two generations before Clive and Hastings.

The Company not only had its armed forts and territories at Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and York Fort in the island of Sumatra, and St. Helena as port of call for ships on the voyage, but it possessed about forty lesser 'factories' in towns governed by Indian rulers. Many of them lay along the coast, but some were as far up-country as Agra and Lucknow.[172] In these remote stations the English often had stirring adventures in defence of their property and trade. We are told how manfully young Mr. Horden dealt with a Nabob who had burst into one of the factories at the head of an armed force. During an hour's palaver, Horden kept the muzzle of his piece at the breast of the Indian Prince, while one of the Prince's soldiers kept his

dagger against the English factor's back. From this situation, worthy of Sheridan's *Critic*, the Nabob was the first to withdraw.[173]

The Company's employees were paid little enough for such strenuous service. Governor Pitt drew £200 salary and £100 gratuity, out of which he certainly could not have found the 48,000 pagodas that he gave for his famous diamond! The humbler 'writers,' of whom there were thirteen in Fort St. George alone, drew £5 each a year, though, according to the Chaplain of Calcutta, 'a man can't lodge and board here tolerably well under forty rupees a month, i.e. five pounds.' But the Company's servants, high and low, borrowed money and traded, soon accumulating large sums in this way through their knowledge and opportunities as men on the spot.[174]

These gains were won at a terrible risk from the climate and conditions of life. The founders of British power in India were a gallant and light-hearted race. 'Two monsoons are the age of a man,' they used to say at Bombay, and one of their number described the English cemetery there as 'a cormorant paunch never satisfied with the daily supplies it receives.' In 1704 there were left alive in Bombay only eight covenanted servants of the Company, and forty English soldiers in ragged red coats, 'looking more like Bandites in the woods than military men.' Several hundred Sepoys, however, went through their exercises once a month 'with as much grace as a cow might curtsey.' In the Company's settlements in Sumatra, half the English new-comers died within two or three years of arrival.

The Anglo-Indian career was indeed a gamble with death. Riches were commonly the reward of the survivors, but death took a heavy toll of a society of Europeans who had not yet adapted their manner of life to oriental conditions, who drank as they were accustomed to drink in England, and whose masterful tempers, aggravated by climate and ill-health, led them into fierce and frequent and fatal duels. No age or rank was immune from these feuds, from the calf-jealousies of the youngest 'writers' up to the hectoring of Governor Pitt, who once threatened to 'whip

and hang ' a member of Council at Madras who had gone into opposition. His enemies retaliated by circulating false stories about the manner in which he had acquired the Pitt diamond—stories that long afterwards suggested to Wilkie Collins the romantic Indian setting of the ' Moonstone.'

Yet above the surface of these feuds, the society in the European town protected by the walls of Fort St. George presented the appearance of a patriarchal establishment. All the English in the Company's pay sat at the Governor's table and were served off his massive silver plate. And on Sundays the Council marched behind their chief to church, whatever may have been their thoughts as they surveyed his broad shoulders from behind.

Joseph Collet, successively Governor of York Fort in Sumatra, and of Madras, was less unpopular and scarcely less able as a Company's officer than Pitt. He was a Baptist, shut out therefore from office at home ; in the East he became a philosophic Unitarian, and prohibited the use of the reading of the Athanasian Creed in his territories, as he thought it beneath the dignity of the Governor to be damned by his chaplain.[175]

There was already a colony of English women in India. Out of thirty-eight English in the Company's pay in the town of Fort St. George in 1702, as many as seven were married to English wives and only two to Indians ; there were, besides, ten young English women unmarried, and as many as fifteen English widows—cruel testimony to the chances of life in that gallant pioneer community. Of the Englishmen not in the direct employ of the Company, a larger proportion were married to Indians. And many no doubt were, in the expressive language of Bardolph, ' better accommodated than with a wife.' [176]

Madras was a centre of mercantile business with other ports and capitals in the East, carried on sometimes in the ' country ships '—as the English called the craft plying the coastal trade—and sometimes in the ' Europe ships ' of the Company. The ventures of merchantmen to the Persian Gulf and China, when sent out from Madras, Calcutta or Bombay, instead of from England, gave a great opportunity for the private trading that enriched the servants of the

Company in the East.* A trade with Burmah was beginning on these lines. The trade with China was already important, though it was confined to Amoy and Canton. It suffered, indeed, under certain disadvantages, for the Chinese did not want cloth but only silver or lead, and the brutality of the Manchu conquerors and the ' monopoly and tyranny of the Mandarins ' would not allow the Chinese merchants a chance to do fair business. But even on such terms there was profit to be made by the English in the purchase of silks, tea, china and ' lacquered ware,' for all of which there was a rising fashionable demand in Europe.[177]

The amalgamation of the Old and New East India Companies, agreed on in principle in 1702, was put into practical working order in the course of the next seven years, partly by the good offices of Godolphin and Sunderland. Thus was brought to an end the worst of the feuds that ever divided the English trading to India, which had risen so high in the reign of William as to endanger the whole future of British connection with the East.†

The settlement of this great quarrel did away with a leading motive for Parliamentary and pamphleteering attacks on the nature of the Indian trade. Public opinion, during the Queen's reign, became more and more indifferent to the complaint that English cloth could with great difficulty be sold in the Far East, and that bullion had to be exported there in large quantities in order to purchase the goods.

The demand for Indian and Chinese wares had indeed become so constant and insistent at home, that men listened more readily to the new economic theories in defence of the much abused trade. Less and less attention was paid to the

* For example, in February 1702, Governor Pitt issued the following proclamation (*India Office MSS. Fort St. George* 12, ff. 47–49) : ' We being credibly informed of Pyrats being abroad and that they have taken several ships, and whereas all country ships are of little force, so that without great difficulty they become a prey to 'em, wherefore to prevent any misfortune of that nature to the inhabitants of Madras, we hereby give notice that if silver is favourable we intend two Europe ships well manned and gunned this season to Amoy and Canton.'

† See *Blenheim*, p. 164. ' The existence of the two rival Companies would have jeopardized the interests of Englishmen in the East. The disunion that resulted, and the discreditable quarrels that took place between 1698–1700 would, if carried further, have led to the expulsion of the English from India.' *Khan*, p. 244.

outcry of the English clothiers and the Levant Company, who in 1702 told a Committee of the House of Lords that ' if silk be brought from India where it is bought cheap with bullion, it will ruin our trade of Turkey whither we send cloth for their silk.' The silk-wearing, tea-drinking, china-using public gave ear instead to the comfortable doctrine of Charles Davenant, who declared that the wealth coming into England as a consequence of trade with the Orient much more than compensated her for the bullion she exported, and that even in gold and silver she was gaining on the balance. A great part of the Eastern goods that the Company shipped to the Thames was re-exported and sold on the Continent at enhanced prices. Even before Anne came to the throne, Davenant had persuaded himself that the East Indian trade enriched England almost as much as the trade with America, and more than the European, African and Levant trades put together.*

In October 1702 Governor Pitt sent home the great diamond that he had recently bought, committing it to the charge of his son Robert, whom thenceforward he pestered with minute instructions by every homeward-bound ship, about the safe-keeping of ' my great concern.'

You will see what I have wrote in my joint letter, that the chest shall stand in the Bank of England. That of blowing open or carrying away the chest may be done, but I hope my sons would not let the actors of it survive such a villainy. And I wish in showing of it (which I would have you withstand without good reasons there be

* The following interesting table represents calculations made by Davenant at the end of William's reign :

' To make up the two millions national profit by trade,

The Plantation Trade may bring in	£600,000
The East India Trade may bring in	£500,000
The European, African and Levant trade, by our own product, may bring in	£600,000
Ditto, by re-exports of Plantation goods . . .	£120,000
Ditto, by re-exports of East India goods . . .	£180,000
	£2,000,000.'

See *Davenant*, II, p. 18, and that volume *passim*, pp. 1–162. See also *Khan*, Chap. IV ; and Defoe, *English Tradesman* (1727), II, ii, pp. 23–24 ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), p. 73.

for it) you see there be no trick played to slide it away and put a christiall in the room of the same magnitude. I charge you that you never take the stone out upon any occasion but that you yourself weigh it when you take it out and when you put it in, and that it never be out of your eye as much as in shifting one hand to another.

When in 1710 Thomas Pitt returned to Europe, Robert must have been divided between dread of the near approach of his redoubtable mentor, and relief that he would no longer be personally responsible for the guardianship of the ' Pitt diamond.' *

Robert was an inadequate son for such a father, but in 1708 he had himself become father of a yet greater son. William Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham, inherited more qualities and opinions from his grandfather than from his parents. Robert was a mild and humble Tory, intervening in the family line between two most formidable Whigs. Like many of his party at the end of Anne's reign, he dabbled in platonic Jacobitism. Whereupon the returned Anglo-Indian wrote to his son threatening to have nothing more to do with any of his family who were disloyal to their country and their sovereign :

It is said you are taken up with factious caballs, and are contriving amongst you to put a French Kickshaw upon the throne again.[178]

But there was not much to be feared from the tentative ' caballs ' of poor Robert and his like. With old Thomas and little William on its side, the illustrious House of Hanover might look forward to the future without dismay.

* In 1717 Thomas Pitt parted with it to the Regent of France for £133,000.

CHAPTER X

Queen Anne's Ireland

The reconquest of Ireland and its consequences. The Penal Laws against Catholics. The Restrictions on Trade and their injury to the Protestant interest. Ireland subject to England. Molyneux. Question of Union. Churchmen and Presbyterians. The Sacramental Test. Whig and Tory in Protestant Ireland.

Ireland was the Achilles' heel of the Revolution Settlement. Yet even in Ireland the arrangements made after the reconquest by William lasted for ninety years unchanged. But they rested on force alone and have since been overset.

In the reign of the Roman Catholic James II, it had been inevitable that the native Irish should rise against Protestant ascendancy and the Cromwellian land settlement. The law was for once on their side, until James was dethroned in London. Then the Protestant settlers rallied in Ulster, and held out single-handed in Londonderry and Inniskillen, till England came to their rescue. Great events followed quickly : the relief of Londonderry in 1689 ; next year the Battle of the Boyne and the successful defence of Limerick by the Irish ; its fall in 1691 after the Battle of Aghrim ; and finally the Treaty of Limerick and the disregard paid to its terms by the victors. These happenings still form the main body of Catholic and Protestant tradition in the island where men live in the past. The Elizabethan and even the Cromwellian wars grew dim and far away, withdrawn behind this nearer mountain of proud and tragic memories. In Anne's day, victors and vanquished were living at the very foot of these overshadowing heights. And down to our own times the history of the Williamite wars has continued as a more lasting and potent element in the divided popular sentiment of Ireland than any memory of past events

has ever been to the less historically minded people of England.

The reason for this difference of attitude towards history is not merely a difference in national temperament, though the Englishman is famous for forgetting what is best forgot. The reason is also to be sought in the circumstance that the thoughts of Ireland were for two hundred years after the Revolution turned in upon herself, upon her own sorrows and feuds, while the thoughts of England turned outwards to great commercial, colonial, military, naval and political undertakings in every quarter of the globe. Moreover, the thoughts of the English were diverted to agricultural and industrial change and enterprise at home. Ireland, meanwhile, moodily ate her potatoes at the door of her hovel, and brooded in her savage, poetic heart over ancient wrongs still unremedied, and griefs ever fresh from year to year : the seasons returned, but brought no change. The decisions made by the sword at Derry, the Boyne, Aghrim, continued to divide Irish society and politics long after Naseby and Sedgemoor had become mere names in the English school books, of little meaning to children whose parents had found other causes of dispute.

From Charles II to George III, the statesmen of Westminster, Tory and Whig alike, when they thought of the Irish question, thought solely how England's advantage could be best served. Cromwell's wars had laid Ireland waste, but the Protector had had this merit, that he regarded the Protestants of both the British Islands as a nation with a common economic interest. The Parliaments after the Restoration cared as little as Cromwell about the Irish Catholics and a great deal less about the Irish Protestants, whose well-being they ruthlessly sacrificed to the farmers and manufacturers of England.

In taking this narrowly English line on the economic problems of Ireland, they greatly increased the political and military dangers against which they had to provide. For by reducing the wealth and numbers of the Irish Protestants out of commercial jealousy, they made it less easy to hold down the Catholics and to guard against French invasion.

The only way to meet this difficulty that suggested itself to the wisdom of Queen Anne's Whig and Tory advisers during their war with France, was to increase the rigour of the Penal Laws against Irish Catholics. No doubt these evil statutes were passed as a war-measure against Louis XIV, but as compared to that other war-measure, the Scottish Union, devised by the same statesmen, what folly and ignorance in contrast to what foresight and wisdom !

It is only fair to recognize the difficulty of the question that faced our ancestors, however much we may regret the answer they found. Their military and political task was to prevent Ireland from being made a place of arms for French attack on England and on England's commerce. To hold Ireland was as necessary to Britain's existence during the French wars of William and Anne, as during the German war of our own day. And it was not easy to maintain military control over a country where at least four-fifths of the inhabitants were Roman Catholic Jacobites, at heart in league with France. A ' garrison ' of Protestant squires in every district was a substitute, on feudal lines, for a great modern army of occupation.* But those over whom they bore rule must be rendered incapable of rising. If the Catholics were permitted to grow rich, educated and organized, they would, with the help of the French, soon drive the English and Scottish settlers into the sea. This was no idle fear. It cannot justify the Penal Laws, but it explains them.

Indeed, the cruel policy succeeded in its immediate object. For several generations after 1691 there was no rebellion, not even in 1715 or in 1745, so prostrate was the native race. These satisfactory results were attributed by English statesmen to the maintenance of the Cromwellian and Williamite land-settlements, which put the ownership of far the greater part of the acreage of Ireland into Protestant hands, and to the difficulties placed by the Penal Laws in the way of an attempt by priest or layman to organize or lead the Catholic peasants.

The Penal Laws passed in the reigns of William and

* The English Parliament recognized the need to keep 12,000 troops in Ireland, over and above the English establishment.

Anne were a breach of the Treaty of Limerick made with the Irish in 1691, which had promised that Irish Catholics should retain ' the privileges enjoyed in the reign of Charles II.' Even that miserable promise was broken.* In England the Roman Catholics were not feared and were therefore in practice tolerated ; in Ireland the Roman Catholics were greatly feared, so the priests were persecuted and the liberty and property of their flocks were invaded by a hundred methods of petty and insulting ill-usage. The Penal Statutes were not fully operative, but they were enforced enough to take the heart out of native resistance for a hundred years. As Swift said, the Irish Catholics were politically ' as inconsiderable as the women and children.' So far the policy succeeded, but at what a cost to the future relations of the English with the Irish race !

The rigour of the Irish Penal Statutes against Catholics was increased by fresh legislation under Anne, once in 1703 at the instigation of a Tory Government, and once in 1709 by the Whigs. There was no difference of policy between the two parties in the matter. The object of the elaborate system of regulations and penalties enacted by these new laws was twofold : in the first place to circumscribe the number and activity of the priests, in the hope that at length they would give up the struggle and disappear from the land ; and in the second place to prevent the former landlords or their descendants from recovering piecemeal the ownership of their ancestral estates, or even from acquiring wealth and influence in the liberal professions.

The legislation against the priesthood failed. Before the middle of the century the attempt to deprive the Irish peasant of the services of his religion was abandoned as impracticable and as repugnant to the latitudinarian spirit of the new age. But the attempt to keep the land, the wealth, the education and the social power of the country in the

* It was not the laws excluding Roman Catholics from Civil Office that were complained of as the breach of the Treaty of Limerick, but the new laws subjecting priests and their flocks to further penalties and harassing and limiting them in their religious activities. This is clear in the Jacobite and Papal letters of the time, e.g. *Bodleian MSS., Carte Papers* 229, ff. 118–121 (date 1704) ; *Add. MSS.* (*B.M.*) 31248, ff. 139–142 ; and the very interesting report to Cardinal Paolucci dated June 22, 1710 (*P.R.O., Tr. Rome*, 101, ff. 13–17).

hands of Protestants succeeded for several generations. The net result of the failure of the Penal Laws in one respect, and of their success in another, was to leave the priest as the only powerful friend and champion of the native population. It was the laws imposed by the English conquerors to depress the Catholics that rendered Ireland the most priest-led country in Europe, by destroying the classes whence her natural leaders should have come.[179]

But in the days of Queen Anne these ultimate consequences were not foreseen, and the attempt was still seriously being made to eradicate the Roman Catholic religion. The Penal Laws of the reign permitted a 'registered' priest to work in his parish, but allowed no Bishop to remain in Ireland to direct him or to ordain his successor. The more violently persecuting methods of Louis XIV were not imitated: no such attempt was made as in France to compel the unwilling attendance of poor human beings at rites they abhorred. On the other hand, Louis was persecuting a minority, while the English were persecuting the religion of the great majority of the population. Naturally, the attempt failed and has recoiled on the descendants of those who made it.

But the design to deprive the Irish of their religion was perhaps nearer to success in Anne's reign than at any other moment. In a curious petition to Ormonde, the Queen's Lord Lieutenant, he is asked to promote 'the conversion of the Popish natives to the Protestant religion' by means of charity schools and the distribution of the Bible and *The Whole Duty of Man* in Irish, on the ground that the population is relapsing into heathenism through the action of the Penal Laws. The petitioners mention

> one statute particularly to prevent the succession of the Popish clergy, by virtue whereof the number of Popish priests is already sensibly decreased, and it is probable that in some counties the whole succession may be extinct in a few years.*

* *Add. MSS.* (*B.M.*) 35933, ff. 21–23. But Convocation in Ireland frowned on the plea of circulating Bibles and Protestant literature in Irish, because 'we ought not to do anything to encourage or propagate that language, and it was our opinion that there is not one single man in the kingdom that can read Irish, but he can read English also.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 105.

In 1710 Cardinal Paolucci at Rome was informed by his agent in the British Islands that, whereas the Roman Catholics in England had liberty in practice to conduct their religious life without disturbance, the persecution in Ireland was rendering it difficult for the Mass to be celebrated and the people instructed in religion.[180] Similar appeals to the Pope, like that of the Provincial of the Irish Dominicans in 1707, describing the state of affairs only too truthfully, helped to persuade Clement XI to resume the policy of the Popes of Elizabeth's time, and endeavour to dethrone the sovereign of England and Ireland by force of foreign arms.[181]

Nevertheless the attempt to starve the religious instincts of the Catholics to death was felt at the end of the Queen's reign to have proved a failure. Swift's friend, William King, Archbishop of Dublin, was perhaps the wisest and best of the Irish statesmen of the time. He wrote to the Lord Lieutenant the following account of the situation in 1715:

> By law the Roman Catholics are allowed a priest in every parish, which are registered in pursuance of an Act of Parliament made about ten years ago. All bishops, regulars, etc., and all other priests then not registered are banished, and none allowed to come in to the kingdom under severe penalties. The design was that there should be no succession, and many of those registered are since dead; yet for want of a due execution of the laws many are come in from foreign parts, and there are in the country Popish Bishops that ordain many. Little enquiry of late has been made into these matters.

Does the English Government wish the law to be seriously enforced or not?—the Archbishop enquires.[182]

It is remarkable that during the Marlborough Wars the French made no attempt to invade Ireland. In 1705 a memorial had been forwarded thence to the continent, urging that troops should be landed at Bantry or Kenmare, not too near the garrisons at Cork or Kinsale: a general rising is promised to assist the invaders, on an even greater scale than in the reign of James II, so that one French soldier in Ireland will be worth to Louis ten of his comrades in Flanders. It is suggested that equal rights for Protestant and Catholic should be promised, but the writer does

not see his way through the vexed question of the redistribution of the land, and admits that though the Protestant settlers would like to deliver themselves from the slavery of England, who takes away their commerce and liberty, they dare not do anything effective for fear of the Catholics whose lands they possess. But in any case the native population will rise, more than a hundred thousand strong.[183]

If such petitions ever reached the French War Office they carried little weight as against the recollection, exaggerated by French national pride, of the incompetence shown by the hordes of ill-disciplined Irish peasants as allies on the banks of the Boyne.

A curious picture of the dispossessed and submerged native society, as seen from above by the usurping English landlord, is given in a letter of Sir Robert Southwell in the first year of Anne's reign. The old possessors of the land or their children were still in many places living on the scene of their ancestral greatness, still honoured by the people, and hand in glove with the priest. A large acreage of land, Sir Robert declares, is often let by unwary Protestant landlords ' to some Irish gentleman that has nothing of his own, that so he may bring in his followers,' from whom he takes a double rent and ' lives idly on the overplus himself. Besides, while all these depend on his protection, they follow his bagpipe whenever disturbances happen ; and he is aided by the priest in gathering these colonies, because they pay him after-tithe which the Protestants pay only to the Minister.' In other words, these poor people, in their loyalty to the lost cause, were supporting, with double rent and double tithe, both the old and the new landlords, both the old and the new religion.[184]

Most of the converts made by the Penal Laws were hypocrites, seeking merely to own land or enter the professions. Some, indeed, can scarcely even be called hypocrites, for their adherence to Protestantism was confessed to be only formal, and they continued to live entirely among the Catholics and to share their views and hopes. Even before the death of Anne, the legal profession contained many such persons.

Meanwhile, the real Protestant upper class, cut off

from the population beneath in a manner utterly unknown in England or Scotland, ' were exposed,' in the words of Lecky, ' to all the characteristic vices of slave holders, for they formed a dominant class, ruling over a population who were deprived of all civil rights and reduced to a condition of virtual slavery.'[185] These are strong expressions. But many of the Anglo-Irish must also have acquired the virtues of aristocracy, if we may judge by later products of their blood and breeding, such as Castlereagh and those three remarkable families, the Wellesley, the Napier and the Lawrence brothers ; while Burke, Goldsmith, Sheridan and many more enriched the life and letters of England with wit and passion from the un-English island. The extinction of this breed of men might be called a logical result of the circumstances of its origin, but would be none the less a disaster.

English statesmen, from the Restoration onwards, regarded Ireland as a colony, that is to say as a place of which the commerce and agriculture were to be encouraged or checked as best suited the interests of the farmers, manufacturers and merchants of the mother country. And unfortunately the agricultural and industrial interests of Ireland happened to be precisely of the kind which most aroused the jealousy of English rivals. Ireland therefore suffered more than the American colonies from commercial restrictions imposed by England. Moreover, the Parliament men of Westminster, whether Tory or Whig, regarded the collective wealth of the neighbouring island with suspicion, as lying outside their control, and affording a source of independent strength to the Crown. This political jealousy of Ireland's well-being was strongly felt, not least by Cavalier and Tory members. James II's policy of bringing over an Irish army to dragoon England had greatly enhanced it, and William's extravagant grants of Irish lands to his Dutch friends had helped to keep it alive.

Acting on these motives, economic and political, the English House of Commons deliberately ruined the prosperity of Ireland. The partnership in the Navigation

Laws and in the colonial trade which Cromwell had extended to her disappeared with the rest of his system ; and the Cavalier Parliament took special measures that put an end to the large import of Ireland's cattle and cloth into England. Her flourishing cloth trade with foreign countries was permitted to survive till after the Revolution, but in 1699 it also was made illegal. The avowed object was to kill the manufacture of cloth in Ireland, regardless of the fact that it was in Protestant hands.

Only the linen industry of Ulster, which had no English rival, was smiled on in its infancy by the statesmen of Queen Anne, and was allowed by them to have the run of the American market.[186]

The Protestant section suffered most from the restrictive laws. It was the English and Scottish settlers who strove to grow rich by breeding cattle and manufacturing goods for export, and by sheep-farming on a large scale to supply the Ulster looms. It was just these classes who were ruined by the stop of trade. The native peasant, content to grow the food he ate, was less affected. But the increase in the wealth and numbers of the Protestant community was checked by the laws of the English Parliament.

One consequence was that, during the Queen's reign, Protestant emigration from Ireland to America began, several generations before it occurred to the Catholics to follow. England prevented her own children and their Scottish cousins from bettering themselves in Ireland, and as Scots and English are always determined to better themselves somewhere, they went off to the Colonies, carrying overseas a traditional desire to be revenged on England, which their descendants amply gratified at the time of the American Revolution.*

* Even from the narrowest point of view of the English clothier's fear of competition, it proved a mistake to have prohibited the export of Irish woollen cloth to the Continent. For the result was that Queen Anne's Irish subjects, irrespective of religion, combined to smuggle raw wool to Europe, whither also the unemployed weavers followed, taking their skill with them. Thus the cloth manufacturer throve all the more on the Continent as a result of its suppression in Ireland.

On the whole subject of the restrictive laws, see Alice Effie Murray, *Commercial Relations between England and Ireland*, Chaps. II–IV, and Rev. R. H. Murray, *Revolutionary Ireland*, Chap. X.

The constitutional basis of government in Ireland was the power claimed and exercised by the Privy Council and the Parliament of the neighbour island. The administration was entirely subject to the will of the English Ministers, and they kept the best places in Church and State for Englishmen. Even the members of the Church of Ireland, though they enjoyed the monopoly of civil, military and ecclesiastical posts against either Catholics or Dissenters, were accustomed to receive the leavings of Irish patronage, while its best places went to pay the party debts of English statesmen. If Swift had been only an Irish parson, and only a Dublin pamphleteer, he would never have been Dean of St. Patrick's.

But the English Ministry did not merely control the Irish executive and distribute the loaves and fishes. It controlled Irish legislation also under the old Poynings Law of Henry VII. The ultimate form in which any measure could pass the Dublin Parliament was determined by the Privy Council in England, who had the power to initiate, alter or reject Bills. The Irish Parliament could refuse to pass a Bill which was returned from England in an amended form, but had no power to alter it. Moreover, the Parliament at Westminster could legislate directly for Ireland, as when it passed the Act prohibiting the export of Irish cloth to the Continent and made the Schism Act of 1714 applicable against the Presbyterians of Ulster.

The first protest after the Revolution against the close constitutional bondage of Ireland was made by William Molyneux, a man of learning and moderation, member of Parliament for Dublin University. In 1698 he published a pamphlet based both on general principles and on much antiquarian lore, entitled *The Case of Ireland's being bound by Acts of Parliament in England stated*, and dedicated it to King William. It was formally condemned by the English House of Commons whose powers over Ireland it had called in question. It set men talking and no more. But it set them talking on a theme they never again forgot. For Molyneux had claimed the full and sole competence of the Irish Parliament to legislate for Ireland on a footing of equality with the English Parliament. The subservience

of Dublin to Westminster he declared to be an English usurpation. Ireland, in his view, was not a country conquered by England, but a separate kingdom belonging to the same King.

The flaw in Molyneux's argument was that Ireland had actually been subdued by the arms of England at the Boyne and Aghrim, and her constitution was the result of that conquest. Charles Davenant, in his answer to Molyneux, pointed out that the Protestant settlers in Ireland, for whom alone Molyneux had been pleading, were a ' colony,' holding as such ' a lasting title to be protected and defended by us.'[187] But if they were to set up as an independent country, the native population would rise and cut their throats, as soon as the protection of England should be withdrawn. In the words of Macaulay, ' it was absurd to claim independence for a community which could not cease to be dependent without ceasing to exist.' So long as the Irish Protestants maintained the Penal Laws and the Protestant Ascendancy, they were in fact dependent on England, whatever the rights of the constitutional and legal argument might be. It was only when in Grattan's day they began a policy of conciliating the Catholics, that they were able to enforce Molyneux's doctrine of independence by the Volunteer Movement of 1782.

1701–1707

During the years when the Union of England and Scotland was being actively discussed and carried, it was natural that the Irish Protestants should ask themselves if they might not benefit by a similar measure. Molyneux in his pamphlet had hinted at the possibility of a representation of Ireland in the English Parliament as an alternative to independence ; ' and this,' he wrote, ' I believe we should be willing enough to embrace, but this is an happiness we can hardly hope for.' The good Archbishop King, leader of the ' Irish interest ' among the official classes, wished for a Union, but feared England would never consent to it on tolerable terms. ' We have this disadvantage,' he wrote in 1701, ' we must just take what is given us, for we can't struggle.' The Irish Protestants were not, like the Scots, formidable enough in face of England to bargain with her on equal terms.

During the first years of Queen Anne, several pamphlets in favour of a Union were circulated in Dublin. And in 1703 a humble petition of the Irish House of Commons to Her Majesty, recounting the ruin of their trade by the recent English laws, and the consequent emigration of the Protestant population, ended with the prayer :

> that your Majesty's goodness be extended towards us in such prudent and gracious methods as may afford us relief, according to the exigency of our condition, by restoring to us a full enjoyment of our constitution, or by promoting a more firm and strict union with your Majesty's subjects of England.

The petition fell on deaf ears, for English statesmen were finding it at the moment hard enough to persuade their fellow-countrymen to admit the Scots to the colonial and home markets, as the price of a Union that England urgently required for her own political safety. It would indeed be vain to propose the admission to these same privileges of Irish clothiers and cattle breeders, merely in order to promote the welfare of Ireland.

Four years later, when the Scottish Union had been accomplished, the Irish House of Commons congratulated the Queen, and added, ' May God put it in your royal heart to add greater strength and lustre to your crown by a yet more comprehensive union.' But it was not to be. England let the golden moment slip by when she could have granted a union which Ireland would have received with gratitude, which would have given the Protestants relief from the economic oppression undermining their real power, and would have created a sense of security that might early have reacted on the relief of the Catholics from the persecuting laws.[188]

Thus the Irish field was being plentifully and industriously sown with dragon's teeth, which would bring forth fruit in due season. But so long as the seed slumbered underground, English statesmen were satisfied. During the reign of Queen Anne they were less troubled by the major problems of Ireland—the treatment of the Catholics and the economic ruin of the Protestants—than by the minor division

of the Protestant interest itself over the bickerings of Anglican and Presbyterian. This absurd quarrel in the face of the enemy was fostered from England, because it could be manipulated as a local branch of the great faction-fight of Whig and Tory, which was the breath of their being to Rochester and Wharton, Somers and Bolingbroke.

The Irish 'Tories,' among whom Archbishop King and Swift became the leading figures, were, according to Swift, 'moderate Whigs' in their theory of government, revering the memory of William and abhorring the Pretender. Their Toryism consisted in their hostility to the Presbyterians, whose activity and turbulence they had some reason to dread. The Prebyterians were the Scots settlers in Ireland, at least as numerous as members of the Established Church in the island as a whole, and ten times as numerous in some places, for example in Londonderry. The Churchmen held the monopoly of office and most of the landed estates. But over against the officials and the squires stood a formidable democracy of farmers and merchants, organized under their ministers and elders like their kinsmen in Scotland. 'The true point,' wrote Archbishop King, 'between them and the gentlemen is whether the Presbyterians and lay elders in every parish shall have the greatest influence over the people to lead them as they please, or the landlords over their tenants.'

There was no Toleration Act for Presbyterians in that mad island. The Scots prentices who had closed the gates of Derry and made good their act against the hosts of James and Louis, had no right under the laws of William or Anne to worship God in their own way. But in fact they held their illegal services and organized their kirk sessions and assemblies as freely as their established brethren in Scotland, save when on rare occasions, as at Drogheda in 1708 and Belturbet in 1712, over-zealous Tory magistrates sought to imprison ministers, on the ground that they were establishing meeting houses where there had been none before.

The light of the Presbyterians in Ireland was not hid under a bushel. When their synods were called together, they would sometimes 'enter the town in a public cavalcade, every minister being attended by a layman on each hand,

well armed to the great terror of such of her Majesty's subjects as are of the Church of Ireland.' In Belfast, we read, 'the Dissenting party have created [a Society for the Reformation of Manners,' and 'compel the constables to go round the town with them to enter people's houses and take what persons they think fit and imprison them.' So at least their enemies declared.[189] They circulated the Solemn League and Covenant and denounced the Episcopalians as idolaters. The Churchmen replied by preaching against 'the sin of schism.'[190]

The Irish Episcopalians were fain to call in 'the rusty curb of old father antic the law,' not from a desire to persecute their brother Protestants, but from the real dread in which they lived of being put down under a resurgent kirk, as their 'rabbled' co-religionists had been put down in Scotland. But they were not really in such danger. For they were not Jacobites, as were the Episcopalians of Scotland, and therefore they could rely on the support of England, more especially when the Tories were in power at Westminster.

Rochester, Anne's first Lord Lieutenant, had done his best to create in the Irish Protestant body the distinctions of 'Whig and Tory' on English lines. His successor, Ormonde, would, if left to himself, have adopted a more conciliatory policy, but Nottingham, acting from England as Secretary of State, found a way in 1704 to harass the Presbyterians by a fresh 'Test,' and so set them by the ears with the Church or Tory interest for the rest of the reign. The Irish Parliament was engaged in passing a new Penal Statute against Catholics ; Nottingham, just before he left office, induced the English Privy Council to insert into it a clause extending to Ireland the Sacramental Test for secular office which had long been the law of England. This would affect Presbyterians as well as Papists. The Dublin Parliament had perforce to accept the change. Hitherto the Presbyterians, though they enjoyed no legal Toleration for their worship, had not been excluded from State and Municipal office. Henceforth they were so excluded.

During the remainder of Anne's reign a furious controversy raged round the Presbyterian demand for the repeal

of the new Test. When the Whigs came into power in England in the middle of the reign, and Wharton went over as Lord Lieutenant with Addison as his Secretary, the hopes of the Presbyterians ran high. They hardly deigned to ask for a Toleration Act, unless it were accompanied by a repeal of the Test.* Archbishop King defended the Test with his authority and Swift with his pen.† It had not been repealed when the Whigs fell from power in 1710. Wharton was replaced by Ormonde, returning once more to Ireland amid the loud rejoicings of the Irish Tories.

The last four years of Queen Anne were almost as agitated a time in Irish as in English politics. But the activity was entirely within the ranks of the divided Protestant body ; the great mass of the nation made no stir as it lay under the feet of the conquerors, indifferent to the scuffle of Whig and Tory overhead.

Ormonde, from the first moment of his return, found the Dublin Corporation given over to ' obstinacy and faction ' in the Whig interest.[191] A series of party quarrels in that body soon developed into a national concern, when the Tory Chancellor of Ireland, Sir Constantine Phipps, encouraged by Bolingbroke, harassed the Whigs throughout the island. Moreover, the great body of Protestants, irrespective of party, soon became anxious about the Succession, and, under the influence of alarmist letters from London, began to suspect the English Tory ministers of the intention to bring back the Roman Catholic Stuarts.[192]

When, therefore, in the autumn of 1713 Shrewsbury succeeded Ormonde as Lord Lieutenant, he found a Whig majority in the Dublin Parliament, threatening to impeach the Chancellor, Phipps, voting supplies for three months

* In October 1709 Somers received a letter from B. Freeman, Dublin, to the following effect : ' The Toleration which is granted in England was offered here in case it would have been accepted without repealing the Test. The long cessation that hath been of any prosecution of Dissenters in this Kingdom ' [Ireland] render nugatory the mere offer of a Toleration already enjoyed in practice, and the call for repeal of the Test is loud. *Somers MSS.* In 1719 Archbishop King declared that 'As to granting the Dissenters a Toleration such as is granted them in England, it has been offered them again and again and it has been refused by their leaders.' Mant, *Church of Ireland* (1840), II, p. 333. See *Leadam*, p. 73, and *Murray*, pp. 364–373 on the struggle over the Test.

† See p. 98 above.

only, and offering rewards for the capture of the Pretender. Shrewsbury, who seems to have gone to Ireland at Harley's behest to pour oil on troubled waters, found himself in great difficulty between a half-Jacobite Cabinet in London and a furiously Whig Parliament in Dublin attacking a High Tory Chancellor. No one of these parties had any confidence in the new Lord Lieutenant or any use for his moderation. ' I have made the figure rather of a Viceroy in a Play,' he complained to Harley, ' than of one who had the honour of Her Majesty's patent.'

But Shrewsbury's own sympathies were so strong for Hanover that in fact he inclined to the Whig side. When Anne died, therefore, the Whigs already had the upper hand in Dublin. It could not well be otherwise, for whenever the Protestant Succession was clearly seen to be in danger, Irish Tories and Churchmen perforce made common cause with the Presbyterians and Whigs.[193]

In the last summer of Anne's reign the Schism Act to suppress Presbyterian and other dissenting schools had been passed at Westminster, and, by an act of partisan fury that was almost insane, was specifically made to apply to Ireland. If it had been enforced in practice the result would have been a civil war between the two sections of Irish Protestants, for Ulster would never have submitted to persecution. But Anne died on the day when it was supposed to become operative. The Schism Act was repealed by the Whigs in the reign of King George.*

But the Test Act of 1704 was not repealed even under the Hanoverian regime, and the Presbyterians of Ireland remained excluded from all civil and military offices under the Crown.

> Most of the great evils of Irish politics [wrote Lecky] have arisen from the fact that its different classes and creeds have never been blended into one nation. We have already seen how fatally the division between Protestant and Catholic was aggravated by its coincidence with the division of classes. The Test Act was another great step in the path of division and it did much to make Protestant co-operation impossible.[194]

* See pp. 280–284 below.

CHAPTER XI

England and France drive a Bargain

Limits of St. John's responsibility for Utrecht. The 'Jersey' period of the negotiation. Jacobite and anti-Dutch character of the negotiations initiated by Jersey. The French Proposal, April 1711. St. John takes charge. Hard bargaining. Prior at Versailles. Mesnager in London. The Preliminaries of October 1711. England and Holland.

The secret negotiations between England and France that resulted in the Peace of Utrecht have always been associated in the world's mind with St. John, Lord Bolingbroke. He was regarded in his own day, and he is still regarded, as the person responsible for the terms of the Treaty and for the much disputed methods by which they were obtained. Yet, in fact, he had nothing to do with the affair until it had been going on for nine months.

In the last week of April 1711 the French Minister sent over to England the first official request that the two countries should treat, on the basis of Spain for Philip, a Barrier for the Dutch and great commercial advantages for England in both hemispheres. This document, the earliest that the Whigs were able to discover when they brought the Tory ex-Ministers to account in 1715, purported to be the beginning of the whole negotiation.[195] But in reality it was the end of the first long stage. The French Foreign Office papers have revealed to posterity that these proposals, while appearing to emanate spontaneously from France, had in fact been collusively arranged between Jersey, Harley and Shrewsbury on the one side and Louis's Minister, Torcy, on the other.

These men, whose counsels St. John was not yet allowed to share, had, ever since August 1710, been seeking ground whereon England and France could stand together and

dictate peace to the rest of Europe. Secrecy had been essential and had been successfully observed. The English statesmen put nothing on paper, lest it should afterwards be produced against them. Neither the Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, nor any of the British Ambassadors were in the secret. From August 1710 to April 1711 proceedings were confined to conversations between Edward Villiers, Earl of Jersey, and the Abbé Gaultier, Torcy's secret agent in England, who reported to his master in cypher letters, and on occasional visits to France. The French official proposal in April 1711, afterwards given to the world as the beginning of the negotiations for peace, were the outcome of this long preparation.

Already, therefore, before St. John had been admitted into the secret, the broadest outline of the Peace had been agreed on between England and France. It had already been arranged that Spain and Spanish America should remain with Philip V * ; that England should obtain great commercial privileges in the Mediterranean and Spanish America, and that a Barrier should be erected in the Netherlands sufficient to give security to Holland, but 'agreeable to England and to the good liking of the English,' that is to say not the extravagantly large Barrier promised to Holland by the Whig Treaty of 1709.

Ever since August 1710, when Jersey first got into touch with Torcy through Gaultier, Holland was spoken of by the negotiators as their common enemy, or at least as their destined dupe. It was not St. John but Jersey who first based the policy of the new Ministers on close friendship with France at the expense of Holland and the German Princes ; and it was Jersey who first offered the French Minister security for the continuance of that friendship by indicating the readiness of the Tory chiefs to restore James III on Anne's death.

The responsibility for the basic principles of the terms of Utrecht, and for the policy of an exclusive friendship with France, does not lie with St. John in the first instance.

* This had been conceded by Jersey four months before the death of the Emperor Joseph. See p. 88 above and *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 230, f. 238, Gaultier to Torcy, December 23, 1710, *E.H.R.*, Jan. 1934, p. 103.

It lies with Jersey, and with Harley who left him in charge of the negotiations from August 1710 to April 1711, and with Shrewsbury who was at least a consenting party to that arrangement.

It may well be asked why a transaction so momentous was left by Harley in the hands of a Jacobite nobleman who was not at the time a Minister of the Crown. Jersey's part in the affair appears to have been begun by chance and continued through negligence. Torcy's secret agent in England during the war was the Abbé Gaultier, a priest in close touch with English Jacobites and connected with Jersey's household, particularly with his Roman Catholic wife. If, in August 1710, Harley and Shrewsbury wished to send a secret message to Torcy at Versailles, the simplest way was to send it through Gaultier. It was therefore natural that their first approaches to France took the form of asking Jersey to talk to the Abbé, who was an intimate of his household. As a beginning, that was well enough. But it was characteristic of Harley that he never afterwards bestirred himself to take the matter into his own hands, as St. John very quickly did as soon as he was admitted to the secret.

If Harley, in the autumn of 1710, had been less negligent and easy, he would have dealt with Gaultier himself or instructed Shewsbury to act for hin. In the latter case, at any rate, the negotiation would not have taken the deeply Jacobite tinge which Jersey gave to it from the first.

Did either Harley or Shrewsbury know and, if they knew, did they approve of Jersey's conduct in telling Gaultier that the new Ministers designed to restore James III on his sister's death? The Whig Duke, one may guess, was kept in ignorance; but Harley always liked to have two strings to his bow, and knew that the Jacobite vote in Parliament had been given him during good conduct.[196] In any case, Gaultier's written reports of his conversations with Jersey were such that Torcy saw in the negotiations of 1710 not only a path to the Peace that was so sorely required by the desperate condition of France, but the brilliant prospect that on Anne's death a Restoration would bring England back into the orbit of French diplomacy. For how, save

by close friendship with France, could James III preserve his throne against Whig and Protestant rebellion? No wonder, therefore, that in January 1711 Torcy was persuaded by Gaultier to pay Jersey £3,000 sterling a year; after all, as Gaultier wrote, it was a very small price to pay for a Peace with a Stuart Restoration to follow.*

March 8 1711

But the importance of Jersey soon afterwards began to wane before that of St. John. Early in March, Harley was wounded by Guiscard, and as Gaultier informed Torcy,

> the illness resulting from this wound kept him for some time from paying attention to the negotiation, and during this interval St. John, Secretary of State, introduced himself into the affair, although the intention of those in charge of it had been to keep him in ignorance. Since he had come to know of it, it was no longer possible to keep him out of the business, though Harley wished it. Gaultier, however, says that St. John is 'well intentioned.'[197]

In the last days of April 1711, Shrewsbury insisted that the Queen should lay before the whole Cabinet the French official proposal for peace 'as a paper come to her hands without saying how,' and that it should be at once communicated to the Dutch Government through the ordinary channel of our Ambassador, Lord Raby, at The Hague. The Whig Duke was fond enough of secret ways, but not quite so fond of them as Harley. The depth of the deceit practised on the Cabinet and the Allies rendered him ill at ease, and he may well have suspected the uses to which Jersey was turning his monopoly of speech with the priestly French negotiator. Shrewsbury's insistence that the affair should be made known to the Cabinet and to the Ambassador gave St. John, as the most important of the Secretaries of State, the opportunity to assert his control. From this

* 'La chose que je vous ay demandée pour luy est fort petite.' Whether Jersey accepted the money I do not know. He died in August 1711, greatly to the advantage of the House of Hanover. *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 230, f. 444; 232, ff. 10–11.

For the Jersey negotiations and their Jacobite character, see pp. 92–93 above. The full evidence will be found in *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.*, Vols. 230–232. See my extracts from those papers in the *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, January 1934, pp. 100–105.

moment forward the negotiations with France passed into his able hands.[198]

St. John had now to carry on a policy which he had not initiated, but which was agreeable to ideas he had previously expressed. More active and ambitious than Harley, the Secretary of State relegated Jersey to his properly subordinate position, even before the Earl's death in August removed him from the scene.

It was well that a stronger man took over the negotiations, for Jersey had showed many signs of weakness as champion of England's interests ; as late as July he told Gaultier that Gibraltar and Port Mahon would be sold back to Spain.[199] He would have been clay in Torcy's deft hands. Fortunately, the agreement with France was still the barest outline when St. John took charge. It was his task to fill in the all-important details which would make it either a good or a bad Peace for England and her Allies. In hard bargaining he proved nearly a match for Torcy, though the Frenchman had the advantage of knowing that the Tory Ministry could not afford to break off without securing a Peace of some kind. But neither, fortunately, could France. In the end St. John obtained very great advantages for England. And if in some respects he neglected her honour and the interests of her Allies, Jersey would certainly have neglected them more.*

In March 1711 Marlborough had given to the Hanoverian agent Robethon his views of the chief members of the Cabinet, all of whom had formerly been his colleagues or subordinates. According to the Duke, Rochester and Harley 'never spoke in a decisive manner,' and Shrewsbury was 'yet more timid than they.' 'St. John alone applies himself to business, and has the requisite vigour and talent.'[200]

The policy that St. John successfully carried out in the summer and autumn of 1711 was to arrange secretly with

* As early as August 1710 Jersey went out of his way to advise France to detach Savoy from the Grand Alliance by offering the Duke good terms if he made a separate peace. This, said Jersey, would force the other Allies to treat. Such advice, given to the enemy before the other Allies had even been asked by the new English Ministry to consider terms of peace, was gratuitous treachery to the principle of the Alliance. *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 230, f. 306. *E.H.R.* January 1934.

France the details of the great advantages which England was to obtain, and to leave over the details of the Dutch Barrier and the rewards of the other Allies to be settled at a general Conference of Powers to be held in the following year. At that Conference England and France, being already agreed as between themselves, could dictate to the rest of Europe.

There was everything to be said for this plan as a means of securing British interests, and something to be said for it as a means of securing European peace. It might well prove the only way in which so many self-regarding States and Princes could be compelled to come to any settlement at all. The Treaty of Ryswick had been dictated to Europe in a somewhat similar fashion by an agreement privately reached between William and Louis. The substantial justice or injustice of England's treatment of her Allies would turn on the degree to which she secured their interests at the Conference. But in any case, the separate and secret negotiation with France, whether justifiable or not, was certain to be deeply resented by all the other Powers, as a breach of the Treaty of Grand Alliance, made in order that England should feather her own nest at their expense.

European resentment, supported by the Whig Opposition at home, would be formidable indeed. In view of the coming storm, it was fortunate for the English Ministers that the Emperor Joseph unexpectedly died ; his younger brother 'Charles III' of Spain therefore succeeded to his Hapsburg inheritance of Austria-Hungary and was elected Emperor Charles VI. St. John and Torcy were prepared to leave him in possession of Milan, Naples and the Netherlands, on the principle of Partition of the Spanish Empire agreed on in William's Treaty of Grand Alliance. And it was difficult for anyone except an Austrian or a very passionate Whig to argue any longer that Charles ought also to be made King of Spain and the Indies, for in the new circumstances that would mean the revival of the Empire of Charles V and the overturn of the Balance of Power in favour of the House of Hapsburg. The English Ministers had in the previous December secretly promised France to leave Spain to Philip, and

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before they were called upon to defend this decision in public the death of the Emperor Joseph had made their case irresistibly strong.

Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1711, St. John and Torcy went at it hammer-and-tongs, haggling over the benefits that England was to derive from the Peace. It was Greek meet Greek and blade cut blade. Each knew the other's need for peace, and each knew his own ; each had the nerve on several occasions to risk the whole negotiation, at least in appearance, in order to carry a point. Until agreement was reached at the beginning of October the bargaining was conducted in secret, for although Heinsius had been officially invited to consider the French outline proposal of April, he was not told that England was filling in the details behind his back.

St. John was the political leader of the squires. He well knew how to win the cheers of the fox-hunters on the back benches by denunciations of the rapacious ' moneyed interest.' None the less he was aware that England's future lay on the sea, that her strength was in trade, that the wealth even of the squires depended on the prosperity of our commerce. He determined to ' dish the Whigs ' by serving up to our merchants such a feast of concessions as would make them lick their lips. Moreover, the privileges thus extorted from France and Spain should be denied to Holland, in spite of the clauses in the Barrier Treaty of 1709 securing equal commercial rights to the two Maritime Powers. Tory feeling against the Dutch should be gratified in the interest of the Whig mercantile class. That surely would unite the country behind the new Ministers. On these principles, the programme that St. John set out to obtain from Torcy included the Asiento or monopoly of the Spanish-American slave trade, to be taken from the French and bestowed on Harley's new South Sea Company ; the restoration of the Hudson Bay Company's forts and territories ; Acadia and Newfoundland for our fishermen ; Gibraltar and Port Mahon as permanent security for our Mediterranean commerce ; the most favoured nation treatment for English trade with the Spanish peninsula ; and

the dismantling of all the fortifications of Dunkirk, the sea-citadel of the French privateers, so long the bugbear of our merchants and seamen. It was a popular programme.

St. John was not for long contented that Gaultier alone should explain his views at Versailles. A Briton must go to present the British demands. In July Matthew Prior, in strict secrecy, went to over haggle with Torcy face to face. A better choice could not have been made. Prior was not only a man about town with a reputation as a wit and a writer of society verse ; he was also an experienced diplomatist, skilled in the French language and in the arts and courtesies that paved a man's way at Versailles. For he had served King William there as Ambassador Portland's secretary. Devoted to the memory of the Stadtholder-King, Prior, though he was now a Tory, never became a Jacobite. In the following year he repulsed the efforts of the French Minister's agents to draw him into the intrigue for a Restoration, to which his English employers were deeply committed.

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St. John very wisely gave Prior no commission to conclude or to yield an inch on any point. He was only to state England's claims and support them with arguments. This he did with an ability and a stiffness that surprised and dismayed Torcy, after his very different experiences during the Jersey regime. The conversations between Torcy and Prior on Gibraltar, Port Mahon, the Asiento, Newfoundland and other points have been reported by both parties and make curious reading. Torcy, aghast, declared that the English demanded ' such considerable advantages as must absolutely ruin all commerce but their own.' He also tried to induce Prior to come to an agreement in a hurry by betraying to him letters from Holland, which indicated that the Dutch might cut in and sell themselves dear to France before England had finished selling them cheap. But Prior was not to be bluffed. He had the honour of a private interview with the Grand Monarch, and then came away. He had settled nothing, but he had done what he had been sent to do, for he had convinced Torcy and Louis that the new British Ministers were in earnest in the demands they made for their own country.[201]

The scene of vital negotiations was now shifted back to London. Prior was accompanied home by a new French agent, Mesnager, a man well skilled in commercial affairs which formed so large a part of the bargain to be driven. St. John had the advantage over the other English Ministers of speaking excellent French at the conferences with Mesnager, and being able to write fluent French letters to Versailles.[202]

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Throughout August and September and the first week of October, he and Torcy were fairly at grips. Twice the negotiation almost broke down : once over the demand of the English for ' cautionary towns ' in the Spanish Indies to secure their trade there, which Philip V would on no account concede ; and once over Louis's demand for the restoration of Lille and Tournai in return for his destruction of the fortifications of Dunkirk. On both points a compromise was reached at the last moment. The English Ministers gave up their claim for territorial security in Spanish-America in return for the extension to thirty years of the period of the Asiento monopoly granted to the South Sea Company.[203] And the question of Tournai and Lille was postponed till the conference, when Louis got back Lille, but finally, after a long struggle, abandoned Tournai.[204]

In one other particular the English Ministers consented to compromise their extensive claims. Newfoundland, Torcy said to Prior at Versailles, was ' the nursery of our seamen,' for the French as much as for the English ; and he afterwards told Shrewsbury that ' to quit entirely the fishery of Newfoundland would beggar three provinces of France.' St. John, however, insisted that this whole island should become British soil, although military superiority in the local war had been clearly on the side of the French, who, from their well-garrisoned base of Placentia had three times taken the ill-defended port of Saint John's. In order to reach an agreement, it was conceded that, if British sovereignty and military occupation were secured, the French fishermen should have the right to dry their fish on a scheduled portion of the coast. This concession was partly due to St. John's need to hasten the agreement between France and England, in order to face the indignant

Allies with a *fait accompli*. Moreover, the news of the failure of the Quebec expedition reached England in the first week of October.*

The compromise on Newfoundland caused trouble between England and France for two hundred years to come. In the reign of Edward VII, Lansdowne as Foreign Minister was still engaged in picking up the ragged ends of St. John's diplomacy about that distant and fog-bound shore. Queen Anne's Secretary had made the concession with his eyes open, as a result of necessity not of ignorance ; he asked and obtained a full statement of the local situation from the Council of Trade and Plantations, who reported to him that ' if the French reserve the privilege of fishing on that coast and drying on the shore, they will thereby have the same advantage in the trade of dry fish as Her Majesty's subjects, and the good end of our having New Foundland restored to us will be defeated.'

The Council of Trade and Plantations also advised him that Cape Breton should be secured and the boundaries of newly-acquired Acadia carefully defined. Here also he failed to satisfy their demands, being disarmed by Hovenden Walker's failure against Quebec. The struggle for the future dominion of Canada had therefore yet to be fought out, but the Treaty of Utrecht registered such concessions in Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland and Acadia as tilted the balance against the French in those regions. The end was not yet, but the turning point had been reached.[205]

On the whole an excellent bargain had been made for Britain, as set down in detail in the ' Preliminary Articles of October ' signed in London by Mesnager for France and by the two Secretaries of State for England.† ' This agreement,' wrote St. John to the Queen, ' contains more advantages for your Majesty's Kingdom than were ever, perhaps, stipulated for any nation at one time.' He did not add that these ' advantages '

Sept. 27 (o.s.) / Oct. 8 (N.S.) 1711

* Swift to Stella, Oct. 6, 1711 : ' The news of Mr. Hill's miscarriage in his expedition came to-day. I doubt Mr. Hill and his Admiral made wrong steps ; however we lay it all to a storm etc. The Secretary is much mortified about Hill, but Lord Treasurer was just as merry as usual.'

† England's chief advantages in the Preliminaries of October and subsequently at Utrecht were: *Asiento* monopoly of slave trade to Spanish-America for thirty

had been won by the Duke of Marlborough, whom the Tory party was denouncing, maligning and driving into exile from the island he had saved and glorified.

There was, indeed, one Cabinet Minister who had some prickings of conscience, not about Marlborough, but on behalf of the Allies of England whom his colleagues already spoke of almost as her enemies. At the end of August 1711 Shrewsbury had written to St. John—

> Looking over the papers again, I am more of opinion there is something in them looks so like bargaining for yourselves apart, and leaving your friends to shift at a general treaty, that I am confirmed the exposing of such a paper (as it will be in the power of France to do) may create great jealousy and complaint from the Allies.

Throughout September his uneasiness grew, and he protested frequently to the Queen and to his colleagues, both as to the rights of the Allies and on the need to compel Louis to acknowledge the Protestant Succession.[206]

Shrewsbury's attitude was not wholly without effect. In the Preliminaries signed on October 8, beside the detailed list of special advantages for England, another paper dealt in more general terms with the rest of the business to be brought before the coming Conference. In this paper, signed by Mesnager, Louis acknowledged the Queen's title and the Protestant Succession after her ; promised to provide that the Crowns of France and Spain should never be united on one head ; promised a Barrier for Holland in the Netherlands but without specifying the towns ; spoke also of a Barrier for the Empire and the House of Austria ; stipulated that he would dismantle Dunkirk but must have an equivalent in return ; and, finally, in separate articles, promised great advantages to the Duke of Savoy, the only Ally who was a favourite with the Tory Ministers.[207]

years ; Gibraltar and Minorca ; St. Kitts Island and Acadia ; Newfoundland and Hudson's Bay ; destruction of the fortifications of Dunkirk ; trade rights in Spain ; Queen Anne's title and the Protestant Succession under the Act of Settlement acknowledged by Louis. The fact that the Spanish Netherlands, Italy and Sicily all passed out of the power of France was also of immense advantage to the security and the trade of England.

For the general course of the negotiations with Mesnager leading to the Preliminaries of October 1711, see *Torcy, Legrelle, Matthew Prior, Bol. Letters.* On the *Asiento*, see the 2nd vol. of Scelle, *Traité négrière*, and *C.H.B.E.*, I, Chap. XI.

No one could doubt that Holland, Austria, Prussia and Portugal would be profoundly discontented with such a document couched in such general terms, when contrasted with the specific lists of concessions already secured for England. Those concessions, the Dutch observed with indignation, excluded them beforehand from any share in the *Asiento*,[208] while the British annexation of Gibraltar and Port Mahon had always been opposed by Holland as destructive to her commercial position in the Mediterranean.*

When the Allies, encouraged by the Whigs, hesitated to join a Conference summoned to negotiate upon such a basis, they may have been ill-advised, but they can scarcely be blamed as severely as St. John and Swift taught the English to blame them. The Dutch, in particular, had ground of complaint. The late English Ministry had promised them certain specific advantages in the Barrier Treaty of 1709—a great military and commercial position in Belgium and equality with England of trading rights throughout the whole Spanish Empire. In return for that pledge, Holland had, at the bidding of England, most unwillingly rejected at Gertruydenberg the immense offers then made by Louis.† Scarcely more than a year had passed, and now a new English Ministry had torn up the Barrier Treaty, had joined with France in putting on Holland the blame for the rejection of the terms of Gertruydenberg, and had by a secret Treaty with Louis swept the *Asiento* and many other good things off the board on behalf of England, leaving the Dutch to jostle with the Austrians for such broken meats as they could find under the Conference table.

* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 380–381.

† See p. 32 above.

CHAPTER XII

The Battle for the Peace

I. *At Home*

Union of Holland, Austria, Hanover and the Whigs against the Preliminaries of October. Swift's *Conduct of the Allies*. The Whig bargain with Nottingham: Occasional Conformity Bill and 'No Peace without Spain' carried in the Lords. Ministerial counter-offensive: Creation of twelve Peers at New Year 1712. Walpole to the Tower. Marlborough dismissed. Prince Eugene's visit. Sir Roger in town. The Mohocks. Restraints on the Opposition Press. Two-party system as the defender of liberty. St. John's Peerage. Marlborough goes into exile.

The Tory Ministers had come to terms with France in the Preliminaries of October 1711. They had now to get this basis of the future Treaty of Peace accepted by Parliament, which was to meet before Christmas, and by the Allies, who were to be summoned to the Peace Conference early in the following year. In the event, the Ministers were compelled to extract this agreement by the strong hand: by putting on Swift to write down the Whigs and the Allies; by disgracing Marlborough; and by calling in the Queen to coerce the House of Lords. St. John, indeed, preferred such methods of active warfare, but Oxford regretted their necessity. And indeed it was only at the last moment that their necessity became evident. It was not certain in October that either Holland or the Whigs would altogether reject the Preliminaries and raise again, in face of fact, the belated slogan of 'No peace without Spain.'

In the early months of the Tory Ministry, the Dutch had been pacified by promises and fair words. They regretted the part they had been forced to play at Gertruydenberg at the behest of Austria and the Whigs. They were no longer wedded to the claim of Charles on the Spanish

Crown. They would even have accepted the Preliminaries of October, if England would have consented so far to modify them as to enforce the Barrier Treaty of 1709 and give Holland a share in the *Asiento* contract. But St. John regarded the terms of the Whig Barrier Treaty as injurious to British commerce both in the Netherlands and elsewhere, and moreover he knew that Louis would never give up all the towns named in that famous document—both Lille and Tournai for example—now that he had gone so far in concessions to England in other parts of the world. Even the trimming Oxford was pledged to secure the monopoly of the slave-trade in Spanish America for his own South Sea Company. The Dutch, therefore, indignant that we proposed to monopolize trade privileges we had bound ourselves by Treaty to share with them, went into opposition and concerted measures with Austria and the Whigs.*

But as late as November 1711 it had not been certain what line the Whigs themselves would take. Throughout that month Somers and Halifax were trying to get into touch with Oxford and drive a bargain with him.[209] They always believed in the possibility of separating him from St. John. Earlier in the year their plan had been that he should break with the October Club, and by the help of the Duchess of Somerset persuade the Queen to hold another General Election and revive the Coalition Ministry of six years before. They had discussed this with the agents of Hanover as the best way to secure the Protestant Succession. But Marlborough, when consulted by the Hanoverian agent, declared the plan impossible because public opinion was still strong against the Whigs, and a new General Election would not yield the desired result. He warned Hanover of the strength of Toryism and even of Jacobitism in the England of the hour.[210]

Could Marlborough, then, be induced by Oxford to separate himself from the Whigs and support the Peace? The Ministry could do much for him, or much against him.

* *Geyl*, pp. 26–29; *Montgomery*, pp. 187–238, especially pp. 224–225. I take the opportunity of calling attention to Mrs. Montgomery's excellent continuation of Geikie's work on the Dutch Barrier. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 158–159, and IX, pp. 293–297, 324; for the Barrier Treaty of 1709 see pp. 29–31 above.

Though the Queen had dismissed his wife from all her places at Court, he himself was still Captain-General—though not 'for life'—and held many great posts and emoluments: Oxford and he were still on terms. In March 1711 he had told the Hanoverian agent that he was pledged neither to the Tories nor to the Whigs. He had indeed little love for either of those 'vile enormous factions,' as he called them. But whichever way he might incline as between English parties, he was determined to preserve the favour of the future King George. Whatever formal protestations he might still make to Jacobite agents, for fear of a Restoration that he might not be able to prevent, the Duke was clear for Hanover. He gave the Elector's representatives confidential advice, and diagnosed the English situation for their benefit with clearer insight than the Whigs.

When, therefore, George, as a German Prince acting on European motives, denounced the October Preliminaries and a Peace without Spain, Marlborough had no choice but to follow suit. He must have been specially pleased with one phrase of the Elector's instructions to his envoy Bothmar in England: 'The defences of France are already pierced, and after taking one more fortress the Allies will be in the heart of the Kingdom and can have what terms they will.'[211]

The lead given by Hanover against the Peace was certain to be followed not only by the Duke but by the Whigs, and by all who had given up hope of further favours from Queen Anne and who looked for future patronage solely to her successors. For this reason George became the pivot of the formidable league of Allies and Whigs now formed for the continuance of the war. The Elector's belief that the foreign policy of the Tory Ministers was a betrayal of the Allied cause added fuel to the anger he felt against them as crypto-Jacobites. In return, his hostility to their foreign policy persuaded Queen Anne's servants that he would discard them as soon as he came to the throne; and that belief drove them ever more deeply into intrigues to bring about a Stuart Restoration in place of a Hanoverian Succession. It was a vicious circle. The cause of Peace and the cause of the Pretender became identified in the

minds of politicians. But the good sense of the English people managed to disentangle them in the end.

St. John foresaw and welcomed the coming fight for the Peace, and took early measures to prepare for the conflict. Swift's *Examiners* had marked out their author as the greatest political controversialist of the age, and his personal friendship with both the rival Tory chiefs made it peculiarly easy to employ him against a common foe. To get service out of Swift he must be treated as an equal, not as poor Defoe was always used. The easy intercourse of men of letters with the rulers of the land was brought to perfection by Oxford and St. John in the summer of 1711, when the Secretary founded his Club of 'Brothers'—Tory statesmen and authors—in rivalry to the Whig Kit-Cat. In his design their dinners were to have 'none of the extravagance of the Kit-Cat or the drunkenness of the Beefstake. The improvement of friendship, and the encouragement of letters are to be the two ends of our society. A number of valuable people will be kept in the same mind and others will be made converts to their opinions.' In this famous London dining club, Oxford, St. John, Swift, Arbuthnot and Prior were the leading members.[212]

In September and October 1711 the Treasurer and Secretary often took Swift down to Windsor in their coaches, and entertained him there overnight. There St. John gave him introduction to the inner secrets of State, the most irresistible of all forms of flattery. The Ministers' Jacobite intrigue with France was never revealed to the Irish Protestant, but since he was to defend the Peace, he was in other respects let deep into its inner counsels.

Windsor. Sept. 28, 1711. [Swift writes to Stella.] I came here a day sooner than ordinary at Mr. Secretary's desire, and supped with him and Prior and two private ministers from France and a French priest [Mesnager, Du Bois and the abbé Gaultier.] We have already settled all things with France, and very much to the honour and advantage of England; and the Queen is in mighty good humour. All this news is a mighty secret; the people in general know that a peace is forwarding. The Earl of Strafford is to go soon to Holland, to let them know of what we have been doing and then there will be the Devil and all to pay; but we'll make them swallow it with

a pox. The French ministers stayed with us till one, and the Secretary and I sat up talking till two.

In this manner St. John primed Swift with material for *The Conduct of the Allies*, the greatest of his pamphlets, which came out at the end of November, a week before the meeting of Parliament, with devastating effects on the enemies of Peace.

With that cold, concentrated force with which Swift could state a case, he placed before the English world the valid arguments for a 'Peace without Spain.' He exposed the monstrous extravagance of refusing Louis's offers of 1709–10, and the futility of our conduct in the Peninsula, which Marlborough and the Whigs had treated as a primary object in diplomacy, yet as only a secondary object of their military endeavour. He carried the public mind back to the terms of William's Treaty of Grand Alliance of 1701, containing the original war aims of the Allies, which St. John made it his boast to obtain with additional advantages to England. In that Treaty, as Swift most pertinently reminded the public, there had been 'not a syllable' of engaging to drive Philip out of Spain.

The Conduct of the Allies materially helped to obtain peace for Europe on the only possible terms. But some of its pleadings were sophistical and unfair, particularly as regards the early years of the war. The true argument for Peace in 1711 would only have been strengthened by the admission that Marlborough had saved Europe and England from the dominion of France. The restoration of the Balance of Power, and the expulsion of the French from Bavaria, Italy and Belgium were not only great British achievements but greatly to the interest of Britain. Yet Swift thought fit to argue that we had gained no advantage for ourselves out of the war, but had been used all through as the mere tools of Austria and Holland. According to him we ought to have allowed Holland and Germany to defend themselves as best they could in Europe, while our fleet possessed itself of the Spanish colonies. We should have remained indifferent to the fate of Belgium, Italy and Germany. St. John knew better, as his past conduct and his later writings both prove. But in 1711 it was his cue to make his countrymen forget all that they owed to Marlborough, and to turn the current of popular antipathy away

from France into hatred of Austria and Holland.* In this, with Swift's help, he largely succeeded, and so, by a false and ungrateful reading of the past, helped to secure a satisfactory liquidation of the future. It is often so 'in the corrupted currents of this world.' It is not always the truest argument for a right course that weighs the most in a party fight.

The effect of *The Conduct of the Allies* was prodigious upon the small educated public that made up the political world of that day. Eleven thousand copies were sold in a month—'a great number,' said Dr. Johnson, 'at that time, when we were not yet a nation of readers.' A week after the day of its publication, a Christ Church don wrote to Edward Harley, 'The book of the management of the Allies and the late Ministry takes, as much as you could wish it. It will put the country gentlemen in the temper you desire; they are very ready to battle it at home for peace abroad.' [213]

The cause of peace had need of all the help that Swift could bring, for as the Christmas session of Parliament drew near, the Opposition became more and more confident, and the Ministerialists more and more uneasy and divided. In such an atmosphere a defeat in the Lords might bring the government down if it could not depend on the hearty and unanimous backing of its great majority in the Commons.

In November Lord Poulett wrote to Oxford,

> The Queen's enemies at present generally understand one another much better than her friends and servants. The adversaries have been a long time prepared for a meeting which will decide the fate of Europe as well as Britain.[214]

The great Tory majority in the Commons was rent by schisms. St. John, after Oxford had gone up to the Lords, was heading the party of discontent against his rule. The cry was raised that Oxford refused to turn all Whigs out of army, magistracy and civil service. Those High Tories

* In February 1712 the Commons passed a series of Resolutions accusing the Dutch of having failed to supply their quota of men, ships and subsidies throughout the war. These complaints (*Parl. Hist.*, VI, 1090) should be carefully compared with the answer made by the States General (*P.R.O.* (*S.P.*) 87, 4, ff. 190–207). On the whole I think the Dutch reply has the best of the matter. In proportion to their lesser numbers and wealth the Dutch war effort had been magnificent; as a State they had crippled themselves by expenditure on the war far more than we. A much better case could have been made out as against Austria.

who had not got jobs for themselves or their relations, held that they were being cheated of the spoils due to the victors. Some who had the least claims to reward made themselves formidable by uniting in a ' March Club,' asserting that the ' October Club ' men had already sold themselves to government. Oxford was fain to buy off the ' March ' men with promises of favours to come. But the loaves and fishes would not go round among so many, unless the Queen and her Treasurer were prepared to dismiss every Whig and Moderate from the civil and military service, to the ruin of those establishments. This, to their credit, they refused to do, as they had refused under similar conditions nine years before.[215]

In these circumstances the Whig Chiefs, a few days before Parliament met, once more approached Oxford with offers of alliance. They were prepared to help him to pass an Occasional Conformity Bill in the House of Lords, where it was thought that it could not get through if opposed by the Whigs. In return, no doubt, they expected him to reconstruct the Ministry and revise the Peace terms.[216]

Oxford rejected the dangerous alliance. He believed in the peace policy of his own government. There was real conviction in the words he wrote at this time to the Duke of Somerset, in defence of St. John's treaty with France :

> No honest or wise man will take upon him the consequences which will follow the defeating this opportunity, for if the arts and restlessness of any here should wrest this treaty out of the Queen's hands, there will be a peace, but such a one, whenever it is, as Britain will have no share in, either of honour, safety or profit.[217]

The Whigs had been unable to ensnare Oxford, but they had captured Nottingham. That tall, melancholy, dark-browed man, in the long old-fashioned coat with deep pockets, looked and was exactly the same honest ' Dismal ' as he had been when chief Secretary of State in Anne's first Cabinet. He had resigned in 1704 on High Tory principles, but six years later Harley had left him out of the reconstructed Ministry, and he was now reported among his former colleagues to be ' as sour and fiercely wild as you can imagine anything to be that has lived long in the desert.' [218]

The Whigs approached this isolated but still formidable relic of a past generation, and entered into alliance with

him on terms. It was agreed that, on the day Parliament opened, Nottingham should move an amendment to the Address pledging the Lords against a Peace without Spain, on condition that the Whig Lords should allow him to pass an Occasional Conformity Bill at the expense of their nonconformist clients.* The Dissenters were gravely discontented at the bargain, but their lordly latitudinarian patrons said the lesser must give way to the greater cause. Only thus, they argued, would the Pope be checkmated and the Hanoverian Succession secured.[219]

The Whigs were sacrificing their principles of religious toleration to their factious desire to overthrow the Ministry and the Peace. But Nottingham, narrow and upright as ever, had sacrificed nothing of his real opinions. He had never changed his views of ten years before in favour of the Occasional Conformity Bill, and against the cession of Spain to King Philip. He had always been singular among statesmen, Whig and Tory, in regarding the enthronement of the Austrian Charles at Madrid as the prime object of the whole war.† But though ' Dismal ' was, as usual, consistent and righteous, it was only natural that the Tories should denounce him as a traitor, bought and sold to the Whigs for office.

Swift delighted the town with one of his scorching pasquinades :

> An orator dismal of Nottinghamshire
> Who has forty years let out his conscience to hire,
> Out of zeal for his country and want of a place
> Is come up, *vi et armis*, to break the Queen's peace.
> ' But some will cry Turncoat and rip up old stories
> ' How I always pretended to be for the Tories.
> ' I answer : the Tories were in my good graces,
> ' Till all my relations were put into places.
> ' But still I'm in principle ever the same,
> ' And will quit my best friends, while I'm *Not-in-game*.'

The Whigs, on the other hand, went round in triumph, extolling his patriotic virtue, drinking his health, and crying out in all companies ' It is *Dismal* will save England at last.'

* On the Principles of the Occasional Conformity Bill see *Blenheim*, pp. 277 *et seq.*

† See *Blenheim*, p. 303.

For some days all went well with the plot. Nottingham's motion that in the opinion of the Lords 'no peace could be safe or honourable to Great Britain or Europe if Spain and the West Indies were allotted to any branch of the House of Bourbon' was supported by Marlborough and the Whigs and carried by 62 to 54. Oxford, it was said had been negligent in whipping up his men; in particular eight 'proxies' of absent Scottish Peers had not been sent in time. A few days later the Occasional Conformity Bill was hurried through their Lordships' House where it had so often before suffered shipwreck. It became law, only to be repealed under George I.

Dec. 7 1711

But no one in town, except Nottingham and the Dissenters, gave more than a passing thought to the Occasional Bill. It was the Lords' vote against Peace without Spain that made the crisis. To our generation it may seem strange that a hostile vote on Foreign Policy in the Lords should be regarded as a fatal obstacle to a government with a majority of two to one in the Commons. But so it was. The relative position of the two Houses and the customs of the Constitution were then such that the Ministry was regarded as destroyed unless it could reverse the vote. Even Swift declared to Mrs. Masham that Oxford and the Queen had betrayed them and that all was lost.

> The Whigs are all in triumph; they foretold how all this would be, but we thought it boasting. Nay they said the Parliament should be dissolved before Christmas and perhaps it may. This is all your damned Duchess of Somerset's doing. . . . I was this morning with Mr. Secretary; we are both of opinion that the Queen is false. . . . Lewis believes that sooner than turn out the Duchess of Somerset she will dissolve the Parliament and get a Whiggish one, which may be done by managing the elections.[220]

But the Queen was not false. She and Oxford had yet a shot in their locker. At the New Year, Anne created twelve Tory Peers and the situation was saved. Mrs. Masham's husband was one of the dozen. The Queen and her Treasurer had planned the *coup* without the knowledge of the other members of the Cabinet. Dartmouth, the second Secretary of State, tells us:

Jan. 1 1712

> I was never so much surprised as when the Queen drew a list of twelve lords from her pocket, and ordered me to bring warrants for them, there not having been the least intimation before it was put in execution. I asked her if she designed to have them all made at once. She asked me if I had any exceptions to the legality of it. I said no, but very much doubted the expediency, for I feared it would have a very ill effect in the House of Lords and no good one in the Kingdom. I thought it my duty to tell her my apprehensions as well as execute her commands. She thanked me and said she liked it as little as I did, but did not find that anybody could propose a better expedient.

When Dartmouth afterwards expostulated with Oxford, he replied that he was tired of depending on the venal Scottish Lords 'for they now come to expect a reward for every vote they give.' On this occasion it was Oxford who had acted with decision.[221]

If some members of the Cabinet that was saved by this timely use of the prerogative thought that it was straining the custom of the Constitution, it may be imagined how furious were the Whigs. But they found that they were helpless. The spirited action of the Treasurer rallied the Tory malcontents enthusiastically round his standard—for the last time. No one could dispute the Queen's legal prerogative to make Peers; all that the Opposition leaders could do was to say it was unparalleled in our history, redolent of James II, and so forth.[222] But nobody marked them. Tory enthusiasm, English loyalty to the Crown and national thirst for peace were blended in a passion that overwhelmed the Whig and Allied resistance.

No political event of the reign at once excited and amused the Town to the same degree. Not only had the Ministry and the Peace been saved by an unexpected and novel stroke of policy, but twelve brand new Peers at a batch afforded a fine subject for gossip, jealousy and jokes. Wharton rose to the occasion in the Lords by asking the twelve, when they took their seats, 'whether they voted by their foreman.' Shrewsbury's Italian Duchess—so the story ran—went to call on Lady Oxford and said 'Madam, I and my Lord are so weary of talking Politics. What are you and your Lord?' The pious Lady Oxford sighed and answered that 'she knew no Lord but the Lord Jehovah.'

'O dear! Madam, who is that?' cried the Duchess, who had not been brought up on the Bible, 'I believe 'tis one of the new titles, for I never heard of him before.' A year later the actress Elizabeth Barry died of a fever, and in her delirium kept repeating with her last breath a line of her own composition:

Ha, ha! and so they make us Lords by dozens![223]

A new constitutional weapon had been forged. A precedent had been created which was to slumber for more than a hundred years, but never to be forgotten. Owing to the action that Queen Anne had taken at Oxford's request, Lord Grey was able to persuade the reluctant William IV that a method other than that of revolution existed, by which the resistance of the Peers to the Reform Bill could be overcome. And the Parliament Act of 1911 was passed by the same means. In those later cases the numbers to be created were greater, and partly for that reason the threat to create was used in place of actual creation. But Oxford and Queen Anne must divide between them the credit of making our Constitution so elastic that it has been able to survive.

The country, it is to be feared, had by now had from the Queen and her Treasurer the best part of their long and great service. Oxford's habitual caution henceforth degenerated into sluggishness that refused to take decisions, accompanied by a physical deterioration that rumour associated with heavy drinking. Anne's increasing ill-health rendered her equally incapable of action. Neither were ever again on a level with the circumstances that they were called on to control.

The defeat of the Whigs was followed up and soon turned into a rout. It was determined first to strike down the two most formidable leaders of Opposition: Walpole, St. John's only rival in the House of Commons, whose place in the counsels of his party was now co-ordinate with that of Somers or Wharton; and Marlborough, whose command of the Allied armies on the French border still gave hope to the war party in Europe of dictating Peace in Paris without the help of St. John.

In that era it was easy to charge adversaries with corruption by treating the financial irregularities permitted by the loose customs of the age as crimes in the particular case of the accused. It was usually the pot who indicted the kettle for blackness: St. John led the attack on Walpole and Marlborough for taking illicit commissions.

In the previous April an ill-prepared accusation against Walpole had completely broken down in face of the facts.*

Jan. 12 1712

In December a smaller but more authentic charge against him was debated in the House of Commons, and a fortnight after the creation of the twelve Peers, he was lodged in the Tower. The Speaker, Bromley, had told St. John that the removal of Walpole from the House was the '*unum necessarium*.'

He had done a thing of which no English statesman in the Nineteenth Century would have dreamt for a moment, but which few in Queen Anne's reign really regarded as wrong. As Secretary-at-War he had assisted his relative and estate-agent Robert Mann to enjoy £1,000 out of a forage contract for the troops. Walpole himself had touched nothing directly.† He was expelled from the Commons House. But the dwindling of the majorities against him showed that many Tory members considered the proceedings vindictive. Walpole was voted guilty of corruption by 57, expelled the House by 22 and committed to the Tower by no more than twelve votes. His constituents of King's Lynn showed their sense of the proceedings by re-electing him, though the Commons voted his re-election to be void. He was extolled by all his party as a martyr. When in July he was released from the Tower he came out with an increased reputation and at once resumed his leading place in the politics of the day.[224]

The very similar attack on Marlborough was an affair of European importance, regarded abroad as a monstrous

* See pp. 107–108 above.

† It seems possible, though not certain, that he benefited indirectly. Mann's son is recorded to have said in conversation that the sum 'received by Mr. Walpole out of the forage contract was intended solely for Mr. Mann's use; who had advanced money to Sir Robert during his necessities.' Mr. Stirling Taylor (*Walpole*, p. 118) thinks this proves 'that the payment to Mann was to settle a loan.' But the words do not make this clear. Walpole may have paid the loan off before.

example of national ingratitude. It can best be defended as a measure deemed necessary in order to secure the Peace. To prevent the serious renewal of warfare next Spring, it was considered essential to replace the fighting Duke by a general more in touch with the Queen's Ministers and less in touch with her Allies, one who would be ready to exchange confidences with Villars but not with Eugene. This can be well understood. But it was unfortunate that Oxford and St. John dared not remove Marlborough in favour of Ormonde, until they had blackened his face by charges of corruption, which should complete the picture that Swift and the smaller fry of party hacks were busily painting of him for the benefit of a credulous public.

Two main charges were brought in the House of Commons against Marlborough. Sir Solomon Medina, who contracted for bread for the allied armies, stated that between 1702 and 1711 he had paid the Duke over £63,000 in commissions. The second charge was that the Duke had taken 2½ per cent., amounting to over £280,000, from the pay of the foreign troops in English employ.

The affair of the 2½ per cent. was an entirely frivolous accusation. The Duke showed that it was the custom for Commanders-in-chief openly to receive that amount in lieu of secret service money for the purposes of war. He showed that Anne had specifically sanctioned the arrangement in his case ; there indeed was the Queen's signature ! And no one who knows anything of Marlborough's methods of warfare can doubt that the best 'informed' general of his age must have spent great sums on secret service.[225]

The other charge of receiving commissions on Medina's bread contracts was more serious, and in later times would have been regarded as corrupt. But when Marlborough declared that he had used the money for secret service, it was not possible to prove how much or how little he had so spent. Too close an accounting might have been foregone by the nation he had saved and enriched. He had served England as she had never been served before with the military intelligence he had bought, and by the splendid use he had made of it in so many glorious campaigns. Other statesmen and generals took commissions and gave the nation

nothing in return. His chief accuser had a few months before filled his pockets with illicit commissions on the Quebec expedition, without any question of paying for secret service, and without taking Quebec ! Moreover, in spite of the Duke's commissions on the bread contracts, no army had ever been supplied so well and so regularly as Marlborough's men. It was not they who grudged him his perquisites, for he had fed them and led them to victory.

As soon as the charges against Marlborough had been formulated, but before they been examined, the Queen, who owed to him the success and glory of her reign, sent him a letter of dismissal from all his offices, couched in terms 'so very offensive that the Duke flung it into the fire, though he was not a man of passion.' It was a sorry end to one of the world's famous friendships.[226]

Dec. 31 1711

The country as a whole had rather more gratitude than the forgetful Queen and the politicians fighting for their places. Many Englishmen were ashamed to see the Duke treated so. In the month following his disgrace, his levees were more crowded than ever ; and passers by cheered him in the street. From the provinces it was reported that 'Tories as well as Whigs drank to the health of the Duke of Marlborough.'[227]

Within a few days of his dismissal, his friend and co-rival in fame landed in England. Prince Eugene was sent over by the new Emperor, Charles VI, to use his influence to stop a Peace without Spain. He was to make the belated offer that 30,000 Austrian and Imperialist troops should be sent to the Peninsula for the campaign of 1712 : it ought to have been done years before. Eugene came to atone for the failure of the Emperor's Envoy, Count Gallas, who had openly consorted with the Whigs and whose remonstrances and intrigues against the Peace had been too audacious. The Queen had, in November, forbidden him the Court and asked for his recall. It was thought in Vienna that neither Anne nor her Ministers would dare to be rude to Eugene.[228]

Jan. 1712

And indeed he was received not only with respect but with universal enthusiasm. Government and Opposition vied with each other in making him welcome, and in using

him each for its own ends. The Whigs praised him as the friend and partner in war of their injured hero, come over to help him avert a disgraceful peace. The Tories hailed him no less loudly, as a greater general and a nobler man than Marlborough.* But the friendship that bound these two soldiers of genius, singularly incapable of jealousy, was proof even against the flattery of the Tories crying out that Marlborough had slain his thousands and Eugene his tens of thousands. The prince was seen everywhere in company with the Duke, but otherwise had the wisdom to avoid the Opposition and consort with the Ministerialists, little as he liked their politics. 'The mob,' wrote Lady Strafford from St. James's Square, 'are so fond of Prince Eugene that his coach can hardly go about, and he is in some danger of being killed with good cheer.'[229]

Eugene's visit, as Swift had prophesied, 'came too late to do the Whigs any good.' It had no effect on our politics, but it is still remembered in our literature: for Sir Roger de Coverley came up all the way from Worcestershire to see 'Prince Eugenio,' and 'stand in some convenient place where he might have full sight of that extraordinary man, whose presence does so much honour to the British nation.' It was January, and the good Tory baronet took occasion to describe to his friend the *Spectator* his recent Christmas festivities, when he had as usual kept open house in the country and 'killed eight fat hogs,' sending 'a string of hog's puddings with a pack of cards to every poor family in the parish. He then launched out into praise of the late Act of Parliament for securing the Church of England, and told me, with great satisfaction, that he believed it already began to take effect; for that a rigid Dissenter who chanced to dine at his house on Christmas Day,

* For an example of the Whig treatment of Eugene's visit see Mrs. Centlivre's dedication of her play *The Perplexed Lovers* to the Prince:

> 'Eugene and Marlboro', names to Europe dear,
> True heroes born and brothers in the War. . . .
> When shall true merit meet with due regard,
> And friends to France be England's foes declared?'

For an example of the Tory line on Eugene see *Mayor*, p. 373: 'Prince Eugene extolled for his generosity but Marlborough abused for his avarice' on the London stage.

had been observed to eat very plentifully of his plum porridge.'[230]

Addison had brought Sir Roger to town at a bad moment in one respect, for general alarm was being felt at the outrages of the 'Mohocks.' These gangs, called after the Red Indians who had recently visited London, consisted of young law-students joined to 'persons of quality,' who infested the streets at night, beat the watch, assaulted peaceable citizens, slit the noses of men, rolled women in barrels down Snow Hill and made themselves a terror to all. The Tories declared that they were Whigs intending to murder the Ministry, but they seem to have been only extremists of the eternal faction of Falstaff's 'Minions of the Moon,' and Milton's 'Sons of Belial, swoln with insolence and wine.' *

For fear of the Mohocks, the slow and solemn procession of Sir Roger's coach to the theatre was well guarded by his friends:

> Captain Sentry bid Sir Roger fear nothing, for that he had put on the same sword which he made use of at the battle of Steenkirk. Sir Roger's servants, and among the rest my old friend the butler, had, I found, provided themselves with good oaken plants. When we had placed him in his coach, with myself at his left hand, the Captain before him, and his butler at the head of his footmen in the rear, we conveyed him in safety to the Playhouse.[231]

It is to be feared that in this imperfect world there were other types of country gentlemen besides those truly resembling Addison's Sir Roger de Coverley. In these same early months of 1712 a certain Herbert Jacob wrote from the innocent rural parts to a friend in the wicked town:

> I cannot entertain you in so elegant a manner as you have done me, the conversaton of the country gentlemen running chiefly upon a comparison of their irregularities, in which he seems to be the most esteemed who goes the greatest lengths. An extravagant debauch generally concludes with a bottle or two of sheer brandy, and a journey of six or seven miles at midnight when you can't see your hand.[232]

* A sham plot, after the fashion of Oates' had been invented by a Jacobite spy Plunket, a pupil of the Jesuits. According to this yarn Marlborough and Eugene had plotted to seize the Tower, set fire to London, and murder the Ministers. The intended victims, however, did not believe in their danger. *Leadam*, pp. 193–194; *Coxe*, Chap. CVII, pp. 491–495, ed. 1819; *Klopp*, XIV, p. 256; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 282–283, 309–311, 451–456.

These night rides home of the inebriated squire or farmer, under overhanging trees, were as much dreaded as the death-dealing smallpox, and kept anxious wives awake till the pale-faced morning, when the riderless steed grazing at the front door sent the frightened servants out to search the wayside ditches.

Meanwhile in town the pamphlet and newspaper war was raging at its height. It was the greatest moment in the literary quality of our political literature. To the genius of Swift, Addison and Defoe was now added that of Arbuthnot. The good-natured Tory doctor wrote a squib in favour of peace, *The History of John Bull*, which kept appearing in parts throughout the year 1712 ; its comparison of the War to a law suit between country neighbours can still be read with fresh delight, and it fixed for ever the name of ' John Bull ' on the Englishman. Arbuthnot's portrait of the rough, generous, irascible, obstinate but persuadable countryman was no bad type of the English public of that day, and remained so a hundred years later when Gillray and the elder Doyle immortalized his rustic lineaments in art.

Meanwhile Swift's *Conduct of the Allies* provoked many answers : the most voluminous were by Francis Hare, Marlborough's campaign chaplain, destined to Bishoprics in the piping days of Whig prosperity and Hanoverian peace. St. John, vexed with the continued enemy resistance, bethought him that a heavy tax on pamphlets and newspapers would silence the small fry of Opposition, while Government could pay Swift and their own men to continue their work. He therefore passed a Stamp Tax at the rate of a penny a sheet on newspapers and pamphlets, and a shilling on every advertisement appearing in a public print. It came into force at the beginning of August 1712, and already on the 7th Swift wrote to Stella :

> Do you know that Grub Street is dead and gone last week ! No more ghosts or murders for love or money. I plied it pretty close the last fortnight, and published at least seven penny papers of my own besides some of other peoples : but now every simple half sheet pays a halfpenny to the Queen. The *Observator* is fallen ; the *Medleys* are jumbled together with the *Flying Post* ; the *Examiner* is deadly sick ; the *Spectator* keeps up and doubles its price.

As between the parties the tax made less difference than St. John had hoped, for the Whigs clubbed together and subsidized their prints. Pamphlets still rained thick as leaves in Vallombrosa, during the last two years of Queen Anne. But, for good or evil, the cheap popular press was gone, until in the nineteenth century the abolition of ' taxes on knowledge ' became a policy of Liberal Governments.[233]

It is a remarkable proof of the degree to which habits of liberty had taken root in the island since the Revolution, that St. John never ventured to attain his object more directly by passing an Act to revive the Censorship of the Press, though it had only been abolished in 1695. Opposition writers and printers could publish whatever they liked or could afford, but they still ran the considerable risks of prosecution for sedition or libel. The government prosecuted freely, urged on by Swift :

> These devils in Grub Street, rogues, that write the *Flying Post* and *Medley* in one paper, will not be quiet. They are always mauling Lord Treasurer, Lord Bolingbroke and me. We have the dog under prosecution, but Bolingbroke is not active enough. He is a Scotch rogue, one Ridpath.

But even this form of repression was limited by the fact that, under the Revolution Settlement, the Judges were irremovable except at the demise of the Crown. The Chief Justice, Parker, had been appointed just before the Whig Ministry fell : there he was fixed upon the Bench, at least until the Queen died. He refused to favour Jacobite as against Whig pamphleteers who were brought before him, and even made some attempt to discover and restrain the nominally anonymous author of *The Conduct of the Allies*. Swift was so angry that he invented and published the absurd statement that the Whig judge ' often drank the abdicated King's health upon his knees.' [234]

Nevertheless, in spite of Parker, a good many Opposition writers and printers were sent to prison. Walpole could find no one venturous enough to print one of his pamphlets, so he issued it from a press which he had set up in his own house.[235] But the wonder is, not that some Opposition writers were punished and others frightened into caution, but that all were not silenced. The reason was that the

two-party system protected the infant liberty of discussion. Whether Tories or Whigs were in Opposition, they stood by their men when the Government threatened them. The smallest printer or publisher's hack could hope to have the whole Whig or the whole Tory party behind him if he was prosecuted by the State. Our formidable factions, for all their nonsense and violence, served to protect the liberty of the subject. It is only in States based on the less civilized principle that no party may exist save the party of government, that liberty of press and person can be totally destroyed, whether in the Eighteenth or the Twentieth Century. That is not the English tradition.*

At midsummer St. John felt entitled to press for the reward of his many services. He had been promised that, if he remained to lead the Commons till the end of the session, he should be promoted to a rank higher than the 'jury' of twelve Barons who had been sent up before him to carry the Peace. At the beginning of the recess he wrote, with affected humility, to ask Oxford whether their mistress would revive in him the title of Earl of Bolingbroke, far as he said it was above his pretensions and deserts. The Queen took his humility at its face value, and made him a Viscount instead. It was a cruel blow. St. John, after a belated attempt to remain in the Commons rather than appear in the Lords with a rank below that of the Earls of Oxford and Dartmouth, took his Viscounty with an anger he no longer pretended to conceal. 'This caused a new ferment,' wrote Oxford sardonically, 'because he was not an Earl, and it rose to a great height against Lady Masham and everybody except the person who encouraged him and yet spoke against it [Lord Keeper, Harcourt?]. The Treasurer did all he could to calm this, and without any occasion Lord Bolingbroke was permitted to go to Paris to please him.' There was more 'occasion' for the chief

July 1712

* In the Record Office (*P.R.O., S.P.*, 11–15) we find constant informations sent up by partisans in the country to the Secretary's office in London, denouncing words alleged to have been spoken against government by individuals—Tory words till late 1710, Whig words after the change of Ministry. But prosecutions are seldom undertaken as a result of these relations; *e.g.* in June 1711 (15, f. 160) enquiry is made, and the conclusion reached that 'Mr. Shanklin is a Dissenter but a quiet man and not likely to have spoken such words.'

English negotiator to go to France at that moment than Oxford allowed. But no doubt it was some assuagement to Bolingbroke's hot fit of pride, to be received at Versailles as the great man. To the end of his life he considered he had been grossly ill used in the matter of the peerage, and in the next reign he wrote to Sir William Wyndham, 'I was dragged into the House of Lords in such a manner as to make my promotion a punishment, not a reward; and was there left to defend the treaties almost alone. I thought my mistress treated me ill.' In October matters were made worse: as many as six Knights of the Garter were created, including the Treasurer but not the Secretary; this, wrote Oxford, 'gave new occasion for disquiet.' Such matters may sound trivial now, but they did not seem trivial to the men concerned. The fate of the Kingdom was likely, when Anne died, to turn on the personal relations of Oxford and Bolingbroke, and they were growing worse with every month that passed.*

During the greater part of 1712 the Marlboroughs lingered on in England, retired from the political scene, in their pleasant house of Hollywell, near St. Albans, for Blenheim was not yet ready for habitation. The Duke was ill and they were both unhappy. In September they lost their one close political and personal friend, Godolphin, who died conjuring Sarah never to desert 'the young man,' Robert Walpole. Had the dying ex-Prime Minister an instinct that this 'young man' would some day govern England as he himself had striven to govern it, with a steady eye fixed on the moderate courses that bring prosperity to a nation? [236]

Godolphin, though he had been so long in control of the Treasury, had accumulated no private fortune for himself. The worst that his enemies could find to say against him on this score was that he had provided for his son by

* Swift, on July 17, wrote to Stella: 'You hear Secretary St. John is made viscount Bullinbrook. I can hardly persuade him to take that title, because the eldest branch of his family had it in an earldom and it was last year extinct.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 194, 198, 465. See also Bolingbroke's letter to Strafford, July 23, 1712, *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 484–485: 'I remain clothed with as little of the Queen's favour as she could contrive to bestow.'

marrying him into the Marlborough inheritance. The great financier had, in an age of corruption, served his country with clean hands. And he had done more for England than many who are more often remembered and praised.[237]

The Marlboroughs were not on good terms with any of the Whig Lords except Cowper, yet they were exposed to the ever-growing rage of Tory denunciation and slander. The pamphleteers no longer even allowed that the Duke was a good general—he had 'once been fortunate' at Blenheim! They circulated with fresh detail every lie that had ever been invented against him. In May Lord Poulett, a Minister of the Crown, publicly accused him of having wasted the lives of his soldiers in war, in order to fill his pockets with the sale of the dead officers' commissions. Such was the language of the hour. Many declared that he must be 'pursued to the blood.' A secret message was sent to Torcy on behalf of the English Ministers to assure the French King that they would 'cut off the head' of the man who had so often beaten his armies in the field. It is not likely they intended to carry their friendship with France so far, but they were glad to gain credit for good intentions.[238]

At last he took the alarm that if he stayed he might be prosecuted. By arrangement with Oxford, he obtained passports and at the end of November caught the Ostend packet and went into voluntary exile till better times. There he put himself in close touch with the House of Hanover and prepared to command the anti-Jacobite armies in case a War of Succession broke out in England, whereas if he had stayed at home, the friends of James in the Ministry might have arrested him before striking their blow.

He was joined by the Duchess in Holland, where the pair of lovers were consoled by each other's company, and by the enthusiastic honours everywhere paid to them by the Dutch people and government, as well as by the soldiers of the allied armies whom he had so often led to victory. According to Sarah's observation at Maestricht, even the Catholics of Holland 'fear the power of France so much that they drink to the Protestant Succession.' Nevertheless she wrote 'I think 'tis much better to be dead than to live out of England.'[239]

CHAPTER XIII

The Battle for the Peace

II. *Abroad*

Opening of the Peace Conference. Nature of the Dutch grievance. High French demands. Renewed secret negotiations between England and France. Question of the French Succession: Philip's choice of Spain. The Restraining Orders to Ormonde. The British troops withdrawn. Dunkirk and Denain. Bolingbroke's visit to France. The gains of Prussia, Savoy and Portugal. Holland submits. Final crisis of February 1713: Bolingbroke's Ultimatum to Torcy. The Case of the Catalans. Signing of the Treaties of Utrecht. Holland and England in the new era.

By January 1712 the battle for the Peace had been decided at home, but it had still to be won abroad. Queen Anne's Ministers had still to coerce their incensed Allies into accepting a settlement of everything in Europe and America at the dictation of England, and at the same time to prevent France from recovering her power and reasserting her own claims under cover of the fierce dissensions of her opponents.

This formidable task was accomplished in the course of 1712 by the bold unscrupulous energy of Bolingbroke. It is true that the French took some advantage of the situation, and secured, in Bolingbroke's own opinion, a better fortress-frontier than they should have been allowed.* But in the main he succeeded in imposing England's will on Europe. And in so doing he gave the world a peace that proved more suited to the needs of the new century than the post-Napoleonic Treaties of Vienna, or the Versailles Treaty of our own day.

* *Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht*, pp. 121–123. All through this chapter I give St. John his title of Bolingbroke, though in fact he only acquired it in July 1712.

But the actual terms of Utrecht are not the whole of the question. The methods employed to obtain them have also to be condemned or condoned. Bolingbroke's coercion of the Allies by deserting their side in the last campaign of the war was regarded by half the world as a blot on England's scutcheon, and will continue to rouse acute controversy as long as history is read. Incidentally it involved him and his personal followers more deeply than ever with the Jacobite cause at home and abroad, and fixed immovably the prejudice of the Elector of Hanover against the Tory party, with important consequences to the future government of Great Britain.

The question how far these methods were justified by necessity is not simple : it cannot be disposed of either by abusing Bolingbroke as ' a rascal,' or by writing off the Dutch as ' grasping traders.' Bolingbroke was not the first or the last statesman to do great things by questionable methods ; and the English at Utrecht ' grasped ' a great deal more for their ' trade ' than the Dutch were able to do. The question must be approached without passion, for it is highly complicated, and there is much to be understood before a right judgment can be formed.*

When the Congress of Powers assembled in the pleasant Dutch city of Utrecht in the last days of January 1712, for the purpose of making a general peace, the situation might well have appalled anyone less resourceful than Bolingbroke. Each several Ally was furious with England for having secured her own interests by a separate negotiation with France, in disregard of the Eighth Article of the Treaty of Grand Alliance. Nor was the point merely formal, for now that France had conceded so much to England, she would certainly concede less to others. England had been helped first out of the dish. Even her favourite allies, Savoy and Prussia, who eventually did well enough at Utrecht, had nothing definite settled on their behalf when the Congress opened. Austria only knew that she was not to have Spain.

* The attacks on Bolingbroke are legion. The best short defence of him will be found in Mr. Wickham Legg's Introduction (pp. xviii–xxii) to *Diplomatic Instructions, France, 1689–1721* (*R.H.S.* 1925). But Mr. Legg omits to state the Dutch case.

But the Dutch statesmen were in the worst plight of all. Not only had the extent of their Barrier in the Netherlands to be defined all over again, but England had secured beforehand a monopoly of trade with Spanish America, in disregard of the Dutch rights to equal treatment in this matter, which had been guaranteed to Holland by British statesmen in the Barrier Treaty of 1709. Moreover, Bolingbroke had, contrary to Dutch wishes and interests, seized the control of Mediterranean trade for England by annexing Gibraltar and Port Mahon as bases for her fleet. It was because of trade, not because of Philip's claim on Spain, that Holland in January 1712 still refused to accept the English terms of Peace.*

Into this powder magazine of discontent and mutual recrimination among the allied powers, the French deliberately dropped a bombshell. In February 1712, as the first important event of the Congress, they presented terms so monstrous that even the English were aghast. The French proposed that the Spanish Netherlands should go to the Elector of Bavaria, and a long list of fortresses on that frontier be restored to Louis.[240] The proposal could scarcely have been worse for England and Holland if they had lost the battle of Ramillies. Belgium was to be given to the ally of France !

After this bad beginning, followed by counter proposals from various Powers which led to no agreement, Utrecht ceased for many months to be the true centre of affairs. ' Her Majesty is fully determined to let all negotiations sleep in Holland,' [241] wrote the Secretary of State. Our plenipotentiaries there, the Bishop of Bristol and Lord Strafford, did nothing in particular with becoming dignity,

* *Bolingbroke* (*Defence of Utrecht*, p. 125) writes : ' That the Dutch were not averse to all treaty, but meant none wherein Great Britain was to have any particular advantage will appear from this ; that their Minister declared himself ready and authorized to stop the opposition made to the Queen's measures by presenting a memorial wherein he would declare *that his masters entered into them and were resolved not to continue the war for the recovery of Spain, provided the Queen would consent that they should garrison Gibraltar and Port Mahon jointly with us, and share equally the Asiento, the South Sea ship, and whatever should be granted by the Spaniards to the Queen and her subjects.*' There is much other evidence that this was the Dutch attitude, e.g. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 158–159, IX, p. 324 ; Scelle, *La traite négrière*, II, pp. 576–577.

while Bolingbroke resumed the method of secret treating with Versailles. In 1711 he and Torcy had thrashed out the terms for England : in 1712 they set themselves to bargain, with the same secrecy, on the terms to be accorded to the various Allies.

Possibly this was the only way of arriving at any general settlement at all. It had been the way in which William had arranged the terms of Ryswick with France on behalf of all Europe. But it is more open to question whether, while negotiating with France on the fate of the world, Bolingbroke should not have continued to apply military pressure upon her in concert with the Allies for whose interests he had now undertaken to bargain. He chose the opposite course, and the English army stood aside while the enemy won battles and took towns. For he was more afraid of Dutch than of French resistance to his plans.

Was this very grave decision wholly a matter of cool calculation on his part ? Was there not also an element of inclination and passion ? Bolingbroke's letters this year display contempt and anger for the Dutch and close friendliness to the French Court. ' They ne'er pardon who have done the wrong.' Since we were cheating the Dutch ' in matters of commerce,' tearing up our previous Treaties as if they had been mere ' scraps of paper,' it was necessary to malign those whom we injured. The Secretary had come to believe the things that Swift and Arbuthnot wrote at his instigation about Holland for the delighted and self-righteous English public.*

But although Bolingbroke was wilfully blind to the Dutch case, he was shrewd enough to know that he must not withdraw the British troops from the field until he had

* *E.g.* to Thomas Harley, Bolingbroke writes on May 10, 1712 : ' I confess I begin to wish that the Dutch may continue still dully obstinate, rather than submit to the Queen's measures, since we do not want them either to make or support the peace, and since it will be better settled for England without their concurrence than with it. Does it not make your blood curdle to hear it solemnly contested in Holland whether Britain shall enjoy the Asiento ? ' He does not mention that we had promised in the Barrier Treaty of 1709 (Article 15) to share any such advantage ' equally ' with the Dutch ! It may have been a bad Treaty, but it bore the signature of Townshend as England's representative. *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 324, see also p. 327.

extorted one more fundamental concession from France. It was no less an English than a Dutch interest that the Crowns of France and Spain should never rest on the same head. That was laid down with emphasis in William's Treaty of Grand Alliance, which Bolingbroke now undertook to implement at Utrecht a dozen years after Marlborough had signed it at The Hague. If no provision were made against a future union of the Crowns of France and Spain, the Whigs might successfully arouse English opinion against the Peace.

Indeed, some such provision had become more than ever necessary owing to the series of domestic catastrophes that darkened the last years of King Louis. In 1711 the Dauphin had died. In February 1712 that Dauphin's eldest son and successor, the Duke of Burgundy, died also, and next month Burgundy was followed to the grave by his own eldest son.* The heir left to the throne of France, afterwards Louis XV, was a sickly infant, by many not expected to live long. The next heir after him, in strict succession was Philip V, King of Spain.

An appalling situation had arisen, threatening once more the Balance of Power and the future peace of Europe, and



Torcy made it worse by declaring that, according to the opinion of certain French lawyers, no renunciation of the Crown by the rightful heir could be valid. Bolingbroke acted with promptitude. He refused to proceed with negotiations on any other point until this great matter had been settled to his satisfaction. With lightning rapidity he made a new and ingenious proposal. As an alternative to the renunciation of the reversion of the French Crown by Philip, let him, wrote Bolingbroke, retain his rights thereto, on condition that he at once hands over Spain and the Indies to the Duke of Savoy. In compensation, he is himself to become ruler of the Duke's territories of Savoy-Piedmont, together with Montferrat, Mantua and Sicily. If and when Philip becomes King of France, these North Italian territories are to be added to the French dominions, but Sicily is to pass to Austria.[242]

The acceptability of this arrangement to Spain, Austria and England was never put to the test. Philip, when compelled by Bolingbroke's insistence to choose at once, chose to retain the Crown he wore. He preferred the certainty of Madrid to the mere hope of Paris added to the less brilliant certainty of Turin. He abjured his reversionary claim to the throne of France, and his grandfather did all he could to legalize and implement his act.

May 1712

On these lines the matter was settled at Utrecht. And since, contrary to expectation, Louis XV lived long and left descendants, the dangers prophesied by the Whigs never arose. It is probable that, in the very difficult circumstances of the case, Bolingbroke had got the best security that was to be had, in spite of the nonsense talked by some French lawyers. For if little Louis had fulfilled the fears of the world and died as a child, not only would it have been the interest of England and of all Europe to see that Philip stuck by his bargain, but the Regent of France, the Duke of Orleans, would have been in a strong domestic position to assert his own rightful claims to the succession. Indeed, his interest as next heir and his fears of a revival of Philip's claim, caused Orleans, after he had become Regent in 1715, to enter into friendship with England, and oblige King George by throwing over the Pretender's cause.

Louis XIV was sorry that his grandson preferred to stay in Madrid. He knew that there was small likelihood of the eventual union of the crowns of France and Spain in face of a hostile Europe, and he was greatly attracted by the prospect that Savoy-Piedmont and Mantua might some day be added peaceably to France. He accepted Philip's choice, but it caused him surprise and chagrin.

The decision to stay at Madrid expressed the affection that had recently grown up between the Spaniards and their King. The strong women who had moulded the weak mind of Philip, had taught him to care for Spain as an end in itself. Since he crossed the Pyrenees eleven years back, he had learned a new patriotism. The understanding between the Castilians and the Royal House, which had broken the plans of Austria and the Whigs, now frustrated the clever designs of Bolingbroke and Louis. The arrangement actually made was the simplest and proved the best.[243]

Something akin to Bolingbroke's active and enterprising spirit was certainly needed to carry through the tremendous diplomatic tasks of the year. They would have been beyond the power of the slow-moving Oxford. But the Secretary had the defects of his qualities in a glaring form. He now proceeded, in the hurry of his restless spirit, to take hasty steps which gravely involved the national honour. He had made up his mind that nothing could bring the Dutch to accept England's terms of Peace except the withdrawal of the British forces from the field.* It might possibly have proved so in the end. If done at a later stage of the campaign, when Torcy had agreed to the chief items still in dispute, if done openly and with full warning to the Allies and not in a secret league with the enemy, the withdrawal of the British troops might, in conceivable circumstances, have

* 'Our ill success in the field would have rendered the French less tractable in the congress: our good success there would have rendered the Allies so. On this principle the Queen suspended the operations of her troops.' *Bolingbroke's Defence*, p. 139.

'Le reine regarde, aussi bien que le Roi, la suspension d'armes comme absolument nécessaire pour ôter aux ennemis de la paix les moyens d'en empêcher, ou d'en retarder la conclusion.' *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 353 (St. John to Torcy, June 7, O.S., 1712).

been expedient and even right. But it was done too soon, in secret concert with the French, in a manner distinctly treacherous. The English troops had been kept in the field till everything had been yielded to England : they were withdrawn when only her Allies' interests were at stake.

The Duke of Ormonde, in whom the High Tories had once hoped to find a military rival to Marlborough, began the campaign of 1712 with every intention of doing his duty in the field. He had received no orders to the contrary when he left home. He commanded the British troops in the Netherlands, together with those foreign regiments who were in the joint pay of England and Holland. He was to co-operate with another large army of Dutch and Germans under Prince Eugene. It was hoped that the joint forces would, after taking Le Quesnoy, penetrate far into France. Since Marlborough's last campaign, Villars no longer had any formidable ' lines ' to defend, though he had a large and high-spirited army in the field.

From the first, Ormonde was uncomfortably aware that Eugene and the other allied generals tended to keep him outside their innermost counsels. But his discomfort was greatly increased when he received a letter from Bolingbroke, dated April 25 (o.s.), bidding him ' be jealous of Prince Eugene's conduct ' and ' be more cautious for some time of engaging in an action, unless in the case of a very apparent and considerable advantage.' He replied, as well he might, that such orders put him in a difficult position. But his position became very much more difficult when he received another letter from the same quarter, written on May 10 (o.s.), 1712, to the following effect :

> It is the Queen's positive command to your Grace that you avoid engaging in any siege, or hazarding a battle, till you have farther orders from her Majesty. I am, at the same time, directed to let your Grace know that the Queen would have you disguise the receipt of this order ; and her Majesty thinks that you cannot want pretences for conducting yourself so as to answer her ends without owning that which might, at present, have an ill effect, if it was publicly known. . . .
>
> P.S. I had almost forgot to tell your Grace that communication is given of this order to the Court of France, so that if the Mareschal de Villars takes, in any private way, notice of it to you, your Grace will answer accordingly.

What was an unhappy nobleman, who aspired also to be considered a gentleman and a soldier, to make of such orders ? He could only obey or throw up his command. He obeyed.[244]

Such were the famous ' Restraining Orders,' which, in the next reign, figured as the most damaging of the accusations that could be proved against Bolingbroke. No other member of the Cabinet had been consulted, not even the Treasurer, although a few weeks later he defended the *fait accompli* in the House of Lords. During his own impeachment three years afterwards, Oxford denied that he ' did advise or consent that any order should be dispatched in her Majesty's name to the Duke of Ormonde, nor had he any view or design to disappoint the expectation of the Allies.' He puts it all upon the Queen's personal orders, meaning thereby that it was Bolingbroke and she who devised it between them.[245] Nor did Bolingbroke ever assert in writing that Oxford or any other Councillor was cognizant before the fact.[246] In after years he went so far as to state that he himself was at first ' surprised and hurt ' when the Queen ordered him to write the Restraining Orders, as if Anne had thought of it all for herself ; those who wish may believe.[247]

At the very best, the Restraining Orders had been sent too soon. They were rashly written before the King of Spain's answer as to the French succession had been received at Paris, and before Torcy had consented to hand over Dunkirk for occupation by the British troops in return for their withdrawal from the field. Still less had the other important questions of the peace negotiation been settled : the Dutch Barrier and the Netherlands frontier of France, the boundaries and possessions of all the minor Allies, had yet to be defined. A little more military pressure would have greatly helped the Secretary's negotiations with France, but such was his hostility to Holland that he put himself by preference into Torcy's hands.

Above all, the attempt to keep the secret of Ormonde's orders from the Allied Generals while revealing it to Villars,

was base in the extreme. It was, indeed, little short of a plot between the French and English Minister to give Villars the opportunity to defeat Eugene. On the day the Restraining Orders were written, Torcy's London agent, Gaultier, wrote to him of Bolingbroke as ' our Secretary ' and of Ormonde as ' our General ' :

> I asked Mr. St. John what Mons. de Villars should do if Prince Eugene took the offensive with the Dutch. He replied there would be nothing to do but fall on him and cut him to pieces, him and his army.

Gaultier then repeats that Bolingbroke is most anxious that Villars should be informed of the Restraining Orders and that Eugene and the Dutch be kept in ignorance.[248]

It is small wonder that Bolingbroke in September wrote to Prior the proud boast :

> I will not say this order saved their army [the French] from being beat, but I think in my conscience it did.

And it is no surprise to find the last stage of treachery reached in October, when Oxford and Bolingbroke together sent word through Gaultier to Torcy

> that they have been informed this morning by a courier that Prince Eugene has resolved to surprise Nieuport or Furnes. This advice has been given by a spy they have about the Prince, whose services he is to use on the expedition. ' I am warning Marshal Duke of Villars of it,' Gaultier takes care to add.[249]

This letter would have proved a useful piece, if the Whigs had got hold of it for the impeachments.

In June Bolingbroke promised Torcy that, if he would put Ormonde in occupation of Dunkirk, ' Her Majesty will not hesitate to conclude a separate peace, leaving the other Powers a period in which to submit ' to the plan agreed between France and England.[250] According to Torcy it was only the opposition of Oxford that prevented a separate peace being signed by the English Ministers that summer.[251] The Treasurer had felt the pulse of the House of Lords in the debate held on the Restraining Orders, when he calmed their Lordships' uneasiness by assuring them that

nothing of that nature was ' ever intended ; and that such a peace would be a base, knavish and villainous thing.' [252]

But the full flavour of the affair could be smelt, not in the Cabinets of statesmen or in the decorous debates in the House of Lords, but in the camp where Marlborough's men received the orders to desert in face of the enemy their comrades of so many glorious campaigns. For that was the way in which the affair struck those simple souls.

For some weeks Ormonde had endeavoured to carry out his unpalatable orders and preserve from his Allies the secret of his defection, while corresponding about it with the enemy commander. Eugene soon saw that he was prevaricating, when he made one lame excuse after another for not taking any active part in the operations of war. The position grew intolerable for a man of honour, and Ormonde wrote letter after letter to the Treasurer appealing for fresh instructions ; but Oxford would not wash Bolingbroke's dirty linen, and characteristically left the letters unanswered.*

At length when a temporary armistice had been arranged by Torcy and Bolingbroke, the truth became known in full, and the British army marched away from the front. A storm of anger swept through the Allied camp, and the veterans of twenty nations cursed England, her Ministers and her General. The foreign troops who were in the joint service of the two Maritime Powers, sacrificed the British half of their pay in order to stay by their comrades in the field. Bolingbroke made this another terrible grievance against the Dutch and Eugene : he described the latter as ' a beggarly German General ' causing the troops in Her Majesty's pay

* Ormonde to Oxford, June 14, 1712 : ' This is the fourth letter that I have done myself the honour to write to your Lordship without hearing from you, which I believe the multiplicity of business is the cause of. I send this to let your Lordship know that I have done all that I could to keep secret and to disguise the orders that I received from her Majesty by Mr. Secretary St. John, but it is above ten days since I received the Queen's pleasure, and now I can't make any more excuses for delaying entering upon action. When I was pressed to it, I made my Lord Strafford's sudden journey to England my excuse, and desired that I might hear from England before I undertook anything. I have been again pressed this day.' *H.M.C. Eliot-Hodgkin*, 1897, p. 203. *Ormonde Memoirs*, 1738, pp. 140–156 ; *Pelet*, XI, pp. 462–463, Ormonde's letters to Villars, May and June.

to desert.[253] But that was not the view of the matter that the British soldiers took ; many of them wept for very shame. With nobler feelings was mingled bitter disappointment at missing the rich plunder of France, ' which they reckoned they had dearly earned ' by a decade of wounds and victory.

At length the hour for their final parting from the Allied regiments had come. ' As they marched off that day,' we are told, ' both sides looked very dejectedly on each other, neither being admitted to speak to the other, to prevent reflections that might arise.' We can well believe Captain Parker when he tells us that his men ' often lamented the loss of the *Old Corporal*, which was a favourite name they had given the Duke of Marlborough.' [254]

July $\frac{5}{16}$ 1713

Further humiliations were in store for them on their retreat through Belgium. The towns they had conquered with their blood in ten victorious campaigns, were closed against them by their Allies ; ' at some places with much ado they handed over their walls to us some things which our men most wanted.' To find harbourage for his disgraced and wandering army, and to exact a pledge for the good behaviour of the Dutch, Ormonde seized on Ghent and Bruges. They were the only towns ' Marlborough's rival ' ever took. Oxford wrote to him ' Your Grace's march to Ghent is a *coup de maître*.' The ' stroke ' had been arranged between Ormonde and Lord Strafford in close secrecy, to prevent the Allies from throwing in garrisons beforehand, ' for there is nothing they apprehend more than the English having Ghent and Bruges.' [255]

Tory tavern songs celebrated the event :

Whilst Ormond he most orderly
  Did march them towards Ghent,
The German dogs, with great Dutch hogs
  Their towns against them pent.

Were we not mad to spend our blood
  And weighty treasure so ?
Do they deserve that we should serve ?
  Adad we'll make them know.

They'll be afraid of Peace and Trade
  And downfal of the Whigs ;
Our glorious Ann, with France and Spain,
  Will dance them many a jigg.

If they have a mind, 'fore Peace be signed
  To own great Anna's power,
Such terms she'll get as she thinks fit,
  And they shall have no more. [256]

Bolingbroke had issued the Restraining Orders before coming to terms with Torcy—a mistake of which the French Minister took full advantage. After more than a month of slow bargaining, the Armistice was at length arranged, on condition that Dunkirk should be occupied by a British garrison until its fortifications had been destroyed and its harbour filled up. The Secretary believed that he could persuade his countrymen to acquiesce in the withdrawal of the British troops, if he could point to the Union Jack flying on the walls of the hated privateer stronghold, as the firstfruits of the friendship with France. On his side, Torcy believed that, if once the English entered Dunkirk, they would be effectively pledged not to take further part in the war.

On July 8 (o.s.) 1712, a small force of troops from England under the redoubtable Jack Hill, landed from Admiral Leake's squadron and were welcomed into Dunkirk by the French authorities as guests and friends. ' The Union Jack was hoisted in three several places of the town.' Ormonde soon afterwards sent in six battalions from Ghent. The civil government remained in French hands, and the garrison was so ill-supplied from home that they depended on French goodwill for their continued occupation. A disease known as the ' Dunkirk fever ' greatly reduced their strength. But they held on until the work of demolition demanded by English mercantile opinion had been effected in the stronghold that had so long been the dread of our seamen.

The French, indeed, delayed the destruction of the port while they appealed to their English friends to let them off proceeding further with so odious a task. In December

1713 they were still trying to save Dunkirk through the agency of Lady Masham. But she reported that the Queen 'would not dare even to think of it.'[257] The next French artifice was to reconstruct, at the neighbouring Mardyk, another harbourage for their privateers. Bolingbroke, who during his last months in office was negotiating an Alliance with France against his old Allies, was in no position to put a stop to these tricks, which were effectually dealt with by Stanhope after the accession of George I.

The entry of the British troops into Dunkirk had been permitted by Louis as a sure means of binding the English not to resume the war. It was a 'pledge' of French good faith to England and equally of English good faith to France. It further broke up the Alliance. It encouraged Villars to take the offensive against the allied army still in the field.[258]

Le Quesnoy had already been taken by the Allies before the complete withdrawal of Ormonde's troops. Eugene, now left with forces inferior to the French, rashly undertook the siege of Landrecies. Villars outmanœuvred him and inflicted on him at Denain such a defeat as the Allies had never suffered under the command of Marlborough. Before the campaign was over the French had retaken Le Quesnoy, Bouchain and Douai. Bolingbroke's object was accomplished: the Allies had been taught that they could not carry on the war without England. Holland would now 'submit' at Utrecht.

July $\frac{13}{24}$ 1712

The armistice, made in the first instance for two months, would require renewal, and many matters were still to be settled between Torcy and Bolingbroke before negotiations could be usefully resumed at Utrecht. Louis was still claiming the Spanish Netherlands for the Elector of Bavaria, and Tournai as well as Lille for France; the territories of the Duke of Savoy and the King of Portugal had still to be agreed upon, as well as the Dutch Barrier and the details of the Anglo-French agreement in North America, not to mention the delicate question of the further residence of the Pretender in France. In August 1712 Bolingbroke went to Paris, taking Prior as his Secretary. The armistice was

there renewed, and though the visit did not finally settle many of the outstanding questions, it was needed and it was useful.*

Bolingbroke was made much of by the Grand Monarch and his courtiers; with his fluent French and easy wit he was formed to shine in that society, whose approval was to him the most insidious of flatteries. Perhaps his unfortunate flight back thither in 1715 was in part due to the recollections of these halycon days of 1712. When he returned to England at the end of August, he left Prior behind him as caretaker.

The rumours that reached home of the Secretary's fine doings at Versailles caused a fresh access of jealousy in Oxford, who declared that his foreign trip had 'added new fuel to his vanity.' In September an unjust and futile attempt was made to substitute Dartmouth in his place as the official negotiator, on the ground that the correspondence with France was the Province of the *Southern* Secretary of State. But Dartmouth was not equal to the task, and soon shrank from the anger of his fellow-Secretary, who claimed that since Oxford was too lazy to undertake the work of peace-making himself, he must leave it to the only Minister with the requisite industry and talent.[259]

Throughout the autumn and winter of 1712 negotiations continued, and one question after another was settled by hard bargaining on both sides. The Dutch had 'submitted' after the catastrophes of the campaign and were ready to take what Bolingbroke could procure for them. His power to bargain with France had been injured by the defeat of the Allies in the field, which he had himself caused in order to overcome the obstinacy of the Dutch; and he afterwards confessed that the French received back too many frontier towns—Lille, no doubt, in particular.[260] But he stiffly refused to give Tournai again to France, and after a fierce diplomatic struggle Louis ceased to demand the great fortress. In spite of the efforts of French Ministers, neither Belgium nor Sicily were yielded to the Elector of Bavaria, who had to content himself, sulkily enough, with a return to Munich and his former territorial

* See pp. 206–207 above.

rights in Germany.[261] Belgium remained to the Austrian, now Emperor Charles VI.

The Dutch 'Barrier,' carved partly out of Charles's dominions and partly out of fortresses won by Marlborough from France, was arranged in a new Treaty signed between England and Holland in January 1713, which took the place of the Whig Barrier Treaty of four years back. The Dutch were again bound to fight for the Protestant succession in England. But the new list of towns for their occupation was not as imposing as that of 1709, though it was a great advance on the old Barrier destroyed by French aggression in 1701, and the tariffs of the Southern Netherlands were so arranged that England and Holland together could exploit them to the full.*

The Dutch had gained some measure of safety by the substitution of Austria for decadent Spain as ruler of the buffer State between themselves and France. But their own 'barrier' towns inside that State were to prove in 1745 of little military avail against French invasion. The system of Dutch garrisons in isolated foreign towns may have been better than nothing when there was no one but Spain to protect Belgium against France. But at best the system was militarily unsound and to a large extent a cloak for commercial advantage. The Dutch and English exploitation of the 'Austrian' Netherlands by tariffs drawn up in the interest of the Maritime Powers, weakened the strength of Belgian resistance to France, and made Austria much less anxious to defend the land than if it had been fully her own.†

Upper Guelders, which the Whig Treaty had promised to Holland, was awarded by Bolingbroke to Prussia. 'The

* The new Dutch 'barrier' was to consist of Furnes, Fort Knocke, Ypres, Menin, Tournai, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur on the outer line; Ghent for communication with the United Provinces, and the Forts of Perle, Philippe, Damme, and various minor forts. (Fort Knocke lay between Furnes and Ypres, and must not be confused with Knocke-sur-mer.) Forts Philippe and Perle guarded the entrance to the Schelt below Antwerp. *See map of Netherlands at end of this book*, and inset note about the final Treaty of 1715. The Barrier destroyed in 1701 is enumerated in *Blenheim*, p. 138 note. *Lamberty*, VIII, pp. 34-42; *Montgomery*, p. 298.

† *Mrs. Montgomery* (pp. 368–370) has some very good remarks on this head.

King of Prussia,' wrote the Earl of Strafford from Utrecht in April 1713, 'thinks himself extremely obliged to the Queen for his acquisition of Guelderland, and a very little caressing will entirely bind him to her interest; he is certainly, after the Emperor, the most considerable prince in the Empire. . . . Tis only this King and the Duke of Savoy who really think themselves obliged to her in this negociation.'[262]

Victor Amadeus of Savoy-Piedmont was, indeed, the prime favourite chosen from among the Allies by Queen Anne's Tory Ministers. In case Philip and his line failed, France agreed that he was to inherit Spain. And he reaped at Utrecht the reward of twenty years of lion-like courage and fox-like cunning, in a territorial expansion that did much to secure the future greatness of his House. Savoy and Nice, which the French had seized during the war, were restored to him, and he obtained a strongly fortified frontier along the Piedmontese watershed of the Alps. Moreover the island of Sicily became his. Bolingbroke had to fight hard with Torcy for these things, but he won. He knew the nature of his country's naval and commercial interests, and, just as he had secured the retention of Gibraltar and Port Mahon by Britain, so too he insisted that Sicily should go, not to a protégé of France like the Elector of Bavaria, but to the Duke of Savoy, a friend to England with no naval pretensions of his own.

Sardinia had been seized by the English fleet in 1708 on behalf of Charles III of Spain, and at Utrecht it was secured to him as Emperor Charles VI. In 1720 Savoy gave Sicily to Austria in exchange for Sardinia. British policy and arms, under Anne and George I, successfully prevented either island from passing under the influence of naval powers like France or Spain.[263]

Portugal, too, was an ally to whom we were deeply obliged. But she was not such a favourite with the Tories as Savoy, and was in any case more completely dependent on England for her trade, and for her very existence now that a Bourbon reigned in Madrid. She must be treated well, but need not be humoured to the top of her bent. The expansion of territory against the Spanish border that

had been promised to Portugal was not obtained, but Bolingbroke fought Torcy to secure her rights in Brazil against encroachment on the Amazon from French Guiana. He won the Portuguese case there by his famous *ultimatum* in February 1713, threatening Torcy with a renewal of the war.

The French, trusting that the Tory Ministers were now in their hands, had adopted a policy of procrastination and obstinacy on many points such as the Portuguese rights in Brazil and English rights in Acadia, and they were attempting to retain Luxemburg for the Elector of Bavaria by a subterfuge. Bolingbroke brought them to book by his very able and uncompromising dispatch of February 17, 1713, giving them the choice of concluding peace at once or seeing Anne ask Parliament 'for such supplies as may be necessary for carrying on the war.'[264] Torcy surrendered, the fence was cleared and the Treaties of Utrecht between the various powers were signed in March and April 1713. The Treaty, signed by Lord Strafford and the Bishop of Bristol for Great Britain and by Auxelles and Mesnager for France, bears the date March 31 Old Style, April 11 New Style.*

Bolingbroke had a keener sense for his country's interests than for her faith and honour. He had shown it in his dealings with Holland; nor was that the only instance. We had used the Catalans to fight our battles in Spain, and had pledged ourselves to secure those provincial liberties which, century after century, have always meant more to them than any other cause. In March 1713 our plenipotentiaries at Utrecht signed a Treaty with France on the subject of Spain, in which it was stipulated that on the evacuation of Barcelona and Majorca by the Allied troops, an amnesty should be granted to the Catalans by Philip, and, more vaguely, that France would give assistance to England in her endeavour to secure a grant of their ancient 'privileges.'[265] But Bolingbroke exacted nothing of the sort in the Treaty he made with Spain herself, by which many advantages

* The various Treaties of Utrecht will be found in Lamberty's *Mémoires*, 1736, Vol. VIII.

were secured for England but little indeed for Catalonia. Philip was left free to declare, in the high Castilian manner, that, if the Catalans would lay down their arms, they could enjoy their lives and properties on the same political terms as the inhabitants of the other Provinces of Spain. France had no wish and England no further power to plead their cause. If they had been wise they would have submitted: much to Bolingbroke's indignation they preferred to be heroic and to die sword in hand.

It would not, indeed, have been expected that we should indefinitely continue the war in Spain for the constitutional rights of another race. But we might have made more diplomatic effort in the matter before shipping off our troops and those of the other Allies from Spain. And Bolingbroke, who had now identified our interests with those of France, made no protest when Louis, contrary to his pledge to act with us on behalf of Catalan liberties, sent his own armies to help Philip besiege Barcelona. And the whole world cried shame upon England, when her over-zealous Secretary ordered the squadron under Sir James Wishart to harass and threaten the defenders of the town. That was a gratuitous insult to the brave population who had fought so many years at our side, who were merely continuing to defend rights we had ourselves guaranteed.

Deserted by all, the Catalans rose to the fiercest pitch of patriotic fanaticism. Besieged by the armies of France and Spain, and with English ships cruising to blockade the port,[266] the men and women of Barcelona defended their city until half of it was laid in ashes by Berwick's siege guns. Catalans and Spaniards displayed the utmost cruelty and courage that the spirit of civil faction can engender in the hot-blooded natures of the South. Berwick marvelled at the resistance of the town. At length, more than a month after the death of Anne, Barcelona fell, and for another space of years the Catalan question, as immortal as the Irish, was buried under the bloody sod.

1714

English opinion was shocked and shamed. The desertion of the Catalans was one of the questions upon which, in the last year of the Queen, the Whig debating power in

Parliament was able to damage the government in the public eye.[267]

Bolingbroke had showed his usual insensibility to the point of view of those who stood in his way. Dartmouth had tried to help the Catalans, but his brother Secretary had snubbed him and had instructed our plenipotentiaries at Utrecht that 'it is not for the interest of England to preserve the Catalan liberties.' It would, however, be unjust to lay the whole blame for the tragedy at the door of one man. The fate of Barcelona, like the destruction of the French Royalists at Quiberon in a later age, stands as a warning of the moral dangers that attend the policy of inciting the enemy's subjects to rebel. It may sometimes be justified by that general abnegation of altruistic scruple which the state of war implies, but it is not to be undertaken with a light heart.

At the end of March and the beginning of April 1713, the series of Treaties signed by the Powers represented at Utrecht gave a general peace to the world. Only the Emperor consulted his honour and dignity by holding out for one more summer of sluggish war on the Rhine. But Villars and Eugene were soon better employed in negotiating a peace, which was signed at Radstadt in March 1714 between Louis and the Emperor Charles. This Treaty fixed the Alsatian frontier : France gave up Kehl and other fortresses east of the Rhine, but retained Landau and Strasbourg.

The rejoicings over the Treaty of Utrecht, held in England during the summer of 1713, were hearty enough. Bonfires were lit all over the country, and nowhere dared the Whigs attempt any counter-demonstration. 'Last night,' writes Lady Barnard, 'we had a vast number of bonfires in every village. The mob likes the peace, although the great do not.'[268] But 'the great,' also, were divided in opinion, and the General Election that August gave a fresh lease of power to the Ministry that had put an end to the war.

It is here that History must say farewell to Holland as one of the Great Powers. That she had ever been such is

a measure of the qualities of her remarkable little folk ; that she should cease to be so was inevitable, and was not primarily due to Bolingbroke. Even the Whig Barrier Treaty could not have maintained her as the equal of England. The long wars with France, during which she had borne a burden far beyond her strength, hastened a process that could not have been much longer delayed.

In an age of tyranny Holland had been the asylum of intellectual freedom, and her burghers for a while had led Europe in many of the sciences and arts. Then she had almost succumbed to the rude violation of her liberties by Louis XIV, but had been saved first by William and again by Marlborough. She was now made safe for her less ambitious voyage through a new era. Though her greatness had departed, she still maintained a quiet and attractive form of life. Three years after Utrecht, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu wrote :

> The whole country appears a large garden : the roads all well paved, shaded on each side with rows of trees and bordered with large canals, full of boats, passing and repassing. Every twenty paces gives you a prospect of some villa and every four hours a large town so surprisingly neat I am sure you would be charmed with them. . . . Here is neither dirt nor beggary seen. One is not shocked with these loathsome cripples, so common in London, nor teazed with the importunities of idle fellows and wenches that choose to be nasty and lazy. The common servants and little shopwomen here are more nicely clean than most of our ladies. The shops and warehouses are filled with an incredible quantity of merchandise, much cheaper than we see in England.

The wars of Marlborough and the Treaty of Utrecht had secured the greatness of England and the safety of Holland. But not easily would their statesmen again confide in one another. When the Dutch found that the Whig Ministers of George I had no intention of reviving the Barrier Treaty of 1709 on their behalf, they considered that England had deceived them, and though common interest held the two countries together in an unequal partnership, there was never again the true understanding and friendship that had united Marlborough and Heinsius during the heroic era of Blenheim and Ramillies.

With the signing of the Treaties of Utrecht, Bolingbroke's one great achievement in the world of action was accomplished. The rest of his political career, after a Niagara leap into rebellion, was to be lost in shallows and in miseries. But he stands in history as the man who, by courses however devious and questionable, negotiated a Peace which proved in the working more satisfactory than any other that has ended a general European conflict in modern times.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XIII

The Military Betrayal of the Allies

from the French Foreign Office Archives

I. *Aff. étr. Angleterre*, 238, f. 73, Gaultier to Torcy. May 21 [N.S.], 1712, from London (describing the despatch of the Restraining Orders to Ormonde).

Hier sur les neuf heures du soir la Vigne arriva icy avec vos depeches. Ce matin le grand Tresorier et Mr de St Jean ont fait la lecture de vos lettres à la Reine. Sa Majesté en a esté si contente et si satisfaite qu'elle a commandé sur la champ a Mr de St Jean de depecher un courier au duc d'Ormond pour luy ordonner expressement de sa part de ne rien entreprendre contre l'armée du Roy ny directement ny indirectement jusqu'à nouvel ordre, et de traverser ceux qui voudroient le faire. J'ai veu et leu la lettre du secretaire à ce général. Elle est dattée au 10^{e} de ce mois vieux stile, elle partira ce soir par la voye d'Ostende. . . .

J'ay demandé a Mr de St Jean quel party il faudroit que Mons. le M. de Villars prit, si par hazard Mr le Prince d'Eugene conjointement avec les Hollondois, vouloit faire quelque tentative. Il m'a respondu qu'il n'auroit point d'autre chose à fair qu'à luy tomber desous et la tailler en pièces, luy et son armée. Souvenez vous, s'il vous plait, qu'il n'y a que le Duc d'Ormond et le M. de Villars qui doivent estre informés et scavoir ce que j'ay l'honneur de vous mander aujourdhuy de la part de notre Ministre et qu'il faut bien prendre garde que le Prince Eugene n'en sache rien non plus que les Hollondois qui n'auront nulle connoissance de la lettre que notre secretaire ecrit ce soir a notre general.

II. *Aff. étr. Angleterre*, 240, f. 79, Gaultier to Torcy. October 29 [N.S.], 1712, from London (Oxford's and Bolingbroke's betrayal of Eugene's military intentions to France).

Monseigneur,

Je vous envoye cet exprès pour votre avis que M. le Comte d'Oxford et milord Bolingbroke viennent de m'avertir qu'ils ont esté informé ce matin par un courier que le Prince Eugene a resolu de faire surprendre *Nieuport ou Furnes* et pour mieux cacher son dessein il doit faire semblant de fortifier Diximude. Cet avis leur a esté donné par un espion qu'ils ont aupres du Prince, et du qu'il doit servir dans cette expedition ; j'en donne aujourdhui avis a M. le Mareschal duc de Villars et je lui marque que vous lui en écrivez. Il mande aussi aux commandans de ces deux places, qu'ils prennent garde à eux et d'etre surpris. Il faut bien garder le secret, car si le Prince venoit a scavoir que vous avez été averti, il ne pourroit soupconner d'autre que celui qui nous a averti, à qui il ne manquerait pas de faire mal passer le tems.

CHAPTER XIV

Scotland again

Unpopularity of the Union. Its first economic consequences at Glasgow and elsewhere. The Hamilton Peerage. The Case of Mr. Greenshields. The jurisdiction of the House of Lords over Scotland. The Toleration Act and the Restoration of Patronage 1712. Linen and Malt. The motion to repeal the Union 1713. Jacobites, Presbyterians and Tory Ministers, at the moment of Anne's death.

The Union of England and Scotland,* which eventually brought the two peoples together in friendly partnership and enabled the Scots to escape from the valley of the shadow of poverty, seemed at first to be accomplishing neither the one nor the other of these ends. The year before Anne died the more faint-hearted of the statesmen who had carried the Union proposed that it should be repealed as a proven failure, and it is not unlikely that, if the Queen's life had been prolonged, the two parts of the island would have once more enjoyed separate Parliaments and armies, separate commercial systems divided by prohibitions and tariffs, and, not impossibly, the rule of separate monarchs.

Scotland had been persuaded to give her grudging consent to the Union in view of the economic blessings that were to be its immediate outcome. But for two or more decades these benefits hung fire. Scotland as yet had neither the capital nor the business organization to make use of the long-coveted trade with the Colonies. Meanwhile, goods from 'South Britain' flooded her home market, and the Scottish manufacture of fine cloth was gravely injured by English underselling. The removal of the Parliament and of many of the higher nobility to London lessened the demand for home products, besides hurting the pride of the

* See *Ramillies and the Union*, Chaps. X–XIV and XVII.

ancient capital. All along the east coast the small port-towns tended to decline in prosperity as the Queen's reign drew towards its close.[269]

But in the West, hitherto the more backward side of the country, the advantages of the Union were more quickly realized. For, whereas ships from Leith and Dundee, built for the German and Scandinavian trade, had to sail round by the Channel or Cape Wrath in order to enjoy the newly-opened trade with America, Glasgow and Dumfries were on the Atlantic seaboard. Their immediate advance towards prosperity was an earnest of the advantages which all Scotland would presently reap from the opening of the markets. In the very summer when the Treaty of Union was ratified, a company of Glasgow merchants hired a ship at Whitehaven in Cumberland, loaded her with mer-
1707 chandise well suited to the needs of the Colonists, sent her to Virginia and received her back with a rich freight of sugar and tobacco. Two years later an English visitor to Glasgow wrote :

> This city is generally reckoned to have gained most by the Union. Its traffic is much advanced and its wealth increased by reason of its standing so well for the West India and Plantation trade.

Some of the West country Whigs, who had been transported in the days of Claverhouse, had survived the hardships of slavery and risen to places of trust in the tobacco plantations ; they now acted as advisers and agents for their kinsmen and co-religionists trading from home. Soon after Anne's death a number of Glasgow-owned ships were regularly plying across the Atlantic, and by 1735 the tonnage of the Clyde was four times what it had been under King William.[270]

But elsewhere in Scotland the first economic consequences of the Union gave rise to grave and very excusable discontent. It took the form of smuggling as a patriotic exercise, carried out with the connivance of the Scottish-born authorities. Magistrates refused their support to the unpopular custom-house officials, who had invaded the country under the Act of Union, and who caused scandal equally by trying to enforce the law and by expecting

permission to attend Anglican services and to be buried by Anglican rites. The Scots upper class, whether Presbyterian or Jacobite, were at one with the popular feeling against these unfortunate officers who tried to stop French wine and brandy entering in time of war. One of them was smartly reprimanded by the Lord President for venturing to search the house of the Earl of Stair for brandy run off the coast. Others, who made a seizure, were 'barbarously wounded so that they were frightful to look at.' And if any smuggled goods were successfully brought into court, the magistrates imposed fines so small as positively to encourage the illicit wine trade with France.[271]

1708–1709

In the world of religion, the Reverend Thomas Wodrow wrote to a correspondent in 1709 :

> Such is the temper of the people at this juncture that they cannot hear the Act of Union spoken of by ministers, even by way of narration, but they stumble at it, as if we were approving that alteration.[272]

If this was already the popular feeling even among Presbyterians in the days of the Whig Government, matters were to grow worse in the last years of the reign.

The Scottish nobility had played a leading part in passing the Union, and they were scurvily rewarded by the English Lords who had been their partners in the work. In 1711 the Queen made the Duke of Hamilton a Peer of Great Britain with the title of Duke of Brandon. As such he proposed to sit in his own right, and not as one of the sixteen elected Scottish Peers. To his astonishment, and to the universal indignation of all Scots, the House of Lords challenged his right to sit, on the ground that under the Union Treaty Scotland was to be represented by no more than sixteen Peers. The application made was a legal misreading of the words of the Treaty. Nevertheless, his brother Peers prevented Hamilton from taking his seat as Duke of Brandon, in spite of the fact that Queensberry had, since the Union, been created Duke of Dover and had sat in that capacity unchallenged. He also was now declared to have no right to sit.

The most disgraceful circumstance in the affair was that the prime movers of this injustice to Scotland were the Whig Lords who had most keenly promoted the policy of the Union that was to reconcile the two peoples. Their motive was fear lest the Crown should swamp the Upper House with Tory creations. But they were joined by some Tories, including the Secretary of State, Lord Dartmouth, jealous for the rights of the English Peerage. Oxford, indeed, and most of the Ministerial party stood up for the Queen's prerogative, but in spite of her presence at the debate as an interested party, their Lordships voted by fifty-seven to fifty-two

> that no patent of Honour, granted to any Peer of Great Britain, who was a Peer of Scotland at the time of the Union, can entitle such a Peer to sit and vote in Parliament or to sit upon the trial of Peers.

This grave injustice remained unremedied until it was reversed by a decision of 1782. The indignation of the Scottish nobles without distinction of party was one of the causes why the political fever of Great Britain continued unabated for several years to come.[273]

In spite of much popular feeling among ministers and congregations, the leaders of the Presbyterian body, guided by the sage counsel of Carstares, had in 1707 prevented the Church Assembly from laying its veto on the passage of the Union.* They had done so because they believed that only the Union could ensure the Hanoverian Succession, and that only the Hanoverian Succession could ensure the continuance of the Presbyterian Establishment. The validity of this train of reasoning was brought forcibly home to all Presbyterians on Anne's death, and rallied them in 1715 to fight for the Union which they so much disliked. But during the last four years of the Queen's reign they were more profoundly alarmed than the Jacobites by the consequences of losing their own Parliament. In the eyes of faithful watchers in Scotland, the Prelatic assembly at Westminster appeared to be disarming and disintegrating their national church with a view to her present destruction. These fears were mainly aroused by two Acts passed by

* *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 279–280.

the Tory Parliament in 1712, the Toleration Act and the restoration of Patronage.

The incident that set these balls rolling was the affair of the Reverend James Greenshields. When the Queen's reign began, the services conducted in the Episcopal meeting-houses differed little from those in the Parish church.* But in the course of the reign the practice of using a Form of Prayer similar to the English began to be common among Episcopalians. As early as 1706 thousands of Prayer Books had been sent over the Border into Scotland. It was a real and significant change in the religious life of an important section of the people, particularly among the upper classes, and it caused corresponding resentment among the followers of Knox. 'The English service is setting up busily in the north,' wrote Wodrow in August 1709, 'at Inverness, Elgin, Aberdeen, Montrose and many other places, to the great grief of many of our brethren, and the weakening or rather ruining of our discipline.' It must be remembered that 'in the north' many of the Parish churches were still served by Episcopal ministers.[274]

No Toleration Act protected the services of Episcopal congregations in Scotland, but in practice they remained undisturbed, even when using the Prayer Book, until in 1709 Greenshields read the English liturgy in a meeting-house he had set up opposite to St. Giles, Edinburgh, the citadel of Scottish Presbyterianism. It was in answer to this challenge that he was prosecuted, in spite of the fact that he had taken the oaths, while in a dozen less prominent places in Edinburgh the same service was being read by non-Jurors and avowed Jacobites, without any interference from the authorities.[275]

Carstares, who objected to a legal or theoretic enactment of Toleration, but loved it in practice, deprecated the proposal to prosecute Greenshields.[276] But for the nonce his brethren had had enough of his moderation. The Presbytery cited Greenshields to appear. He denied its jurisdiction over him. He was suspended from officiating as a minister without warrant, and for violating the uniformity of worship. He refused

Sept. 1709

* See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 183–184, 206–209.

compliance. The Edinburgh magistrates, called in to enforce the ruling of the ecclesiastical court, threw him into prison. He appealed to the Lords of Session who upheld the action of the magistrates. Thereupon Greenshields took his case to the House of Lords.

Dec. 1709

He had appealed to Caesar, greatly to the astonishment of those who thought that the matters of their own law were no business of Caesar's. But it was more than a year before his case was heard in London. And during that year the great Tory reaction took place in South Britain. In Scotland the fears of the Presbyterians were aroused by the Sacheverell uproar beyond the Border, and national feeling was further alarmed by Greenshields' appeal to a tribunal whose jurisdiction over Scotland had not hitherto been popularly recognized as implicit in the Treaty of Union.* In these circumstances the years 1710–1711 witnessed a number of riots and persecuting actions against Episcopalian clergy in various parts of Scotland, particularly against those who used the Prayer Book. The tacit mutual understanding by which the Episcopalians, though not tolerated by law, had been tolerated in practice, began to break down. There was need for an Act of Parliament to defend the Episcopalian services in Scotland as the Nonconformist services were defended in England. Bishop Wake's Edinburgh correspondent, a man of moderate views, informed his patron that such an Act was necessary in order to avert a Jacobite rebellion.[277]

In March 1711 the House of Lords tried the case of Greenshields. The right of jurisdiction over Scotland had first to be proved, as it was denied by the counsel for the Edinburgh magistrates and Lords of Session. 'There never was any appeal to the House of Lords in Scotland,' argued Sir Joseph Jekyll. There never had been, till by the terms of the Treaty of 1707 such a jurisdiction was implicitly conceded as a consequence of Union. In that sense their Lordships decided by 68 votes to 32, and that ruling has ever since been accepted in Great Britain.

The question of competence being thus settled, the

* *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 266.

Lords proceeded to exercise their new jurisdiction in the case of Greenshields. And after a short debate it was

> ordered and adjudged by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that the said sentence of the Magistrates of Edinburgh and the Decree of the Lords of Session in North Britain, made against the said James Greenshields, shall be, and they are hereby, reversed.

This judgment overrode the findings of the ecclesiastical court, whose decision the Scottish civil magistrates had merely enforced. Henceforth the House of Lords was judge of the limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Scotland.[278]

Scottish opinion was doubly outraged. The discovery that the House of Lords was the final Court of Appeal for the whole island, a fact cleverly concealed from notice in the wording of the Union Treaty, came as a severe shock to national pride. And the particular decision in favour of Greenshields seemed, perhaps rightly, to be a misconstruction of the existing law. But if it were so, there was all the more reason for a statutory change in the law that should make the services of the Scottish Episcopalians legal beyond all doubt. In the following year Parliament passed an Act of Toleration for their relief.

March 1712

The alarm and indignation with which this measure was greeted was one half of it sheer bigotry. But it also represented a fear that the half-Jacobite Parliament in London was preparing the way for an overturn of the existing system of Church and State in Scotland, and that this was one of the first steps. Almost all Scottish Episcopalians were Jacobites. It was this consideration that misled a fundamentally tolerant man like Carstares to oppose the measure. Aided by the English Whig Lords, he was able to induce the government to insert into the Bill an Abjuration of the Pretender as a condition of Toleration for the Episcopalian clergy. But the Tories imposed, by way of reply, a similar condition on the ministers of the Establishment. They, indeed, were ready enough to abjure the Pretender, but they objected to the Anglican implications of the oath as it was worded, and their tender consciences were shocked at being compelled to swear anything by a Prelatic

Parliament as a condition of their ministry, which was in their view an entirely religious function. The horror of erastianism in which the Scottish conscience was nurtured could not be understood by Englishmen. The Abjuration Oath long continued to be a stone of stumbling to the clergy of both religions in Scotland, though for very different reasons in the two cases.[279]

Immediately on the heels of the Toleration Act followed the restoration of Patronage, which became law on May 1, 1712. The democratic element in the appointment of ministers to parishes was regarded by many Presbyterians as an essential point of religion ; and apart from all theory, there was practical danger in presentation by patrons many of whom were latitudinarians, Episcopalians or Jacobites. For these reasons patronage had been abolished by law after the Revolution ; by the Act of 1690 the Protestant heritors and elders should ' name and propose ' a minister to the whole congregation, which if dissatisfied might appeal to the Presbytery, whose decision should be final. But now, in 1712, the ' prelatic ' Parliament of Westminster altered this law, in defiance of the spirit of the Union Treaty, though with full legal competence to do exactly as it pleased with Scottish religion. The right of presentation was restored to the old patrons, unless they were Roman Catholics.

The results of this change in the law were not very great for the first generation after its passage. But its later consequences were momentous indeed. It was the root cause of a long series of secessions of Presbyterian bodies from an Established Church bound by this State-made law.

Perhaps, indeed, the consequences of the Act were not wholly bad. In the Eighteenth Century the rights of the patrons were often exerted to place moderate-minded ministers in parishes of zealots, who objected to their intrusion, yet benefited by their mild ministrations. Readers of Galt's *Annals of a Parish* will not forget that in the first year of George III's reign the excellent Mr. Balwhidder was thus intruded, ' for I was put in by the patron, and people knew nothing whatsoever of me, and their hearts were stirred unto strife on the occasion.'

In the Nineteenth Century the consequences of the

Patronage Act of 1712 culminated in the secession of the Free Church under Chalmers, a protest on behalf of evangelical liberty which is one of the great facts in the history of Scotland. At length, in 1875, the measure so lightly passed in Queen Anne's reign was reversed, and in our own day the reunion of the Church was able to take place as a result of the final abolition of Patronage.[280]

The Toleration and Patronage Acts together did much to disgust Presbyterians with the Union.

> I am told [wrote Wodrow] that when the Bill of Toleration was passed last year, my Lord Somers had this expression 'Now the foundation of the Church of Scotland is sapped.' If he had joined this and Patronages together, I think he would have said this and much more. And for my own part I am of opinion that the Patronages are yet a more severe thrust at our constitution than the Toleration.[281]

In all matters concerning Scotland, Lord Oxford was far removed from the general sentiments of his party. He remained, as he had been at the time of the Union Treaty, much under the influence of Defoe and Carstares, who kept him posted as to Scottish opinion. In 1709 he had written to Carstares in the language of a fellow-Puritan: 'My soul has been among lions, even the sons of men, whose teeth are spears and arrows, and their tongues sharp swords'; after this exordium, brother Harley proceeds to lament the tendency of the Whig Cabinet Ministers to favour Deists, and ends with a proposal, very unusual at that period, for an alliance of English Episcopalians and Scottish Presbyterians against infidelity! And now that he was in office, he went far in his attempts to placate the Scottish Church. He deprecated the bringing of Greenshields' appeal before the House of Lords, and he tried to prevent the introduction both of the Toleration and the Patronage Acts. He was more loyal to the maintenance of the Union than the Whig Lords whom he had helped to pass it, and he took a totally different view of Scotland from that prevalent among his own partisans. It formed one of their many grievances against him.[282]

While the religious policy of the Tory Parliament alienated the Presbyterians but pleased the Episcopalians of

Scotland, its economic policy aroused the deepest resentment of both parties. And unfortunately the English Whigs failed to oppose the economic ill-treatment of North Britain, although their principles and past actions ought to have led them to do everything to make the Union a success. In 1711 a duty was imposed on the export abroad of British linen. It fell with undue severity on Scotland, because linen was her staple industry, as cloth was the staple industry of England; yet by Article Fourteen of the Act of Union it had been promised that new imposts should be made 'with due regard to the circumstances and abilities of every part of the United Kingdom.'

This promise seemed to the Scots to be even more grossly violated when in the spring of 1713 a tax was voted of sixpence a bushel on all British malt, regardless of the fact that Scottish malt was of inferior quality and lower price than English. Moreover the same clause of the Act of Union had expressly stipulated that 'malt to be made and consumed in that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland, shall not be charged with any imposition upon malt during this present war.' But when the tax was imposed the last of the Peace Treaties, that of England with Spain, had not yet been signed, though fighting had ceased.[283]

The anger roused in Scotland by the Malt Tax was so strong and universal that while this feeling was at its height the Scottish members at Westminster combined to demand the repeal of the Union. Argyle himself declared that it had failed to achieve its object of drawing the two peoples together in friendship, and Englishmen of all parties agreed. But the other object of the Union had been to secure the Hanoverian Succession on Anne's death. How would that be affected by its repeal? The question was not altogether easy to answer at that moment of time, but it was a consideration at the back of everyone's mind in their dealing with the question. Fears for the Hanoverian Succession made both English and Scottish Whigs doubtful, and more or less insincere, in their demand for repeal.

Nevertheless, several of the chief architects of the Union—Somers, Argyle and Seafield—did, in words at least, demand the destruction of the measure which is their best

claim to the gratitude of posterity. The Scottish Peers were very angry at the Malt Tax and other indignities, and very much afraid of opinion in their own country, while the English Whigs were playing to embarrass the Ministry and to curry favour in Scotland against the approaching General Election. It is doubtful if the Junto seriously intended to repeal the Union,[284] and they were certainly opposed to its repeal unless accompanied by further securities for Hanoverian Succession in Scotland, which they failed to obtain.

Oxford on this occasion played a more direct and manly part. He believed sincerely in the Union and he used all his strategy to save it. But many of his followers had little love for it, though now called upon to save it from the Whigs.

> It is very comical [Erasmus Lewis wrote to Swift] to see the Tories, who voted with Lord Treasurer against the dissolution of the Union, under all the perplexities in the world lest they should be victorious; and the Scotch, who voted for the bill of dissolution, under agonies lest they themselves should carry the point.[285]

There was so much finessing and cross-voting that it is impossible, in the absence of a proper Parliamentary report, to make out what precisely occurred. But in any case the motion for leave to bring in Repeal was defeated in the Lords, and was never introduced into the Commons.*

June 1 1713

* *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1216–1220, gives the date wrong (it was June 1 not May 28) and is vague as to the actual purport of the division. Compare with it *H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 556. In *More Culloden Papers*, II, p. 34, a letter from Duncan Forbes (from Edinburgh) describes the precise nature of the motion that was carried by four votes only: 'The Whigs had promised to stand by our [Scottish] members in that matter provided that a clause were conserted to be inserted in the Act for the Dissolution of the Union, whereby the Succession should be secured; but our people were so rash as to make the overture before they had commenced with the Whigs upon that security, by which means the Whigs were necessitate to propose a delay, until such time as they could get assurance from our people of that satisfaction they expected. This want of a full understanding being understood by the Treasurer [Oxford], he proposed to go on to the motion instantly, and the question after a considerable struggle put *proceed* or *delay*, it carried *proceed* by four votes. Thereafter the question was put whether leave should be given to bring in the Bill [for Repeal of the Union] or not, and it carried in the negative by a vast majority, all the Whigs voting against it because it was proposed out of concert before they had time to prepare it.' This account of the proceedings in the Lords differs from the ordinary accounts, but it is borne out by L'Hermitage (*Add. MSS.* 17677 *GGG*, f. 204), and is quite compatible with the two divisions mentioned in *H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 556, and is consistent with Halifax's speech as reported in *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1219. See also *Lockhart*, I, pp. 429–437; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 148–150, and Onslow's note; *Mathieson*, pp. 292–293; *Wodrow, Anal.*, II, pp. 236–237.

* *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 394.

As the life of Queen Anne drew visibly near to its end, all thoughts in Scotland were turned to the question of her successor. The Queen and her government up in London were universally supposed to be preparing a Restoration, and at the distance of Scotland from the capital no distinction of policy was recognized in this respect between Bolingbroke and Oxford. Even the Scottish Jacobite members at Westminster were convinced that the Queen had determined to do her brother right at last, probably by promoting a legislative repeal of the Act of Settlement. And the Whigs, in their anger and alarm, fostered this belief by their attacks on the Jacobitism of Ministers.[286] When Oxford paid £4000 to some Highland clans, most of whom were Jacobite, Argyle denounced it in Parliament as money given them to arm for the Pretender, although the Treasurer declared he was only paying them to remain quiet, according to a well-known policy of King William's time.[287]

March 1714

Queensberry, the Third or Scottish Secretary of State,* died in July 1711, and for two years the post was not filled up, the government of Scotland remaining chiefly in the hands of Bolingbroke as Northern Secretary of State. In September 1713 Oxford, jealous of his rival's power, renewed the Third Secretaryship and placed Scotland under the Earl of Mar, former unionist and future Jacobite rebel, whose policy was as uncertain as the Treasurer's own.[288]

This change did nothing to affect the glowing and confident expectations of the Jacobites of Scotland, who, in the belief that the game was being prepared in London by sure hands in Court and Parliament, refrained from continuing those warlike preparations on their own part which under the Whig Ministry they had always kept on foot. They were, therefore, taken by surprise when King George was peacefully proclaimed in London, Bolingbroke attending at the ceremony which the Scots had believed he would never permit to take place. This was a main reason why the trial

of strength in the North did not take place on Anne's death, but a year later in the Rebellion of 1715.*

It was in these last years of the Queen's reign that the London *Spectator* began to influence the Scottish upper class, and that the fame of a certain Edinburgh wig-maker, Allan Ramsay by name, and his turn for verse, epigram, and good companionship began to spread in Jacobite literary circles—the first streak of dawn to the splendid day of Eighteenth Century Scottish letters.

* On October 16, 1714, one of Oxford's Scottish informants wrote to him from Edinburgh: 'I have lately had occasion to talk freely with some of the chiefs of the Jacobite party here and I find that they have been strangely surprised and taken unawares at the Queen's death, which is the true reason of their doing nothing for their young master, as they call him. They say that so long as the Whigs had the Ministry in their hands and they thought their master's interest in danger, they were at a great deal of pains and some charges too, to be always on their guard, by having arms and horses both for themselves and followers always at hand, by holding an intercourse one with another by letters, messengers, or personal meetings sometimes at what they call their Highland Huntings; but when the Tories came into the Ministry they thought their master's interest secure, and they became so too, giving over all their care and diligence, and reckoning that they had nothing then to do but to wait and obey the orders which they expected to be sent from above when any opportunity offered, specially such a one as the Queen's death, which when it happened their expectation was at the crisis, where it continued till they saw that grand opportunity lost.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 498–499. Defoe bears this out in his *White Staff* (1714), Pt. II, pp. 14–22, and *Lockhart*, I, pp. 476–483, is not inconsistent with it.

CHAPTER XV

After the Peace

The Mohun-Hamilton duel. Anglo-French Ministerial intrigues for a Jacobite Restoration. Addison's *Cato*, April 1713. Swift's return to Ireland. Faults of the Spanish Commercial Treaty. The French Commercial Treaty lost in the Commons. Bolingbroke's faction against Oxford. General Election, August–September 1713.

In the autumn of 1712 the English Ministers had determined to send an Ambassador Extraordinary to France, to hasten and dignify the last stages of bargaining for Peace. Matthew Prior, who had the strings of the negotiation in his hand, could not receive his proper reward either as Ambassador to France or as plenipotentiary at Utrecht, because the Queen considered a man of humble origin unfitted to hold such dignified posts: a year before, she had written of Prior, 'I doubt his birth will not entitle him to be envoy.'[289] A grandee of the first order of magnificence was required to fill the part at Versailles which the Duke of Portland had filled so well at the close of William's war. On this occasion the choice of the Queen's Ministers significantly fell on the Duke of Hamilton, leader of the Scottish Jacobites. His appointment as Ambassador aroused the fiercest party feeling, for it was hoped and feared that he was going to Paris not only to hasten the Peace but to prepare the Restoration. His weak character and uncertain policy might have made his mission a disappointment to ardent Jacobites, as his leadership of the parties opposed to the Union had formerly proved. But the matter was never put to the test, for he never left the British shore.

Lord Mohun, who in his youth had been a rake-hell and a murderous brawler, had taken to politics as a Whig orator in the Lords, and had partially reformed his manner of life. Hamilton and he were opponents in a protracted

law-suit, about which they had recently had words. A message was taken to the Duke on Mohun's behalf, which he construed as a challenge : evidence differs as to which side provoked the duel. A meeting was arranged on the eve of the Ambassador's departure for France.[290]

Maccartney, who acted as Mohun's second, had been one of Marlborough's generals, recently broken for his politics by the Tory Ministers. Though he was a good soldier he was a gambler who had run through his own and his wife's fortune, he had got into various scrapes, and had for years past enjoyed a bad reputation among his brothers in arms.[291] The Duke's second was a Colonel John Hamilton of the Scots Foot Guards.

The four men met in Hyde Park in the early morning of November 15, 1712. The principals rushed at one another ' desperately like wild beasts, not fencing or parrying.' The Duke killed Mohun, and Mohun gave the Duke a wound which, in the opinion of the doctors, was the cause of his subsequent death. Meanwhile the seconds also, as the custom of the age allowed, were exchanging passes, and Colonel Hamilton had been lightly wounded below the calf of the leg ; but when he saw the Duke lying prostrate over the body of Mohun, he ran to his assistance. So far there is little dispute as to the facts. What happened next is more doubtful.

Three days later, Colonel Hamilton swore before the Privy Council that, as he held the wounded Duke in his arms, Maccartney came up ' with a sword ' and ' made a push at him.' The Colonel ' thought when he saw Maccartney push at the Duke it had been at him and asked him what he meant, but he made no answer but got away.' A surgeon, according to Colonel Hamilton, then came on the scene and opened the Duke's coat, ' and found a wound upon his left breast which never bled, though it was a large orifice, which he took to be the wound given him by Maccartney.' This story of Maccartney's stabbing the Duke was not confirmed by the servants who were looking on at the duel and who came up to assist the fallen men. Colonel Hamilton's uncorroborated statement, which is not itself very clear or convincing, is rendered yet more doubtful

by the fact that he made apparently no attempt to arrest Maccartney on the spot or to accuse him before the spectators. Modern opinion, from Sir Walter Scott onwards, has held that Maccartney did not stab the Duke. But all good Tories were at the time convinced that the Queen's Ambassador had been assassinated by a premeditated Whig plot, and the belief was not unnatural in view of the bad previous characters of Mohun and his second.

Maccartney fled for his life : he would indeed have run great danger before a jury of his countrymen in the feeling of the hour. But after the accession of George I he returned, stood his trial at the King's Bench, and was acquitted of the charge of murder. The famous Earl of Chesterfield sat through the trial, and though he considered Maccartney ' very capable of the vilest actions,' was convinced of his innocence. ' There did not appear,' writes Chesterfield, ' even the least ground for a suspicion of it ; nor did Hamilton, who appeared in court, pretend to tax him with it.'

At the time of its occurrence, the duel aroused party rage to the highest pitch. When Maccartney fled abroad, the attempt was made to have him extradited, and when the hunt for him was at its height, Swift sent over a droll story to entertain his lady friends in Dublin:

> Was it not comical for a gentleman to be set upon by highwaymen and to tell them he was Maccartney ? Upon which he brought them to a justice in hopes of a reward, and the rogues were sent to gaol. Was it not great presence of mind ? [292]

Hamilton's place at Paris was taken by Shrewsbury, who was the least likely of all the Ministers to countenance Jacobite intrigues. He performed his part with dignity and grace, but he did not like the atmosphere of too close friendship with France. Possibly for that reason he did not stay there long after the signing of Peace. In 1713 he was sent to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant : his doings there have already been described. Prior remained on in France, as the maid-of-all-work, indispensable but ill paid.

It was perhaps as well for the House of Hanover that Hamilton never went to France, and that Prior extricated himself from an attempt of Torcy and Gaultier to draw him

into the Jacobite intrigue.[293] For the conspiracy of the French and English Ministers to effect a Restoration on Anne's death took on fresh vigour after the signing of the Treaties of Utrecht.

As early as October 1712 Bolingbroke had felt himself on good enough terms with the Pretender to ask him, through Torcy, for a list of the Whigs who had made protestations of Jacobite loyalty ! James cautiously replied that, since the correspondence with Marlborough had been intermitted two years ago, he had had no traffic either with Whigs or Tories but that of which Bolingbroke himself was well aware. Berwick's comment was ' Your Majesty's answer upon that point was very generous and just, and ought to have a good effect with the present Ministry, who by that will see *they* run no risk in trusting Your Majesty.'[294]

As soon as the Treaties of Utrecht were safely signed, the Jacobite Restoration became the first object of Torcy, of Gaultier and Ilberville his agents in England, and of the Duc d'Aumont, sent as French Ambassador to London.[295] Their correspondence, now open to historians in the French Foreign Office, was not available to the Whigs when they impeached Oxford and Bolingbroke in 1715. If it had then been published, it would have proved what was so strongly suspected, that the two English Ministers, from the Treaty of Utrecht to the death of Anne, were in constant communication with the Pretender through French agents, and were plotting with the French Ministers to bring him to the throne on the Queen's death.* Bolingbroke was the more deeply committed and the more earnest and active of the two : Oxford was only playing one of his innumerable double games, insuring himself against the Restoration if it should prove inevitable, as it well might in case the young man changed his religion ; meanwhile he secured the Jacobite vote in Parliament, and was able to keep an eye on Bolingbroke's dealings with James.

Oxford would never lend himself to any practical plan

* A good selection of the most important of the relative documents from the French Foreign Office Archives will be found in the *English Historical Review*, July 1915, edited by Mr. Wickham Legg. Others will be found at the end of *Salomon*, and others in App. E, pp. 336–340 below, in this volume. See also *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*.

to effect the Restoration, and Bolingbroke's ideas on that point never went further than his design to man the public service and officer the army wholly with High Tories and Jacobites. In that policy he met with constant opposition from Oxford, backed, until the last week of her life, by the Queen. Bolingbroke and Oxford were, however, agreed on one point : they both told James that it was necessary that he should turn Protestant. Then, no doubt, they could have carried a repeal of the Act of Settlement through Lords and Commons and so put the law on the Jacobite side. It is possible that Anne hoped for this outcome, but she never gave clear expression to any view about her successor, except that, whoever he might be, he was not to land in England while she was alive.

James, for his part, never once contemplated the possibility of a change in his religion, and had therefore no desire to be restored by a bargain with Parliament. In April 1713 he wrote to Torcy desiring that no proposal about him should be made to either House, and expressing a wish to come to England during the recess ; then his faithful subjects 'animated by my presence' might, 'by an unexpected stroke,' place him on the throne when Anne was dead.[296] It is the plot described in *Esmond*, but it never materialized outside the pages of fiction, for James never came to England.

Such, however, was his idea of a Restoration, wholly without conditions. It might suit Atterbury, but it seemed to Bolingbroke impracticable and to Oxford undesirable. And so things drifted on, season after season, to the final catastrophe not only of the Jacobite but of the old Tory cause.

In March 1713, on the eve of the signature of Peace, Oxford declared to Gaultier that he was in the Pretender's interest and was fast bringing the Queen round. On this occasion his avowal of Jacobite loyalty was made confessedly with the object of inducing James to trust the English Ministers so far as to take their advice and travel in Italy, Bavaria or Switzerland.[297] Anne's servants wanted to remove her brother thus far afield, in order to avoid the charge made against them by the Whigs of abetting his continued residence on French soil. Under the terms of Utrecht

Louis acknowledged Anne and the Protestant Succession after her, and gave a formal promise not to assist the Pretender. At the time of the Dunkirk armistice James had been compelled to quit France, but he would go no further away than Lorraine, where, under the Duke's friendly protection, he settled down at Bar-le-Duc on the border of France to watch how matters went. In July 1713 Lords and Commons both addressed the Queen, asking her to bring pressure on the Duke of Lorraine to expel his guest: these addresses, though initiated by the Whigs, had been carried unanimously, because no member of either House wished openly to mark himself as Jacobite.[298]

A few days before Oxford made to Gaultier his not very sincere declaration of loyalty to James, the good young man had written forty-five letters to thirty-nine Cardinals![299] The cause of a constitutional, Anglican Jacobitism was a dream of English country-houses and had no root in the realities of the exiled court overseas; the Whigs always said so, and Bolingbroke was one day to discover by personal experiment that they were right, and to declare so in the most forcible terms in his *Letter to Sir William Wyndham*.

The rage of faction throughout the last four years of Queen Anne set its dividing mark on most aspects of life and letters in London. But there was one pleasant interlude, wherein the Whigs and Tories vied with each other only in the applause they gave to Addison's tragedy of *Cato*. It was impossible for anyone completely in his right senses to feel bitter against Addison ; and for two years past the creator of Sir Roger de Coverley had seldom dipped his pen in the political inkpot, though all men knew that he was still a staunch Whig. In the weeks following the signature of the Treaties of Utrecht, his tragedy, of which all save the last act had been written ten years before, was at last permitted by the modest author to appear upon the stage. The goodwill displayed towards him was astonishing in that tense moment of public affairs. On April 3, 1713, the day that the news of the signing of the Peace reached England, he dined with Swift and Bolingbroke and discussed the vexed question of the hour.

> We were very civil [writes Swift to Stella], but yet when we grew warm, we talked in a friendly manner of party. Addison raised his objections and Bolingbroke answered them with great complaisance.

Three days later the friendly foes met in the wings of Drury Lane Theatre :

> I was this morning [writes Swift] at the rehearsal of Mr. Addison's play. There were not above half a score of us to see it. We stood on the stage, and it was foolish enough to see the actors prompted every moment, and the poet directing them ; and the drab that acts Cato's daughter [Mrs. Olfield] out in the midst of a passionate part, and then calling out *what's next ?*

On April 14, 1713, the first public performance was given of the long expected play, with the most powerful and brilliant society in the world as audience. The party that had won the war and the party that had dictated the peace were both there in force to do honour to the bard. The tragedy was in the fashion of the time and was acclaimed as the greatest of Addison's works : to posterity it seems one of his feeblest, in spite of a few passages of real dignity not unworthy of the man who had just written ' The spacious firmament on high.' Cato's soliloquy at the beginning of the last act faintly echoes Milton and Shakespeare ; but most of the play echoes the French classical theatre and not overwell. A writer in Steele's *Guardian* pronounced that *Cato* ' exceeded any of the dramatic pieces of the ancients,' but as scarcely anyone in Europe except Bentley was capable of reading the Greek drama with ease and intelligence, the *dictum* only means that it was as good as Seneca.

The play, though extravagantly praised by almost everyone, was dull, and it managed to infect Pope himself with its dullness. That rising young poet, who had recently delighted the town with his first version of *The Rape of the Lock*, enjoyed the extreme honour of being asked to write the Prologue for *Cato*. He did not mean to be political, but the Whig half of the house broke into raptures over his couplet :

> Here tears shall flow for a more generous cause,
> Such tears as Patriots shed for dying laws.

The Prologue then proceeded with some remarkable rhymes in praise of the dramatist :

> He bids your breasts with ancient ardour rise
> And calls for the Roman drops from British eyes.
> Virtue confest in human shape he draws,
> What Plato thought, and godlike Cato was.
> . . . . . .
> With honest scorn the first-named Cato viewed
> Rome learning arts from Greece, whom she subdued.
> Our scene precariously subsists too long
> On French translation and Italian song.

Again rounds of clapping from the Whigs, who had always denounced the Italian opera as Popish and French influence as unpatriotic. And when, after the curtain had gone up on the play itself, Cato declared that

> When vice prevails and impious men bear sway,
> The post of honour is a private station,

all the Whigs who were fighting to get back to office shook the theatre with their applause. But the Tories would not suffer the occasion to be snatched from them thus. After hissing the Prologue, they decided to applaud the play. They declared that the vile military tyrant Caesar was intended for Marlborough, and that ' Cato must mean either the Lord Treasurer or Bolingbroke' ! The master-stroke was Bolingbroke's own, when he sent for Cato's impersonator, Booth, and gave him a purse with fifty guineas for acting so well the part of the patriot ' who defended liberty against a Perpetual Dictator ' : Marlborough's demand for the Captain Generalship for life had not yet been forgotten. And so ' the numerous and violent claps of the Whig party on the one side of the theatre were echoed back by the Tories on the other.'

Both parties continued to attend the performances in this schoolboy mood, and the piece ran for twenty nights, then accounted a very long run. After a fortnight of this entertainment, a Whig Lord wrote to his private friends recording his conversation with the Tory Lord Chancellor's son :

I asked him how he liked our play. ' *Your play ! my lord, 'tis ours,*' says he ; ' *or at least you will allow Cato to belong to us, by reason Mr. Booth is one of us.*' Very good, quoth I, take him in God's name : you purchased him at the rate of fifty-four guineas which Lord Bolingbroke collected among you young gentlemen at the play the other night. They might make the best of their player, since we had our poet ; and bribe him if you can.[300]

It is small wonder that so popular a play, which was published and read throughout the land after its run of the stage, should have added to our common stock of phrases some that are still alive, though their origin has been long forgotten. The best known is the gallant sentiment of Portius :

> 'Tis not in mortals to command success,
> But we'll do more, Sempronius ; we'll deserve it ;

or Marcia's sententious warning to her sex :

> The woman that deliberates is lost.

While *Cato* was still upon the stage, Swift's life-sentence was passed by the Queen ; the Deanery of St. Patrick's, Dublin, was assigned to him. Like so much else at the time it was a compromise, not on this occasion between the views of Oxford and Bolingbroke who would both have gladly kept their friend with them as an English Dean, but between the Queen's dislike of Swift, nourished by the Duchess of Somerset and the Archbishop of York, and her sense of duty to her Tory Ministers.* Swift accepted his fate as inevitable, writing to Stella :

> Neither can I feel joy at passing my days in Ireland ; and I confess I thought the Ministry would not let me go ; but perhaps they can't help it.[301]

To another friend he wrote :

> The prints will tell you that I am condemned to live again in Ireland ; and all that the Court or Ministry did for me was to let me choose my station in the country where I am banished.

* See pp. 117–118 above, and Sir C. Firth's pamphlet, *Dean Swift and Ecclesiastical Preferment*, reprinted by Sidgwick and Jackson from *Review of English Studies*, Jan. 1926.

For his health's sake, and to avoid the slow jolting of the coach in the ruts, he rode a-horseback through the June weather from London to Chester, hoping there to take ship for Ireland. From Chester he writes to Stella :

> I am here after six days. A noble rider, fais ! And all the ships and people went off yesterday with a rare wind. This was told me, to my comfort, on my arrival. Having not used riding these three years made me terribly weary. Yet I resolve on Monday to set out for Holyhead, as weary as I am.

But he thought better of it and did not venture the journey through the Welsh hills. So by slow stages he returned to his Irish exile, poorly rewarded, as he thought, for all his services. Indeed he had done more during three years' residence in London to settle the immediate fate of parties and nations than did ever any other literary man in the annals of England.[302]

In June 1713 the Whigs won their first popular and Parliamentary success since their downfall three years before, in causing the rejection of the commercial part of the Treaty with France. They had ceased to represent the general opinion of the country on the issue of peace and war, but they still represented it, not only as to the Succession, but on most commercial questions. The vested interests of existing manufacture and commerce, and the popular economic theory of the day as to the balance of trade, were championed by the Whigs in their attack on the Spanish Commercial Treaty as insufficient, and on the French Commercial Treaty as undesirable and dangerous.

Bolingbroke's policy in the Treaties he had made with France and Spain was to dish the Whigs by winning such great commercial advantages for England at the expense of Holland and other countries, that the Tories would appear as the true benefactors not only of the landed interest but of the mercantile community also.* In this he was partly, but not wholly, successful.

The old-established trade with the Spaniards, both in Europe and America, was regarded by all sections in England as of vital importance. We had engaged in the

* See p. 182 above.

war very largely to prevent France from shutting us out of its benefits. Spain bought our goods, cloth from England and dried fish from the Newfoundland banks, and sold us in return choice wool, dyeing goods and other materials for our manufactures. Bolingbroke, in the Treaties of Utrecht, won territorial and political protection for this trade and for our Turkey and Mediterranean commerce in general by securing Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and by getting the *Asiento* monopoly of the South American slave-trade. But the old immunities, that English merchants had enjoyed in Spain herself under the excellent Treaty of 1667, were not properly secured by the Commercial Treaty that Lord Lexington negotiated at Madrid with Philip V's Ministers and the Princess des Ursins. For want of proper advice on this technical and difficult subject, Bolingbroke in 1713 accepted a Commercial Treaty which at once broke down in practice. Before the Queen died, the whole trading community in England, without distinction of party, was up in arms about the ill usage of our merchants in Spain, and a new Treaty had to be negotiated under George I. This failure on a question of detail was one of the reasons why public opinion, particularly in the towns, began to turn against Bolingbroke and the Tories in the last year of Queen Anne.[303]

The French Commercial Treaty, on the other hand, was objected to for the opposite reason—not that it made trade too difficult but that it made it too easy. Bolingbroke's political and dynastic policy was to make an Alliance with France against the European Allies with whom we had been working ever since the Revolution. To strengthen this new diplomatic orientation, he desired to create a new vested interest in trade with France, and did not like it the less if it was made at the expense of the Commercial Treaty with Portugal, so dear to the Opposition. Claret was Tory, port was Whig.*

* The political flavour of the two wines appears in the literature of the day, *e.g.* in Mrs. Centlivre's *Gotham Election*. In spite of tariffs there must have been a great deal of claret drunk by the upper classes in England ; *e.g.* in the *Gotham Election* (1715), the innkeeper says : 'Most of our gentry for this last vour years, dye mind, will touch nothing but French claret. There are zome that like your Port wines still, but very few, and those of the poorer sort too.'

The Whigs, with a diametrically opposed foreign policy, were correspondingly fearful lest a good trade with France should render an alliance with the patron of the Pretender popular in the City of London. Hitherto they had been able, by duties and prohibitions, to prevent such a trade from growing large. In the battle they had now to fight for political reasons against the commercial clauses of the Utrecht Treaty with France, they had economic advantages that decided the event. The popular theory of the balance of trade, as well as the vested interests of commerce and manufacture, stood opposed to the sacrifice of the Portuguese trade for a trade with France.

The Portuguese, under the Methuen Treaties of 1703, had for the past decade been buying our cloth in great quantities and paying for it partly in port wine and partly in Brazilian gold. This exchange now amounted to a great vested interest, in which wool-growing farmers and squires were involved, together with weavers and cloth merchants. And since we imported gold from Portugal, it was regarded as a sound trade because the 'balance' was the right way. The French, on the other hand, would sell us claret and silk goods, and would not take cloth in return, but, it was alleged, principally gold. 'French wines had to be bought for money, those of Portuguese growth could be obtained for goods.' French trade, therefore, would be a bad trade according to the economic ideas of the time ; and certain practical results would flow from it : clothiers and sheep farmers would be injured ; our rising silk manufacture at home would be checked by French competition ; our Turkey and Italian trade would suffer, as we bought silk from those countries in return for cloth, and if now we bought silk from France instead, we should sell less cloth in the Mediterranean. Finally the Portuguese would put up high duties against our cloth, because, by the Methuen Treaty, they were privileged to sell their wine to us at a duty one third lower than the French ; this condition would be annulled by the proposed Treaty with France, and the Portuguese would therefore be free to recoup themselves in any way they chose.

It is difficult to say how far these fears were exaggerated,

since the matter was never put to the test. For the same reason it is impossible to say how great a benefit a freer trade with France might have proved. Scotland and the American colonies would certainly have benefited respectively by trade with France and with the French West Indian Islands. But in fact the Scottish members voted sixteen for the Commercial Treaty and sixteen against.[304]

Bolingbroke, whether he was right or wrong as an economist, had miscalculated as a politician : he desired to promote English trade, but he was not in close touch with the mind of the trading community, as were the Whig leaders. The first opposition made in Parliament to the commercial clauses of Utrecht was, indeed, voted down on May 14th by a majority of over a hundred on a straight party vote. But in the course of the next month a formidable agitation arose in the country and Tory members were put under strong pressure by their constituents.* Deputations of clothiers and silk merchants, traders with Portugal, Italy and Turkey thronged the lobbies and gave alarmist evidence to Parliament. A riot in London of silk-workers, dismissed by their masters in fearful expectation of the flood of French silks, had to be suppressed by the militia.

The finishing stroke was given by Sir Thomas Hanmer. That worthy Baronet realised the old Tory ideal of an independent country member : he sat for Suffolk and had refused office. Swift spoke of him as 'the most considerable man in the House of Commons.' When, at the last moment, he changed his mind and came out against the Treaty of Commerce, he sealed its fate. His Toryism was beyond reproach or question: as a High Churchman he had voted for the 'Tack' in 1704, and as an October Club man he had taken a leading part in the movement for the Treaties of Utrecht. In November last he had been in Paris, where the French had treated him with the highest consideration, and where the Jacobites had courted him in vain.[305] On trade, and on the Succession, he found himself, much

* *E.g.* the *Shakerley MSS.* (kindly shown to me by Mr. Arthur Bryant) reveal the pressure put on Shakerley, the Tory M.P. for Chester, by his constituents regardless of their politics. Chester, as the emporium of the Portuguese wine trade, would have suffered by the reduction of the duties on French wine.

against his will, on the Whig side, and on both questions his leadership of a strong Tory group was of decisive importance. These dissidents became known as the 'Whimsicals' or 'Hanoverian Tories.'

Oxford, who cared little about Bolingbroke's pet projects, had attempted in vain to get the commercial clauses withdrawn without a division, but a vote was taken and the Ministry was beaten by 194 to 185, in the same House which a month before had given them a majority of over a hundred on the same question. Nearly eighty Tories voted against the Government. Only one of the four Tory Members for London dared to vote for trade with France. As the Commons refused to implement the commercial clauses, they had to be cut out from the Treaty of Peace.[306]

June 18 1713

In this controversy the power of the pamphlet press had been conspicuous, but Swift, busy with his move to Ireland, had taken little part. Defoe had stood up for the Ministry in the *Mercator*, but a very formidable rival review had been started by the opponents of the trade with France, called the *British Merchant*, subsidized by General Stanhope and Lord Halifax. It was well primed with statistics and arguments that carried the day with a public brought up on the Balance of Trade theory, to which the Tories had no clearly defined free-trade theory to oppose. Of lighter weight was Addison's *Trial of Count Tariff*, a playful Whig parable of the same general type as the Tory Dr. Arbuthnot's *John Bull* of the year before.*

Bolingbroke was bitterly chagrined, the more so as the Dutch, whom he so hated, seized the opportunity of the English rejection of trade with France to increase their own.

* Mr. H. O. Meredith, in his outlines of the *Economic History of England*, p. 190, says: 'The Tories, though willing to break up the commercial policy of the Whigs, were not prepared to secure for England the advantages of a simple free trade tariff. They held so much of the balance of trade doctrine that it was difficult for them to answer the positions of the Whigs, viz. that the trade with Portugal was a gain, that with France a loss to England. Their argument that we ought not to refuse trade with France because they were our enemies, though sound so far as it went, did not touch the economic case of the Whigs, viz. that we traded with France at a loss.' I think this is borne out by a study of the Tory arguments in *Mercator* (May 26, 1713, to July 14, 1714), of which a copy will be found in the British Museum Newspaper Room.

They were overjoyed at it and laughed openly at us [he wrote]; they are going to take off the small duties they have on French goods particularly on silks.[307]

His anger was turned chiefly against Oxford, who had been lukewarm in the matter, and whom, moreover, he and his friends suspected of an intrigue with the Whigs. At the end of March the Treasurer had gone openly to dine with Lord Halifax, though the town gossip declared that the other members of the Junto had refused to share the repast.[308] The same week Swift, devoted as he was to Oxford, wrote regretfully of his unwisdom in 'not refusing to converse with his greatest enemies.'[309] Indeed, throughout his whole period of office, Oxford continued to receive letters from Halifax, offering him advice on financial questions; congratulating him on his achievements, among others on the Peace of Utrecht; and from the spring of 1713 onwards adumbrating a combination of the Whigs with the Lord Treasurer to save the Hanoverian Succession—opposition to Bolingbroke being implied though not expressed.[310] Probably Oxford wrote nothing in answer to these letters, but he talked with Halifax and he did not discourage his suggestions. The Treasurer seems to have been at least as loyal to his Ministerial colleagues as Bolingbroke, but he characteristically kept open two possible lines of movement for the future, one of advance to Jacobitism if the Pretender should turn Protestant, the other of alliance with the Whigs to save the Act of Settlement.

Rumours of Oxford's dealings with the Whigs, followed by the defeat of the Treaty of Commerce, stirred the High Tories to fresh efforts to seize control. Lists were circulated showing the scandalous number of Whigs still left in the army, the Lord-Lieutenancies, the magistracy and the civil service, whom Oxford refused to dismiss. Atterbury, whom the reluctant Queen had made Bishop of Rochester in June 1713, joined with Lord Chancellor Harcourt who had procured his elevation, and with Bolingbroke, who was head of their cabal, in a campaign against the Treasurer as being 'no sincere Churchman.' 'If your brother will not set himself at the head of the Church party, somebody must,' said Bolingbroke to Oxford's brother Edward. To meet

the outcry, the Treasurer agreed, in August, that his own friend, Lord Dartmouth, should be superseded as Southern Secretary by the High-Church leader, Bromley. Dartmouth became Privy Seal in place of Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, who was promoted to the see of London for his services at Utrecht.[311]

But what Oxford gave with one hand he took back with the other. While he persuaded the Queen to appoint Bromley, he also persuaded her to take Scotland out of Bolingbroke's management by reviving the Third Secretaryship of State in the person of the Earl of Mar, and making the Earl of Findlater and Seafield Chancellor of Scotland. 'These things,' wrote Erasmus Lewis, 'make Lord Bolingbroke stare.'*

Aug.–Sept. 1713

Early in September, the Treasurer went down to Wimpole† for the marriage of his son Edward, and Bolingbroke, after writing him profuse congratulations and professions of friendship, 'took advantage of his absence' in the country to push the intrigue for his removal from office.[312] Lady Masham was set to work on the Queen; according to the Harley family, Bolingbroke bribed Abigail with shares in the Asiento Company and by other illicit transactions. Oxford already felt his position undermined; when he left office a year later he wrote to Swift: 'I have had no power since July 25, 1713.'[313] Conscious of his own increasing ill health, and inattention to business, of which Bolingbroke complained, sometimes in reasonable and justifiable language,[314] the Treasurer at one moment in the autumn determined to resign. But he was persuaded to change his mind by his friends Lord Trevor and Lord Dartmouth. Having reluctantly decided to stay on, he wrote to Dartmouth on November 25, 1713:

> I received your kind and compassionate letter and return you hearty thanks for the instances of your friendship. I will hasten, according to your admonition, to return to my duty. But I hope those who desire my place, if they looked upon it with the same eyes I do, would not take it up if they might.

* See p. 243, above, on the Third Secretaryship; *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 318.

† This famous Cambridgeshire seat, pronounced and generally spelt 'Wimple' in those days, came to Edward Harley junior by his marriage with the daughter of the Duke of Newcastle. He sold it to Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in 1740 for £100,000. Edward was the name both of Oxford's brother and of his son and heir.

That autumn Oxford's friend, Erasmus Lewis, wrote:

> I find by all the pamphlets, they give up the distinction of Whig and Tory, and bend all their thoughts to make new distinction between the Tories themselves, as Hanover Tory and Pretender Tory, English Tory and French Tory, for trade and against it.[315]

In these circumstances it was a serious matter for the supporters of government that the time of the old Parliament had run out and that another Election was due under the Triennial Act. They managed, however, to go once more to the polls as a united party, and to be returned to power for one more eventful year.

The General Election of August and September 1713 was fought with spirit by both sides. The Whigs were more united and in better heart than three years before, and 'in the northern parts had the better management.'[316] Their partisans, all over England, marched about wearing wool in their hats, and parading wooden shoes, to symbolize the ruin of the cloth trade by the Tory Commercial Treaties, and the betrayal of the country to France. Above all they declared that the Ministers intended to bring in James upon Anne's death. Trade and the Protestant Succession were popular cries, and had a majority in the new House, thanks to Hanmer and his Hanoverian Tories. But the Whig party vote was not much increased.

For the Tories, whether they followed the banner of Bolingbroke, of Oxford or of Hanmer, united to fight the Election on two issues: gratitude to the Queen and her Ministers for making Peace, and fear for the Church in danger. The Sacheverell wave had not yet spent its force. Above all, the power and patronage of government were on the Tory side, and in the reigns of Anne and her successor these influences never failed to carry a general election.*

* In Mrs. Centlivre's *Gotham Election*, written in 1715 and referring as much to the Election of 1713 as to that of 1715, we read:

> 'Enter a mob with their candidates at the head of each Party, one bearing a

In the Cornish pocket boroughs, since Godolphin's death, the High Tory influence was again supreme. Bishop Trelawny liked to be well with the Government of the day, and after some hesitations and loyal regrets for his deceased friend Godolphin, was persuaded by Oxford to support Tory candidates in Cornwall. By the middle of September Lord Lansdowne boasted, with only a little exaggeration, that he had procured the Tories there a majority of ten to one, and that he would have prevented any Whig being returned for a Cornish constituency if the Lord Treasurer had sent yet more money and distributed yet more places among wavering voters.[317] To 'cornwallise'* became an electoral term for corruption, intimidation and falsification of electoral lists; these arts were confessedly employed by both sides all over the country, but in this election the majority of the returning officers were Tory partisans.

From Cornwall to Cumberland, Oxford was abused for not turning every Whig out of every post in government pay, to speed the good work of the elections. Sir Charles Musgrave complained bitterly that he had not been made Governor of Carlisle instead of the Whig Earl who took his title thence; but Musgrave was elected for the town in spite of that disadvantage.[318] Civil servants, magistrates, army and navy officers, tide waiters and innumerable humble folk who did not happen to be Tories, were protected by the obstinate justice of Oxford and his royal mistress. In saving the country from too close an application of 'the spoils for the victors,' they served the State well, and set an example behind which the Tories were glad enough to find shelter when George I came to the throne. Indeed, even from the party electoral point of view the Treasurer may have been right, for his incorrigible moderation had its uses in retaining for the Tories the allegiance of

Pope and wooden shoes with wool in their hats; the other a Tub with a woman preacher in it and laurel in their hats.

'The Whigs cry "No Pope: No Perkin."

'The Tories "No tub-preaching; no Liberty and Property men."

'Whigs "No Fire and faggot! No wooden shoes! No trade-sellers! Down with that Frenchfied dog! No High Boy."

'Half a score fall together by the ears and exeunt fighting.'

* 'If he could have *Cornwallised* it by scattering some guineas illegally'—Sir Robert Price on the Weobley election, Sept. 3, 1713. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 327.

many Hanoverians and men of the middle way. Bishop Trelawny had yielded only to Oxford's personal appeal for support in the Cornish boroughs. And Hanmer and his following had to be kept in the party fold.

In the Wiltshire boroughs the election was fiercely and unscrupulously conducted. The Duke of Somerset, now on the Whig side once more, was offering annuities of fifty pounds and upwards to certain voters in Marlborough, but a larger number took the bribes of the Tory family of Bruce, who carried the day.[319] In Ludgershall the Tory agent wrote unabashed to Lord Bruce that 'several good old votes that were allowed upon the last poll were struck off now, because they would have voted for Mr. Skylling,' the Whig candidate, and 'many new sham votes were made and allowed to pass by the bailiff because they voted for General Webb and Mr. Fern,' who were duly returned in the Tory interest.

Hardly less frank is the same Tory agent's account of the election for Wilts county conducted in the Cathedral town:

> Sir Richard Howe and Mr. Hyde [Tories] carried the election against Mr. Aske and Mr. Pitt by a majority of near 600 votes. The Whig party appeared, all of them, with wool in their hats at the place of election. The Tories hooted them, called them wolves in sheep's clothing, surrounded them by parcels and whipped many of them, and knocked down others, insomuch that the Whigs were soon forced to pull all the wool out of their hats. Mr. Penruddock and Mr. Thomas Burnet had a quarrel, and a challenge passed, but the Bishop [Burnet of Salisbury] locked up his son the next morning and Penruddock swears he'll post him.*

Underneath the rivalry of the great families, the corruption and the horseplay of which Wiltshire elections appeared to consist, lay the undying feud of Anglican and Puritan, of Church and Dissent. When, on the accession

* This same boisterous Thomas Burnet wrote during the heat of the election some lines expressive of more filial affection than reverence:

> 'We drank to the Bishop, old Gilbert of Sarum,
> The Tories he'll baffle, in pulpit ne'er spare 'em,
> And show the blind geese that their sense is but *parum*.'

Clarke and Foxcroft's *Life of Burnet*, p. 464.

of George I, the Duke of Marlborough rode through the town from which he took his title, he was welcomed by

> three of his officers and a mob consisting of about twenty or thirty Presbyterians, Anabaptists and Independents, shouting *God bless the Duke of Marlborough* ; but as they rode along the street the Church people crying out *God bless the Church, the King and Dr. Sacheverell* drowned the other noise.[320]

In the autumn of 1713 all men knew that a Tory victory at the polls would mean in the new Parliament an attack on the Dissenting interest in some form—the form actually taken was the Schism Act to destroy their schools. For this reason, though the election was declared by the Tories to turn on their own merits as the peace-makers of Europe, the Society of Friends felt a more lively concern about Toleration than about Peace. In the Sussex County Election, nine Quakers voted for the Whig candidates and only one for the Tories : in the contest for Buckinghamshire fifty-three Quakers voted for the Whigs and only three for the Tories.* But there were exceptions. At Minehead in Somerset, where the right of every voter to vote had to be shown by a Parish Certificate kept in the Church Chest, the Whigs complained that

> the Rev. Mr. Moggridge the Vicar and one Joseph Alloway, a Quaker and Overseer of the Poor, . . . upon the poll produced only such Certificates as were for their advantage and suppressed all those which would have disqualified any of their own voters.

In this way these two men of God secured the return of the Tory candidates, Sir Jacob Banks and Sir John Trevelyan of Nettlecombe.[321]

The Tories once more held the Parliamentary keys of power, and would hold them so long as the Queen should

* See Poll Books for these contests, 1713. *Bodleian MSS. Willis* 54 and 56. It is possible to tell how Quakers voted, because in the poll books the word *affirmat* is written opposite their names. They and they alone were allowed by the law of William's reign to affirm instead of swearing the declaration of Allegiance and Supremacy required of every voter. On May 29, 1713, the House of Commons had divided on the question whether to deprive Quakers of the privilege of affirmation—a Tory act of revenge for their Whig voting. But it was defeated by 148 to 58. It was said that, if it had been carried, a move would have been made to deprive other Dissenters of their votes. L'Hermitage, *Add. MSS.* 17677 *GGG*, ff. 197–198.

live. But it was known that her days were numbered. The time was short. What would they do with it ? If they healed their own divisions, appeased the fears of moderate men and joined frankly in preparing the way for the accession of the House of Hanover in accordance with the law of the land, they would be in a position to exact a large share of power in the new reign. But if their party were to be broken in half by the quarrels of its leaders ; if the House of Hanover, already deeply suspicious, were to be further alienated by a half Jacobite policy that let ' I dare not ' wait upon ' I would ' ; and if at the same time the attempt were made to eradicate Whiggery and Dissent by forcible measures, the rebound in the new reign might be fatal indeed. Oxford, in the muddy depths of his mind, saw the situation truly, but was every week becoming less capable of action, or even of intelligible speech. Bolingbroke could act, but his one idea of action was ever more violent partisanship, in a national crisis that needed other remedies and a different spirit.

CHAPTER XVI

Queen Anne's Last Parliament

The Queen's dangerous illness, Christmas 1713. The English Ministers ask James to change his religion; his refusal, February–March 1714. The Hanoverian Tories take alarm. Argyle. Marlborough's position. Defoe. Steele's *Crisis* and his expulsion from the House. The vote on the Succession in danger. The writ for the Duke of Cambridge. Death of the Dowager Electress Sophia. The Schism Act. Proclamation against the Pretender. Last scene in Parliament July 1714: accusation of corruption against Bolingbroke's agent, Arthur Moore. Bolingbroke's projected alliance with France, Spain and Sicily.

After the election, but before the meeting, of her last Parliament, Queen Anne took ill at Christmas and nearly died. Her danger proved a touchstone of the attitude of parties in relation to the Successor, and might well have served, more than it actually did, as a warning to Ministers of their precarious position and their want of any preparation for the future. While Anne lay between life and death at Windsor, Oxford was carelessly absent and Bolingbroke stood at her bedside in a cold sweat, praying 'God in his mercy to these Kingdoms preserve her.' In town, where the rumour ran round that she was dead, the Tories were 'out of their wits,' while the Whig chiefs bustled around in their sedan chairs to one another's houses, in a pleasurable excitement, which it was impossible altogether to conceal and for which their enemies bitterly reproached them after the recovery of the Queen.[322]

Dec. 24–25 1713

All agreed that the Pretender's plans were not ready, and that if Anne had died Sophia of Hanover would have been raised to the throne. The Act of Settlement, passed by the Tories themselves in 1701, still stood unrepealed, and there was no Jacobite majority in either House of Parliament unless and until James turned Protestant. Nor were his

partisans yet sufficiently in control of the military and executive power to attempt to overthrow the law by force. On December 14, Gaultier had written to Torcy bidding him pray that Anne should live 'some years' yet, or the Stuart cause was lost. Yet in the same letter he related how Oxford had just said to him that he would never endure that a German should rule in England, and that Parliament would change the Succession if James would imitate his uncle Charles II in his easiness about religious profession. Gaultier added that Victor Amadeus of Savoy and Sicily was ready to have his son brought up as a Protestant if the young man could succeed to the British Crown as great-grandson of Charles I; and that, if the House of Stuart refused to oblige in the point of religion, Bolingbroke was not indisposed to seek in the House of Savoy another bolt-hole by which to escape from Hanoverian rule.[323]

Oxford, while declaring to Gaultier that he was more faithful than his rival to the Stuart as distinct from the Savoyard interest, would take no practical steps to secure the succession of the exiled Prince. In the previous May he had promised to send over a secret agent to reside at his Court, a point on which James laid great stress; but the promise, though repeated in the winter, was never fulfilled.[324]

The danger that the Ministers had run at Christmas moved them to take in February at least one practical step which, given their views and policy, they ought to have taken more than a year before. They no longer hinted but demanded that James should join the Anglican Church. Their message was forwarded with zeal and weighted with additional arguments by the agents of the French Government, Gaultier and Ilberville, who saw in James's accession to the throne on any terms a means of bringing back England into the orbit of French diplomacy. Gaultier, though an abbé, was of opinion that London was well worth a sermon. In a remarkable letter of February 6, he advised James to 'ask God to enlighten you as to the part you should take.' This most worldly churchman told James outright that he would never

Feb.–March 1714

sit on the English throne unless he 'dissimulated his religion or changed it entirely.' He should also treat Whigs and Tories equally well. And Gaultier added that even if he came to the throne he would not keep it unless, after promising to observe the laws, he 'kept his word better than the King his father kept his.' The programme, both in its baseness and in its wisdom, was utterly unpalatable to the young man. On February 26 he replied with indignation telling Gaultier that he and the English Ministers were asking him to play the knave and that he would rather forfeit his inheritance. Next week he wrote a more polite refusal in three well-expressed English letters to Anne, Oxford and Bolingbroke.

> All the just securities that can reasonably be asked for your religion, liberties and properties I shall be most willing to grant, and as that can be expected from a man of principle and true honour I am ready to comply with it, and you have I know too much of both to require more of me.

Torcy observed sardonically that the abbé Gaultier deserved to be made Archbishop of Canterbury for his proselytizing zeal, and James complained to Cardinal Gualterio that the abbé had wanted him to desert his religion 'and had even the effrontery to ask me to write to the Pope,' on the point of conscience.[325]

James III was an honest man : he would not profess one faith while believing another, like his uncle Charles ; nor did he, like Henri Quatre, regard religion as an affair of politics. By refusing to equivocate, he saved England from another age of trouble and revolution, and confined the arena of possible civil war to the North of the Island. Our country owes him a great debt.

In the last days of February 1714, Oxford became very precise, promising Gaultier that if James would turn Protestant he would persuade the Queen to name him heir in her will, and would move Parliament to repeal the Act of Settlement.[326] But it was too late. The angry reply was already on its way from Lorraine, and early in March the Queen and her Ministers knew that the essential condition could not be fulfilled.

What were they to do now ? The logical consequence of the demand they had sent to James and of his peremptory refusal would seem to be that the Tory Ministers should make their court to Hanover instead, and outrival the Whigs in preparing the way for the now inevitable accession. The interests of their party and the peace of their country alike demanded it. If they had spent the last months of Anne's reign in retracing their steps out of the Jacobite slough, they might have reached *terra firma* in time.

But there were obstacles to this obvious course. The Queen would not endure to hear talk of the Succession, and would not suffer a Hanoverian Prince to be received in the island before her own death. She was a sick woman, and no longer able to bring her mind to bear on the problems that would confront her Ministers and subjects as soon as she was gone. Moreover, Bolingbroke's Francophil policy had been carried so far that it was difficult and dangerous to draw back. The French and the Jacobite Courts could, if incensed, publish damning evidence against the Tory Ministers ; and the House of Hanover was already so much enraged against them that it would be difficult at this late date to effect a reconciliation. Bolingbroke could not abandon the hope that somehow James might yet find his way to the throne and choose him as Treasurer ; while Oxford, broken in health and staying himself with flagons, was sunk in an apathetic torpor, a caricature of his old method of cautious non-committal.

And so the two Ministers left the problem of the Succession alone as insoluble, and engaged instead in their fatal feud with one another. On April 26, 1714, Gaultier wrote to James :

> Lords Oxford and Bolingbroke are not on good terms, but they have both separately sworn to me this morning that after the Queen they will recognize no King but you.[327]

Such asservations were now merely a confession of impotent waiting on events, in the hope that something would yet turn up to forestall inevitable fate.

If Bolingbroke and Oxford had, even at this eleventh hour, united to put themselves openly at the head of the

Hanoverian interest, they could have swung the central bulk of the Tory party, which was hanging, uncertain and undirected, midway between its Jacobite and Hanoverian wing. The feelings of many a squire of the old Cavalier tradition are touchingly expressed in a letter written by Peter Shakerley, Tory M.P. for Chester, to his half-brother.

> I am sorry there should be any cause for making such severe reflections on the ingratitude of the Family of the Stewarts, and wish it had been less apparent. And though there is so much truth in it that I think neither the old cavaliers (if any of 'em are living) nor any of their sons will ever risk lives and fortunes for their sakes, yet these instances of their ingratitude administer such sourings to the once loyal party as will I fear make the overthrow of the monarchy too easy whenever it may be attempted ; and under pretences of securing it, it is to be feared that a Standing Army will always be kept up.[328]

Such was the central Tory feeling, conducive to a melancholy inaction. The sons of the Cavaliers could not be brought into the field on behalf of a Roman Catholic Stuart ; they would reluctantly have followed a clear lead for Hanover, if given by their accredited chiefs. But Oxford and Bolingbroke vouchsafed no clear sign, and their followers were left a prey to rumour and divided counsel.

Meanwhile one section of the party acted without waiting to be led. The Hanoverian Tories, called ' Whimsicals ' by their enemies, were men who had made up their minds that England's Church and laws would be in greater danger under a Roman Catholic Stuart than under Queen Sophy or King George. This view was held not only by avowed moderates, but by a large body of strong High Churchmen, such as Nottingham, Hanmer and Dawes who had just succeeded Sharp, as Archbishop of York. These men bestirred themselves to agitate for the House of Hanover, in and out of Parliament. They drew together in consultation with the Middle Party of Shrewsbury, Somerset, and Argyle.

The Tory Bishops, all save two, showed by their votes in the Lords that they feared above all other things a Roman Catholic King. Trelawny wrote, ' I can't but fear the Pretender is next oars ; if so the coffin is bespoke for the

Queen, for Popery is always in haste to kill when they are sure of taking possession.' And a great mass of lay opinion, opposed to the Whigs for four years past, listened with approval to the song :

> Whoe'er is in place I care not a fig,
> Nor will I dispute between High Church and Low,
> 'Tis now no dispute between Tory and Whig,
> But whether a Popish successor or no.

' The generality,' wrote a Tory Peer in March 1714, ' thinks of nothing after the Queen but the House of Hanover, . . . there is such an aversion to Popery.'[329]

The approaching crisis of the Succession brought Argyle out against the Ministers whom he had helped to put into office. Already alienated by their conduct towards him in Spain,* the Campbell chief was not the man to sit still while a plot was being hatched to place the enemy of his house and clan on the throne of Britain. Old fundamental feelings were stirred up, deeper than his recent quarrel with the English Whigs, deeper than his feud with Marlborough. He swore that if the Pretender made any attempt, he would deal him out the measure that the House of Stuart had twice dealt out to the heads of the House of Argyle.[330] And at Christmas he had reconciled himself to Marlborough. In April 1714 he was removed from all his places in the army and in the State. Only, like his ally the Duke of Somerset, he was still Privy Councillor, and that might yet have import on occasion.

Marlborough, as usual, was playing a double game, but with more skill and more knowledge of his real intentions than can be traced in Oxford's vague duplicities. The Conqueror of France made himself a humble petitioner to Louis and James, for fear of eventualities which if possible he intended to prevent. In October 1713, on the news of the result of the General Election in England, he asked his nephew Berwick and James II's widowed Queen to solicit Anne and Oxford in his favour by means of Louis XIV, to prevent the new Parliament from depriving him of his wealth ; for he feared lest he should be called on to refund the moneys which it was said he had embezzled on

* See p. 114 above.

commission. In March 1714 he asked for a pardon from James III, which Berwick contemptuously advised his half-brother to grant, 'as one may give to those sort of people as good as they bring, that is words for words, for I see nothing else in all Marlborough says, and indeed he has never behaved himself otherwise.' [331]

These insurances against a possible Jacobite restoration, which he had been taking out ever since the early years of William, and of which Berwick for one was now heartily sick, have a little lowered him in the estimation of mankind. Others, it is true, did likewise, but few so regularly; and by no means all, either of Whig or Tory statesmen, joined in the ignominious game. It must always be a cause of regret to posterity that John Duke of Marlborough so often stooped to imitate the occasional shuffling of Shrewsbury and Somers in this matter, rather than the consistently straightforward conduct of Nottingham, Stanhope and Walpole. It did him no good, and by keeping alive the suspicions of the Hanoverian agents [332] perhaps helped to prevent him from being named as one of the Regents on Anne's death and from holding the first place in the counsels of King George.

It was the more unnecessary because, alike by interest and conviction, Marlborough was bound to the House of Hanover. He was not, as Bothmar suspected, merely waiting to see who would come uppermost. He went so far as to offer a loan of £20,000 to the Elector of Hanover to help to secure the Succession, which he of all men would never have done if he had had any real doubt on which side he stood.* He was, moreover, fully prepared to lead his veterans and their Dutch comrades against the Jacobites and French if it came to a war of Succession. He and Cadogan arranged with the Hanoverian Court that on Anne's death Marlborough should, in the name of the new sovereign, present himself to the English troops still in the Netherlands and lead them to England to secure the Act of Settlement. But they agreed to reject the mad proposal of coming with armed force to England during Anne's life, a premature step which Bolingbroke was praying they would take; it

* *Coxe*, III, Chap. CXI, ed. 1819, p. 561.

was the one thing that would have arrayed Queen and country on the side of James.[333]

Sharing Marlborough's life in exile, and ever close to his heart, was one with more than all his zeal for the Protestant interest, who would, if she could, have stopped his insincere approaches to the Jacobites. Probably, indeed, Sarah knew nothing about them; to tell her would have taxed even Marlborough's courage. From their exile she wrote home to a friend:

> Having done so much for the cause of liberty and for the good of England, I had much rather have him suffer upon that account than change sides, for that would look as if what he did in the Revolution was not for justice, as it really was, but to comply with the times. . . . If one must hazard, it should be in the cause of liberty, for if one was ruined for that, one had the satisfaction of having performed a right part. And I was born with a great aversion for fools and tyrants.[334]

In the growing excitement over the danger to the Protestant Succession, it was not likely that either Daniel Defoe or Richard Steele would keep silent, or that either would fail to get into trouble; the frankness of Steele and the roundabout methods of Defoe proved equally dangerous in such a heat of party passion as now raged through England.

Defoe was still earning his pittance in Oxford's employ, writing hard to prove to a sceptical public that the Government of which his patron was the nominal head, had at heart the true interest of the Dissenters and of the Protestant Succession. Defoe himself was a stout Hanoverian and wrote three pamphlets in that cause bearing remarkable titles: *What if the Queen should die? Reasons against the Succession of the House of Hanover*, and *Some considerations of the advantages of the Pretender's possessing the Crown of Great Britain*. The incorrigible man again adopted the method of irony which had cost him so dear ten years back over the *Shortest Way with Dissenters*.* He pointed out how much to our advantage it would be that the Pretender should come to the throne, because then we should never again have to make war on France, as our King's interest would be identified with that of Louis; and that the restoration of

* See *Blenheim*, pp. 281–283.

James would relieve the nobility of the burden of attendance at Parliament—and so forth.

Everyone knew that such arguments were ironical, but the Whigs, who were furious with Defoe for deserting their party and defending the Peace, pretended not to understand.

April 1713 One of them at his own charges instituted proceedings against the printer and publisher for attacking the Hanoverian Succession. The accused men revealed the identity of the author, which had never been a real secret. Defoe was arrested and, pending his trial, was committed to Newgate by the Whig Chief Justice Parker. He only escaped from prison by the intervention of the Ministers, who procured him a pardon from the Queen.

Defoe's rage against the Whigs and Dissenters was so highly provoked by this incident that thenceforth he constituted himself delator against their pamphleteers and was as eager as Swift to induce Ministers to prosecute. In March 1714 he urged the Government to indict Steele for making ' insinuations of the danger of the Succession under her Majesty's administration ; ' so bitter had the quarrel become between Defoe and the party that was fighting for the cause he had at heart.[335]

Steele had a rare courage. Other writers, including Swift and Defoe, published their pamphlets without their names, hoping, sometimes in vain, thus to avoid enmity or prosecution. But Steele had, in 1713, published a pamphlet under his own name, called *The Importance of Dunkirk considered*, complaining that the French were not demolishing its fortifications and that the English Ministry connived at the delay. Early in 1714 he published *The Crisis*, his famous pamphlet on the danger to the Protestant Succession, and put on its title page ' By Richard Steele Esq.' He was now a Member of Parliament, having last summer resigned his post of Commissioner of Stamps in order to take an active part against the Government.*

* The letter to Oxford in which he resigned, dated June 4, 1713 (*Lansdowne MSS.* (*B.M.*) 1236, f. 263) is a characteristic document. Steele expresses his want of confidence in the Treasurer's policy and adds : ' Share, my Lord, your good fortune with whom you will. While it lasts you will want no friends, but if an adverse day ever happens to you, you will find, I think, myself obliged to be your friend and advocate.'

The Crisis was less bitter and provocative than much party writing on both sides that escaped under the shield of anonymity. But that a Member of Parliament should under his own name declare the Succession not safe in the hands of Ministers, was unendurable, particularly as it was

March 18 1714 true. Steele was expelled from the House of Commons. The majority for this act of discipline was nearly a hundred ; only a few of the Hanoverian Tories, including Lord Finch, the Earl of Nottingham's son, spoke or voted in opposition. Walpole, returned to the new Parliament for King's Lynn, made a powerful speech as Whig Leader.

The effect of the affair was to ventilate the question of the Succession and to increase the growing uneasiness of the man in the street.

The Crisis had been answered by Swift's *Public Spirit of the Whigs*, which has long survived Steele's piece in our national literature. The Dean was back on a visit from Ireland, deeply anxious about the growing estrangement between Oxford and Bolingbroke, but stone-blind to the Jacobite intrigue conducted by his two friends, rumours of which he continued to regard as a Whig lie. The *Public Spirit of the Whigs* contained, among other matter, an attack on the Scottish nobility as beggars and parasites whom the Union had planted out on England. The Scots Lords addressed the Queen against the libel, and Ministers who needed their votes could save Swift from prosecution only by the pretence of anonymity, which deceived no one. The incident makes Steele's avowal of his own writings the more praiseworthy by contrast.[336]

Steele as author took revenge for Steele as Member of Parliament. A week after his expulsion, a skit on Oxford appeared in number 14 of *The Lover*. The Puritan origins of the Harley family are first described, and then Steele continues :

> I can assure you the family is now grown much more polite. But having been bred in such strictness and formality both Anthony [Oxford] and his brother Zachariah come into a wench's chamber with the same air they used to enter a congregation of saints. It is a hard thing to unlearn gestures of the body, and though Anthony

has quite got over all the prejudices of his education, not only as to superstition but as to religion also, he makes a very queer figure, and the persecuted sneak is still in his face, though he now sets up for a persecutor.

This picture of Oxford gave equal pleasure to the promoters and to the victims of the Schism Act.

In the following month a series of debates and divisions took place in both Houses on the questions whether the Protestant Succession was safe under the existing Ministry, and what steps should be taken to make it more secure. In the Commons, Walpole's Whig phalanx was joined by the flying squadron of Hanoverian Tories led by the Speaker Sir Thomas Hanmer, who, when the House went into Committee on the safety of the Succession, gave voice to his fears in uncompromising terms. The blow to Tory unity was the more serious, because Hanmer had been chosen Speaker of the new Parliament by Oxford's influence, with a view to attaching him more strongly to the Ministers whom he had opposed on the Treaties of Commerce. The usual government majority of over a hundred in a large division shrank to less than fifty.[337]

April 15 1714

In the Lords a series of similar debates demonstrated the same rent in the Tory garment. On April 5 the Protestant Succession was voted to be not in danger by a majority of only twelve ; ' Lord Treasurer, you carried it by your dozen,' said Wharton to Oxford, referring to the recent creation of Peers. On April 13 another motion in the Lords on measures to be taken against the Pretender was opposed by the Ministry but was defeated by only two votes. It was in the highest degree significant that not only all the Whig Bishops, but all the Tory Bishops except Atterbury and Crew, voted against the Government. The sound Tories who had just been put into the Sees of York and London turned against their Ministerial friends on this question. The prelates who were about to urge on the Schism Act against Dissenters were in grave alarm at the prospect of a Popish King, and in that matter had less than no confidence in Bolingbroke.[338]

The debates on the danger to the Succession had strengthened the House of Hanover and had drawn its most active friends in the different parties together in a formidable coalition. But in the following week occurred an incident, known as ' the Duke of Cambridge's Writ,' which raised the Jacobite hopes high, for it was interpreted in England, in Hanover and in France as indicating that the Queen was in a plot with her Ministers to secure the Succession for the House of Stuart.

Such, however, was not the case. There is no indication that Anne ever wished to be succeeded by a Roman Catholic King. She could not stultify her whole past life by such a betrayal of the Church of England. Since 1711 her brother had been appealing to her family feelings in a series of letters of ' tenderness,' but without obtaining reply.[339] On the other hand she had no liking for the House of Hanover ; she had all Queen Elizabeth's jealousy of a successor, half feminine, half politic ; and she was still as determined as she had always been that no Prince should be allowed to set up court among her subjects during her own lifetime.*

This feeling on her part extended itself even to the young Electoral Prince, afterwards George II. He had been made Duke of Cambridge, and as such had a right to be summoned to take his seat in Parliament as a Peer of the Realm. The Hanoverian leaders in England, Whig and Tory alike, were persuaded that he ought to come over at once in that capacity, so as to be present as representative of his grandmother Sophia and his father the Elector in case the Queen should suddenly die. There was much to be said for the plan, and if the Queen had encouraged it, it might have solved many difficulties. But her personal feeling rendered this hopeful scheme a very bad mistake.

The Hanoverian agent in England at the moment was Schütz, a man of diplomatic family, but of little experience in great affairs. He made the not unnatural error of associating only with the Hanoverian partisans and neglecting to court Oxford and the Queen, whom, like other Hanoverian agents, he wrongly regarded as definitively in the interest of James. His impatience for action was encouraged by the

* See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 90–92.

sprightly eagerness of the octogenarian Dowager Electress ; Sophy's one remaining desire was that ' Queen of England ' might be inscribed on her tombstone, even if she was too old to cross the sea. The race between herself and Anne made them at this moment bitter rivals in the secret of their hearts. Without consulting her son the Elector, she wrote to Schütz in terms which might be construed as an order to demand the writ of summons for her grandson the Duke of Cambridge.*

A wiser agent would have consulted Oxford or the Queen in private before making the demand, or would have referred the matter back to Hanover for further instructions, possibly for confirmation by the Elector. Schütz, instead, consulted the Hanoverian party : the Whigs Devonshire, Somerset, Orford, Somers, Cowper, Halifax, Wharton and Townshend ; the Tories Anglesey, Nottingham and Hanmer ; and the Duke of Argyle. They one and all besought him to demand the writ and to fetch the young Prince over at once, on the ground that whichever side had its representative on the spot at the moment of the Queen's death would secure the Succession. They were wrong, as the event proved, for the Act of Settlement and the Regency Act automatically decided the issue in the absence of the candidates.

On April 12, 1714, Schütz went to the Chancellor Harcourt and demanded the writ for the Duke of Cambridge. Harcourt, taken by surprise, changed colour, looked down and said he would consult the Queen. After a painful silence, he ended the conversation by an assurance that he was not refusing the request, and that an answer would be given when the Queen's pleasure had been taken.

A Cabinet Council was held that night in Anne's presence, and lasted till after midnight. The Queen was furious, and Bolingbroke played for her favour by supporting her view that the writ should be refused. But the law made it necessary that it should be issued, and Oxford and the other Ministers saw visions of impeachment in the

* ' Je vous prie de dire à Mons. le Chancelier My Lord Harcourt qu'on est fort étonné ici qu'on n'a pas envoyé un writ à mon petit-fils le Prince Electoral. . . . Je crois qu'il ne trouvera pas mauvais que vous le lui demandiez et la raison.' Schütz might have replied that Harcourt would find it very bad indeed. *Michael*, p. 328.

next reign, if they could be accused of having broken the law in the Pretender's interest. Oxford's stand in this matter was a chief cause of his loss of favour with the mistress he had served so long and so well.

The writ was handed to Schütz, but he was forbidden to come to Court, and Sophia and her son were informed that the Queen was very angry and that it would be highly impolitic to send over the Electoral Prince. Oxford had a trusty agent in Hanover, his relation Thomas Harley whom he had sent there to keep himself in favour with the House that was, after all, the more likely of the two to obtain the Crown. In an excellent letter to Thomas, written the day after the Cabinet Council, Oxford made the whole position clear. The Elector George understood. His mother Sophia had not consulted him in demanding the writ, nor had he any particular desire to be represented in England by his son, of whom already he was to some degree jealous. The Elector repudiated the whole affair, insisted on the recall of Schütz and sent over once more the experienced and politic Bothmar. So far as was possible, George retrieved the situation. But the Hanoverian interest had suffered a serious set-back, and the chance of Bolingbroke ousting Oxford had been greatly increased.

Hard on these events, the Dowager Electress died, at the age of eighty-four. She would have made a good and popular Queen Sophy, if Anne had died a few years earlier. But she had lost the race. George took his own affairs in hand with patience and wisdom. He made no false step but bided his time, which was not to be long. He revised the list of Regents who, under the Regency Act, were to carry on the government after Anne's death until his own arrival in England.* Thirteen out of his eighteen nominees were Whigs, to counterbalance the Tory Ministers who would serve as Regents *ex officio*.[340]

Unable for the moment to find any policy to pursue in the vital matter of the Succession to the Crown, Bolingbroke attempted the great diversion of the Schism Act. A Bill,

* See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 92–93.

after the heart of Atterbury and Sacheverell, to persecute Dissenters, would serve a double purpose : it would embarrass and perhaps destroy the moderate Oxford, the would-be Tory patron of Dissent ; and it would reunite the party under his rival's leadership. The attack on Nonconformist liberties would rally most at any rate of the ' Whimsical ' Tories who had asserted their independence in the matters of the Commercial Treaty and the Protestant Succession.

For these tactical objects, the Schism Act answered its purpose. But behind the immediate gains, in Parliament and within the ranks of the party, which would follow from the introduction of the measure, were envisaged the ends to be obtained by the provisions of the Act itself. Confessedly it was meant to extirpate Dissent or ' Schism ' in times to come, by putting down the academies and schools where the rising generation of pastors and their congregations were brought up. The more fanatical of the Church clergy, not only Sacheverell, but better men like Sharp the late Archbishop of York and Samuel Wesley, had for years past been urging that Dissenters' schools should be suppressed for religious reasons, and the Lower House of Convocation had so petitioned in 1704–1705.[341] But the avowed object of the lay supporters of the Schism Bill in Parliament was political. The Nonconformist vote at elections was the strength of the Whigs, and in the debates on the Bill, Bromley, the member for Oxford, offered that it should be withdrawn if the Whigs would consent to the disenfranchisement of the Dissenters themselves, in lieu of the destruction of their schools. To abolish the Nonconformist vote would be to kill the Whig party even more rapidly than the Schism Act could achieve that end. This alternative was much discussed, but was naturally rejected by the Whigs.[342]

Schools and academies of the kind that it was proposed to suppress had existed under great difficulties and dangers after the Restoration. After the Revolution, in a more tolerant era, they multiplied and modestly flourished in the light of day. The Dissenters had every right to keep up such establishments at their own expense, for they were excluded by law from the only two Universities of England,

and by law or custom from most of the secondary schools. Moreover, they wished to bring up their children in a Nonconformist atmosphere, and particularly to give their future ministers a proper education. There appears to have been no substance in Sacheverell's charges of Republicanism and fanaticism in these establishments. What we know of them in the reign of Anne shows them as places of moderation, piety and scholarship ; and in the coming Hanoverian era they added an important and valuable element to the national education, particularly in science and in other studies conducted in the English instead of the Latin tongue.[343]

Oxford and Cambridge in the Eighteenth Century were at a low ebb both for numbers and teaching, partly because of their exclusively denominational character as Anglican seminaries, partly because of their high fees. The humbler dissenting Academies remained for many Englishmen, not all of them Nonconformist in religion, the only available path to higher education. That path the Schism Act proposed to block up.

In Anne's reign there were many of these small schools and academies all over the country, some conducted by a single master, generally a dissenting clergyman. There were some on a rather larger scale, like the Taunton Academy, where, just before his death in 1706, the Headmaster Warren told Defoe ' that there were three score and twelve ministers then preaching, whereof six had conformed to the Church, the rest were among the Dissenters, who had been his scholars.' [344]

The Schism Act which was passed in June 1714 aimed at the suppression of these academies and schools ' down to the meanest.' The Act rendered it illegal, under pain of imprisonment, for anyone to teach, either in institutions or in private houses, unless he had obtained a licence from his Bishop, and unless he qualified by taking the Sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England and by making a declaration that he would conform to her liturgy. For fear of the laxity of Whig Bishops, the episcopal licence to teach was not to be granted until the candidate had produced his ' sacrament certificate.' By a consummation of

folly, against which Shrewsbury as Lord Lieutenant protested in vain, the Act was deliberately extended to Ireland, where half the small Protestant garrison were Dissenters of a type not accustomed to bow to the yoke of 'Prelacy.' One mitigation was inserted to pacify the alarm of the industrial and mercantile interest, which in London was formidably opposed to the Act ; it was conceded that reading, writing arithmetic and the mechanical arts might be taught by a Dissenter, but not in a school kept by such an one. Cultural or religious teaching remained prohibited.[345]

The debates on the Schism Bill were hotly conducted in Parliament, for the Whigs felt their existence as a party to be at stake. And the attempt to turn the flank of the Act of Toleration aroused generous indignation and alarm. Oxford and Bolingbroke were reminded that they both had received part of their education from Dissenting ministers. Most of the Hanoverian Tories, indeed, including Hanmer, Anglesey, and several of the Bishops, rallied to the banner of persecution, but the old High Church leader, Nottingham, who had laid the Toleration Act on the table of the Lords in 1689, declared that since the passing of the Occasional Conformity Act the Church was now secure and that

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> he thought himself in conscience obliged to oppose so barbarous a law as this which tended to deprive parents of the natural right of educating their own children.

On the principle that two blacks make a white, the Tories pointed out that this natural human right was in the same degree denied by law to Roman Catholic parents, and that Englishmen training for the Roman priesthood were educated in foreign seminaries ; this argument caused General Stanhope in the Commons to declare that the laws against Papist education in England ought to be mitigated —the first sign of the later liberal view of the Whig party on Catholic disabilities.

Shrewsbury, who had come back from his post in Ireland to use his influence with Queen Anne and to watch over the interest of the Protestant Succession, opposed the Schism Bill, and so did Bishop Wake of Lincoln, besides all the

Whig Bishops. Most significant of all, Oxford's brother, Edward Harley, was one of the very few Tories in the Lower House who voted in opposition.[346]

Oxford was a man of moderation who saw the nation's interest as a whole. He had for years been endeavouring, through Defoe, to persuade the Dissenters that they would be secure as his clients and might safely abandon their connection with the Whig Lords. This policy was ruined by the Schism Bill, which he hated from every personal and public point of view. Yet he dared not openly oppose a measure that the Queen and the Tory party so ardently advocated. To have done so would have been to court instant dismissal. He knew that, as Defoe said, 'The Schism Bill was a mine dug to blow up the White Staff'— as the Treasurer was called from the symbol of his office. Lest the mine should explode he preserved a sulky silence, and sat, during the debate in the Lords, 'dumb and swelling with a discontent that visibly spoke his affections to the Bill.'[347]

Meanwhile, Bolingbroke, happy in the sight of his rival's sour humour, was at the top of his form, eloquently announcing to their Lordships that the suppression of Dissenting Seminaries would make a united Nation, by 'stifling for the future the divisions amongst us.' Deism and the free thought of a libertine were not, we must suppose, held by him to be incompatible with the doctrine of the Established Church. While he was edifying the House of Lords with these pious orthodoxies of debate, his followers entertained one another with stories of his debaucheries, how

> he himself bragged that in one day he was the happiest man alive, got drunk, harangued the Queen, and at night was put to bed to a beautiful young lady, and was tuck'd up by two of the prettiest young Peers in England, Lord Jersey and Bathurst,

both great supporters of the Bill. His friend Swift, while condemning his 'criminal pursuit of pleasure,' marvelled how he mixed it with an amazing industry, 'plodding whole days and nights like the lowest clerk in an office,' in contrast to the growing negligence of Oxford, the man of morals and system.[348]

The Schism Bill was carried by a majority of 111 in the Commons and of 5 in the Lords. It was to come into force on August the First. On that day, by a coincidence which Puritan tradition long regarded as providential,[349] Queen Anne died and the whole edifice of persecution fell crashing to the ground. Even so, the Act was not repealed until the winter of 1718–19. But during the interim it was very laxly enforced under a King who found in the Protestant Dissenters the most actively loyal section of his subjects. Two or three academies were closed as a result of the Schism Act ; and, Atterbury, in his diocese of Rochester, insisted that teachers in grammar schools should come to him for licences. But the wholesale suppression of the Dissenting schools and academies, which would certainly have taken place under a High Tory, and still more under a Jacobite, administration, vanished through the gate of bad dreams.[350]

The passage of the Schism Act into law immensely exacerbated party feeling and redoubled the hopes and fears of all men as to what would follow upon Anne's death. Some of the Puritans avowed that they would fight as their fathers had fought rather than yield up their liberties and their children to Prelatists. Bolingbroke eagerly hoped to provoke them to rise in arms before the Queen's death, and laid plans with the French agents that in case of a Whig rebellion, French troops should be sent over to suppress it, and that the Pretender should follow in their train. Louis offered to send troops at once, but, except in the case of an actual rebellion against the Queen, Bolingbroke did not dare to consent. He hoped, indeed, that the rashness of his enemies would put him in position to accept the aid of the Grand Monarch.* The Whigs refused to oblige. They were neither such knaves nor such fools as to rebel, when a few months would put the law on their side. In vain is the snare set in the sight of the bird.

Meanwhile, the quarrel of Oxford and Bolingbroke became every day more bitter, and the Cabinet and party were

* See the very important letters of May–June 1714, printed in the footnote of *Salomon*, pp. 305–306.

dividing on the issue. Swift, finding all efforts to reconcile his friends were vain, retired, not indeed to Ireland but to a Berkshire village, to await the catastrophe. Of the two men he loved Oxford the best, but at the present juncture he blamed him the most. For, as Swift and all others bear witness, the Treasurer was no longer fit for his office, and could not apply himself to the daily routine. Moreover, he had ceased to exercise his old arts of managing men, which had raised him to the head of the State. 'He began,' wrote Swift, 'to be soured and to suspect his friends ; and perhaps thought it not worth his pains to manage any longer.' He would not even open his mind to the colleagues who were most devoted to him, like Dartmouth, still less ally himself with the Hanover Tories and Shrewsbury to secure the Protestant Succession. He had no plan but to wait in sullen apathy for the Queen's death.

So Oxford held fast the Treasurer's staff 'with a dead gripe,' as Arbuthnot wrote on July 10. Even Swift advised him to resign at the end of the Session and leave the field clear for Bolingbroke. If the Dean had known that the Secretary was waiting for his chance to bring over the French troops and the Pretender, he might have thought Oxford the lesser evil of the two.[351]

Swift still declared with perfect sincerity his opinion that 'the two points of the highest importance' should be first to crush the Whigs and Dissenters so that they could never rise again, and secondly to bring in the House of Hanover.[352] He did not perceive that the two policies were mutually destructive. How could George be brought in by his worst enemies to reign in an island where his best friends had been crushed, never to rise again ? Swift's vindictive temper against Whigs and Dissenters, and his blindness to the fact of Jacobitism in the High Tory ranks made him useless as an adviser at the Crisis. He did well to go down into dignified philosophic retirement in Berkshire.

Oxford's dull resistance was inspired rather by personal anger against his intriguing rival than by any clear design to save the Hanoverian Succession. For he was still in close touch with the Pretender through the French agents. Gaultier, who was going back to the Continent with a budget

of Jacobite plots, confessed to Torcy his growing embarrassment as the recipient of the confidences of the two rival statesmen :

> Bolingbroke [he wrote, on June 14], in whom I have an entire confidence, wishes me to tell him the sentiments of the Treasurer about the Chevalier, and the Treasurer absolutely forbids me to let anyone know of what he is going to say to me when I depart. If I keep his secret I shall disoblige Bolingbroke who is entirely devoted to James, and if I tell him and Lord Oxford gets to know it, he will no longer trust me.*

Jacobite hopes rose high after the Schism Act. The refusal of the House of Commons to vote pay to the Hanoverian troops who had refused to follow Ormonde's secession from the field, was regarded as a further rebuff to the House of Hanover and a proof of Jacobite inclinations. In fact it only showed that the Tory party, while not prepared to oppose the advent of the Hanoverian Successor, could not swallow its pride enough to court him beforehand. According to Defoe, Oxford had favoured the payment of the Hanoverian troops, but Bolingbroke had insisted that the motion must be opposed. The town was alive with rumours of French troops ready at Havre to embark for England. The Pretender's agents were actually enlisting men in London and Westminster. The Jacobite press was active, but Charles Lesly did the cause little good by frankly announcing, in a pamphlet published in the summer, that James would never change his religion.

Parliament took alarm, and Ministers thought it necessary to make a demonstration in favour of Hanover. On June 23 the Queen issued a proclamation offering £5000

* See Appendix E, p. 338, below. It has been suggested that Oxford was wholly insincere in his protestations of loyalty to James, and that he meant only to keep an eye on Bolingbroke's intrigues with the Pretender's agents, lest his rival should monopolize the confidence of the Jacobite Court and take him unawares with some *coup* from that quarter. Somerville's *Q. Anne*, pp. 591–592. It is hard to fathom duplicity so reticent. The shrewd Leibnitz wrote on June 7, 1714: 'I am ready enough to believe that my lord Oxford will not lend his hand easily or heartily to bring in the Pretender; for I do not think he would mend his position that way but rather make it worse. *But I fear that for the sake of maintaining himself he may be obliged to pretend to give in to it*, and so let matters go so far that it will be difficult to remedy them.' *Kemble*, p. 505.

for the person who should arrest her brother on his landing in the Kingdom. The Whigs grumbled that the reward was a small one for so important a service, but, as a formal homage done by the Ministry to the Act of Settlement, the Proclamation had its effect in checking the landslide towards Jacobitism. The adherents of the House of Stuart, who had come to regard the Queen and her servants as their own, were staggered, and some of them began to fear that Bolingbroke was either timorous or false. But it was generally understood that the Proclamation was the act of Shrewsbury and Oxford, under pressure from Hanmer and the Hanoverian Tories.[353]

The session of Parliament was now drawing to a close. On the floor of the House and in the counsels of the Whig party, the wisdom of Walpole and the honest vigour of Stanhope had begun to raise them to the front place. The influence of the old Lords of the Junto, though still great, was no longer supreme. They had governed the party during two stormy reigns, but it was younger men who were to reap the harvest under King George. Halifax, Wharton and Somers all died less than two years after Queen Anne. It was well that their leadership could be satisfactorily replaced, since the country was destined to a long period of Whig rule.

The final scene in the House of Commons on the eve of its prorogation, was scarcely edifying and was ominous of the want of internal harmony and moral weight in the high places of Government. Nottingham and the Whig Lords, acting on information supplied by the indignant shareholders of the South Sea Company, accused Bolingbroke's agent, Arthur Moore, of corruption, the implication being that with his help Bolingbroke and Lady Masham had lined their pockets at the public expense. As the South Sea Company was under Tory management, the accusation was the more heeded. Moore was said to have attempted to trade privately to South America contrary to the Company's regulations, by bribing the Captain of the Company's ship, and to have been supported in the attempt by sinister Ministerial influences at work through

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the Admiralty. He was also accused of having been bribed to sacrifice the interests of British merchants in negotiating the Spanish Commercial Treaty at Madrid. Bolingbroke opposed an enquiry by the Lords into these charges, which it was said would have involved both himself and Lady Masham, but Oxford advised the House to proceed, and hinted at grave matter behind.* To stop an investigation that might prove damaging to her Secretary and her favourite, the Queen came down on July 9 and prorogued her last Parliament, that never met again till she was dead. The condition of the Tory Government and party was not enviable, divided Hanover against Stuart and cross-divided Bolingbroke against Oxford, with Anne's life a matter of months, if not of weeks. Swift's simile was apt :

> A ship's crew quarrelling in a storm, or while their enemies are within gunshot, is but a faint idea of this infatuation.[354]

It was characteristic of Bolingbroke's restless and in some ways admirable energy, that during June and July 1714, while every day engaged more ardently in the struggle to wrest the Treasurer's staff from the obstinate grasp of his rival, he should have initiated a new line of foreign policy for England, and pushed a new Treaty almost to its conclusion at the moment of the Queen's death.

In June he instructed Prior to negotiate a Defensive Alliance between England, France, Spain and Savoy-Sicily, to defend Victor Amadeus' new Sicilian possessions against possible attack by the House of Hapsburg. The Emperor Charles VI considered that Sicily should have gone with Naples, which had passed into his possession. But the British fleet held the island at its disposal, and England had allotted it to Victor Amadeus of Savoy. France had wanted

* As the affair was not probed to the bottom it is impossible to say whether Bolingbroke was guilty of corruption in this case. The South Sea General Court declared themselves satisfied of the guilt of Moore 'which censure made a great noise and was highly resented by Lord Bolingbroke who countenanced Arthur Moore.' Boyer's *Pol. State of Great Britain*, pp. 12–13. But the alleged connection of Bolingbroke with Moore in the matter was never examined. He had, at least, no higher standards than Marlborough, Somers or Walpole : in January 1714 he wrote to the Treasurer asking in black and white for half a year's secret service money to pay off a mortgage on his estate. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 379.

it for the Elector of Bavaria but had been forced to submit, and France was now to be brought in to protect the Savoyard rights against Austria. Bolingbroke heaped obligations on the House of Savoy, partly because he thought it conceivable that he might some day place a converted Prince of that line on the throne of Britain.*

The new Alliance had the further attraction to Bolingbroke that it would array England, France and Spain against the Whig ally, Austria, and thus ratify and complete the whole trend of Tory policy for the last four years. At the same time he was alarmed by rumours that Philip V of Spain did not intend to abide by his renunciation of the French crown if Louis XIV's next heir died without children. Only three days before Anne's death, Bolingbroke sent Torcy a warning, couched in vigorous terms, that any attempt to unite the crowns of France and Spain, contrary to the public law of Europe as established at Utrecht, would infallibly revive the old system of alliances between England, Germany and Holland.

Bolingbroke, however, saw a chance of security in the personal interest that the Duke of Orleans had in maintaining his own reversionary right to the throne of France. Orleans would be Regent when Louis XIV died, and King if Louis XV died without children—unless Philip's claims were revived contrary to the Treaties of Utrecht. It was the Tory Secretary who, in the last days of his power, initiated the policy of an understanding with Orleans.†

The negotiations for the Treaty with France, Spain and Sicily were dropped upon Anne's death. But the policy of friendship with France and with Orleans was, after an interval, resumed by the Whigs in the reigns of George I and Louis XV. There was, however, one important change:

* See pp. 225, 267 above.

† See pp. 213–215 above. On July 29, 1714, Bolingbroke wrote to Prior: 'Some way should be found of applying to the Duke of Orleans, who is in interest so much concerned, and who has sense and spirit enough to know and pursue that interest. The matter is delicate, and must be handled accordingly, but it would be of great use that this Prince should know that he may depend on her Majesty's Friendship, and on the utmost assistance which this nation can give him to support him in that Rank and in those Rights which by the Treaties of Peace he has the justest Title to.'

Stanhope, in 1716, set a price on England's friendship which Bolingbroke had not demanded from France. Orleans was compelled not only to complete the long-delayed destruction of the harbour and fortifications of Dunkirk, but to abandon the cause of the Pretender, not only in form but in fact.[355]

CHAPTER XVII

The Crisis and the Death of Anne

The Tory split. The dismissal of Oxford, July 27, 1714. Bolingbroke's two days of power. His position and probable intentions. The dynastic question as viewed by Church, Army and People. Jacobite purge of the Army. Bolingbroke's dinner to the Whigs and Stanhope's conditions. Whig preparations. The Queen in extremity, July 30. Somerset and Argyle in the Privy Council. Shrewsbury made Treasurer. Privy Council and Cabinet. Measures to secure the Hanoverian Succession. Death of Anne, August 1, 1714. The dead Queen.

The last months of Anne's reign were for her the most unhappy. Widowed ; without a friend left to whom she cared to unbosom herself, or a statesman whom she any longer felt she could trust ; her ears filled, not with the murmur of wise counsels for the safety of the land, but with the shrill invective of servants who thought more of their quarrels than of their duty or of her peace ; in pain of body and confusion of mind, she awaited her deliverance by the friend of all.

Neither Lady Masham's 'malice of a bedchamber woman' now turned against Oxford,* nor the more dignified exhortations of the Duchess of Somerset in the Hanoverian interest, could be to Anne what Sarah's company and Godolphin's sage advice had been in happier years. She had long trusted Harley, but now she noted with indignation Oxford's inattention to business, his torpor of mind and body, his recourse to drink of which she complained that he carried the symptoms into her presence. Even his friends noted the change in him with alarm.

* This expression of Marlborough's about Abigail in earlier years was now again justified by her language against her second benefactor, Oxford, to whom she owed only less than what she had owed to Sarah. See her letter to Swift of July 29, 1714, *Swift's Letters*, II, pp. 200–201, and *ditto*, pp. 182, 190.

'I have long thought his parts decayed,' Erasmus Lewis wrote to Swift, and the Dean, though he preferred Oxford personally to Bolingbroke, told him he should retire.[356] But retire he would not. The one thing that could still rouse 'the Dragon,' as his intimate friends and foes now agreed to call him, was the defence of the Treasury against Bolingbroke and Abigail, whom he had come to regard as thieves, leagued to enrich themselves at the public expense. 'The Dragon dies hard. He is now kicking and cuffing about him like the Devil,' wrote Dr. Arbuthnot on June 26. For a month after that, the Treasurer still held the fort—a month fatal to his enemies because it proved to be the last of the Queen's life. 'If he would have taken half so much pains to have done other things,' wrote Arbuthnot, 'as he has of late to exert himself against the Esquire [Bolingbroke] he might have been a Dragon, instead of a Dagon.' [357]

So June and July were spent not in paving the way for King George or for King James, but in splitting the Tory party into two embittered factions under its two famous chiefs. Such quarrels of colleagues have often repeated themselves in our history, and have often proved the most irremediable of all. The reason why in the reign of George I the Tory party failed to rally and reunite, was that in the last weeks of Anne's life the division on the dynastic question had come to correspond with the bitter grievance of Oxford and his supporters against the man who supplanted him, and the hatred of Bolingbroke and his friends for the man who kept them waiting till it was too late.[358] Oxford and his personal following joined Shrewsbury and Hanmer in active support of the Hanoverian, who would at least save them all from Bolingbroke: while Bolingbroke, Ormonde, Wyndham and Atterbury became Jacobites, to be revenged on Oxford and the Whigs. None but the Tories themselves could have brought about the long Whig hegemony that followed the death of the Queen.

From May to July 1714 the exiled Court of the Stuarts and the English enemies of Oxford co-operated to secure his dismissal. The Jacobite interest was arrayed against the Treasurer, by a bargain struck between

Bolingbroke and Lockhart, member for Edinburghshire.* Berwick, from abroad, instructed the Duke of Ormonde to persuade Anne to dismiss her unprofitable servant. Ormonde, who commanded the army, and the Duke of Buckinghamshire, who presided over the Privy Council, were both now deep in the Jacobite plot.[359] Those who fought hardest against their fellow-Tories to secure the removal of Oxford, regarded it as the necessary step towards a Restoration. But they knew that it would be the first step only and that if the Queen died too soon they would have, for awhile at least, to make the best of King George.

On July 27 Anne at last gave way and dismissed her Treasurer. She was not thereby aiming at her brother's Restoration, though men of all parties thought so. But she had never forgiven Oxford for urging the necessity of the formal issue of a writ to the Duke of Cambridge.† She resented the sullen negligence of her servant's manner, and she was fairly worried into dismissing him by the ceaseless importunities of Lady Masham, Bolingbroke and their partisans. 'They say the Queen was very loath to part with the Treasurer,' wrote a Tory Peer, 'but was teased into it. Most of those called Tories were very warm against him, not thinking him enough of their side.' ‡

The final scene was one of rude passion. Regardless of the presence of their mistress, who sat drooping with bodily pain and weakness in the chair, the rivals denounced each other with unseemly violence across the Council table, and the outgoing Treasurer accused the triumphant Secretary of financial corruption. The words sank deep into the Queen's ear. She knew that Godolphin and Oxford had never robbed the Treasury to enrich themselves. But could she trust this brilliant profligate, always in financial straits, with the

* Bolingbroke promised Lockhart that if the Jacobite vote were given to enable Ministers to wind-up the business of the session, Oxford should be dismissed during the recess and preparations made for a Restoration. *Lockhart*, I, pp. 476–478. Edinburgh City returned the Whig, Sir Patrick Johnstoun. In this Parliament the Scottish members were not unequally divided between Whigs and Jacobites.

† See pp. 278–279 above. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 662.

‡ *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 412–413; Edward Harley also wrote: 'Her Majesty was at last prevailed upon by a *perpetual teasing* to come to a resolution to part with him.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 480.

keeping of the public purse? Already she had twice interfered to protect him against enquiry, once in the matter of the Quebec contracts, and that very month over the South Sea. This uncertainty, and the certain knowledge of his debaucheries, which like Wharton he flaunted in the world's face, prevented the Queen from handing on the White Staff to Bolingbroke. 'His character is too bad to carry the great ensigns,' wrote Erasmus Lewis to Swift; 'for the man of Mercury's bottom is too narrow, his faults are of the first magnitude.'

Anne had withdrawn her confidence from Oxford, but she had not given it to his foe. There remained a shadowy third, who might yet prove the *tertius gaudens*. Shrewsbury was a Cabinet Minister, but being a Whig he kept out of the fierce domestic quarrel which rent the Tories, though he quietly inclined towards Oxford.[360] Three days were yet to pass before he emerged from the shadow, where he was an adept at lingering till the moment was ripe.

Oxford, who had fought with fury till driven from his post, thereupon accepted defeat with philosophic resignation, which he must needs express in poetry as bad as his prose. This strange man, who had decided the fate of nations, announced his fall to Swift on the day it took place, in a school-boy jingle which it pleased him to call an 'imitation of Dryden.'

To serve with love,
And shed your blood
Approved is above.
But here below
Th' examples show
'Tis fatal to be good.*

His letters and actions in the days and weeks that followed indicate that leisure soon restored his health of body and balance of mind. Once out of office, he knew how to be patient and to wait, an art which his rival, to his own ruin, failed to learn.

* *Swift's Letters*, II, pp. 198–199; he was so much pleased with the rhyme or the sentiment that he sent it also to his sister two days later. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 477.

The Queen, who had retired sick in body and in spirit, from the angry scene in the Council Chamber, gave Oxford that afternoon a long and kindly interview of farewell, treating him better than she had treated Godolphin on a like occasion.* Two days later, on the morning of July 29, she 'complained of a pain in her head,' was pronounced by the doctors to be in grave danger, and was 'relieved by cupping.' The gout, which had long been torturing her legs, had 'translated itself upon the brain.'† The end was drawing near.

It thus came about that Bolingbroke enjoyed only two full days of power as Secretary of State with no Lord Treasurer over his head. He had not time to form, still less to carry out, a plan of action, and posterity has since been left guessing what he would have done if the Queen had lived. Something at least can be said with confidence. In the first place he prepared to form a Cabinet of would-be Jacobites like himself, for the very good reason that no one else would join. Neither the Whigs nor the Hanoverian Tories nor the friends of Oxford would co-operate with him. The colleagues ready to his hand were Wyndham, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was to be put at the head of the Treasury Commission; Harcourt, Lord Chancellor; and Ormonde in command of the army and the fortresses of the Realm. Bishop Atterbury would try to manage the Church on their behalf and it was announced that he would take the place of the Hanoverian Dartmouth as Lord Privy Seal.[361]

July 28–29 1714

That these men would have restored the Pretender if they could, is made more than likely by their subsequent conduct in the reign of George I. But it does not follow that, if left at the head of affairs under Anne, they would have dared to make the attempt. There are many indications that they were waiting on events to guide their course. They could not have secured a majority in the House of

* See p. 66 above. This friendly interview with Oxford, not without political significance, has been too little noticed by historians. The fact is proved by *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 480–481, and L'Hermitage, *Add. MSS.* 17677 *HHH*, f. 323.

† *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury* (1898), p. 222, Dr. Shadwell's opinion. This is borne out by the report made to the Privy Council on July 30 by Shadwell, Sloane, Arbuthnot and four other doctors attending the Queen. *P.R.O.* (*P.C.*) 2, 84, f. 375.

Commons to repeal the Act of Settlement for the benefit of a Roman Catholic,* even if they could have persuaded the Queen to make a Jacobite majority in the Lords, by creating several score of Peers, which she certainly would not have done. However long Anne had lived, it is probable that at her death the law would still have stood against James ; and in the England of that day the law was nine points of possession. Moreover there would have been ranged in support of the law all the Whigs, the Dissenters and the moneyed interest, half the Tories, all save two or three of the Bishops, and last but not least Marlborough's veterans, even if Bolingbroke had had time to turn them all out of the army and replace them by Jacobites. In such circumstances Bolingbroke might, as rebel, have raised a civil war with the help of French troops. But it is very likely that he would have shrunk from an attempt so bold ; and if he had tried it, Ormonde, even with Villars to aid, would probably have been beaten by Marlborough and his men with the law of England and the wealth of London behind.

There are indeed indications that the would-be Jacobite Ministers were awed by the difficulties in the way of Restoration. Wyndham blurted out to his fellow-Jacobite, Lord Lansdowne, that the Pretender ' was an impracticable man and would never be brought in.' [362] And stories were afterwards afloat among the Jacobites, purporting that Bolingbroke betrayed them at the crisis from fear and a cold heart.[363] He cannot be blamed for his prudence, when the more experienced and cool-headed of the agents who were watching affairs in the Pretender's interest confessed that the country had recently turned against his claims since it had become known that he held out no hopes of changing his religion. Not only French Gaultier and Ilberville but Plunket and other British Jacobites declared in these critical days that James had lost his chance by going out of his way

* It is true that there was an old Jacobite tradition (recorded in some detail in *Add. MSS.* 9129, ff. 17–19) to the effect that ' 300 ' members of the House of Commons had agreed to support a motion to repeal the Act of Settlement, and that some of them held a meeting to arrange the matter with Bolingbroke, which he promised to attend but did not. But the evidence, as we have it, is late and not first-hand. I am certain there were not ' 300 ' members who would have voted for a Roman Catholic king.

to declare he could never become a Protestant. He might, they grumbled, at least have been silent on the subject.*

Loyal churchmen could not face the prospect of a King who had so recently and so emphatically declared that he would never separate from Rome. Some parsons, particularly in the West and North, preached against the ' Lutheran heresy ' [364] and in Staffordshire and the Welsh border told their parishioners ridiculous stories against the German Prince who was to be forced upon England.[365] But most of the clergy and their congregations, little as they relished the idea of a Hanoverian Succession, liked the alternative still less. The ' Lutheran heresy ' would not prevent the King from conforming to the Anglican ritual, as he was bound to do under the Act of Settlement, and would not divide him from his subjects by a hedge of confessors and priests.

During his two days of power, Bolingbroke seems to have been uncertain what game to play. On the one hand he prepared to form a Cabinet of Jacobites, and to speed the work of weeding out Whigs and Hanoverian Tories from the army and the fleet. On the other hand he tried to negotiate with the Whigs.

The purge of the army had been going on for four years past, with increasing rapidity during the last few months. Marlborough's favourites had long ago disappeared from the service, and early in 1714 Argyle and Admiral Byng had been dismissed, together with dozens of colonels and other officers of the Guard and Line suspected of Hanoverian inclinations. In April, two Colonels of the First Regiment of Foot Guards had been forced to sell out, and had been replaced by two Roman Catholics, contrary to the law. Given another few months, the armed forces of the Crown, by sea and land, might be placed wholly under Jacobite control. There lay the best hope for a Restoration.[366]

Yet, as things stood in July 1714, military feeling and professional skill were on the side of Hanover and ' the old Corporal.' The dismissed officers were better soldiers than the men who were supplanting them, and might prove

* See Appendix E, pp. 339–340 below.

at a pinch to have more influence with the rank and file, whom they had so often led to victory over the French. For four years past the Tories had been vilifying Marlborough's army and belittling its achievements. The Ministers had done their best to break up its personnel, and to humiliate it with 'restraining orders' in face of the armies of Europe. Could they now rely on the red-coats they had traduced and dishonoured to help them break the laws of England, and carry out, with French help, a rebellion in favour of a Popish King?[367]

No wonder that Bolingbroke had his doubts. He was a man of tireless energy, but by no means of iron nerve. Slow Oxford was the less easily frightened of the two. And so on July 28 the Secretary astonished the town by giving a dinner to the Whig chiefs! With 'the Dragon' and the moderate Tories he could never again hope to make terms; but what about the Whigs? After all, he had no sure majority of his own either in Lords or Commons. An adverse vote next autumn was certain in the Lords and not improbable in the Commons, if Parliament reassembled before the basis of the Ministry had been broadened.[368]

Bolingbroke therefore determined to throw out a feeler towards the Whigs. A coalition with them might keep him safe from the revenge of Oxford, till his plans had had time to mature. No doubt he hoped before long to dispense with the Whigs and enforce the Schism Act to their ultimate ruin, but it would be useful for a time to keep them quiet by courtesies and fair words. Moreover, if Anne, by cruel mischance, were to die upon his hands at once, he had better have friends at the new Court. Such, we may guess, were his reasons for this strange negotiation.

Stanhope, Craggs and William Pulteney, the wealthy and witty member for a Yorkshire borough, came to his dinner; Walpole, who was also invited, was out of town. The 'man of Mercury' waxed eloquent on his devotion to the House of Hanover. His guests sat, grim, polite, incredulous. When the last course had been eaten and wine had begun to warm their spirits, Stanhope

replied for his colleagues. Let Bolingbroke, he said, put the army and navy into hands loyal to Hanover: the Whigs did not ask for office, but they asked for that. Let Russell, Lord Orford, command the fleet that was to bring over George and keep out James and the French troops. Let Marlborough command the army and the fortresses of the realm. On those terms, said Stanhope, the Whigs would readily see Bolingbroke and his friends monopolize the gains of office till the Queen's death, and afterwards they would share with him the favour of King George. Let him join the Whigs to bring in Hanover. Or let him join France and try to bring in James. There was no third part. Let him choose.

Bolingbroke, who above all things wished to put off the hour of choice, was struck dumb by these plain, soldierly words. His embarrassment was patent to his guests. He could answer them nothing and the dinner-party broke up.[369]

It is to be observed that, although some Jacobite and some Hanoverian agents at this time thought that Marlborough might even yet sell himself to effect a Stuart Restoration,[370] the Whigs at this critical conference made his acceptance as Captain-General the acid test of Bolingbroke's devotion to the Hanoverian cause.

So there was to be no Whig alliance. It is usually supposed that, in a few hours that still remained to him as first Minister of the Crown, the Secretary contemplated entrenching himself in a complete control of the armed forces and the magistracy, so as to be able to make terms with King George, if King James proved impossible. Anne and Oxford had, in spite of the continued remonstrances of hot partisans, left a dozen shires in the hands of Lords Lieutenant of Whiggish views, who should be removed at once if there was to be no Whig alliance.* It is not unlikely that Bolingbroke hoped to have time to replace these and all other moderates in the public service by men of his own choice, and then as man in possession bargain with Stuart

* See the list of Lords Lieutenant to whom the Privy Council addressed its orders on July 30, *P.R.O.* (*P.C.*) 2, 84, f. 380. The Whig Lords Lieutenant still left were moderate Whigs—Kent, Scarborough, Carlisle, Cholmondeley, Shrewsbury, Henry Boyle. Several counties were left in charge of Pembroke, neutral between Whig and Tory but certainly staunch for Hanover.

or Hanoverian. But we know nothing of what he intended, and quite possibly he was no wiser himself.

Unlike the embarrassed Secretary, the Whigs had a straightforward path before them, and they took it. United on a policy that they were not ashamed to announce to the world, without equivocation or compromise they stood up for the Protestant Succession as fixed by law, and displayed in that cause an ability and zeal which earned them the confidence of George and of plain-dealing Englishmen. As Atterbury wrote with envious admiration :

> They have, as they boast themselves, the game in their hands ; and, to do them justice, they act like men in earnest, who are resolved to play it to purpose.[371]

The Lords of the Junto, indeed, were tired veterans, most of them on the very verge of the grave. But the rising Whig leaders in the House of Commons, the men with whom Bolingbroke attempted to negotiate over the dinner-table, the men now in the prime of life who were to govern England in the coming era as a result of this week's work—Stanhope, Pulteney, Walpole—were fully equal to the Crisis, and had their plans for the safety of England and the fortune of their party well in hand.

None of these younger Whigs had, like Marlborough, Shrewsbury, and Somers, ever corresponded with the Jacobites, or secretly begged the exiled King for pardons which they had no intention of earning. They put their lives and fortunes freely at stake for the Protestant Succession, to win or lose it all. They were not hampered by any hope of forgiveness by James III if he attained the Crown, or by any prospect of recovering Queen Anne's favour by slighting the Electoral House.

They believed the Crisis to be even more dangerous than it was in truth, because they supposed that Queen Anne had joined in her Ministers' plot to secure the Stuart Succession after her death.* They feared that she would leave

* At the prorogation of Parliament early in July, judging from the Queen's speech which contained no reference to Hanover, Stanhope drew this conclusion and told Lockhart as much, in a curious conversation held between two honourable enemies in Westminster Hall. *Lockhart*, I, p. 479. Lockhart, like most Scottish Jacobites, believed the Queen was doing their business for them. See pp. 243–244 above.

a will bequeathing her rights to her brother, and although such a document could not legally override the Act of Settlement, it would have an effect on opinion. The moment she was dead, her Ministers, so the Whigs feared, would proclaim James III.

But even if this should happen, the law would still be on the side of King George. Neither Monarch nor Ministers, but only Parliament, can dispose of the Crown. And the Whigs were determined that the law of the land should not fail for lack of armed support. They hoped for Marlborough's aid, but, if he did not reach England in time, Stanhope was prepared to lead forces loyal to the Crown against rebel Ministers of a dead sovereign. He was in touch with a large number of dismissed veterans in London, who had arms in their houses and were prepared to fight. In the Scottish capital a similar policy was pursued : A Whig Association in Edinburgh and the neighbouring countryside had for months past been storing arms and privately enlisting the services of Marlborough's disbanded soldiers, ' whether Serjeants, Corporals or single sentinells [privates] who may be thought well affected or prudent.'

Stanhope's kinsman, the famous Lord Chesterfield, long afterwards reported that a detailed plan of action had been formed ; that the Hanoverian partisans were to assemble in the duelling fields behind Montagu House; that Cadogan would seize the Tower and Stanhope would secure the persons of the leading Jacobites. They would then have no fear of proclaiming King George in the City of London, which was certain to support the Act of Settlement.[372]

But it never became necessary to resort to these stern measures. Anne was not so Jacobite nor her Ministers so bold as the Whigs imagined. The day before Anne died, Ilberville, who was in the inmost secrets of the plot against Hanover, wrote to King Louis describing ' the inaction of the Queen and the cooling of various Jacobites for several months past,' due to the Pretender's over-rigid declaration of his religious faith.[373] Time was in any case required to mature any possible plan in James's interest, and time was not granted. Anne had served England well in her life ; and her last service was rendered by the opportunity of her death.

On the morning of July 30, the Queen's illness took a turn that would clearly prove fatal, and those members of the Privy Council who usually attended its meetings under the existing regime were hastily called together at Kensington Palace where she lay ill. Among the more important of the members who received and answered the summons, only three were strong Hanoverians—Shrewsbury, Robinson Bishop of London and Oxford's friend Lord Dartmouth. But the leading Jacobites, Bolingbroke, Wyndham, Ormonde, Buckinghamshire and Lansdowne, who were all present, had no plan of action ready. Of the less influential Councillors some, like Thomas Coke, were for George, and those who inclined to James were not at the moment prepared to show their sentiments without strong reason to suppose that they would prevail.*

What would have happened in this assembly of frightened and embarrassed men if the Hanoverians had come equally unprepared, it is hard to say. But a lead was given from without. As soon as the news of the Queen's relapse had been known that morning, a great step had been taken—probably on Shrewsbury's advice, though of that there is no proof positive. The Dukes of Argyle and Somerset had gone to the house of Bothmar, the Elector's new but experienced agent, had told him that the Queen was dying, that they were going to the Privy Council to secure his master's interests, that the moment Anne was dead they would let Bothmar know and ensure the proclamation of King George.[374]

From Bothmar's house, the two Dukes drove to Kensington Palace, and, exercising their indisputable rights as Privy Councillors, entered the chamber to take part in the meeting to which they had not been summoned. The Council had not met till noon and there is no record in the minutes of any business having been transacted before the arrival of the two Dukes. Shrewsbury made them welcome. Their coming did not strike him with the surprise or chagrin with which it may have struck Bolingbroke.

It is to be observed that those Lords of the Whig Junto

* See p. 308 below, for the Privy Council Register record of the most important of the events of that morning, from the *P.R.O. MSS.*

whose names were still on the Privy Council list—Sunderland, Somers and with them Cowper—made no attempt to come till the next day.[375] The decisive action of July 30 was prudently left to the Middle Party of Shrewsbury, Somerset and Argyle, who had put the Tories into office four years before, and were now to bring King George to the throne, in a manner that not even the most prejudiced could describe as a Whig *coup d'état*.

The Middle Party, chiefly consisting of the three Dukes, was weak in voting strength in the factious Houses of Parliament. But it was strong in that it held the balance between Whig and Tory, and that it spoke out boldly at this Crisis the real sentiments of the nation at large. The instrument ready to its hand was the Privy Council. The existing Cabinet had no dynastic policy which it cared to announce. Moreover the Cabinet was a meeting of the confidential servants of the Crown unknown to law, and drawing its authority from the presence of the Queen as its chairman. When therefore she was incapacitated by grave illness, the Cabinet lost much of its customary prestige. On this great occasion it made no attempt to assert itself. In normal times the Privy Council was gradually yielding power to the smaller and more partisan body. But when, during the recess of Parliament and the mortal sickness of the Monarch, sudden action of the highest importance had to be taken in the name of the laws and for the safety of the Realm, the old constitutional power and authority of the Privy Council stood England in good stead.

There is no report, official or unofficial, of the debates in the Privy Council of July 30, but only of its acts. The first of its officially recorded decisions, taken in the first hour of its sitting, was that from which all the others flowed. It was unanimously agreed ' to move the Queen that she would constitute the Duke of Shrewsbury Lord Treasurer.'

He was the man of the moment. Both the Whigs and the Bolingbroke party preferred his Treasurership to the chance of a resuscitation of Oxford.* The Tories in

* It was held that, if the Treasurership was not filled, Oxford would be Treasurer again on the demise of the Crown, and as such one of the Regents under the Regency Act. *Michael*, p. 364.

majority on the Council would not recommend a Treasurer from the Whig Opposition, or choose Argyle or Somerset whose tempers they feared. And they were sadly aware that neither George nor the nation would trust Bolingbroke or any of themselves to preside over the great impending change. Shrewsbury, who was agreeable both to Hanover and to England, was yet one of their own Cabinet, and he was an honourable and kindly man, who would be no party to their persecution in the new reign. The best hope that Bolingbroke and the Tories had of retaining a place in the counsels of King George, was to appear before him as Shrewsbury's friends.

Probably for these reasons, Bolingbroke readily fell in with the lead given by Argyle and Somerset. He himself proposed Shrewsbury to the Privy Council as the right man to be Treasurer and went at the head of a deputation to carry the unanimous advice to the dying Queen.[376] With him went Harcourt as Chancellor, Dartmouth as Privy Seal and Powlett as Lord Steward. The Council had first sent for the seven doctors in attendance on Anne, who had assured them that 'Her Majesty was in a condition to be spoke to.' The Duchess of Somerset was about the Queen's bedside and certainly made all things as easy as she could for the Hanoverian game that her husband was playing in the other room. Of the conduct and whereabouts of Abigail, Lady Masham, on this day, nothing is told.*

It will never be possible to say how much the Queen understood of what she was doing. But the point is not vital, for if she had been in a state to form decisions for herself, her thought would almost certainly have coincided with the recommendation of the Council. We read that :

> The Queen about one o'clock gave the Treasurer's staff to the Duke of Shrewsbury, my Lord Chancellor holding her hand to direct it to the Duke.†

* See pp. 308–309 below, for P.C. Register. See also *H.M.C. Downshire*, p. 902, on the Duchess of Somerset that day.

† *Wentworth Papers*, p. 408. Tradition seems divided as to how far she was conscious. Some say she told Shrewsbury to use the staff for the good of her people. But during the Regency discussions of 1788 the Marquis of Buckingham wrote that 'Queen Anne's consent was undoubtedly never given, but only supposed, to the staff of Treasurer which the Duke of Shrewsbury brought out of her bedchamber, and you will remember, in that case, the assumption and exercise of the power by the Council.' *H.M.C. Fortescue* (Dropmore), I (1892), p. 364. On the other hand Lansdowne, who was present at the scene, wrote that day that she had given her staff to Shrewsbury, 'being perfect in her senses.' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 477. Sunderland wrote to Nottingham that night: 'I must not forget telling your Lordship that as soon as the Queen could just know people, the Council begged her to give the Treasurer's staff to the Duke of Shrewsbury, which she did immediately.' *History of Burley-on-the-Hill*, by Pearl Finch, p. 196.

Then the Privy Council settled down to work under the leadership of the new Treasurer. Adjourning occasionally for meals and rest, they sat on till midnight, issuing with lightning speed the orders that made Great Britain and Ireland and the British seas armed and ready to receive the lawful successor and to repel the invader or the rebel. Half the men at the Privy Council board were in some sort or degree Jacobites, but for that very reason they must seem the more eager in the business. No murmur of opposition was heard as letters were expressed to the Judges, to the Lords Lieutenant, to the Lord Mayor of London and the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, to all Mayors of Corporations, to Ormonde the Captain-General, to the Governors of garrisoned towns and forts, and last but not least to the commanders of the fleet on whom all depended. The Privy Council clerks must have been busy during those twelve hours. An embargo was laid on all shipping in the ports ; the Tower, Edinburgh Castle and other strongholds were revictualled and the garrisons increased ; the troops were fetched home from Dunkirk and Flanders ; the London militia were called out ; horse and dragoons were concentrated round London ; all over England and Scotland the horses and arms of Roman Catholics were ordered to be seized ; and Bothmar was officially apprised of what was toward. All afternoon and all night messengers were starting one after the other from Kensington Palace gate, and galloping along the roads with the fateful letters in their bags. Wherever they arrived, men learnt that the Queen was dying and that Protestant George would assuredly be the next King, as the signatures of Shrewsbury, Bolingbroke and half a dozen Tory Privy Councillors made clear beyond all shadow of doubt.[377]

Next day, July 31, the Privy Council met again for another prolonged sitting, broken by adjournments. That morning Oxford reappeared at the board, and Somers, Sunderland and Cowper came to represent the official Whig Opposition, now wholly reconciled to Government. After consulting the doctors on the Queen's state, the Council's first act that day was to send for Bothmar and explain to him all the steps they had taken to secure his master's succession, and to ask him if there was anything else he could suggest. He declared himself perfectly satisfied, as well he might. A letter was then written to the Elector, warning him of the Queen's expected demise, recounting the steps taken, and asking 'that you would vouchsafe upon the first notice to favour this nation by your immediate presence.' This letter was signed by all the Privy Councillors in attendance, who that day represented every shade of political opinion and party division. It was dispatched to Hanover by the hand of a hearty Whig, James Craggs. A private letter from Bothmar to his master recommended him not to reward Craggs with gold but to wait till he was King and give him a good post.

The same day the Council sent to warn the States General of the Queen's condition, and to remind them of their Treaty obligation to support the Protestant Succession in Great Britain with Dutch forces, if occasion should arise. Further and more specific orders were sent to Ormonde and Admiral Leake. Having done all, the Council adjourned till eight o'clock next morning, Sunday, August the First.[378]

But even that early hour proved too late. At six o'clock Dr. Shadwell aroused the clerks of the Council and told them that the Queen could not live another two hours. Messengers were hurried off to London to summon the Councillors at once. They were, it is to be supposed, deep asleep after two nights of vigil, but Shrewsbury and half a dozen others quickly arrived, to be presently informed that the Queen had died at half past seven o'clock. The Council at once adjourned from what was now a house of mourning, to meet in fuller numbers at St. James's Palace, there to proclaim King George.[379]

The windows were darkened in Kensington. Silence lay heavy in the courtyard and in the long suites of dark panelled chambers, through which the life of a Kingdom had so lately pulsed. The gate had shut on the last coach rumbling off through the fields to St. James's, to be in time for the Proclamation. The awed and tearful waiting women heard from far away the shout of an immense multitude hailing the successor, and the salvoes of cannon proclaiming the triumph of English liberty, religion and law. These things were well, and the woman lying on the great bed had, by her fifty years of dutiful, painful, harassed life, and her heart so 'wholly English,' helped much to bring them about. But she was tired and would sleep. Not, like royal Elizabeth, contending to the last with Death as if he too had been by right her subject. Not, like the King who had died twelve years before in this same Palace, haunted to the last by the thought of great schemes for the salvation of Europe that he must needs relinquish. Those great schemes had been accomplished in the name and by the choice and command of this simple woman, because she had known how to choose her friends. But then clouds had descended and friendship had turned sour. Left to her own guidance—for her well-loved husband too had died—she had chosen new friends and given her people peace. Then the clouds had descended again and with weakening body and brain she had of late failed to see through them into any future she desired. All she longed for was to be at rest, and now, as always, she had her way. There lay the Queen of Great Britain, the last Stuart to rule the island, and, for all her simplicity, the wisest and most triumphant of her race.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XVII

Minutes of the Privy Council, July 30, 1714

The following are the minutes of the Privy Council held on July 30 up to the appointment of Shrewsbury as Lord Treasurer (*P.R.O.* (*P.C.*), 2, 84, f. 371). Explanatory names, etc., in square brackets, are added by me.

At the Court of Kensington the 30th of July 1714.

Tuesday twelve at noon and continued by several adjournments till late at night.

PRESENT.

Lord Chancellor [Harcourt].
Lord Treasurer [Shrewsbury appointed during the meeting].
Lord President [Duke of Buckinghamshire].
Lord Privy Seal [Dartmouth].
Duke of Somerset.
Duke of Northumberland.
Duke of Ormonde.
Duke of Argyle.
Lord Steward [Lord Powlett].
Earl of Rochester.
Earl of Marr.
Earl of Loudown.
Earl of Findlater.
Earl of Portmore.
Viscount Bolingbroke.
Bishop of London [Robinson].
Lord Lexington.
Lord Guernsey.
Lord Lansdowne.
Lord Bingley.
Chancellor of the Exchequer [Sir W. Wyndham, Bart., M.P.].
The Vice Chamberlain [Thomas Coke, M.P.].
Mr. Boyle.

Her Majesty having this morning at ten of the clock been taken dangerously ill, their Lordships mett in Council Chamber and considering the Present Exigency of Affairs were unanimously of an Opinion to move the Queen that she would Constitute the Duke of Shrewsbury Lord Treasurer.

The Physicians were then called in and asked if Her Majesty was in a condition to be spoke to. And they all agreed that she was, viz. :

Dr. Laurence	Dr. Arbuthnott	Dr. David Hamilton.
Dr. Shadwell	Dr. Sloane	Dr. Richard Blackmore.
		Dr. Read.

Whereupon the Ld. Chancellor, the Ld. Privy Seal, the Ld. Steward and the Ld. Viscot. Bolingbroke at the request of the Board having waited upon Her Majesty to acquaint her therewith, the Duke of Shrewsbury was forthwith commanded to attend Her Majesty And returned to the Board after having received from Her Majesty's hand, the staff as Lord High Treasurer of Great Brittain. And His Grace then took the Oaths appointed and his seat at the Board accordingly.

Upon considering the dangerous condition of Her Majesty's Health, it was thought fit to give the following Orders for securing the Peace and Quiet of Her Majesty's Dominions.

[Follow many pages of the orders issued to magistrates, army and navy.]

NOTE

The excellent and kind-hearted Dr. Arbuthnot, who attended the Queen in her last illness, wrote to Swift on Aug. 12 :

'My dear mistress's days were numbered even in my imagination, and could not exceed certain limits ; but of that small number a great deal was cut off by the last troublesome scene of this contention among her servants [dismissal of Oxford]. I believe sleep was never more welcome to a weary traveller than death was to her.'

EPILOGUE

Undisputed Accession of King George

Some remarks on the character of the Whig hegemony and the Hanoverian constitution

All the world was hurrying to St. James's Palace, on foot, in chairs, or by coach-and-six. Power and fashion, Whig and Tory, all the Lords and Commoners who were left in London during the recess, thronged that morning to greet the rising sun of Hanover, and bask, if possible, in its beams.

But it was also a 'Sabbath morn,' and in the sober City, before the news had been told, vast congregations of business men and their employees had gathered in the Dissenting places of worship, in an agony of fear and hope. For it was the day on which, by statute, the Schism Act came into force, to destroy their schools and usher in, as they believed, another age of persecution—unless the Queen should die. Their friend Bishop Burnet, gone westward early in the morning to hunt for news, had agreed to send a message, if the great change took place, to Mr. Bradbury, the Independent minister of Fetter Lane. As the preacher began his sermon, he looked up from the pulpit to the gallery, and saw a man push his way to the front and drop a handkerchief into the body of the hall. It was the Bishop's signal. Bradbury broke off his discourse to announce to his hearers that no longer Queen Anne but King George was their liege sovereign. The sea of upturned, anxious faces was transformed in a moment by the action of joy, and at the bidding of the preacher they rolled out a psalm of thanksgiving to the God who had delivered them once more. They all knew now that the Schism Act was born dead; that their persecutors would be hurled from power, and that they

and their children would be allowed to live as freemen, the most loyal of all the subjects of King George.*

While these humbler folk were rejoicing, 'the great' were busy at St. James's. Bothmar and Kreienberg, the Hanoverian Ministers, were summoned to be present. Time was needed to draw up the proper form in which to proclaim the new King, and while this was being done in one room, in another the important work was in process of naming and swearing in the Regents or 'Lords Justices,' who were to bear rule in the island till George in person should arrive. Under the Regency Act they were to consist of seven great officers of state, and eighteen more persons named by the Successor. Three sealed documents, each containing the list of his choice, were solemnly opened, one after the other, and found to correspond. They revealed a few Hanoverian Tories and a goodly number of moderate Whigs, but neither Somers, Sunderland nor Wharton : George was not in the pocket of the Junto.†

Bolingbroke, as mere 'Secretary,' was not one of the *ex officio* Regents and he had not been named by King George. His day was over. But Archbishop Tenison, in whom the High Church Queen had never confided and who had during the Tory regime retired from all the Councils of State, came over from Lambeth Palace to take a leading part in that day of triumph for the tolerant and moderate principles which in his thought were proper to the Church of England.

The other Privy Councillors treated with regal ceremony those Regents who were present among them, and messengers were sent off to those who were at their country homes to bid them come up to town and rule the land.

* Clarke and Foxcroft, *Life of Burnet*, pp. 469–470. When, after George's arrival in England, the Dissenting ministers went in their black gowns to read him an address, a courtier asked Bradbury : 'Pray, Sir, is this a funeral ?' 'Yes, Sir,' was the reply, 'it is the funeral of the Schism Act and the resurrection of Liberty.'

† The *ex officio* Regents were *Tenison*, Archbishop of Canterbury ; Harcourt, Lord Chancellor ; *Shrewsbury*, Lord Treasurer ; Buckinghamshire, Lord President ; Dartmouth, Lord Privy Seal ; Earl of Strafford, First Lord of the Admiralty ; and *Parker*, Lord Chief Justice—*three Whigs* to four Tories.

George had named *Shrewsbury*, *Somerset*, *Bolton*, *Devonshire*, *Kent*, *Argyle*, *Montrose*, *Carlisle*, *Scarborough*, *Orford*, *Townshend*, *Halifax*, *Cowper*, Whigs, and Anglesey, Abingdon, Nottingham and Roxburgh, Hanoverian Tories, and the unattached Earl of Pembroke. In some lists *Pomfret* is put instead of Pembroke, but the P.R. Register is clear on the point.

Meanwhile the Proclamation had been prepared, and was eagerly signed not only by the Regents and Privy Councillors but by many Lords, Bishops, Members of the Lower House, and officials such as Sir Christopher Wren, Surveyor General. A hundred and twenty-seven names in all were appended to the Proclamation, of which perhaps half were Tory, including not only the Hanoverian Tories but Bolingbroke, Wyndham and Ormonde. It was a national act.*

These formalities had taken up the morning hours, but between one and two o'clock the patience of the vast crowd waiting in front of St. James's Palace met its reward. They saw appear first the Regents, then the Privy Councillors, the Lord Mayor, and the throng of nobles and gentlemen who had signed the Proclamation. The kettle-drums rattled and the trumpets spoke ; everyone present, high and low, bared their heads ; and the Herald read the Proclamation :

> We therefore, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of the Realm, being here assisted with those of Her Late Majesty's Privy Council, with numbers of other principal gentlemen of quality, with the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of London, do now hereby with one full voice and consent of tongue and heart, publish and proclaim that the High and Mighty Prince George Elector of Brunswick Lunenburg is now by the death of our late sovereign of Happy Memory, become our only lawful and rightful liege Lord, George, by the Grace of God King of Great Britain, France and Ireland.

When he ended with the words ' God save the King,' a great and joyful shout went up, spreading in waves up St. James's Street, through the Mall and along the Strand. Again the kettle-drums and trumpets sounded, and far away the batteries of the Tower told the City and the river that George was King.†

* See the list in *P.R.O. (P.C.)* 2, 85, f. 2. For the proceedings about the Regency and the Proclamation that day my authorities are the Privy Council Register in the Record Office (2, 85) and *Michael*, pp. 366–367 for the Hanoverian reports.

† The hour of the Proclamation is noted in *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 482. The Houses of Parliament met that very afternoon, but as the Commons' Speaker, Sir Thomas Hanmer, was away in Wales, both Houses adjourned till August 5, when they proceeded to pass loyal addresses and to consider the Civil List. *Parl. Hist.*, VII, pp. 3–6.

The night was a night of cheering crowds, illuminations and bonfires in all the streets of London. There was ample space in the great squares where the nobility had their mansions, and each magnate had his bonfire kindled by his servants before his door. One of the largest was Bolingbroke's, before his house in Golden Square, which caused much amusement to the Hanoverian and Harleian Tories, who observed that their enemies, so ' rampant ' a few days ago after Oxford's dismissal, ' began to turn upon their heel very quickly.' Oxford, elated at his rival's downfall, broke again into execrable and ungrammatical verse, writing on August 18 to his friend Dartmouth :

> And for those who did conspire
> For to bring in James Esquire
> Now hope to be saved by their own Bonfire.
> Doctors agree they are never the higher.
> Teste Jonathan.

The late Lord Treasurer, helped by ' Jonathan ' Swift, had already persuaded himself that he for one had never been in favour of ' James Esquire.' Possibly he never had been at heart, but in that case the Abbé Gaultier and his young correspondent in Lorraine had been the more deceived.*

Bolingbroke kept up his spirits bravely for awhile. Two days after the Queen's death he wrote to Swift :

> The Earl of Oxford was removed on Tuesday ; the queen died on Sunday. What a world is this and how does fortune banter us. . . . I have lost all by the death of the queen but my spirit ; and I protest to you I feel that increase upon me. The Whigs are a pack of Jacobites ; that shall be the cry in a month if you please.

So wrote the ' man of Mercury.' Swift replied with greater insight into the situation :

> Your machine of four years modelling is dashed to pieces in a moment ; and, as well by the choice of Regents as by their proceedings. I do not find there is any intention of managing you in the least.[380]

* *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 321 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, p. 198 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 408–409. It is possible that the expression ' Queen Anne is dead ' originated from the excitement caused by her death and the issues that hung on it. Delaune, the ruffianly President of St. John's, Oxford, ordered King George to be prayed for on August the First. It was objected that it was not certain Queen Anne was dead. ' Dead ! ' he exclaimed, ' she is as dead as Julius Caesar.'

Indeed there was no desire to keep terms with Bolingbroke. The Regents treated him not as a power to be propitiated but as a culprit to be examined, and before the end of the month he was curtly dismissed from the Secretaryship, before ever the King reached England. And when at last George arrived he gave the coldest reception not only to Bolingbroke but to Oxford. The hangers-on of the late Ministry were soon in distress. Lady Masham was a private person once more. And Mrs. Manley, the libeller, wrote a begging letter to Oxford on August 30:

> I have nothing but a starving scene before me, Lord Marlborough and all his accomplices justly enraged against me. Nothing saved out of the wreck.[381]

Meanwhile the Marlboroughs returned from exile. They had decided to come home before they knew that the Queen was dangerously ill.[382] But they had chosen the right moment. On the evening of the day of the Queen's death they arrived at Dover to meet the news, and were received at their landing with every sign of popular enthusiasm. On August 4 they made triumphal entry, side by side in their glass coach, over London Bridge and through the City to Marlborough House, ' amid the acclamations of the people as if he had won another battle at Hochstet.' Before them rode an improvised escort of ' two hundred horsemen three in a row,' with a company of London train-bands marching behind, through shouting crowds, though hooting was mingled with the cheers.

George had offended Marlborough by failing to name him as one of the Regents, but the first document he signed in Hanover as King of England, only five days after the Queen's death, made the Duke once more Captain-General. Even Bothmar, lately suspicious of his loyalty, wrote on that day, ' He will be of great service if the Pretender makes any attempt.' He was again England's magnificent arm of defence, but his political influence was never revived in the counsels of State. For if he was no longer a Tory, neither was he a Whig, and the Whigs were now supreme. In old age and with failing powers, he enjoyed the domestic leisure and happiness at Blenheim for which he had so often sighed

in years gone by, when writing his letters home to Sarah from the field.[383]

The King had seen no reason to make haste to England. There was no danger to his throne. Not a mouse had stirred against him in England, in Ireland or in Scotland. When Anne died, Bolingbroke, Ormonde and other Jacobites told Ilberville that at all costs civil war must be avoided, that at present they were loyal to King George and that the French King must accept the situation.* Louis XIV, who had no wish for another war, acknowledged the fact of the Protestant Succession and repulsed the attempt of the Pretender to come to Paris and embroil France and England. Berwick, the ablest Jacobite, was besieging Barcelona a fortnight away from news. Nothing was anywhere attempted on James's behalf. Queen Anne had left no will ; only a mysterious packet of papers was found, with directions upon it in her handwriting that it should be burnt unopened, as it duly was by the Regents in Bothmar's presence. Some have surmised that it contained her brother's appeals to her, to which she had not responded as he hoped ; but there is in fact no evidence save the merest rumour as to what the packet contained.[384]

And so, having set his German affairs well in order, and said a slow and sorrowful farewell to beloved Hanover, promising often to come back, the elderly German gentleman proceeded by leisurely stages towards his new inheritance. It was not till September 18 that he landed at Greenwich, where he was received in state by a loyal nobility and people. It was not so dramatic an affair as Charles II's landing at Dover or Napoleon's return from Elba, but, alone of the great dynasties of Europe, his race has continued ever since to occupy the throne without losing possession even for a day. Our country is still ruled by King George under the terms of the Act of Settlement.

The Whig hegemony that continued for forty years, as a result of the happenings during the four last years of Queen Anne, was caused by the divided state of the Tory

* See Appendix E, p. 340 below.

party and its uncertain loyalty to the throne. The first two Georges had no choice but to take Whig servants and had therefore to accept their terms. They could not, like William and Anne, play off one party against the other, and for that reason the independent political power of the Crown still further declined. When Bolingbroke and Ormonde, alarmed and provoked by their impeachment, fled to France and joined the Pretender in 1715, when Wyndham plotted in vain to raise Western England, and when Scotland was actually rent by an evenly contested Civil War, it was made more than ever impossible for George I or his son after him to look with favour on the Tories. His subjects, too, craved for quiet and an end to the long round of civil wars and persecutions of a century past. If the Whigs could give men security they could be permitted to bear rule, riding the country on a light rein. Most of the Hanoverian Tories or their children became Whigs of one kind or another. The Tories who still followed Wyndham in Parliament, dwindled to a mere group. And Bolingbroke, in spite of his speedy and complete renunciation of Jacobitism after six months' experience as the Pretender's Secretary, was never admitted back into the House of Lords. All he could do was to turn pamphleteer and preach the 'moderate' doctrine of his old rival Oxford, as his own new philosophy of 'the Patriot King' above all party divisions.

When Bolingbroke fled to France, Oxford, with the cool courage that was the finer part of his phlegmatic nature, remained to stand his trial. Fortunately the French archives were not available to the prosecution; and the House of Lords, always at this period a moderator of party heats, acquitted him as it had acquitted Somers sixteen years before. In so doing, it served England well, for the use of impeachments against fallen statesmen is unsuited to a constitutional regime. In civilized society men cannot be expected to serve their country with ropes round their necks.

The outstanding fact in political history under the first two Georges is the abeyance of the Tory party as an effective force in Parliament. The two-party system did not die but it slept. There were always avowed Tories in Parliament, but they were not numerous enough either to take over the

government when a change was needed, or to act alone as an Opposition. They usually worked with that section of the Whigs who happened to be opposed to the Whig Government of the day. Since there was no rival party which the Whig aristocracy as a whole had cause to fear, it grew negligent of public opinion, and relied more and more on perfecting the corrupt machinery of elections, instead of appealing on points of principle to the electorate. Where there are no effective Tories there can be no proper Whigs. As the struggle for power ceased to be political it became personal, a scuffle of the rival 'great houses' for the power to distribute the good things of Church and State.*

The question in Parliament from 1715 to 1760 was not whether 'the Whigs' should be turned out, but only which Whigs should be turned out and which Whigs should take their place. The principles for which the party had stood in old days, such as Toleration of Dissenters and the limitation of the Power of the Crown, were no longer in the forefront of controversy, largely because they had been realized and had become an essential part of the political structure of the land, and partly because they were forgotten amid the personal rivalries of 'the great.' In the last years of this regime, the elder Pitt appealed to the country over the heads of the degenerate Whig oligarchy of the day, and in the great crisis of the Seven Years War revived the old popular spirit of Whig nationalism, in a call to Britons to defend

* The aristocratic character of ordinary patronage in the eighteenth century is amusingly illustrated by the following epitaph, recorded in Nichols' *Literary Anecdotes*, III, p. 52.

Here rest all that was mortal of
Mrs. Elizabeth Bate,
Relict of the Reverend Richard Bate,
A woman of unaffected piety
And exemplary virtue.
* * * *
She was honourably descended,
And by means of her Alliance to
The illustrious family of Stanhope,
She had the merit to obtain
For her husband and children
Twelve several employments
In Church and State.
She died June 9, 1751, in the 75th year of her age.

their religion, liberties and commerce against the House of Bourbon. Neither Walpole as Prime Minister nor Newcastle after him had made any such appeal.

The Jacobite danger was the real strength of the Whigs. Neither the King nor the electors would turn the Whigs out to bring in James. Even Bolingbroke had learnt by his brief personal experience at the Pretender's Court that to make him King would be to make Roman Catholic priests once again the directors of royal policy. To restore such a regime would merely lead to another Revolution. The existence of the dynastic question which had ruined the Tories in 1714, continued to divide and distract them, and to render them suspect to powerful classes who would otherwise have been on their side.

Security and liberty were obtained under the Hanoverian Constitution, because, under Walpole, the Whigs became, what they had not always been, the 'moderate men.' At bottom their famous 'moderation' was due to the fact that they were a minority in the island; they were normally the weaker party, holding office by the accident of the dynastic question and the division of the Tories on that supreme issue.

Before the Industrial Revolution, England was still mainly agricultural. Therefore the squires and the rural clergy were more powerful, when united and aroused as in 1710, than the Dissenters and the business and professional classes who had rallied round the Whigs and the House of Hanover in 1715. If the Whigs were wise, they would never injure the interests or alarm the prejudices of the clergy and squires. The Whigs could monopolize power, if only they would leave the Tory classes alone. Walpole, as he grew older, fully grasped this principle, and acted upon it for many years as Prime Minister, with complete success. His motto was *quieta non movere*, 'Let sleeping dogs lie.'

In ecclesiastical affairs great care was taken not to give cause for another cry of 'Church in Danger.' Through the help of the able manager, Bishop Gibson—himself an actively loyal Hanoverian but not a Low Churchman—the Whig Ministers brought about an understanding between

the House of Hanover and the Established Church. That was the true basis of Eighteenth Century peace and stability in England.

In pursuance of this 'moderate' policy in matters ecclesiastical, the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts of Anne's reign were repealed in George I's reign, but no further concession was made to the Dissenters. The Test and Corporation Acts were left untouched. Those Nonconformists who refused to qualify by taking the sacrament according to the rites of the Established Church, were still excluded from municipal and State office.

Owing to the moderation of the Whigs in doing no more for their Nonconformist clients and nothing more to provoke the clergy, there was no repetition of the popular outcry of 'Church in Danger' that had done the Whigs such harm in the days of Dr. Sacheverell. The growing spirit of Latitudinarianism, characteristic of the educated classes in the Eighteenth Century, helped Whig statecraft gently to lay the spirit of High Church enthusiasm.

So the Whig attempt to come to terms with the Church was successful under the first two Georges, far beyond what could have seemed possible in the fervid days of William and Anne. Nor was the Whig policy of 'moderation' confined to the religious field. The Tory squires were left unprovoked. Many of them were placed on the Bench as Justices of the Peace. Fielding in *Tom Jones* represents Squire Western as a magistrate. He had been placed on the Bench by those Whig Lords and 'Hanover rats,' of whom he said 'I hate the very name of themmum'; he had no thought of joining the Pretender in 1745. So too, academic liberties were rigidly respected by the Government, who never interfered with the extreme Toryism of Oxford.

After long generations of trouble, persecution and hatred, England had at last won through to a period of domestic peace and individual freedom. It was not a period of avowed idealism; it was not a period of legislative reform. But neither idealism nor reform is the whole of life for men or nations. The vigour and initiative of Englishmen, at

home and overseas, in all branches of human effort and intellect, were the admiration of Eighteenth Century Europe. The greatness of England in the Hanoverian epoch was made by men acting freely in a free community, with little help indeed from Church or State, but with no hindrance. The great art of letting your neighbour alone, even if he thinks differently from you, was learnt by Englishmen under Walpole, at a time when the lesson was still a strange one elsewhere. Some European countries have not learnt it to this day or are rapidly unlearning it again. The manners and customs of English political and ecclesiastical controversy were softened between 1715 and 1760, and this change left a lasting mark on life and politics.

It has been calculated that there were about seventy 'great Whig families,' who, under the early Hanoverian Kings, formed the Government and led the Opposition. Each of these great families usually had its titular head snugly in the Upper House, while its heirs and cadets sat for family boroughs and made their reputations in the faction fighting in St. Stephen's Chapel.

This is the system which Disraeli termed 'the Venetian Oligarchy.' An oligarchy in some sense it was ; but it was the very opposite of Venetian. The methods of the rulers of Venice were despotism, inquisition, enforced silence, and secret political justice. But the 'Whig Oligarchy' was submissive to the rule of law, and the English laws gave to the Executive no power to suppress speech or writing that attacked the Government. Unless the Law Court found a critic of Government guilty of sedition, Ministers could do nothing to silence him. The Law Court, not the Government, decided what was libel, blasphemy or sedition. And the Judges were independent of the Executive, and the Juries were often hostile.

The highly civilized conception of law as a power superior to the will of the rulers was strong among the Eighteenth Century English. The Law of England had triumphed in the great battle with the Stuart Kings ; the idea of the rule of law—as propounded by Coke and Selden —had been victorious on the field of Naseby ; had been

muddled away by the quarrels and outraged by the violence of its Puritan champions ; had been restored in 1660, imperilled in the later years of Charles II, destroyed by James II, but had finally triumphed at the Revolution. The King had then been made definitely subject to the law. The prerogative that claimed to be above the law had been killed dead. The Whig oligarchy, after 1714, made use of the powers of the Crown as defined by the Revolution of 1688. But those powers so defined were very limited. The irremovable judges could no more be removed by the Whig nobles than by the King.

Modern criticism of this regime and its mentality is not that it interfered too much, like a 'Venetian Oligarchy,' but that it interfered too little, allowing law to grow antiquated and out of date, while society was being reborn by industrial change. Not tyranny but an exaggerated conservatism was the weakness of the Walpoles and of the Pelhams after him. *Quieta non movere* is not the motto of a Reformer, but neither is it the motto of a Tyrant.

The specific work of the early Eighteenth Century in England, on the line down which it was launched by the events of Anne's reign, was the establishment of the rule of law, and that law a law of liberty. On that solid foundation the reforms of succeeding epochs have been based.

If England between the Revolution and the death of George II had not established the rule of the law of freedom, the England of the Nineteenth Century would have proceeded along the path of change by methods of violence, instead of by Parliamentary modification of the law. The establishment of liberty was not the result of the complete triumph of any one party in the State. It was the result of the balance of political parties and religious sects, compelled to tolerate one another, until toleration became a habit of the national mind. Even the long Whig supremacy that was the outcome and sequel of the reign of Anne, was conditional on a vigilant maintenance of institutions in Church and State that were specially dear to the Tories, and a constant respect for the latent power of political opponents, who were fellow subjects and brother Englishmen.

THE QUEEN'S PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF STATE, 1709–1714

(*Whigs are printed in italics.*)

	1709	1710	1711	1712	1713	1714
Lord Treasurer	Sidney, Lord Godolphin	Godolphin dismissed Aug. 1710. No Ld. Treasurer till following May	Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, May 1711	. . . . .	. . .	Oxford dismissed July 27. *Shrewsbury* succeeds July 30
Lord President of the Council	*Lord Somers*	Earl of Rochester, Sept. 1710, ob. May 1711	John Sheffield, Duke of Buckinghamshire, June 1711			
Lord Privy Seal	*Duke of Newcastle*	. . .	(*Duke of Newcastle* ob. July) John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, succeeds	. . .	William Legge, Earl of Dartmouth, Aug. 1713	
Chancellor of the Exchequer	*John Smith*	Robert Harley, Aug. 1710	Robert Benson, June 1711	. . .	Sir William Wyndham, Aug. 1713	
Lord Chancellor	*Lord Cowper*	Sir Simon Harcourt (Lord Keeper only)	. . . . .		Sir S. Harcourt became Lord Harcourt and Chancellor, April 1713	
Secretary of State (Northern)	*Hon. Henry Boyle*	Henry St. John				
Secretary of State (Southern)	*Charles Spencer, Earl of Sunderland*	Wm. Legge, Lord Dartmouth	. . . . .		Wm. Bromley, Aug. 1713	
Third Secretary (Scotland, etc.)	*Duke of Queensberry*	. . .	Queensberry dies July 1711. Post vacant two years		Earl of Mar, Aug.-Sept. 1713	

THE QUEEN'S PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF STATE, 1709–1714—*continued.*

(*Whigs are printed in italics.*)

	1709	1710	1711	1712	1713	1714
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland	*Thomas, Earl of Wharton*	James Butler, Duke of Ormonde	. . . . .		*Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury*, Sept. 1713	
Lord High Admiral	Thomas Herbert, Earl of Pembroke; succeeded by *Russell, Earl of Orford*, Nov. 1709	(First Ld. of Admiralty) Sir J. Leake		(First Ld. of Admiralty) Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford		
Secretary at War	*Robert Walpole*	George Granville, created Lord Lansdowne, Dec. 1711		Sir William Wyndham, June 1712	Francis Gwyn, Aug. 1713	
Master-General of the Ordnance	Duke of Marlborough	. . . . .		Richard Savage, Earl Rivers, Jan. 1712, died Aug. 1712		
Master of the Horse	*Duke of Somerset*	. . . . .		Jan. 1712, *Somerset* dismissed		
Lord Chamberlain	*Marquis of Kent*	*Charles Talbot, Duke of Shrewsbury*, April 1710				
Lord Steward	*Duke of Devonshire*	John Sheffield, Duke of Buckinghamshire, Sep. 1710	Earl of Poulett, June 1711			

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

State of Finances at end of Session, June 1711

A. *Appropriation of supplies by House of Commons for the year 1711.* (*Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, *ff.* 236–237.)

	£	s.	d.
For 40,000 sailors of R.N. for 13 months	2,080,000	0	0
For the R.N. ordinary expenses	120,000	0	0
For 40,000 men in Flanders	919,092	3	6
For augmentation of 10,000 men in Flanders	177,511	3	6
For 3000 Palatines in service of H.M. and States General	34,251	13	6
For 4639 Saxons in same service	43,251	13	6
For Bothmar's Hanoverian Dragoons	9,269	16	6
For the augmentation of troops in Flanders, 1709	220,000	0	0
For garrison, pensioners and marines	546,108	17	8
For land artillery	130,000	0	0
Interest on a year's Irish debentures	49,357	17	2
For transport of troops	144,000	0	0
For subsidies to H.M.'s Allies	478,956	16	7
For Spain and Portugal	1,500,000	0	0
For extraordinary expenses of war	292,369	2	4
Exchequer Bills	45,000	0	0
Annual funds for the lottery of 1,500,000	135,000	0	0
Annual funds for the lottery of 2 millions	186,670	0	0
Total appropriations	7,110,839	4	3

(Inaccurately added up as 7,070,939 in the MSS.)

B. *Funds assigned towards these appropriations.*

	£
Four shilling land tax	1,900,000
Tax on malt	650,000
[Borrowings] Lottery of £10 tickets for 1,500,000	1,500,000
[Borrowings] Lottery of £100 tickets for 2 millions	2,000,000
[A million short.]	£6,050,000

C. *Public debts for which Parliament assigned funds during session of 1711.*

	£	s.	d.
Admiralty debt [to Michaelmas, 1710]	5,130,539	5	5
Ordnance debt [to Michaelmas, 1710]	154,324	15	8¼
Debt for transport of troops [1710]	424,791	5	4½
Irish debentures	1,018,656	17	9
Deficient Tallies, up to 1710	12,025	1	0
Navy debts (Michaelmas to Christmas, 1710)	378,859	5	8¼
Debt to Elector of Hanover for certain subsidies	9,375	0	0
Total	£7,128,571	10	11

D. *Extraordinary money grants.*

	£	s.	d.
To the inhabitants of the Islands of Nevis and St. Christopher for their losses during the French invasion of 1705	103,003	11	4
For building 50 new churches in London and Westminster	350,000	0	0
	£453,003	11	4

APPENDIX B

Some Correspondence of Marlborough, Godolphin and the Whig Ministers before and after their Fall in 1710

Of these letters Nos. 1 and 3 show how little either Somers or Godolphin ever contemplated the desirability of making peace on terms which France would accept (see p. 61 above). The Duchess's note endorsed on No. 1, describing Somers' intentions, is not far off the mark. No. 2 refers to the ungracious manner of Godolphin's dismissal by the Queen. No. 4 shows the fears of one of Godolphin's friends that he and Marlborough would be impeached and executed as a sequel to their fall; some of the October Club members were, in fact, clamouring for such measures (*Wentworth Papers*, p. 161, and *Journal to Stella*, February 18, 1711), but in vain.

Number 1

Add. MSS. 9109, ff. 71r–72r

Lord Somers to the Duke of Marlborough

$\frac{6}{17}$ June 1710.

My Lord

I have been confined to my chamber for near a month, and as in that time I have seen several things pass and feared many more likely to pass at home so I have had full leisure to consider alone the critical circumstances of affairs abroad, which cannot but be much influenced by what is doing in England. Our Enemies will not be in good earnest for peace, when they see us so busy in doing their business for them, and our friends can never think it reasonable to depend upon so wild a people. While the expectations of the Campagne amuse the world, everybody is in suspense, but as soon as that draws towards an end, and the time of preparation for another year comes near, the dutch will begin to speak after their old manner of their being exhausted, and what language we shall be able to use for their encouragement or our own I fear is too easy to foresee. Whatever way I can turn my eyes, I can discern no hopefull appearance but from the army which Your Grace commands, and for no longer time than till that army must go into winter quarters. You have done wonders for us; and I hope you are reserved to complete them and I am sure you will do all that is possible. It is very natural to say then why

is the Duke of Marlborough so impertinently interrupted when he has the care of all Europe upon him? I have (I must confesse) but little to say for myself, unless it be the owning as I have done already, that I can see no reasonable ground of hopes, but from what Your Grace is able to perform this Summer, and therefore to beg you that you will have that just regard to the glory you are possessed of as not to let any resentment or any contrivance how artificial soever, put you out of the way of carrying it on to all the perfection it is capable of receiving. That will be to gratify your enemies. The most effectual and the most certain way of finally disappointing them and punishing them, is to take no notice of what they do, but to go on to make the utmost use of the opportunity, that so by God's blessing you may bring peace with you and come home crowned with laurels; and then you may despise them, and restore us once more to our senses. These I hope are your purposes, and that they may have this Issue, is the most sincere desire of him who is with all sincere respect. My Lord, &c. &c.

Endorsed by the Duchess of Marlborough.

A very good letter from Lord Somers in June 1710 not to take notice of the contrivances and malice of those in power for the good of the common cause; and I believe it was sincere as to his wishing him good success in the war, though I cannot doubt but he would have joyned with Abigail to put him out when that service was completed and as he did contribute to bring her into full glory; to have compassed his own ends he would have served with her or under her, notwithstanding the great obligations he had to me.

Number 2

Add. MSS. 28055, f. 432

Godolphin to the Queen

Tuesday the 8th of *July* 1710.
[error for *August*]

May it please Your Majesty

I have received this morning the honour of your Majesty's Letter with your Comands in it to break my staff, which I have done with the same duty and satisfaction in what relates to my self as when I had the honour to receive it from your Majesty's hands.

Since your Majesty is not pleased to allow me to wait upon you, I must humbly beg leave to take this last occasion to assure your Majesty in the most sincere as well as the most submissive manner, that I am not conscious of the least undutifull act,—or of one undutifull word to your Majesty in my whole life, and in the instance which your Majesty is pleased to give I have the good fortune to have severall witnesses of undoubted Credit. I should never bee able to forgive myself if I had not always served your Majesty with the most particular respect and duty, as well as with the greatest zeal and integrity.

I shall only presume to add that my heart is entirely sensible of all the honours and favours your Majesty has done mee and full of the most zealous

wishes for your prosperity, and happyness, in this world and in that to come, which I beg leave to assure your Majesty shall always bee the hearty and constant prayer of

May it please your Majesty,
The most humble and most dutiful
of all your Subjects,
GODOLPHIN.

NUMBER 3

Letter of Godolphin to 'No. 126'

Add. MSS. 28055, f. 434

December 17th, 1710.

My Lord

having had time to reflect, Since our last Conversation upon the present posture of the Queens affairs abroad, I find my mind so much affected with the dangerous circumstances in which to mee they appear to bee, that I am not able to keep my self, from laying my thoughts of them before your Lordship as plainly and as briefly as I can upon so copious a subject, being very sensible that you have all the same duty for her Majesty, and the same zealous good wishes for her Service that I have my self, with the addition of a better, tho' not a more impartiall judgment; but before I enter upon any particulars, I think it not improper to remove some prejudices, which may otherwise lie against any thing that comes from mee upon this subject;

in the first place therfore I beg leave to assure you, upon my honour and upon my truth, that if I lament the measures taken at present in relation to the forreign Affairs, it is so farr from the least view or thought of being employd again my self that I know no temptation upon earth powerfull enough to oblige mee to it,

secondly I repeat the same assurances to you, that I have not the least resentment or animosity against any one person whatsoever, whom I either know, or think to bee in her Majesty's Confidence, and trust; but having the same zeal and dutifull affection for her person and Interests that I ever have had, and the same tender Concern for her future quiet, and the security of this kingdome which she governs, and is therefore in some measure answerable for, I can not reflect upon the present posture of her Affairs without the greatest uneasyness upon my own mind, and as great apprehensions that misfortunes are coming faster upon her Majesty than she seems to bee aware of. God send she may bee able to find the way, if there bee any, to avoyd them. My Lord, I take her Majesty's future quiett and security to depend upon a good determination of the present Warr, and nothing is more evident than that the great and constant successes with which it has pleased God to bless her Majesty's arms through the whole course of it had layd a certain foundation for bringing it to a happy period, even before this time, if the disorders and divisions at home, and the disgrace of such Ministers as had always appeared most zealous for the Common Cause, had not so much encouraged *france*, that though quite exhausted, it has given them new life. Though their Armys have been beaten for 7 years together, the Warr is yett to begin

afresh, and they are become so haughty and insolent as wholly to lay aside all thoughts of accommodation by a generall peace;

there are 3 particulars, which seem chiefly to have encouraged, and Confirmed them in this insolence;

first the blow given to the publick Credit;

secondly the dissolution of the parliament upon it;

thirdly, the assurances sent to France, by the Jacobites and french partisans here, that the Duke of Marlborough shall bee removed from the Com[m]and of the Army;

I take the first of these not to have been, in it self, wholly irrecoverable, for the strength of the publick Credit, did not, in my opinion turn so much upon the personall influence of that Minister who had the chief management of it [Godolphin himself] but upon the knowledge and experience which the whole Allyance abroad had justly Conceived of his firm Adherence to the Com[mon] Cause, which made them very naturally inferr, that the laying him aside was a plain indication that the Interest of the Allys was declining in Great Brittain; and the Consequence is as plain that the publick Credit which had been raised at first, and supported chiefly upon that foundation must necessarily decline with it.

Now the publick Credit being once broken, it is not, with great submission, in the power of the Queen and parliament in conjunction, to restore it again, without the help of more time than our present circumstances will, I doubt, allow; nor can it bee restored even with the help of time unless that time bee employd in creating the same Confidence in the Allyes abroad, of the Ministers, her Majesty pleases to employ, as they had in those that went before them, which was the true and solid foundation of bringing the publick Credit to so great a height in England.

The second particular, viz: the dissolution of the last parliament, had not much effect upon the forreign affairs, otherwise than as it was a great confirmation of the former stroak given to the Credit, and looked upon by the Allys to proceed from the same cause, which consequently did very much increase their distrust and jealousy of the brittish counsells.

From this distrust and diffidence it is, that I apprehend all the ill consequences imaginable to the Queen's affairs, I see no step made to remove them, since the meeting of the parliament but rather the contrary, talking never soe big nor voting never so well, signifies very little towards carrying on the Warr with effect, if there bee not an entire conjunction and harmony betwixt her Majesty and the Allys abroad as it has been hitherto, and if, as the french have been already gratifyed in the two first poynts they must also have the further satisfaction of seeing the assurances from their friends here made good by the Duke of Marlborough's not serving any more, this must needs give the finishing stroak to the droopping Allyance, and make it fall to pieces immediatly; nor, when this is more certainly known, will france so much as hearken to any proposalls for a generall peace, but expect the Allys shall treat separatly, as they certainly will be obliged to doe, for they always looked upon the Duke of Marlborough as the great *Cement* by which the whole Confederacy was held together, and the States will not trust any other subject of the Queens with the Command of their Army but will rather, as

well as the rest of the Allys, make the best terms they can for themselves; and when the Allyance is once broken, can it enter into any bodys imagination that the Queen and the brittish Nation will have any terms from france, but what shall bee in favour of the pretender! is it not also to bee apprehended, that if the Nation sees it self driven to such a plunge, it may putt the parliament upon addressing to the Queen, to give the Command of her Army to the Elector of Hannover, and what a difficulty that would bring upon her Majesty either in granting or refusing, I leave you to judg?

There is yett one consideration behind; worse than all the rest which is, that when the Queen is brought under such difficultys, it suggests but too much encouragement to attempts against her person, according as it shall appear to bee for the advantage of either faction at that Conjuncture; this is the most melancholly reflexion of all, for Wee are all bound up, as one may express it, in the Queens life, which God Almighty long preserve, and direct her for the best in all things; this shall bee in all events the Constant prayer of your Lordships most obedient humble servant.

[Endorsement] this Letter was shewn to *42* [the Queen] by *126* upon the 21st of December 1710.

Number 4

Add. MSS. 28055, f. 440[r]

Letter to Godolphin from a friend unnamed

June 25th [1711]

My Lord

Though I know your Lordship has many more able Counsellors, yet I am sure you have no servant more faithfull or sollicitous for you than me: and this fear makes me presume thus at a distance and unasked, at the hazard of your opinion of my discretion to throw in my mite towards the preservation of what I love and esteem. The Papists are every where admitted into the secret at this time relating to the family of Hanover and the person who pretends to obstruct that succession (as tis now the mode to call him mildly), the Warr that is to be with the Dutch, and the Offensive league with France &c.: These people as well as the Jacobites cannot so well contain themselves but that now and then in the heat of argument or wine, they lett dropp what they know and think, and tis not only my own remark but that of other Gentlemen in this country that their principal malice is levelld against the Duke of Marlborough and your Lordship; but especially the Duke who (the gentlemen of that persuasion say) must of necessity be pursued even to blood: I do not question but they have many more in view fit to accompany him though none whom they own so openly to wish so heartily ill to: now my Lord I do not doubt, as this plott thickens which it will do very fast many who think likely to obstruct it will be seized and sacrificed, and you may be sure they will begin with the persons they esteem most dangerous and able to controll them. Were it not good then (whilst tis time) to think of some secure shelter till the storm be overblown? The considerations of mony, Estate or relations ought not to be put in any Ballance with that of Life, which once

lost can never be retreived: I am aware of the dilemma in this case; that by such an action a person seems to own himself guilty. But to avoyd this what if leave were first asked to retire? to go to Aix la Chapelle? &c. the doubt is, this leave (though assurances or suretyes shoud be given of not ingaging in a contrary party) woud not be given; and then the very asking for it woud hasten the execution of what is intended.

I am therefore most humbly of opinion that this case ought to be maturely and speedily discussed by the best freinds you have: and the safest method pursued, whatever sinister constructions it may bear, for time (which the living allwayes have and the dead never) will set all those to rights agen. When one is safe one may publish manifestos: and those who are masters of summes of money, need be less sollicitous what becomes of Lands and Pensions. Every thing that is lawless, cruell, violent, rash or tricking is now to be expected and to come to the sad circumstance of a *non putaram* is what woud be very unbecoming wise men. Tis not innocence, though ever so clear, that will prove any protection rather the contrary, and what cannot be done with collour of Law will be done otherwise.

My Lord *Liberavi animam meam* and heaven direct you: methinks I see danger of this kind very plain and very near, but perhaps I speak as a fool. However I am sure I am

Your most faithfull humble Servant.

[Addressed:] To the Right Honourable the Earl of Godolphin at St. James's.

[Endorsement:] June 25 No name or date. [Seal: A lion (?) rampant.]

APPENDIX C

De Foe on Sacheverell

De Foe's letter to General Stanhope, one of the Managers of the Impeachment of Sacheverell, 1710 (from Lord Stanhope's *Chevening MSS.*).

Sir,

As it is my misfortune not to have the honour to be known to you, so at this time it may be some loss to the public interest in the affair of Sacheverell, which you are managing (pardon me the word) with so much applause.

I was moved to give you this trouble, Sir, upon my being informed you had sent for some *Reviews* * to furnish something of the Doctor's character. But, as I will not deceive you, Sir, in what I am writing, so neither will I in the person writing, and therefore, after asking your pardon for the rudeness of this, I have plainly subscribed my name.

Nothing, Sir, has witheld me from blackening and exposing this insolent priest but a nicety of honour, that I thought it dishonourable to strike him when he was down, or to fall on when he had other enemies to engage. But since his defence is made of false suggestions as to his being for the Revolution, and his character is part of his applause among this rabble, and particularly since I find it necessary to represent him right to those who are his Judges, I chose rather to be impertinent, which I ask your pardon for, than that you should not be let a little way into his character, to the truth of which I will at any time appear and produce sufficient testimony, at the same time running the venture of the indignation of the Doctor and his rabble, with which I am severely and openly threatened.

First, Sir, as to his morals, I do not say there are Members in your House who have been drunk with him a hundred times, and can say enough of that to you, because I know it would be said to press gentlemen to betray conversation. But if you please to converse with Mr. Duckett,† a Member of your House, or with Coll. Oughton of the Guards, they will (especially the first) furnish you abundantly on that head (or at least can). Then, Sir, as to his favouring the Revolution, that he has drunk King James's health upon his knees. That he has spoken so scandalously of the Government, that some strangers have asked him if he had taken the oath to the Queen, and being

* Viz. back numbers of the *Review*, edited by De Foe.

† George Duckett, M.P. for Calne in the Parliament of 1708–10. Stanhope was then in the House of Commons (' your House ').

answered by him that he had, have expostulated with him how it was possible either that talking in that manner he could take the oath, or that taking the oath he could talk in that manner.

And lastly (as to the Revolution also) I shall name you two persons: Samuel Eberall of Birmingham, and the minister of Birmingham (I think his name is Smith, but can come to a certain knowledge of the name),—these can make proof even to conviction that in their hearing he said with an oath in the late King William's reign—He (Sacheverell) believed that he (the King) would come to be *De-Witted* and that he hoped he would live to see it.

These words Mr. Eberall affirms he heard him speak and will justify that fact in his tooth. And these things I thought it my duty to acquaint you of, that you may make such use of them as you shall see cause. If I had the honour to know you, Sir, I might give you larger accounts, and if you think it for your service I shall do it when ever you please.

Asking your pardon again for this freedom,

I am, Sir, your most humble and obedient servant,

De Foe.

Newington Near Hackney,

March 8, 1709 [= 1710 by modern reckoning].

I print this letter of De Foe's as a curiosity, not necessarily as the truth. Indeed it may be considered more injurious to De Foe than to Sacheverell. Of the charge of drunkenness I know no confirmation. The charge of wishing King William ' De-Witted ' appeared in the following December in the Rev. William Bisset's *Modern Fanatick* (= Sacheverell). However that may have been, there are various indications that Sacheverell was at heart a Jacobite, *e.g.* in 1713 when he was the principal figure at a banquet where *The King shall enjoy his own again* was played with immense and significant applause. *English Thinkers of the Augustan Age* (ed. Hearnshaw), p. 101 note.

APPENDIX D

BRIHUEGA

I. *Colonel Michel Richards' Letter on Brihuega*

THE following (from *Stowe MSS.* (*B.M.*) 476, ff. 2–4) is a letter written to Craggs by Colonel Michel Richards, who commanded the British train of artillery which was with Starhemberg's column, present therefore at Villaviciosa but not at Brihuega. It is interesting to note that in Richards' opinion the plundering done by our troops, due to want of supply, was a great cause of the catastrophe.

BARCELONA, 9th of Jan. 1711 [N.S.]

I don't doubt but you have been very uneasy to know what has occasioned or contributed to so extraordinary and sudden a change in our affairs in Castile and particularly to the loss of our friends. Different people will give different reasons and constructions. In the Marshall's [Starhemberg's] account printed here, and that he has sent to England, he goes no farther than to give his reason for fighting, and that want of provisions, obliged the several nations to take several routes, and perhaps as some people think, he endeavours to insinuate that the English kept too great a distance. But I dont think the question lyes here, but rather how it should be that the enemy should assemble so considerable an army and bring them 150 English miles without our knowing that they had either foot or cannon with them. We supposing them only a consider(able) detachment of about 2000 horse that would endeavour to make us uneasy in our retreat. This want of Intelligence must proceed from the disaffection of the people, or otherwise our General [Stanhope] must be very hard of beleife. I believe 'twas the first, for our army not having been pay'd since our coming into the country and as ill provided with bread was fallen into great disorder beyond the remedy of the Generals. And I believe that no one will wonder that an army composed of so many different nations, ill provided with bread and worse with mony, should doe so ; for as for the Castillans it will be allowed by everybody that from our entering the country till our retreat we found them beyond what we expected. Nor can we say they hurt us till then ; for having beat their invincible Army for so many leagues before us, from whom they expected the reduction of Catalonia, they changed their tone ; till they found by their emisarys that we should not be so soon supported as they from France, and when they see there army follow

our retreat, tis no wonder that a people who had suffer'd so much by us should take up arms. And according to the present View of affairs, of the enemys superiority on both sides and we without mony or magasins of provisions which is worse, I wish that timely releife may come in these so materiall points, least the Catalans should change their mind too, for they have suffer'd very much and now more.

II. *Criticisms of Stanhope*

The stories put about afterwards by Stanhope's enemies that he was at Brihuega contrary to Starhemberg's orders (*e.g. H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 219), have no foundation, though repeated by *Parnell*, p. 290. Stanhope, in his dispatch written in captivity to Dartmouth on January 2, 1711, says : 'The Headquarters were that night [December 3–4] at Villarejo, where it was agreed that the English should make three marches to Brihuega and the Imperialists to Cifuentes.' *Add. MSS.* 9117, ff. 172–177, printed in *Mahon*, p. cxviii. The fact that Stanhope was acting according to orders in going to Brihuega is confirmed by Captain Cosby's letter, printed in Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), p. 466.

Stanhope has been blamed by some for not sending away his cavalry and dragoons. They might perhaps have escaped, but not certainly for they were surrounded by greatly superior numbers of horse. Moreover, Stanhope used them, especially the dragoons, in the defence of the town, which he hoped to protect till Starhemberg should arrive ; and he was short-handed for holding the walls. It is true that some of his officers thought that he should have confined his scheme of defence to the citadel, and so needed fewer men and less ammunition, in which he was perilously short (Boyer's *Queen Anne*, p. 465). I am quite unable to judge whether or not it would have been better to have held the citadel alone.

Stanhope's real responsibility for the defeat at Brihuega lies first in his policy of invading Castile at all, especially without proper supplies ; and secondly, in failing to keep out enough scouting parties to warn him of the approach of Vendôme's infantry and guns.

APPENDIX E

The Ministerial Jacobite Intrigue, as revealed in the French Foreign Office Archives

From the beginning of the negotiations with England in the summer of 1710 to the death of Anne in August 1714, Gaultier and the other French agents in England wrote to Torcy at Versailles not only on the questions of peace and alliance with England but on the means of effecting a Jacobite restoration on Anne's death. Louis undertook by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht not any longer to aid the Pretender, but in fact the activities of his Minister at Versailles and of his Ambassador and agents in London were redoubled on James's behalf as a result of the signing of peace. Nor can this be wondered at, since both Oxford and Bolingbroke entered into the plot. English Ministers wrote nothing direct to the Pretender, but they sent him continual messages and promises and received his answers through the agency of Gaultier and Torcy. The degree of their sincerity, especially in the case of Oxford, is open to endless question, but the facts of this intrigue are to be found in the French Foreign Office Archives (*Affaires étrangères, Angleterre*), in the Quai d'Orsay.

The student will find very important parts of this correspondence printed from this source by Mr. Wickham Legg in *English Historical Review* (July 1915), and by myself in the same periodical (January 1934); also in *Salomon*, Appendix and notes. Transcripts made for Sir James Mackintosh from the same French archives will also be found in the British Museum, *Add. MSS.* 34493–34497. The story as it appears in the French Archives is borne out by the correspondence of James and his friends, printed in *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, I, 1902.

In this Appendix, I now make a further contribution to the printing of this evidence, once more expressing my gratitude to the courtesy of the archivists of the French Foreign Office.

I. The visit of the influential Tory M.P., Sir T. Hanmer, to Paris; he was afterwards a leader of the Hanoverian Tories.

(*Aff. étr. Ang.* 240, f. 192.) Gaultier to Torcy, November 29, 1712 [N.S.].

Le Chevalier Hanmer est un gentilhomme de merite. Il est entierement des amis du Comte d'Oxford, de milord Bolingbroke, du Duc D'Ormond et de tous ceux de ce partis là. Vous ne devez attendre aucune confidence ny ouverture de sa part, et de votre costé vous ne luy en devez faire aucune; car il n'est absolument point dans notre secret [= 'J. III,' note says]: il scait que les choses s'avancent, et se feront; mais il ne scait ny quand ny comment et vous pouvez compter qu il ny a rien de mysterieux dans son voyage et dans son sejour à Paris.

II. The Duc d'Aumont, French Ambassador to London after the peace, writes to Torcy, April 18, 1713 [N.S.] (248, f. 373).

Vendredi dernier M. le Comte de St. Jean, Mons. frère du Viscomte Bol., apporta à la Reine la traitté de paix signé avec tous les alliés à l'Archiduc prez. Cette nouvelle a esté receue par le peuple avec de grandes acclamations et des demonstrations de joies bien marquées. La cour de France qui [cypher begins here] dans le cours de la negociation de la paix n'a voulu rien entamer sur les interets du Chevalier de St George dans l'apprehension ou elle estoit que cela ne donnat lieu a quelque incident qui fu tort au dessin principal, va sans doutte prendre quelques mesures en faveur de ce Prince.

Et il y a lieu de croire, que comme on a toujours aprehendé pour la santé de la Reyne et que cette Princesse ne peut pas aller loin, le Conseil de France en cas que ce malheur arrivivait, a fait son plan et ses arrangements. J'ay prist ous les eclaircissements necessaires pour l'execution des ordres de sa Majesté en cas quelle jugeasse à propos d'entrer dans une affaire dont certainement il sera question dans ce pays cy par la rivauté des partis qui y regnent et qui vont bientôt changer d'object sans changer de sentiments.

III. As the Succession question looms larger, Argyle takes a strong Hanoverian line and he and Marlborough tend toward reconciliation.

(247, f. 80.) Torcy to Gaultier, November 25, 1713 [N.S.].

On dit que le Duc d'Argill a dit qu'il falloit envoyer le chevalier de St Georges ou son Père [James II] avoit envoyé le grand père de luy Duc d'Argill [viz. to the scaffold]. Il le reconnoit donc pour fils du Roy Jacques.

(247, f. 159.) Gaultier to Torcy, December 20, 1713 [N.S.].

My Lord Grand Tresorier m'a dit de vous mander que depuis peu le Duc de Marl. s'estoit reconcilié avec le Duc d'Argill. Vous scavez les sentimens de le dernier touchant le chevalier.

[For the important negotiations of Oxford and Bolingbroke with James in January–March 1714, and their unsuccessful attempt, aided by the Abbé Gaultier, to persuade him to declare himself a Protestant, see *E.H.R.*, July 1915, and *Salomon*, Appendix, and *Macpherson*, II, pp. 525–526.]

IV. As the quarrel of Oxford and Bolingbroke comes to a head in the weeks before the Queen's death, neither abate their

protestations of loyalty to James, whatever Oxford's real sentiments may have been.

(256, ff. 176–177.) Gaultier to Torcy, June 14, 1714 [N.S.].

Mons le Cte d'Oxford me dit encore que la Reyne avoit pris depuis dix jours de nouvelles mesures pour empesher que le Duc de Cambridge, qui en a grande envie, ne passe en Angleterre et qu'elle en avoit écrit fortement au Duc et Duchesse de Hannover. Il m'a aussi asseuré qu'en douze jours je partirois bien instruit, et par écrit de tout ce qui regarde le Chevalier. . . . Le Cte D'Oxford et My Lord Bolingbroke sont plus mal ensemble que jamais. Ce dernier, en qui j'ay une entière confiance, veut que je luy dise avant mon départ les sentimens du Tresorier sur le Chevalier, et le Tresorier me deffend absolument de faire connoistre a qui que ce soit aucune chose de ce qu'il me dira quand je partiray. Mandez moi s'il vous plait, Monseigneur, ce que je dois faire et quel parti il faut que je prenne dans un tel cas. Car si je garde le secret je desobligerais un homme [Bolingbroke] qui est entèrement devoué a Montgoulin [the Pretender], et si je le revele et que My Lord Oxford vienne à le scavoir, il n'aura plus confiance en moi.

M. le Comte d'Oxford vien de me dire de mander de sa part que M. le Duc de Lorraine trahit le Chevalier, et que, par le moyen de ce Duc, L'Empereur et le Duc d'Hannover scavent tous ce qui se passe à Bar le Duc.

V. The French agents describe Whig fears and policies on the eve of Anne's death.

(257, f. 122.) Ilberville to Louis XIV, July 19, 1714 [N.S.].

Les avis que le Pretendant avoit été vu au Havre prest à s'embarquer avec des trouppes de Vostre Majesté ont été donnez pour estre sûrs dans la Chambre Haute par M. de Scarborough et par son fils dans la basse [Earl of Scarborough and his son Lord Lumley the Whig member for Arundel]. Vous savez, Sire, a quoy tout cela tend.

(257, f. 123.) Ilberville to Torcy, July 19, 1714 [N.S.].

Ce discours de ceux qui tiennent en meme tems que le Chevalier se prepare a passer en Angleterre sont a dessein de accoutumer le peuple a voir venir le Duc de Cambridge avec des Troupes.

(257, ff. 175–176.) Ilberville to Torcy, July 30, 1714 [N.S.], describes Whigs and Hanoverian Tories (Hanmer, etc.) drawing together and actively agitating popular opinion against the Pretender.

VI. The French agents report to Torcy the progress of the quarrel of Oxford and Bolingbroke, the fall of Oxford and the Queen's fatal illness, in the light of the chances of a Jacobite Restoration. It is important to observe the stress still laid on the necessity of James pretending to turn Protestant.

(257, f. 155.) Ilberville to Torcy, July 23, 1714 [N.S.].

My Lord Chancelier [Harcourt] s'est hautement declaré contre My Ld d'Oxford et parlé plus d'une fois a la Reyne sur la necessité de songer a son

salut et de tous ses serviteurs en congediant My Lord D'Oxford. . . . On vient de m'assurer que la Reyne en reprenant la bague de G. Tresorier donnera a My Lord d'Oxford le titre de Duc de Newcastle.

(257.) Ilberville to Torcy, August 5, 1714 [N.S.].

Le bruit public est que ce soir ou demain My Ld Oxford sera destituée. Je reviens de Kensington ou j'ay affecté d'aller a luy a l'ordinnaire et au retour j'ay recontré en chemin My Ld Bolingbroke qui y alloit avec un visage fort gay. Je ne doute que my Ld Bolingbroke, s'il en a la teste de Ministère comme il ne faut pas douter, ne luy conseille d'executter ses desseins au plustot, connoissant très bien le peril qui se trouve dans le retardement.

Le Seigneur Plunket [Jacobite and Roman Catholic] qui m'est venu voir ce matin a l'ordinnaire, après m'avoir parlé du changement prochain dans le Ministère en ennemi declaré de Ld Oxford, et m'avoir etalé ses services passez, m'a fait part des avis importans qu'il dit vous avoir donnez et à M. de Berwick sur les moyens absolument necessaires pour mettre le Chevalier sur le trone d'Angleterre. L'un est le changement de religion au moins en apparence, de concert avec le Pape, l'autre que le Roy sacrifie cent ou deux cens mille pièces [livres sterlings] pour gagner des voix dans le Parlement. Il m'a avoué qu'il ne vous a pas trouvé ny m. le Duc de Berwick disposez a gouster ses propositions, mais il ne cessera de les repeter. Voyons, dit il, plus clairement que jamais que sans cela il n'y a rien a esperer.

Il se figure que my Ld Marlborough pouvoit bien approuver de bonnes intentions pour le Chevalier, et cite à ce propos le Duc de Berwick qui le croit très capable de revenir à son devoir. Un retour sincère de sa part seroit bon a gagner quelques officiers reformés ou cassés qui luy sont attachés. Mais c'est selon moy tout ce qu'on en devoir attendre. Le party Wigh ne manquera pas d'autres generaux pour commander les revoltez en cas de guerre civile, comme le Duc d'Argill, mess. Cadogan, Stanhope, etc.

VII. Bolingbroke's policy and position after the fall of Oxford.

(257, f. 252.) Gaultier to Torcy, August 7, 1714 [N.S.].

J'ay eu l'occasion de luy [Bol.] faire mon complement sur la victoire qu'il a remportée sur le Tresorier, et de la faire resouvenir qu'il m'avoit dit, il y a plus d'un mois, que ce ne devoit pas songer a partir que la Reine ne se fût determiné, parcequ'il etoit asolument necessaire que le Chevalier sceut a quoy s'en tenir. Il ne l'avoit pas oublié et il m'a assuré de nouveau qu'il étoit toujours dans les mêmes sentimens à l'égard de Montgoulin [the Pretender] pourveu qu'il pris les mesures qu'il m'en diroit davantage la premiere fois que nous nous verrions.

(257, f. 259.) Ilberville to Torcy.

Il paroit qu'il n'y a rien a craindre dans la Chambre Basse, mais la deffection de 7 ou 8 Seigneurs dans la Chambre Hautte mettoit la Reyne dans la nécessité de faire encore des nouveaux remedes au dangereux mais necessaire état où elle se trouve. On a remarqué que des 12 nouveaux que M. de Oxford fit faire y a deux ans trois ou quatre ont voté avec les Wights dans les derniers temps.

(257.) Memoir by Ilberville, dated August 11, 1714 [N.S.] (the day before the Queen died).

Il paroit inutile a l'heure qu'il est de faire des reflections sur les causes de l'inaction de la Reine et du refroidissement que plusieurs Jacobites ont fait paroitre depuis quelques mois. Je n'ay garde de dire que le Chevalier a mal fait de ne pas changer de Religion, et de n'en donner aucune esperance à la Reyne et à ses Ministres, mais je diray avec plusieurs Thorys Catoliques et Protestans fort raisonnables sur ce Chapitre qu'il n'estoit pas necessaire de repondre avec affectation qu'on ne devoit pas s'attendre qu'il le fit jamais, et que rien au monde ne pourroit l'y obliger. Je sais ce que My Ld Bolingbroke a dit à M. l'Abbé Gaultier des lettres qu'il a écrites en ce Pays depuis peu à diverses personnes. Un Ecossais des plus zélés pour luy, après avoir déploré la malheur de ce Prince, a ajouté qu'il en est en partie la cause, par la profession de foy Catolique sans necessité, et ce m'il venoit de voir une lettre dans ce sens entre les mains d'un Jacobite de distinction, qui le prevenoit de ce qui vient arriver, par la reflexion qu'il n'y auroit jamais eu rien a faire pour luy, quand même la Reyne auroit vecu.

VIII. French and Jacobite policy in view of George I's unopposed succession.

(257, f. 314.) Ilberville to K. Louis, August 14, 1714 [N.S.].

[Some Jacobites want Louis to launch Pretender on Scotland. Wiser ones say wait.]

Mylord Bolingbroke m'a averti qu'on m'observoit beaucoup et me priait de me souvenir que l'interest de Votre Majesté et celuy de tout l'Europe exigeoit qu'on ne fournist a vos enenemys aucun prétexte de recommencer la guerre. J'ose assure votre Majesté que je regleray si bien ma conduite et mes discours que je ne donnerai aucune prise aux Wights.

(258, f. 16.) Ilberville to Torcy, August 16, 1714 [N.S.].

M. le Duc d'Ormond avec lequel je fus enfermé deux heures avant hier pense comme my lord Bolingbroke et les autres Jacobites bien sensez que vôtre interest, celuy des Anglois bien intentionnés et celuy mesme du chevalier et celuy de toute l'Europe est qu'il se tienne en repos presentement ; ce sentiment est fondé sur ce que l'on n'a pas vu la moindre demonstration en sa faveur dans tout ce qui s'est passé ici, et qu'il revient de conter qu'il en a esté de mesme dans les Provinces ou les pretendens Jacobites se sont contentés de marquer du regret de la Reyne sans donner aucun signe d'affection pour luy, tres satisfaits de se voir garantis de la guerre civile.

(258.) Ilberville to Torcy, August 28–30, 1714 [N.S.].

M. Bolingbroke ne croit pas qu'il soit absolument impossible au Roy d'Angleterre de se servir de ce qu'il y a de meilleurs sujets dans les deux partys. . . . En faisant cela il pourroit avec le temps faire cesser la division qui reyne entre les Anglois, mais s'il ne le fait pas il doit s'attrendre a voir former une Ligue du party qu'il aura negligé.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

MSS.

Add. MSS. = British Museum, *Additional MSS.* (*B.M.* = British Museum, other collections).

Aff. étr. Ang. = Paris, Foreign Office MSS., Quai d'Orsay, *Affaires étrangères, Correspondance politique Angleterre* (see Appendix E, pp. 336–340 above, and my communication to *English Historical Review*, January 1934).

Althorp MSS. = MSS. belonging to Earl Spencer in Althorp House, Northants. Some papers of Sarah Duchess of Marlborough among others.

Argyle MSS. = Correspondence of the Duke of Argyle from Spain, 1711, in the Cambridge University Library, Add. 6570.

Bodleian MSS. = MSS. in the Bodleian, Oxford.

Chevening MSS. = General Stanhope's Papers at Chevening, belonging to the present Earl Stanhope.

Dartmouth MSS. = MSS. of Lord Dartmouth, property of the Earl of Dartmouth at Patshull, supplemental to the documents from this collection which were printed in *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, 1887.

India Office MSS. = *MSS. in the India Office, Factory Records.*

P.R.O. = *MSS.* in the Public Record Office (*S.P.* = State Papers ; *Tr.* = Transcripts).

Shakerley MSS. = Correspondence to Peter Shakerley, Tory M.P. for Chester (seen by the courtesy of Mr. Arthur Bryant).

Somers MSS. = A collection of Lord Somers' correspondence, public and private, property of the Reigate Corporation (seen by the courtesy of the Steward of Reigate Manor and Dr. W. Hooper of Redhill).

Wake MSS. = Archbishop Wake's MSS. in the Christ Church Library, Oxford.

PRINTED MATTER

Adams = James Truslow Adams, *Revolutionary New England, 1691–1776.*

Ailesbury (Rox.) = *Memoirs of Earl of Ailesbury*, Vol. II (*Roxburgh Club*, 1890).

Arbuthnot = G. A. Aitken, *Life and Works of John Arbuthnot*, 1892.

Ashton = J. Ashton, *Social Life under Queen Anne* (1882).

Atkinson = *Marlborough*, by C. T. Atkinson.

Bacallar = *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire d'Espagne sous le règne de Philippe V*, par D. Vincent Bacallar y Sanua, Marquis San Phelipe. Traduits de l'Espagnol (Amsterdam, 1756).

Berwick = *Mémoires du maréchal de Berwick*, ed. 1778.

Blackader = *Life of Col. Blackader of the Cameronian Regiment*, 1824.

Bol. Letters = *Letters and Correspondence of Lord Bolingbroke*, 4 vols., 1798.

Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht = *Bolingbroke's Defence of the Treaty of Utrecht*, with an Introduction by G. M. Trevelyan (a reprint of Letters VI–VIII of Bolingbroke's *The Study and Use of History*), Cam. Univ. Press, 1932.

Burchett = Josiah Burchett, *Transactions at Sea*, 1720.
Byng Papers = *The Byng Papers* (Navy Records Soc., 1930–31).
Calamy = J. T. Rutt's *Life of Edmund Calamy*, 1830.
Carstares' Letters = *State Papers and Letters addressed to William Carstares*, 1774.
C.H.B.E. = *Cambridge History of the British Empire*.
Chambers = W. and R. Chambers, *Domestic Annals of Scotland*, 1861.
Collet = *Private Letter Books of Joseph Collet, sometime Governor of Fort St. George, Madras*, 1933.
Conduct = *Account of the Conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough* (by herself), 1742.
Cowper = *Private Diary of William, 1st Earl Cowper* (*Rox.* 1833).
Coxe = Archdeacon Coxe, *Memoirs of Marlborough* (page references are to the edition of 1819).
Coxe's Walpole = *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, by William Coxe, Rector of Bemerton (later Archdeacon of Wilts), 1798.
C.S.P. = *Calendar of State Papers* (*Dom.* = Domestic ; *Am.* = America and West Indies ; *Tr.* = Treasury).
Cunningham = W. Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, ed. 1903.
Defoe = Defoe's *Tour through Great Britain*, ed. i, reprint by G. D. H. Cole, 1927.
Dispatches = *Marlborough's Dispatches*, ed. by Sir G. Murray, 1845.
Drake = *Memoirs of Capt. Peter Drake* (Dublin, 1755).
Edgar = Rev. Andrew Edgar, *Old Church Life in Scotland* ; I = 1st series, 1885 ; II = 2nd series, 1886.
Egerton = H. E. Egerton, *Short History of Colonial Policy*, ed. 1920.
E.H.R. = *English Historical Review*.
Feiling = Keith Feiling, *History of the Tory Party*, 1924.
Feldzüge = *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen*, 1879.
Fortescue = Sir John Fortescue, *Hist. of the British Army*, I, 1899.
Geyl = *Nederland's Staatkunde in de Spaansche Successieoorlog*, Prof. Geyl, 1929.
Goslinga = *Mémoires de Sicco van Goslinga*, 1857.
Granville = *Granville the Polite* (Lord Lansdowne), by Elizabeth Handasyde, 1933.
Hamilton = Alexander Hamilton, *A new account of the East Indies*, 1727.
Hanmer = *Correspondence of Sir Thos. Hanmer*, edited by Sir Henry Bunbury, Bart., 1838.
Hedges = *Diary of William Hedges*, Vol. III (Hakluyt Society, 1889), containing contributions to a biography of Thomas Pitt, Governor of Fort St. George.
Hervey, L.B. = *Letter-Books of John Hervey, first Earl of Bristol*, 1894.
H.M.C. = *Historical MSS. Commission* (*R.* = *Report*).
H.C.J. = *House of Commons Journals*.
H.L.J. = *House of Lords Journals*.
H. of L. MSS. = *MSS. of House of Lords*, printed under authority of the *H.M.C.*
Hume Brown, Scotland = P. Hume Brown, *Hist. of Scotland*, 1909.
Kemble = *State Papers from the Revolution to the accession of the House of Hanover*, edited by J. M. Kemble, 1857.
Khan = Shafat Ahmad Khan, *The East India Trade in the 17th century* (Oxford, 1923).
Klopp = Onno Klopp, *Fall des Hauses Stuart*, Wien, 1875–1888.
Lamberty = G. de Lamberty, *Mémoires*, 1736.
Leadam = *Longmans' Political History*, Vol. IX, by J. S. Leadam.
Leake = *Life of Sir John Leake* (Navy Records Soc., 1920).
Lecky, Ireland = Lecky, *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century* (Cabinet edition).
Lediard, Marl. = Thomas Lediard, *Life of Marlborough*, 1736.

Legrelle = A. Legrelle, *La Diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*.
Lockhart = *The Lockhart Papers* (ed. 1817).
Macky, Scotland = *A Journey through Scotland*, John Macky, 2nd ed., 1732.
McLachlan = H. McLachlan, *English Education under the Test Acts* (Manchester, 1931).
Macpherson = James Macpherson, *Original Papers*, 1775.
Mahon = Lord Mahon, *War of the Succession in Spain*, 1836.
Marchmont = *Papers of the Earls of Marchmont*, 1831.
Mathieson = *Scotland and the Union*, William Law Mathieson, 1905.
Matthew Prior = *Matthew Prior*, by L. G. Wickham Legg, 1921.
Mayor = J. E. B. Mayor, *Cambridge under Queen Anne*, 1911.
Michael = Wolfgang Michael, *Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert*, I.
Miller = O. B. Miller, *Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford* (Stanhope Essay, 1925).
Millner = John Millner, *Journal of Marches, etc.*, 1733.
Montgomery = *The Dutch Barrier*, by Geikie and Montgomery, 1930. (The part of this valuable work referred to in this volume was written by Miss Montgomery.)
Murray = R. H. Murray, *Revolutionary Ireland and its Settlement*, 1911.
Parker = Capt. Robert Parker's *Memoirs*, 1746.
Parkman = Francis Parkman, *A Half Century of Conflict* (Centenary edition, 1922), Vol. I.
Parl. Hist. = Cobbett's *Parliamentary History*.
Parnell = Col. Arthur Parnell, *The War of the Succession in Spain*, ed. 1905.
Pelet = General Pelet, *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d'Espagne*, 1835.
Priv. Corr. = *Private Correspondence of the Duchess of Marlborough*, 1838.
Remembrance = *The Remembrance, Scots Brigade in the Netherlands*, Vol. III, 1901.
R.H.S. = *Royal Historical Society* publications.
Rox. = *Roxburgh Club* publications.
Salomon = F. Salomon, *Geschichte des letzten Ministeriums Königin Annas*, 1894.
Somerville, Q. Anne = Thomas Somerville, *History of Great Britain during the Reign of Queen Anne*, 1798.
Swift, Letters = *Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, edited by F. E. Ball, 1911.
Swift, Prose Works = Swift's *Prose Works*, edited by Temple Scott (Bohn's Library, 12 vols.).
Taylor = Frank Taylor, *The Wars of Marlborough*, 1921.
Tindal = Tindal's continuation of *Rapin's History of England*, ed. 1744.
Torcy = *Memoirs of the Marquis of Torcy*, by himself, 2 vols., 1757. Translated from the French.
Verney = *Verney Letters of the Eighteenth Century*, 1928.
Walker = Sir Hovenden Walker, *Journal of the Late Expedition to Canada*, 1720.
Ward's Sophia = A. W. Ward, *The Electress Sophia*, 1909.
Wentworth Papers = *The Wentworth Papers*, 1705–1739, edited by J. J. Cartwright, 1883.
Wheeler = J. T. Wheeler, *Madras in the Olden Time*, 1861.
Wodrow Anal. = *Analecta*, by the Rev. Robert Wodrow (*Maitland Club*, 1842–1843).
Wodrow Corr. = *Correspondence of the Rev. Robert Wodrow*, 1842.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

[1] P. 2. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 87–88 ; G. N. Clark, *Neutral Commerce in the War of the Spanish Succession* in the *British Year Book of International Law*, 1928, pp. 77–78 ; *Burchett*, pp. 726–727.

[2] P. 4. *Villars, Mémoires*, sub 1709 ; *Pelet*, IX, pp. 6–28 ; Lavisse, *Hist. de France*, VIII, pp. 116–118 ; *Blenheim*, p. 321.

[3] P. 4. *Lavisse*, VIII, pp. 115–116 ; *Torcy*, I, pp. 382–407.

[4] P. 5. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, ff. 2–3.

[5] P. 7. *H.M.C. Chequers* (1900), pp. 198–199 ; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 520, 572 ; *Tatler*, No. 59 (original editions) ; *Millner*, pp. 262–274 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 455–483 ; *Villars, Mémoires*, sub 1709 ; *Pelet*, IX, pp. 35–38 ; *Goslinga*, pp. 103–104, asserts that Marlborough wanted to besiege Ypres instead of Tournai, but was overruled.

[6] P. 10. Cf. *Parker*, p. 138, to Orkney in *E.H.R.*, April 1904, p. 318 ; Kane, *Campaigns*, 1745, p. 84.

[7] P. 11. *Villars, Mémoires*, sub 1709 ; *Pelet*, IX, pp. 86–87, 93, 343.

[8] P. 14. *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, p. 319.

[9] P. 15. R. Cannon's *Historical Records, First or Royal Regiment of Foot*, pp. 117–118, 269 ; ditto, *The Buffs*, pp. 160–161.

[10] P. 15. *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, p. 319 ; the absence of any serious resistance by the enemy in defence of the ' redans ' is confirmed by *Blackader*, p. 351, as also by *De la Colonie*, p. 341, on the French side.

[11] P. 16. *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 497, 513–516, 520 ; *Tindal*, IV, 136–137.

[12] P. 16. *Parker*, pp. 138–139.

[13] P. 18. For Malplaquet, see *Feldzüge, Serie* 2, *Band* II, on the German side ; on the French side, *Pelet*, IX and *Villars, Mémoires* and *De la Colonie*, pp. 335–346, and *Feuquières, Mémoires* (1741), IV, pp. 27–48 ; and H. Sautaï, *Bataille de Malplaquet* (French official account, 1904).

Coxe, Chaps. LXXXI–LXXXII ; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 591–597 ; *Parker*, pp. 136–139 ; *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, pp. 316–321 (Orkney, the best single authority) ; *Remembrance*, pp. 485–499 ; *Blackader*, pp. 348–351 ; *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 382–389 ; *Millner*, pp. 271–281 ; *Tindal*, IV, 136–139 (map misleading) ; *Lediard, Marl.*, II, pp. 489–545 ; *More Culloden Papers*, II, p. 15 ; *H.M.C., R.* 5, p. 188 ; *H.M.C. Hare*, p. 229. Dalton, *English Army Lists*, VI, pp. 297–397, the ' Malplaquet roll.'

Goslinga, pp. 108–110, stops short of the battle itself. The Blenheim tapestry, in the manufacture of which the Duke took a special interest, shows the character of the entrenchments ; the Grenadiers' Company in their tall shakos in the front line of the regiment about to attack ; and other details. Of secondary authorities, *Taylor, Atkinson, Fortescue, Belloc* and *Malplaquet*, and *Wars of Marlborough*. For the best modern professional account see Major A. H. Burne in the *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Apr. 1933.

[14] P. 18. *E.H.R.*, Apr. 1904, pp. 320–321.

[15] P. 18. Eugene reported 16,000 to the Kaiser, see *Feldzüge, Serie* 2, *Band* II, *Supplement*, p. 259 ; the official estimate in *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 501, makes it over 18,000.

[16] P. 19. *Priv. Corr.*, II, p. 383 ; *Dispatches*, IV, p. 597.

[17] P. 19. *Lediard, Marl.*, II, p. 501 ; *Millner*, p. 280.

[18] P. 20. *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 387–391 ; *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), p. 881 ; *Hervey, L.B.*, I, pp. 259–260.

[19] P. 21. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 526–527 ; *Hearne's Collections*, II, p. 265 ; Durfey's *Pills*, I, pp. 58–60 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, ff. 271 and 273, L'Hermitage on Whig and Tory attitudes.

[20] P. 21. *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 391–392.

[21] P. 23. *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 475, ff. 128–133, Richards' last letters and papers ; *Tindal*, IV, p. 141 and map opposite ; for the less favourable view of Richards' conduct see *Boyer's Anne* (1735), p. 393, copied in *Chamberlen's Anne* and elsewhere ; *Parnell*, Chap. XXIX. *Parnell*, p. 262, says that Richards wrote on Feb. 25, 1709, to his brother, Col. Michael Richards : ' Goodnight, Micky. God send us a merry meeting.' But, in fact, the word ' goodnight ' refers to the pay for his Portuguese troops and his fear of Portuguese courtiers' avarice : ' I hope you have secur'd the money which I suppose my Major D. Eman. De Barrios has brought from Lisbon for my Regiment's Account, for if that once getts into the hands of the courtiers, good night Nicolas. Pray God send us a merry meeting ' (*B.M. Stowe MSS.* 475, f. 131).

CHAPTER II

[22] P. 28. *Add. MSS.* 9107, f. 91.

[23] P. 29. See the important State Paper in *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 87, 4, ff. 190–207, especially 202–205 (the Dutch answer to the Tories' charges in 1712).

[24] P. 30. See *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 380–381 ; *Geikie*, pp. 147–152, 160–162, 180–182 ; *Feldzüge, Serie* 2, *Band* III, *Supplement*, p. 32, Eugene to Charles, Mar. 26, 1710.

[25] P. 31. Noorden, *Europä. Gesch.*, III, pp. 602–604 ; *Geikie*, pp. 175–184 ; *Dispatches*, IV, pp. 667, 673–674 ; *Klopp*, XIII, p. 351.

[26] P. 34. *Burnet*, V, p. 398 ; *H.M.C. Dartmouth* (1887), p. 300 ; Charles King's *British Merchant* (ed. 1721), III, pp. 19–20 and *passim* ; *Luttrell*, VI, p. 668.

[27] P. 34. For wheat prices 1701–1714, see p. 437 of *Blenheim* ; see also *Verney*, I, p. 278, Jan. 7, 1710.

[28] P. 34. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, f. 38 (*L'Hermitage*).

[29] P. 35. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), p. 197 ; *H.M.C. Downshire* (1924), p. 866 ; Turberville's *Shrewsbury* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 167–169.

[30] P. 36. *Somers MSS.*, copy of Portland's letter of March $\frac{11}{22}$, 1709 [= 1710 ?].

[31] P. 38. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, f. 254 (*L'H.*) ; *H. of L. MSS.* (1708–1710), pp. 285–286 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 780–783 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 96 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 399, 425, VI, pp. 33–35 ; *H.M.C. Verney, R.* 7, p. 507 ; *Leadam*, pp. 141–143 ; *Add. MSS.* 28946, ff. 35–37, on conduct of the Elector Palatine to his Protestant subjects ; *C.S.P., Tr.* (1708–1714), pp. xv–xvi, 257, 267, 331, 475 ; Burton's *Anne*, III, pp. 116, 180–182 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 34, 11, f. 44 ; 14, f. 32. *The Palatines' Catechism* (1709), a fairly impartial discussion of the question. For the Palatines in Ireland see Lecky's *Ireland*, I, pp. 351–352 ; *Murray*, pp. 359–362 ; *Add. MSS.* 35933, ff. 12–20 ; *Irish Commons Journals*, III, pp. 857–861 ; *Somers MSS.* contain a batch of official and semi-official correspondence on the Palatines, that bears out evidence from other sources.

[32] P. 38. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 195–196.

[33] P. 39. *Tatler*, No. 63 ; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 167 note and 190 ; *Journal to*

Stella, July 3, 1711, and Jan. 28, 1712 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 541. Mrs. Manley's letter to Harley of May 10, 1712, implies, I think, that she had not been put on by him to write the *New Atlantis*.

[34] P. 40. *Add. MSS.* 9118, ff. 246–248, 270, Mr. Mainwaring to Sarah, and App. B, p. 327 above, Sarah's note on Somers' letter of June $\frac{6}{17}$, 1710. *Althorp MSS.*, Sarah to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744 ; *Priv. Corr.*, II, pp. 148–161 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 542 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), p. 198.

[35] P. 40. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213.

[36] P. 41. *Coxe*, Chap. III, ed. 1819, pp. 135–136 (end of Chap. LXXXV).

[37] P. 42. Mainwaring's letter to the Duchess of Marlborough, *Add. MSS.* 9118, f. 246.

[38] P. 42. *Conduct*, pp. 224–226 ; *Coxe*, III, ed. 1819, p. 130 (Chap. LXXXV) ; *H.M.C. Marlborough Papers*, *R.* 8, p. 43 ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 83 ; Mrs. Kathleen Campbell's *Sarah Duchess of Marlborough*, pp. 202–204 ; on Abigail's character, see her fellow-Tory Dartmouth's note, in *Burnet*, VI, pp. 32–33 note.

[39] P. 43. The story told by Lord Coningsby (*Archaeologia*, XXXVIII, pp. 9–12), which makes Somers and Godolphin positively treacherous to Marlborough in this matter, lacks confirmation. Sarah never suspected Godolphin of betraying her husband. But as we have Harley's evidence that Somers was intriguing to supplant Godolphin in August 1710, it is possible he may have had the same idea in his head as early as January. See *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213.

[40] P. 43. *Coxe*, Chap. LXXXVI ; *Atkinson*, pp. 414–415 and note ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 102–104 ; *Feiling*, p. 416.

CHAPTER III

[41] P. 46. See App. A, p. 324 above, and *Lansdowne MSS.* 829, ff. 123–125, *Representation by the Lords' Commissioners of the Treasury of the state of the revenue for 1710 : Stats. of Realm* (ed. 1822), IX, pp. 148–243 ; *R.H.S.*, 1910 (Leadam on Godolphin's finance), pp. 22–26 ; *Dowell*, II, pp. 75–76 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 650 ; *Plunder and Bribery, a memorial to the British Parliament* (1712), pp. 35–43, for the sailors' grievances ; *C.S.P., Tr.* 1708–1714, pp. xv, 298, 300, 323, 352, 360–361.

[42] P. 46. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, ff. 374, 389 (L'Hermitage) ; *H.M.C. Coke*, p. 84 ; Ashton, *Social Life in Reign of Anne*, I, pp. 114–116 ; *H.M.C. Rutland*, p. 189 ; *R.H.S.* (1910), pp. 25–26 ; Swift, *Journal to Stella*, Sept. 15, 1710 ; *Verney*, I, p. 291 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 126–129 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 658, Halifax on the lottery.

[43] P. 47. *Hearne's Collections*, II, p. 320, III, p. 65 ; *Blenheim*, pp. 51, 277. See Appendix C, p. 332 above, De Foe's letter to Stanhope on Sacheverell.

[44] P. 48. C. E. Mallet, *History of the University of Oxford*, III, p. 36.

[45] P. 49. Swift, *Memoirs relating to the Change in Queen's Ministry in 1710* ; *Althorp MSS.*, the Duchess's letter to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744 ; Dartmouth's note to *Burnet*, V, p. 429.

[46] P. 50. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 99–100 ; *H.M.C. Townshend*, p. 334 ; *Ailesbury, Mems.*, II, p. 620.

[47] P. 51. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 110–113 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, ff. 401, 418–419, 421–422 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 535 ; *H.M.C. Kenyon*, p. 444 ; *H.M.C. Sackville*, I (1904), p. 35 ; *Burnet*, V, pp. 431–432 [543] ; *Leadam*, p. 166 ; Colley Cibber's *Apology*, 1740, p. 347.

[48] P. 54. Reports of the speeches for and against Sacheverell will be found in *State Trials*, XV, *Parl. Hist.*, VI, and Boyer's *Queen Anne*. For the passages I specially refer to in the text see *State Trials*, XV, pp. 41–43, 79–83, 97, 109–116, 126, 196–201, 225, 364–368. A more out-and-out defence of Sacheverell can be found in Smalridge's *Thoughts of a country gentleman upon reading Dr. Sacheverell's tryal* (1710). For moderate Tory comment on Harcourt's speech see *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 533–535.

[49] P. 54. Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), p. 433.

[50] P. 55. *State Trials*, XV, p. 97.

[51] P. 55. *A Hundred Years of Quarter Sessions ; the government of Middlesex 1660 to 1710*, E. G. Dowdell (1932), pp. 19–24.

[52] P. 57. *State Trials*, XV, pp. 521–702 ; Ned Ward's *Vulgus Britannicus* [*sic*] *or the British Hudibras*, 1710, very curious ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 533–534 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 34, 12, ff. 5, 14, 16 ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 416–417 ; Andréadès, *History of the Bank of England*, p. 126 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, ff. 418–419, 421–422 ; *Calamy*, II, p. 228.

[53] P. 58. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 537–538 ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 443–444 ; *Coxe*, Chap. LXXXVII (III, pp. 162–164, ed. 1819).

[54] P. 58. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, p. 468 ; J. E. B. Mayor, *Cambridge under Queen Anne*, p. 384 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 539, 550 ; *Leadam*, p. 169 ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 34, 12, ff. 1, 43 ; *Ailesbury, Memoirs*, II, p. 621 ; Bisset's *Modern Fanatick* (Dec. 1710), pp. 4–8.

[55] P. 59. *H.M.C. Coke*, pp. 84–101 ; *H.M.C. Ailesbury* (*R.* 15, App. 7, 1898), pp. 201–202 ; *Ailesbury* (*Rox.*), p. 621 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 537. For the furies of the Sacheverell controversy see the Rev. William Bisset's *Modern Fanatick* [= Sacheverell] and the *Letter in answer to the Modern Fanatick* ; *The Priest turned Poet* (a rhyming parody of Sacheverell's sermon). *The Dialogue of a Sacheverelite Parson and a Hoadlean Gentleman, or Both Sides Pleased*, is more decently written than most of the pamphlets on either side.

CHAPTER IV

[56] P. 63. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, pp. 219 ; *Feiling*, pp. 418–420 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 133 ; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 11–12, Onslow's note ; *Faults on Both Sides* (1710), expressing ' moderate ' views.

[57] P. 63. *Priv. Corr.*, I, pp. 295–298, Sarah's first record of the interview, from which I think she must have drawn her account in *Conduct*, pp. 236–245 ; Mrs. Campbell's *Sarah Duchess of Marlborough*, pp. 207–210. I note that Sarah's epitomes of the Queen's letters of April 1710, printed in italics on pp. 237 and 238 of the *Conduct*, are true representations of the actual letters, which can be found in the *Althorp MSS.*

[58] P. 64. *Conduct*, pp. 248–253 ; *Priv. Corr.*, I, pp. 305–306, II, pp. 421–423 ; Turberville's *Shrewsbury*, pp. 171–175 ; *Coxe*, Chaps. LXXXIX–XC ; *Burnet*, VI, p. 7, Hardwicke's note.

[59] P. 65. *Burnet*, VI, p. 8, Dartmouth's note ; *Coxe*, Chap. XCI ; Coxe's *Walpole*, II, pp. 24–30 ; *Conduct*, pp. 257–259. Onslow's note in *Burnet*, VI, pp. 11–12, is interesting, but lacks confirmation ; the correspondence of the Whig leaders themselves, such as we have, does not indicate that they would have refused to meet Harley half-way if he had really made such offers as Onslow says.

[60] P. 66. Coxe's *Walpole*, II, p. 31, Marlborough's letter of July 5, 1710.

[61] P. 67. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213.

[62] P. 68. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 550, 562, 584–585, 597, 616, 629–631.

[63] P. 68. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 213 ; *Cowper*, p. 43.

[64] P. 69. *Althorp MSS.*, the Duchess to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744.

[65] P. 69. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 618–624, 635–636 ; Atkinson's *Marlborough*, pp. 431–434 ; Moderate Tory Pamphlet, *Reasons why the Duke of Marlborough cannot lay down his command*, Aug. 1710 ; see *Add. MSS.* 9110, f. 92, for Shrewsbury's continued protestations of friendship to Marlborough, end of August 1710 : ' He did confess there were a great many things that might make the D. of Marlborough uneasy, but hoped for all that he would have no other thought but going on,' *viz.*, as commander in the field.

[66] P. 69. See *Blenheim*, pp. 206–207 ; *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 163–164 ; *P.R.O.* T., 38, 737, and 48, 15 give at regular intervals the names of the Treasury clerks. The continuity of Treasury personnel through the changes of Ministry is remarkable.

[67] P. 70. See Appendix A, p. 324 above ; *Lansdowne MSS.* (*B.M.*) 829, ff. 123–135 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 545, 637 ; *R.H.S.* (1910), pp. 26–31, Leadam on Harley's finance.

[68] P. 70. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 551, 579, 590, 592, 599, 608, 611, 632 ; *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 300 ; *Dartmouth MSS.*, letter of Duke of Beaufort to Dartmouth, Sept. 21, 1710 : ' I find that not having the list of Deputy Lieutenants with the Queen's approbation will be of ill consequence to our elections.'

[69] P. 70. *H.M.C. Bath*, III (1908), p. 437 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, II, p. 219, IV, pp. 551–552, 561, 578 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, f. 595.

[70] P. 71. Nichols (John), *Literary Anecdotes*, I, pp. 396–397, VIII, p. 369 ; *Notes and Queries* (3rd ser.), III, p. 409.

[71] P. 71. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 151 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 607 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, III, p. 440 ; *H.M.C. Downshire*, p. 903.

[72] P. 72. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 612–613 ; *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), pp. xvii, 258–259.

[73] P. 72. As to the two members returned by Newcastle for Boroughbridge, we know Stapylton was a Tory (*B.M. Stowe MSS.* 223, f. 454), and we know Peyton was a Tory at that time in fact, whatever he may have been sometimes called (*B.M. Lansdowne MSS.* 1236, f. 255). For Aldborough see *Portland*, IV, p. 612, where he put in Monkton and Jessop, both Whigs.

[74] P. 72. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 149 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 592 ; *H.M.C. Aylesbury* (1898), pp. 201–202 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, ff. 595, 641 ; *Cowper*, p. 50.

[75] P. 72. *Bodleian MSS. Ballard* 15, f. 96.

[76] P. 72. *H.M.C. Coke*, pp. 88–100.

[77] P. 73. *H.M.C. Downshire*, p. 903 ; Basil Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 125–127 ; J. E. B. Mayor's *Cambridge under Queen Anne*, p. 396 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *DDD*, ff. 615, 671 ; *Granville*, pp. 109, 121, 127.

[78] P. 74. In *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 223, ff. 453–456, is a very interesting list of Whigs, Tories and a few ' Doubtfuls.' It is not wholly accurate, and can be contrasted with the list of the Parliament elected in 1705 (*Stowe MSS.* 354, f. 161), where the Members are grouped in a number of different categories, and with the passage in *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 291, where Harley analyzes that Parliament of 1705. Compare also the list (again not wholly accurate) of Tories, ' Whimsical ' Tories and Whigs as then divided on the Commercial Treaty with France in 1713, given at the end of *Letter from a Member etc. on the Bill of Commerce* (1713). *Feiling*, p. 422, without being inaccurate, uses words that leave an impression of Whig defeat in Cornwall and Bucks greater than was actually the case, and his suggestion on p. 423 that the Tory majority was about three to one makes it too big. It was nearer two to one.

CHAPTER V

[79] P. 76. *Coxe*, III, Chap. LXXXIV (ed. 1819, pp. 122–123) ; *R.H.S.*, *British Diplomatic Instruction, Sweden*, pp. xiv–xvi, 40–47, and *ditto, Denmark*, pp. xi, 31–33. On England's Baltic policy see *Blenheim*, pp. 9–10, and *Ramillies and the Union*, pp. 288–293.

[80] P. 77. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 177.

[81] P. 79. *Add. MSS.* (*B.M.*) 9117, ff. 155–159, Stanhope's dispatch to Walpole. It had been printed in *Somerville, Q. Anne*, p. 637, but wrongly in one very important word ; the *Stowe MS.* shows that Somerville's ' a little hill *behind* us ' should be ' *between* us.' See also *Mahon*, pp. cxxi–cxxvi, Lenoir's Journal ; B. Williams' *Stanhope* ; *Parnell*, Chap. XXXI ; *Tindal*, IV, p. 176 ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 459–461 ; *Bacallar*, II, pp. 336–341. The narrative printed in Tindal shows that Parnell is wrong in implying that the killing of the Spanish General by Stanhope is not mentioned by anyone who took part in the battle. Moreover, Queen Anne presented Stanhope with a gold medal, commemorating the event, which she would scarcely have done if it had not really occurred. It is now at Chevening.

[82] P. 79. St. Simon established the date of Vendôme's commission and departure as prior to the arrival of the news of Saragossa at the French Court.

[83] P. 81. B. Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 96–97 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 638–639 ; *Tindal*, IV, p. 178 (a personal narrative) ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 461–462 (Col. Harrison's narrative) ; *Mahon*, pp. 305–312 and cxv–cxvi Appendix ; *Bacallar*, II, pp. 345–354 (confuses right and left wings, but important on the morale of the Spanish army before the battle) ; *cp.* Dalton, *Army Lists*, VI, p. 385.

[84] P. 82. Geikie, *The Dutch Barrier*, p. 138, letter of Aug. 26, 1709.

[85] P. 84. *Ailesbury* (*Rox.*), II, p. 629.

[86] P. 84. *Bacallar*, II, pp. 314–400 ; B. Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 100–105 ; *Mahon*, pp. 314–330 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 401–402. On the plundering and outrages by the Allies we need not believe all the stories in *Bacallar*, but they give the Spanish point of view, and are to some extent confirmed by Col. M. Richards' letter to Craggs printed in Appendix D, p. 334 above.

[87] P. 84. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 25, 1710, referring to a conversation ' two months ago ' ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 152 ; B. Williams' *Stanhope* on the intention to replace him by Argyle, entertained before Brihuega.

[88] P. 87. For Brihuega see B. Williams' *Stanhope*, which gives far the best account of it from a careful collation of all sources. See also *Stowe MSS.* (*B.M.*) 476, ff. 2–4 ; *Add. MSS.* 9117, ff. 172–177, printed in *Mahon*, App., pp. cxvii–cxx ; *Coxe*, Chap. XCVI, note at end of chapter for General Pepper's accusations against Stanhope, on which see B. Williams ; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 180–181 ; *Bacallar*, II, pp. 405–420 ; *Klopp*, XIII, p. 544 ; *cp.* Dalton, *Army Lists*, VI, pp. 386–387, for English prisoners taken ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 465–466, and see App. D, p. 335 above.

[89] P. 88. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 230, Gaultier's letters to Torcy of Oct. 7 (N.S.) and Dec. 23 (N.S.), 1710.

CHAPTER VI

[90] P. 90. *Bol. Letters*, III, p. 78 ; *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 240, f. 79 (printed App. to Chap. XIII, p. 231 above), Gaultier's letter to Torcy, Oct. 29, 1712 (N.S.).

[91] P. 91. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 218.

[92] P. 91. *Salomon*, p. 249, note 3, Jan. 28, 1714.

[93] P. 91. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, Jacobite correspondence 1712–14 ; *Salomon*, pp. 331–343 ; *H.M.C. Stuart Papers* (1902) ; *Add. MSS.* (*B.M.*) 31255, ff. 6–15 ; *Macpherson*, II, p. 525.

[94] P. 92. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 511–517.

[95] P. 93. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 230, ff. 205–323, especially f. 319 (see excerpts in my article in the *E.H.R.*, Jan. 1934). Some of these important letters between Torcy and Gaultier, July–Oct. 1710 *et seq.*, were transcribed by Mackintosh from the archives in Paris, and the transcripts are now in the British Museum, *Add. MSS.* 34493 ; *Legrelle*, IV, p. 583.

[96] P. 93. *Macpherson*, II, pp. 187, 202–203 ; *Stowe MSS.* (*B.M.*) 223, ff. 448–449 ; *Cowper*, p. 49.

[97] P. 93. *Macpherson*, II, p. 264, Nov. 7, 1711. Buckingham is sometimes called Buckinghamshire, as he was Duke of the County of Buckingham. *Ward's Sophia*, pp. 399–401 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 126.

[98] P. 93. *Ward's Sophia, passim* ; *Coxe's Walpole*, II, p. 32 ; *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 224, 225, Raby's letters to the Electress, *e.g.* 224, ff. 303–305, and other correspondence between Hanover and England ; and see *Macpherson* for 1710–12.

[99] P. 94. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 630, V, pp. 42, 78 ; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 239, 258 ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), pp. 511–513 ; *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 235, ff. 286–287.

[100] P. 95. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 536. The letter refers to the Secretaryship at War, which St. John had formerly held, which Walpole held then, and was at one moment intended for Cardonnel.

[101] P. 95. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. iii, 231–232, 234–235 ; Dartmouth's note to *Burnet*, VI, p. 45.

[102] P. 95. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 152 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 640, 658, 674–675, 687, V, pp. 115–116, 120, 125.

[103] P. 97. *Journal to Stella*, Feb. 18, Mar. 4, 1711 ; see also *Leadam*, p. 180 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 161, 180, on the impeachments demanded by the October Club, especially its younger members. A good account of the differences between Harley and the October Club as to policy in 1710–11 will be found in *Lockhart*, I, pp. 322–324.

[104] P. 98. On the First-Fruits and Twentieths see *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 609–610 ; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 201–203, 212–213 ; *Add. MSS.* 4804, f. 32, Swift's commission from the Irish bishops to deal with the First-Fruits question, Aug. 31, 1710.

[105] P. 99. *Journal to Stella*, Sept. 9 and 30, Nov. 8 ; *Swift, Letters*, I, p. 194.

[106] P. 100. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 641.

[107] P. 100. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 94, Sept. 1711.

[108] P. 103. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1025–1026 and note ; *H.M.C. Clements* (1913), p. 251 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 185 ; *Luttrell*, Mar. 8, 1711 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, f. 204. The 'penny post' operated within the London area, see *Blenheim*, p. 91.

[109] P. 103. *H.M.C. Clements*, p. 251 ; *Hervey, L.B.*, I, p. 301.

[110] P. 104. *Hervey, L.B.*, I, pp. 287, 290 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 166, 172.

[111] P. 104. *Somers MSS.*

[112] P. 105. *Spectator*, No. 3, Mar. 3, 1711 ; W. R. Scott, *Joint Stock Companies*, III, pp. 283, 293.

CHAPTER VII

[113] P. 107. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 928–932 ; *Cowper*, pp. 49–50.

[114] P. 107. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1000, 1001, 1014 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 657 ; *H.C.J.*, XVI, pp. 471, 610, 611 ; *H.L.J.*, XIX, pp. 284, 287.

[115] P. 108. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1016–1019 ; *Leadam*, p. 180 ; *Stella*, Apr. 27, 1711 ; *Swift's Letters*, I, pp. 74 and 253 and notes ; *Coxe's Walpole*, I, pp. 32–36 ; *The Debts of the Nation Considered* and *The Thirty-five Millions accounted for*, two pamphlets of 1711.

[116] P. 108. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 167 ; *H.C.J.*, XVI, pp. 432, 440 ; *Burnet*, VI, p. 36, Onslow's note ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 103–104. The full title of the Qualification Act is 'An Act for securing the freedom of Parliaments by the farther qualifying the members to sit in the House of Commons.'

[117] P. 109. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 637, 662–663.

[118] P. 109. *Wentworth Papers*, p. 167.

[119] P. 109. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *EEE*, ff. 103–104 ; Swift, *Examiner* No. 35 (No. 34 in the reprint) ; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 35–36.

[120] P. 110. Muralt's *Letters on the English*, translated from the French ed. 1726, p. 9.

[121] P. 112. Spencer Walpole, *Hist. of England*, Chap. V (ed. 1902, Vol. I, pp. 388–390).

[122] P. 112. On the subject of the new London churches I am grateful for help from Mr. H. M. Walton, of Queens' College, Cambridge, who has made a special study of the affair. See *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1004–1005, 1012–1013 ; *Tindal*, IV, p. 208 ; *H.C.J.*, Apr. 6, 1711 ; *Strype's Stow's London* (1720), Bk. V, pp. 52–53 ; J. E. Smith, *St. John the Evangelist, Westminster* (1892), Chap. II ; William Maitland, *History of London* (1756), I, p. 509 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 159, 195, 237.

[123] P. 113. On the debates see *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 935–993 ; *Luttrell*, VI, pp. 677–678 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 170–179 ; *Account of Earl of Galway's Conduct in Spain*, 1711.

[124] P. 113. *Lansdowne MSS.* (*B.M.*) 1236, f. 261.

[125] P. 114. Argyle's letters from Spain will be found in the Cambridge University Library (Add. 6570). Quotations from them are made in a communication by Professor Temperley to the *Cambridge Hist. Journal*, 1924. In the MSS. themselves, *sub* July 2, 1711, will be found details of the quarrel of Charles and the Catalans. See also *H.M.C. Eliot-Hodgkin* (1897), pp. 86–87 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 687, V, pp. 17, 240–241 ; Robert Campbell's *Life of Argyle* (1745), pp. 69–72 ; *Burnet*, VI, p. 55, Dartmouth's note.

[126] P. 114. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 656.

[127] P. 115. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 162–165 ; *Tindal*, IV, p. 195.

[128] P. 115. *Coxe's Walpole*, II, pp. 36–37 ; Bolingbroke, *Study and Use of History*, Letter VII ; *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 327 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 656.

[129] P. 115. *Tindal*, IV, p. 196 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 623–624 ; *H.M.C. Bath* I (1904), pp. xi, 203–207 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 177–178 ; *Cowper*, pp. 49–52 ; *Coxe*, Chaps. XCVIII–XCIX.

[130] P. 116. Sarah's defence will be found in full in *Add. MSS.* 9121, ff. 1–20, written while she was abroad in 1712 or 1713. See also *Conduct*, pp. 263, 272–316 ; Churchill's *Marlborough*, I, p. 563 ; *Coxe*, Chap. XCVIII ; *Letters of Duchess of Marlborough*, 1875 (to Mr. Jennings, Dec. 4, 1710), pp. 18–24, 123–125 ; *Other Side of the Question*, 1742 (Tory answer to *Conduct*), p. 465 ; Mrs. Campbell's *Sarah Duchess of Marlborough*, 1932 (the best biography of her), pp. 216–228 ; see *H.M.C. Buccleugh* (1899), I, pp. 360–361, for a detail of Sarah's official accounts.

[131] P. 117. *Althorp MSS.* Sarah's letter to Mr. Mallet, Sept. 24, 1744. Lord Cowper 'came to see me twice a week, though the Queen had servants [in St. James's Palace] that had windows into my court of Marlborough House that saw him. And when I went out of England he sometimes wrote to me.'

[132] P. 118. *Burnet*, VI, p. 32, notes by Dartmouth and Onslow ; Sir C. Firth,

Dean Swift and Ecclesiastical Preferment, reprinted from *Review of English Studies* of Jan. 1926, by Sidgwick and Jackson, a masterly and decisive piece on Swift's fortunes. Swift's attack on the Duchess of Somerset, the *Windsor Prophecy*, will be found among his Poems, and the reader will be able to understand its references to Thynne and Koningsmark if he reads the article on the Duke of Somerset in the *Dic. of Nat. Biog.*, or consults *State Trials*, Vol. IX, pp. 1–128. See also *Swift's Prose Works* (ed. T. Scott), V, p. 463, and *Stella* journal for Dec. 1711.

133 P. 118. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 464, and pp. 311, 326, 360, 369.

134 P. 119. *Portland*, IV, pp. 656, 675–676, V, pp. 464–465, 655 ; *Leadam*, pp. 182–183 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VII, pp. 188–190.

135 P. 120. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, pp. 666–670, V, p. 655, 'dying request,' etc. ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 185–187 ; *Stella*, Mar. 8–25, *passim* ; *Examiner*, No. 33 (32 in the reprint), *Swift's Prose Works*, IX, pp. 207–214 ; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 39–40 (Dartmouth's note) ; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 201–202 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, f. 142 ; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 238–242.

136 P. 121. *Stella*, Mar. 8, 1711 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 655 ; *Luttrell*, VI, p. 700 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1006–1009.

137 P. 121. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 674.

138 P. 123. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 189–190 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 140, 155–156, 161, 167.

139 P. 124. On the South Sea Act see *Add. MSS.* 17677 *EEE*, ff. 178, 193–194, 216 ; W. R. Scott, *Joint Stock Companies to 1720*, III, pp. 291–298 ; E. S. Roscoe, *Robert Harley* (1902), pp. 145–151 ; *R.H.S.* (1910), pp. 28–32 (*Godolphin's Finance*) ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1021–1023 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 158, on the Dutch attitude.

140 P. 127. Monk's *Bentley*, I, pp. 282, 289, 308–309, 334, 356.

141 P. 127. For Atterbury at Christ Church see *H.M.C. Portland*, VII *passim* (the quotation is from p. 137), but compare it with Chap. VI of Beeching's *Atterbury* ; Dartmouth's note to *Burnet*, VI, p. 165, on the Queen's attitude to Atterbury and Sacheverell.

142 P. 128. *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 299.

143 P. 128. *H.M.C. Kenyon*, p. 447.

CHAPTER VIII

144 P. 133. *Lansdowne MSS.* (*B.M.*) 1236, f. 259. The 'project' there mentioned is the siege of Le Quesnoy (Letter of Oct. 2, 1711).

145 P. 133. For the forcing of the Lines and taking of Bouchain see *Fortescue*, I, pp. 540–548 ; *Atkinson*, pp. 439–453 ; *Coxe*, Chaps. CII–CIV ; *Pelet*, X, pp. 419–421 and *passim* ; *Parker*, pp. 149–170 ; *H.M.C. Hare*, pp. 232–233 ; *Marchmont*, II, pp. 77–79 ; *Goslinga*, pp. 126–136 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 643–647 ; *Lediard, Marl.*, III, pp. 132–192 ; *Millner*, pp. 315–341 ; *Dispatches*, V, pp. 428–437 ; *Bouchain, a dialogue between the late Medley and Examiner*, 1711.

CHAPTER IX

146 P. 138. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 199–200 ; *C.S.P., America 1702–3*, p. 673 ; *Egerton*, Bk. II, Chap. IV, and *Adams*, Chaps. I–VI *passim*.

147 P. 138. *Parkman*, p. 161.

148 P. 139. Wyatt Tilby, *The American Colonies 1585–1763*, p. 216. Some contemporary estimates put the number in French Canada even lower ; see *C.S.P., America 1708–9*, pp. 41–45, 163–164, and *ditto, 1710–11*, pp. 329–331.

149 P. 140. See J. Nelson's letter to Shrewsbury in *H.M.C. Buccleugh* II, 2 (1903), pp. 724–729, 734 ; *C.S.P., America 1708–09*, pp. 163–164 ; *C.H.B.E.*, VI, Chaps. III and IV (pp. 79–81).

150 P. 141. For the Indian war in the Southern colonies see *C.S.P., America 1711–12*, pp. 277–281.

151 P. 141. *Parkman*, p. 126 ; *Adams*, pp. 71–81.

152 P. 142. *Add. MSS.* (*B.M.*) 32694, ff. 108–130.

153 P. 143. *Parkman*, Chaps. VI–VII ; *Tatler*, No. 171 ; *Spectator*, Nos. 50, 56, and note p. 336, Vol. I, ed. of 1897 ; *Adams*, pp. 77–81 ; *Burnet*, VI, p. 61 ; Dartmouth's note ; *C.S.P., America 1710–11*, pp. vii–xii and *passim*. On the plans of the Godolphin Ministry to take Quebec in 1709–10 see *Add. MSS.* (*B.M.*) 32694, ff. 108–136 ; *C.H.B.E.*, VI, pp. 85–86.

154 P. 143. Letter of Jan. 17, 1711, *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 656.

155 P. 144. *Macpherson*, II, p. 530.

156 P. 145. See Major Livingstone's report on the garrison and defences of Quebec, *C.S.P., America 1710–11*, pp. v–vii, 329–331.

157 P. 146. *C.S.P., America 1711–12*, with Cecil Headlam's excellent Preface, prints most of the relative documents about the Quebec expedition, including the Journals of Hill, Vetch and King, referred to by *Parkman*, p. 182 note. See also *Walker, passim*, especially pp. 124–125 and 275–280. Walker was hardly treated in the reign of George I, but his mismanagement of the expedition is made clear, even on his own evidence. See also *Parkman*, Chap. VIII ; *Add. MSS.* (*B.M.*) 32694, ff. 101–107 ; *Adams*, pp. 81–83 ; *Burchett*, pp. 778–781 ; *Leake*, II pp. 364–367 ; Boyer's *Q. Anne* (1735), pp. 507–510 (on which the account in Chamberlen's *Q. Anne* is based) ; *Lediard, Naval Hist.* (1735), II, pp. 851–856 ; *C.S.P., America 1710–11*, pp. 329, 556–560. On Nicholson's expedition see *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 89.

158 P. 146. *Cunningham*, pp. 281–282 ; *C.S.P., America 1702–3*, p. 80 ; *ditto, 1708–9*, p. 305 ; *ditto, 1711–12*, pp. 178–179.

159 P. 146. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 78, 173 (*France* 1699–1704), ff. 234–243 ; *C.S.P., America 1702*, pp. xliv–xlv, 441–442 ; *ditto, 1711–12*, pp. 17–18.

160 P. 146. *Boyer's Q. Anne* (1735), pp. 51–52 ; *C.S.P., America 1704–5*, pp. 32–33.

161 P. 147. *C.S.P., America 1708–9*, pp. xxxi, xxxv, 122–123, 318.

162 P. 147. *C.H.B.E.*, I, p. 267 ; *C.S.P., America 1708–9*, p. 212.

163 P. 147. *H.M.C. Verney, R.* 7, p. 508.

164 P. 147. *C.S.P., America 1702–3*, p. 817 ; *ditto, 1708–9*, p. 47.

165 P. 149. *Luttrell*, Mar. 5, 1701–2.

166 P. 150. *C.S.P., America 1708–9*, p. 212 ; see *ditto*, pp. xvi–xvii, 177–179, 209–213 ; and *ditto, 1710–11*, pp. xvii, 352–353 ; *H.C.J.*, XVI, pp. 275–276 ; *Cunningham*, p. 278 note ; Ch. Davenant's *Works*, ed. 1771, V, his *Reflections on the African Trade* ; *H.M.C. Kenyon* (1894), pp. 432–433 ; *Egerton*, pp. 109–111 ; *C.H.B.E.*, I, Chaps. XI and XV ; *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 78, 153, f. 267. Above all I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the late Miss Thora Stone, and to her thesis (in the University Library, London), *The Struggle for Power on the Senegal and the Gambia 1660–1713*.

167 P. 151. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 87, 4, f. 94.

168 P. 151. *P.R.O.* (S.P.) 105, 178, *Levant Co. Chancery Register 1702–7, passim* for the system at work ; *R.H.S.* (1927), *Diplomatic Service under William III*, pp. 96–97 ; *Cunningham*, p. 252 ; De Foe's *English Tradesman* (1727), II, ii, p. 65 ; *H.M.C., R.* 10, App. IV (1885), p. 414, Mr. Salwey's MSS.

169 P. 152. *H.M.C. Portland*, II, pp. i, xi, 256–259 ; *H.M.C., R.* 10, App. IV (1885), pp. 414–415 ; *Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's Letters* from Turkey, 1717.

[170] P. 154. *Wheeler*, I, pp. 358–406, II, pp. 17–18 ; Basil Williams' *Chatham*, Vol. I, Chap. I ; *India Office MSS.* (Pitt's diary, *Fort St. George Records* for 1702). From Pitt's letter of Nov. 8, six months after the raising of the siege (*Hedges*, p. lxxix), it would seem he had not paid the 20,000 rupees, presumably because this was conditional on certain restorations that had not been fulfilled. For the Treaty that ended the siege see *Wheeler*, I, p. 405. For an account of Madras towards the close of Anne's reign see *Hamilton*, I, pp. 358–368 ; he declares that there were 500 Europeans and as many as 80,000 Indians in the Company's Madras territory. The Indians were sometimes estimated at an even higher figure.

[171] P. 154. *Wheeler*, II, p. 21.

[172] P. 154. *Factory Records of the E.I. Co. preserved in India Office* (1897), p. viii, gives a list of the factories of this period ; *Collet, passim*, on Fort York.

[173] P. 155. *Hamilton*, I, pp. 372–377.

[174] P. 155. *India Office MSS., Fort St. George*, 12, list at end of vol. ; *Collection of Letters from the Protestant Missionaries in the East Indies*, Pt. III (1718), p. 187.

[175] P. 156. *H.M.C. Fortescue* (1892), pp. 38, 48–49 ; B. Williams' *Chatham*, I, pp. 20–22 ; *Hedges*, pp. cxxv–cxl ; Henry Dodwell, *Report of the Madras Records* ; *Bombay in the days of Queen Anne*, Hakluyt Soc., 1933, pp. xvi–xxiii, 12–13, 25 ; *Collet*, pp. xiv, xxii–xxiii and *passim*, for Sumatra and Madras, E.I.C., life and death and Collet's career.

[176] P. 156. *India Office MSS., Fort St. George*, 12, end of the volume.

[177] P. 157. *East India Co. trading to China*, H. B. Morse, Vol. I, *passim* ; *H.M.C. Rutland* (1889), p. 165 ; *Early English Intercourse with Burmah*, D. G. Hall (1928), Chap. X.

[178] P. 159. *H.M.C. Fortescue*, pp. 36–37, 52 ; B. Williams' *Chatham*, I, p. 23.

CHAPTER X

[179] P. 164. See *Lecky, Ireland*, Vol. I, Chap. II, and *Murray*, Chap. IX, on the Penal Laws.

[180] P. 165. *P.R.O. (Tr.) Rome*, 101.

[181] P. 165. *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 31248, ff. 139–142.

[182] P. 165. Bp. Mant's *Hist. of Church of Ireland* (1840), II, p. 212.

[183] P. 166. *Add. MSS. (B.M.)* 20311, ff. 68–74.

[184] P. 166. *H.M.C. Egmont*, II (1909), p. 209.

[185] P. 167. *Lecky, Ireland*, Vol. I, Chap. II, pp. 282–283, ed. 1902.

[186] P. 168. *H. of L. MSS.* (1702–1704), pp. xxxv–xxxvi, 343–351.

[187] P. 170. *Davenant's Works* (1771), II, p. 250, ' Of the Land of England.'

[188] P. 171. *H.C.J. Ireland* (Dublin, 1753), Oct. 20, 1703, and July 9, 1707 ; *Murray*, pp. 335–339, for Archbishop King's views on Union ; *Lecky, Ireland*, I, pp. 442–444 ; *H.M.C., R.* 2, App., p. 244, Annesley's letter of 1706 ; W. Molyneux, *Case of Ireland's being bound by Acts of Parliament in England.*

[189] P. 173. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 254–255, 339–340 ; *Swift, Letters*, I, pp. 126–127, footnote on Drogheda ; *Leadam*, p. 72 ; Swift, *Letter concerning the Sacramental Test*, 1708.

[190] P. 173. *Lecky, Ireland*, II, pp. 426–427 ; Mant, *Church of Ireland* (1840), II, pp. 333–334.

[191] P. 174. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 65, 239–240.

[192] P. 174. *H.M.C., R.* 7 (*Egmont Papers*, I), p. 238 (Feb. 23, 1713).

[193] P. 175. *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 241–246 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 339–340, 370–371, 377 top ; *Feiling*, p. 462 ; *Leadam*, p. 214 ; Turberville's *Shrewsbury*, pp. 197–205.

[194] P. 175. *Lecky, Ireland*, I, p. 429.

CHAPTER XI

[195] P. 176. *Parl. Hist.*, VII, p. ciii, ' First Proposals of France,' dated Apr. 22, 1711.

[196] P. 178. *Berwick*, II, p. 127.

[197] P. 179. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, f. 44.

[198] P. 180. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 201–202 ; *Bol. Letters*, I. pp. 172–174.

[199] P. 180. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, f. 43.

[200] P. 180. *Klopp*, XIV, p. 673, App. I, *Archiv der Stadt Hannover.*

[201] P. 183. For Torcy's account of Prior's visit see *E.H.R.*, July 1915 (Mr. Wickham Legg's printing of *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 233, ff. 43–58), and *Torcy*, II, pp. 128–136. Prior's account is in *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 34–42. See also Mr. Wickham Legg's excellent life of *Matthew Prior* (1921), pp. 149–161 ; see also *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, ff. 87–88 ; for Prior's refusal to be drawn into the Jacobite intrigue see *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 505–507, and *Matthew Prior*, pp. 217–218.

[202] P. 184. See Bolingbroke's autograph letters in *Aff. étr. Ang., passim* ; *Torcy*, II, p. 153.

[203] P. 184. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, ff. 243–248, 251–258 ; *Torcy*, II, pp. 155–156.

[204] P. 184. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 233, pp. 208–210 ; *Matthew Prior*, pp. 163–164 ; *Bol. Letters*, I, pp. 375–376 note ; *Torcy*, II, pp. 154, 168 (viz. the second 168, pagination wrong in this edition).

[205] P. 185. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 36 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I, pp. 228–229 ; *C.S.P., America 1711–12*, pp. vi–ix, 254, 256–257 ; *C.H.B.E.*, VI, pp. 87, 136–138 ; *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 380 note. The actual details of the French fishing rights on the Newfoundland shore were settled only in the final Treaty. The preliminaries of Oct. 1711 left the question open.

[206] P. 186. *Bol. Letters*, I, p. 337 ; *Torcy*, II, p. 165 ; *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 210–214 ; *E.H.R.*, Oct. 1932, pp. 646–647.

[207] P. 186. The preliminary articles are printed in *Parl. Hist.*, VII, pp. cvii–cxiv, and *Bol. Letters*, I, pp. 374–381, 403–406 and notes.

[208] P. 187. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 158–159.

CHAPTER XII

[209] P. 189. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 108, 115–116, 120.

[210] P. 189. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 672–677, from *Archiv der Stadt Hannover.*

[211] P. 190. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 688–692, *Mémoire instructif pour le Baron de Bothmar*, Nov. 7, 1711 ; *Ward's Sophia*, pp. 400–401 ; *Salomon*, p. 125 ; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 263–264.

[212] P. 191. *Bol. Letters*, I, pp. 246–247, Letter to Earl of Orrery, June 12, 1711.

[213] P. 193. *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, p. 79.

[214] P. 193. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 119.

[215] P. 194. See *Blenheim*, pp. 206–207 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 365–366.

[216] P. 194. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 120, Halifax' letter to Oxford of Dec. 2, 1711.

[217] P. 194. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 120, Oxford's letter to Somerset, Dec. 1, 1711.

[218] P. 194. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 119, Poulett to Oxford, Nov. 1711.

[219] P. 195. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, f. 10.

[220] P. 196. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 5, 8, 9, 1711.

[221] P. 197. *Burnet*, VI, p. 87, Dartmouth's note.

222 P. 197. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, f. 17.

223 P. 198. *Burnet*, VI, p. 88 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 263 ; Colley Cibber's *Apology* for his Life (1740), p. 134 ; Mrs. Barry died in 1713.

224 P. 199. Coxe's *Walpole*, Chap. VI ; *H.C.J.*, XVII, pp. 29–30, 128 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1067–1068 ; G. R. Stirling Taylor's *Walpole*, pp. 114–119 ; *Case of Mr. Walpole in a letter from a Tory Member ; Leadam*, p. 191 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, f. 30 ; *Parade of the Triumphant Criminal, in a letter to Robert Walpole now a prisoner in the Tower* (1712).

225 P. 200. *H.M.C., R.* 8 (*Marlborough Papers*), p. 16, July 6, 1702, Anne's grant of 2½ per cent. ; p. 41, May 1 and Nov. 16, 1702, further agreements on the subject ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1049–1059, 1076–1088 ; see also *Add. MSS.* 9113, ff. 137–138.

226 P. 201. *H.M.C., R.* 8 (*Marlborough Papers*), p. 16.

227 P. 201. *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, ff. 20, 25–26, 28.

228 P. 201. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 175–184, 682–683 ; *Journal to Stella*, Oct. 29, 1711.

229 P. 202. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 244, 258 ; *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 243–249, 292–301 ; *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 156, 163–164 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, ff. 22–23, 26, 78.

230 P. 203. *Journal to Stella*, Jan. 6, 1712 ; *Spectator*, No. 269, Jan. 8, 1712.

231 P. 203. *Spectator*, No. 335, Mar. 25, 1712 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, p. 113 ; *Journal to Stella*, Mar. 8–9, 1712 ; *Ashton*, Chap. XXXVII.

232 P. 203. *Add. MSS.* 35359, f. 12.

233 P. 205. Fox Bourne, *English Newspapers* (1887), I, pp. 80–84 ; *Stats. of Realm* (ed. 1822), IX, pp. 616–617 (10 Anne, c. 18, secs. cv, cxiii).

234 P. 205. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 13, 1711, Oct. 28, 1712 ; *Public Spirit of the Whigs* (*Swift, Prose Works* (ed. Temple Scott), V, p. 353) ; Campbell's *Lives of Chancellors* (Macclesfield), IV, p. 515.

235 P. 205. Coxe's *Walpole*, I, pp. 42–43.

236 P. 207. Coxe's *Walpole*, I, p. 42.

237 P. 208. *Burnet*, VI, pp. 133–134, and Dartmouth's note ; Churchill's *Marlborough*, I, p. 499.

238 P. 208. *Add. MSS.* 28055, f. 440, printed in App. B, p. 330. For pamphlets against Marlborough in 1712, see (e.g.) *The perquisite monger* ; *No Queen, no General* ; *Oliver's Pocket Looking-glass* ; *Burnet*, VI, p. 95 [593] ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1137 ; *Aff. étr. Ang.* 248, f. 1, letter of Jan. 1713 about cutting off Marlborough's head.

239 P. 208. *Coxe*, Chap. CIX (III, pp. 531–532, ed. 1819) ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, ff. 400, 406, 423 ; Mrs. Campbell's *Duchess of Marlborough*, pp. 227–229 ; *Letters of Duchess of Marlborough* (Murray, 1875), pp. 26, 64 ; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 135–137 and notes ; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 477–478.

For Marlborough's correspondence with Berwick, 1713–14, see *H.M.C. Stuart Papers* (1902), pp. lx, 278–279, 286, 307–308.

CHAPTER XIII

240 P. 211. *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 642–643.

241 P. 211. *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 327.

242 P. 214. It is strange that Torcy (II, p. 297) says that Bolingbroke also offered Naples to Philip. He did not, as is shown by *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 284 and *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 669–670.

243 P. 215. *Torcy*, II, pp. 286–305 ; *Legrelle*, IV, pp. 662–677 ; *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 204–205, 221–230, 235–237, 244–255, 275–293, 314–317.

244 P. 217. *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 274, 320–321 ; *Memoirs of the Life of Ormonde* (London, 1738), pp. 134–140.

245 P. 217. *Parl. Hist.*, VII, p. 175.

246 P. 217. Lord Hardwicke (*Burnet*, VI, p. 119 note) writes that Bolingbroke 'used to say,' in after years, that Oxford proposed the Restraining Orders to the Council. But he never said so in writing, and all the evidence is against it.

247 P. 217. *Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht*, p. 130.

248 P. 218. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 238, f. 73 (see p. 230 above, App. to Chap. XIII).

249 P. 218. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 240, f. 79, Gaultier to Torcy, Oct. 29, 1712 (see p. 231 above, App. to Chap. XIII).

250 P. 218. *Bol. Letters*, II, pp. 403–404.

251 P. 218. *Torcy*, II, pp. 347–348.

252 P. 219. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1138.

253 P. 220. *Bol. Letters*, II, p. 422.

254 P. 220. *Parker*, p. 175 ; *Millner*, p. 356.

255 P. 220. *Millner*, p. 358 ; Ormonde, *Memoirs* (1738), pp. 173–176 ; *H.M.C. Eliot-Hodgkin* (1897), pp. 204–205 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, IX, p. 332.

256 P. 221. D'Urfey's *Pills to purge Melancholy*, VI, p. 347.

257 P. 222. *Aff. étr. Ang., passim* for 1713, *e.g.* 247, ff. 42–43 and 156, Gaultier to Torcy, Dec. 19, 1713 ; *Leake*, II, pp. 374–392, for the story of the occupation ; Steele's *Importance of Dunkirk considered*, 1713.

258 P. 222. *Legrelle*, IV, p. 680.

259 P. 223. *Bol. Letters*, III, pp. 57–58, 82 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 234–235, 467 ; Macknight's *Bolingbroke*, p. 308 ; Sichel's *Bolingbroke* (1901), pp. 404–409.

260 P. 223. *Bolingbroke's Defence of Utrecht*, p. 123.

261 P. 224. *Matthew Prior*, pp. 180, 202–203.

262 P. 225. *H.M.C. Portland*, IX, p. 375.

263 P. 225. *Torcy*, II, pp. 336, 340, 344 ; *National Policy and Naval Strength*, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, pp. 20–21.

264 P. 226. *Bol. Letters*, III, pp. 417–439.

265 P. 226. *Aff. étr. Ang.* 248, ff. 268–275 ; *Lamberty*, VIII, p. 51.

266 P. 227. For the orders given to the fleet and Admiral Wishart's own action, see *Parl. Hist.*, VII, App., pp. lxxix–lxxxiv (or *Tindal*, IV, pp. 381–384). Capt. Camocke, R.N., wrote that 'at the request of the King of Spain the said Camocke ordered men-of-war to cruise off Barcelona and prevented any supplies to enter that port,' *Byng Papers*, III, pp. 55, 63. Whether he was acting under orders from Admiral Sir James Wishart is not clear.

267 P. 228. *Berwick*, II, pp. 110–125 ; *Mahon*, Chap. IX ; *Parl. Hist.*, VII, App., pp. lxxi–lxxxiv ; Macknight's *Bolingbroke*, pp. 348–353 ; *Matthew Prior*, pp. 205–206 ; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 347–348, 380–384 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 365–366 ; Steele's *Crisis* (1714), p. 32 ; De Foe's *White Staff*, pp. 15–16, and Swift's *Public Spirit of the Whigs* for contemporary defence of the Ministers.

268 P. 228. *H.M.C. Bagot, R.* 10 (1885), Pt. 4, pp. 342–343 ; *H.M.C. Corporation of Chester, R.* 8, p. 395 (Ap. 4, '1712' should be 1713) ; *Aff. étr. Ang.* 248, f. 373.

CHAPTER XIV

269 P. 233. *De Foe*, II, pp. 701, 710, 781–782 ; *New Mills Cloth Factory* (Sc. Hist. Soc. 1905), pp. lxxxii–lxxxiii.

270 P. 233. *Calamy*, II, p. 210 ; *De Foe*, II, 725–726, 745–749 ; *Macky, Scotland*, pp. 294–295 ; *Glasgow, its Origin, Growth and Development*, John Gunn

editor (1921), pp. 40, 63 ; *Economic Evolution of Scotland*, Henry Hamilton (Hist. Asso. Leaflet No. 91), p. 4.

271 P. 234. See *Ramillies and the Union*, p. 335 ; *Somers MSS.*, letter of Mr. J. Jekyll to Somers 1709 ; *Cal. Treas. Papers 1708–1714* (1879), pp. xviii–xix, 71, 77.

272 P. 234. *Wodrow Corr.*, I, p. 41.

273 P. 235. *Burnet*, VI, pp. 80–84, Dartmouth's and Onslow's notes ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 340–344 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1045–1049, 1066 ; *H.L.J.*, Dec. 20, 1711, and June 6, 1782 ; *Hume Brown, Scotland*, III, pp. 148–149 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 458–459 ; *Add. MSS.* 17677 *FFF*, ff. 10–12.

274 P. 236. *Wodrow Corr.*, I, p. 30 ; *Somerville, Q. Anne*, pp. 467–468 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 195, 211 ; *Wake MSS., Arch. W. Epist.* 5, letter to Wake of Jan. 14, 1710 ; *H.M.C., R.* 1 (1870), p. 118.

275 P. 236. *Mathieson*, pp. 195–196 ; *Wake MSS.* in Christ Church, *Arch. W. Epist.* 5, letter to Wake from Edinburgh, Jan. 14, 1710.

276 P. 236. R. H. Story's *Carstares*, p. 321.

277 P. 237. *Wake MSS., Arch. W. Epist.* 5, letter to Wake of Jan. 14, 1710 ; *Chambers*, III, pp. 366–367.

278 P. 238. *H. of L. MSS. 1708–1710*, pp. 356–359 ; *H.L.J.*, XIX, p. 240.

279 P. 239. *Mathieson*, pp. 200–204 ; *Hume Brown, Scotland*, III, pp. 147–148 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 379–385 ; *The Scottish Toleration argued* (anon., but actually by Carstares), 1712 ; R. H. Story's *Carstares*, pp. 325–334, 349 ; *Stats. of Realm*, IX, pp. 557–559.

280 P. 240. *R. H. Story's Carstares*, pp. 335–343 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 204–212, 237–241 ; *Stats. of Realm*, IX, pp. 680–681 ; *Edgar*, II, pp. 366–369 ; *Wodrow Corr.*, I, pp. 15–16, 275–277, 307 note, 404 ; *Right of Church members to chuse their own overseers*, by Rev. James Hog, 1717.

281 P. 240. *Wodrow Anal.*, II, p. 133.

282 P. 240. Defoe's letters to Oxford about Scotland will be found in *H.M.C. Portland*, IV and V, *passim* ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 346–347, 378 ; R. H. Story's *Carstares*, p. 335 ; *Carstares' Letters*, pp. 774–776, a very curious letter ; *Mathieson*, p. 210.

283 P. 241. *Lockhart*, I, pp. 414–417 ; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 148–149 [621] ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1214–1220 ; *Mathieson*, pp. 291–292 ; *Hume Brown*, III, pp. 149–151. The full text of Article 14 of the Union Treaty will be found in Defoe's *History of the Union*, p. 533, and elsewhere.

284 P. 242. See Halifax to Oxford of May 27, 1713, *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 292.

285 P. 242. *Swift's Works* (1814) (ed. Sir W. Scott), XVI, p. 71 ; *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 41.

286 P. 243. *Portland*, V, pp. 498–499 ; *White Staff* (De Foe), 1714, Pt. 2, pp. 15–22 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 476–483.

287 P. 243. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1336, 1339–1340 ; *White Staff* (De Foe), 1714, pp. 17–18 ; *Lockhart*, I, p. 377.

288 P. 243. Mark Thomson, *The Secretaries of State 1681–1782* (Oxford, 1932), p. 33 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 467–468.

CHAPTER XV

289 P. 245. *Lansdowne MSS.* (*B.M.*) 1236, ff. 261–262 ; *H.C.M. Bath*, I, pp. xi, 217.

290 P. 246. See *A Noble Rake, the Life of Charles, Fourth Lord Mohun*, R. S. Forsythe (Harvard, 1928), pp. 201–210.

291 P. 246. *H.M.C. Portland*, IV, p. 266, Major Cranstoun's letter of Oct. 1705 ; see also *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 85–86.

292 P. 247. *Journal to Stella*, Dec. 26, 1712. The conversation between the Duke and Maccartney, which Col. Hamilton swore took place before the duel began, seems to me highly tendentious and improbable, and helps to throw doubt on the value of the rest of his evidence. That evidence and the testimonials of the other onlookers, as given to the Privy Council, will be found in *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, pp. 312–314 ; see also *Defence of Mr. MacCartney*, by A Friend (1712), pp. 16–22. The case is discussed very fully in R. S. Forsythe's Life of Mohun (*A Noble Rake*, Harvard Press, 1928). Readers will remember that what Col. Esmond says is not evidence. For Chesterfield's evidence as to the second trial see Temple Scott's *Swift's Prose Works* (1925), X, pp. xxii–xxiii.

293 P. 248. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 505, 507.

294 P. 248. Gaultier to Torcy, Oct. 12, 1712. 'M. de Bolingbroke pour commencer tout de bon a travailler aux affaires de Montgoulin [James] veut absolument scavoir qui sont ceux d'entre les Whiggs qui lui offraisent il y a dix huit mois ou environ de lui rendre service. Il ne faut pas, s'il vous plait, que Mons. Prior sache rien de tout ceci,' *Aff. étr. Ang.* 240, f. 82 ; *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 502 ; *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, p. 248.

295 P. 248. See D'Aumont's letter, App. E, p. 337 above, on the change of French policy as a result of the Peace to more active espousal of the Jacobite cause (Apr. 18, 1713).

296 P. 249. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 504.

297 P. 249. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 503.

298 P. 250. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1232–1235.

299 P. 250. *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, p. 259.

300 P. 253. *H.M.C. Egmont R.* 7, I, pp. 238–239, 246. See also *Guardian* for May 19, 1713 ; *Nichols' Literary Anecdotes*, VI, p. 84, Gay's letter ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 330 ; Miss Aikin's *Addison*, II, pp. 76–96 ; Aitken's *Steele*, I, pp. 371–373. A curious reason why *Cato* ran no longer than twenty nights is given in *H.M.C. Egmont, R.* 7, I, p. 239, May 7, 1713.

301 P. 253. *Journal to Stella*, Apr. 13–18, 1713.

302 P. 254. *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 24, 40, 45 and note ; *Journal to Stella*, June 6, 1713.

303 P. 255. 'The Lords have made a representation to the Queen in which they desire her to surmount the insurmountable difficulties the Spanish trade lies under by the last Treaty. . . . The clamour of the merchants, Whig and Tory, has been too great to have passed a vote in vindication of it as it stands ratified' (Ford to Swift, July 6, 1714, *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 171). See also *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 272, Lexington's own doubts at Madrid, and *ditto*, p. 337 ; *British Merchant* (ed. 1721), III, pp. 93–326, for text of the Treaties and Whig comment. Miss McLachlan of Girton, who is working on the subject, has kindly given me information. In June 1714 a merchant writes from Cadiz : 'We are in a worse condition than in the reign of King Charles II and not half so favoured in duties as the French nation' (*British Merchant*, III, p. 224). For the Parliamentary Debates see *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury* (1898), pp. 213–216.

304 P. 257. *Cunningham*, pp. 414–415. For the way the Scottish Members voted on the Commercial Treaty see the lists on pp. 33 and 42, *Letter from a Member of the H. of C. to his Friend in the Country relating to the Bill of Commerce*, 1713.

305 P. 257. *Hanmer*, pp. 24–29, and App. E, pp. 336–337 above.

306 P. 258. *H.C.J.*, May 14 and June 18, 1713 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1210–1213, 1220–1223 ; *Burnet*, VI, pp. 146–147, 150–151 [620, 622] ; *Hanmer*, pp. 31–33 ; *Leadam*, p. 207 ; *Macpherson*, II, p. 420 ; *R.H.S.* (*England and Portugal*), 1907, pp. 170–172 ; *Mercator* ; *British Merchant* ; *Trade with France, Italy, Spain and Portugal considered*, 1713 (sometimes wrongly attributed to Defoe) ;

Letter to a West Country Clothier, 1713 ; Epistle from *Heinsius to Walpole*, 1713 (Tory squib to deflect feeling on the controversy against the Dutch) ; *Letter from a Member of the H. of C. to his Friend in the Country relating to the Bill of Commerce*, 1713, defence of the Treaty, with a useful division list, showing which of the Opposition were Whigs and which 'Whimsical' Tories ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 351–353. For the riot of the London silk-workers see L'Hermitage, *Add. MSS.* 17677 *GGG*, f. 190.

307 P. 259. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 300.

308 P. 259. *H.M.C. Verney*, *R.* 7, p. 508, Mar. 24, 1713.

309 P. 259. *Swift*, *Letters*, II, p. 15, Mar. 28, 1713.

310 P. 259. Halifax to Oxford, Mar. 8, 1713 : 'I cannot but think it would be to your Lordship's interest more than any man's else to establish the Queen in peace and quiet, and put the nation in peace and security for ever. Upon this footing I beg to enter into whatever measures you please to prescribe. Allow me to wait upon you to adjust anything you judge proper for that purpose, and I dare say Lord Somers will be ready to attend you, though what passed between us shall be a secret till you command me to speak of it.' May 26 : 'I am very desirous to lay hold of all occasions to take measures with your Lordship for the good of my country and the security of the Protestant Succession.' May 27 : 'I have made further progress in that matter and you may be sure of being effectually supported in the maintaining of the Protestant Succession and the Union,' *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 270–271, 292. See also pp. 108, 115, 120, 125, 131, 133, 134, 251, 254, 268, 275, 451 for other such letters of Halifax to Oxford, running from Nov. 1711 to May 1714.

311 P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 466, 468, 660.

312 P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 326, 661.

313 P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 466–468, 661 ; *Swift*, *Letters*, II, p. 198.

314 P. 260. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 311, his letter of July 27, 1713.

315 P. 261. *Dartmouth MSS.* at Patshull for Oxford's letter of Nov. 25 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 661 ; *H.M.C. Dartmouth*, p. 319.

316 P. 261. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 322.

317 P. 262. *Granville*, pp. 127–130 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 279, 329–331 ; *H.M.C. Cowper*, III (1889), *Coke MSS.*, p. 107.

318 P. 262. *Dartmouth MSS.* at Patshull, letter of Sir Christopher Musgrave to Dartmouth, undated.

319 P. 263. *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury* (1898), pp. xii, 206, 210–213.

320 P. 264. *H.M.C. Somerset-Ailesbury*, pp. 206–216.

321 P. 264. *Granville*, p. 130.

CHAPTER XVI

322 P. 266. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, 374–376 ; Swift, *Enquiry into Behaviour of the Queen's Last Ministry*.

323 P. 267. *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 247, f. 135 (printed in *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 506) ; *Kemble*, p. 513.

324 P. 267. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 506 ; *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, pp. 264, 291, 294 ; *Salomon*, p. 336.

325 P. 268. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 507–518 (well selected from *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.*, where I have verified the correspondence). *Salomon*, pp. 335–345 ; *Add. MSS.* 31255, f. 8, James to Cardinal Gualterio, Apr. 23, 1714. Ilberville took the same line as Gaultier as to the fatal consequences of James refusing to dissimulate his religion, see *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 508, and App. E, pp. 339–340 above.

326 P. 268. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, pp. 512, 513 ; *Salomon*, pp. 334–345.

327 P. 269. *E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 517.

328 P. 270. *Shakerley MSS.*, letter of Peter to George Shakerley, Feb. 20, 1707.

329 P. 271. *Wilkins' Political Ballads* (1860), II, p. 114 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 361.

330 P. 271. *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 247, ff. 80, 159, App. E, p. 337 above ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 364.

331 P. 272. *H.M.C. Stuart Papers*, pp. lix–lx, 278–279, 286, 307–308.

332 P. 272. *E.g.* Bothmar to Robethon, *Macpherson*, II, pp. 636–637.

333 P. 273. *Macpherson*, II, pp. 472–473, 477–478 ; *Salomon*, pp. 306–307 notes.

334 P. 273. *Letters of Duchess of Marlborough from MSS. at Madresfield Court* (Murray, 1875), pp. 69–70.

335 P. 274. See the three pamphlets named in the text ; also Chadwick's *Life of Defoe*, Chap. IX ; John Forster, *De Foe* (ed. 1860), pp. 139–140 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 266–267, 274–284, 392–395.

336 P. 275. Aitken's *Steele*, II, pp. 14–23 ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1266–1329 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 360–361.

337 P. 276. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1346–1347 ; *Hanmer*, pp. 35–47.

338 P. 276. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1335–1343 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 366.

339 P. 277. *Macpherson*, II, pp. 223, 589 ; *Salomon*, pp. 334, 337–338.

340 P. 279. For the whole affair of the writ see *Michael*, pp. 327–329 ; *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 543, 559–562 ; *Ward's Sophia*, pp. 412–438 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 416–419, 662 ; *Macpherson*, II, pp. 472, 589–592, 603–605 ; *Kemble*, pp. 512–521.

341 P. 280. *State Trials*, XV, pp. 83, 368 ; *Life of John Sharp* (1825), I, pp. 358–359 ; Calamy's *Baxter's Life and Times* (ed. 1713), I, pp. 665, 684 ; Samuel Wesley, *Reply to Mr. Palmer's Vindication of the Dissenters* (1707), pp. 24–25.

342 P. 280. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1350 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 389 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *GGG*, ff. 197–198, for a discussion on the question of disenfranchisement of Quakers and other Dissenters in 1713.

343 P. 281. See *McLachlan*, *passim*.

344 P. 281. *De Foe*, I, p. 267 ; *McLachlan*, pp. 70–72.

345 P. 282. *Statutes of Realm*, IX, pp. 915–917 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *HHH*, ff. 255–256, 262.

346 P. 283. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1349–1358 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 385–389 ; *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *HHH*, f. 238, for Ed. Harley's vote ; *Mr. Steele's Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning the Bill to Prevent the Growth of Schism*, 1714 ; *Life of Dr. Radcliffe* (1715), pp. 84–85.

347 P. 283. *White Staff* (De Foe, 1714), p. 33 ; *Leadam*, p. 218 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 383.

348 P. 283. *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 389, 395 ; *Swift*, *Prose Works*, V, pp. 430–431, *Queen's Last Ministry*.

349 P. 284. *Calamy*, II, p. 293 note.

350 P. 284. *McLachlan*, pp. 7, 9, 15, 85 ; Beeching's *Atterbury*, p. 217 ; C. J. Abbey, *The English Church 1700–1800*, I, p. 208.

351 P. 285. *Swift*, *Prose Works*, V, pp. 431, 452–455, *Queen's Last Ministry* ; *Swift*, *Letters*, II, pp. 174, 223.

352 P. 285. *Swift*, *Prose Works*, V, pp. 406–407, *Some free thoughts upon the present state of affairs*.

353 P. 287. *Parl. Hist.*, VI, p. 1358 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 384, 391–393 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 467–473 ; *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 699–700 ; *Aff. étr. Ang. MSS.* 257, f. 122 ; *Macpherson*, II, p. 631 ; *White Staff* (De Foe, 1714), pp. 34–35 ; Charles

Lesley's *Letter to a Member of Parliament in London*, dated *Bar le Duc*, April 23, 1714 ; *Kemble*, pp. 515–517.

354 P. 288. *Add. MSS.* (*L'H.*) 17677 *HHH*, ff. 268–270, 282, 288–289, 293–295. 301–302 ; *Swift, Prose Works*, V, p. 405 (*Free thoughts upon the present state of affairs*) ; *Parl. Hist.*, VI, pp. 1361–1363 ; *Wentworth Papers*, pp. 393–405 ; *Leadam*, pp. 218–219 ; Boyer's *Queen Anne* (1735), p. 666 ; *Tindal*, IV, pp. 365–366 ; *Add. MSS.* 25495, *South Sea Co.'s Court of Directors' Minutes*, ff. 166–170, 175–183, 185 ; Boyer's *Pol. State of Great Britain*, VIII, pp. 12–13.

355 P. 290. *Diplomatic Instructions*, France, II (ed. Wickham Legg), pp. 34–35, 70–75, 81, 105–108 ; Basil Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 189–190, 211–229 ; on the claims of Savoy to the throne of Britain still in consideration, see *Kemble*, p. 513 and *Aff. étr. Ang.* 247, f. 135 (*E.H.R.*, July 1915, p. 506).

CHAPTER XVII

356 P. 292. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, pp. 405, 407 ; *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 199, 202, 223.

357 P. 292. *Arbuthnot*, pp. 64, 68.

358 P. 292. For the growth of the irreconcilable split in the Tory Party, see *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, pp. 188–197 and *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 228.

359 P. 293. *H.M.C. Stuart*, pp. 323, 325 ; *Berwick*, II, pp. 132–133.

360 P. 294. *H.M.C. Bath*, I (1904), pp. 246–247 ; *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 168, 185 ; *Salomon*, p. 313, note 3.

361 P. 295. *Michael*, p. 360 ; *H.M.C. Portland*, VII, p. 198. Even before the fall of Oxford L'Hermitage had reported that Atterbury was to be Privy Seal.

362 P. 296. *Granville*, pp. 138, 259–260.

363 P. 296. *Klopp*, XIV, pp. 699–700; see more fully, *Add. MSS.* 9129, ff. 17–19.

364 P. 297. *H.M.C. Lonsdale*, p. 249.

365 P. 297. Macky's *Journey through England* (1732), II, pp. viii–ix.

366 P. 297. *Hardwicke Papers* (1778), II, pp. 522–525; *Verney*, I, p. 274 ; General Hamilton's *History of the First or Grenadier Guards* (1874), II, pp. 59–60.

367 P. 298. For the feeling of the army about the Tory Ministers see *An Apology to the Army, written by an Officer*, 1715.

368 P. 298. *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 190 ; Ilberville to Torcy, Aug. 7, 1714, *Aff. étr. Ang.* 257, f. 259, App. E, p. 339 above.

369 P. 299. *Salomon*, pp. 312–314; *Michael*, pp. 358–359 ; *Swift, Letters*, II, p. 202 ; Basil Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 145–146.

370 P. 299. Appendix E, p. 339 above, and *Macpherson*, II, pp. 636–637.

371 P. 300. *English Advice to the Freeholders of England* (1714), p. 4 (written by Atterbury just after the accession of King George).

372 P. 301. Chesterfield, *Miscellaneous Works* (ed. 1777), pp. 15–17 ; the details cannot be considered certain on such late and second-hand evidence, but Stanhope's leadership and the general intention are beyond doubt. *Salomon*, p. 231 ; Mahon, *Hist. of England*, 1836, I, p. 133 ; Basil Williams' *Stanhope*, pp. 142–145, 464–465 ; *Lockhart*, I, pp. 462–463.

373 P. 301. App. E, p. 340 above, Ilberville, Aug. 11, 1714 (N.S.).

374 P. 302. *Michael*, p. 363.

375 P. 303. *P.R.O., Privy Council Register* 2, 84, f. 371 and f. 385.

376 P. 304. *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 207, 215 and note 3 ; *Michael*, p. 364.

377 P. 305. *P.R.O., P.C.* 2, 84, ff. 371–385.

378 P. 306. For the proceedings of July 31 see *P.R.O., P.C.* 2, 84, ff. 385–389. For Bothmar's letter to his master about Craggs see *B.M. Stowe MSS.* 227, f. 252.

379 P. 306. *P.R.O., P.C.* 2, 84, ff. 389–390 ; 2, 85, f. 1.

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380 P. 313. *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 214, 224, letters of Aug. 3 and 7, 1714.

381 P. 314. *H.M.C. Portland*, V, p. 491.

382 P. 314. See Sarah's letter of July 29, 1714 (O.S.), from Antwerp, in *Kemble*, pp. 516–517.

383 P. 315. *Coxe*, Chaps. CXIII, CXVII ; *Macpherson*, II, p. 640 ; *Wentworth Papers*, p. 410 ; *Swift, Letters*, II, pp. 216–217 ; *Klopp*, XIV, p. 654.

384 P. 315. *Salomon*, pp. 316–319.

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

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